President Roosevelt Knew Japan Would Attack Pearl Harbor and Did Not Notify American Military Commanders in the Pacific

Transcription

1 President Roosevelt Knew Japan Would Attack Pearl Harbor and Did Not Notify American Military Commanders in the Pacific Rachel Taylor Ron Paul Curriculum American History April 5, 2017

2 Page 1 Everyone knows the contemporary history of World War II, but few know who really started the largest war in the world. A majority of the U.S. population and even that of the world have been lied to for decades. Does anyone want the truth to come out? Who likes being lied to? It is always important to understand history. Without a true comprehension of historical events, it is impossible to do what few have ever done: learn from their mistakes. So, what is the lie that has been told to and swallowed by most of the populace? A healthy diet of truth can help fix the problem of illusion, and therefore, U.S. citizens should know that President Roosevelt knew in late November 1941 that the Japanese Navy would attack American forces in early December, but he failed to warn American military commanders in the Pacific. FDR was not surprised. 1 FDR wanted a war with Japan as a legitimate way to get involved in a war against Germany. So, what were the sentiment's of the American public towards becoming involved in a war which was being waged thousands of miles away? It might seem surprising today, but most wanted to stay neutral. The emotional and physical scars of WWI were still n the minds of many Americans. They didn't want to get involved in another war of they could possibly avoid it. It was because of this public sentiment towards the war, that Roosevelt reluctantly signed the Neutrality Act of 1935 into law. This was to give the illusion that America wasn't in any way considering getting involved in a war which would have little to do with the way in which they went about their normal lives. In a Fireside Chat "On the European War" given on September 3, 1939, Roosevelt exhorted the American people that they need "not remain neutral in thought." Later, as the war across the ocean raged, this outlook was doomed to change, as all things do. The supposed neutrality other United States government was assured to be one no longer. During the course of the enforcement of the Neutrality Acts, this government was forced to 1 Perloff, James. "Pearl Harbor: Hawaii Was Surprised; FDR Was Not." The New American. N.p., 7 Dec Web. 05 Apr

3 Page 2 take more subtle measures to aid the British against the Germans. The British, under the Neutrality Act of 1939, were given arms and supplies on a "cash and carry" basis. In efforts to give even more aid to the British government, on September 2, 1940, President Roosevelt signed a Destroyers for Bases agreement. In this agreement, the United States supplied the British with more than 50 broken down, out of date battleships in exchange for the 99-year leases of territory in Newfoundland and the Caribbean, which would be used as U.S. air and naval bases. The only reasons the ships were not a gift, as British Prime Minister Churchill requested they be, was because Roosevelt knew this would not be accepted by the American public or Congress. Indeed, many Americans saw this as an unfair exchange, but there was little they could do as their country was further engulfed in the war. The neutrality cover was finally blown on December 17, 1940, with the passage of the Lend- Lease Act. The United States would provide Great Britain with the supplies it needed to fight Germany, but would not insist on being paid immediately. Instead, the United States would lend the supplies to the British, deferring payment. Lend-Lease was designed to serve America s interest in defeating Nazi Germany without entering the war until the American military and public was prepared to fight. To really get into a war with Germany, FDR used Japan as a way to get into the war in Europe. The reason an attack a on Japan would bring such a wanted result was because Japan, Germany, and Italy had signed a compact which provided that each would come to the aid of the other in the event that either was attacked by the United States. What is really profound about this was that FDR approved many of Hitler's and Mussolini's policies. The reason he wanted to get into the war on the side of the British was because most of the American people favored the British cause and there was much to be gained from trade with Britain. As an added bonus, Britain was a major sea-power, who would be assisting the U.S. in "policing" the seas and other countries, especially under the guise of the "League of Nations". There was quite a bit of objection to leaving the Pacific fleet in such a vulnerable position in the

4 Page 3 Hawaiian Islands. Most of the objection came from James Richardson who, beginning in January 1940, was Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CinCUS), which was commander of both the Scouting Force (Atlantic Fleet) and Battle Force (Pacific Fleet). At the time of his appointment, Richardson was particularly suited for the post. He was one of the Navy's foremost figures. Since his earliest days, after leaving Annapolis, he had made the study of Japanese warfare his life's work. He was beyond question the Navy's outstanding authority on Pacific naval warfare and Japanese strategy. Richardson noted that:...in 1940, the policy-making branch of the Government in foreign affairs the President and the Secretary of State- thought that stationing the Fleet in Hawaii would restrain the Japanese. They did not ask their senior military advisors whether it would accomplish such an end. As we have since discovered in history, it didn't. Richardson did believe that advanced bases like Guam and Hawaii were necessary but that insufficient funding and efforts had been made to prepare them for use in wartime. He also believed future battles in the Pacific would involve aircraft carriers and more scouting forces would be needed to locate them. Richardson recognized how vulnerable the Fleet was in such an exposed and remote position, a logistical nightmare only made worse by the slim resources, and lack of preparation and organization. Richardson argued such a forward defense was not practical or useful, despite Japan's attack on China and whatever promises had been made to Britain to come to their aid if attacked. According to journalist John T. Flynn, the Fleet had little in the way of housing, materials, or defensive mechanisms at Pearl Harbor. Richardson wanted to return to the West Coast, prepare the Fleet, and then perhaps return to Pearl Harbor. "It was Richardson's belief and indeed generally supported by the Navy that the Fleet should never be berthed inside Pearl Harbor where it would be a mark for an attack. This was

5 Page 4 particularly true in such troubled times when the airways of the East were hot with rumors of approaching conflict. What is more, Richardson held the belief that Pearl Harbor was the logical first point of attack for the Japanese High Command, wedded as it was to the theory of undeclared and surprise warfare. For ten years the U.S. Navy held "attacks" on the Army defenses at Pearl Harbor, and were always successful. Defending the base was rather hopeless, in his mind. Richardson made two trips to Washington to meet with Roosevelt to discuss the issue. He followed this up with an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Harold R. Stark, pointing out that it was Richardson's firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan: I believe my official letter of October 22, 1940, in regard to the dismal state of the Navy's War Plans, was probably one factor which made Stark accept with equanimity the President's urge to have me relieved. After his early October visit to Roosevelt, on October 26, 1940, a White House leak to the Washington-based Kiplinger Newsletter predicted Richardson would be removed as Fleet commander. Most believed he might be promoted upwards to replace Harold Stark as CNO. But instead he would be "fired." On 1 February 1941, General Order 143 reorganized the United States Fleet. In its place, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Fleet were re-established, each under its own commander in chief. On 1 February 1941 Richardson was replaced by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel as the new Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPac) and as CinCUS in case the two ocean fleets merged. Admiral Ernest J. King became Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CinCLant)

6 Page 5 on the same day and later CinCUS in Dec 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor." Upon his relief by President Roosevelt, "Richardson reverted to his permanent rank of rear admiral and served as a member of the Navy General Board, and in the office of the Secretary of the Navy until his retirement on October 1, 1942." The attack on Pearl Harbor was an action brought through U.S. provocation towards Japan. A very important question to ask is whether or not Pearl Harbor was a purely unprovoked attack on the US's part. Did the U.S. take any action that would have led Japan to believe that they had no alternative but to attack the U.S.? The best evidence which supports the thesis that there was provocation from the U.S. towards Japan are the eight actions that were advocated by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, who believed that war with Japan was inevitable and should be provoked at a time that best suited US interest. In his October 1940 memorandum, McCollum presented eight actions that he predicted would lead to a Japanese attack on the United States: 1. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly in Singapore. 2. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies [now Indonesia]. 3. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government in Chiang Kai-shek. 4. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore. 5. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient. 6. Keepnthe main strength of the US fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. 7. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.

7 Page 6 8. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire. 2 FDR did see these actions, and took steps to begin their implementation. Some the steps had already begun to be implemented, as is the case with Lend-Lease Act. The others soon followed. Finally, desperate for resources and to delay the US's ability to engage in the war, Japan made plans to attack the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Why would the Japanese want to go to war with U.S.? Strategically, it makes no sense. The obvious size variations in the countries, the availability of resources, and even just the shear distance between the countries should make it clear that Japan really had nothing to gain from getting the U.S involved in a war against the Axis powers. The strategic danger to the United States was from Germany, not Japan. In his eight-action memorandum, McCollum cited these six military factors in promoting his proposals: 1. All of continental Europe was under the military control of the German-Italy Axis. 2. Only the British Empire actively opposed the growing world dominance of the Axis powers. 3. Axis propaganda successfully promoted American indifference to the European war. 4. United States security in the Western Hemisphere was threatened by the Axis fomenting revolution in Central and South American countries. 5. Upon the defeat of England, the United States could expect an immediate attack from Germany. 2 Stinnett, Robert B. "FDR's Back Door to War." Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. First ed. New York: Touchstone, p.8. Print.

8 6. Warships of the Royal Navy would fall under the control of the Axis when the British were defeated. 3 Page 7 His dire predictions were undoubtedly right. The number one problem opf the United States, according to McCollum, was mobilizing the public support for a declaration of war against the Axis powers. McCollum's proposal triggered by the Tripartite Pact, is the only veritably evidence of the American policy. 4 Naval intelligence established a secret delivery system for Japanese military and diplomatic intelligence for Roosevelt in the winter of 1940 and continued to December 7, Sometimes when he had a hot item McCollum delivered the report to FDR; otherwise the President's naval aide made the delivery. This twenty-two month monitoring program allowed the American government to anticipate and then study Japan's reactions to the provocations advocated by McCollum. FDR did not warn the correct military officials as Japanese naval forces continued to advance on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, stationed in Pearl Harbor. One of the few things that anyone knows about the Japanese intercepts and there were hundreds of them, is that American cryptographers knew how to and did solve the Japanese naval intercepts. This includes the ones which indicated that Pearl Harbor was going to be the target of the Japanese attack on the US. This information was kept in the naval archives, labeled as "top secret". The reason given for the information's not being released to the public was that it was a matter of "national security". One thing that has never been considered by anyone was that Japan had actually broken US diplomatic codes, just the US had broken Japanese diplomatic codes. However, in 2001, Toshihiro Minohara discovered documents that proved Japan had indeed solved 3 Stinnett, Robert B. "FDR's Back Door to War." Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. First ed. New York: Touchstone, p.13. Print 4 Stinnett, Robert B. "FDR's Back Door to War." Day of Deceit, p. 14. Print.

9 Page 8 these codes. It was long believed the developing country of Japan, with it's fierce navy and army rivalry, hadn't been up to measure when it came to code-breaking, particularly the documents of the Americans. The Japanese archives reveal that Tokyo knew what was going on in Washington in the weeks before Dec. 7, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, killing more than 2,000 people. The U.S., alarmed by the march of Japan's Imperial Army through Asia, had imposed an oil embargo on the nation and told it to get out of China, among other things. Togo had sent a conciliatory rebuttal, known as the "Five Points Plan," offering some concessions and seeking to continue discussions. It is worth mentioning that FDR himself was much concerned over Japan's march through China, as his family had made their money by dealing with the Chinese. Japan knew from the decoded cables that the U.S. had been seriously considering some of the compromises. But on Nov. 26, 1941, the Americans stunned Japan with a hard-line edict essentially ordering Tokyo's troops to get out of China and Indochina or face the consequences. In fact, the edict was set forth for the exact purpose of pushing Japan into war. 5 This apparently convinced even Togo that the U.S. had decided on war. Many historians have speculated that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was looking for an excuse to get into the war in Europe; they posit that he knew Japan would attack but thought the target might be American forces in the Philippines or instead perhaps Malaya, then a British colony, which would prompt the U.S. to come to the aid of its ally. 6 If this was really FDR's view, why was the Pacific Fleet placed in the vulnerable position which it held in Hawaii at Pearl Harbor? Surely, with all the breaks in Japans military codes, it would have been quite easy to determine whether or not there were any spies operating in the area around Pearl Harbor. How did the Japanese even get enough information to have even a vague idea, much less a well worked out strategy, in order to make the attack on Pearl Harbor? How did they know where the ships 5 Times Staff Writer, Valerie Reitman. "Japan Broke U.S. Code Before Pearl Harbor, Researcher Finds." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 07 Dec Web. 04 Apr Valerie Reitman. "Japan Broke U.S. Code Before Pearl Harbor, Researcher Finds." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 07 Dec Web. 04 Apr

10 Page 9 were anchored and where the bases were located? The answer should be simple: they had spies. It's the most feared and often used word in the whole telling of wars, espionage, and sabotage. It makes the best story, but what if that story is based on a complete untruth? The truth is, the US navy did know of spies operating in the area around Pearl Harbor. The chief Japanese spy assigned in Hawaii was Tadashi Morimura, who was scheduled to assume the post of chancellor in the Japanese Consulate. Morimura's posted immediately aroused suspicious within America's intelligence community, because he was young and not listed in the official Japanese Diplomatic Registry. [pg. 84.]These spies were not apprehended. Instead, they were allowed to go about their work, with only light surveillance This was to ensure that Japan would still be views as the country which committed the first overt act of war and to give the illusion that it was a complete surprise. The only people who were surprised were the public and many of the military men and civilians who would be in harms way when the attack came. The largest, most unprovable myth about the Japanese advance on Pearl Harbor is that the Japanese Navy was under and maintained a strict radio silence regime. They made numerous communications between their ships while traveling to Pearl Harbor, disclosing that it was indeed their target. Once received in the nation's capital the Japanese warship locations were delivered to President Roosevelt in the White House, according to district intelligence chief McCullough. 7 As of December 3, the number of Japanese warship broadcasts in the North Pacific was significant. On December 3, operators from Station SAIL in Seattle said that strong radio signals were originating in the North Pacific. 8 Japanese Admiral Nagumo's radio communication plan called for repeating the Tokyo broadcasts for the smaller warships within the task force. 9 December 4, 1941, was 7 For McCullough's sending the intelligence data to the White House vis a secure method, see Robert Ogg's comments p. 40, SRH 255, RG 457, MMRB, Archives II 8 Stinnett, Robert B. "The Japs Are Blasting Away On The Frequencies."Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. First ed. New York: Touchstone, p Print. 9 Stinnett, Robert B. "The Japs Are Blasting Away."Day of Deceit, p Print.

11 Page 10 a busy day for Japan's powerful radio transmitters. 10 Although the overload of broadcasts did not necessarily provide location for the warships or air units, they did indicate that her navy was gearing up for some kind of drastic operation as Homer Kisner dutifully reported in his Chronology of December 4, None of these important findings were ever delivered to Admiral Kimmel or Lieutenant General Walter Short, who Commander of the US Army's Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Oahu. Japanese navy officers involved in the Pearl Harbor attack insist that the carrier fleet of Divisions One, Two, and Five (those assigned to the Pearl Harbor attack force) were on total radio silence. To conclude, it wasn't possible for the Japanese to sneak-up on the US as they had thought. The Japanese made a fatal error in allowing communications between the smaller vessels in the task force sent to attack Pearl Harbor. They disobeyed orders and never really got reprimanded for it. To bad no one in Hawaii knew that. How could FDR be anything but the savior of America? He "saved capitalism from itself." During the entirety of both his first two campaigns, he made many promises. It does look as though he kept all of them. His popularity level was higher than any that of any other President since Abraham Lincoln. He was the first President who used radio to secure his place in the minds of most American people. He promised, in his first election, that he would bring an end to the recessions which had haunted Herbert Hoover's presidency. Franklin D. Roosevelt was in his second term as governor of New York when he was elected as the nation s 32nd president in With the country mired in the depths of the Great Depression, Roosevelt immediately acted to restore public confidence, proclaiming a bank holiday and speaking directly to the public in a series of radio broadcasts or fireside chats. His was a reassuring presence, a voice of hope, for many Americans through the trials of the Great Depression and, later, those of World War II. His ambitious slate of New Deal programs and reforms 10 Stinnett, Robert B. "The Japs Are Blasting Away." Day of Deceit, p.198. Print.

12 Page 11 redefined the role of the federal government in the lives of Americans. Now, the government would be able to lend a hand in keeping the economy on its feet as nonintervention had been shown it's incompetent to this effect. Reelected by very comfortable margins in 1936, 1940 and 1944, FDR led the United States from isolationism to victory over Nazi Germany and its allies in World War II. This is the main topic of discussion in this paper. It is indeed given to FDr's credit that all of this transpired. Still, after all of the trials of war, FDR was once again elected to a fourth term, the only president ever to do so. FDR spearheaded the successful wartime alliance between Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States and helped lay the groundwork for the post-war peace organization that would become the United Nations. That is, it was successful until the Soviet Union decided it wanted to get ahead in spreading Communism. So much for "world peace". To get back to the point concerning Roosevelt's involvement in the beginnings of World War II, as early as 1937, FDR warned the American public about the dangers posed by hard-line regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan, though he stopped short of suggesting America should abandon its isolationist policy. FDR went on a tirade in his famous "Quarantine Speech" that Japan and its policies would lead to worldwide domination and destruction and that it was the duty of American citizens to stop this intolerable policy to spread any further. After World War II broke out in Europe in September 1939, however, Roosevelt called a special session of Congress in order to revise the country s existing neutrality acts and allow Britain and France to purchase American arms on a cash-and-carry basis. Though this was something neither Britain nor France would be able to reciprocate, the American government was delighted to get a chance to assist these innocent nations in their fight against the horrible, atrocious Nazis and their allies. Germany captured France by the end of June 1940, and Roosevelt persuaded Congress to provide more support for Britain, now left to combat the Nazi menace on its own. Now, it was all the more imperative that the American citizenry stops all this foolish isolationist nonsense and do something to save all the innocent lives that were being taken by the Nazis

13 Page 12 and the other Axis powers. To make sure that he could keep a handle on things, Roosevelt decided to run for reelection again in 1940, despite the two-term tradition for presidents in place since the time of George Washington; he defeated Wendell L. Wilkie by nearly 5 million votes. As he promised, Roosevelt increased his support of Great Britain with the passage of the Len-Lease Act in March 1941 and met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August aboard a battleship anchored off Canada. In the resulting Atlantic Charter, the two leaders declared the Four Freedoms on which the post-war world should be founded: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear. This would be an added incentive to the American people to ensure that these freedoms would be enforced and not infringed upon. Now, it has finally come to the major turning point in history which determined what part Americans would continue to play in the war. On December 7, 1941, with seemingly no reason at all, the Japanese bombed the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. Under Roosevelt's leadership, the nation rebounded from the devastating surprise attack. The next day, Dec. 8, 1941, the day after the bombing, Roosevelt appeared before a joint session of Congress, which declared war on Japan. Why was the attack on Japan considered a total surprise? By December 7, 1941, U.S. officials had been anticipating hostilities with Japan, but they didn't know when or where they might occur. In November, U.S. intelligence (which had cracked Japan's diplomatic code) revealed Japan was about to break off diplomatic negotiations American officials believed this could lead to Japanese military action and warned military commanders throughout the Pacific, including Hawaii. But because Japanese military codes were still secure, they did not know where Japan might strike. Most thought Japan would seize oil-rich British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia. American forces in the Philippines could threaten such a Japanese advance, so Washington saw potential conflict there. The prospect of an assault on Hawaii, mounted across 3400 miles of ocean, seemed remote. the timing of any Japanese offensive was also unknown. American officials hopes to delay hostilities as much as

14 Page 13 possible, while continuing to build up U.S. forces in the Pacific. 11 Still, how could it have happened? Who was to blame? What could be done to guard against surprise attacks in the future? There were no easy answers, no quickly forged consensus. Under these circumstances, perhaps it was inevitable that certain critics of the President would emerge as "Pearl Harbor revisionists," who would come to be known as eager accusers of Franklin D. Roosevelt for having misled the public in regard to the coming of the war in the Pacific. It is understood by many "FDR supporters" that they seemed to determined to spread the notion that Roosevelt goaded the Japanese government into attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor, thus making it possible for him to enter the European conflict through the "back door of the Far East." This leads to an attribution of Tokyo's decision for war to the allegedly arbitrary policies sanctioned by the President, especially the freezing of Japan's assets in July 1941 and the proposal for a settlement that Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented to the Japanese government in November. It is aid that archival research does not support these contentions. Therefore, the problem in 1941 was not that Roosevelt was relentlessly pushing Japan's leaders toward the brink; the problem was that he could not find a viable way to stop them from taking the plunge of their own accord. FDR had by now learned that a policy of forbearance toward the government in Tokyo, instead of having a salutary effect, simply resulted in ever-more aggressive behavior on the part of the Imperial Japanese Army. 12 Only after this fact had been driven home with galling emphasis did the President move decisively. His executive order to freeze all Japanese assets in America was not an arbitrary action taken without provocation. It was a long-delayed response to repeated Japanese policy initiatives that threatened the national interests and security concerns of the United States as perceived and defined by 11 "Pearl Harbor: Why Was the Attack a Surprise?"Google Cultural Institute. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, n.d. Web. 05 Apr < 12 Butow, R.J. C. "How Roosevelt Attacked Japan at Pearl Harbor." National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives and Records Administration, Fall Web. 05 Apr. 2017

15 Page 14 the American government. The first president to leave the country during wartime, Roosevelt spearheaded the alliance between countries combating the Axis, meeting frequently with Churchill and seeking to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union and its leader, Joseph Stalin. Meanwhile, he spoke constantly on the radio, reporting war events and rallying the American people in support of the war effort (as he had for the New Deal). Why is World War II remembered as "The Good War"? Despite the destruction, death, and devastation, the war helped usher in a new world order, one in which Hitler's Third Reich in Europe was no more, and some of history's most heinous crimes had been exposed and resisted. In the United States, wartime mobilization pulled the American economy out of depression, employing millions. American women and blacks experienced some freedoms unattainable in pre-war society. And on the world stage, the United States earned a new, powerful and coveted role. World War II also marked the beginning of the end of world imperialism as nationalist movements began to triumph over weakened colonial empires. One by one, in the decades following the war, colonized peoples all over the world would gain their independence. In these ways, as historian Jay Winter has argued, 1945 marked the moment when the world broke from its past and moved toward a new era.1 So, there wasn't any sacrifice made and the President seems to be free of the guilt that has been placed upon him. As Americans go about everyday life, they don't often consider the consequences of actions which were made decades into the past. The key to the future is understanding the past. Today, there are many who don't really know "why" America did get involved in World War II. It really wasn't a war that had much to do with the everyday life of the average American citizen. Other than Pearl Harbor, American soil was never bombed or invaded by any enemy forces. People were lied to in 1941 by the U.S government and which has done its best to keep the illusion up and running. The fact is Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the one whom all Americans loved and trusted, let the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor all the while claiming that it was a surprise attack. He knew they were going to attack. The delivery of

16 Page 15 important messages to the correct military officials was delayed just long enough that no one knew the Japanese were coming until it was too late. President Roosevelt knew in late November 1941 that the Japanese Navy would attack American forces in early December, but he failed to warn American military commanders in the Pacific. To this day, many still feel the effects of this failure. What would the world of have been like had the proper authorities in Hawaii been alerted to the dangers of the approaching Japanese fleet? As the day goes down in history, 2, 403 Americans were killed and 1, 178 others were wounded. If important base installations such as the power station, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) had been attacked, the war would have been of a much longer duration. The goal had been to get involved in a war which killed millions of people on all sides, and all because the U.S. government just could not keep its nose out of other nation's business. Instead, they preferred to sacrifice some human lives early in the running so that they could put their important cause into action. Today, those lives could not have been lost, but for the fact that no one outside the White House really knew what the Japanese were planning. There were some military officials who did protest what was being done. These were fired, replaced, or claimed to be incompetent officers who did not do their duty. The families of these men called for the investigations of 1945, 1948, and Much of the evidence that would have made their claim legitimate never was seen in court. The many who could have witnessed in these officers defense either were not called were too old to remember all the details or had already died. Though few people will ever really know what happened in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor, the reader is now assured of some knowledge to the fact. Authors Note: For a more extensive insight into President Roosevelt's hand in preventing the proper officials at Hawaii from knowing the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, read Robert B. Stinnett's Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor, which has been cited numerous times in this essay.