7 th MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON RADIOACTIVE SOURCE SECURITY APRIL 2018, IAEA HQ, Vienna CHAIR S REPORT (Version 31 May 2018)

Transcription

1 7 th MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON RADIOACTIVE SOURCE SECURITY APRIL 2018, IAEA HQ, Vienna CHAIR S REPORT (Version 31 May 2018) IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 1

2 1. Participation The seventh meeting of the Working Group on Radioactive Source Security (WGRSS-7) was held on April 2018 in Vienna, Austria, and was attended by 107 participants from 6 8 Member States and three observer organizations (Annex A), which outnumbers any previous WGRSS meeting. Ms Alessia Maria Rodriguez y Baena from the IAEA s Division of Nuclear Security (NSNS) served as the Scientific Secretary for WGRSS-7. The background of participants ranged from assistance providers, regulators, operators, law enforcement to technical experts, and other representatives with radioactive source security responsibilities. Secretariat staff from NSNS and other organizational units also participated in the meeting. 2. Opening Remarks and Introductions: Mr Jason Tierney, Acting Director-NSNS, provided opening remarks to the WGRSS, stressing that upgrading security of radioactive material and associated facilities is one of the focus areas of the work in the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security and one of the priorities of Member States as reflected in the 5th Nuclear Security Plan for the period that was endorsed by the 61st IAEA General Conference last September. He also highlighted the objective of the WGRSS which is to identify approaches to enhance cooperation and coordination to support improved security for radioactive sources worldwide, but also and above all to serve as a forum for discussion and exchange of information by interested parties. He noted that the group of participants this year is the largest so far to attend this meeting, which he stated was an indication of the growing interest of the Radioactive Source Security community in the Member States. 3. WGRSS-7 Chair Ms Muzna Assi from the Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission (LAEC) served as the chair of WGRSS-7. The Scientific Secretary welcomed the participants and noted that reports of previous WGRSS meetings and current meeting materials are available on the IAEA s NUSEC portal at: Source-Security/April-2018-Meeting 4. Agenda The Chair asked participants for feedback on the proposed agenda and, when none were received, it was adopted without further changes (Annex B). 5. Review of WGRSS-6 The Chair of WGRSS-6, Ms Margaret Cervera, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) - United States, summarized the last meeting in terms of the major topic areas addressed. Participants noted that the WGRSS-7 agenda reflected many of the recommended subjects, identified by the previous meeting. 6. International Cooperation and Assistance: Updates on Multilateral and Bilateral Initiatives Presenter: Canada, USA, Lebanon, WINS, ISSPA This session addressed the subject of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in nuclear security areas from the donors perspective, the international community and Member States. IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 2

3 Presentation 1: Canada s Weapon Threat Reduction Program (Canada) This presentation provided an overview of the Canadian Weapons Threat Reduction projects with partner countries, international organizations, NGOs and other government departments, responsible for the mitigation of threats posed by CBRN weapons and related material. The presenter addressed nuclear and radiological security with a focus on emerging challenges and threats concerning cyber threats and limited global cyber security capacities. The presenter stressed that Member States should work with the IAEA (NSNS) on their Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to allow for coordinated and sustainable planning of nuclear security related assistance. Presentation 2: Global Cesium Security Initiative (USA) The presenter highlighted the GCSI s objective to expand and accelerate efforts, enhancing the security of Cs-137 devices worldwide through a protect, remove and reduce strategy, developed by the Office of Radiological Security (ORS). In outlining the strategy, the presenter discussed the role of alternative technologies as well as end of life and sustainable security. The presenter also stressed the critical importance of national regulatory infrastructures in Cs-137 security concentrating on the Code of Conduct and IAEA NSS 14 urging all states to have effective national regulatory infrastructures which includes licensing, security requirements, inspection and enforcement. Further explanation were provided on how ORS could assist regulatory bodies in establishing and implementing such requirements to increase sustainability of international riskreduction efforts; and concluded with the ORS new approach to Cs-137 security. Presentation 3: IAEA Assistance in the Field of Nuclear Security in Lebanon (Lebanon) The presenter explained that nuclear security activities at the Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission (LAEC) aim to combat illicit trafficking and to establish nuclear security infrastructure in the country, concentrating on LAEC services in the field of physical protection. The presenter then gave an overview of the assistance received from NSNS for enhancing this field through the International Nuclear Security Advisory Services (INSServ) mission conducted in May 2006, which resulted in the establishment of an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP). The missions, within INSSP, then followed to include several physical protection upgrades as well as repatriation of high activity disused radioactive sources. The presenter summarized the radioactive waste management status in Lebanon and then concluded on LAEC efforts to establish a safe and secure RWM store which is under establishment with the assistance of the NSNS-IAEA and ORS-US. She stressed that the Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission (LAEC) seeks to continuously improve its security infrastructure. To this effect, the LAEC is in need of a facility to secure disused and/or orphan sources. Also from the US side, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is seeking to help fulfil this need by organizing a project for upgrading the civil works in the facility used to store disused/orphaned radioactive sources. Presentation 4: World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Update (WINS) The presentation included a general overview of WINS activities with an update on the WINS Academy and its support to Nuclear Security Support Centers (NSSCs). The presenter explained the vision and mission of WINS, which are to effectively secure nuclear and other radiological materials and facilities by contributing to train competent professionals who will apply best practices to achieve operational excellence as well as to be the leaders in knowledge exchange, professional development and certification for nuclear security management. The presenter summarized the achievements of WINS, concluding with the gender champions initiative, which focuses on identifying and overcoming the barriers to women s greater participation in nuclear security, following the rational that greater diversity would be needed to address the evolving threats. IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 3

4 Presentation 5: Involvement of International Source Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA) Member Companies in the Management of Disused Sources (ISSPA) The presenter introduced the International Source Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA) and its role in radioactive source security, particularly with regard to its role in the management of disused radioactive sources. The presenter outlined ISSPA s interaction with the IAEA and regulatory agencies and its different projects implemented in the field; and listed past and future ISSPA activities. He also described ISSPA member companies roles in the management of disused radioactive sealed sources. 7. Update on the IAEA s Programme for the security of radioactive material and associated facilities Presenter: IAEA (NSNS) NSNS staff provided an update on the Secretariat s activities since the last WGRSS-6 meeting. The session included four presentations on the subject. Presentation 1: Regulatory Task Force (NSNS) The presenter summarized how the NSNS had created an internal task force to work on a harmonized approach within the division to support Member States on regulations development. He informed that the task force created a working document that would provide some steps and considerations for regulations development and general model provisions. The document would also include specific modules, proving examples of model provisions for physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, security of other radioactive material, and transport of both materials. Presentation 2: Guidance and Training Development (NSNS) In this presentation, an update was provided on guidance documents Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 20 and 14 that are being assessed this year to determine if there is a need for their formal revision. Further, the revised NSS No. 11 will be published in Technical guidance on Security Management and Security Plans for Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities is currently under development and will go to NSGC in June and then have a 120-day review period for Member States. The Guidance on the Management of Disused Sources is currently available online and will be published in hardcopy in May The TECDOC on Notification, Authorization, Inspection and Enforcement for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources is also currently under development but is expected to be published in The presenter also mentioned that there is an update currently ongoing for the training course on the Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities. In addition to this, the course on Authorizations and Inspections for the Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities, currently under development, will be piloted in Q Presentation 3: End of Lifecycle Management (NSNS) The presenter referred to last year when the Radioactive Material Security Team removed 30 Cat 1 and 2 disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) from six Member States and announced that the team is currently in procurement to remove four Cat 1 and 2 sources from three more countries. These activities are being conducted in collaboration with the IAEA Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology (NEFW), and there is currently an effort to enter into procurement to remove eight additional sources from one Member State. The presenter also highlighted that there are several other Member States requesting assistance with source removals. In the same context, there was an update on the Borehole project, which is one technical solution for the management option of disposal of a State s DSRS. In this regard, the presenter informed the meeting that Malaysia had submitted their safety case to the regulatory body and their evaluation was completed. In addition there would be an external review to be completed by May Construction and disposal operations are expected to start in July/August 2018, depending on the issuance of a license by the regulatory body. In Ghana, the safety case has been finalized and is currently being reviewed before IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 4

5 submission to the regulatory body. Construction and disposal operations are also expected to begin in Other activities in the field include the development and deployment of a mobile hot cell in Malaysia to assist with borehole operations, the development of safety and security standards for ISO containers being used as long term source storage, and upgrading a hot cell in Indonesia for the conditioning of Cat 1 and 2 disused sealed sources. Presentation 4: African Regional Project (NSNS) The presenter informed that the project was launched in April 2017 in Morocco, and has recently been extended for an additional year to March Activities during 2017 included: a launch event, two sub regional training courses (one for English speaking countries and one for French Speaking countries), and country specific support (six separate events). In total, 185 participants were trained in As for the 2018 events, these would include: one lessons learned meeting to discuss the first year progress, national workshops/expert missions (8-10 expected), and a pilot drafting school for nuclear security. The priorities for the current year of the project include developing a harmonized approach for the provision of national assistance, increased national support for finalizing and adopting draft regulations, common activities for countries with less advanced regulatory frameworks, and regional capacity building for regulatory infrastructure development. 8. IAEA Nuclear Security Needs Identified in the Context of Other Agency Activities Presenter: IAEA (NEFW, NSRW, PACT) The purpose of this session was to discuss the cross cutting security needs from the IAEA s and the international community s perspective. Presentation 1: NEFW Activities on the Management of Sources (NEFW) The presentation reported on NEFW s programme to assist Member States with cradle to grave management and tools, end of lifecycle options, including different activities organized to assist Member States compile better inventories, and capacity building. As far as technology development is concerned, it was noted that NEFW offer assistance to Member States to learn hands on how to condition Cat 3-5 disused sealed radioactive sources. It was noted that a mobile tool kit has been developed to assist with this activity and can be provided upon request. The benefits of the tool kit were mentioned, including enhanced safety and security and technical reliability at DSRS conditioning sites. The mobile tool kit can also support borehole disposal. Upcoming activities in the field include: Type B(U) package being donated from the USDOE Establishing regional qualified technical centers Promoting reuse and recycling Collaboration on new mobile hot cell- the end product will be an open source design to better assist Member States Presentation 2: Regulatory Infrastructure Development Project (RIDP) (NSRW) The presenter explained the objective and scope of the IAEA safety-security project RIDP. The project was devised to identify gaps in legal and regulatory frameworks in beneficiary countries in close collaboration with multiple divisions in the agency, donors, and country counterparts to enable better success in the projects. So far, five activities had been conducted. With a regard to joint safety-security training, the presenter highlighted an on-going eight-week pilot training course on safety and security for new regulators in Latin America. Participants expressed their keen interested in the course and noted IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 5

6 that it would be a useful format also to be implemented in other regions. Presentation 3: impact Review: Coordinated Comprehensive Cancer Control Assessment (PACT) (PACT) This presentation covered the impact review missions that assess national cancer control capacities and needs in low or middle income Member States that have requested assistance. There has been 19 missions conducted since its creation in There are three stages of review in a mission, as follows: - First there is a situational analysis and data collection, IAEA desk review with assistance from external experts - Second there is a country visit - Third the information gathered in the first two stages is analyzed and integrated into an impact report that is submitted to the Minister of Health in the recipient country The report issued is often the starting part for future cancer-related TC projects in radiation medicine, radiation safety, and possibly nuclear security. It was noted that the NSNS participation in these events is important to establish/strengthen contact with national counterparts for nuclear security for medical applications, to promote security features before/during planning of medical facilities, and to inform partner countries about security projects available to them through the IAEA. 9. National Inventory Management of Radioactive Material for Security Purposes Presenter: IAEA (NSRW), USA The session detailed the different national inventory management tools developed by the IAEA and the USA and how inventory management is considered a very important basis for any regulatory system. Presentation 1: Development of RAIS+ (NSRW) The IAEA NSRW expert presented on RAIS and how it promotes a consistent and common approach to regulatory information management in accordance with Safety Standards and the Code of Conduct. He highlighted that, ideally, RAIS is not just an inventory management software, but is integrated into the regulatory processes. Then he gave an overview of new features of RAIS+, including the possibility to integrate nuclear security related information in a more systematic way. The discussion following included some questions on different RAIS features. One of these questions was whether RAIS supports barcode reading function, which is not currently the case, but IAEA staff assured that RAIS could be customized to do so. Other questions inquired about how to update RAIS for which the IAEA is providing technical assistance both on remote and on-site basis. There were questions on the scope of RAIS and if it covers security issues. Though it does not provide a place to enter all of the details of a security system, RAIS is customizable so more details could be added as needed. Finally, the licensees interaction with RAIS was raised, but it was noted that they can access the system but are provided minimal access to provide their information in the application there (only applicable if the regulatory body hosts an online version of RAIS). The fact that RAIS can provide statistical reports in a standardized form was also explained. Presentation 2: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Integrated Source Management Portfolio: Safety and Security Integration (USA) The presenter explained different systems utilized in the US and elaborated more on: NSTS (National Source Tracking system) is developed in line with the Code of Conduct (CoC) and includes licensee information in addition to some information on the source/device. This information is verified by inspection and with an annual inventory reconciliation exercise. The system allows the regulators and manufactures to change data (role based system). IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 6

7 WBI (Web Based Licensing) includes all NRC licenses, all licenses for cat 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material where only regulators can change the data. LVS is an integration of a previous system that enables authorized licensees to verify certain information about other licensees authorized to possess, use or ship radioactive material. It is worthwhile to note that all these systems support both safety and security features. However, the need arose to ensure that the inventory management system could be utilized for emergency response operations (as a lessons learned in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina), so the information contained in the system was scrutinized to ensure all information that was needed was included and identified what was only nice to have information. 10. Cross-Cutting Issues Related to Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage: Awareness Raising Presenter: Albania, IIA In this session, the presenters shared their experiences on how they run their programs related to raising awareness of nuclear security and crosscutting issues. Presentation 1: Secure and Sustainable Management of Radioactive Sources in Albania. A Regulator s perspective (Albania) Albania explained how international obligations and for the secure management of radioactive material are implemented at the national level, presented the challenges encountered and discussed how the use of alternative technologies can be a solution to on-going security and safety challenges. Presentation 2: Role of Industry Associations in Contributing to Source Security (IIA) The presenter acknowledged the crucial role of IAEA in harmonization & guidance, and the prime responsibility of Member States/operators to implement the guidance. In the same respect, the IIA targets the CEOs/management of source owners who are responsible for this implementation. It was mentioned that IIA can serve as an interlocutor to reach directly user companies. / The presentation aimed at explaining the engagement with interested parties including industry associations, the education and communication and addressed the alternative technologies as a way to reduce the source of the security risks. The presenter stressed the importance on sharing news, engagement especially with practical suggestions that improve outputs, promoting a security culture that delivers more than compliance recognizing that operators that work together and attend industry gatherings have a desire to learn, to engage and to contribute. The presenter concluded on encouraging thoughts about how to engage with Member States that are not present. 11. Risk-Informed Approach towards the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage Presenter: Belgium, Hungary This session included national experience on the use of a risk informed approach to prioritize nuclear security systems and measures. Presentation 1: Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat for Radioactive Materials in Belgium (Belgium) The presenter outlined the different steps taken in Belgium to organize and conduct a national threat assessment for radioactive material under regulatory control. The presenter highlighted that NSS implementing guide No. 10 was used as guidance for Belgium s threat assessment. With regard to interagency coordination, the presenter highlighted the importance of proper identification of expertise and resource available. In Belgium s case, after consultation with security services, the regulatory authority IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 7

8 (FANC) took the lead in conducting the threat assessment, based on rationale that the regulatory authority was most familiar with the, objective, methodology and radioactive source security expertise required for the successful conduct of a national threat assessment. In summary, the presentation offered a case-study of a Member State s practice in implementing IAEA NSS guidance by applying general principles and recommended steps to its national context. As such the presentation was welcomed by participants and identified as a best practice for future WGRSS presentations on the same or other subject areas. Presentation 2: A Risk-Informed Approach towards the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage in Hungary (Hungary) The presenter elaborated on the national nuclear security legislative and regulatory framework for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Hungary, concentrating specifically on the risk informed aspects of the national regulation. Then he explained the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Security Upgrade Project in Hungary whose scope is to identify nuclear and radiological materials which could be potential targets, and to enhance security by removal of sources or installing/improving physical protection systems. The presenter concluded on the risk based planning of the radioactive sources inspections in the country. 12. Regulatory Bodies: Organization and Management of Authorizations & Inspections Presenter: India This session involved one lecture from India discussing the organization of the Indian regulatory body, the authorization/licensing processes, and the inspection processes. Presentation 1: Organization & Management of Authorizations and Inspections in India (India) The presentation addressed the functions of the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which are the development of safety documents; safety review and issuance of license/authorization for nuclear and radiation facilities, verification of compliance with the stipulated requirements by the nuclear and radiation facilities, regulatory inspections, safety research, licensing of key operating personnel, and the review of emergency preparedness and public information. The presentation also detailed their regulatory measures for security of radioactive material (RAM). The AERB only reviews those aspects of security that have an impact on safety. Other security aspects are reviewed by relevant government authorities. 13. Implementing IAEA Guidance on the Security of Radioactive Material: Regulatory requirements for the security of high-activity radioactive sealed source Presenter: Brazil, Bulgaria, Pakistan This session examined the regulatory requirements in different countries on regulating the security of high-activity radioactive sources. Presentation 1: Security of Radioactive Sources (Brazil) The presentation included security as part of the licensing process for radioactive sources in Brazil. This included also details on licensing the import/export of these sources. It was also discussed that the operators of RAD facilities are asked to look at relevant provisions from regulations for nuclear facilities as there are none specific to radioactive material. There are currently two new regulations (one for RAD material in use /storage, one for transport) under development. According to new regulations, RSO is designated Security Officer (no additional certification), however certification programme for RSO will be updated to include security content. Finally, the challenges were addressed which included training, information system, and safety-security interface at RAD material facilities. IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 8

9 Presentation 2: Bulgaria s Interpretation of Recommendations for Security Measures Identified in NSS 11 (Bulgaria) The presenter introduced the Act on the Safe Use of Nuclear Energy (ASUNE) which regulates the social relations associated with the state regulation of the safe use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation and with the safety of radioactive waste management and spent fuel management, as well as the rights and duties of licensees implementing these activities, in order to ensure nuclear safety, radiation protection and physical protection. The presenter also discussed other regulations currently in place in Bulgaria that are in line with the Code of Conduct and the Bulgarian national regulatory infrastructure and legislative framework. The presenter explained those regulations and concluded on the achievements of maintaining a high level of safety and security for radioactive sources, so as to reduce the likelihood of accidental harmful exposure to, or the malicious use of such sources to cause harm to individuals, society or the environment inter alia. Presentation 3: Pakistan s Interpretation of IAEA Recommendations and National Regulations (Pakistan) The presentation discussed the role of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the national regulator of Pakistan, in drafting the Regulation PAK/926 entitled Security of Radioactive Source(s). The regulation was based on the IAEA recommendations and guidelines in order to form a basis for ensuring the security of sealed radioactive sources, including categorization and assignment of security levels. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has also embarked on maintaining the security of sources from cradle-to-grave by developing an Accountability and Control Program at corporate level. The Program consists of: Acquisition of source data from all PAEC establishments. Maintenance of a source database for all sources used in all PAEC establishments. Continual inspections to evaluate and verify the measures taken in place at various establishments for safety and security of sources. Physical inventory verification of sources at all PAEC establishments to verify the sources in the database. PNRA is maintaining the national register of all categories of radioactive sources 14. Ensuring Compliance with Security Regulations Conducting Security Inspections at Radioactive Material Facilities Presenter: Canada, Malaysia, Philippines This session identified the different aspects of the inspection process in different Member States. Presentation 1: Training Safety Inspectors on Radioactive Material Security (Canada) The presenter introduced Canada s training programme within the regulatory authority to provide security expertise to inspectors to allow those inspectors that had a predominantly safety-orientated education and training to conduct security inspections of radioactive material in use and storage and of associated facilities. The presentation also entailed a series of security measure demonstration videos and how much time was needed to defeat the showcased delay measures. As many Member States are in a comparable situation of joint safety-security inspection responsibilities by regulatory body staff, the presentation was a brief outline of outline of one way to overcome training challenges in this regard. Presentation 2: Malaysia Experience on Conducting Inspections (Malaysia) The presentation provided an overview of Malaysia s regulatory infrastructure for the safety and security of radioactive sources. The presenter elaborated on Malaysia s legal system and the national policy concentrating on the inspection process within the overall security authorization process. She IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 9

10 explained the methodology of security inspections and how they entail both administrative and physical security portions. The administrative portion includes training, inventory records, and the security plan, and then the physical security portion includes details on the inspection itself. The inspection reference is the IAEA NSS-11. Presentation 3: Philippine Experience on Conducting Inspections (Philippines) The presenter introduced the Nuclear Regulatory Division (NRD), the regulatory arm of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI), which undertakes the activities in support of international commitments on radiation protection, nuclear safety, safeguards and security of nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities. She went on to detail how PNRI implements the regulatory functions and elaborated more on their inspection process. The presenter gave a detailed overview of the different steps of inspections and subsequent enforcement in the Philippines. She ended the presentation stressing that consultation with stakeholders is one of the good practices on how to improve the implementation of security inspection programs as well as in developing a new regulation related to security of radioactive material. 15. Case Studies: Facility Response to Nuclear Security Events Interface Between Facility Response and National Detection of a Nuclear Security Event Presenter: IAEA, US This session focused on the different approaches in the field of response especially those involving interface between different stakeholders. Presentation 1: Establishing a Preventative Radiological Detection Program (USA) The presenter provided his views on establishing a preventive radiological detection programme from the perspective of a private sector partner (PSP). He noted that the PSPs are an important element in contributing to a comprehensive radioactive source security programme. He presented on the establishment of the framework to coordinate detection activities in the US state of Massachusetts. He talked about the steps and the activities undertaken. He highlighted that it is a continuous process and efforts are still ongoing to increase and maintain awareness, provide training as well as assist with the calibration and maintenance of radiation detection equipment. Presentation 2: Incident and Trafficking Database Trends and Cases in Radioactive Material Security (NSNS) The presenter presented the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database and focused on the statistics that can be drawn from the analysis of reported incidents. Three topics were discussed: the location of MORC incidents, the question of sources in transport, and the trends in trafficking in other radioactive material. He informed that as of the meeting date incidents had been reported. He described interesting patterns in types of incidents detected both in the interior and at borders. He noted that more than 50% of incidents were detected through regulatory activities, including inspection and reports of loss of material by licensees. This highlights the importance of good communication channels between the regulators and the licensees, as well as the role of reliable inventory systems and inventory checks. By the end of the presentation there was a question on whether there is data available in the database on the intent, and this was confirmed but it was clarified that it is probably the least provided information due to sensitivities etc. A fact that an incident is reported to the ITDB does not demonstrate weak security, on the contrary, it shows good regulatory infrastructure in the reporting country. 16. Debrief on the Findings from the Breakout Sessions I, II, and III Presenter: Group 1 (Fac.: Canada), Group 2 (Fac.: Montenegro), Group 3 (Fac.: Spain) The breakout sessions followed a common methodology, proposed by Canada, in that the respective IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 10

11 facilitators prepared some instructions notes, introductory presentation and a handout for participants. In the handout the process was explained, including the purpose of the breakout session and some generic questions to encourage reflection and participation. The respective facilitators had the flexibility to use the method they were most comfortable with to encourage discussions and interactions. In breakout session III, facilitation was conducted through the use of small groups. In the second breakout session II, discussions were held in the plenary; whereas in breakout session I the discussions took place in form of a round-table discussion. Group 1 Safety vs. Security Categorization (Canada) Breakout session 1 was composed of approximately participants with Mr. Raphael Duguay (Canada/CNSC) serving as a facilitator. The facilitator provided some initial thoughts on the subject and made a presentation on the CNSC Categorization and Aggregation Tool. This presentation covered the challenges with aggregation for operators using and storing multiple categories 3 and 4 radioactive sealed sources. The facilitator presented the methodology used with a reference to existing IAEA guidance on categorization (E.g. RSG 1.9, NSS 14, and NSS 11). During this session, participants were invited to share their experience and challenges with the categorization system. One expert noted that as part of the revision of NSS 11, several experts had looked at the different parameters and systems of categorization for safety and security. In their review they had concluded that the current RSG 1.9 categorization system for radioactive sources would be good enough for security purposes. All participants agreed that a basis for categorization is necessary. It was also mentioned that the graded approach is important to consider when applying security levels. Some participants mentioned the need to establish clear guidelines on aggregation and practical examples. In this regard, participants expressed the wish to include aggregation in the new version of the IAEA s RAIS system. All participants agreed that the current categorization method provides a robust foundation to assigned security levels. However, as the categorization system in IAEA safety guidance RSG 1.9 is based on a radiological emergency, it does not necessarily take into consideration all the potential consequences in case of a Radioactive Dispersal Device. The group concluded therefore that although not perfect, the current categorization system was considered to be adequate with some flexibility in implementation and interpretation to consider other consequence factors. These other consequence factors may have to be assessed on a case by case basis to modify the security level assigned to one site. Participants noted in this regard the importance of other factors (ex: packaging, mobility, half-life, chemical form, dispersibility, etc.). Some participants mentioned that there are still challenges in the implementation of categorization because of the lack of awareness. In terms of good practices, categorization should be clearly defined in Member States regulations. This would allow better international consistency and opportunities for harmonization. Also, the categorization system should be part of the licensing process to ensure that a process is implemented to identify what are the categories and to associate the proper security level and/or requirements. Group 2 Designing a Security System for Radioactive Material in Storage: Safety-Security Interface in Practice (Montenegro) Breakout Session II was facilitated by Ms Tamara Djurovic (Montenegro). In this session participants discussed the following subjects: (1) Areas subject to potential conflicts between safety and security and strategies for solutions; (2) Good practices for a coordinated approach to safety and security; (3) Considerations in the management of changes and modifications; (4) Related recommendations to the IAEA; and (5) Ideas for next, future, sessions. Discussing the first subject, participants identified a series of areas with potential conflicting priorities of safety and security and offered some strategies to solve these. For the second subject, participants IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 11

12 listed a number of good practices for a coordinated approach to safety and security which were well received by the WGRSS participants. Participants noted on the third subject a series of considerations in the management of changes and modifications, needed to adopt in existing safety- systems to incorporate security systems and measures. On (4) recommendations were made to the IAEA to organize meetings, events, seminars with both safety and security agencies and experts, including participation of representatives from both the regulatory body and operators from an early stage; to develop documents such as security guides and safety standards that are consistent and complementary with involvement of safety experts in the production of security documents and vice-versa; and to consider joint safety-security expert teams within the IAEA assistance programmes to Member States in order to improve safety-security integration, e.g. contingency planning. Group 3 Security Culture: Countering Insider Threats to the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage (Spain) Breakout Session III was facilitated by Mr. Andres Sanz Coronado (Spain). Participants concentrated in their discussion on characteristics of the insider threat to the security of radioactive material in storage. Considering the size of the group, participants split into three study groups to discuss security measures to mitigate the insider threats. The first study group focused on surveillance, physical protection measures and technological measures for tracking stolen radioactive sources. The second group on management of human resources as employees, suppliers and visitors; and the third group on legal regulation and tools for background checking and risk assessments on persons. 17. Upcoming Events in Presenter: NSNS This session offered, through presentation by IAEA staff, a preview of upcoming events of likely interest to WGRSS participants. Participants were invited to submit synopses for the upcoming IAEA international conference CN-269: International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material: The Way Forward for Prevention and Detection. The conference will be a conference organized by the IAEA s Division of Nuclear Security, bridging the gap between two communities: Those authorities responsible for retaining regulatory control for the security of radioactive material and those authorities responsible for the detection and response to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The conference is intended to provide a dedicated forum for those two communities to discuss interface issues, cooperation and communication, e.g. to ensure a smooth and timely transition from facility-response to national detection of a nuclear security event. 18. Closing Remarks and Next Steps This session addressed the following topics: Terms of Reference (ToR) The ToR were shared in advance of the meeting for critical review by the attendees. A few suggestions were made as to how the document could be revised, namely by (i) opening the WGRSS to non- Member States, upon their request, consistently with NSNS practice for other meetings; (ii) expanding the scope of the WGRSS to include all radioactive material and not only radioactive sources, consistently with the revised NSS 11, and (iii) nominating participants to the WGRSS for a term of two or three years, so has to ensure continuity and focus in the work of the same. No objection to the above proposals was made. It was agreed that the Secretariat would take the lead in preparing a revised version of ToR and share the draft with the attendees of WGRSS-7 to seek feedback, in a consultative manner. Feedback from the Participants on Future Meetings Suggested topics included the following: Exchanging radioactive source security regulations; IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 12

13 The regulatory body s role in promoting nuclear security culture; Collaboration between different authorities & organizations in the security of RS; Training in physical protection systems for regulators; Best practices in protecting mobile RS (well logging, industrial radiography); Sharing of experience on cost-benefit analyses of specific security measures; Security by design within the framework of establishing a new practice/radioactive source facility; Norms and certifications criteria for barriers; Facility response to a nuclear security event; and Security considerations for the different management options of DSRS. The participants also welcomed the consultative and collaborative approach applied during the preparation and implementation of the WGRSS-7 meeting (e.g., attendees were offered the opportunity of contributing directly to the preparation of the draft Agenda) and recommended the same be applied in the future. Chair for WGRSS-8 The Secretariat requested participants to advice of interest so that a chair can be selected in advance of the next meeting. Mr Surur Kedir Mohammed (Director for Notifications and Authorisations Directorate, Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority) welcomed the possibility to chair the WGRSS-8 meeting and his nomination was approved by the participants. Tentative dates for the WGRSS-8 meeting were announced to be April The chair advised that the WGRSS meeting summary would be circulated to participants for comments and then finalized and posted to NUSEC as part of the meeting records. SH-MAFA made closing remarks, emphasizing that topics not within the scope of the WGRSS, such as transport security, could be addressed through other activities of the division. Muzna Assi WGRSS-7 Chair, 26 April 2018 Annexes: A. Agenda. B. List of Participants. IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 13

14 Annex A. Agenda Time Monday 23 April 09:30 09:45 Opening Remarks, Introduction of Chair Topic Presenter: a/ Director IAEA Nuclear Security Division (NSNS) 09:45 10:15 Introductions & Review of Previous WGRSS Meeting Presenter: WGRSS-7 Chair, Scientific Secretary, WGRSS-6 Chair Chair s Opening Remarks Administrative Matters Adoption of Agenda Review of WGRSS-6 Outcomes 10:15 10:45 International Cooperation and Assistance: Updates from Multilateral and Bilateral Initiatives 10:45 11:15 Coffee Break Presenter: Canada, USA, WINS, ISSPA Canada s Weapon Threat Reduction Program (Canada) Global Cesium Security Initiative (USA) 11:15 12:30 International Cooperation and Assistance: Updates from Multilateral and Bilateral Initiatives (continued) 12:30 14:00 Lunch Break IAEA Assistance in the Field of Nuclear Security in Lebanon (Lebanon) Release of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Update (WINS) Involvement of International Source Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA) member companies in the management of disused sources (ISSPA) 14:00 15:30 Update on the IAEA s programme for the security of radioactive material and associated facilities Presenter: IAEA (NSNS) Discussion Points: IAEA programme updates, including: 15:30 16:00 Coffee Break Regulatory Task Force Guidance and Training Development End of Life-Cycle Management Update from the Africa Regulations Development Project Next Steps IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 14

15 16:00 17:15 IAEA Nuclear Security Needs Identified in the Context of Other Agency Activities Presenter: IAEA (Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Waste Technology [NEFW], Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety [NSRW], Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy [PACT]) NEFW Activities on the Management of Sources (NEFW) Regulatory Infrastructure Development Projects (NRSW) impact Review: Coordinated Comprehensive Cancer Control Assessment (PACT) 17:30 19:00 Networking and Cocktail Reception VIC Restaurant (Mozart Room) Tuesday 24 April 09:30 10:45 National Inventory Management of Radioactive Material for Security Purposes 10:45 11:15 Coffee Break Presenter: IAEA (NSRW), USA Development of RAIS+ (NSRW) United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Integrated Source Management Portfolio: Safety and Security Integration (USA) 11:15 12:30 Cross-Cutting Issues Related to Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage 12:30-14:00 Lunch Break Presenter: Albania, Lebanon, International Irradiation Association (IIA) Secure and Sustainable Management of Radioactive Sources in Albania: a Regulator s Perspective (Albania) Role of Industry Associations in Contributing to Source Security (IIA) 14:00-15:30 A Risk-Informed Approach towards the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00 17:00 Presenter: Belgium, Hungary Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat for Radioactive Materials in Belgium (Belgium) A Risk-Informed Approach towards the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage in Hungary (Hungary) Regulatory Bodies: Organization and Management of Authorizations & Inspections Presenter: India Organization and Management of Authorizations & Inspections (India) IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 15

16 Wednesday 25 April 09:30 11:00 Implementing IAEA Guidance on the Security of Radioactive Material: Regulatory requirements for the security of high-activity radioactive sealed sources 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break Presenter: Brazil, Bulgaria, Pakistan Security of Radioactive Sources (Brazil) Bulgaria s Interpretation of Recommendations for Security Measures Identified in NSS 11 (Bulgaria) Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources in Pakistan: Interpretation of IAEA Recommendations and National Regulations (Pakistan) 11:00-12:30 Ensuring Compliance with Security Regulations Conducting Security Inspections at Radioactive Material Facilities 12:030-14:00 Lunch Break 14:00-15:30 Breakout Sessions Presenter: Canada, Malaysia, Philippines Training Safety Inspectors on Radioactive Material Security (Canada) Malaysia Experience on Conducting Inspections (Malaysia) Philippine Experience on Conducting Inspections (Philippines) Session I: Safety Versus Security Categorization; Facilitator: Montenegro Session II: Designing a Security System for Radioactive Material in Storage: Safety-Security Interface in Practice; Facilitator: Canada Session III: Security Culture: Countering Insider Threats to the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage; Facilitator: Spain 15:30 16:00 Coffee Break Available rooms for break-out sessions: Press Room, M0E19, M0E60, M0E61 16:00-17:00 Case Studies: Facility Response to Nuclear Security Events Interface Between Facility Response And National Detection of a Nuclear Security Event Presenter: IAEA, USA Establishing a Preventative Radiological Detection Program (USA) The Incident and Trafficking Database Trends and Cases in Radioactive Material Security (IAEA/NSNS) IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 16

17 Thursday 26 April 09:30-10:30 Debrief on the findings from the break-out sessions I, II and III. Presenter: Breakout Session Facilitators 10:30-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00-11:30 Upcoming Events in Discussion Points: CN-269 Code of Conduct Initiatives (NSRW) Nuclear Security Activities for second half of 2018, :30-12:30 Closing Remarks and Next Steps Presenter: IAEA (SH-MAFA), Chair, Scientific Secretary Terms of Reference Review (e.g., criteria for participation in future WGRSS meetings) Feedback from the WGRSS and Nest Steps Chair for WGRSS-8 Process for Chair s Report Finalization 12:30 Meeting Adjourned IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 17

18 Annex B. List of Participants Nr Mr/ Ms First Name Last Name Country Organization Address of Organization 1 Mr Rustem Paci Albania Radiation Protection Office Radiation Protection Office Aleksander Moisiu, 80 TIRANA ALBANIA 2 Mr Yeghishe Gondakyan Armenia Nuclear and Radiation Safety Nuclear and Radiation Safety Centre Centre 4 Tigran Metz avenue YEREVAN 0010 ARMENIA 3 Ms Raquel Delgado Austria WINS World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Landstraßer Hauptstraße 1/ VIENNA AUSTRIA 4 Ms Rhonda Evans Austria WINS World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Landstraßer Hauptstraße 1/ VIENNA AUSTRIA 5 Mr Pierre Legoux Austria WINS World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Landstraßer Hauptstraße 1/ VIENNA AUSTRIA 6 Mr Ceyhun Eyvazov Azerbaijan Specialized Establishment Isotope of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Azerbaijan Specialized Establishment Isotope of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Azerbaijan Baku-Shamakhi Highway 32nd km BAKU AZ0100 AZERBAIJAN rustial@yahoo.com y.gondakyan@nrsc1.am raquel.delgado@wins.org rhonda.evans@wins.org pierre.legoux@wins.org jeyhun.eyvazov@fhn.gov.az IAEA WGRSS-7 Chair s Report April 2018 Page 18