Target Capabilities List. Draft Version 2.0

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1 Target Capabilities List Draft Version 2.0

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5 Table of Contents SECTION I: INTRODUCTION...1 SECTION II: ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS...9 : CAPABILITY SUMMARIES...26 Capability Summary Template COMMON TARGET CAPABILITIES...28 Planning Interoperable Communications Citizen Preparedness and Participation Risk Management PREVENT MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES...53 Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings Intelligence Analysis and Production Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations CBRNE Detection PROTECT MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES...96 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Laboratory Testing RESPOND MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES Onsite Incident Management Emergency Operations Center Management Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Volunteer Management and Donations Responder Safety and Health Public Safety and Security Response Animal Health Emergency Support Environmental Health and Vector Control Explosive Device Response Operations Firefighting Operations/Support WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection Isolation and Quarantine Urban Search & Rescue Emergency Public Information and Warning i

6 Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Medical Surge Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Mass Prophylaxis Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) Fatality Management RECOVER MISSION AREA TARGET CAPABILITIES Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment Restoration of Lifelines Economic & Community Recovery APPENDIX A: PLANNING FACTORS AND TARGET LEVELS... A-1 Introduction... A-3 Planning Factors Template... A-5 COMMON CAPABILITIES: PLANNING FACTORS... A-7 Planning... A-9 Interoperable Communications... A-11 Citizen Preparedness and Participation... A-18 Risk Management... A-23 PREVENT MISSION AREA CAPABILITIES: PLANNING FACTORS... A-24 Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings... A-26 Intelligence Analysis and Production... A-28 Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination... A-30 Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations... A-32 CBRNE Detection... A-33 PROTECT MISSION AREA CAPABILITIES: PLANNING FACTORS... A-34 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)... A-36 Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense... A-39 Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Laboratory Testing... A-43 RESPOND MISSION AREA CAPABILITIES: PLANNING FACTORS... A-56 Onsite Incident Management... A-58 Emergency Operations Center Management... A-61 Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution... A-66 Volunteer Management and Donations... A-71 Responder Safety and Health... A-73 Public Safety and Security Response... A-76 Animal Health Emergency Support... A-78 ii

7 Environmental Health and Vector Control... A-94 Explosive Device Response Operations... A-100 Firefighting Operations/Support... A-102 WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination... A-105 Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection... A-109 Isolation and Quarantine... A-114 Urban Search & Rescue... A-117 Emergency Public Information and Warning... A-120 Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment... A-126 Medical Surge... A-130 Medical Supplies Management and Distribution... A-139 Mass Prophylaxis... A-144 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services)... A-147 Fatality Management... A-155 RECOVER MISSION AREA CAPABILITIES: PLANNING FACTORS... A-172 Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment... A-174 Restoration of Lifelines... A-178 Economic & Community Recovery... A-181 APPENDIX B: UNIVERSAL TASK LIST (UTL) ALL HAZARDS TAXONOMY AND EXPLANATION...B-1 iii

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9 SECTION I: INTRODUCTION On December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness. The purpose of HSPD-8 is to establish policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities. HSPD-8 establishes the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United State and requires establishment of a National Preparedness Goal. The Secretary of Homeland Security charged the Executive Director of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (DHS/SLGCP) with responsibility to lead HSPD-8 implementation on his behalf. The National Preparedness Goal provides the means for the Nation to answer three fundamental questions: How prepared do we need to be?, How prepared are we?, and How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap? HSPD-8 states that the National Preparedness Goal will establish measurable readiness targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. The Interim National Preparedness Goal, issued March 31, 2005, is the product of a standard Capabilities-Based Planning process and enables Federal, State, local, and tribal entities to prioritize needs, update preparedness strategies, allocate resources, and deliver preparedness programs. This approach began with rigorous analysis of a range of representative planning scenarios for incidents of national significance. From this analysis, key homeland security prevention, protection, response and recovery tasks were defined and catalogued. Finally, capabilities required to perform these tasks were documented. These efforts responded to the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 (Public Law ) requirement for DHS/SLGCP to provide State and local jurisdictions with nationally accepted preparedness levels of first responder capabilities no later than January 31, These efforts are transforming our approach to national preparedness. SECTION I INTRODUCTION This document presents version 2.0 of the Homeland Security Target Capabilities List (TCL), which identifies 36 capabilities required to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of national significance. It was developed with the active participation by and in consultation with key stakeholders at all levels. The TCL is a companion document to the National Preparedness Goal. Capabilities-Based Planning DHS/SLGCP adopted a capabilities-based planning approach to define target capabilities. This included stakeholder involvement at each step of development. This approach is defined as planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of 1

10 threats and hazards while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice. Capabilities-based planning helps to inform and optimize decision making at all levels of government by linking resource allocation to the capabilities that are most urgently needed to perform a wide range of assigned missions and tasks. The primary objective in strengthening homeland security capabilities is to deter our adversaries. But since deterrence is uncertain and perfectibility is impossible, we must prepare for the potential consequences (perhaps unprecedented) of successful attacks. The United States is also plagued by a host of natural hazards so we must maintain constant preparedness to respond and recover from these frequent non-malicious events. Thirty of thirty-six capabilities are common to both terrorist attacks and non-malicious hazards. The process of identifying the target capabilities included ten steps. This Target Capabilities List incorporates the results of Steps 3-6. Key planning assumptions, documents and products used or developed in the process are briefly explained below. SECTION I INTRODUCTION Planning Steps 1. Define the threats (employing 15 representative National Planning Scenarios) 2. Identify tasks to be performed (Universal Task List) 3. Identify critical tasks 4. Define required capabilities (Target Capabilities List) 5. Determine capability requirements 6. Assign responsibility for capabilities 7. Define capability requirements (Analysis of Requirements) 8. Assess current capabilities against targets (National Needs Assessment) 9. Allocate resources for priority needs (Homeland Security Strategies) 10. Assess preparedness (National Preparedness Report) Planning Assumptions The Target Capabilities List was developed using the same planning assumptions as those used to develop the National Response Plan. These include: Incidents are typically managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level. Incident management activities will be initiated and conducted using the principles contained in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The combined expertise and capabilities of government at all levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations will be required to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from Incidents of National Significance. 2

11 Incidents of National Significance require the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate operations and/or resources, and may: Occur at any time with little or no warning in the context of a general or specific threat or hazard Require significant information-sharing at the unclassified and classified levels across multiple jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors Involve single or multiple geographic areas Have significant international impact and/or require significant international information sharing, resource coordination, and/or assistance Span the spectrum of incident management to include prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery Involve multiple, highly varied hazards or threats on a local, regional, or national scale Result in numerous casualties; fatalities; displaced people; property loss; disruption of normal life support systems, essential public services, and basic infrastructure; and significant damage to the environment Impact critical infrastructures across sectors Overwhelm capabilities of State, local, and tribal governments, and private-sector infrastructure owners and operators Attract a sizeable influx of independent, spontaneous volunteers and supplies Require extremely short-notice asset coordination and response timelines Require prolonged, sustained incident management operations and support activities Top priorities for incident management are to: Save lives and protect the health and safety of the public, responders, and recovery workers Ensure security of the homeland Prevent an imminent incident, including acts of terrorism, from occurring Protect and restore critical infrastructure and key resources Conduct law enforcement investigations to resolve the incident, apprehend the perpetrators, and collect and preserve evidence for prosecution and/or attribution Protect property and mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, communities, and the environment Facilitate recovery of individuals, families, businesses, governments, and the environment Deployment of resources and incident management actions during an actual or potential terrorist incident are conducted in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ). Departments and agencies at all levels of government and certain nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, may be required to deploy to Incidents of National Significance on short notice to provide timely and effective mutual aid and/or intergovernmental assistance. SECTION I INTRODUCTION 3

12 The degree of involvement in incident operations depends largely upon specific authority or jurisdiction. Other factors that may be considered include: The State, local, or tribal needs and/or requests for external support, or ability to manage the incident The economic ability of the affected entity to recover from the incident The type or location of the incident The severity and magnitude of the incident The need to protect the public health or welfare or the environment 1. Departments and agencies support the homeland security mission in accordance with national authorities and guidance and are expected to provide: Initial and/or ongoing response, when warranted, under their own authorities and funding Alert, notification, pre-positioning, and timely delivery of resources to enable the management of potential and actual Incidents of National Significance Proactive support for catastrophic or potentially catastrophic incidents using protocols for expedited delivery of resources SECTION I INTRODUCTION National Planning Scenarios The first step toward achieving the goal of national preparedness is to answer the question How prepared do we need to be? To answer that question, a set of National Planning Scenarios were developed by a Federal interagency working group led by the Homeland Security Council to illustrate the effects and conditions of incidents of national significance for which the Nation should prepare. The 15 National Planning Scenarios address all-hazard incidents, which include terrorism, natural disasters, and health emergencies. They represent a minimum number of scenarios necessary to illustrate the range of potential incidents, rather than every possible threat or hazard. The National Planning Scenarios serve as the basis for identifying tasks that must be performed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from these incidents, as well as the capabilities required to perform the tasks. Developing the national capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, or recover from these challenges creates the agility and flexibility required to meet the widest range of threats and hazards. The 15 National Planning Scenarios are: 1. Improvised Nuclear Device 9. Major Earthquake 2. Aerosol Anthrax 10. Major Hurricane 3. Pandemic Influenza 11. Radiological Dispersal Device 4. Plague 12. Improvised Explosive Device 5. Blister Agent 13. Food Contamination 6. Toxic Industrial Chemical 14. Foreign Animal Disease 7. Nerve Agent 15. Cyber 8. Chlorine Tank Explosion 4

13 Universal Task List The Universal Task List (UTL) answers the questions What do we need to do to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the threats represented by the National Planning Scenarios? Through national workshops and broad national review, stakeholders across 12 homeland security disciplines from all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector identified tasks required prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the incidents represented by each scenario. The tasks were then combined into a comprehensive menu called the Universal Task List. Most of the tasks would need to be performed for all or multiple scenarios. The UTL serves as a common language and reference system. It also provides a foundation for training and exercise objectives, as a tool for operational planning, and for use in evaluations and assessments of performance. The UTL current contains a catalog of approximately 1,600 tasks encompassing all levels of government and disciplines, from the national strategic to the incident level. The UTL does not identify who will perform the task or how it should be performed. That is left to the implementing agencies. No single jurisdiction or agency is expected to perform every task. Rather, small subsets of tasks will be selected based on specific roles, missions, and functions. The UTL is a living document that will be updated on a regular basis in conjunction with updates to the Target Capabilities List. Target Capabilities List The Target Capabilities List (TCL) provides a framework for the development of a network of capabilities that will be available when and where they are needed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of national significance. September 11 th and subsequent worldwide attacks underscored the need for all levels of government and disciplines to have core capabilities in place and to work together to prevent and protect against future attacks, as well as to assure an effective response and recovery from attacks or natural and accidental disasters. Because incidents of national significance, by definition, will exceed the capacity of any single jurisdiction, it is important to take a national view in defining the type, amount, and placement of capabilities across the country. All levels of government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and citizens have a role in national preparedness, including those defined in the TCL. SECTION I INTRODUCTION Capabilities provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from the performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and standards of performance. A capability may be delivered with any combination of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained and exercised personnel that achieve the desire outcome. Capabilities are based on a foundation of plans, procedures and processes. They build on and incorporate requirements from the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, existing performance standards, and other parallel efforts, such as 5

14 the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. They provide the means to achieve the National Preparedness Goal. The placement of capabilities will be determined by risk, need and potential consequences. While all jurisdictions, no matter how small, need access to required capabilities, no jurisdiction is expected to own every capability in sufficient quantity needed for a large-scale event. Resources to supplement the resident capabilities will need to come from other jurisdictions, the state, the federal government, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the public. Smaller jurisdictions with lower risk will have some level of capability, but will place greater reliance on mutual aid partners during an emergency. To facilitate the sharing of capabilities, the National Preparedness Goal identified Expanded Regional Collaboration as one of seven national priorities. SECTION I INTRODUCTION The TCL assumes that local jurisdictions have an operational level of required capabilities to address steady state operations and smaller-scale emergencies and disasters. For example, the TCL does not address capabilities for routine firefighting or law enforcement services, or seasonal flooding. The TCL addresses unique capabilities and incremental resources related to terrorism, very large-scale disasters, or pandemic health emergencies. Establishing the plans, procedures, systems, interagency relationships, training and exercise programs, and mutual aid agreements required to build capabilities for incidents of national significance will enhance performance for all hazards response, regardless of incident size. Some capabilities are universal and should be built and maintained in every jurisdiction. For example, every jurisdiction should have plans that define how a response will be conducted, even if it is done primarily through mutual aid. Most capabilities will be distributed based on performance requirements. If a capability is needed quickly to save lives or reduce major property damage, it will need to be available in or near most jurisdictions. Capabilities that are less time sensitive can be regionalize or centralized. Some capabilities that require teams with specialized training and equipment, such as bomb squads, should be located in jurisdictions where there are sufficient resources and demand to sustain proficiency, and that can best serve regional needs. The success of national preparedness hinges on task proficiency and capability sufficiency. The tasks in the UTL and capabilities in the TCL provide a standardized construct for homeland security planning, training, and exercise activities. This is the soundest approach to assuring and measuring preparedness, since preparedness will be traceable down to a specific task and capability element. Being able to highlight what task is at risk, or which capability element is deficient provides the means to link resource decisions to specific shortfalls in proficiency or to the supply of a particular capability element, providing a fiscally rational approach to buying down risk. A national preparedness approach centering on capabilities means that future preparedness requirements will ultimately be expressed as comprehensive capability 6

15 needs, with clearly defined requirements, namely: why a capability is needed; how the capability will be used; what function the capability will perform; who will need the capability; when the capability will be available; what key performance and other attributes comprise the capability; how the capability will be supported; what skills will be required and how responders will be trained; and finally, how much the capability will cost. Stakeholder Participation HSPD-8 is being implemented with an unprecedented level stakeholder involvement. Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, non-government organizations and the private sector have been invited to participate in the development and review of National Preparedness Goal, the Universal Task List, and the Target Capabilities List. DHS/SLGCP adopted a consensus of the community approach to this task with the assistance of almost a hundred national associations and thousands of participants. Consensus does not mean that there is perfect agreement rather, it meant that every effort was made to ensure that: 1) The process is explicit, rational and fair 2) Every participant is treated well and their inputs are heard, and finally 3) That participants can accept the outcome. Involvement of stakeholders has been accomplished through national stakeholder workshops, working groups, and broad national reviews. Stakeholder Workshops DHS/SLGCP held stakeholder workshops to define tasks and capabilities required for incidents of national significance. In June 2004, DHS/SLGCP brought together over 160 representatives from agencies at all levels of government and the private sector to review the UTL. In October 2004, DHS/SLGCP held a second workshop with over 350 representatives to obtain input and involvement in the development of the TCL. Stakeholders were brought together again in early June and late July of 2005 to refine the TCL and to establish national target levels for capabilities and to assign responsibility for building and maintaining the capabilities. SECTION I INTRODUCTION Working Groups Vital to the consensus approach, DHS/SLGCP has closely coordinated its work with two working groups. A State, Local, and Tribal Working Group originally formed to provide input on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP) has been expanded to provide feedback and input for HSPD-8 implementation. The group met several times and will continue to review and provide input to the process. The members of the Working Group represent 18 national associations. A Federal Interagency Working Group was also established and will continue to review and provide input and guidance on overall HSPD-8 implementation. In addition, 16 stakeholder working groups, formed at the June 2005 National Capabilities Workshop, worked over a two-month period to refine their assigned capability(s), establish national target levels, and assign responsibility. 7

16 National Review The TCL is only as strong as the validation it receives from the homeland security community. Therefore, DHS has hosted two broad national reviews for the document via the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) system. Comments received have been, and will continue to be, incorporated into the document or catalogued for future consideration. Federal agencies, State Homeland Security Advisors, State Emergency Management agencies, State Public Health agencies, and more than 80 national associations were invited to participate in the UTL and TCL development process through broad national reviews. These reviews were conducted at each critical stage in the development process. SECTION I INTRODUCTION Conclusion National preparedness is a quest, rather than a guarantee. Over 200 years ago, Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers that since no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies, a power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government. Since the Nation s founding, responsibility for national preparedness has been a shared mission of all levels of government. The foundation for national preparedness in the 21st Century is a capabilities-based approach to managing risk. The Department of Homeland Security and its Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness look forward to working with Members of Congress and Federal, State, local, and tribal stakeholders to meet the requirements of HSPD-8 and the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005 to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Think Nationally, Plan Regionally, Act Locally 8

17 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE SECTION II: ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS The assignment of capabilities to tiers provides a framework to determine who is responsible for building and maintaining a capability and what resources are required to perform the critical tasks to meet the performance standards. The tiers system described below is comprised of three components: geographic groupings, performance objectives, and capability resource class. HSPD-8, as well as the National Preparedness Goal support the requirement for a system of tiers. HSPD-8 requires that the National Preparedness Goal establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It also requires that in making allocations of Federal preparedness assistance to the States that Federal departments and agencies provide assistance for first responder preparedness based on assessments of population concentrations, critical infrastructures, and other significant risk factors, particularly terrorism threats, to the extent permitted by law. The Goal states that as the heart of the Goal, the Target Capabilities List (TCL) provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability that Federal, State, local, and tribal entities will be expected to develop and maintain. Every entity will not be expected to develop and maintain every capability to the same level. The specific capabilities and levels of capability will vary based upon the risk and needs of different types of entities. The Goal identified Expand Regional Collaboration as a national priority. As used in the goal, region generally refers to a geographic area consisting of contiguous State, local, and tribal entities located in whole or in part within a designated planning radius of a core high threat urban area. The precise boundaries of region are defined by or within the states. The intent is to maximize access to required capabilities for the U.S. population and the Nation s high priority critical infrastructure. Target levels of capabilities will be met in the most effective and expedient manner through mutual aid agreements and assistance established under a regional approach. SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS Although all jurisdictions are exposed to some level of risk of a major incident, it is not possible or even desirable to build and maintain full capacity for all capabilities in all communities. The planning process involved stakeholders in determining not only what capabilities are required, but where those capabilities should be built and maintained. Stakeholder working groups analyzed the requirements by criticality, risk, and demand to make recommendations on the assignment of the capability to levels of government and distribution of the capability across the country. Their recommendations reflect the assumption that capabilities will generally be located where criticality, risk, and demand 9

18 are the greatest and that jurisdictions with less need will access required capabilities through mutual aid or from regionalized or centralized resources. The tiers include six levels ranging from: Very high population / population density UASI (Urban Area Security Initiative) designated urban areas (Tier A) Mid-to-high population / population density UASI urban areas (Tier B) Remaining urban areas and other non-uasi regions centered on larger Metropolitan Statistical Areas (Tier C) Regions centered on smaller Metropolitan Statistical Areas (Tier D) Very small Metropolitan Statistical Areas and regions centered only on Micropolitan Statistical Areas (Tier E) Regions with no urban core (Tier F) SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS The tiers structure is designed to provide a common framework and analytical basis for the assignment of target levels to capabilities and capabilities to levels of government. It is not a funding formula. The structure is based on three closely related components: 1) Geographic Groupings, 2) Performance Measures and Objectives, and 3) Capability Classes. These components will help ensure a consistent approach to assigning target levels to capabilities, for assigning accountability for building and sustaining capability, for assessing capability proficiency, and for addressing capability gaps and overlaps. The system also provides the basic framework to measure preparedness at the national level. Each component is described in more detail below. Geographic Groupings Based on Total Population, Population Density, and Critical Infrastructure States group jurisdictions based on population, population density and mutual aid considerations; DHS helps to assign the groups to standard Tiers that best match their risk factors Performance Measures and Objectives Defines how tasks will be performed Addresses capacity and proficiency Should be assigned to each entity (e.g., regional partner, State, Federal) that contributes to achieving the capability. Will be applied with flexibility to allow for differences among States Capability Resource Classes Some classes will be proportional to population; Some classes will be common-to-all Some classes will be critical infrastructuredependent, such as presence of major agriculture or an international border 10

19 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Geographic Groupings The geographic component of the tiers system assigns individual or groupings of jurisdictions (to include cities, towns, and counties as appropriate), as determined by the State, into one of six tier levels based on three factors: 1) total population, 2) population density, and 3) critical infrastructure and other threat indicators. Under this system, States retain flexibility to organize their jurisdictions as they choose, in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal priority for Expand Regional Collaboration. The geographic component is a starting point for determining capability level requirements. The geographic component of the tiers system leverages successful regional concepts embodied in existing initiatives like the DHS Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI). In developing the geographic component of the tier system, the existing UASI urban areas (which also include the HHS CRI cities), existing State-defined homeland security regions, and Census Bureau geographic areas, were used for design purposes. Factors and weightings were designed to emphasize strong regional approaches to preparedness. The tiers structure recognizes and emphasizes that preparedness for incidents of national significance will require a regional response. The structure provides a mechanism to integrate existing planning and operational approaches to ensure effective prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities. Tier Level Determination Steps Total population, population density, and critical infrastructure and other threat indicators are leading factors of risk. In general, the higher the score on all three factors, the higher the potential consequences, and therefore the higher the level of risk. Consistently applied risk-based geographic tiers will help ensure that areas with similar generic risk characteristics are working to achieve and sustain similar target levels of capability. States, in consultation with local and tribal partners, will group their jurisdictions as they deem appropriate. The jurisdictional groupings (which can be individual or multiple jurisdictions) should cover the entire geography of the State. Interstate groups (such as the National Capital Region) are encouraged. SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS For an optimal outcome under the tiers system, States should take into consideration how population, critical infrastructure, multi-jurisdictional mutual aid, and risk are distributed across their State. As a general rule, to the degree possible, most entities within the same U.S. Census Bureau defined Metropolitan Statistical Area should also be in the same sub- State grouping. The four primary steps to determine the tier level include: 1. Determine the geographic groupings (city, county, groups of counties or any combination thereof) for the State. 2. Calculate the Total Population factor to determine the Total Population Group. 11

20 SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS The Total Population factor results in the assignment of all jurisdictions (or groups of jurisdictions) to one of the six Total Population Groups. The initial determinant within the Total Population factor is the presence and size of an urban core. Generally, Census Bureau data 1 can be quickly accessed to determine the presence of an urban core. For quick reference, if the jurisdiction (or groups of jurisdictions) includes the core city of Metropolitan Statistical Area (or Metropolitan Division), the area will fall into one of Total Population Groups A D. If the core city of a Micropolitan Statistical Area is present, but no Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the area will fall into total population Group E. If the area is neither a Metropolitan nor Micropolitan Statistical Area, the area will fall into Population Group F. After determining the nature of the urban core, the total population of the area is calculated based on the total population within the boundaries of the jurisdiction (or groups of jurisdictions). Total Population Groups Population Population Characteristics Group Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with a total population of greater than 4 million (that contain a large urban core) A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with a total population of over 1 and fewer than 4 million (that contain a large urban core) A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with a total population of over 250,000 and fewer than 1 million (that contain a large urban core) A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with a total population under 250K (that contain a large urban core) A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping associated with a small urban core only All other individual jurisdictions or contiguous jurisdiction groupings not meeting the definitions above 3. Calculate the Population Density factor to determine Population Density Group of the jurisdiction or region. 1 Information from the U.S. Census Bureau on the identification of Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Micropolitan Statistical Areas is available at the following Census Bureau Internet sites: and 12

21 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE The Population Density factor results in the assignment of all jurisdictions (or groups of jurisdictions) to one of six Population Density Groups (See Figure Y below); The population density of the area is calculated by dividing the total population of the jurisdiction by the total square miles of the jurisdiction. Population Density Groups Population Population Density Characteristics Density Group Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with total population density of greater than 1,500 people per square mile A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with total population density of over 1,000 and fewer than 1,500 people per square mile A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with total population density of over 500 and fewer than 1,000 people per square mile A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with total population density of over 200 and fewer than 500 people per square mile A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with total population density of over 100 and fewer than 200 people per square mile A jurisdiction or contiguous jurisdiction grouping with total population density of fewer than 100 people per square mile 4. Identify Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Other Threat Indicators Factor. Most jurisdictions or geographic areas across the country have critical infrastructure or key resources. Because assets are spread so widely across the country, this is generally not a factor that can be used to define capability needs. However, there are a limited number of national-level critical infrastructure assets that may require increased capability levels. Identification of specific threat-related information is generally classified. The Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Other Threat Indicators Factor is not a direct input into the tier calculation, but is an additive component to ensure proper alignment of jurisdictions to the appropriate tier level; Presence of critical infrastructure of national significance may raise the assigned geographic tier for a group of jurisdictions or may increase the requirement for specific capabilities with an existing tier group; DHS will also analyze jurisdiction-specific threat information from law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, and others similar to information SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 13

22 sources used for the UASI funding distribution model to assess whether an increase in tier level is required. Tier Level Calculation A straightforward calculation determines the base tier level, which includes the total population and population density factors only. The Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Other Threat Indicators Factor are then applied by DHS to determine the final tier level. The figure below provides an illustrative overview of the tier level calculation. SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS Tier Level Calculation Total Pop. Grouping Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Pts Pop. Density Grouping Group 1 Group 2 80 X.50 + Group 3 60 X.50 = Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Pts Total Points Performance Measures and Objectives The second major component of the tiers system is Performance Measures and Objectives. The performance measures and objectives for each capability define how quickly and how well the critical tasks need to be performed. Some performance objectives apply universally across all jurisdictions. For example, the amount of time available to decontaminate victims of a chemical attack is the same in a large metropolitan city as it is in a rural area. The difference is the scale of the requirement. Other performance measures may vary across the geographic groupings. The time for arrival of a bomb squad, for example, may be much shorter in a densely populated urban area than in a less densely populated area, where evacuation of the area may be the initial response. Other performance objectives allow for the regionalization or centralization of capabilities. These are generally performance objectives related to requirements for specialized teams, such as Urban Search and Rescue or to resources that are less acutely time-sensitive, such as fatality management Base Tier Level Final Tier Level. Once States identify their jurisdictional groupings, they will be submitted to DHS. The tier level for most regions will remain unchanged; however, some may be adjusted upward by DHS due to presence of significant nationallevel critical infrastructure or other high threat situational requirements Once jurisdictions have been assigned to geographic groupings, they should review the Target Capabilities to identify the critical tasks that they would be responsible to perform and the performance measures and objectives that apply to their group. 14

23 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Capability Resource Classes The Capability Resource Class component assigns resources required to perform the assigned critical tasks to an applicable performance standard. Stakeholder working groups identified both the types of capability elements or resources (personnel, plans, organization and leadership, training, equipment and systems, and exercises) required to perform the critical tasks to the performance standards, as well as the national target levels required to prepare the Nation for incidents of national significance. The capability resources are assigned to the geographic groupings on the basis of risk. The type and amount of resources are generally higher in high population, high-density areas. For example, Type I Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces that can extricate victims from heavy construction collapse are needed in urban areas with high-rise buildings. The working group recommended Collapse Search and Rescue Teams and Heavy Rescue Strike Team and Squads for other geographic groupings. However, the Type I Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, while located in large metropolitan areas, are available for deployment to jurisdictions in other geographic groupings. For some capability resources, particularly those related to animal health and safety, the highest risk areas are not in the high population, high-density groupings. All levels of government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector and the public have a role in national preparedness. Therefore, some of the capability requirements are assigned using criteria other than geographic distribution. The critical tasks and performance objectives were analyzed by the working groups to identify those capabilities or capability elements that should be regionalized or centralized and/or are the responsibility of, in whole or in part, non-public entities. The table below provides a summary of the assignment of capability resources classes to geographic groupings, as well as to federal and state governments, non-government organizations, the private sector, and the public. SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 15

24 Capabilities Tier Summary Common Capabilities Tier Summary SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 16

25 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Prevent Mission Tier Summary SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 17

26 Protect Mission Tier Summary SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 18

27 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Respond Mission Tier Summary SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 19

28 Respond Mission Tier Summary (cont.) SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 20

29 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Respond Mission Tier Summary (cont.) SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 21

30 Respond Mission Tier Summary (cont.) SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 22

31 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Respond Mission Tier Summary (cont.) SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 23

32 Respond Mission Tier Summary (cont.) SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 24

33 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Recover Mission Tier Summary SECTION II ASSIGNMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO TIERS 25

34 : CAPABILITY SUMMARIES Capability Summary Template Capability Description The capability description is a statement of the principal action or activity that must be performed. Capabilities are combinations of resources that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or more tasks, under specified conditions and to national standards. CAPABILITY SUMMARIES: CAPABILITY SUMMARY TEMPLATE Outcome Statement of the expected outcome resulting from the performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and to national standards. Relationship to National Response Plan (NRP) ESF/Annex Maps the capability to the National Response Plan (NRP) Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Annexes that are most closely associated with the capability description and outcome statement. Activities Performed with the Capability Key activities that would be conducted with the capability are identified. This list provides additional information to support the desciption and ensures that the list of critical tasks address all appropriate activities under this capability. Critical Tasks Lists the tasks that need to be performed to achieve the desired outcome. Critical tasks are defined as those tasks that must be performed during a major event to prevent occurrence, reduce loss of life or serious injuries, mitigate significant property damage, or are essential to the success of a homeland security mission. The first column includes the task number found in the UTL. The number incorporates a reference to the Mission and Function in the taxonomy and a sequence number. The second column identifies the task. The critical task list may include new tasks identified by the stakeholder working group or tasks that were revised. These tasks will be added to the UTL and will be assigned a UTL number. Performance Measures and Objectives The Performance Measures define how the demonstration of the capability through the performance of critical tasks would be measured. The Performance Objective defines how well and how quickly the task should be performed. Some measures may be outcomes while others may be outputs that serve as surrogates or indicators for outcomes. Capability Elements 26

35 DRAFT DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE Capability Elements are the resource required to perform the critical tasks, under the conditions defined by the National Planning Scenarios, to the performance standards. They include: personnel, planning, organization & leadership, equipment & systems, training, and exercises, evaluation, and corrective actions. Any combination of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel resources can be utilized to achieve the outcome. The capability elements are not an exhaustive list of requirements, but provide a guide to the type of resources that are generally required to perform the critical tasks. Linked Capabilities Linked capabilities are those capabilities that are directly related to the subject capability and must be in place to perform tasks that feed into the capability, directly follow the capability, or that must be performed concurrently with the capability to achieve desired outcome. References Key documents used to develop the Target Capability. Capability Planning Factors and Target Levels Capability planning factors are the result of analysis of capability requirement by stakeholder working groups over a two month period and represent an initial effort to define national targets to develop a national network of capabilities. The appendix also includes the planning of assumptions and planning factors used to develop the national targets. The planning factors for each capability can be found in Appendix A. CAPABILITY SUMMARIES: CAPABILITY SUMMARY TEMPLATE 27

36 Common Target Capabilities 28

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38 Planning Capability Description This capability is the foundation on which all other capabilities are developed and enhanced. Specifically, all hazards planning is a mechanism to develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies and procedures describing how the federal, state, local and tribal governments will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment and resources to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from incidents such as those described in the National Planning Scenarios. COMMON CAPABILITIES: PLANNING Outcome The planning capability ensures the ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies. The planning process and the resultant plans incorporate an accurate hazard analysis and risk assessment. Relationship to National Response Plan ESF/Annex Planning supports all Emergency Support Functions and Annexes at the Federal, State, Local and Tribal Levels Activities Performed with the Capability Activity Description Develop Plans Develop and maintain plans for Homeland Security preparedness including strategic plans, emergency operations plans, recovery plans, mitigation plans, and continuity plans. Coordinate agreements in support of plans. Develop Exercises Develop drills and exercises to rehearse execution of plans Conduct Assessment Coordinate assessments of preparedness in support of the National Preparedness Goal. Coordinate evaluation of exercises and incident operations, including preparation of After-Action Reports. Manage a lessons learned system in support of a cycle of continuous preparedness improvement. Critical Tasks UTL# Task New Task* New Task Develop Strategic Plans that shall include, but are not limited to the national mission areas of prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from manmade and natural disasters, and acts of terrorism. The strategic plan shall define the vision, mission, goals, and objectives of the jurisdiction. Develop Emergency Operations/Response Plans describing how personnel, equipment, and other governmental, non-governmental and private resources will support and sustain incident management requirements. 30