Urban Search & Rescue RDD (Dirty Bomb) Exercise for Northern California State/National US&R Task Forces

Transcription

1 Urban Search & Rescue RDD (Dirty Bomb) Exercise for Northern California State/National US&R Task Forces - Integrated with Sentinel Response 18 Reort/Improvement Plan June 21, 2018, , 2015 HSGP Award Rev. April 2013 HSEEP-IP01

2 PREFACE This After-Action Report/ for the Northern California US&R RDD (Dirty Bomb) exercise ( , 2015 HSGP Award) aligns exercise objectives with preparedness doctrine to include the National Preparedness Goal and related frameworks and guidance. Exercise information required for preparedness reporting and trend analysis is included. Rev. April 2013 HSEEP-IP01

3 EXERCISE OVERVIEW Exercise Name Exercise Dates US&R RDD Exercise for Northern California state/national Urban Search & Rescue Task Forces (Integrated with Sentinel Response 18). California US&R Task Force participation funded by , 2015 HSGP Award Full-Scale Exercise events: March MAR18 2-day exercise/aar 24MAR18 Redeploy/Recover Scope Mission Area(s) Core Capabilities Objectives Threat or Hazard Sentinel Response was a full-scale exercise (FSE), planned for March 2018, 20-24th at various locations across the Northern California Region. The US&R RDD Exercise for the three Northern California state/national US&R Task Forces was integrated into Sentinel Response to exercise interoperability. For complete list of participating organizations please refer to Appendix B. Protection, Prevention, Mitigation and Response, Mass Search & Rescue Refer to Core Capabilities Refer to Objectives RDD (Dirty Bomb) Attack Resulting in Structural Collapse and Unknown Numbers of Missing and Trapped Victims Resulting from a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Following a Disastrous M 6.8 Earthquake on the Hayward Fault Rev. April 2013 HSEEP-IP01

4 Scenario The Northern California US&R RDD (Dirty Bomb) exercise, enjoined with Sentinel Response 2018, represented a catastrophic Magnitude 6.8 earthquake whose epicenter is Northern California s Hayward Fault in the Bay Area, followed by opportunistic terrorist attacks that included an RDD (Dirty Bomb) detonation in Sacramento, to which the three Northern California-based state/national Urban Search & Rescue Task Forces were deployed in support of local government first responders and with assistance California National Guard CBRNE assets and other state and federal agencies. In the scenario, The Brotherhood, a Home Grown Violent Extremist (HGVE) organization inspired by the Global Salafist movement, takes advantage of the aftermath of the earthquake disaster to further their aims and attempt to stretch emergency responders and response system to the limits by executing a series of simultaneous terrorist attacks in the Bay Area and the State s Capital City. Their plans for include detonation of a box truck-borne Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD) inside a large enclosed stadium serving as a refuge area for thousands of earthquake evacuees. The notional RDD detonation results in structural collapse and an unknown number of missing and trapped victims in a larger interior and exterior scene contaminated by radioactive materials. The three Northern California-based US&R Task Forces (California Task Force 3, Menlo Park, California Task Force 4, Oakland, and California Task Force 7, Sacramento) are deployed to the RDD (Dirty Bomb) detonation with collapse and radiation contamination and unknown number of people missing and trapped at the Arco Arena in Sacramento, where they reinforce first responders and integrate with CBRNE assets from the California National Guard to conduct extensive search and rescue operations in the simulated radioactivity-contaminated environment of a closed arena with thousands of people impacted by the truck-borne RDD detonation. Rev. April 2013 HSEEP-IP01

5 Rev. April 2013 HSEEP-IP01

6 Sponsors Governor s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) California Homeland Response Force (California Army National Guard 49th Military Police Brigade) Sacramento Incident Management Team (SACIMT) Participating Organizations The US&R RDD aspect of Sentinel Response 2018 was a joint exercise between Cal OES, the Sacramento Fire Department, other local agencies, the California National Guard, and Regional, Operational Area, and State responders. For complete list of participating organizations please refer to Appendix B. Point of Contact Cal OES Fire & Rescue: Deputy Fire Chief Larry Collins Cell Phone: larry.collins@caloes.ca.gov 49th MP Brigade California National Guard Homeland Response Force 510 Parker Rd Fairfield, CA Sentinel Response 18 Exercise Director Captain Wilson, Christopher Office: ext. 5 christopher.a.wilson1.mil@mail.mil Sentinel Response 18 Planner SSG Maynich, Anastasiya Office: ext 5 Cell Phone: Anastasiya.a.maynich.mil@mail.mil Sentinel Response 18 Planner/HRF Liaison SGT Meiorin, Flavio Office: ext 5 Cell Phone: Flavio.l.meiorin.mil@mail.mil Rev. April 2013 HSEEP-IP01

7 Cal OES Fire & Rescue and CFRTA: Assistant Fire Chief Joe Gear Cell Phone: Cal OES Exercise Section: Sandeep Singh Cell Phone: CFRTA US&R Training Coordinator: Nicole Paskey Cell Phone: California Urban Search & Rescue Task Force 3 (CA-TF3): Program Coordinator Joe Crivello, San Jose Fire Department Cell Phone: jcrivello@catf3.org Point of Contact California Urban Search & Rescue Task Force 4 (CA-TF4): Program Manager Robert Lipp, Oakland Fire Department Cell Phone: RLipp@oaklandnet.com California Urban Search & Rescue Task Force 7 (CA-TF7): Program Manager Scott Williams, Sacramento Fire Department Cell Phone: swilliams@sacfire.org Bay UASI Liaison: Philip D. White Cell Phone: Phil.white@sfgov.org Rev. April 2013 HSEEP-IP01

8 Sentinel Response-18 Full-Scale Exercise - Exercise Overview 7 Cal OES FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The purpose of the US&R RDD (Dirty Bomb) exercise at the Arco Arena (integrated with the Sentinel Response 2018 Full-Scale Exercise) was fourfold: 1. To achieve an objective established by Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. and Cal OES Director Mark Ghilarducci to test and validate the ability of California s state/national Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Task Forces to effectively conduct urban search and rescue operations in a radiation-contaminated environment in accordance with the National Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Response System Enhanced Operations In The Contaminated Environment standard operating procedures (SOP s) and other applicable operational standards, in order to assure and improve California s readiness to respond effectively and rapidly to any future attack or disaster requiring the US&R Task Forces to conduct operations in a radiation-contaminate environment. 2. To build on the experiences of the California-based US&R Task Forces in other RDD/CBRNE exercises and their experiences responding to previous terrorist attacks that resulted in major sustained Urban Search & Rescue operations (including the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the Oklahoma City bombing), as well as dozens of other national and international disasters to which California-based US&R Task Forces have been deployed since To bring local, state and federal emergency responders from throughout Northern California together to validate and test current Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD) emergency response concept of operations plans (Con Ops) while exercising the California National Guard s specialized capabilities and in this case integrating them into ongoing urban search & rescue operations in order to to assist civilian responders in a multiple disaster scenario. 4. To quantify, document, and share valuable lessons learned in the course of responding to a realistic simulation of a dirty bomb detonation resulting in structural collapse and lifethreatening radiological contamination that requires the employment of specialized techniques and equipment with the complication of compressed time-adjusted rotation of resources during sustained operations as part of the National Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Response System Enhanced Operations In The Contaminated Environment protocols and equipment. This FSE included response to reports of multiple terrorist attacks following a 6.5 earthquake on the Hayward Fault. In the scenario, the Brotherhood a fictional homegrown violent extremist group had decided to execute multiple terrorist attacks in the disaster area at time when government resources appear to be stretched to their limits responding to the effects of the earthquake catastrophe. This scenario was selected and the FSE designed to evaluate the current preparedness of emergency responders, their equipment, and their command and control capabilities to respond to both types of terrorist attack; as well as to validate the ability of California s Fire & Rescue and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Systems to deploy and coordinate

10 sufficient resources and support for these simultaneous emergencies at the same time the state is managing an earthquake catastrophe. The simulated RDD attack scenario at the Arco Arena was selected specifically as part of a plan to meet a benchmark established by Governor Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. and Cal OES Director Mark Ghilarducci to test and validate the ability of all eight of California s state/national Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Task Forces to conduct urban search and rescue operations in a radiation-contaminated environment. All three of the Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces deployed and operated at the Arco Arena. In November 2018, Cal OES plans to exercise the remaining five state/national US&R Task Forces based in Southern California in a simulated RDD (Dirty Bomb) detonation and structural collapse with radiation contamination at the Del Valle Regional Training Center (a Los Angeles County Fire Department facility that serves as a regional training site with extensive urban search & rescue training and exercise props). The nature of this two-part exercise is based on current California homeland security concerns, and current world events, in addition to the ever-present potential for an RDD detonation terrorist attack, or (worse) a suitcase nuclear device, or (even worse) a nuclear strike somewhere in California or elsewhere in the U.S. or her territories. Terrorism remains an ever-evolving, dynamic and real threat to California and the nation. Some terrorists and terror groups are shifting from symbolic, highly planned and structured al - Qaeda - style attacks (terrorist - directed) focused on high -visibility targets, to threats that are more diffuse, difficult to detect, and less costly to implement (terrorist - inspired). Another disturbing trend is the mounting of multiple, concurrent attacks often referred to as Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (CCTA's). There also is concern about certain state players in the world with the capability to conduct attacks that could result in one or more radiation-contaminated disaster zones. The potential to cause major structure collapse secondary to a detonation, trapping people and exposing rescuers to radiation is a potent hazard for which specialized CBERNE response capabilities will be required, is ever-present. including properly trained and equipped Urban Search & Rescue resources from local government, and state US&R resources, and in some cases interstate and federal US&R response 1. In the scenario developed for Sentinel Response 2018, The Brotherhood plans coordinated attacks at different locations throughout Northern California in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake on the Hayward Fault, which already has resulted in major local, state, and federal response that would likely be bolstered by a California request for international US&R Teams for sustained urban search and rescue operations in the quake impact zones. The Brotherhood s notional plans include the detonation of a large RDD at the Arco Arena, which is being used as a reception area for earthquake refugees. Participants in the Arco Arena RDD detonation exercise FSE included the Sacramento Fire Department conducting initial search & rescue and medical treatment, reinforced by the California 1 The eight California-based state/national US&R Task Forces are part of a network of 28 state/national US&R Task Forces strategically located across the United States, which are the basis of the National Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) Response System.

11 Fire & Rescue Mutual Aid System 2 coordinated by Cal OES. Also included were local law enforcement, the 49 th Military Police Brigade California National Guard, the Homeland Response Force in partnership with the 95 th Civil Support Team; Cal-OES Fire & Rescue (Special Operations and Hazardous Materials Section); California US&R Task Force 3 (Menlo Park); California US&R Task Force 4 (Oakland); California US&R Task Force 7 (Sacramento); Cal-Fire, Bay Area UASI; Department of Energy, Radiation Assistance Team-7; Federal Bureau of Investigation, and local ems agencies and participating hospitals. For some personnel assigned to the three participating northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces, the US&R RDD scenario at Arco Arena was their first opportunity to conduct full-scale Urban Search & Rescue operations in a simulated radiologically contaminated environment requiring the wearing of the additional required PPE for extended periods of time and requiring the implementation of stay times based on the notional level of radiation exposure at various parts of the exercise site. As a result, much of what was accomplished was accomplished through application of specialized training and procedures not routinely practiced or tested on a frequent basis. Another factor in the development and implementation of this FSE was a relatively short lead uptime from conceptualization to execution (4 months), which prevented normal scheduling of preexercise training and workshops where a wide range of helpful pre-exercise preparation could have been employed, as well as time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Future exercises of this type and magnitude should take this into account and plan accordingly. That said, there is also a value to not so thoroughly plan and practice every aspect of a FSE that it is conducted from rote memory by some participants. In that sense, the relatively brief lead-up time provided a more accurate evaluation of current readiness and helped highlight aspects of the Improvement Plan. The participants showed enthusiasm and initiative in working through the challenges with which they were presented during fast ramp-up to the exercise, and the exercise itself. Valuable information was learned as a result of the Sentinel Response FSE, which will be incorporated in future regional CBRNE emergency preparedness and security planning efforts, training, exercises and equipment procurements (including a related US&R RDD exercise being planned by Cal OES Fire & Rescue in November 2018 involving the five Southern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces and other emergency resources, also funded by , 2015 HSGP Award). 3 --AAR Prepared by Phil White, Bay Area UASI, and Larry Collins, Cal OES Fire & Rescue, with input from all participants. 2 Including California s eight state/national US&R Task Forces, 12 California Regional US&R Task Forces, 19 Cal OES US&R Type 2 Trailers, dozens of local government US&R assets, dozens of haz mat teams (including 12 Cal OES Type II Haz Mat Response Vehicles), dozens of water rescue assets (including 13 Cal OES Swiftwater-Flood S&R Teams), dozens of helicopter and fixed wing assets and more than 6,000 fire engines, including 113 Cal OES Type I Engines with US&R Level 3 capabilities). 3 Participation of the California-based state/national US&R Task Forces resulted from direction by Cal OES Director Mark Ghilarducci to exercise the US&R Task Forces in an RDD Detonation exercise to evaluate their readiness to effectively conduct US&R operations in a radiation-contaminated environment.

12 ANALYSIS OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND CORE CAPABILITIES Aligning exercise objectives and core capabilities provides a consistent taxonomy for evaluation that transcends individual exercises to support preparedness reporting and trend analysis. Table 1 includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and performance ratings for each core capability as observed during the exercise and determined by the evaluation team. Table 1. Summary of Exercise Objectives Core Capability Performance Objective(s) Core Capability Note without Challenges (P) with Some Challenges (S) with Major Challenges (M) Unable to be (U) Overarching Exercise Objectives 1. Create a simulated RDD/dirty bomb attack exercise that requires the deployment of the three Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces and other appropriate agencies including local government and the California National Guard, and which will be managed utilizing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) that also incorporates the guiding principles of the National Response Framework (NRF) Operational Coordination 2. Strengthen each Operational Coordination participating agency s preparedness to respond to threats of or actual terrorist attacks using RDD resulting in structural S S

13 Objective(s) Core Capability Note collapse and the need for Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces. 3. Develop a Northern California US&R RDD exercise to quantify current readiness and steps to improve RDD response policies and procedures, provision of needed training and equipment and procurement for improved delivery of service. 4. Bolster coordination between the three Northern Californiabased state/national US&R Task Forces and local, state and federal CBRNE first responders to assure a prompt and efficient response to CBRNE emergencies. Operational Coordination Operational Coordination without Challenges (P) P P with Some Challenges (S) with Major Challenges (M) Unable to be (U) 5. Practice and evaluate how State Emergency Support Functions #4 (conbined Fire and US&R), 13 (Law, light and wilderness SAR), 8 (Public Health & Medical Services), and the corresponding federal ESF s are incorporated in the exercise scenario response. Identified ESFs are supported with CBRN TF assets IAW CS OPORD Allow the three Northern Californiabased state/national US&R Task Forces to conduct and Situational Assessment Operational Coordination SOPs. Mass Search & Rescue Operations S S

14 Objective(s) Core Capability Note evaluate the National Urban Search & Rescue Response System s Enhanced Operations In The Contaminated Environment (radiation) protocols. without Challenges (P) with Some Challenges (S) with Major Challenges (M) Unable to be (U) 7. Decontamination: Conduct decontamination operations at multiple training sites utilizing different components of the JMEEL (ex: Tents and Trailers, the state/national US&R Task Force WMD ops, etc). Mass Care Services S 8. Medical: Integrate medical personnel from the three Northern California based state/ national US&R Task Forces into overall incident prehospital care operations Operational Coordination Mass Search & Rescue Operations S 9. JISSC: Execute integration of civilian Communications platforms with military Communication platforms. Communication Services S Cal-OES, CATF-3, CATF-4 and CATF-7 Objectives 10. Test readiness of the Northern Californiabased state/national US&R Task Forces for conducting Urban Search & Rescue operations resulting from an RDD, and exercise the National Urban Search & Rescue Response System s Enhanced Operations in the Contaminated Environment procedures while conducting US&R operations in a Mass Search and Rescue Operations Operational Coordination S

15 Objective(s) Core Capability Note simulated radioactively contaminated structure collapse environment. without Challenges (P) with Some Challenges (S) with Major Challenges (M) Unable to be (U) 11. Evaluate the readiness of the three Northern Californiabased state/ national US&R Task Forces to safely conduct search, rescue/recovery operations within or near a known or suspected contaminated environment. Environmental Response/Health and Safety Mass Search and Rescue Operations S 12. Practice the reduced stay times of first responders conducting search & rescue due to exposure to radiation, and the assumption of these operations by the Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces; and evaluate the ability of state/ national US&R Task Forces implement appropriate stay times and personnel or team rotations to achieve uninterrupted US&R operations in the radiationcontaminated environment. Mass Search and Rescue Operations S 13. Evaluate the ability of the Northern California state/national US&R Task Forces and other resources to conduct effective Wide Area Search" using all appropriate means, based in part on radiation levels and acceptable exposure Situational Assessment Mass Search & Rescue Operations S

16 Objective(s) Core Capability Note to search canines; and to determine survivability profiles for victims missing or trapped in collapsed structures (which may in some cases actually shield victims from some radiation exposure) 14. Exercise the requirements for the Northern California state/national US&R Task Forces requirements per the National US&R Response System s - Phase III Operational Readiness Exercise and Evaluation Program (OREEP), intended to have each state/national US&R Task Force evaluated every three years on the following 5 tasks: US&R Task Force Mobilization; Transportation of US&R Task Force personnel and cache; Establishing a US&R Task Force Base of Operations (BoO); Onsite US&R Task Force Operations; and US&R Task Force Demobilization. 15. Exercise and evaluate the ability of Incident Command to request Fire & Rescue and EMS resources for an RDD attack with collapse and missing or trapped victims, including additional California state Mass Search and Rescue Operations Operational Coordination Operational Coordination without Challenges (P) P P with Some Challenges (S) with Major Challenges (M) Unable to be (U)

17 Objective(s) Core Capability Note US&R resources and (if necessary) those from out-ofstate, as well as. California National Guard resources 16. Integrate specialized assets at a radiationcontaminated structure collapse disaster, i.e., in support of first responders and Northern California s three state/national US&R Task Forces 49th Military Police Brigade California National Guard, Homeland Response Force (FEMA Region IX) 95th Civil Support Team Local, state and federal law enforcement and radiation emergency response assets Operational Coordination Mass Search & Rescue Operations Sacramento Incident Management Team (SACIMT) Objectives 17. Coordination of local first responders from multiple agencies with each other and with CA ANG resources and the three Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces 18. Demobilize from the exercise & accurately capture significant events in AAR Operational coordination Operational Coordination This occurred as a result of exercise design This occurred as a result of exercise design without Challenges (P) with Some Challenges (S) S with Major Challenges (M) M Unable to be (U) Ratings Definitions: without Challenges (P): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. with Some Challenges (S): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this U

18 Objective(s) Core Capability Note without Challenges (P) with Some Challenges (S) with Major Challenges (M) Unable to be (U) activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified. with Major Challenges (M): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. Unable to be (U): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s). Objective 1 Overarching Objectives) Create a simulated RDD/dirty bomb attack exercise that requires the deployment of the three Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces and other appropriate agencies including local government and the California National Guard, and which will be managed utilizing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) that also incorporates the guiding principles of the National Response Framework (NRF) Operational Coordination The strengths and areas for improvement for each objective aligned to this core capability are described in this section. Strengths The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths: Strength 1.1: Multiple agencies and disciplines were well represented (see attached participating agency list). Strength 1.2: The available human, air, vehicle, camp, and equipment resources were effectively managed and utilized through the use of the incident command system using the Area Command model which simultaneously oversaw the operations at two incidents within the larger Sentinel Response 18 exercise that were over 60 miles apart (Arco Arena and Sonoma Raceway Incident Commands). Strength 1.3: Assigned areas of responsibility, divisions of labor and mission assignments were consistent with guiding principles of the National Response Framework, FEMA Nuclear/Radiological Annex, the National Urban Search & Rescue Response System Enhanced Operations In The Contaminated Environment, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Planning Guidance for the First 100 Minutes Following the Detonation of a Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD).

19 Strength 1.4: Incident management teams demonstrated the ability to select, scale and apply required ICS/SEMS principals to effectively manage and simultaneously direct the response to multiple major emergencies. Areas for Improvement The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level: Area for Improvement 1.1: Homeland Response Force (HRF) Area Command and incident management teams (IMT s) did not interact with maximum effectiveness. Reference: Area Command, ICS Analysis: This was the first time that the incident management teams and the HRF Headquarters had attempted to create an Area Command. As a result, they were not always familiar with how this would be best accomplished. This short time line prevented the normal scheduling of preexercise training and workshops where this could have been addressed as well as time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Area for Improvement 1.2: The interaction between Arco Arena Incident Command, state/national US&R Task Forces, and CBRN teams could have been more effective. Reference: Area Command, ICS , Sentinel Response Participant Playbook Analysis: The US&R RDD exercise began with a briefing hosted by the Sacramento Incident Management Team (SIMT). However, once that concluded participating agencies at this incident then initially tended to establish their own incident command structures at different locations to manage the missions assigned them. Their command and control improved when, several hours later, they merged into the single unified command structure at a single location that was appropriate. The HRF command post never relocated, and did not send a liaison officer to the Arco Arena Unified Command. The Arco Arena Unified Command did not imbed liaison officer with the HRF. The Arco Arena Unified Command would have benefitted from the situational awareness offered by the HRF visual displays of incident data and the HRF would have had better situational awareness of the disposition of US&R and local government resources. Additional Comments: None Objective 2 Strengthen each participating agency s preparedness to respond to threats of or actual terrorist attacks using RDD resulting in structural collapse and the need for Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces. Operational Coordination The strengths and areas for improvement for each objective aligned to this core capability are described in this section.

20 Strengths The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths: Strength 2.1: Participants demonstrated the ability to respond to an RDD incident. Strength 2.2: Participants sought ways to take advantage of each other s capabilities i.e. the formation of rescue task forces and joint-hazard response teams. Strength 2.3: Participants demonstrated the ability to plan, coordinate and execute a unified response despite the complexity of the incidents and multiple agencies/disciplines involved. Strength 2.3: Participants were successful at responding to the initial RDD and the secondary devices. The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level: Area for Improvement 2.1: Many participants had not had an opportunity before the exercise to learn and practice applying the ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) concept at a simulated RDD incident, and had difficulty implementing ALARA at this exercise. Reference: Sentinel Response Playbook Analysis: For many of the participants this was the first time they had tried to perform typical tasks in a radiologically contaminated environment, and did not appear prepared to fully implement the ALARA protocols at the scene of a radiological contamination incident for the purpose of reducing/managing emergency responder exposures (Time, Distance and Shielding). Area for Improvement 2.2: Some participants at both simulated attacks did not fully determine of communicate whether secondary devices or other weapons of mass destruction were present during initial scene surveys, or during US&R and/or decontamination operations (i.e. being on the lookout for improvised explosive devices that might have been missed by bomb squad personnel, searching survivors for weapons, suicide vests, also testing for the presence of chemical and biological warfare agents, etc.). Reference: Sentinel Response Playbook Analysis: For many of the participants this was the first time they had responded to an RDD incident, and some seemed to be less than familiar with the need to search survivors, determine the possible presence of other WMD s both during initial site characterizations and/or ongoing operations. Additional Comments: None Objective 3 Develop a Northern California US&R RDD exercise that is geared towards encouraging the development and improvement of procedures to improve the response to RDD detonations

21 resulting in structural collapse; and determining the need for provision of needed training and equipment procurement for improved delivery of service and safety of emergency responders. Operational Coordination The strengths and areas for improvement for each objective aligned to this core capability are described in this section. Strengths The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths: Strength 3.1: This exercise demonstrated the benefits of existing US&R operations in contaminated environments training concept of operations plans and (ConOps) and standard operating procedures (SOP's). Strength 3.2: The exercise was of sufficient complexity to identify the need for additional and specific equipment procurements, policies, procedures, training and exercises (tabletop and fullscale) Strength 3.3: Participants demonstrated the ability to respond to detonation of an RDD Areas for Improvement The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level: Area for Improvement 3.1: Each participating organization had its own CBRNE policies and procedures which sometimes made it a challenge to form multiple jurisdictional/multi-disciplinary teams Reference: Sentinel Response Participant Playbook Analysis: Due to the exigent circumstances of the notional RDD attack, the formation of multiagency/multi-disciplinary teams was often required to occur on-the-spot. Some members of the state/national US&R Task Forces did not have experience combining with the California National Guard s CBRNE units, so this exercise was extremely valuable in providing them with that experience and with showing how this can work under conditions requiring this approach. Without local, regional, state, or federal policies and procedural guidance that is well practiced during exercises of this nature, the result can be personnel operating under different rules of engagement, varying radiation exposure limits, and/or personal protective equipment requirements at the same disaster. Incident commanders and those in the chain-of-command can lose valuable time while these issues have to be negotiated in advance of any action can be taken. Additional Comments: None Objective 4 Bolster coordination between the three Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces and local, state and federal CBRNE first responders to assure a prompt and efficient response to an RDD attack and radiation disasters.

22 Operational Coordination The strengths and areas for improvement for each objective aligned to this core capability are described in this section. Strengths The partial capability level can be attributed to the following strengths: Strength 4.1: First responders were aware of the need to request additional CBRNE resources early in the simulated attacks. Strength 4.2: Additional US&R and CBRNE resources were requested appropriately through the California Fire & Rescue and Law Enforcement Mutual-Aid Systems Strength 4.3: Local, State and Federal CBRNE resources arrived early in the incident, as did the three Northern California state/national US&R Task Forces. Strength 4.4: The Arco Arena Incident Command effectively utilized local, state and/or federal resources in support of the RDD attack response. Areas for Improvement The following areas of operational capability require improvement to achieve the full capability level: Area for Improvement 4.1: The Arco Incident Command (Incident Management Team) encountered challenges directing initial US&R/CBRNE (RDD detonation) operations and had some difficulty overcoming them. Reference: Sentinel Response Participant Playbook Analysis: For some members of the Arco Incident Management Team (IMT) and for many of the participants, Sentinel Response 2018 was their first experience responding to a simulated CBRNE (RDD detonation) emergency. Some members seemed unfamiliar with the guiding principles, strategies and tactics required when responding to the detonation of an RDD. Consequently, some members of the Arco IMT appeared to be unfamiliar with the specialized resources available to them locally and through the California Fire & Rescue and Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Systems, how to request them, and how best to utilize them. As a result, valuable time was sometimes lost that could have directly impacted the survivability of some victims, or of the long-term health of responders and others, had this been an actual attack. Additional Comments: None Objective 5 Practice and evaluate how State and Emergency Support Functions 4 (In California ESF-4, Fire, is combined with Urban Search & Rescue, ESF-9), 13 (Law), and 8 (Public Health & Medical Services) are incorporated with their federal counterpart ESF s in the exercise scenario response. Identified ESFs are to be supported with CBRN Task Force (TF) assets IAW CS OPORD

23 Situational Assessment The strengths and areas for improvement for each objective aligned to this core capability are described in this section. Strengths The full capability level can be attributed to the following strengths: Strength 5.1: This exercise had scenarios which fully incorporated State and Emergency Support Functions 4 (Fire combined with Urban Search & Rescue), 13 (Law), and 8 (Public Health & Medical Services) with their federal counterpart ESF s Emergency Support Functions and CBRN TF elements as members of all-hazard reconnaissance/rescue teams. Strength 5.2: The exercise was well supported by HRF CBRN Task Force and available IAW CS assets Strength 5.3: HRF CBRN Task Force and available IAW CS assets were fully integrated into all levels of the incident organization Areas for Improvement The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level: Area for Improvement 5.1: HRF CBRN Task Force capabilities were not fully utilized in all US&R operations at the Arco Arena. Reference: None Analysis: The HRF s Search & Extraction (S&E) teams could have been used much more frequently and effectively to assist in US&R operations (i.e. high-angle rescue scenarios inside the Arco Arena). This occurred because some responders and members of state/national US&R Task Forces did not fully understand the capabilities of the HRF and did not take fully advantage of all their specialized capabilities until late in the exercise. This lack of understanding was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise that prevented the normal scheduling of preexercise training and workshops where this could have been addressed as well as time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. But it also illustrates what would likely have occurred had this been an actual RDD attack resulting in US&R operations in the contaminated environment. Additional Comments: None Objective 6 Allow the three Northern California-based state/national US&R Task Forces to conduct and evaluate the National Urban Search & Rescue Response System s Enhanced Operations In The Contaminated Environment (radiation) protocols. Environmental Response Health and Safety/Mass Search and Rescue Operations The strengths and areas for improvement for each objective aligned to this core capability are described in this section.

24 Strengths Strength 6.1: US&R, CST and HRF leadership communicated effectively at the Operations/Branch/Division/Group levels Strength 6.2: In most cases, the state/national US&R Task Forces, the CST and HRF performed search operations within the limits of PPE requirements and restrictions Strength 6.3: The state/national US&R Task Forces deployed Canine Search Teams with the understanding that their mission or capabilities may be limited due to the radiologically contaminated environment Strength 6.4: Multi-disciplinary/agency CBRN search and rescue teams were able to be formed due to the high degree of cooperation between participants and agencies. Strength 6.5: Momentum of US&R operations was maintained through the timely and effective sharing of personnel and logistical resources. Strength 6.6: Members of the state/national US&R Task Forces, the CST, and the HRF dealt effectively with threat posed by the potential secondary device that was discovered as part of the exercise, AND an unkown device (not part of the exercise) discovered by a US&R Task Force Rescue Squad conducting rescue of victims in the darkened bleachers of the Arco Arena. A this is not a drill Operational Retreat was called exercise controllers, and the suspicious electrical devices were examined by SME s, and once determined to be wi fi equipment and a camera mounted in an unorthodox way, it was reported to the Sacramento Sheriff Department for disposition. Then the exercise resumed. Areas for Improvement The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level: Area for Improvement 6.1: IMT, the state/national US&R Task Forces and overhead, the CST and the HRF need to interact more effectively and exercise more frequently. Reference: Sentinel Response Playbook Analysis: This was the first time that many of the participants had participated in a simulated RDD incident. Consequently, much time was lost as incident goals, objectives and roles had to be negotiated and squared with Commander s Intent. Although much of this was resolved satisfactorily, some principals and methods of conducting US&R operations in a contaminated environment were never fully implemented or reflected in the IAP developed by the IMT. This occurred in part because some of the IMT, state/national US&R Task Forces, CST and HRF personnel have not participated together in interagency RDD training. This lack of experience through training and exercises, and of knowledge of each other s capabilities, was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise which prevented the normal scheduling of preexercise interagency training, interagency workshops where this could have been addressed as well as the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Area for Improvement 6.2: In many cases, no PPE (i.e. N-95 masks) was provided to survivors Reference: Department of Homeland Security, Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Response Guidance Planning for the First 100 Minutes

25 Analysis: This was the first time that many of the participants had participated in a simulated RDD emergency response. Consequently, in many cases survivors were not provided with the type of PPE (N95 mask) needed to prevent further exposure. This occurred in part because a significant percentage of the state/national US&R Task Force personnel and members of the CST and HRF personnel had not had RDD training or experience where this need was addressed for victims of a dirty bomb. This critical lack of training in the need for survivor PPE was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise which prevented the normal scheduling of preexercise training, workshops where this could have been addressed as well the just-in-time procurement of survivor PPE supplies as well as the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Area for Improvement 6.3: Fire/rescue/medical first responders and State/national US&R Task Force members need additional radiological safety training, exercises, and equipment to be prepared to safely and effectively operation in radiation-contaminated environments. Reference: Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, International Atomic Energy Agency Analysis: This was the first time that many of the participants had responded to a simulated RDD incident or operated in a simulated radiologically contaminated environment for significant periods. Consequently, it appears from observation and anecdotes that a significant percentage of the state/national US&R Task Force personnel (as well as first responders) were somewhat unfamiliar with certain the basics of radiation safety that would be helpful to all responders, or with operational enforcement of the ALARA principle (Time, Distance and Shielding), or of some important strategies and tactics to reduce radiation dosage, and in some cases with the use of radiation detection/dosimetry equipment or the interpretation of radiological contamination data. There also was observed that among many emergency responders there is a certain reliance on unfounded assumptions that could affect the decision to engage or to declare a no go or even a mission turn-down even when conditions actually warrant engagement of US&R resources to save lives after an RDD detonation. This appears, in part, to be related to the relative low frequency with which most first responders and even state/national US&R Task Force members train and exercise for RDD s and other radiological emergencies and disasters. This dynamic was observed during the just-in-time training provided in a tent set up in the parking lot of Arco Arena to responders by SME s from the Department of Energy as part of the Sentinel Response 2018 exercise. Many of the questions and concerns expressed by responders including members of the state/national US&R Task Forces reflected this. Also it is observed that some of the traditional fire service training in radiological response is in need of updating and revision to reflect most recent knowledge and experiences. Sentinel Response planners believe that many of these misinterpretations and unfounded beliefs can be overcome by a renewed effort to educate all responder (including members of the state/national US&R Task Forces in the latest and most accurate information about responding to and operating in RDD and other radiationcontaminated environments. The inconsistent levels of knowledge and experience with radiation safety and response were exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise which prevented the normal scheduling of pre-exercise training, workshops where this could have been addressed as well the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise.

26 Area for Improvement 6.4: All state/national US&R Task Forces and other responders with a greater chance of encountering radiologically contaminated search and rescue environments need a user-friendly radiation dosimeter watch reader for each task force unit (or for each member). Reference: Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, International Atomic Energy Agency Analysis: This was the first time that many of the participants had participated in a simulated RDD incident. Consequently, the importance of each US&R Task Force unit (or every member) having its own rad watch, and each US&R Task Force having at least one rad watch reader to monitor accumulated dosage at the end of each shift, does not appear to have been universally understood. Area for Improvement 6.5: State/national US&R Task Force personnel and other responders need additional radiation emergency forms and job-aid sheets Reference: Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, International Atomic Energy Agency Analysis: This was the first time that many of the participants had participated in an RDD incident simulation. Consequently, the need/benefit to record pre and post vitals of teams entering/exiting the incident area, standardization of pre-entry briefing information, or use of a site safety plan template and other job-aids does not appear to have been fully understood by all state/national US&R Task Force members and other responders, and therefore the task forces were not always provisioned with them prior to the beginning of their operations. The lack of these forms and jobaids specifically designed for US&R operations was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise. This short time line prevented the normal scheduling of pre-exercise training, workshops where the use of these forms and job-aids could have been addressed as well the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Area for Improvement 6.6: US&R Base of Operations BoO/ICP could benefit from the installation of radiation portal alarm systems Reference: Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, International Atomic Energy Agency Analysis: This was the first time that many of the participants had participated in an RDD incident. Consequently, the importance of preventing the accident ancillary spread of radiation contamination into critical support areas such as the US&R teams BoO and Incident Command Post (sometimes by personnel not fully decontaminated after exiting contaminated areas) was not fully understood. This lack of understanding was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise. This short time line prevented the normal scheduling of pre-exercise training, workshops where this issue could have been addressed as well the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Area for Improvement 6.7: Use of In-Mask communications Reference: Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency, International Atomic Energy Agency

27 Analysis: This was the first time that many state/national US&R Task Force personnel had participated in a simulated RDD incident. Consequently, the hazards created by the removal of their full-face Air Purifying Respirator (APR) to speak on the radio was not fully understood by all members. Removal of their respiratory protection to speak to speak more clearly on the radio significantly increases the risk of internal radiation contamination. The apparent lack of understanding about this dynamic was evident from observing operations and seeing exactly that occurrence on repeated occasions. This apparent absence of awareness of that significant exposure hazard was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise. This short time line prevented respiratory protection training where this issue could have been addressed as well the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Area for Improvement 6.8: Incident maps with required details need to be provided to every team entering the incident area Reference: Sentinel Response Playbook Analysis: Many of the exercise participants were unfamiliar with the need for, method of, or their role in the creation incident maps that contain details about readily identifiable features of the incident location/building, best access points, safe routes of travel, exclusionary zones, security perimeters, areas of safe refuge, casualty collection points, equipment/supply drop points, etc. Once, maps have been created they need to be available in sufficient quantities down to the Team Leader so that everyone at the incident has a common frame of reference. This occurred in part because US&R, CST and HRF personnel have not had hazmat/cbrne map training were this is addressed. This lack of hazmat/cbrne training was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise. This short time line prevented the normal scheduling of pre-exercise training, workshops where this could have been addressed as well the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Area for Improvement 6.9: Need to provide to improve decontamination decision making and capabilities Reference: Sentinel Response Playbook Analysis: This was the first time that many of the participants had participated in an RDD incident. Consequently, no formal decontamination planning was performed nor were many of the exercise participants familiar with the need to perform contamination surveys before directing persons and equipment to undergo decontamination. As a result, some persons and equipment who were not contaminated were forced to unnecessarily undergo decontamination. In a real-world situation, this could negatively impact the prompt and efficient decontamination of contaminated, survivors first responders and their equipment. This occurred in part because US&R, CST and HRF personnel have not had hazmat/cbrne training were this is covered. This lack of decontamination plan training for a radiation incident was exacerbated by the short time line in the lead up to the exercise. This short time line prevented the normal scheduling of pre-exercise decontamination training that included the use of HEPA vacuums where this could have been addressed as well the time to preview the Sentinel Response Participant Playbook in advance of the exercise. Additional Comments: