Employing the USS HORNET MUSEUM. as an Emergency Response Center. during a major Bay Area disaster

Transcription

1 Employing the USS HORNET MUSEUM as an Emergency Response Center during a major Bay Area disaster White Paper - Rev 2 - Feb 2006 USS Hornet Museum EOC Team This white paper was created by the Aircraft Carrier Hornet Foundation as a result of the disaster that occurred in New Orleans in August 2005 when hurricane Katrina flooded the entire city. The recovery of the city and its citizens was significantly enhanced by the insertion of a US Navy warship that brought aid, comfort, and emergency operations support capabilities to the city within several days. ACHF believes this experience can serve as a use-case for having a ship-based EOC pre-positioned inside the Bay Area at a securable site.

2 A Crisis of Failed Response: The events of fall 2005 in New Orleans brought into focus the challenges faced by a community following a catastrophic event in a major urban environment, and graphically point out the critical need to create and maintain a secure first-responder infrastructure in advance of such an event. Government leaders across the country now clearly realize the need for local preparedness before a disaster occurs and the need for rapid response in its aftermath. After Katrina, it was clear the New Orleans city infrastructure had failed almost immediately and that emergency facilities thought to be sufficient for weeks, actually failed within days, compounding the misery and anger of tens of thousands of citizens Are San Francisco Bay Area Communities Ready? In the Bay Area, many city mayors recently unveiled a proposal to survey the general state of Regional Emergency Preparedness, and the availability of facilities required to meet those needs. They realize that current preparations are limited at best, while there remains no doubt the San Francisco Bay Area will experience a catastrophic event sometime in the future. The only question is how to ensure an effective initial response by local agencies during the critical first week while federal response teams are being activated and moved into the Bay Area. FEMA Factors for an EOC The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/ Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate has issued general guidance for the submission of applications for their EOC grant program. Grant funding will be awarded competitively based on certain key evaluation factors. FEMA defines an EOC as "The protected site from which State and local government officials coordinate, monitor, and direct emergency response activities during an emergency." Evaluation Factors The objective of the FEMA EOC grant program is to assist the states in building a nationwide network of fully functioning EOCs. The goal for this network is to be capable of effectively and efficiently responding to the range of natural and manmade hazards and threats to minimize the loss of life, injuries, and damage to property, and continue essential government functions without interruption. The first step towards creating a nationwide network of fully functioning EOCs is to ensure an EOC capability at the State level. FEMA incorporated the published national priorities and EOC characteristics into the evaluation factors. These factors are directly linked to deficiencies and the impact they might have on emergency operations. The FY 2002 EOC grant guidance identified the national priorities as: ¾ New EOC construction where the most cost effective action is new construction; ¾ Corrective construction to address deficiencies; ¾ Architectural and Engineering services for EOC projects in FY 2003 and out years; ¾ Creation of State Alternate EOC at an existing building for Continuity of Operations; ¾ Physical modifications to enhance security, but not the hiring of guards; ¾ Retrofits of existing EOC with collective protection system for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) agents; ¾ Redundant communications; and

3 ¾ Other projects to increase the survivability of existing State or local EOCs. The guidance also identified the characteristics of a fully functioning EOC as: ¾ Survivability the EOC can endure the effects of a realized potential risk and continue operations from the EOC or a fully-capable alternate location; ¾ Sustainability the EOC can support operations for extended durations; e.g., be able to sustain operations 24 hours a day/7 days a week, with the capability of continuous operations for a minimum of 72 hours without resupply; ¾ Security the EOC can guard against potential risks and protect operations from the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information (e.g., have sufficient security and structural integrity to protect the facility, its occupants, and communications equipment and systems from relevant threats and hazards); ¾ Interoperability the EOC can share common principles of operations and exchange routine and time-sensitive information with local jurisdictions, State-level EOCs, and FEMA s network of operations centers; and ¾ Flexibility the EOC can scale operations and adapt operational space to the all hazards event (e.g., have sufficient space, equipment, furniture, supplies, telecommunications, computer support, and the like available to satisfy mission requirements). A Unique Response: Unfortunately, in New Orleans during and after the hurricane Katrina incident in August 2005, there was no functioning EOC in place. To help mitigate the worsening humanitarian crisis in, the US Navy brought in the assault carrier USS Iwo Jima. This single mobile, floating package included a helicopter landing platform, an emergency medical facility, a communications center, a water treatment plant, a shelter for first responders and government authorities, and it became the Emergency Operations Center, fully secured and unaffected by surrounding events. In New Orleans, the convenient location of local Naval facilities enabled this quick response. Such Naval facilities no longer exist in the San Francisco Bay Area. USS HORNET as an Emergency Preparedness Facility: The USS Hornet Museum, a retired Essexclass aircraft carrier, can provide much of these same capabilities for the entire Bay Area. While the Hornet was originally built in 1943, she was significantly modernized in the mid-1950s, with other upgrades occurring until her decommissioning in As a large-scale disaster and emergency facility, it can supplement the Emergency Response Plans of the greater San Francisco Bay Area. Owned and operated by the Aircraft Carrier Hornet Foundation (ACHF), she is currently moored at Pier 3 of the former Alameda Naval Air Station. If required, the Hornet could be moved to a different location, such as the SF waterfront or elsewhere, depending on the disaster circumstances.

4 With more than seven years of restoration work already performed, the Hornet Museum is often used as a major event facility for up to 3,000 attendees. It is also used as an overnight berthing facility for youth groups and their adult chaperones, with sleeping and feeding accommodations for more than 700 people. For example, during the summer of 2005, Hornet handled the overnight stay of 1,200 Boy Scouts during their Camp-o-rama for one night. Later that summer, she handled a two-week deployment of over 100 Sea Scouts for their summer encampment program. ACHF believes it would be cost-effective to bring the ship s systems to a readiness standard that would allow rapid activation of Hornet as either a primary or alternate Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This would include a command and control center, helicopter landing platform (HLP), an emergency housing facility for EOC staff and first responders, and as a prepositioning facility for emergency provisions should the need arise. The unique aspect of this proposal is based on Hornet s capabilities as a retired Navy warship. It has an 894-foot long flight deck and a high radar mast for mounting lineof-sight radio communications systems that can reach much of the Bay Area. As a hardened floating platform, it possesses unrivaled survivability should a catastrophe such as a terrorist attack or major earthquake strike the Bay Area. Further, because of her location near a MARAD facility, she is capable of being immediately secured for the duration of the crisis, limiting access by unauthorized personnel. Hornet has the necessary common spaces to accommodate the full staff required for an EOC and tasks to be performed during a crisis scenario. She has multiple rooms that can be dedicated for communications, planning and conferencing. Wire runs are readily available throughout the ship for telecommunication and computer systems, as are the high masts and large open deck suitable for a variety of communications and satellite equipment. There are several areas that could be used as media or executive briefing areas. Hornet could provide helicopter support for four major functions that will be needed immediately upon EOC activation. (1) A Command, Control, and Communications Center for California Emergency Service personnel / FEMA / Military Liaison Teams. (2) Shelter and support including first aid for up to 1,000 first responders and government authorities. (3) A triage staging area usable for helicopter evacuation. (4) A flight deck for multiple medium lift helicopters and observation / command & control helicopters that could support continuous operations for several days before requiring replenishment.

5 Next Steps in the Process A formal study to determine the costs and timeframes for upgrading the USS Hornet could be conducted fairly quickly (several weeks) and with a minimal amount of funding. The probable upgrades required to ensure effective operation of an EOC are also fairly insignificant when compared to the money spent in New Orleans to provide a similar capability. They also could be accomplished within months, not years, leveraging the already-mentioned capabilities used by the Hornet in the normal course of its museum operations. For instance, to ensure full operation in the event of loss of the power grid in the Bay Area, the Hornet would need to obtain two modern 500kw generators. Security Concerns: The former warship is inherently more secure than most command and control sites in the Bay Area. Access control is very simple, with only a few access ramps to the ship, all of which are gated and can be locked and/or guarded. By relocating Hornet back to its original mooring position at Pier 3 South (circa 1998), the Hornet could be placed adjacent to the operational Port Security Zone of MARAD yet continue to conduct normal museum operations. When a disaster or other emergency situation arose, the Hornet could be included within the MARAD Port Security Zone by a simple gate closing, to provide a highly secure EOC site. Summary: With appropriate funding, the ACHF would complete upgrades necessary to Hornet to provide the capabilities as described, maintain the vessel and its systems in a state of readiness, and provide a coordinating structure to which the various governmental assets could be attached for training and during activation. The ACHF stands ready to work with emergency preparedness authorities in the Bay Area community to provide critical first-week disaster support in response to a major event.