A lesson learned is only an observation until a behaviour has been changed.

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2 A lesson learned is only an observation until a behaviour has been changed. ARMY LESSONS LEARNED CENTRE PO BOX STN FORCES, KINGSTON, ON K7K 7B4 LE CENTRE DES LEÇONS RETENUES DE L ARMÉE CP SUCC FORCES, KINGSTON, ON K7K 7B4 (613) / CSN(RCCC) LCol DM Chupick Director / Directeur (Ext/Poste 4814) /Courriel: Chupick.DM@forces.gc.ca Maj CR Voss Deputy Director / Directeur adjoint (Ext/Poste 4909) /Courriel: Voss.CR@forces.gc.ca Maj CJ Young SO Operations / OEM Opérations (Ext/Poste 4816) /Courriel: Young.CJ@forces.gc.ca Maj RL Kennedy SO Training / OEM Entraînment (Ext/Poste 5117) /Courriel: Kennedy.RL@forces.gc.ca Capt RP Paquin SO Support / OEM Soutien (Ext/Poste 4813) /Courriel: Paquin.RP@forces.gc.ca Capt PJ McComb AAR Project 2IC / Adjoint, Projèt d Analyse après action (Ext/Poste 5440) /Courriel: McComb.PJ@forces.gc.ca Previous editions of Dispatches and The Bulletin are available on both: DIN: Internet: Providing the right information, to the right people, at the right time!

3 THE LAV III AND LEOPARD C2 MAIS TRIAL Leading Us into the Army s Future The fielding of the LAV III and Leopard C2 by the Canadian Army is having a revolutionary affect on Canadian combined arms tactics. Accordingly, the various elements of the LAV III s command and control, tactical employment, and maintenance have been considered and refined through the combat development process. These efforts will contribute to improving the Army s war-fighting capability and will put the best tools to effectively fight the respective combat systems in the hands of soldiers and their leaders. While it is understood that combat development is a continual process, it was considered necessary to scientifically measure and demonstrate to the field force the increase in combat effectiveness as the vehicles fielding neared completion. To accomplish this, arrangements were made for an international trial with the US Army, taking full advantage of one of their Mobile Automated Instrumentation Suite (MAIS) of equipment. The weapons effects simulation (WES) used during the field trial was provided by Operational Test Command (OTC) in accordance with a project arrangement (PA) and the Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program (CANUSTEP). MAIS proved to be an extremely capable, soldier-friendly system that provided an excellent WES platform. More importantly it provided the necessary data to contribute scientific and analytical validity to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) development process. The LAV III Leopard C2 MAIS Field Trial demonstrated to the Army that the TTPs that have been prepared for the LAV III company and the LAV III Leopard C2 combat team are effective, substantial, and validated guidance for the field force. The trial formally concluded on 16 November The aim of the LAV III Leopard C2 MAIS Field Trial was to provide the Army with a comprehensive history of the field trial and associated LAV III Leopard C2 tactical and doctrinal development. This issue of Dispatches is designed to assist with dissemination of the MAIS trial results and to inform the Canadian Army of the way ahead. You are encouraged to seek out and view: Fight to Win, LAV, Leopard and Tactics An Army sponsored, 45-minute video highlighting lessons learned from the MAIS trial. This video will be distributed across the Land Force in the near future. Major C.R. Voss Acting Director Army Lessons Learned Centre February 2003 DISPATCHES 1

4 THE LAV III AND LEOPARD C2 MAIS TRIAL Leading Us into the Army s Future TABLE OF CONTENTS PART 1 BACKGROUND 3 PART 2 LESSONS LEARNED 4 PART 3 MAIS PLAN OF TESTS 7 MAJOR QUESTIONS AND SCENARIOS PART 4 METHODOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 13 OF PLAN OF TESTS PART 5 LESSONS AND OBSERVATIONS 16 PART 6 CONCLUSION 19 DISPATCHES 2

5 PART 1 BACKGROUND Armies now have a bewildering array of mechanized vehicles for use by the infantry M113s, FV 432s, Marders, Bradleys and BMPs among others. The Canadian Army pioneered the innovation of infantry on tracks and Lt Gen G.G. Simonds, commanding 2 CDN Corps in Normandy deserves much of the credit. The idea had been around for many years, but it was Simonds who brought the concept to practical use A RCEME Workshop received the task on August 3, 1944 to plate up 76 US Army self-propelled guns, nicknamed Priests, in four days. Code-named Kangaroos, they were ready on time, a credit to RCEME ingenuity The RHLI were constituted as an all-arms battle group for Operation TOTALIZE [Caen to Falaise] The value the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry attached to the Kangaroos is implicit rather than explicit Phrases like the column was met by small arms fire which caused no damage or casualties state their case. B-GL /FT-001 Past Serving the Future (Final Draft) Originally envisioned as an infantry only field trial, the concept for a combined arms infantry-armour trial emerged in the fall of At that time, the intent was to conduct the MAIS Field Trial in the fall of After preliminary discussion with the US Army s Operational Test Command (OTC), it was determined that a 2000 trial would not be possible as a Bradley trial in Fort Hood was scheduled for the same period. A three-phased trial approach was developed entailing a trial on the Modular Semi-Automated Forces (ModSAF) constructive simulation system, an un-instrumented field trial, and an instrumented field trial. Commander Land Forces Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) directed a single trial in three phases : Phase 1 Constructive Trial. Conducted by the Army Experimentation Centre (now the Army Simulation Centre (ASC)) in July 2000, this phase utilized the ModSAF constructive simulation system to obtain verifiable data through the use of simulation in order to support previous work that was based solely on professional judgment. Phase 2 Uninstrumented Field Trial. Conducted by the Infantry School and 2 RCR in September 2000, this phase examined those elements of LAV III company tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that could be easily validated in the field without recourse to a weapons effects simulation (WES) system or could not be simulated at the Army Experimentation Centre (AEC). Phase 3 Instrumented Field Trial. This phase utilized MAIS to provide instrumented and analyzed data to validate the draft TTPs. DISPATCHES 3

6 Concurrent with the conduct of Phases 1 and 2, the Army conducted a number of related trials on the capabilities of the LAV III. The field force was also learning from realistic training conducted with both the LAV III and Leopard C2 on Exercise VALID RAM with 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and the Combat Team Commander Course (CTCC) serials and by taking advantage of lessons learned while on operations in Eritrea and experience gained during the Canadian-American (CANAM) competition. The CTC Janus Simulation Centre was tasked to conduct the plan of tests to facilitate a simulation systems comparison. The Army used Janus for both experimentation during Exercise IRON RENAISSANCE (Evaluation of the LAV III Combat Team in Conventional War Operations) and Exercise IRON XINETE (Battlefield Mobility) AIM The aim of this issue of Dispatches is to highlight and disseminate the LAV III Leopard C2 MAIS trial results and to inform the Canadian Army of the way ahead. The LAV APC represents a leap from the 1960 s era M113 and Grizzly APCs to a twenty-first century design and complexity. We cannot treat it casually, and we had better not wish the dilemma away to a zulu harbour. While the dismounted infantry company will always remain the infantry s core fighting unit, it must now embrace the fact that the LAV APC will constitute a significant component of its firepower and tactical capability. Captain M.M. O Leary, The RCR The Twenty-First Century Infantry Company The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol 2 No 1 (Feb 99) PART 2 LESSONS LEARNED While the organization (Nov 02) and conduct of the MAIS Trial are discussed in detail below, it is beneficial to start by highlighting the key MAIS Trial Lessons Learned presented in the video Fight to Win, which will be distributed to the Army in Dec 02. More detailed presentation of lessons learned are shown in the video and in the Lessons/Observations section of this Dispatches. Lessons learned were derived from MAIS data collected from the following five actions conducted within a common battle group scenario: Unsuccessful block. Successful block. Meeting engagement. Unsuccessful advance. Successful advance. DISPATCHES 4

7 UNSUCCESSFUL BLOCK Key lessons learned were: Thermal Imagery is Best. Sensors on the Leopard C2 and LAV III are very effective at finding the enemy. In most cases, the side that detects the enemy first wins. Although Leopard and LAV can detect enemy as far as four kilometres away, usual detection range is m. Vulnerability While Detecting the Enemy. In the observation role, the LAV was extremely vulnerable to enemy tanks. LAVs can be used in the detection role but should be protected with long-range anti-armour support. SUCCESSFUL BLOCK While the unsuccessful block provided lessons learned about sensors and survival, the successful block clearly reinforced existing doctrine and tactics concerning firepower, while illustrating new tactics that can be employed in the Leopard C2 LAV III team: Artillery, Tank and LAV Firepower. Firepower wins battles, but only if used in the right way. The LAV is the best killer of enemy BMPs and can work effectively with Leopards against enemy mechanized units. The effective use of artillery against long-range massed targets, while it contributed to the destruction of the enemy, also improved the survival of the LAV by engaging the enemy outside the LAV s engagement zone (LAVs could easily kill enemy BMPs). LAV Engagement Zone. The LAV should engage enemy targets between 800 and 1200 metres. That is the range at which LAV firepower, sensors, and armour outperform the BMP. Inside 800 metres, the LAV is susceptible to BMP 30 mm cannon fire; the BMP AT5 missile is easier to evade at longer ranges (outside 1200 metres). Coordination of Fire. Coordinated, massed fire was most effective. Proper preparation before battle will ensure effective, coordinated massed fire. Tanks kill tanks; LAVs kill BMPs. MEETING ENGAGEMENT The meeting engagement highlighted the benefits of effective situational awareness. Situational Awareness. The mobility and speed of the LAV is important, but not as important as knowing the ground and enemy around you. Effective use of the LAV TACNAV system allowed crew commanders to concentrate on moving tactically and detecting enemy. Lead with Smaller Elements. When the enemy is not completely defined, use caution and lead with the smallest element possible. Mutual support, dispersion, and the use of dismounted reconnaissance were reinforced. DISPATCHES 5

8 UNSUCCESSFUL ADVANCE The LAV proved to be an effective hunter with or without Leopards; this hunting effectiveness was enhanced through accurate and timely communications. Reporting Contacts. Enemy contacts must be reported ASAP, as it is vital information to everyone on the battlefield. If one LAV becomes a casualty with this information, others may meet the same fate attempting to locate the enemy again. Succession of Command. Proven SOPs must be in place to ensure quick succession of command on the battlefield. Often, when commanders became casualties, the success of the entire operation was jeopardized. Threats Change During Day and Night. Due to the very good sensors on the LAV and Leopard, threats often change between day and night. Commanders must be prepared to take appropriate risks to take advantage of their sensors. Threats by Day T72, Artillery, BMP, Handheld Anti-armour weapons, AT-5. Threats by Night T72 and Artillery. Roads, Crests, and Destroyed Friendly Vehicles. Roads are almost always covered by direct and indirect fire. While a road gives the LAV more mobility, it is also the first place that the enemy will set up a kill zone to cover an avenue of approach. Crests force you to silhouette your vehicle therefore should be crossed using established drills and appropriate security. Use extreme caution when approaching areas where friendly vehicles have been recently destroyed. Once the enemy has destroyed one vehicle, they will focus their attention looking for other victims. This is particularly important at night when the flames from a burning vehicle illuminate the surrounding area. Location of Commanders While Defining the Enemy. In the offence, most casualties occur when defining the enemy. Commanders should avoid moving too far forward until lead friendly elements have successfully defined the enemy. Early loss of commanders often risked the success of the entire mission. Illumination. Use of illumination often gave away friendly intentions and narrowed the delta between LAV and BMP night fighting capabilities, providing advantage to the enemy. Also, command movement was often noticed early. These risks must be carefully considered before using illumination. SUCCESSFUL ADVANCE The successful advance clearly showed the benefit of bringing all of the advantages of the LAV III Leopard C2 team together. Firebase. Use a large firebase, possibly including Leopards and LAVs, to win the firefight. While the ERYX was an effective weapon, it was not well suited for a LAV assault. Constructive Trial (Phase 1) To ensure that appropriate and relevant tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) were developed and validated, a combination of constructive and live simulation trials were conducted. Known as Army Experiment 5 (AE 5), this virtual experiment validated the draft TTPs and assisted in developing them further. AE 5 employed constructive simulation and Modular Semi-Automated Forces (ModSAF) to evaluate, both quantitatively (through loss-exchange ratios, ammunition expenditure, etc.) and DISPATCHES 6

9 qualitatively (through judgments and insights of participants) the effectiveness of TTPs used in the conduct of war fighting operations by organizations equipped with LAV III and Leopard C2. Results of the experiment provided the following observations: LAV III significantly enhanced offensive and defensive operations. When well-sited in defence, 25 mm gun provided a significant impact. During countermoves, LAV III deployed with Leopard C2 provided greater killing potential and reduced vulnerability of Leopard C2. LAV III cannot engage heavy armour, but was effective against BMP 2. When one LAV III platoon was removed, the company group suffered higher percentage of vehicle losses and double the infantry losses. During a company offence with two LAV III platoons in the firebase and one assaulting, loss exchange ratio (LER) was substantially more favourable. During combat team offensive operations, LAV III platoon reduced Leopard C2 in firebase vulnerability to BMP 2 fire but not to T72 fire. Dug-in T72s were very difficult to destroy. Could not determine optimum location for LAV III vehicle on dismount. Ahead, behind or inline no statistical difference arose between average number of casualties. Spacing between dismounted troops was a significant factor in casualties. AE 5 concluded that ModSAF is not amenable for conducting vehicle positioning analysis. PART 3 MAIS PLAN OF TESTS, MAJOR QUESTIONS, AND SCENARIOS In order to provide focus and a realistic and practicable framework within which to conduct this field trial and establish the daily plan of tests, it was necessary to develop and harmonize a set of master questions. The production of the original Infantry Company LAV III TTPs had focused on development, as opposed to validation, and this was reflected in the original master questions. The master questions were used to provide the foundation for the development of a plan of tests. The LAV III Un-instrumented Field Trial (MAIS Phase 2) examined LAV III tactics from individual vehicles up to company level and provided the following observations based upon the professional opinion of the participants and data collection team. Location of the Commanders in the LAV III. Who occupies the crew commander position in the section vehicles? The section commander who will dismount or a permanent vehicle commander? Must be in best location to influence the battle. In turret when moving. May handover turret to 2IC to lead dismounted element. Change Between Mounted and Dismounted Commanders. If it is determined that there will be a change between the dismounted element DISPATCHES 7

10 commander and the Zulu vehicle commander in the turret, when should that occur in relation to the dismount point? Should be completed out of contact. Division of Leadership Positions Within the Section. How does the section fill three leadership positions section commander, 2IC, and crew commander when it is only established for two leadership-trained positions? Location of the Platoon Commander During the Final Approach to the Objective. If it is accepted that the platoon commander will dismount with his platoon, is he an exception to the likely TTP that dismounting commanders will have moved to the rear of the vehicle before the dismount area (or assault position)? Can the platoon commander maintain adequate situational awareness during the final approach using the Crew Situational Awareness Monitor (CSAM)? In back of LAV III as platoon commander expected to dismount with platoon. LAV Sgt to command platoon during approach to objective. Not possible to command effectively from back of LAV III. Provision of Intimate Support to Attacking Infantry. How do the LAV IIIs best provide direct fire support to dismounted infantry during the assault? What is the best command relationship? What are the best formations? Provision of Support to Dug-in Defending Infantry. What is the most effective command relationship for the provision of support to dug-in infantry? Resources for the Construction of LAV III Positions. What is the requirement in terms of plan and time to construct LAV III positions if natural ones do not exist? Tactical Mobility. What is the tactical mobility of the LAV III compared to other vehicles it must operate with? What things affect the mobility, both adversely (load, terrain, etc.) and positively (Central Tire Inflation System (CTIS), tire chains, etc.)? During blackout drive with driver s viewing aid, speeds of 16/10 km/hr on tracks/cross-country respectively are possible. Electronic viewing aids impose significant eye strain. Breaks of 20 minutes per hour recommended. No longer than two hours without a break. LAV III can move at high speeds that would prevent gunner from tracking targets. Commander must decide which is more important: speed or effective fire? LAV III Movement at the Platoon and Lower Levels. How should the LAV IIIs be organized within the platoon to provide the maximum observation, firepower, and protection when moving tactically? Is it necessary DISPATCHES 8

11 to have LAV IIIs broken down into pairs that can support each other s movement? Who commands each pair? Despite better sensors, the naked eye is still the most important tool to maintain situational awareness. When operating heads down, movement rates and spacing needed to be reduced. Ability to Navigate and Conduct All-Weather Operations. How much will the combination of a TACNAV system and thermal imaging and image intensification improve our ability to navigate and conduct all weather operations? Laser Threat Warning Receiver. What drills should be employed if the LAV III is lased? Should these drills differ if it is a range finding laser versus a target designator? Tasking of Zulu Vehicles. What will be the normal method of controlling the Zulu vehicles on behalf of the platoon or company? Will this be done through the LAV sergeant or will Zulu vehicles be tasked directly and independently by the dismounted element? Location of Commanders Within the Platoon. Where should the platoon commander, 2IC and LAV sergeant be in the platoon s vehicles? Platoon 2IC best able to perform duties while riding in platoon HQ LAV this arrangement imposes a risk on chain of command during operations. Calls for Indirect Fire. Will the addition of the far target indicator increase the number of calls for indirect fire to the forward observation officer (FOO) or fire controller (FC) to the point where new procedures will have to be put in place? Noise Signature of the LAV III. How close must an enemy get before they will hear the noise signature of a LAV III or group of LAV IIIs? Default Location of the LAV IIIs On the Battle Position or in the Hide. Where should the default location of the LAV IIIs be: on the position or in the hide? Can the LAV IIIs remain on the battle position without compromising it? Most LAV III vehicles should be in hide until required to fight or move troops. When sited outside hide, camouflage and concealment are critical. Establishment and Operation of an OP. In addition to noise signature questions, what additional skills will be required for the rifle section so that the turret crew can be augmented to operate 24/7 for an extended period of time? A section task with turret manned by two personnel one gunner/crew commander qualified and another, familiarization training qualified. Shifts not to exceed two hours with external sentries deployed. Must be re-examined as personnel very familiar with training area and not with precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR). With the issue of the Interim LAV III Tactics Manual in January 2001, the development phase had effectively transitioned into a validation phase. Hence, it became necessary to rationalize the process in order to gain the most from the MAIS trial. An examination of the LAV III was necessary. The following thought process evolved: DISPATCHES 9

12 The fundamental question that arises in the discussion of the LAV III within the context of the company, company group, and combat team is how will we fight it? During the consideration of this question, the focus rapidly shifts to what do we do now? Does the LAV III give the commanders any capability that would radically alter the current TTPs? Will we fight differently with the LAV III than we would with the M113? Although initially one would think so, considering the LAV III improved firepower and surveillance and target acquisition (STA) capabilities, a closer examination suggested that the following factors be examined: With no LAV III medium or long-range anti-armour weapon capability, there has been no change from the M113. Therefore, in a LAV III versus tank engagement, the LAV III loses. Doctrinally, what is the role of the mechanized infantry company? Is the LAV III simply a section vehicle or a platoon/company/combat team asset? If it is one of the latter, losses of the LAV III will affect/limit the mobility of dismounted infantry. What increased firepower does the LAV III provide? If increased firepower results in employment of the LAV III beyond the section, there are consequences. The LAV III can be employed without the dismounted infantry with an acceptance of risk due to mobility loss, or the infantry can remain mounted with an acceptance of risk to the mounted infantry. Our doctrine gives us the tactical employment options for the M113 on the position, to the rear of the position, on a flank, or in a hide. Has this changed with the LAV III? Capabilities have improved but not principles of employment. The LAV III is NOT an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in the classic sense, as the infantry dismounts to fight. What increased STA capability does the LAV III provide? If the intent is to use the LAV III in a screen/guard role, the same risk parameters apply. LAV III capabilities appear to be superior to the M113 while conducting reduced visibility operations. Have these improvements, in concert with the improvements to the Leopard C2, changed the current TTPs? Do we now have a force multiplier that did not previously exist with the M113? Which current drills require change based on the addition of the LAV III? As a consequence of this thought process, three main evaluation criteria were established: Flexibility of employment. Destructive capability of the LAV III. Operations in limited visibility. Further analysis determined that the area with the least amount of scientific or analytical data available and, therefore, the greatest gain potential during the trial was the consideration of the conduct of operations in reduced visibility conditions. DISPATCHES 10

13 MASTER TRIAL QUESTIONS Namely Does the LAV III augment the capability of the company, company group or combat team to conduct combat operations? Does the LAV III provide for a wider application of the vehicle to the TTPs? Can the LAV III now conduct flank security, countermoves, secure the line of departure (LD), or pursuit operations alone or with tanks? If you assume that the M113 could, but only at great risk, is there less risk if the LAV III is used? Does the LAV III augment the ability of the company, company group, and combat team to destroy the enemy? Does the LAV III augment the ability of the company, company group or combat team to conduct operations in reduced visibility conditions? This is the MOST IMPORTANT aspect of the combat team trial and to date was untested. It was determined that, using MAIS, this trial would demonstrate this aspect categorically. With the arrival of the LAV, our mechanized infantry will benefit from a vehicle which purportedly offers mobility close to if not equal to the tank over most terrain, and excellent firepower in the form of a stabilized 25 mm cannon with a thermal sight This is a leap of two full generations As a stand alone vehicle, we now have a platform which, during offensive operations, can work in direct cooperation with the leading armour, add their weight of fire to the fight on the objective and participate in cut-off and exploitation operations supporting an attack. Defensively, the LAVs employment as a fighting entity forward, on the flanks and within battle positions are now all viable options. Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) D.W. Thompson, The RCR "Some Thoughts on the LAV", The Infantry Journal, Vol 32 SCENARIOS The trial team developed five scenarios to serve as a framework for the collection of data for subsequent detailed analysis. The main variables within the trial plan of tests were operations during daytime, night-time, and night-time with illumination. The only dismounted activities permitted in all of the scenarios were Eryx/RPG teams and dismounted reconnaissance. Scenario One LAV III Company Advance to Contact. Scenario Two LAV III Company Meeting Engagement. DISPATCHES 11

14 Scenario Three LAV III Company Advance to Contact and Assault. Scenario Four Mixed LAV III Leopard C2 Force in a Blocking Position. Scenario Five Mixed LAV III Leopard C2 Force in a Meeting Engagement. SCOPE MAIS provided real time casualty assessment (RTCA) by means of immediate player attrition and survivability information without exposure to live fire. MAIS is not the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES), and can best be illustrated through the following figures: Live simulation utilizing MAIS was used to collect raw data. Data was collected utilizing the full breadth of available resources: Video. Questionnaires. Focus groups. Data collectors. After Action Reviews. Trial was conducted on mixed terrain during daylight, night and night with illumination under typical New Brunswick fall atmospheric conditions. An opposing force (OPFOR) was deployed using enemy doctrine and tactics. Trial focused on the LAV III and Leopard C2 in mounted operations. Trial investigated both LAV III-only operations and mixed LAV III Leopard C2 operations. Smoke was not used as it would have interfered with the MAIS laser. Close air support, electronic warfare, logistics and local BG support (less artillery) were not employed as they would not have contributed directly to the measurement of the capabilities of the LAV III Leopard C2. Artillery was utilized during the LAV III-only trial portions. DISPATCHES 12

15 PART 4 METHODOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN OF TESTS The plan of tests was the fundamental cornerstone of the MAIS trial. Deeply embedded in the Master Events List, it was the focal point for all aspects of the trial conduct. Given the transition from the development of TTPs to their validation and the evolution of the master questions, it was important to develop a plan of tests that would address the three master questions. Since the consideration of operations in reduced visibility conditions was the point of main effort, it was essential that the plan of tests reflect that. Given the parameters of the trial (selected OPFOR capabilities, terrain, chosen scenarios, and other relevant factors), the trial results could be hypothesized. However, it was necessary to provide instrumented and analyzed data so that findings would not be subjective in nature. Accordingly, the plan of tests was developed to provide evidence of the three categories previously mentioned flexibility of employment, the enhanced destructive capability of the LAV III, and the ability to conduct operations in reduced visibility conditions. It was determined that it would be easiest to do this in the following order: Operations in Reduced Visibility Conditions. A plan of tests was developed that compared selected operations during day and night. The impact of illumination was a vital element to this process. The plan of tests would incorporate these three variables: operations during day, night, and night with illumination. The aim was to demonstrate with a sufficient degree of analyzed data that we must take advantage of reduced visibility conditions to maximize the excellent STA capabilities of both the LAV III and the Leopard. Enhanced Destructive Capability. Adding the LAV III to the order of battle would provide an increased capability to destroy the enemy. It seems self-evident that the destructive capability of the LAV III s stabilized 25 mm cannon and a turret-mounted 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun would be superior to the pintlemounted.50 calibre of the M113, but it was considered necessary to develop a plan of tests that would provide analyzed data to demonstrate this during day and night. Flexibility of Employment. Of the three master questions, this one was the hardest to address with empirical data. By addressing the first two issues, the trial should be able to demonstrate that the LAV III and Leopard C2 bring greater flexibility to all levels of command. DISPATCHES 13

16 A plan of tests was developed. The process was an evolutionary one encompassing many months of effort. The need to conduct the trial utilizing scenarios that were both achievable and measurable dominated the process. An initial plan of tests encompassing some ten scenarios and 21 serials of testing was reduced to five scenarios and five serials. An additional objective of the trial was that the data collected would provide lessons beyond the immediate realm of the three master questions. The field trial had re-focused from developing TTPs to the point of validating them. Consequently, the plan of tests evolved to a more global view of the battlefield and the employment and deployment of LAV III and Leopard C2 on it. The scenarios developed to facilitate this view became wider to reflect those increased capabilities believed to be relevant to the tactical forum, vice the internal procedures and actions of the respective crews. In doing so, it was necessary to maintain trial fidelity to ensure that the three master questions were answered without having to sift through all the factors that could determine an outcome. All components of the combined arms team have a contribution to make, and in order to isolate the contributions of LAV III and Leopard C2, it was necessary to take the three broader scenarios and isolate the key elements for observation. TERRAIN MANAGEMENT The first step was to obtain an area that would allow adequate movement and manoeuvre by a LAV III company. It was generally accepted that the area bounded by the Hibernia Road in the NORTH, the Murray/Hampstead Road in the SOUTH, Area 20 in the WEST, and the general boundary formed by the wood lines on the EAST of Areas 21, 26 and 27 formed the natural template. The second step in the process was to ensure that MAIS coverage could be achieved throughout these areas. In June 2001, the final allocation of MAIS relay towers, to provide trial coverage, was tested and confirmed. Six relays provided total coverage of the test area and feedback to the Command, Control and Communications (C3) centre. DATA COLLECTION PROCESS The first priority of the trial was to capture and collect all data. Once collected, it was important to provide information on the context or circumstances of the testing. The final priority was to ensure that all relevant information was analyzed, quantified and stored in a timely manner for subsequent translation into specific findings and/or recommendations. The data collection organization consisted of: Chief Data Collector. Data Collector Second in Command. Individual Data Collectors. Librarian. Clerks. Imagery Technicians. DISPATCHES 14

17 CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (COE) BOARD The Army had not conducted a trial of this magnitude and scope in the past. Originally, in the development of the trial structure, it was envisioned that a COE Board would have a large responsibility in the daily conduct of the trial. Specifically, they would convene on a daily basis to evaluate and determine what subsequent plan of tests or iterations should be conducted, repeated or ignored. Since that original view, significant changes occurred in the plan of tests, focus, and methodology of the trial. These changes arose from a number of factors: safety, availability of resources, issue of draft TTPs by both the Infantry School (LAV III Company Tactics Interim) and Tactics School (Draft Two Combat Team TTPs). As such, the role of the COE Board assumed less managerial importance. However, it maintained a very important role in trial optics and credibility. This was an Army trial and, as such, the Army had a responsibility to ensure that the trial was conducted in an efficient manner to capture relevant lessons and to ensure they were implemented as lessons learned across the Army. The board accomplished this by providing an independent overview of the trial. OPFOR DIRECTION AND CONDUCT The OPFOR was modeled on a BMP 2 platoon of a motor rifle battalion. In the latter stages of the trial, a BMP company was employed with various sized T72 forces to attack the mixed Leopard C2 LAV III force. The only additional support provided to the platoon was an OPFOR forward observation vehicle with officer (FOO). The FOO was employed in the first three weeks of the trial during the LAV III only stages. As part of initial work-up training, the company providing the OPFOR (HOTEL Company 2 RCR) conducted OPFOR tactical training in accordance with the generic enemy doctrine. The OPFOR platoon commander was provided the location of all platoon defensive positions and indicated his parameters for deployment. OPFOR platoon forward/reverse slope and ambush positions were chosen to reflect a variety of concepts. This was done specifically to provide comparison for detection, target identification, and destruction ranges. Results were realistic in nature based upon the circumstances of each iteration. When the BLUE FORCE was caught by the OPFOR in a reverse slope position at ranges of less than 800 m the results favoured the OPFOR. When the BLUE FORCE detected the OPFOR outside 30 mm cannon range, the scales tended to favour BLUE FORCE. The OPFOR was an aggressive and realistic force throughout. Despite having inferior technology in their BMP 2, particularly during reduced visibility conditions, they still managed to inflict substantial damage if the BLUE FORCE neglected common tactical principles or made errors in deployment or manoeuvre. The OPFOR was more scripted during the latter stages of the trial in order to ensure that the trial conditions were met. DISPATCHES 15

18 FIREPOWER PART 5 LESSONS AND OBSERVATIONS LAV IIIs were the most frequent killers of BMPs during company and combat team level testing. LAV III 25 mm armour-piercing, fin stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition killed most BMPs. 95% of BMPs killed were stationary. 70% of BMPs killed were turret-only hits. Average successful engagement range of BMPs by LAV IIIs 1,476 m. Company level testing, overall exchange ratio of LAV IIIs destroyed versus BMP was 1:37 in favour of the LAV III. Combat team level testing, overall exchange ratio of LAV IIIs destroyed versus BMP was 7:4 in favour of the LAV III. Leopard C2 decisive tank killer (due to the construction of the scenarios and the limited involvement of Eryx). Leopard C2 105 mm APFSDS ammunition killed the most T72s and BMPs. Average successful engagement range against T72 by Leopard C2: 1,412 m during daylight. 1,318 m during night testing without illumination. 1,381 m during night testing with illumination. Overall exchange ratio Leopard C2 versus T72 was 1:23 in favour of the Leopard C2. Combat team testing included BLUE both assuming a blocking position and conducting a meeting engagement en route to a blocking position. One Leopard C2 killed by a BMP (AT 5). 26 of 130 BMPs killed DISPATCHES 16

19 were killed by Leopard C2s. T72s killed 18 of the 23 LAV IIIs killed during combat team testing. Light conditions affected the relative outcomes of the battles: During company level testing, LAV III performance was very similar during daylight and night with illumination. Overall, LAV III performed best during nighttime testing without effective illumination and least well at night-time with effective illumination. Leopard C2 results were generally consistent regardless of the light condition, although Leopard C2s performed marginally better during daylight and least well during night without illumination. Effectiveness of friendly artillery and devastating effect of enemy artillery were reinforced, thereby confirming the combined arms team and the need to be cognizant of the artillery threat. BATTLESPACE Insights were provided on ranges, frontages, formations, types of movement, sources of casualties, results as light condition changed, and the most effective manner of fighting. Average frontages used for all operations were 1,781 m for company and 563 m for platoon. General pattern was that, as testing progressed, platoons and companies extended their frontage as long as light conditions were constant. When night testing without illumination commenced, spacing contracted initially and then eventually expanding back to a company frontage of 2000 m, and the same pattern was noted when the night testing with illumination began. Clear that the battle space occupied by a LAV III company has significantly expanded from that previously occupied by a M113 company. DISPATCHES 17

20 SENSORS Company Level Thermal imagers (TI) were the most effective overall sight for detection during company level testing (LAV III only) and were used to detect the enemy 55% of time. Longest recorded range at which enemy detected 4,350 m. Average range, by iteration, to detect the enemy: 1,692 m during day. 1,483 m during night with no illumination. 1,966 m during night with illumination. During daylight most detections were made using binoculars (44%), naked eye (22%), and both TI and turret optical sight 11%. During night testing TI performed better than image intensifier (II) even with illumination provided. TI was most effective system for detection of enemy given that two thirds of trial conducted at night. All results are comparable to those achieved during LAV III Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) User Trial. Combat Team Level Sensor results for Leopard C2 and LAV III during combat team level testing were similar to those demonstrated by LAV III during company level testing. During combat team level testing at night, TI was most effective overall for detecting the enemy, providing 90% of enemy detections. Daylight testing results divided between binoculars, naked eye, and optical sights (all providing more than 27% of detections), with TI being used less. Longest recorded range at which enemy detected during combat team level testing 4,650 m. Average ranges, by iteration, to detect enemy: 2,474 m during day. 2,150 m during night with no illumination. DISPATCHES 18

21 2,272 m during night with effective illumination During combat team testing LAV III detected and engaged enemy first only 17% of time, while Leopard C2 engaged first 83% of time. This is reflective of the fact that enemy tended to lead with their T72s and that often, the LAV IIIs were held back pending appearance of BMPs. Field trial demonstrated that LAV III capable of conducting night and reduced visibility condition operations over wider frontages than have traditionally been employed by the infantry company. Trial demonstrated that effective use of LAV III s firepower provides us with an ability to destroy an enemy at increased ranges with a greater degree of force protection offered by increased standoff ranges. Trial results offer commanders at various levels of command greater flexibility in deployment and tactical application of LAV III structured forces. Before field trial, daylight plan of tests was also conducted on ModSAF by the Army Simulation Centre and Janus by the CTC Janus Simulation Centre. These tests were completed to provide further analytical tools. THE WAY AHEAD PART 6 CONCLUSION The completion of the field trial has not provided the Army with all the answers. Given limitations to the trial, further study is needed to expand our base of knowledge. Specifically, further research and analysis should occur on the following: Command and Control. The impact of the introduction of situational awareness systems (SAS) and the digitization of the field force must be analyzed. Radio traffic volume has increased substantially due to greater dispersion and the more aggressive application of the LAV III as a firing platform. The issue of command and control between mounted and dismounted elements of the combat team could not be studied due to trial limitations. Actions on the Objective. Given limitations imposed on the trial, the assault was not studied. With the establishment of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre and WES, experimentation should be conducted to provide data on the dismounted assault. While the field trial demonstrated that enemy vehicles on the objective could effectively be destroyed or neutralized by direct fire, there was no ability to determine the impact of a dug-in enemy on the assaulting force. Without this information, it cannot be assumed that the enemy can be destroyed purely by fire. Sustainment. Further study is necessary to evaluate the sustainment capability of the LAV III company. Although the doctrinally based Operation CYCLOPS echelon is available as a model, it remains that current LAV III company echelons have developed in an ad hoc fashion as a result of not having the specialized vehicles to fulfill their respective roles. Ammunition DISPATCHES 19

22 consumption will be a major factor in LAV III sustainment. Further analysis through the use of ModSAF and continued refinement and assessment of the MAIS data may provide a clearer picture. CONCLUDING REMARKS The LAV III Leopard C2 MAIS Field Trial has demonstrated the utility and strength of the combat development process by embracing the complete range of constructive and live simulation systems available to the Army. Great strides have been taken in formalizing the experimental and analytical nature of doctrine development with a view to providing validated TTPs for the field force. All of this has been realistically tempered by the human factor, as demonstrated during the MAIS Field Trial. Soldiers and commanders have accepted and met the challenges provided by the use of a real-time casualty assessment tool. A key element to the successful fielding of the LAV III and Leopard C2 is the development of validated and relevant company group and combat team TTPs. On 16 November 2001, the LAV III Leopard C2 MAIS Field Trial concluded, the culminating point of approximately four years of staff effort, testing, simulation and analysis. In addition to confirming the current TTPs, the field trial clearly demonstrated the improved capabilities of the LAV III and the Leopard C2 against a limited, yet determined enemy. The major comparison tools used in determining these improved capabilities were in the fields of firepower, battle space, and sensors. While observations were made in a number of other fields, it was within these three fields that the clearest analytical evidence was provided to answer the three master questions. The use of a graduated, instrumented trial for the development of TTPs is new for the Canadian Army. As such, it must be emphasized that the use of DISPATCHES 20

23 instrumentation and the field trial itself was designed to support, not replace, the professional knowledge and judgment of the field force commanders by providing detailed data to support decisions incorporated within the TTPs. It must also be understood that evaluation and analysis will be an ongoing process requiring structured experimental evaluation through detailed coordination and the supporting efforts of many of the Land Staff Directorates and the field force. This field trial was the first of its kind conducted in Canada, and many lessons learned in the development and conduct of the trial may have future application (these lessons have also been captured in the Trial Report). The Trial Report has expanded beyond what was originally envisioned to include a database of LAV III and Leopard C2 information. Significant portions of this information can be used directly to produce training and instructional aids. The integration of the LAV III and Leopard C2 into the Army s tactical inventory has evolved in a timely, progressive, and efficient manner. Concurrently, the various elements of their command and control, tactical application, and maintenance have been refined through the combat development process in order to improve the Army s war-fighting capability. The end-state of these initiatives has always been to put in the hands of soldiers and their leaders the best tools to effectively fight with the respective vehicles. While combat development is a continual process of study, experimentation, evaluation, and re-evaluation, the importance of providing concrete and visible evidence of LAV III Leopard C2 capabilities to the field force is critical. The LAV III Leopard C2 MAIS Field Trial has demonstrated to the Army that both the LAV III company group and combat TTPs are effective and validated guidance for the field force. Remember to seek out and view: Fight to Win, LAV, Leopard and Tactics An Army-sponsored, 45-minute video highlighting lessons learned from the MAIS trial. This video will be distributed across the Land Force in the near future. MAIS Trial Report The complete MAIS Trial Report is available on the LFDTS Intranet ALLC Acknowledgements Thanks go to the Tactics School Chief Instructor, Major Roger Cotton, who compiled this Dispatches from the MAIS Trial Report written by Major Bill Beaudoin. The Fight to Win video was produced by Captain Brent Kerr and Major Pat Bailey. DISPATCHES 21