NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM 1976

Transcription

1 A t T : M NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM 1976 STANFORD LIBRARIES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES NIXETY-FOURTH COXGRESS SECOND SESSION ON ERDA FISCAL YEAR 1977 AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER MARCH 18, 1976 Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

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3 NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM 1976 HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES NINETY-FOUKTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON ERDA FISCAL YEAR 1977 AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER MARCH 18, 1976 Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1976 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C Price $1.55

4 JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY JOHN O. PASTORE, Rhode Island, Chairman MELVIN PRICE, Illinois, Vice Chairman SENATE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JOHN YOUNG, Texas STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri TENO RONCALIO, Wyoming JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico MIKE McCORMACK, Washington JOHN V. TUNNEY, California JOHN E. MOSS, California HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee JOHN B. ANDERSON, Illinois CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey MANUEL LUJAN, JB., New Mexico JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas FRANK HORTON, New Jersey JAMES L. BUCKLEY, New York ANDREW J. HINSHAW, California GEORGB F. MURPHY, Jr., Executive Director JAMES B. GRAHAM, Assistant Director WILLIAM C. PABLEB, Committee Counsel JAMES K. ASSHLSTINE, Assistant Counsel ALBION W. KNIGHT, Jr., Professional Staff Member NORMAN P. KLUO, Technical Consultant STEPHEN J. LANES, Technical Consultant BEVERLY A. BAUGHMAN, Research Assistant MICHAEL R. KEPPEL, GAO Consultant CHRISTOPHER C. O'MALLEI, Printing Editor (H)

5 TOPICAL SUBJECT.. ". < : '.. Page Hearings on Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program on Thursday, March 18, 1976 ^-.^ _.._.. - : 1 Opening remarks of Senator Montoya!. 1 Statement by Senator Jackson ^_i ^ 1 Statement of Richard W. Roberts, Assistant Administrator, for Nuclear Energy, ERDA J._-_J L: : 2 Statement of Adm. H. G. Rickover, Direbtor, Division of Naval Reactors, ERDA _.. 3 Soviet submarines. _: '_: : 3 Attack submarine construction _. 4 Trident submarine 1. 5 Number of missile tubes >-_, :._,._,. -., 5 Strategic missile submarine construction ^t. ^ 6 Submarine shipbuilding capacity. ;- ^-_-- : ^ 6 Trident cost 7 Excess flag officers 8 Cruise missiles 8 Soviet Navy vs. U.S. Navy cruise missile capability 10 Safety of nuclear power 15 Safety record of naval reactors 16 Importance of training and oversight 17 GE engineers 18 Probability of nuclear confrontation 19 Fusion 20 Designing plants to anticipate problems 21 Never an accident to damage naval fuel 22 Government representative at each commercial plant 23 Commercial industry has access to naval information 24 Personal responsibility 25 Shippingport experience 26 Reactors can be operated safely 27 Emphasis on safety 28 Statement of appreciation 29 Statement of Senator Howard Baker 31 Additional views of Adm. H. G. Rickover 33 Mission of the U.S. Navy 34 Soviet naval threat 34 Trident 36 General purpose naval forces 37 SSN-688 class attack submarines 37 Advanced design submarine nuclear propulsion plant. 37 Surface warships 38 Aircraft carriers. 38 Carrier size 38 The fourth Nimitz class carrier, CVN Nuclear propulsion for guided missile major combatants 41 Advantages of nuclear propulsion for surface warships 41 Title VIII Nuclear Navy 46 Aegis ships 48 Conversion of nuclear cruiser Long Beach to Aegis 50 Comparison of CSGN and DDG Comparison of cost, CSGN and DDG (Hi)

6 IV Page Cost issues cited by opponents of nuclear propulsion 53 Shipbuilding capacity 53 Need for high capability ships 54 HEARING DATE Thursday, March 18, STATEMENTS OF ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES Roberts, Richard W., Assistant Administrator for Nuclear Energy, ERDA_ 2 Rickover, Adm. Hyman G., Director, Division of Naval Reactors 3 Wegner, William, Deputy Director, Division of Naval Reactors 2 Leighton, David T., Associate Director for Surface Ships and the Light Water Breeder Reactor, Division of Naval Reactors 9 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Statement by Senator Jackson 1 Soviet Navy vs. Navy cruise missile capability 10 Statement by Senator Baker 31 Additional views of Adm. H. G. Richover 33 APPENDIX Appendix. Report entitled "Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes for U.S. Naval Nuclear Powered Ships and their Support Facilities, Report NT-76-1, August

7 NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM 1976 THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1976 CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, Washington, D.C. The Subcommittee on Legislation met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room H-403, the Capitol, Senator Joseph M. Montoya (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Montoya and Symington and Representatives Young, Price, Roncalio, Anderson, and Lujan. Also present: George F. Murphy, Jr., executive director, and Albion W. Knight, Jr., professional staff member. OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR MONTOYA Senator MONTOYA. The subcommittee will be in order. The Subcommittee on Legislation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy meets this morning to receive testimony from Admiral Rickover on the U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion program, and the light water breeder reactor program under the Energy Research and Development Administration. As always, Admiral Rickover, we are pleased to have you before us Ẇould you please proceed to bring us up to date, particularly on the nuclear navy. Admiral RICKOVER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Roberts, who is my boss in ERDA, is here, and I believe he would like to say a few words first. Senator MONTOYA. Before we start with Dr. Roberts, if there is no objection, I will place in the record at this point a statement by Senator Jackson. [The statement by Senator Jackson follows:] STATEMENT BY SENATOR JACKSON It has come to my attention that the Executive Branch is studying what policy this country should follow regarding the export.of American nuclear technology to the Soviet Union. Requiring particular attention is the interest expressed by the Soviets in acquiring, on a commercial basis. U.S. light-water reactor technology. I have written letters to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration regarding my serious concern over the export of our light-water reactor technology. My concern in this matter stems from the fact that the light-water reactor technology currently available in the United States derives in large part from (1)

8 the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. The first light-water reactor designed to generate electricity on a commercial basis was developed as a part of this."navy program since, at the time, no other technical organization within the "country was capable of managing such a program. Since then, advances in light-water reactor technology growing out of the Navy program have been made available to U.S. industry. This has increased the benefits that the American people have derived from.these federal programs. At the same time, we have developed a strong commercial power reactor industry. Because this technology has both civilian and military applications, great care must be taken to insure that it does not contribute to the military potential of our principal adversary, the Soviet Union. It is significant that the Soviets, in their work on light-wate.r redactors, have concentrated almost exclusively on military applications 'the propulsion of nuclear-powered submarines. It is naive to think that any U.S. light-water reactor technology exported to the Soviet Union will not provide direct benefits to the Soviet nuclear submarine program. In fact, such technology will assist the Soviets in upgrading their nuclear submarines, thereby adding a qualitative improvement to the already sizeable numerical advantage that the Soviets enjoy in this area. It would be foolhardy for the government of the United States to contribute to the upgrading of the Soviet Navy by allowing the export of sensitive nuclear technology.... I, and I believe my colleagues in the Congress, regard the export of lightwater reactor technology to the Soviet Union as a very serious matter. Over the years, Congress and the Executive Branch have developed a policy and procedures to control the export of nuclear technology. It is important that Any policy which the Executive Branch wishes to adopt regarding export of American nuclear technology to the Soviet Union must first be submitted to the Congress for a thorough review prior to implementation. STATEMENT OF RICHARD W. ROBERTS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR NTJCIEAR ENERGY, ERDA Dr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman., One of the things that has impressed me about the Naval Reactors Division is that it operates more nuclear reactors than any organization in the country, some 135 different operating nuclear reactors. They have just logged their 1,400th year of safe, successful, reactor operation; 106 submarines and 7 surface ships have now steamed more than 30 million miles. I am impressed especially by the attention paid to quality in the /entire naval reactor program and how this has impacted on the commercial nuclear reactor program in this country. The fact that all of these things have happened is very much attributable to Admiral Rickover's vision, and indeed, tenacity. Senator MONTOYA. How many reactors dp you have? Dr. ROBERTS. The Naval Reactors Division is responsible for 135 operating nuclear reactors. Senator MONTOYA. Where are the other reactors? You mentioned : figures that total 113. Dr. ROBERTS. 106 on submarines, 7 in surface ships there are a number of prototypes,, and what are the other ones, Mr. Wegner? Mr. WEGNER. Multiple reactors. Admiral RICKOVER. Some ships have more than one; Enterprise, for example, has eight. Senator MONTOYA. I have seen those. Admiral RIGKOVER. Yes, sir. And the Nimitz has two. Of course, as Dr. Roberts says, we have a number in our land prototypes which are like the designs on the ships. All told I am responsible for 135 operating naval reactors.

9 Senator MONTOYA. Is that all you wish, to say, Dr. Koberts? Dr. ROBERTS. That is all I have to say. Senator MONTOYA. Admiral Bickover. STATEMENT OF ADM. H. CK RICKOVER, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF NAVAL REACTORS, ERDA Admiral RICKOVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to give you some statistics about the program. In a very short time I will tell you what we are doing. As Dr. Roberts said, we have 106 submarines in operation now. This includes 65 attack submarines and 41 ballistic-missile submarines. There are 28 additional SSN-688 class attack submarines and 4 Tridents authorized. That gives us a total of 106, and with 32 more, that makes 138 submarines that I am now responsible for. I have not included the NR-1 nuclear research vehicle that is also in operation. We have two nuclear carriers in operation. These are surface ships, of course. And two more being built. And we have five nuclear cruisers in operation, and four more being built. So that gives us 152 nuclear vehicles that we are responsible for. SOVIET SUBMARINES Senator MONTOYA. How does that compare with the Russian fleet? Admiral RICKOVER. They have more. They have no nuclear surface ships, but they have about 30 more atomic submarines than we have. They surpassed us in nuclear submarines in I might as well talk about that subject now. They are turning out about four times as many submarines a year as we are, and some of them are very advanced. For example, they have 75 ballistic missile submarines of which 55 are nuclear powered. Included in the nuclear units are what they call their Delta class submarines which fire ballistic missiles having a range of 4,200 miles. They operate these right off their coast in the Barents Sea and northern waters, and with 4,200-mile missiles they have the range to reach anywhere in the United States, practically the entire continent if they wish to. I said they have a large number altogether. They have 34 of what we call Yankee class submarines. These presently have ballistic missiles with a range of 1,600 miles. And even with the 1,600-mile range those submarines can cover much of the United States. [Deleted.] [Senator Symington having reentered the room, Admiral Rickover offers the following recapitulation:] I am just answering a question of the chairman's about the relative strength of submarines between the United States and Russia. I said that since 1970 they have exceeded us in the number of nuclear submarines, and they are presently producing about four times as many as we are per year. I noted that one of the most significant developments is the Delta class submarine which fires missies with a range of 4,200 miles. This range is so great that they don't have to operate far off the Russian coast in the north and they can cover China and the United States from there. The Soviets actually have Delta's making patrols.

10 Also they have one or more of their older Yankee class ballistic-missile submarines stationed in the Atlantic. These submarines carry missiles, which at present, have a range of 1,600 miles that will soon be extended to 2,500 miles. Even with the 1,600-mile range they can cover most of the highly populated areas of the United States. That is as far as I got at this point. Senator SYMINGTON. As long as you brought it up, may I ask a couple of questions? Senator MONTOYA. Sure. Senator SYMINGTON. As you know, I have been worried about submarines Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON [continuing]. For a long time. I have felt it. is our No. 1 strategic weapon. How many submarines do you think we should have more being built per year than we are building now? ATTACK SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION Admiral RICKOVER. Several years ago the building program was set at five per year. These are the new attack type, the SSN-688 class high speed submarine, [deleted]. When Admiral Zunrwalt was Chief of Naval Operations, it is my opinion he did not want to build any more attack submarines. Finally, a compromise was made where we would build five every 2 years. That was subsequently reduced by the systems analysts to make it two in 1 year and one every other year, and that is where we stand now; except that the House Armed Services Committee, I believe, has voted this year to have an additional submarine. Senator SYMINGTON. Well, as you know, also I have been worried about the price of the Trident. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. I think the Poseidon in my over 30 years in Government is the No. 1 strategic weapon in the world today submarine regardless of the nature of it. Why did Admiral Zumwalt not want to built any more? Admiral RICKOVER. I believe that Admiral Zumwalt,felt that attack submarines were no longer a threat, and I believe he convinced people in the Defense Department, and possibly as high up as the White House, that submarines were no longer a threat and, therefore, we didn't need them. He also said if he had his way he wouldn't build any nuclear surface ships. He actually said that in a meeting. But that was his opinion and, of course, being Chief of Naval Operations and you know how things work in Government and in life the man who is close to the throne generally has his way because the man on the throne has many things to do. It is like in law possession is ninetenths of the law. So the man right up at the top, who filters all the recommendations, generally has his say. I certainly have found that to be true in my experience in Government. He supported Trident, I will say that. Mr. Leighton said Admiral Zumwalt supported Trident, and that is correct. He fully supported Trident.

11 TRIDENT SUBMARINE Senator SYMINGTON. One more question. My worry about the Trident has to do with price. I have heard that if you took the warheads out of the Poseidon you could get the same distance, [deleted] miles of the missile as you do in the Trident. I would rather see more submarines, but because of money, there is going to be a continuing fight about the cost of Trident missile submarines. You mentioned the Soviet Yankee class and a 4,200-mile missile? Admiral RICKOVER. That is the new Delta class. It is a follow-on to the Yankee. Senator SYMINGTON. Delta? Admiral RICKOVER. A follow-on to the Yankee class. Senator SYMINGTON. Now, if you could build as many Poseidon class as you wanted, how many would you build a year? Admiral RICKOVER. How many would I build? How many Poseidons would I build a year? I would rather answer that question in a different way if I may do so. I would like to give you some background. You must remember that our 41 ballistic missile submarines were all designed with the technology available in the 1950's. They were all built between 1958 and 196Y. The first ones are getting to be 20 years old. For a submarine to be viable without requiring excessive amounts of maintenance it should be replaced in at most 25 years. We must plan for an orderly replacement program anyway. Assuming the United States should retain a sea-based strategic deterrent with the present number of submarine missile tubes, I would build three Trident class submarines a year. Now, to answer your questions specifically about the high cost of the Trident. Are you familiar with the origin \ Senator SYMINGTON. I think so, yes. Admiral RICKOVER. The origin was that we have a large submarine that could only make 4 knots and would most of the time rest on the Continental Shelf of the United States. That was the concept. That was dreamed up by the systems analysts. Senator SYMINGTON. Four knots? Admiral RICKOVER. Four knots. That is right. NUMBER OP MISSILE TUBES Let me add that the systems analysts have for years recommended we build no more nuclear ships of any kind. And you well remember that some years ago they wanted to sink 10 of our Polaris submarines. They wanted them actually sunk. That is correct, sir. I am sure you are familiar with that. The number of missile tubes and their size was a major issue in the design of the Trident submarine. I recommend approval of 20 missile tubes, although I would have preferred reducing the number to 16. This recommendation received agreement within the Navy. The decision to use 24 missile tubes by the Department of Defense was based on the cost effectiveness studies and recommendations of their system analysts. Mr. Laird, who was Secretary of Defense at that time, said

12 if the Navy reopened this issue, the White House might not support the Trident. That is the actual politics of the Trident. A question has been asked, "Wouldn't it be cheaper to build submarines having the same total missile carrying capacity as the Trident but with fewer missile tubes per submarine?" Several studies have been made of the optimum size of the ship. These studies conclude, and it is obvious, that the cost per missile is greater for a ship with 16 missiles than one with 24 missiles. Senator SYMINGTON. One more question. Admiral RICKOVER. Have I answered your question? Senator SYMINGTON. I think so. STRATEGIC MISSILE SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION Eepresentative YOUNG. I was interested in the original question how many would you build if you had your way? Senator SYMINGTON. That is good, John. Admiral BICKOVER. We now have a total of 656 strategic ballistic missile tubes in submarines and probably we are going to end up with no more than we have now. With the presently planned yearly building program of 1; 2; 1; 2, and so on, we will have a decrease in the number of submarine strategic ballistic missile launch tubes in the 1980's. With a program of three Tridents per year, the total number of missile tubes does not drop below the present level of 656. That is why I recommend building three per year, sir. Of course, that is a lot o,f money, I know that. Representative YOUNG. Admiral, what is the capacity of this country to build submarines? Admiral RICKOVER. We once had seven yards delivering an average of 10 nuclear submarines per year. The capacity depends on what size program is approved. We have a system where we change the program every year and when we reduce from building 10 a year to 3 or 4 a year, the capacity goes down. It is not only the shipbuilding capacity, it is also the manufacturing capacity that goes down. Building nuclear ships requires highly specialized industrial organization and special facilities and tools. If you can keep that going you are all right. But the minute you cut down, the companies shift over to other work and it takes a very long time to get back into building the highly specialized equipment required for nuclear ships. This is why we need approval for long lead items in order to keep the production lines going. The manufacturers who have to make all this equipment, which is very complex, devote their best people and facilities to the work. This is the great dilemma we face. Representative YOUNG. Would you yield further for one more question? Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. SUBMARINE SHIPBUILDING CAPACITY Representative YOUNG. Admiral, what is the capacity now? Admiral RICKOVER. On an all-out basis we could probablv build 10 or 12 submarines a year. The Russians could build about 20 nuclear

13 submarines per year on a single shift basis and more if they worked overtime. They are building about 10 submarines per year right now without any particular exertion. They have expanded their submarine building capacity an estimated 50 percent over the past 10 years, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Admiral Kickover, Congressman Young asked what our present capacity was. What can we do today with our active shipyards? Admiral RICKOVER. If Congress gives the Navy the authority to build more ships the Navy could get them built. We have commissioned 17 nuclear submarines in 1 year. Senator MONTOYA. Some of our shipyards have been deactivated. What can we do with those, or in those which are still active? Admiral RICKOVER. We built many of them in Navy yards. We can go back to building submarines at Portsmouth and Mare Island. Ingalls, a commercial shipyard, used to build them. We can build more if they are approved. TRIDENT COST Senator MONTOYA. What is the cost of the Trident today? Admiral RICKOVER. The total Navy cost of the Trident program right now, and that includes the cost of the ships, all the research and development, and the base at Bangor, Wash., is currently estimated to be $19 billion, I think. Senator SYMINGTON. $19 billion per ship? Admiral RICKOVER. The total cost covers 11 ships. I might say parenthetically the reason that the Defense Department added in their 5-year program an llth ship was to keep the program going because of the necessity to replace our aging ballistic missile submarines. The total program cost is presently $19.5 billion. But only half of that is for the construction of 11 ships. The other half is for the research and development, procurement of missiles and the base. Senator MONTOYA. $19.5 billion in constant dollars or Admiral RICKOVER. That number includes escalation to the year of expenditure. Senator MONTOYA. Chances are Admiral RICKOVER. The $19.5 billion figure is the Navy's current cost estimate for the entire program. The program cost estimate has been revised to include the eleventh submarine and currently projected escalation. Of course, the estimated escalation rates may change. Senator MONTOYA. That is what I am trying to suggest. Senator SYMINGTON. If the chairman will yield that means about $1,730 million a ship, and if it goes up you have a $2 billion submarine. Admiral RICKOVER. Well, you are using a different type of figuring. Senator SYMINGTON. I am dividing 11 into 19. Admiral RICKOVER. Sir, if you took all military hardware, no matter what it is, and used the approach of counting in your research and development, you would get different figures compared to just hardware costs. If you are talking about the cost of a complete ship with missiles and bases you are right. Senator SYMINGTON. Your problem is you can't walk the poopdeck of a submarine, and a lot of admirals in addition to Zumwalt like to walk that poopdeck. So I am really supporting you, but we have to get the information as to why this heavy cost.

14 : s Let me ask you this question. Admiral RICKOVER. May I answer that last question? Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. EXCESS FLAG OFFICERS Admiral RICKOVER. What you have in the Navy, as I have testified, is a large number of excess flag officers just as you have in your favorite service, the Air Force. You have nearly twice as many colonels and lieutenant colonels for every airplane in the Air Force. What have you tione about that? Senator SYMINGTON. Let's leave the Air Force out of it. Admiral EICKOVER. Yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. I am in trouble with the Air Force on the B-l already. Admiral RICKOVER. Excuse me, sir; I will only talk about the Navy. The Navy has 153 admirals on duty in Washington. Now, if you really want to get more money again parenthetically if you want to get more money for the actual Navy you should get rid of many of the admirals and get rid of all of their staffs. They sort of build on each other. May I recall the time why you were in charge of the Air Force? Is that all right? Senator SYMINGTON. No; please. Admiral RICKOVER. You don't want me to do that? Senator SYMINGTON. No; that is too nostalgic for me. Admiral RICKOVER. You were close to the throne. You mean you would rather be there than here? Senator SYMINGTON. Let's get on with it. I have got this question to ask you, and I am serious now. Because we have a problem on these cruise missiles, and this afternoon we have hearings. I am chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee in the Foreign Relations Committee, and Military Application Subcommittee in this Joint Committee, and this cruise missile situation has got me worried. I don't see how you can figure the range and the Air Force is keeping the range down, in my opinion, possibly because it is hurting the B-l the Navy's cruise missile range is much longer. Woulol submarine-launched cruise missiles coupled with attack submarines recognizing cost effectiveness do more for our military capabilities than building more ballistic-missile submarines, or as much; let's put it that way? Admiral RICKOVER. That is a difficult question for me to answer because I am not the one who is responsible Senator SYMINGTON. Will you do me a favor? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. Will you think about it apd give me an answer for the record? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, I will try to get you an answer. Senator SYMINGTON. I think this cruise missile situation is going to revolutionize our whole concept of defense. I may be wrong. Because the more we get into it in the Arms Control how are you going to tell

15 9 the range? How do you know what is in it regardless of whether it comes from land Representative ANDERSON. Somebody delivered a whole package of GAO reports to my office a couple of days ago. I haven't had time to read it yet. One of them deals with the cruise missile thing. Have you seen the GAO report? Senator SYMINGTON. No. Representative ANDERSON. You might check on that. There is some kind of GAO report on the cruise missile. Senator SYMINGTON. You fire them from the air, you don't have to have a land base to use them. You can use them on ships, submarines, or surface ships. Representative RONCALIO. We don't have them on submarines, do we? Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. I will attempt to supply that information. I would like to say this, when the Navy did away with the cruise missile I objected. That was many years ago. I wanted to put that into the record. So I am certainly not against cruise missiles. Furthermore, I have been advocating for years that the Department of Defense authorize a submarine which would fire cruise missiles while submerged against surface ships. I have frequently advocated that type of submarine. I think that is something that possibly this committee might comment on. I repeat what I have testified many times. There has been a long history of Navy opposition to nuclear submarines starting with the Nautilus. Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to say to my friend : and I am through now, if it hadn't been for Representative Yates and Representative Price, and Senator Jackson, and at least to some extent myself, this distinguished gentleman would not be testifying before us today because he would be out of the Navy. And I can never forget that that goes back about 22 years. Mr. LEIGHTON. To clarify Senator Symington's question. Are you referring, sir, to strategic cruise missiles only, or are you addressing the broad subject of strategic tactical nuclear warheads and conventional warheads? Because they are basically different types of cruise missiles in different mixes. Senator SYMINGTON. Then we get into the question, what is a tactical weapon and what is a strategic weapon? In the Battle of the Bulge the B-17 was a tactical airplane, it was the biggest airplane, strategic airplane, we had. From Iwo Jima we sent fighter planes to destroy plants which would be a strategic mission in the southern end of Japan. Now today, what is tactical, what is a strategic weapon? If you are going to destroy a strategic target you are on a strategic mission. The Air Force is holding their cruise missiles to 700 miles. Why do you control it, hold it to 700 miles, if you don't know whether the enemy range is 700 miles or 1,700 miles? Actually the Navy cruise missile that they are developing is 1,800 miles. And so I can't differentiate between a tactical and a strategic weapon, and I am appealing for support on this. It is just my own

16 10 thinking because, for example, the F-4 Phantom out of Frankfort can drop over a million tons equivalent of TNT on the Soviet Union, you see. A fighter plane. The strategic mission. I think the tactical aspect is pretty difficult to analyze. What worries me is if we made a deal with the Soviet Union how can we tell what the range of the missile is? That is my point. Mr. LEIGHTON. I understand that question. But you do want the admiral to get an answer that addresses all aspects of the cruise missile? Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. Mr. LEIGHTON. Also conventional warhead as opposed to nuclear warheads. Are you also interested in his addressing conventional warheads as opposed to nuclear, or just nuclear? Senator SYMINGTON. Yes; and I would be interested in whether "or not he feels certain that we can tell where a missile has a conventional warhead or a nuclear warhead. Is it a nuclear weapon or a conventional weapon, based on its shape or based on anything we see, especially if it flies a closed circuit? These are questions that need answers. Mr. LEIGHTON. I understand you are also addressing the question how do we tell what they have; or if you see what they have how do you know what is in it? Admiral EICKOVER, Senator, I will try to get you the information you want and put it in the record. Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral, I would appreciate that deeply; I really would. Because one thing you can say about the military is they are prone to following tradition as against modernity, especially if they won the previous war. And the great exception to that you don't need any posies from me is your own work. Mr. LEIGHTON. You are going to have to qualify the statement we put into the record. As you pointed out, you are not responsible in this area. Senator SYMINGTON. I have great respect for you, but I don't want you to coach the admiral. Mr. LEIGHTON. We may have great difficulty in getting the information the Senator is looking for. Senator SYMINGTON. That is the point. I wouldn't be asking for it if it was simple. Admiral RICKOVER. If he doesn't get the right information he can raise hell. [The information which follows was subsequently supplied for the record:] SOVIET NAVY vs. U.S. NAVY CRUISE MISSILE CAPABILITY* Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. started developing cruise missiles at about the same time. While U.S. development stopped in the early 1960's, Soviet development continued. Today, they have cruise missiles which meet their range requirements, are nuclear capable, and are currently deployed. The Soviets have nine anti-ship missile systems on their ships and submarines (figure 1). An additional six air-to-surface anti-ship missile systems are deployable on Soviet land-based, long range maritime patrol/bomber aircraft intended for use against our ships. Two Soviet cruise missile systems are landbased. Seven of these 15 missile systems are true cruise missiles those shown Based on Information from the Office of Naval Intelligence.

17 11 in figure 1 [deleted]. Three of their four naval cruise missiles are deployed on their ships now and a fourth has been flight tested in advanced development. While the SS-NX-12 cruise missile is being developed for ships, the number of deploy able ships with cruise missiles installed already is formidable (figure 2). The total of [deleted] Soviet ships armed with [deleted] total anti-ship missiles are currently in existence. Note that [deleted] Soviet E-II nuclear submarines can carry eight cruise missiles apiece which can be nuclear tipped and usable either in a land attack mode from deep waters or in an anti-ship mode against high-value targets. [Figures 1 and 2 follow:] SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEMS Designators Launch mode Propulsion AS-1/Kenne1.... Air-launched \ AS-2/Kippe r. Air-launched AS-3/Kangaroo - Air-launched AS-4/Kitchen Air-launched AS-5/Kelt-. Air-launched AS-6/. Air-launched SS-N-3 deleted Sub/surface-launched SS-N-3 de! eted Sepaf Surface-launched [Deleted.] SS-N 3 del eted Shaddock Sub/surface-launched. SS-NX- 2. Sub-launched... SS-N-2/Sty (... Surface-launched SS-N 7 Sub-launched SS-N-9/Sire n - Sub/surface-launched SS-N-11 Surface-launched SS-N-14 Surface-launched FIGURE 1 U.S.S.R. CRUISE MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS Ship type Number of units Missile type Missile launchers/ ship Capability Submarines: E-II C J P Wflwin cyl.) W (long bin). Major surface ships: Kresta 1 Kresta II Kynda Kildin Krivak _ Kara Kashin Coastal ships: Nanuchka OSA SS-N-3/12 SS-N 7 SS-N-3/9 [Deleted] SS-N-3 [deleted] SS-N-3 [deleted] i De ' eted i ss^n-i4": :::::::: SS-N-3 SS-N-11 SS-N-14 SS-N-14. SS-N 11 SS-N-9 SS-N [Deleted] 4 g [Deleted.] Total [Deleted]. [Deleted.] FIGURE 2 Note: All identified missile types'can carry an HE or nuclear warhead, with the exception of the SS-N-1. The capabilities of Soviet naval cruise missiles are shown on figure 3. Note that the SS-N-3, Shaddock's antiship guidance limiting "range" of 220 miles is listed. The potential aerodynamic, fuel limited, range of Shaddock is actually in excess of [deleted] miles. This range ambiguity is clarified in figure 4 which shows missile range in relation to flight profile. [Deleted.] [Figure 3 follows:]

18 12 L- c. i : t ; 2 3 uj o ;-.: 3: i ^i C i u ' 2 I I U 3 = c : S < o c? 1.* c z LL X O! L g <l z 4i> f c 5 '.D ^ i o cra 1C 8 S a>. w '3 O 13 5 w w«p - 1^= A, ^T \3 P C z 3 U c i a: 01 o 0> 1 = I =5- c/ = < to 0 o>. CL 2. S * DflJ 3 o S.S i^^ s ^ S!!^ I.E C 2 i^ a 0 11!! i >, J^ m 2 1 o ^0 c o I K i JQ JC aj J2 ^1 Z 1 to to!» 5 = C^ =. = ^1

19 13 [Figures 4 and 5 deleted.]

20 14 It is interesting to note that the Soviet Navy has deployed cruise missiles with range capabilities greater than the 600 kilometer (324 NM) which has been discussed seriously as a range limitation on U.S. cruise missiles. Soviet cruise missile range capabilities are not known generally to the American public. The published data from unclassified sources is shown at figure 6. Omitting the SS-N-3 from a public discussion would give the general impression of Soviet cruise missile ranges on the order of 220 miles in contrast to actual capabilities [deleted]. [Figure 6 follows:] SOVIET NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE Ship type Number of units Missile type Missiles/ship Total Submarines: E-ll C J i P W(twincyl.) W (long bin) Major surface ships: Kresta 1 Kresta II Kynda Kildin... Krivak.. Kara.. Kashiri _... Coastal ships: Nanuchka..... Osa. Total » < <251 SS-N-3 1 SS-N-7 SS-N-3 i SS-N-3 i SS-N-3» SS-N-3 i SS-N-10 SS-N-3 i SS-N-11 SS-N-10 SS-N-10 SS-N-11 SS-N-9 SS-N < > SS-X-12 now in development to replace SS-N-3. 'SS-N-11 on modified Kashin's only. Source: Jane's ( ); Aviation Week (Feb. 2,1976). FIGURE 6 Another classified set of statistics are Soviet production rates and cumulative production of naval missiles in recent years. [Figure 7.] In Shaddock (SS-N-3/SSC-1) alone for the 5% years shown, they produced [deleted] true cruise missiles. Based on a U.S. Navy total of 500 ships, this is over [deleted] cruise missiles per ship just for the Shaddock. The data available on figure 7 shows an awesome total [deleted]. Not listed are the AS-1, 2, and 3, the SS-N-14 and their latest SS-NX-12. [Figure 7 follows:] SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE PRODUCTION RATES Missile 1st Cumuhalf, lative totah SS-N-2. } SS-N-3/SSC-1 SS-N-7 SS-N-9 SS-N-10 HDeleted] SS-N-11 AS-4 AS-5. AS-6. From date of inception. Source: DI-410-3A. FlGUBE 7 In summary of Soviet Naval cruise missiles, they have a demonstrated existing capability in cruise missiles, years of operational experience with them, and adequate numbers [deleted].

21 15 By comparison, our Navy currently has no cruise missile capability. We resumed our cruise missile development in the early 1970's when we were able to see clear technological advantages. For example, our precision accuracy in production of small gyro's and our micro-computer technology provide us an edge in guidance system accuracy and missile weight. There are two cruise missiles under development for the Navy. The anti-ship Harpoon missile is in the operational evaluation stage, has a range of 60 nm, and an initial operational capability (IOC) [deleted]. The Tomahawk is in advance development. It has an anti-ship operational range of about 300 nm and a power projection (land attack) range of about 2,000 nm. The planned IOC of Tomahawk is Although Condor is not a cruise missile in the strictest sense of the definition, it does provide our Navy with an air-to-surface rocket propelled, electro-optically guided missile for employment against surface ships and land targets at ranges up to 60 miles. Condor has an IOC of Senator SYMINGTON. I once said for the record it would be just as hard with modern weapons to hit a nuclear carrier or any other carrier as it would be to hit a bull in the tail with a bass fiddle. I still believe I was right; and if I was right 5 years ago I am certainly right today. That is one of the chief reasons I am interested in submarines. Admiral RICKOVER. I appreciate your interest in submarines because I have always gotten support for submarines from Congress. In fact, as you well know, if it had not been for the support of Congress we wouldn't have our nuclear submarine navy, sir. Mr. LEIGHTON. You may well remember Senator Symington was a tremendous help in getting the high speed attack submarine through Congress and convincing the Pentagon to build it. Admiral RICKOVER. You did, Senator. You did not hear this last comment of Mr. Leighton's which I would like to repeat. You were gracious enough to say a nice thing about me, and I would like to remind you that in 1968 you were very instrumental in getting permission to build the fast submarines which, from hindsight, is the best thing we have ever done. So I think I have answered your question as far as I can at this point. Senator SYMINGTON. I only plead with you, as money becomes ever more important, as we come into a $70, $80, $90 billion annual deficit, which means, in my humble opinion, capitalism is definitely on the way out unless we can stop it. I only plead with you to consider every possible way to handle cost effectiveness in the submarine picture. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Senator MONTOYA. Do any members have any questions at this point? SAFETY OP NUCLEAR POWER Representative RONCALIQ. Admiral Rickover, one of the big issues is safety of nuclear reactors that has been brought out before our committee lately, and we would like to know how good the quality assurance is the effort of quality of assurance on the part of the manufacturers. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. I am well aware that you have been having hearings on the safety of commercial nuclear atomic plants. I thought that you would be interested in this, so I have written a statement, and with your permission I would like to read it so that when the record is published it cannot be misunderstood.

22 16 Kepresentatiye RONCALIO. I would be grateful to you for that, and I would also like to get permission for the declassification of what you are saying so it can be made public. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. SAFETY RECORD OF NAVAL REACTORS Recently there have been, as you know, accusations about the safety of commercial plants. In connection with Navy plants, I don't know of any specific safety questions regarding the Navy's nuclear power propulsion programs, so rather than talk in generalities I would like to make a few specific statements concerning the safety experience of the Navy's nuclear power program. And when I get through with this, if you want to ask me any details about how the Navy does things I will be glad to tell you. The primary objective of reactor safety is to prevent the uncontrolled release of the radioactive fission products generated in the fuel. In the Navy's nuclear program the control of this radioactivity is assured through the use first of high integrity fuel elements; second, a reactor plant designed to withstand battle shock, which is a very terrific shock; third, a reliable protective system; and fourth, a carefully trained crew whose qualifications are periodically and regularly monitored. To date there has never been an operating occurrence, casualty, incident, accident, or whatever you want to call it, which has resulted in damage to naval fuel and the subsequent release of fission products from the fuel. There has never been one. This considers the total operating experience of the Navy's nuclear program, including the operation of more than 135 reactors and over 270 reactor cores. More than one-half million individual fuel elements have been built, and we have accumulated over 1,400 years of reactor operation. Representative ANDERSOX. How many hundred? Admiral RICKOVER. Over 1,400 years. This is cumulative years of reactor operation. Only two very small fuel element defects have been observed to date. These defects have not affected or limited the operation of the reactors in those ships nor did they represent any hazard or potential hazard to the environment. For each of the two cores that had a defect we reviewed the manufacturing records and determined there had been a small defect in the original manufacture. Improved manufacturing inspection today would prevent even these defects. In addition, in two of our prototype reactors I deliberately put in or caused defects in these fuel elements to see what would hanpen. We found we could keep on operating and that the deliberate defects did not propagate. Each core has [deleted] fuel elements and each element has its own serial number. Whenever anything happens, or when the core is depleted, we can take that specific fuel element out and examine it, and then we learn lessons from it. In addition, I might tell you about the Shipjnngport reactor. That is the Shippingport Atomic Power Station which was the first landbased nuclear central station in the United States. The first core had 100,000 fuel elements in it. Each one of those was serially num-

23 17 bered. We designed the core so that it would operate with 1,000 of those fuel elements having failed. It was deliberately designed that way. When the core was depleted and we took it out we found 3 out of the 100,000 had small defects. Those were all traced to the manufacturing process, which has been improved since that time. The defects did not in any way limit plant operation or affect the environment. In addition to the experience with our naval fuels, the experience to date with the Navy's reactor plant integrity has also been very good. As a result of stringent quality control during fabrication, the conservative selection of materials and the design margin allowed for military application, the barrier against release of fission products is proven through experience to be a reliable barrier of high integrity. There are some significant differences inherent in the design and operation of Navy and commercial nuclear powerplants which should also be recognized. The average power level in a naval nuclear propulsion plant is about 100 times less than that of a commercial nuclear powerplant. This power level determines the quantity of radioactivity in the reactor that is potentially available for release. In addition, naval reactors are mobile, not stationary, as is the case for land-based plants. Most of their operation is far removed from the public. As a result of these considerations alone it can be seen that operation of a naval nuclear propulsion plant is inherently less of a potential problem to the public than the commercial nuclear central station plant. What I have just told you is a prepared statement, and I worded it very carefully to give you the facts, but it is true that we take very great care in our design and in the selection of materials in the operation. IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING AND OVERSIGHT In the operation of these plants particularly, our people are all specially selected, specially trained, and they are inspected regularly. I have my representatives making inspections at all times of the day and night. I have representatives in the nine shipyards that are involved in naval nuclear power. Part of their duty is to individually and periodically inspect each reactor plant for 2 hours at a time, so they don't get a surface impression, and report anything that is wrong. They generally find only minor things wrong. The naval plants are built with considerable redundancy. You cannot build any machine in this world that will be perfect. Take the human body, which is God's finest creation, so we think. And yet people get sick. They have problems. If we can't get a human being who doesn't have any problems, how can we then expect, philosophically, that a machine designed by a human being will be completely perfect? That is impossible in nature; it cannot be done. And yet that is what many unthinking people are demanding of nuclear power when they say, you must prove it to be absolutely safe. Therefore, now I am talking from considerable experience, and as the forerunner of the nuclear power program in the country. I am talking from about 25 years of experience. The way you deal with the situation is to design safety into the plant and to have considerable redundancy, to enable you to handle potential problems. In one case

24 18 you might have one or more things go wrong simultaneously. With redundancy and the other safety features and well-trained people, the plant will continue to work. That is what we have done in the naval nuclear propulsion plants. GE ENGINEERS Senator SYMINGTON. If I may interrupt here. We have an interesting problem facing this committee. We have three engineers from General Electric who decided that either through the Sierra Club or their own decisions that the plants that we built aren't any good and maybe 5 people would be killed in an accident, or 10, and you can't get within 20 yards of our other hearing room because the public is so interested in finding out whether or not we are going to have an accident that might kill a few people. You have hearings about the question of proliferation of nuclear material, and you can't get people interested. For example, the German deal with the Brazilians, which has given them a complete enrichment process; and the French have not withdrawn their offer to the South Koreans. You can't get anybody to attend these hearings that deal with the potential for what could mean death for thousands or even millions of people. One of the things I can hope we can accomplish, in this Joint Committee which I leave in the not too distant future is to get this information to the people so they will understand the problem. The "Atoms for Peace" plan with all due respect to the great President, or his adviser, who thought about it as I see it from the way we are proliferating, is turning into an "Atoms for War" plan by giving all the countries of the world the opportunity to make plutonium. Dr. Agnew, out of Los Alamos, pointed out to me that (a) the Brazilians have uranium (b) they don't have to enrich it to 90 percent 235, all they have to do is enrich it to 3 or 4 percent and make electricity with it, and then use the plutonium in the residual. So there you set up a situation I am not saying they would but the Brazilians could ship back bombs to Germany on German or Brazilian ships, and nobody would know anything about it, and Germany would suddenly become a nuclear power without people really knowing about it. I took a member of this staff, a member of the Foreign Kelations Committee staff, and a member of the Armed Services Committee staff, and we went to Vienna to find out about the International Atomic Energy Agency. We spent days looking around and talking with people. We decided that it was just a lot of bunk, like the United Nations, a lot of talk, no thrust, no way of preventing proliferation. Take the Nonproliferation Treaty as another example; you can withdraw from it giving 90 days' notice. If Libya or Kuwait, or any country wants to get all the information, they have the money now, all they have to do is join up, get all the information they can get and resign in 90 days. So the other day the Secretary of State, for whom I have respect, says that the Nonproliferation Treaty and this is his word is "adequate."

25 19 So I just wonder, because of your vast experience in this field, what do you think we are going to do about this plutonium proliferation? How are we going to stop it? Is there any way to stop it? Admiral RICKOVER. I personally doubt that there is. Again being philosophical, I don't think people ever face up to facts. For example, in the energy situation, I have been talking about that for a quarter of a century. I pretty much predicted much of what has happened. It appears that action to deal with the problem and long-term basis will not be taken. Congress has not dealt with the issue because when people have to run for election regularly, it is virtually impossible for such a body to make the difficult decisions that most people dislike. I am not talking about just the U.S. Congress, I am talking about any parliamentary body. I think that is the way to look at it. I hate to say this, but our descendants are going to have to fend for themselves without much help from the present generation. You asked my opinion. Senator SYMINGTON. Of course. I am terribly interested, and I know everybody else is. Admiral RICKOVER. It is not one that comes from age, it comes from observing how things happen and the real nature of human beings, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. One more question. PROBABILITY OP NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION There were five prominent worldwide prominent- scientists, one of them Dr. Kistakoski, the No. 1 scientist under President Eisenhower, and they said in a statement in Boston the other day that an all-out nuclear confrontation, an Armageddon, you might say, was no longer a possibility by the year 2000, but a probability. Would you agree with that? Admiral KICKOVER. I can't prognosticate that. I have been asked that question before, and let me answer it in my own way. Is that all right? Senator SYMINGTON. Yes; indeed. "We are having a big hearing this afternoon with three Senators testifying, and a lot of experts, and I am getting information. Admiral KICKOVER. In my opinion once you use a nuclear weapon it is going to escalate to full-scale nuclear war. That is one opinion I have had. Senator SYMINGTON. I couldn't agree with you more. Admiral RICKOVER. I have had that opinion for many years. The second thing is this, in some countries such as the Soviet Union, the people in power, because their own position depends on it, could use what you might call a Hitler way of doing things. They claim they are saving the world. Hitler felt that way. The Russians feel that the wave of the future is Communism, and they must help the world toward that end. In general they love humanity if it fits their plan, but they don't care about individuals. That sort of attitude is obvious from their oppression of their own people. I think you possibly could get the Hitler approach to nuclear war in Russia because the only thing the top people have in life is their power in the Politbureau. I think one or two people there possibly

26 the head of the military organization, and the Chairman of the Communist Party those two probably hold the fate of mankind in their hands. I think that they have been ruthless with their own people. In my opinion, they certainly would not. care about being ruthless with a capitalist country. If nuclear war is going to be started they are going to do it, and it will happen when they figure they can start it and win, and no one will reply. Senator SYMINGTON. I think the Soviet doesn't want a nuclear war any more than we do because they probably feel they are defeating us the way Lenin prophesied, knocking off our economy. A lot of people forget that in capitalism the main source of income is taxes. I think they are doing fine. With all these other countries moving in now, as one scientist said, 2 scorpions in the bottle now, you now have 6, you may get 25 in the next 10 years. Admiral RICKOVER. Certainly there is another avenue to obtain world domination for the next 30 years and that is to control the oil fields in the Near East, and I think they could do that. Senator SYMINGTON. I have been off the subject, but it is terribly interesting to me. One more question. Admiral RICKOVER. Have I enlightened you? I don't think I have enlightened you because you are soon going to be a statesman. FUSION Senator SYMINGTON. You know an awful lot about fusion. We are going to have a fusion hearing after you finish this morning. We are working on laser fusion, and on magnetic fusion; and we have Dr. Hirsch, who ran the magnetic program becoming Dr. Seaman's assistant at ERDA, et cetera, et cetera. The question is divided into two parts, and then I am done. First, do you think that some day we will be able to control fusion to make electric energy. And, second, if so, which of the systems do you think is the better system as you see it today, the magnetic system or the laser system? Admiral RICKOVER. Senator, I am not familiar with the fusion process. It would be great temerity on my part to say something can't be done. On the other hand, there are limits in nature that one must not overlook. I really don't know. I will say that I would not be overly optimistic. This is a highly developmental effort and it is not proven yet that it will work or that commercial application can be realized. I remember 3 years ago, when I was asked by the chairman of the House Interior Committee, Mr. Aspinall, to comment on a prognostication we would have fusion by 1997, I said that anyone making such a precise prediction was pulling your leg. They are doing the same thing a wise bureaucrat does in the budget process. If he asked for $15 million, people question it. If he asked for $14.9 million or $15.1 million they think he has really put a lot of thought into it.

27 21 I know the ways of the bureaucratic process. I don't think that anyone could make a precise prediction unless it is for propaganda to help get the budget approved. Typically people will come out and say it will be done early. I personally wouldn't. If I were put in charge of that project I would be very humble about it and say I don't know when it will be proven. I can't give you an exact answer to that question, sir. If I could you know I would quit my job and start playing the stock market. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much, Admiral. Eepresentative RONCALIO. Admiral Rickover, one of the men, Dr. Pollard, formerly of NRC, testifying with klieg lights and lots of press listening to him answering some of my questions, one of my statements to him was a reflection on the profoundly impressive safety record of nuclear naval reactors, and he interrupted by saying to me yes, and if I could discuss the classified material I would be responsive to that about the safety record. What is he talking about? Admiral RICKOVER. I don't know, sir. Representative RONCALIO. We can't discuss it except in this room. Admiral RICKOVER. Well, I don't know why he could have not talked about it in general terms. There are technical aspects which can't be declassified because they would be of value to our enemies. But I have not withheld anything from this committee in these executive sessions. Three years ago when the Russian Deputy Chief of Naval Operations was here he asked me what we did, and I wouldn't tell him. Naturally, I am not going to tell him, nor would I want to make technical details public because that is tantamount to foreign disclosure, which in turn would adversely affect the security of our citizens. Representative RONCALIO. You just testified from your prepared statement that there have been no incidents. DESIGNING PLANTS TO ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS Admiral RICKOVER. There haven't been any. We have had technical problems. I am not saying we don't have problems. We can have machinery go out and it does, but it is so designed we can keep on operating our ships. This gets back to the redundancy of design I mentioned. We design our ships anticipating equipment problems. We have done other things. Take shielding, for example. When I was in Oak Ridge in 1946 and 1947 I had some discussions with Dr. Muller, who was the Nobel Prize geneticist. He was very much worried about personnel exposure to radiation. As a result of these discussions I designed the shielding for our naval reactor plants to be many times more stringent than required by the standards that were in effect in Even though the radiation exposure limits have been reduced considerably since then, our design, even for the first ship, the Nautilus, was such that it is still more than necessary to meet the present-day lower levels. I have done,many things of that kind. As another example, from the very beginning I would not let anyone carry a radium dial wrist-

28 22 watch on a ship because our detection instruments were so sensitive that they would be affected by such items. You can have a man stand on the deck of a submarine and measure fallout or atmospheric radiation. It is very easy to measure. When he gets down in the ship he can't measure anything. You can cover a lot of things by the way you design things. You can cover a lot of things by the way you train people, and by having regular inspections and checkups on what they do. As I mentioned we have very thoroughgoing inspections all the time. It is like a housewife keeping her house clean. If she keeps it very clean, chances are she is not going to have an accident. If that is the kind of person she is, she is not going to have an accident, or let her* children get hurt. Mr. LEIGH-TON. I believe Mr. Roncalio was indicating that by virtue of another witness' referral to the classified nature of the program^ that he thereby insinuated there may be something in our classified naval work that suggested something unsafe* I think it would help the committee to show in the record of an executive hearing that there is nothing in the classified information which would indicate in any way an unsafe condition in naval nuclear propulsion. Admiral RICKOVER. I will flatly state that there is nothing in the classified information or any information I have that I would not tell this committee. Representative RONCALIO. Thank you very much. Senator MONTOYA. Much of this information which you have given us will be sanitized and released. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Except perhaps the number of submarines that we have and so forth. Admiral RICKOVER. But I would like to assure every member of this committee, both present and absent, if I ever knew of anything that could be unsafe on any nuclear powered ship, I would fix it. Senator MONTOYA. Admiral, I want to clear something for the record, or perhaps get your further comment on it, if it is not subject to clarification. You indicated in your statement that your program of safety and inspectidn and reliability was better with respect to naval reactors than what existed with respect to the reactors in the commercial sector. Admiral RICKOVER. I did not say that, sir. I only told you what we did in naval reactors. I am not too familiar with what is done in the commercial area. Senator MONTOYA. Bring me the statement. Admiral RICKOVER. I can. Senator MONTOYA. Will you read that portion? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. NEVER AN ACCIDENT TO DAMAGE NAVAL FUEL I have a part that says to date there has never been an operating occurrence, casualty, incident, accident, or whatever you want to call it which has resulted in damage to naval fuel. I think the part you are referring to was when I indicated there are some significant differences inherent in design and operation of

29 23 Navy and commercial nuclear powerplants. The average power level in port in a nuclear propulsion plant is about 100 times less than that of a commercial nuclear powerplant. That is a matter of fact. This power level determines the quantity of radioactivity in the reactor that is potentially available for release to the atmosphere*. In addition, naval reactors are mobile and not stationary as is the case for land-based plants. As a v result of these considerations alone, it can be seen that the operation of a naval nuclear propulsion plant is inherently less of a potential problem to the public than a commercial nuclear central station plant., As I also said, we have never had any kind of reactor accident. Senator MONTOYA. What comment do you have about my different regulation?, - GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AT EACr COMMERCIAL PLANT Admiral BIOKOVER. About the amount of inspection? Tarn not familiar with what is done in commercial nuclear powerplants. I have advocated regularly to this and other committees you had better listen to this one, sir that they use the same method that I use at the Shippingport Atomic Power Station. Before I permitted the Shippingport plant to be started up on December 2, 1957, 1 insisted that the chairman of the board of Duquesne Light Co. sign a written agreement that at any time the reactor was in operation I would have a Government representative present in the control room with the authority to shut that plant down if he thought it was being Operated unsafely., We have shut that plant down twice in those 20 years, though the last time was many years ago. It has not been necessary since. I would recommend that you consider doing the same for central station plants, that is, have a Government representative present who does not work for the utility, and has the authority to shut it down. Senator SYMINGTON. Is that for a private- > Admiral KICKOVER. For utilities. I am talking about central station nuclear powerplants. I do that very thing at Shippingport. That is one concrete suggestion I can make. I would make another broad suggestion about the utility industry if you care to hear this. Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. Admiral RICKOVER. I would have the utilities set up an organization analogous to the NEPA, which is the National Electric Power Association, entirely financed by the utilities. This organization would be technically proficient and have the responsibility for the design of central station atomic powerplants, for their operation and for their inspection. The organization would report to the utility industry. It should be a neutral body which would not be concerned with economic or other considerations. I think that would help the public to have greater assurance that there is somebody watching. ^ Senator MONTOYA. Is your feeling the NRG does not have the capability at the present time? Admiral RICKOVER. I doubt that they have the manpower to assign full time representatives to monitor each plant. I think the NEC is a good org-anizatipn. I think Mr. Anders has taken hold of the situation and I think he is doing it very well. My second suggestion would not be for the NRC to do, this is for the- Senator MONTOYA. The industry to police itself.

30 24 Admiral RICKOVER. The industry to police itself, yes sir. I also recommend a Government representative be present in the control room whenever the reactor is operating. You need to do something to reassure the public. They listen to everything that comes out, particularly scare stories, and when radiation is involved the stories are usually made to sound scary. Representative RONCALIO. I would like to get a transcript of this record and get it declassified as soon as possible. Second, your new chief in EEDA, Dr. Roberts, and Mr. Leighton, you gentlemen can help profoundly I think by tooling up, if you can. We need dissemination of information, we need to tell the people of the country what we have heard today, and I know you, Dr. Roberts, have some excellent, good people on your staff who can do this. Senator SYMINGTON. I could not agree with the Congressman more. We have set back the whole development of our country because of unnecessary secret classifications of some materials. COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY HAS ACCESS TO NAVAL INFORMATION Admiral RICKOVER. One point I would like to make here. The technical things we do in the naval nuclear program are known to the commercial nuclear industry. They get our reports. Many of the same firms actually manufacture naval equipment so they know what we are doing. Representative RONCALIO. They relied on AIF and these spokesmen for the last 20 years to keep the public informed, and I have got my own pet peeve as to why there is doubt. I think if we didn't have any Price-Anderson Act there would be doubt. With all respect to my two colleagues here. Admiral RICKOVER. The commercial industry knows what we are doing so if they are having problems they at least know what we are doing and can draw on our work to help solve their problems. Senator SYMINGTON. If you will yield to me for a moment. I am very interested in what Representative Roncalio said. We had a witness before us from Commonwealth Edison in Chicago. He said it was going to cost them $30 million or more because of the pressures from the Sierra Club and others, I suppose, whose lawyers were demanding that they get the water back to the temperature it once had been. And everybody knows that when you limit a public utility to a maximum amount of profits you are also stating the profit they are going to make, 8 percent on investment or what have you. Somebody asked I don't know if you were here that time, Mr. Roncalio somebody asked this gentleman who was head of Commonwealth Edison. Are you saying you don't need to do this? He stated, "Absolutely, we don't need it, but we can't take the pressures for it." I asked him if that means the consumer will pay for it, and he said of course. That was his answer. Somebody told me night before last that their power bill had gone up 700 percent in 4 years. In line with that, I don't know if you saw on television the two poor women that couldn't cook and couldn't sew, and so on. They brought them on the air. They had to shut off the television. They couldn't pay the bills. Somebody sent them a check for $500 after seeing this program.

31 25 Isn't there any way following Congressman Eoncalio's thought isn't there any way we can get this information out so that we can inform the people who are trying to stop progress? PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY Admiral RICKOVER. You remember I mentioned earlier about trying to be a philosopher-king, which is an impossible situation. But, as Mr. Price well knows, because he was here from the early days, I have always been personally responsible for everything that might happen in the nuclear Navy. I still do that because I am responsible for this program from the womb to the tomb. I and my organization are responsible from the inception of a nuclear propulsion plant, for allocating the money for it, for designing it, for building it, and for operating it until the ship is placed out of commission. Now you don't have any other example of that either in the military or anywhere else in this country. I feel that such long-term responsibility is essential in advanced technical work. You are not going to get that anywhere if you havepeople with short time tours of duty, particularly in the military. That is absolutely impossible for any complex technology. The military has a built-in system for failure in this because of their forced rotation of personnel. Representative LTJJAN. Mr. Chairman, let me follow up a little bit on that. I think what Congressman Roncalio was saying is that you give us, the members of this committee, great confidence by coming in here. You speak very frankly, very honestly, you tell us that things go real well, and I suppose that by and large that is why most members of this committee, as a matter of fact, I would say all members of the committee are really supportive of the whole nuclear program. Well maybe we wouldn't be to begin with if we weren't supportive. I think that what Congressman Roncalio is saying, that this word, you say the companies know about it all, all about it, and we know all about it, but it is like a preacher in church, why don't the people come en mass. We are already en mass. But to get it out to the general public, and having so much classified stuff that doesn't need to be classified. Senator SYMINGTON. That is right. Representative LUJAN. It harms the effort and makes people suspicious. Admiral RICKOVER. May I comment? There is one thing I didn't mention concerning the importance of haviru? a single person being responsible for a program over a long period of time. Everything that happens in nuclear ships is reported directly to me. I get hundreds and hundreds of reports monthly, and I read them and pay personal attention to them. I am a man at the center of a large communication network. I make sure I know what is going on and I make sure that, insofar as is humanly possible, we identify and correct any problems. If we see a recurrence of a problem we look at the design, and we change it if necessary, even if it has to be done on all ships. You have to have that. You cannot satisfy people just by issuing orders and reports. You must be technically responsible first and foremost.

32 26 As I indicated, what we do in our designing and operating is known to the people in the commercial industry. That is the point. That is known. Representative LUJAN. We are concerned about the general public's attitude toward the whole nuclear program and perhaps you certainly would be a spokesman for informing the public because you are believed^ Admiral, whenever you say something. Admiral RICKOVER. I can't go out and talk to them about the commercial program. That is not my responsibility. Representative RONCALIO. No, but you can have your picture on the front of a piece of the work that ERDA can g6t out and say what you say about this and call a television conference with CBS, and invite Walter Cronkite,, and invite him down to have a chat about the safety of nuclear Admiral RICKOVER. But 1 cannot talk about the safety of commercial plants. I am not responsible for them. Much pi, what we do technically is known to them. What else can I do? Representative RONCAUO. You are doing fine. We are searching. Admiral RICKOVER. I understand your dilemma, and I gave you two suggestions of something that could be done. But I mentioned that before. I mentioned it years before. Representative YOUNG. I was caught out of the room, Admiral, on the first concrete - ^ Admiral RICKOVER. Did you hear the second one? Representative YOUNG. Yes., SHIPPINGPORT EXPERIENCE Admiral RICKOVER. I will repeat the first one. As you know, my organization designed and built the Shippingport Atomic Powerplant which was the first central station plant in this country. It went critical on December 2, I would not let that plant start up until the chairman of the board of directors and president of the Duquesne Light Co. signed an agreement that any time that plant was in operation I would have my representative present in the control room, and" he had the authority to shut that plant down if he thought it was not operating safely.... That has happened twice in the history of that plant, 1 but not for many years. Representative LUJAN. Could that be an employee of NRC, maybe? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, it could be for commercial plants. I recommend you have somebody who is directly or indirectly working for the Government serve in this capacity. You don't want a utility man doing it. In my opinion, the cost to do this is small compared to the billions of dollars these plants cost and it would give the public assurance that their health and safety is being protected. He shouldn't get into other aspects of plant operation. He is there to monitor the reactor, and if he thinks it is unsafe, he can shut it down. Representative YOUNG. Also he could get into the area of competence of the operator, too. There have been some complaints about that. Admiral RICKOVER. Of course, whoever is on duty performing this oversight function would be in a position to observe and report on the

33 27 competence of the operators. My people do this at Shippingport. If they see something that is not safety related but isn't right they tell the chief operator for him to take action. You don't want to give the government man any task that diverts him from his safety function. Representative YOUNG. Thank you, Admiral. Admiral RICKOVER. I think you can have assurance from what I said that it is possible to operate these plants safely. Mr. LEIGHTON. May I make a comment off the record? Representative YOUNG. Yes. Without objection it will be off the record. [Discussion off the record.] Representative YOUNG. Back on the record. Admiral Rickover, you have stated several times in your statement your conviction that commercial nuclear powerplants can be operated safely. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Representative YOUNG. Just as sure as we are sitting here they are going to take parts of your testimony and contend from it they can't be. Admiral RICKOVER. I would like to make a statement for the record on that subject. May I? Representative YOUNG. Yes. Admiral RICKOVER. First, I have been from the beginning and still am responsible for the first central station nuclear plant, the one at Shippingport, Pa., that has been in successful operation since However, I am not responsible for other commercial nuclear powerplants and, therefore, I am not, of course, familiar with many of the details of such plants or their operation. REACTORS CAN BE OPERATED SAFELY There are, of course, differences between the present-day commercial plants and the much smaller Shippingport and naval plants with which I am familiar. However, based on my knowledge and experience I firmly believe nuclear power can be safe and reliable. I note also that the safety record for commercial reactors to date is good. There have been no reactor accidents to my knowledge. That record plus the excellent experience with the naval program support my view. Representative YOUNG. An excellent statement, Admiral. Admiral RICKOVER. This will be in the public record. Representative LUJAN. Can I get to the other side of it? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes. Representative YOUNG. Excuse me just a minute. Mr. Price has a question. Representative PRICE. How many years has the Shippingport been operating now? Admiral RICKOVER. The plant started up on December 2, Of course it has had its downtime as all plants do. Representative PRICE. Nineteen years. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. I will give you a better one than that. The first atomic powerplant in this country and in the world was the prototype reactor for the Nautilus in Idaho. That same plant has been operating continuously except for occasional periods for 23 years. It has probably been operated more than any propulsion plant in history because we use it for training 24 hours a day. It is still operating.

34 28 Representative RONCALIO. Arco? Admiral RICKOVER. In Idaho. In what is now called the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. EMPHASIS ON SAFETY Representative LUJAN. Thank you. I was going to ask the question on the other side. We are all, of course, very concerned with all of the safeguards and safety and all of those things. In your opinion, Admiral, is a sufficient amount of money being spent there, too much by overreaction, or not quite enough? Admiral RICKOVER. I would say it is probably too much. I suspect that millions of dollars are being wasted by overemphasis on safety. This is something people are generally afraid to say because it sounds like you are preaching against motherhood. In fact I think it hurts safety. I will tell you what I mean by that. That is a strange statement to make. When we designed the land-based prototype reactor for the Nautilus, I designed it to be exactly the way it would be in the hull of the ship instead of using a breadboard model as everybody else does in advance development work. After we started operating the prototype we found we had too many safety devices. So much so that it kept interfering with operation of the plant. So in the Nautilus we reduced the safety features and improved the reliability and simplicity of the plant. Too many safety features can actually be an impediment to the safe operation of a reactor plant. Representative LUJAN. Can you give us a safety feature that might have Admiral RICKOVER. I would rather not do that, sir, for this reason. To do so would mean I was taking on some Government regulating organization that oversees the commercial industry. I would rather put it this way. I think you believe that I have acted responsibly in this field, and that I have taken personal responsibility for what we do. We have been successful. I am saying if I were responsible for the commercial industry. I would be careful not to put in every safety feature that anyone decides would be desirable. I am not saying that just to save money. I genuinely feel it can achieve exactly the opposite result and lead to confusion and complexity that degrades safety. Let me give you a more tangible example. Suppose a young draftsman decides to require four valves in a safety system where two could do the job. His logic is if two are good, then four are better. But as a result, the operator has trouble keeping track of what valve is in what position and this could lead to a mistake or incident by inadvertently opening the wrong valve. That is exactly the sort of thing that can happen. Representative YOUNG. May I say while still on my mind, when we were off the record, Mr. Leighton Admiral RICKOVER. Is this off the record? Representative YOUNG. No; this is on.

35 29 Mr. Leighton made some observations relating to problems and some suggestions, and pursuant to Mr. Roncalio's early admonition to have this record carefully examined, I want to make sure that Mr. Murphy gets together with Mr. Leighton. Representative RONCALIO. Yes? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Representative YOUNG. Some of these problems could be pretty serious. Admiral RICKOVER. Mr. Young, you know, I am talking to you very sincerely. I am talking to you from my heart and trying to tell you the truth. I think you gather that I am not trying to make any case for anyone. Representative YOUNG. I understand that. Mr. Leighton made some serious points about problems created for you and your function. Admiral RICKOVER. If we don't watch out there will be another movement to sink some of our submarines as was once the case in the Defense Department. I am all for that provided our enemies follow suit. Representative RONCALIO. You believe in equivalence? Admiral RICKOVER. At least; yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. Do you have anything else to tell us, Admiral Rickover? STATEMENT OF APPRECIATION Admiral RICKOVER. I did not have any opening statement, but I would like to introduce some additional material. Above all I would like to say and I think that probably Senator Symington can understand me better than anyone else here how deeply I appreciate being able to talk to the representatives of the people of the United States the way you permit me to do. You have always been most generous to me, you have always supported me, even when you had doubts, and I have done everything I could to live up to what you expect of me. I will continue to try to do so as much as I can. Representative PRICE. Mr. Chairman Senator MONTOYA. We admire you very much, Admiral Rickover, and you have made a great contribution to this country's security. Admiral RICKOVER. I would like to add another thing. You know the host always gets all the credit, but you have a very faithful servant in George Murphy, who embellishes your committee. Senator SYMINGTON. I thought I was going to agree with everything you said [Laughter.] Senator MONTOYA. We praise him every day by keeping him on the payroll. Admiral RICKOVER. I want to make sure you understand I had some Senator SYMINGTON. Now you know what you have to do is pay for two big hats for him because his head has gotten this much bigger. Representative PRICE. I would like to go off the record. [Discussion off the record.] O

36 Senator SYMINGTON. I think that after listening to Admiral Rickover for over 24 years in the Senate, and his record, and the record of his people in naval reactors, because of the turmoil generated about commercial reactors, where, nevertheless, already 8 percent of our power I understand is already coming from nuclear power. We don't know what the future holds with respect to oil, we don't know too much whether to go into coal or a solar system or geothermal. I think we ought to try to find some way that we can get the Admiral interested in the commercial problems. When three engineers can sort of say that this committee, the Atomic Energy Committee and the General Electric Co., and Westinghouse Co. and I am in trust, I don't know if I have any stock in them or not when they can say that these people are all wrong, and this is done wrong, and so forth, and so on, sort of based on the report that Admiral Rickover has made from the standpoint of safety alone, aside from anything else, I would hope there is some way we could get him involved in the commerical aspect of nuclear reactors because in my part of the country, perhaps I had little to do with it, to get the utility there to put in a nuclear plant. And you would be surprised at the degree of opposition just putting in a plant because everyone is warning that they are going to blow up or something. Representative ANDERSON. I am being opposed for reelection by a write-in candidate running against me solely and exclusively on the fact that I supported Price-Anderson, and charging that I am an advocate of nuclear power. So I know what you mean. Senator SYMINGTON. Congressman, I suspect you know more than I do, John Anderson, and you have the same idea I have, f don't see why in some way we can't get Admiral Rickover he is getting along in years, he is amost as old as I am but we ought to get him interested in this thing because I believe that properly handled that the Almighty has placed this force on Earth either to give us a more prosperous and happy and very possibly more secure life, or to destroy life. In all seriousness, I think there ought to be some way we could get Admiral Rickover involved in this commercial situation based on the record that he has established for the military aspects. Senator MONTOYA. Would you object, Admiral, to testifying in an open hearing just on the safety record? Admiral RICKOVER. There was a lot of discussion while you were can we have this off the record? Senator SYMINGTON. Sure. [Discussion off the record.] Senator MONTOYA. We understand that you have some additional material, Adminal Rickover, and I hope you will submit it for inclusion in the record. Admiral RICKOVER. Thank you, sir. Again may I express my deep appreciation for the way all of you treat me. It is far more than I deserve, and I am grateful that we have people like this in Congress. I know what your problems are. I know for you to get time to do anything for the country is very difficult, what with all the demands that are being made on you by your constituents and by special interests. I know that full well. That is why I am so deeply apprecia- 30

37 31 tive, and I would like to say that I am very sorry that Senator Symington has made up his mind to leave. He and I have had a couple of differences of opinions, but I thoroughly respect him, and I value very much his friendship. I think if it hadn't been that way a lot of these things wouldn't have come out the way they have. Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to reciprocate 100 percent with my feeling toward you. Senator MONTOYA. Thank you, gentlemen. Senator Baker has a statement that he wishes to make part of the record. Without objection, it is so ordered. STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOWARD BAKER Recently I and several colleagues visited New Zealand and had discussions with their new Prime Minister, Mr. Muldoon. One of the issues I raised with the Prime Minister was the refusal by the previous government to allow U.S. nuclear powered warships to visit his country. I was particularly gratified to learn that Mr. Muldoon agreed with me that such an attitude on the part of a close defense ally was not proper and just after I met with him he publicly announced that his government would allow our ships to visit New Zealand ports. I am concerned that there are too many similar cases where the crews of our nuclear powered warships are being denied the courtesy of a visit to countries whose forces they often operate with in support of mutual defense objectives. Australia is one such country and Spain is another. In the case of Spain the Senate is now considering a new treaty having considerable defense implications and yet, except for the ballistic missile submarine squadron in Rota, the Spanish refuse to let our nuclear powered warships visit their ports. How can we ratify a treaty such as this when one of the most fundamental courtesies of an alliance is being denied? I do not understand why we have tolerated this situation as long as we have. For an ally to deny our ships access when they are serving the defense interests of all of us is at best an unfriendly act. It cannot be because these countries fear these ships are unsafe for there is no military program in the world with the safety record of our nuclear fleet. It cannot be over legal concern on indemnity and liability because, through the efforts of the Joint Committee, Congress enacted Public Law to give every country a solemn pledge that the United States would pay for the damages should a warship reactor accident ever occur. The Congress has done its part and the sailors are certainly doing their part by serving at sea away from their families for months at a time. I think it is time for those countries who benefit from the military presence of this country while denying our nuclear powered warships access to do their part. If they are unwilling to do this most simple and appropriate thing, then I think we should seriously reconsider the basis on which the defense relationship rests. You cannot expect to maintain a friendship if you are unwilling to invite your friend into your home. Our Navy is becoming increasingly nuclear powered and it is these ships which are best suited and most capable for overseas operations. We should not continue to accept discrimination of these ships by any ally and congressional action may be necessary to get the matter resolved. Certainly the Congress should not enact or endorse continuance of a defense treaty unless there is a specific understanding that visits by U.S. nuclear powered warships into the ports of the other treaty members will be permitted. [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee recessed.]

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39 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF ADM. H. G. EICKOVEE INTRODUCTION I have been associated with the naval nuclear propulsion program for more than a quarter of a century during which time there have been: 13 Secretaries of Defense; 15 Deputy Secretaries of Defense; 12 Directors of Defense Research and Engineering, including former positions of Chairman, Research and Development Board and Assistant Director for Research and Engineering; 8 Assistants to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, including former Chairmen of the Military Liaison Committee; 14 Secretaries of the Navy; 15 Under Secretaries of the Navy; 11 Chiefs of Naval Operations; 12 Vice Chiefs of Naval Operations; 5 Chiefs of Naval Material since the position was established in 1963; and 10 Commanders of the Naval Sea Systems Command, including the former positions of Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command, and Chief, Bureau of Ships. On the average, each of these 115 key officials in the approval chain held his position a little over 2 years. In any given year, about 4 of these 10 top positions had a new incumbent. Since my own tour of duty in this program spans this entire period, I undoubtedly have a different view of the events which have occurred than do the legions of officials I have mentioned, and their numerous subordinates all of these constantly rotating officials had to approve my requests before I could proceed with my work. Mr. Chairman, your tour of duty and that of several of your illustrious colleagues also spans this entire period, so I am sure you fully understand this point. In some of my remarks, I may express views contrary to those of my superiors in the Navy and those in the Department of Defense. You are aware that there have always been basic differences between my opinions and those of my superiors. I must make it clear that I claim no superior wisdom. Furthermore, my superiors have more responsibilities and problems different and more onerous than mine, and these responsibilities and problems may require different solutions than I propose. I make no claim that my views are right and theirs are wrong. I can only say what I think and what I believe. My superiors have no obligation to justify their positions to me. Therefore, I wish to make it clear that I do not represent myself as knowing or understanding the full basis for their decisions. But, because I have held a responsible position for many years, I have an obligation to give you my own detached assessments. I dannot permit political or personal considerations to prevent me from discharging this obligation, nor can I permit what has been called the decencies of human relations to control my relationships with Congress. In that context, I will present to you my candid opinions concerning the issues before the Congress which affect the naval nuclear propulsion program. (33)

40 34 MISSION or THE U.S. NAVY Today, the Western world depends on the strength of the United States. Short of all-out nuclear war, this strength depends on the ability of the U.S. Navy to maintain the sea lines of communication to our allies. If the Soviets could prevent our Navy from assuring the flow of men and material across the seas, none of our armed services could conduct overseas military operations in any area where the Soviets choose to challenge us. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the mission of the U.S. Navy to ensure free use of the seas so as to defend us and our maritime allies^ is much more difficult than the mission of the Soviet Navy which is to deny us the free use of the seas. It is much more difficult to forge a chain than it is to cut a link. There are those who dismiss as unrealistic the possibility of a direct confrontation between American and Soviet naval power. I think events may well show they are wrong, unless we build naval forces which can clearly counter the best Soviet naval forces. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States, with superior naval power and superior nuclear weapons, was willing to confront the Soviets with both. From now on, we are faced with the Soviets having at least equal, if not superior, nuclear weapons capability. If.we also allow them to attain superior naval forces, why should we assume that they will not confront us with this naval power to obtain their objectives in areas where they consider we will not be willing to risk our own annihilation? In short, failure on our part to provide naval forces which can stand up to the best naval forces the Soviets develop could lead to our having to give in on all issues for which we are not willing to go to nuclear war. SOVIET NAVAL THREAT The Soviets have made rapid progress in the design and construction of nuclear submarines in particular, as well as the rapid expansion and improved capabilities of their surface combatant fleet. As a student of naval history, I am concerned that there has never in peacetime been anything comparable to the current growth of Russian naval power. We need to view these efforts critically because such actions appear to be inconsistent with, if not a repudiation of, efforts to reduce tensions between the superpowers. Unlike the United States, the Soviets are spending more of their military budget on procurement, research and development, and operations, than on manpower. While over 50 percent of the U.S. defense budget pays for personnel, only about 35 percent of the Soviet budget is required for personnel costs. The result is that in recent years, many new types of weapons systems have entered the Soviet arsenal, including new design planes, tanks, and ships. From 1968 through today the Soviet Navy has increased both in numbers of ships and in capability. For example, the number of nuclear submarines in the Soviet fleet increased from 61 in 1968 to 135 today, surpassing us in this area in 1970, During the same period, the number of Soviet major surface combatants increased from 200 to 229 while the number of U.S. major surface combatants fell from 350 to 172. While their numbers continue to increase, ours continue to decline.

41 35 The U.S. Navy is scheduled to drop 27 ships from, the active fleet in fiscal year including 2 carriers. 3 destroyers, and 1 submarine. The U.S. Navy active fleet level stands at 477, the lowest since Looking at the submarine situation, specifically, the comparison is particularly ominous. Currently the Soviets have a total of 330 submarines, consisting of 135 nuclear powered and 195 diesel powered, all of which have been built since World War II. The total U.S. force is 116 submarines with 106 nuclear powered and 10 diesel powered. In the critical area of strategic submarines, of the 55 Soviet nuclear ballistic-missile submarines in operation. 34 are Yankee class submarines which are equivalent to our 41 Polaris and Poseidon submarines except they are all newer than oura., The Soviets also have at sea 11 ships of their new Delta class ballistic missile submarines, with more under construction. These ships carry the 4,200-mile missile which means that from their operating areas in the Barents Sea and northern waters they can cover the entire United States and most of Mexico. In total the Soviets have more nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines than we do and they are building new ones at a rate of about six a year compared to our Trident rate of one or two per year. In the area of attack submarines the Soviets have a total of 190 units compared to our 75. Of their total 40 are nuclear powered while 65 of the U.S. units are nuclear. However, Russia has 65 additional submarines armed with the unique capability of firing cruise missiles. Of these 65 units, 40- are nuclear powered. The United States does not have any submarines capable of firing cruise missiles, although our Navy ig developing a version of the Harpoon missile which will be capable of being fired from submarine torpedo tubes. The Soviets have the largest and most modern submarine yards in the world. They are credited with a nuclear submarine production capability of 20 ships a year on a single shift basis. While not fully utilizing this vast building capacity, in 1975 they completed 10 submarines while we completed 2. As late as 1966, the Russians had only two new construction yards building nuclear submarines; today they have four with this capability and further expansion of such fajcimties is currently in progress. ' At present, while our Poseidon conversions are going on, the maximum U.S. capacity to build nuclear submarines is less than half that of the Soviets. Upon completion of these conversions about 1977^ our present capacity would still be far below theirs. Of even greater concern than total numbers is the fact that since 1968 the Soviets have introduced over nine new designs, or major modifications in design, besides converting older designs to improve their capabilities. They have introduced significantly improved versions of their attack, cruise-missile, and ballistic-missile nuclear submarine designs. In the last 8 years they have introduced more new submarine designs than have ever been put to sea, during a comparable period, in all of naval history. The United States, on the other hand, has introduced only two new design submarines in this period. This comparison should not be surprising since we spend less than 20 percent 6f our naval budget on submarines while the Soviets spend approximately 40 percent.

42 36 The trends in the surface navy are also of concern. Today the Soviets have more major surface combatants than we, and many of their ships carry surface-to-surface missiles, which our ships do not yet have. As of February of this year the Soviets had 229 major combatants compared to our 172. Since 1962 the Soviets have built 800 major and minor surface combatants, mine warfare and amphibious ships, while the United States has built 167, or less than one-fourth as many. I will include with my statement classified comparisons of Soviet and U.S. surface ships and submarines. Overall, I believe that our surface Navy is still more powerful because of our aircraft carriers. However, even this is not reassuring since, as a land power, they do not have to depend on sea lines of communication to conduct military operations. As a maritime power, we are dependent upon being able to control sea lines of communication in order to conduct military operations overseas. The mission assigned to our Navy is a far more difficult task than the Soviet Navy mission of preventing our Navy from maintaining such control. In light of the developments I have just described, it should be apparent that the threat we face from Soviet naval expansion is real and ominous. TRIDENT There is general acceptance that our nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines are a vital element of our Nation's deterrent to all-out nuclear war. The Trident program proposed by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1977 includes construction funds for only one ship the fifth submarine of the class. Originally the Trident program was planned to include construction of three submarines every year after the lead ship. Last year, two submarines were planned for fiscal year 1977, but the program was stretched out again, resulting in added costs. The Navy has estimated that the program stretchout proposed this year will add about $225 million to the cost of the first 10 Trident submarines. As I discussed earlier, the Soviets have deployed Delta class ballistic missile submarines capable of firing 4,200 mile missiles. In a sense, the Soviets are already operating their equivalent to our Trident submarines. In comparison, our first Trident submarine will not deploy until The existing Soviet missile capabilities increase the threat to our land-based strategic forces and increase the reliance we must place on our sea-based strategic forces. The Trident submarines will enable the United States to maintain a secure and viable strategic deterrent in the face of the increasing Soviet threat. The longer range of the Trident missiles will permit basing our ballistic missile submarines in the United States no foreign basing will be required. This will eliminate the vulnerability of our ballistic missile submarine force to international political action that could deny us the use of foreign bases. This is extremely important because we are always in danger of losing our foreign bases. For example, the treaty recently negotiated with Spain calls for removal of our ballistic missile submarines from the base in Rota, Spain, in 3 years. The Trident submarines will have increased survivability because they are being built with all the latest technology. They will be more

43 37 difficult to detect than our existing Polaris and Poseidon submarines because the Trident submarines will be quieter and the longer range missiles will give the submarines 10 to 20 times more ocean area to hide in. Our existing Polaris and Poseidon submarines are noisy compared to current standards. They were all built with the technology of the 1950's. Quieter submarines are necessary to decrease the probability of detection and insure the survivability of our seaborne strategic deterrent. The Polaris and Poseidon submarines are wearing out and we must plan now for an orderly construction program to provide replacements. I believe Congress understands the importance of our ballistic missile submarine force as a deterrent to nuclear war. I recommend that the committee not allow more delays in this program, which is vital to our national survival. The bulk of our naval ships, our general purpose forces, are designed to carry out naval missions' in conflicts short of all-out nuclear war. About half these are submarine and surface combatants designed to fight in areas of high threat; they are our naval strike force ships. The other half are assigned to nonstrike force functions; such as underway replenishment groups, amphibious assault forces, convoy escorts, and support ships, which service the fleet. I have never recommended, and I know of no serious consideration ever having been given to providing nuclear propulsion for ships in the latter categories. Therefore, I will confine my comments to major combatants to be built for naval strike forces. SSN-688 CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINES Our nuclear-powered attack submarines are the best antisubmarine warfare weapons system we now have. In fiscal year 1975, the building rate for nuclear attack submarines was reduced from five per year to five every 2 years. Because of fiscal constraints, the planned building rate starting in fiscal year 1978 was recently reduced further to two per year. Considering the rapidly improving quality and expanding number of Soviet nuclear submarines, I consider this to be an inadequate building rate. I have repeatedly recommended that we restore the building rate to a minimum of five ships per year. The SSN-688, the first ship of the new class of high-speed attack submarines, will be delivered this summer. Twenty-eight ships of this class are under contract. The fifth ship, the Memphis, will be launched this Saturday, April 3. I am convinced that when these ships join the fleet, they will be in great demand to carry out many high priority missions. ADVANCED DESIGN SUBMARINE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT The proposed Defense Department fiscal year 1977 budget includes $ million to continue development of the advanced design submarine nuclear propulsion plant. Development of this plant will enable the Navy to design various improved submarine configurations incorporating new weapon systems, advanced sonars, and other features

44 38 while increasing the submarine's performance capabilities compared to our existing designs. In my classified remarks I will discuss further the need for this development work. SURFACE WARSHIPS Aircraft carriers and Aegis fleet air defense ships are the only other major combatants currently planned to be built for naval strike forces. These ships are designed to fight in the areas of highest threat and will form the backbone of our first line naval strike force. Considering the difficulties of providing logistic support in the areas of highest threat, in my view it is essential that our first line warships be given the mobility and flexibility that only nuclear propulsion can provide. The United States has given up any possibility of matching the Soviet Navy in numbers of ships; therefore, our only hope to be able to carry out our naval mission in the areas of highest threat is superior ships. In my opinion, in the 1980's and beyond, in any area where the Soviets challenge us with their best naval forces, we will need all-nuclear carrier task forces if we are to be able to conduct sustained offensive operations. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS For the foreseeable future, the aircraft carrier will be the principal offensive striking arjn of the Navy in a non-nuclear war. No other weapon system under development can replace the long-range, sustained, concentrated firepower of the carrier air wing. Torpedo firing nuclear submarines, cruise missile firing nuclear submarines, nuclear cruisers with anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities all are needed to supplement and augment the capabilities of the nuclear carrier. The number of overseas air bases available to us is rapidly declining. It must be clearly understood that there is no known alternative to carriers for providing tactical air power beyond the range of provisioned and protected land bases. If an opponent is successful in developing weapons that can sink large numbers of our carriers, and we are not successful in developing sufficient counterweapons or if we simply do not build sufficient modern carriers to protect our sea lanes the United States will have to change its national objectives to be consistent with our inability to conduct overseas military operations. CARRIER SIZE There are many who would push the Navy in the direction of constructing carriers much smaller than the Nimitz, with the fighting capability selected based on a predetermined ship size or cost. Unfortunately, as H. L. Mencken has said, "For every difficult and complex problem, there is an obvious solution that is simple, easy, and wrong." There are no cheap or simple solutions to the problem of building a Navy capable of meeting the Soviet threat. It should be obvious that such approaches, if we are to learn anything from the past, are destined to result in large cost growth when the cost of providing a reasonable capability is faced up to, or else result in ships which afford consolation during periods of peace, but leave the country inadequate defense in time of war.

45 39 Frankly, it does not make sense to me to set an arbitrary "design to cost" ceiling for the acquisition cost of an aircraft carrier, nuclear or conventional. The fighting capability of the air wing the carrier can support determines the offensive capability of the entire carrier task group. For the relatively small amounts "saved" in carrier acquisition cost, major reductions in combat capability of the air wing would result. Such reductions' do nothing to cut carrier task group support costs such as escort force costs. In fact, they increase logistic support costs because of the more frequent replenishment required by the reduced capacity of smaller carriers for combat consumables. Further, the Navy has well documented experience that smaller carriers have higher aircraft accident rates. As the unit cost of aircraft continues to increase, this could become a significant cost factor. It should be borne in mind that the design of the Nimitz class carriers evolved from 50 years of experience with the design, construction and operation of aircraft carriers. The present trend toward fewer carriers increases the number of types of aircraft the remaining carriers must be able to handle. This increases the number and variety of shops, maintenance facilities, spare parts, and personnel that must be accommodated. Further, the reduction in the total number of carriers requires each to be large in order to accommodate as many aircraft as possible, so that the minimum number of carriers need be used for any given assignment. Also, the increasing sophistication of the projected Soviet air threat argues against a decrease in the capabilities of the carrier air wing which would be forced by a significant reduction in carrier size. The CVNX Characteristics Study Group report recently published by the Navy concludes: Overall, it is more cost effective to procure modified design Nimitz class carriers. The principal reasons are: Projected funding levels will support a force level of not more than 13 or 14 fully capable carriers., At force levels of 13 or 14 carriers, high individual carrier capability is required to meet tactical requirements. Carriers significantly smaller than the Nimitz class cannot support the practical minimum number and types of aircraft required to perform missions alone in the presence of an air threat. Nimitz size carriers provide more than twice the combat capability of the smallest practical nuclear powered alternative. Nimits size carriers have more flexibility to incorporate changes in characteristics that may "be required during the life of the ship due to changes in the threat and new technological developments. For a three-carrier procurement program, the cost of three Modified Nimitz size carriers is about the same as the cost of three of the smallest sized carrier concepts developed. I concur in the conclusion of the carrier study that we should continue building Nimitz class carriers. A substantial portion of the higher investment cost of a nuclear carrier is directly offset by the elimination of the cost of buying and delivering propulsion fuel oil; also, by the reduced cost of the logistic support forces needed due to less frequent replenishment of combat consumables because of the larger capacity of the CVN for aviation fuel and ammunition. Navy studies have shown that it takes the equivalent of an extra fleet oiler just to provide the peacetime propulsion fuel support for an oil-fired aircraft carrier. Of course, in war-

46 40 time the oil-fired carrier's vulnerability is largely determined by its requirement for a continuous supply of propulsion fuel and the extreme vulnerability of oilers. THE FOURTH NIMITZ CLASS CARRIER, CVN-71 The Navy originally proposed that a fourth Nimitz class carrier, the CVN-71, be built for delivery in October years after the contract delivery date of the nuclear aircraft carrier Carl Vinson, CVN 70. To achieve this delivery, the carrier must be authorized in fiscal year 1978 or 1979 with a minimum of $350 million in fiscal year 1977 for procurement of long leadtime items. The President's fiscal year 1977 budget authorization request submitted to Congress in January 1976 deferred the advance procurement funds to fiscal year Deferral of advance procurement funds from fiscal year 1977 to fiscal year 1978 would delay delivery of the carrier to at least October This would also delay delivery of long lead equipment to the point that the earliest ship keel laying date that could be supported would be April This is iy 2 years after the scheduled launch of the Carl Vinson. The projected October 1985 delivery is predicated on the assumption that the shipbuilder would be able and would agree to provide the skilled manpower necessary to build the carrier in this time period, even though most of the manpower used to build Carl Vinson could be expected by that time to have been reassigned to other work, or laid off. In the past 25 years, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. has been awarded contracts for the construction of eight aircraft carriers; the largest gap between these carriers has been 4 years. Therefore, the minimum 5-year gap between the CVN-70 and the CVN-71, caused by deferral of long lead funds to fiscal year 1978, would create greater disruption in the carrier building program at Newport News than has been experienced at any time during the last quarter century. The long lead nuclear propulsion plant components for the Nimitz class carriers are the largest components produced for the naval nuclear propulsion program and, in many cases, required development of special production lines, and facilities to produce them. The components for the Nimitz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carl Vinson, and a ship's set of shore-based spares, were ordered between fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year An average of one ship's set of components was ordered every 21 months, with the longest gap between any two orders being 3 years. The last of these components was ordered in calendar year Deferral of long lead funds from fiscal year 1977 to fiscal year 1978 would put at least a 5-year gap between the ordering of nuclear propulsion plant component for the CVN-70 and the CVN-71. The October 1985 delivery for the CVN-71 is predicated on the assumption that the 5-year gap after ordering the CVN-70 nuclear propulsion plant components will not increase new component lead time. This assumes that the component manufacturers involved will make their production facilities and manpower available at the time needed, even though these facilities can be expected to be shut down or diverted to other work due to the 5-year gap between orders.

47 41 The Navy estimates that the minimum increase in the cost of the CVN-71 due to deferral of long lead funding to fiscal year 1978 will be $178 million. Insofar as the next nuclear carrier, the CVN-71, is concerned, if we are ever going to build it, I don't see how there can be any question but that we should go ahead with the procurement of long lead items now. On the other hand, if a decision has been made that the CVN-71 is not to be built, the Navy should be told what reduced functions and missions it should be designing its forces to meet, and then expend its efforts to meet them. The present situation is intolerable where on the one hand there is apparent agreement that the ship is required, and, on the other hand, the approval actions all go in the opposite direction. The way this issue is being handled is creating distrust within the Department of Defense and within the cognizant committees in the Congress. This is a situation the U.S. defense establishment can ill afford at this critical time, and when there is a general public distrust of all things military. It should be borne in mind that a Nimitz class carrier is the largest and most complex device ever constructed. To manufacture the components and systems and to build and test the whole ship with its multitudinous equipments requires the skill of many thousands of highly trained people. Therefore, when the program is stretched out and special production facilities are disrupted as is happening on the CVN- 71 large additional costs are unavoidable. The cost of delaying start of the CVN-71 is much higher than the inflation cost added to the much simpler ships that would be deferred to make funds available for the CVN-71. NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR GUIDED-MISSILE MAJOR COMBATANTS Just as I recommended that new aircraft carriers be nuclear powered, so do I recommend that new guided-missile major combatants built to accompany them be nuclear powered. Previous studies have shown that each time a nuclear ship is substituted for a nonnuclear ship in a carrier task group, the capability of the task force as a whole will improve, with the greatest gain being made when the all-nuclear task group is achieved. The all-nuclear carrier task group has greater capability to penetrate and counter the projected Soviet naval threat than any other naval surface force we know how to build. By being far less dependent on logistic support than conventional forces, and by having the capability to retire at high speed for replenishment in low threat areas, the all-nuclear carrier task group has a capability to continue sustained operations in a high threat area which cannot be matched by any other currently foreseeable type of naval force. In my opinion these capabilities are well worth the added cost involved. ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR SURFACE WARSHIPS Nuclear propulsion allows a submarine to operate completely independent of the Earth's atmosphere; thus nuclear power provided a true submersible for the first time. Prior to the advent of nuclear

48 42 propulsion the most modern submarines could only remain submerged below snorkel depth for a day or so, and could only run at full power submerged on their batteries for an hour. Nuclear propulsion gives submarines essentially unlimited high speed endurance, surfaced or submerged. The advantages of nuclear propulsion for surface warships may not appear to be as dramatic, but nevertheless they are very important from a military standpoint. With existing designs of naval nuclear propulsion plants it is possible to provide enough energy for 10 to 13 years of warship operation without the need to refuel. And new reactor designs now under development will last 15 years. In contrast, oil-fired naval warships must be refueled every few days. The initial nuclear fuel for a Nimitz class aircraft carrier contains the energy equivalent,of 11 million barrels of Navy distillate fuel oil, or enough oil to fill a train of railway tank cars, stretching from Washington to Boston. It was the concern for fuel for naval ships in time of war that led to establishment of the naval oil reserves, which are now being considered as a quick source of additional oil during the present shortage. But even if part of this reserve is still available during a future war it will also be necessary to have the oil at hand where it is needed, before it can be used. Of what value is an oil-fired warship if it is unable to get oil? It is the need for a reliable worldwide fuel distribution system that is the Achilles' heel of our oil-fired Navy. The difficulty in obtaining foreign oil supplies to support operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean during crises in recent years shows this vulnerability. If we are concerned that the improving Soviet naval capability will increase the Vulnerability of our first line strike forces then we must recognize it is no longer reasonable to assume that our underway replenishment groups can be operated with impunity. Further, as the size of our Navy is decreased, and with a commensurate reduc 1 tion in the number of underway replenishment groups, it becomes increasingly important that we minimize the amount of logistic support required by the strike forces. The all-nuclear carrier task.gfoup, having essentially unlimited high speed endurance, carrying more combat consumables which permits longer periods between replenishment, and with the capability to retire at high speed for replenishment in low threat areas, has the capability to conduct sustained combat operations far greater than that of any other surface naval force we know how to build. Against a sophisticated naval threat it could quickly turn out that our ability to conduct sustained combat operations would be controlled by the logistic support available. Under such circumstances the all-nuclear carrier task group has far greater striking capability than a conventional group. When logistic supply lines are attacked during a real war, the decrease in the requirement for ships' fuel for the strike forces will have a compounding beneficial effect. The surviving fuel transportation and storage facilities can then all be concentrated on getting fuel for aircraft and other military vehicles to the forward areas. The escorts that would otherwise be required for the tankers which carry

49 43 ships' fuel could then be assigned to assuring the safety of other supplies. A major lesson of World War I, the first war in which fuel oil played a predominant role, was pithily expressed: "The allies floated to victory on a sea of oil." In World War II also, the supply of oil was a controlling factor in most military operations. Here is a statement about fuel that points out how lack of oil was instrumental in the defeat of Japan. It is quoted from the strategic bombing survey conducted after the war t This report, entitled "Oil in Japan's War", states: In every phase of the war, oil determined Japan's strategy and governed the tactical operations of its Navy and Air Forces. The collapse of the Japanese war effort was the consequence of their inability to maintain their supply routes to the southern zone. "The effect of oil shortage on Japanese Naval strategy became devastatingly apparent in the campaign for the Marianas and the Philippines. Japanese fleet units had to be dispersed between the Japanese Inland Sea and Singapore, owing to limited fueling facilities, and failure to achieve satisfactory coordination between the fleets contributed substantially to the Japanese defeat. Fuel shortage in the Home Islands deprived the Japanese naval forces fighting off the Philippines of the services of at least three battleships, which, together with several aircraft carriers, were taken out of service and assigned to duties as port and anti-aircraft vessels because they consumed too much oil. There are numerous examples where oil shortages have been a critical factor in military operations, examples that appear now to have been forgotten. Unfortunately, history has a way of taking revenge for forgetfulness., Take the carrier task.force. In the case of a conventional carrier, with four conventional escorts, one-third of the fuel is used for the carrier, one-third for the conventional escorts, and one-third for the aircraft. By doing away with the need for fuel for the carrier and its escorts; by making them nuclear powered; only one-third the amount of propulsion fuel that used by the aircraft is needed. Further, we designed the Nimitz class nuclear carriers with the capacity for almost twice as much aircraft fuel and 50-percent more aircraft ammunition than the latest and largest conventional carrier. This reduction in logistic support becomes especially important when our naval forces are operating away from home, during a real war, when they are subject to enemy'attack. ; ' In general, a carrier with four conventional escorts will have one escort off its screening station about one-tenth of the time for refueling. Leaving station not only weakens the screen, but also increases the vulnerability of the escort and its fueling ship, whether it is an oiler or the carrier itself. This is so because of fueling restrictions on course, speed, and maneuverability. When a nuclear carrier is substituted for a conventional carrier, the range of a carrier task group, with four conventional escorts, is doubled. When two 6f the four escorts with the nuclear carrier are nuclear, the range of the carrier task group is doubled again. When all the escorts are nuclear, the range of the carrier task group is essentially unlimited. For these reasons, a nuclear task force is at least 50 percent more effective than a conventional task force; this is probably actually much greater than 50 percent.

50 44 Each nuclear ship added to the fleet also makes an additional unit available to the fleet commander for assignment to independent operations where logistic support may be nonexistent or difficult to provide. Examples are quarantines, shows-of-force, rescues, protection of minesweeping operations, prevention of aerial minelaying, and submarine trailing and hold-down operations. Each nuclear escort substituted for a conventional escort also increases task force flexibility and mobility through advantages which are difficult to describe in numerical form. For example, none of the numerical comparisons of the relative effectiveness and cost of nuclear and conventional escorts cited in Navy cost studies take into consideration losses due to enemy action. One Navy study on "Nuclear Power for Surface Warships" showed that: Losses of underway replenishment ships can be expected to be greater when supporting conventional than when supporting nuclear warships; Under several of the threat conditions studies, the number of replenishment ships lost supporting conventional warships was more than twice the number lost supporting nuclear warships; and that The greater the threat to the underway replenishment ships, the larger is the loss differential to be expected owing to the larger replenishment force required for the conventional warships. I am sure you know the maxim learned through the bitter lesson of war that: "The art of war is the art of the logistically feasible." It is the elimination of the requirement for a continuous supply of propulsion fuel that makes nuclear powered warships so valuable. The areas I have just mentioned represent a tremendous increase in military effectiveness. In my opinion, this effectiveness far outweighs the small increase in lifetime cost for the all-nuclear carrier task force. There are many examples where the value of nuclear propulsion for surface warships has been demonstrated in real terms, in every day operational missions of the fleet. I frequently receive letters from the commanding officers of our nuclear warships telling me of some of these advantages. As one of many examples, for 13 days during July 1971, the Truxtun the cruiser that Congress changed to nuclear propulsion in the 1962 program provided an excellent demonstration of the capability of a nuclear powered ship to perform truly independent missions, free of the fuel oil umbilical cord. While on a special mission, the Truxtun steamed 8,600 miles at an average speed of advance of 28 knots, traveling from Subic Bay in the Philippines to Perth, Australia, and crossing the Indian Ocean twice en route. This is the longest period of such high-speed operation ever sustained by any ship. This high speed could have been continued for an essentially indefinite period, had there been a need. At the conclusion of her mission, the Truxtun was fully ready to undertake protracted combat operations. In contrast, our most modern oil-fired cruiser would have had to refuel at least three times during such a transit, and would have arrived at her destination with close to minimum fuel reserves, unable to conduct extended combat operations. And, of course, there are no tankers normally available in the middle of the Indian Ocean from which to refuel. From a practical standpoint, no nonnuclear ship could have performed the Truxturfs mission in peace or in war because of the fuel support needed.

51 7R-853 O Last year the Truxtun completed her first overhaul and refueling since she was commissioned in Her new reactor cores will provide for at least 10 years of operations. Last week I received a letter from her commanding officer, Capt. B. F. Tally, reporting on a recent fleet exercise in which the Truxtun, along with conventional ships, operated with the nuclear carrier Enterprise in task force operations. He said: Truxtun operated in a multithreat environment and on occasion simultaneously engaged surface, submarine, and air threats. I was pleased with the results. The fleet exercise once again pointed out the advantages of nuclear power. Frequently, Enterprise went to a high speed to avoid a threat, et cetera. On several occasions, Truxtun was the only member of the task group which could maintain station and keep up with Enterprise particularly at speeds of 30 knots or greater. The mutual compatability of nuclear-powered warships appears to be well-recognized today since Truxtun is scheduled to operate with Enterprise in all exercises in the next several months and deploy with her. Also to be considered in comparing nuclear powered to conventionally powered ships is the availability of fuel reserves during war. I mentioned that the naval oil reserves are now being considered as an emergency source of fuel. These reserves are, therefore, not guaranteed. The situation is different when we have nuclear fuel as a reserve. What limited our industrial output, and therefore our fighting capacity in World War II, was the labor supply. But we can employ labor now in peacetime to manufacture nuclear fuel for our nuclear navy, and we can store the fuel in a small area. We would then be assured of having a nuclear fuel reserve for a long war, and we would not need labor during to war to manufacture nuclear fuel. There are events in the Nation's history that, to use Thomas Jefferson's phrase, are like "a fire bell in the night." The recent conflict in the Mid East was such an event. For the first time, we were in a situation where the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean outnumbered the United States 6th Fleet. Had the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet been order to challenge the 6th Fleet, who would have won? From the limited information available to me, I do not think the answer is entirely clear. Would such a question have been seriously asked 10 years ago? Perhaps this thought will give you an inkling of the change that has taken place in the balance of naval power over the past decade. This change underscores the urgent need we, as an island nation, have to build a Navy strong enough to protect our national interest and our economic and political survival. To me, it is clear that the strike force ships we build for such a Navy must have nuclear power. Four years ago I furnished your committee a chronological summary of the history of nuclear surface warships over the past quarter century. This chronology was subsequently published in part 9 of your hearing record for Department of Defense Appropriations for 1973 on pages 199 to 467. References to the major studies of nuclear propulsion for surface warships are noted in the appropriate places in that chronology. Lengthy though it is, the chronological summary merely scratches the surface of the tremendous amount of effort that has gone into documenting and analyzing the advantages, value, and cost of nuclear propulsion in surface warships. In the chronology I barely touched

52 46 on the extensive analyses of cost and effectiveness and the voluminous documentation of actual examples reported by fleet commanders where nuclear-powered surface warships have been- able to perform important missions in the Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian Oceans which conventionally powered ships either couldn't do at all or would have had great difficulty doing under war conditions. The studies that have been made of this issue have cost millions of dollars and countless man-years of effort, including that of many high-level people. Every aspect of the advantages and cost of nuclear surface warships has been exhaustively studied in minute detail over a period of many years by hordes of analysts, civilian and military. These studies have brought out time and again that a nuclear surface warship has a higher initial investment cost than its conventional counterpart; but that when overall costs are taken into consideration, the nuclear ships are not much more expensive and provide greatly increased military capabilities. I do not believe that further studies can produce any more facts. TITLE VIII NUCLEAR NAVY Two years ago Congress established a policy espoused in title VIII of the Defense Department Appropriation Authorization Act of 1975, that the United States will provide nuclear propulsion for major combatants built for naval strike forces. In my opinion, passage of title VIII was one of the most significant steps taken by Congress since World War II to help Congress carry out its responsibilities under section 8 of article I of the tl.s. Constitution "To provide and maintain a Navy.'' I think title VIII is misunderstood by many who have not taken the time to read it carefully and to read the legislative history. Many questions are asked about the impact of building an "all nuclear Navy" as required by title VIII. Title VIII does not require an "all nuclear Navy." Section 801 makes it the policy of the United States to modernize the Navy by building, major combatant vessels for the strike forces with nuclear power. Section 802 defines "major combatant,,vessels for the strike forces..." as including combatant submarines; combatant vessels for aircraft, carrier task groups which include aircraft carriers and the cruisers, frigates, and destroyers which accompany them; and combatant vessels of these types designed for independent missions where essentially unlimited high speed endurance will be of significant military values. The legislative history clearly shows that title VIII does not preclude the Navy from building oil-fired sea control ships, patrol frigates, surface effect ships, or other such ships, because these ships are not included in the definition of "major combatant vessels for the strike forces." Fur.ther, it is clear that auxiliary craft, support force ships such as oilers and replenishment ships, amphibious ships and convoy escorts do not fall under the definition of section 802. Thus, title VIII does not require an "all nuclear Navy;" it applies solely to major combatants to be built for the strike forces. Since the Department of Defense is recommending nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers in their shipbuilding program, the

53 47 only ships currently at issue under title VIII between Congress and the Department of Defense are the ships to carry the Aegis fleet air defense system the nuclear strike cruisers, CSGN's; and the DDG-^T class gas-turbine-power Aegis ships. Section 803 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a written report each year which presents the Department of Defense 5-year defehse program for construction of nuclear-powered warships. Section 804 defines the conditions under which it is legal for the Department of Defense to request authorization or appropriations from Congress for major combatant vessels for the strike forces which are not nuclear powered. Section 804 states: All requests for authorizations or appropriations from Congress for major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the U.S. Navy shall be for construction of nuclear-powered major combatant vessels for such forces unless and until the President has fully advised the Congress that construction of nuclear-powered vessels for such purpose is not in the national interest. Such report of the President to the Congress shall include for consideration by Congress an alternate program of nuclear-powered ships with appropriate design, cost, and schedule information. This section provides Congress the necessary information to decide for itself whether or not any specific combatant vessel for the strike forces of the Navy shall or shall not be nuclear powered. Nuclear propulsion has revolutionized naval warfare by providing essentially unlimited high-speed endurance for submarines and surface warships. From the very beginning of the nuclear pdwer program, there has been strong opposition in the Navy. Were it not for Congress and the Atomic Energy Commission, we would not have nuclear submarines. In 1948, the Navy's systems analysts made a study that showed the nuclear submarine would have a military value 1.41 times as much as a conventional submarine, but would cost about twice as much. The Navy's analysts concluded that nuclear power was not worthwhile for submarines and argued that if the Navy built nuclear submarines, it would get only one nuclear submarine each year, instead of two diesel submarines every year. This demonstrated a complete failure of imagination. Fortunately, Congress prevailed and the Nautilus was built; in fact, the Atomic Energy Commission had to pay for the propulsion plants in the first two nuclear submarines the Nautilus and the Searwolf. Although nuclear submarines have now been recognized as among the most vital warships the Navy has, opposition to them has con-, tinued for over a quarter of a century. At one point, the Department of Defense decided to stop building nuclear submarines after 1970, but this was overruled by Congress. In another case, systems analysts in the Defense Department suggested sinking 10 of our Polaris submarines to save money. More recently, congressional action has increased the number of high speed Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarines in the shipbuilding program over that requested by the Department of Defense. Thus, a reluctance to build submarines has continued even though the Soviets have surpassed us in numbers of nuclear submarines since 1970; outbuilt, us last year by. 5 to 1 and even though the Soviets now have three times our submarine building capacity and are still increasing that capacity; and even though the Soviets have introduced over

54 48 nine new design submarines or major modifications in design over the past 8 years as compared to two for the United States. The opposition of the Department of Defense to nuclear-powered surface warships has been even more persistent. The seven nuclear surface ships in service today came into being only through the efforts of Congress. The aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy was built with conventional power over the strong objection of Congress. One of the two nuclear-powered frigates which were authorized by Congress in fiscal year 1968 was not permitted to be built by the Department of Defense, and the other was delayed for nearly 2 years. In 1971, the Defense Department scrapped a previously planned program to provide each nuclear-powered carrier with four nuclearpowered escorts, then suspended indefinitely the nuclear-escort construction program, even though this was the only type of new combatant ship having fleet air defense capability. The arguments between Congress and the Department of Defense over the need for nuclear propulsion in major combatants culminated in the passage of title VIII. This year marks the first real test of the effectiveness of title VIII. The issue before Congress is whether or not ships to be equipped with the Aegis fleet air defense system will be nuclear powered. Ageis is the latest and best system the Navy has devised to protect its major surface ships against enemy air attack. The decision of the Congress this year on the issue of whether Aegis ships to be built for naval strike forces will be nuclear powered will have a profound effect on the future of the Navy, and will determine the rate of application of nuclear propulsion for surface ships. AEGIS SHIPS The Aegis fleet air defense system has been under development for several years. The development has now reached the stage where the Navy is asking for authorization for Aegis ships. The Congress will make the decision this year whether all Aegis strike force ships are to be provided nuclear propulsion, or whether the mix of conventional and nuclear ships proposed by the Department of Defense will be built. Up to April 1971, Navy programs were based on all Aegis ships being nuclear powered. It was planned to modify future Virginia class nuclear cruisers to accommodate Aegis. In April 1971, the Secretary of Defense canceled the third Nimiiz class carrier, the CVN-70, and the two nuclear cruisers, CGN-41 and -42; he also cancelled the Navy's future plans for building Aegis equipped nuclear cruisers. During the next 2 years, the Defense Department restored the CVN- 70 and the CGN-41 and -42. Last year, Congress canceled the CGN- 42 İn 1973, Admiral Zumwalt, who was then the Chief of Naval Operations, recommended starting a class of gas turbine-powered Aegis destroyers in fiscal year 1977 and a class of nuclear cruisers with Aegis in fiscal year Secretary of the Navy Warner requested that the CNO investigate "the feasibility of building a single new class of aircraft carrier escort, nuclear powered, vice the two now planned

55 49 * * *" In a meeting I attended on Octboer 12,1973, Admiral Zumwalt chose a program of 16 gas turbine-powered Aegis ships and 8 nuclear Aegis ships to provide 2 Aegis ships per carrier for a projected force level of 12 carriers of which 4 are already authorized to be nuclear. This decision became the basis for the presently planned mix of conventional and nuclear Aegis ships. At this meeting, he said that the talk of an energy crisis was just so much talk, that we are sitting on a 400-year supply of coal and that we will soon have the capability of putting this in a form we can use in our ships. He said that if he had his way, he would never build another nuclear-powered surface ship. He said that his decision on the number of conventional Aegis ships was based on the assumption that all new carriers will be non-nuclear. Therefore, he approved 8 nuclear Aegis ships to provide 2 each for the 4 nuclear carriers and 16 nonnuclear ships to provide 2 each for 8 conventional carriers he assumed would later be replaced by conventional carriers. Admiral Holloway became Chief of Naval Operations in July 1974, a month before title VIII became law. Based on his review of future shipbuilding plans, he recommended that future carriers be nuclear powered. He also recommended, and the Navy adopted his position, that the Navy build 18 nuclear-powered strike cruisers, CSGN's, in lieu of the prior proposed mix of 16 nonnuclear and 8 nuclear ships with Aegis. In a letter of December 6, 1974, to the chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Holloway proposed a 4-year program for building Aegis ships. This program called for six nuclear-powered strike cruisers, CSGN's, to be authorized in the 4-year period from fiscal 1977 through fiscal 1980, and no conventional Aegis ships. The Navy subsequently recommended to the Secretary of Defense that, in addition to all new construction Aegis ships being CSGN's, Aegis should be introduced into the fleet by converting the nuclear cruiser Long Beach to Aegis as soon as possible. The Defense Department disapproved the Navy's recommendation to convert the Long Beach and disapproved the 18 CSGN program proposed by the Navy. The Navy continued to recommend that the first new Aegis ship be a CSGN in fiscal year 1977 with advance procurement funds in fiscal year The Defense Department cut the Navy's fiscal year 1977 budget and persuaded the Navy to recommend in the fiscal year 1977 program a DD-963 type ship with Aegis; this was named the DDG-^7 class. In June 1975, the President disapproved this DOD/Navy recommendation and requested Congress to provide advance procurement funds in the fiscal year 1976 budget for the first CSGN to be authorized in the fiscal year 1977 program. The Congress did not authorize and appropriate the long lead funds. A few months ago the Navy program had been changed to four nuclear strike cruisers to be built over the next 5 years, along with seven conventional ships. In the program now proposed, there are only two nuclear strike cruisers and eight conventional Aegis ships to be built in this 5-year period. The second CSGN would be delivered in 1986, about the same time as the sixth nuclear-powered carrier, CVN-72. Thus, when all of the ships planned for the fiscal year year program are

56 50 delivered, we will have six nuclear carriers and only two nuclear Aegis ships. There will also be six to eight aging conventional carriers and eight, new nonnuclear Aegis ships. I am firmly convinced that unless Congress takes the initiative, by next year you will find that the analysts in the Office of Management and Budget and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense will attempt to eliminate completely the nuclear strike cruiser program. It would not surprise me if they then again recommended building conventional aircraft carriers in lieu of nuclear carriers. That has been the pattern for over 25 years, starting with nuclear submarines. And I see no indication that the analysts ;have changed one iota in their position that, since nuclear surface ships cost more, we should build conventional ships. But why should anyone expect to be able to get the great military advantages nuclear propulsion gives a warship without having to pay something for them? Aegis is planned as our most capable AAW weapons system. Because Aegis ships will be expensive, regardless of their means of propulsion, there will never be a large number. In a naval war against an enemy employing sophisticated weapons systems, all strike forqe Aegis ships will be needed in the areas of highest threat. It is under just such circumstances that the advantages of nuclear propulsion are most urgently needed to maximize mobility and minimize logistic support. It is into such high threat areas where the nuclear carrier task forces will be sent in time of war, and they will need nuclear-powerer 1 Aegis ships to accompany them. The Aegis ships should be nuclear for the same reasons that carriers should be nuclear. In areas where the threat is great enough to require nuclear carriers and Aegis ships our first line naval strike forces it is highly unlikely that oilers can survive. When a non-nuclear Aegis ship runs low on fuel, it will be necessary to remove the Aegis ship to an area of lower threat to meet the oiler, losing the Aegis protection just when it is most needed. The CSGN also has unique capability for independent operation in areas where carriers are not available and the ship-launched cruise missiles in the CSGN can provide sufficient offensive power. Another consideration is that to have a credible nuclear powered guided-missile ship capability in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, it is necessary to build a reasonable number of nuclear ships so that,some ships are available for immediate deployment at all times. Even if all 10 Aegis ships presently planned to be authorized over the next 5 years are given nuclear propulsion, the Navy would still have a total of only 19 nuclear-powered guided-missile ships in both oceans in the 1980's. It is my opinion that the fleet commanders of that period will consider this to be the minimum needed, considering the problems we can foresee today. CONVERSION OF NUCLEAR CRUISER LONG BEACH TO AEGIS The quickest and cheapest way to get the first Aegis production unit into the fleet is to convert the nuclear cruiser Long Beach. If $371 million of initial funds are provided in fiscal year 1977, the ship can be at sea with Aegis late in 1981 at a total cost of $785 million.

57 51 This would not only get Aegis into the fleet at the earliest possible date, but would also increase by 6 years that portion of the Long Beach life during which it would have the Aegis system, and would provide another nuclear powered Aegis ship much sooner. The Long Beach is not expected to require refueling before If the ship is converted to Aegis with 3 years in the yard, refueling will not be required before If the ship is ever to be converted to Aegis, I recommend it be done as soon as possible. COMPARISON OF CSGN AND DDG-47 In addition to nuclear propulsion, the nuclear strike cruiser proposed by the Navy has significantly greater military features than the DDG-47 gas turbine powered Aegis ship included in the President's fiscal year 1977 budget request. The anti-air warfare missile magazines in the CSGN carry 45 percent more missiles and there are twice as many Harpoon anti-surface missile canister launchers, 16 in lieu of 8. The CSGN is designed to carry eight Tomahawk ship-launched cruise missiles; whereas, the DDG-47 does not have space to carry this system. Each of these missiles has five times the range of the Harpoon missile and twice the explosive power. Thus, the CSGN will be able to bring within antisurface missile range, targets in an area 25 times that covered by the DDG-47. The CSGN will carry an 8-inch gun in lieu of two 5-inch guns in the DDG-47. The range of the projectiles that will be available for the 8-inch gun is expected to be greater than the range of the 5-inch gun projectiles; the CSGN will be able to bring within gun range an area about nine times larger than the area covered by the DDG-47. Either ship can carry helicopters, but the aircraft-handling facilities in the CSGN will be larger, so that it will be able to carry two VTOL aircraft; this will greatly increase its targeting capabilities at long ranges. The CSGN will have several other features not included in the DDG-47. It will have a task force coordination center, as well as accommodations and facilities for a unit commander and his staff. It will also have the SSES electronic intelligence and analysis system; this is not included in the DDG-47. The displacement of the CSGN has been increased over 1,000 tons to provide fragmentation armor not in the DDG-47. It is also being designed to provide systems to isolate ship internals.from chemical and biological attack. The CSGN also has greater space and greater electrical power capacity for future weapons systems modifications. I thoroughly agree with the Chief of Naval Operations' decision to include the additional military features in the nuclear strike cruiser. These, combined with nuclear propulsion give the strike cruiser far greater capabilities than any other surface warship in the world, except the aircraft carrier. Nevertheless, there is no question that the DDG-47, which is being called a destroyer, is a major combatant. It has greater displacement and has more armament than any of the 18 nonnuclear cruisers built since World War II. It is even heavier and has more armament

58 than the nuclear cruisers Bairibridge and Truxtun. I do not know why it is called a destroyer, DDG, rather than a cruiser, CG. COMPARISON or COST CSGN AND DDG-47 The increase in estimated acquisition cost of buying the first Aegis ship as a CSGN, in lieu of DDG-47, is about $490 million in fiscal year 1978 program dollars. Of this amount, about half is due to the difference in weapons systems. The remainder is due to the higher acquisition cost of nuclear propulsion, including the initial nuclear fuel which will provide for 15 years of ship operations. The cost of buying and delivering oil is not included in the acquisition cost of a conventional ship. At today's prices, it would cost about $90 million to buy and deliver an amount of oil for the conventional ship which would provide the amount of energy equivalent to the energy in the nuclear cores of the CSGN. A comparison which would bring out the added procurement cost which is due to having all nuclear propulsion for Aegis ships would be to compare the cost of the seven nuclear strike cruisers included in the President's alternative all-nuclear program cited in his letter of February 13, 1976 to the Speaker of the House, to the cost of a mixed program of two nuclear strike cruisers and six conventional ships with the same military features other than propulsion, including the cost of buying and delivering an equivalent amount of fuel for each ship. This is two less conventional ships than in the currently approved mixed program of eight conventional ships and two nuclear strike cruisers. The cost of the seven nuclear strike cruisers is estimated to be $8.530 billion. The cost of two nuclear strike cruisers and six conventional DDG^47 class ships is estimated to be about $6.298 billion. To this should be added $1.5 billion to give the six conventional ships the same military characteristics as the nuclear strike cruisers, and $540 million at today's prices for the cost of buying and delivering 3 million barrels of oil to each conventional ship. This gives a total for the mixed program of $8.338 billion. This is only $192 million less than the cost of seven nuclear strike cruisers. Thus, when the all-nuclear program of seven strike cruisers is compared to a mixed program of two nuclear strike cruisers and six conventional ships having the same characteristics, the extra cost of the all-nuclear program is seen to be about $200 million for one less ship. Navy studies and actual experience at sea have shown that even with the same weapons in nuclear and conventional ships, it takes fewer nuclear ships to do the same job as a greater number of conventional ships. Further, Navy studies over many years have shown that when all costs of a carrier task group over its life are considered, substitution of nuclear powered escort ships for conventional ships with the same weapons increases the overall peacetime cost of a carrier task group only about 1 percent for each escort changed to nuclear propulsion. This would also be true for a nuclear strike cruiser compared to a conventional strike cruiser with the same military features other than propulsion. Taking into consideration the declining number of overseas bases and the difficulties that will be encountered in the future to deliver

59 53 propulsion fuel oil in the areas of highest threat, and when all costs of nuclear and conventional ships are taken into consideration, I believe that the added military benefits of nuclear propulsion for Aegis ships are well worth the additional cost involved. COST ISSUES CITED BY OPPONENTS OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION For many years opponents of nuclear propulsion have advocated that the acquisition money be used instead to buy a larger number of cheaper conventional warships. The desire for small, light, cheap weapons systems has been endemic for a long time. Experience in wartime, however, indicates that the essential ingredients of a successful seaborne weapons system reliability and redundancy, speed and endurance, versatility, firepower are often lacking in such developments. These lessons have been lost on generation after generation of our leaders and must be periodically relearned at potentially enormous cost and loss of life when we are faced with actual wartime situations. The number of AAW missile batteries, the number o.f sonars and ASW weapons systems, and the number of escorts needed to protect the great investment in a carrier task force cannot properly or logically be traded off for nuclear propulsion. No matter how many tradeoffs we study of other ways to spend the money we need to pay for nuclear propulsion, we will always be faced with comparing unlike things; none of the tradeoffs accord freedom from logistic support for propulsion fuel which is provided by nuclear propulsion. The other tradeoffs provide additional defensive protection for the task group, but none of them increase the offensive capability of the CVN, as does nuclear propulsion in the escorts. To compare a larger number of conventional escorts with a smaller number of nuclear escorts at equal cost is not to compare alternate ways o.f achieving the same capability: it is merely to compare two different capabilities that can be achieved with the same amount of money. Even life cycle cost comparisons made of nuclear and conventional warships are based on the assumption that carrier task forces could be safely replenished in the strike area. I believe that if a realistic wartime assumption concerning the ability of carrier task forces to conduct replenishment operations in areas subject to the projected Soviet naval threat of the 1980's were used, the relative cost of nuclear-powered surface warships would be shown to decrease. In a real combat situation a sophisticated enemy would make a determined effort with nuclear submarines and other forces to interrupt our supply lines and sink our replenishment ships. Under such circumstances, the ability of nuclear warships to retire at high speed from the areas of highest threat in order to replenish combat consumables in areas of lower threat and then return to the strike area at high speed could mean the difference between victory and defeat in the strike area. SHIPBUILDING CAPACITY Some also argue that we should not increase the nuclear warship building program because we do not have enough shipbuilding capacity. But the question of building capacity is a chicken and egg

60 54 proposition. The problem is that we do not have a firm nuclear shipbuilding program. If we can get a firm long-range program, we can get the additional capacity we may need to produce it. But we cannot expect shipbuilders and component suppliers to gear up to do considerable work when they are not reasonably sure of the extent of future work. In the past, we have had as many as seven shipyards two naval and five private build nuclear warships. All seven built nuclear submarines; three built nuclear cruises; and one, Newport News, has and continues to build nuclear carriers. At the peak of the nuclear warship building program in the early 1960's, 14 nuclear ships were authorized per year. However, the decline in the number of nuclear ships authorized each year an average of about six peif year for the last 5 years and the desire to build each one for as little cost as possible, has caused us to concentrate our present nuclear warship construction in two yards, the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics in Groton, Conn., and the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. in Newport News, Va.; this yard was bought by Tenneco Inc., of Houston, Tex., in However, two yards that used to build nuclear ships, the Quincy yard of General Dynamics, and the Ingalls yard of Litton Industries have expressed interest in bidding on the nuclear strike cruiser program. Today the annual investment by electric utilities in nuclear power equipment for central station powerplants is far greater than-the Navy's annual investment in naval nuclear propulsion plants. Further, 12 years ago, annual naval shipbuilding contracts exceeded U.S, commercial shipbuilding contracts by a factor of three. Today the dollar value of annual commercial shipbuilding approximates the dollar value of naval shipbuilding contracts. Both of these factors add to the urgency of establishing a firm long-range nuclear warship building program, so that we are in a good position to-compete for the necessary industrial capacity. NEED FOR HIGH CAPABILITY SHIPS The Soviets recognize the importance of becoming the world's strongest ea power. We have now chosen not to challenge them with numbers of ships. It is, therefore, essential that the ships we do build are the most powerful and effective weapons we know how to build. This means nuclear propulsion, and the best ahtiair, antisubmarine, and surface-to-surface weapons we have for major warships. The penalty for any other approach is the steady erosion of our. conventional military forces; a consequent reduction jn our influence and in our "options" in world affairs; and the reliance of our security on nuclear weapons which, if used, would be the most supreme disaster. Historically, the United States has relied on the quality^ of its weapons and the ability to manufacture them in large quantities to win its battles, rather than on large numbers of men. The American people do not appear to be willing to support large numbers of men under arms. Further, the complexity of modern weapons and the rapidity with which major wars can now be started preclude relying on wartime production capacity to furnish our weapons; we must plan on fighting

61 66 a major war with the weapons we have at its outbreak. I believe we would be following a shortsighted path if we do not provide our first line striking forces with the best weapons our technology can provide. If the problem is that the Nation's financial managers are not willing to provide enough money to insure our present defense, and at the same time invest sufficient funds to insure our future defense, then our people must be informed of the stark reality they face. We must not do what we have done so often in the past; namely, fail to provide adequate defenses using the sugarcoated philosophy that they are not needed, only to soon find ourselves in a war which costs many times the funds saved. In World War II, we got away with it because our allies took the brunt of fighting while we rearmed. In Korea, we got away with it because we were able to reactivate quickly large numbers of World War II ships, as well as equipment which had just been put in reserve. In the Vietnam war, we managed to sustain ourselves by using up a great deal of material, drawing down our reserve stocks, wearing out much equipment, and because our real opponents did not fight with their first team. Most people do not realize how badly our naval forces were allowed to deteriorate by the hiatus in naval shipbuilding in the 1960's and the reduction in fleet readiness accepted to make funds, material, resources, and personnel available for the Vietnam war. All wars and all military development should have taught us that a war, small or large, does not follow a prescribed scenario laid out in advance. If we could predict the sequence of events accurately, we could probably have avoided the war in the first place. As a war progresses, we can count on constantly facing new conditions and surprises as the enemy seeks new means to probe our weaknesses; that is what we repeatedly experienced in Vietnam. When a war starts, we must fight with what we have. You will recall that all the aircraft the United States used in World War II had been designed prior to that war. Further, it takes 5 years to build a large warship. This often means using our weapons for an entirely different mission than that for which they were designed. For example, consider the use of B-52's in Vietnam. Therefore, every major weapon should be designed with the maximum possible inherent flexibility. It is the need for the flexibility in warships built to operate for 30 years or longer that makes it so obvious and so important that we use nuclear propulsion in every major surface warship we build; especially since the ships we are building today are expected to last through part of the 21st century. Despite the fact that Congress has repeatedly taken the position that we need to build more nuclear-powered surface warships, after 25 years of studying the issue we have only seven nuclear surface ships in operation and six more under construction. This is a very slow rate of transition to nuclear power for the greatest maritime power in the world an island nation dependent on the strength of its Navy for its security. ; Decisions made today concerning nuclear propulsion will not have their effect in the fleet until a decade from now. We delude ourselves if we do not recognize that in the intervening years the Soviets will introduce major improvements in their naval weapons systems. As they continue to try out new technological advances in their fleet, we can

62 56 expect them to incorporate the lessons learned into their new design ships. They have demonstrated time and again that they are willing to invest large amounts in new concepts. No one can tell what problems our future leaders will face. However, the defense capabilities available to them will have been decided by the decisions we make today. The issue before the Congress should be decided on the capabilities our ships must have to meet the challenge. No cost analyses; no political expediencies; no other factors should be permitted to obscure this fundamental fact. You cannot measure military capability by cost alone. To do so can be fatal to this country, especially since our likely adversary is engaged in the greatest expansion of military forces in history and continues to outspend us. I know that with today's fiscal problems facing the Congress, it is extremely difficult to make investments for the future. However, if such investments had not been made in the past, we might not have survived as long as Ave have. If the investment for our future needs is not made now, there may be no future. Our defense budget is being decreased each year in real dollars. It, therefore, becomes increasingly imperative that we have the best weapons our technology can provide. As for myself, I would rather fight a war with fewer, but better soldiers; with fewer but better guns, or tanks, or planes; with fewer but better ships. That is the road for a nation that excels in technology, and is reluctant to expend lives in war; yet, nevertheless, desires to win. The systems analysts always tell us that we don't need the best ships, but they don't tell us how to counter the threat with inferior ships. For example, in the issue of nuclear-powered surface warships, nowhere do they address how we should ensure that tankers can survive in areas of high threat. And without tankers, the conventional ships cannot survive. What must be done? We need a firm long-range program to build nuclear-powered ships. a program that will not be drastically changed every year or 2 as has happened in the past. Admiral Moorer, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for many years an eloquent proponent of nuclear power for our striking forces, agreed with me that we must build these first-line ships during peace. The excuse for not building better ships is always that they are "more expensive". But all weapons of war are expensive. Cheap weapons w^ill not win a war. And if we cannot win a war, there is no sense in spending money on weapons at all. Rarely in naval history have the leaders looked far enough ahead. They generally build ships they consider to be adequate for the present. That is why, frequently, naval leadership has been replaced once war broke out. We should be planning now for war that may erupt 15 or more years from now. Therefore, I agree with the policy recommended by the House Armed Services Committee that now is the time to establish a firm program for making all new major combatant ships for our striking forces nuclear powered. I consider this should be a matter of national priority. For the reasons I have presented, I consider it urgent that we proceed now with the next nuclear carrier, the nuclear strike cruiser program, and conversion of the cruiser Long Beach to Aegis.

63 57 APPENDIX Report NT-76-1 August 1976 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS AND THEIR SUPPORT FACILITIES 1975 Prepared by M. E. Miles, G. L. Sjoblom, J. D. Eagles Nuclear Power Directorate Naval Sea Systems Command Department of the Navy Approved by H. G. RICKOVER, ADM USN Deputy Commander for Nuclear Propulsion

64 58 ABSTRACT The environmental effect of disposal of radioactive wastes originating from U. S. Naval nuclear propulsion plants and their support facilities is assessed. The total radioactivity in liquids, less tritium, discharged to all ports and harbors from the more than one hundred Naval nuclear-powered ships and supporting tenders, Naval 'bases and shipyards was less than 0,002 curie in The total tritium released to all ports and harbors was less than one curie in This*report confirms that procedures used by the Navy to control releases of radioactivity from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities are effective in protecting the environment and the health and safety of the general public.

65 59 ' TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY 1 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE DISPOSAL 3 Policy and Procedures Minimizing Release of Radioactivity in Harbors 3 Source of Radioactivity 3 Radioactivity Removal From Liquid Wastes at Shore Facilities 4 Liquid Waste Releases in Harbors 4 Short-Lived Radionuclides 4 Fission Product Radionuclides 6 Tritium 6 Carbon 14 7 Liquid Waste Releases at Sea 7 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL.9 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING Navy Environmental Monitoring Program 11 ENVIRONMENTAL PATHWAYS ANALYSIS 18 AUDITS AND REVIEWS 23 CONCLUSIONS. 24 REFERENCES 25 LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE RELEASED TO HARBORS FROM U. S. NAVAL 1 NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS AND THEIR SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR 1971 THROUGH 1975 TABLE 2 TOTAL RADIOACTIVITY IN LIQUID WASTE RELEASED AT SEA ORIGINATING 8 FROM U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS TABLE 3 TABLE 4 RADIOACTIVE SOLID WASTE FROM U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS AND THEIR SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR 1971 THROUGH 1975 SUMMARY OF 1975 SURVEYS FOR COBALT 60 IN BOTTOM SEDIMENT OF U. S. HARBORS WHERE U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS HAVE BEEN REGULARLY BASED, OVERHAULED OR BUILT TABLE 5 RADIONUCLIDE RELEASES ASSUMED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PATHWAYS ANALYSIS 20 TABLE 6 ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE TIMES, CONSUMPTION AND CONCENTRATION 21 PARAMETERS ASSUMED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PATHWAYS ANALYSIS H 10 13

66 60 22 TABLE 8 ESTIMATED TOTAL WHOLE BODY RADIATION EXPOSURE TO GENERAL PUBLIC 22 WITHIN 50 MILES FROM ASSUMED LIQUID AND AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASES FROM SHIPYARDS ENGAGED IN NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PLANT WORK LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ILLUSTRATION 1 SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM 5 ILLUSTRATION 2 DREDGE FOR SAMPLING HARBOR SEDIMENT 12 ILLUSTRATION 3 GAMMA SPECTRA OF HARBOR BOTTOM SEDIMENT SAMPLES 16 APPENDIX ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SURVEY CHARTS 29 19

67 61 SUMMARY The radioactivity in wastes discussed in this report originates in the pressurized water reactors of U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships. As of the end of 197&, the U. S. Navy had 106 nuclearpowered submarines and seven nuclear-powered surface ships in operation. Support facilities involved in construction, maintenance, overhaul and refueling of these nuclear propulsion plants include nine shipyards, twelve tenders, and two submarine bases. This report describes disposal of radioactive liquid wastes, disposal of solid wastes and monitoring of the environment to determine the effect of radioactive releases and updates reports on this subject issued by the Navy in references 1 through 10. This report concludes that radioactivity associated with U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships has had no significant or discernable effect on the quality of the environment. A summary of the radiological information supporting this conclusion follows: From the start of the Naval nuclear propulsion program the policy of the U. S. Navy has been to reduce to the minimum practicable the amounts of radioactivity released into harbors. Navy procedures to accomplish this have been reviewed with the U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration and the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. The total gamma radioactivity released within twelve miles from shore from all U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities in recent years is shown in Table 1. TABLE 1 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE RELEASED TO HARBORS FROM U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS AND THEIR SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR 1971 THROUGH 1975 Number of Ships Radioactivity-Curies Year In Operation (less tritium) 100 less than less than less than less than less than As a measure of the significance of these data, if one person were able to drink the entire amount of radioactivity discharged into any harbor in 1975, he would not exceed the annual radiation exposure permitted for an individual worker by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. *References are listed at end of report O

68 62 Enviornmental monitoring is conducted by the U. S. Navy in U. S. and foreign harbors frequented by U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships. This monitoring consists of analyzing harbor water and sediment and marine life samples for radioactivity associated with Naval nuclear propulsion plants, radiation monitoring around the perimeter of support facilities and effluent monitoring. Environmental samples from each of these harbors are also checked at least annually by a U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration Laboratory to ensure analytical procedures are correct and standardized. The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency has conducted independent surveys in U. S. harbors; results have been consistent with Navy results. These surveys have confirmed that U. S. Naval nuclearpowered ships and support facilities have had.no significant effect on the radioactivity of the marine environment. -2-

69 63 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE DISPOSAL Policy and Procedures Minimizing Release of Radioactivity In Harbors The policy of the U. S. Navy is to reduce to the minimum practicable the amounts of radioactivity released to the environment but particularly within twelve miles from shore including into harbors. This policy is consistent with applicable recommendations issued by the Federal Radiation Council (incorporated in Environmental Protection Agency in 1970), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, International Commission on Radiological Protection, International Atomic Energy Agency, and National Academy of Sciences 'National Research Council (references 11 through 18). Keeping releases small minimizes the radioactivity available to build up in the environment or to concentrate in marine life. To implement this policy of minimizing releases, the Navy has issued standard instructions defining the radioactive waste disposal limits and procedures to be used by U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities. These instructions were reviewed and concurred in by the, U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration and the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. Source of Radioactivity In the shipboard reactors, pressurized water circulating through the reactor core picks up the heat of nuclear reaction. Reactor cooling water circulates through a closed piping system to heat exchangers which transfer the heat to water in a secondary steam system isolated from the primary cooling water. The steam is then used as the source of power for the propulsion plant as well as for auxiliary machinery. Releases from the shipboard reactors occur primarily when reactor coolant water expands as a result of being. heated to operating temperature; this coolant passes through a purification system ion exchange resin bed prior to being transrferred from the ship. The principal source of radioactivity in liquid wastes is from trace amounts of corrosion and wear products from reactor plant metal surfaces in contact with reactor cooling water. Radionuclides with half-lives greater than one day in these corrosion and wear products include tungsten 187, chromium 51, hafnium 181, iron 59, iron 55, nickel 63, zirconium 95, tantalum 182, manganese 54, cobalt 58, and cobalt 60. The most predominant of these is cobalt 60, which has a 5.3 year half-life; cobalt 60 also has the most restrictive concentration limit in water listed by organizations which set radiological standards in references 11, 12, and 13 for these corrosion and wear radionuclides. Therefore, radioactive waste disposal is conservatively controlled by assuming that all the long-lived radioactivity is cobalt

70 64 Radioactivity Removal From Liquid Wastes at Shore Facilities Radioactive liquid wastes at shore facilities are collected in stainless steel tanks and processed through a processing system to remove most of the radioactivity (exclusive of tritium) prior to collection in a clean tank for reuse. Even after processing to approximately 10~ microcuries of gamma radioactivity per milliliter reactor coolant is reused rather than discharged. Illustration 1 shows a simplified block diagram of the waste processing system which consists of particulate filters, activated carbon bed filters, mixed hydrogen hydroxyl resin and colloid removal resin beds. This type of processing system has been developed and used successfully to produce high quality water containing very low radioactivity levels. This water is reused in the Naval nuclear propulsion plants rather than discharged. Liquid Waste Releases in Harbors The total amounts of long-lived gamma radioactivity released into harbors and seas within twelve miles from shore has been less than curie during each of the last five years. This total is for releases from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and from the supporting shipyards, tenders and submarine bases, and at operating bases and home ports in the U. S. 'and overseas and all other U. S. and foreign ports which were visited by Naval nuclear-powered ships. This quantity is conservatively reported as if it consisted entirely of cobalt 60, which is the predominant long-lived gamma radionuclide and also has the most stringent concentration limits. To put this small quantity of radioactivity into perspective, it is less than the quantity of naturally occurring radioactivity (reference 19) in the volume of saline harbor water occupied by a single nuclear-powered submarine.. Although volumes are of less significance than the amount of radioactivity released, Table 1 of earlier reports has also shown that the total volume of liquids released within twelve miles has been reduced from millions of gallons per year in the 1960's to less than 25 thousand gallons per year beginning in Thus the Navy has achieved its policy of reducing releases of radioactive liquids in harbors to the minimum practicable amounts. Therefore, volumes have been deleted from this report. Short Lived Radionuclides Reactor coolant also contains short-lived radionuclides with half-lives of seconds to hours. Their highest concentrations in reactor coolant are from nitrogen 16 (7 second half-life), nitrogen 13 (10 minute half-life), fluorine 18 (1.8 hour half-life), argon 41 (1.8 hour half-life) and manganese 56 (2.6 hour half-life). For the longest-lived of these, about one day after discharge from an operating reactor the concentration is reduced to one thousandth of the initial concentration and. in about two days the concentration is reduced to one millionth. Therefore, since most of the water is transferred to shore facilities for processing and reuse rather than discharged, these short-lived radionuclides are not important for water disposal considerations. -4-

71 65 FILTER CARBON BED CARBON BED OR H-OH RESIN H-OH RESIN F1LTE :) PUMP REUSE CLEAN TANK SAMPLE CONNECTION SAMPLE CONNECTION RECIRCULATION PUMP FILTER SAMPLE CONNECTION TO WATER REUSE ILLUSTRATION 1 SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM -5-

72 66 Fission Product Radionuclides Fission products produced in the reactor are retained within the fuel elements. The fission gases krypton and xenon are also retained within the fuel elements. However, trace quantities of naturally occurring uranium impurities In reactor structural materials release small amounts of fission products to reactor coolant. The concentrations of fission products and the volumes of reactor coolant released are so low, however, that the total radioactivity attributed to long-lived fission product radionuclides strontium 90 and cesium 137 in releases from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities has been less than curie per year for all harbors combined. Fallout of these same fission products has often been more than this in one rainfall in a single harbor. Tritium Small amounts of tritium are formed in reactor coolant systems as a result of neutron interaction with the approximately percent of naturally occurrring deuterium present in water, and other nuclear reactions. Although tritium has a 12 year half-life^ the radiation produced is of such low energy that the radioactivity concentration guide issued by the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and by other standard-setting organizations is one hundred times higher for tritium than for cobalt 60. This tritium is in the oxide form and chemically indistinguishable from water; therefore it does not concentrate significantly in marine life or collect on sediment as do other radionuclides. Tritium is naturally present in the environment because it is generated by cosmic radiation in the upper atmosphere. Reference 20 reports that the production rate from this source is about six million curies per year, which through rainfall causes a tritium inventory in the oceans of about one hundred million curies. Because of this naturally occurring tritium, much larger releases of tritium than are conceivable from Naval nuclear reactors would be required to make a measurable change in the background tritium concentration. The total amount of tritium released during each of the last 5 years from all U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and their supporing tenders, bases and" shipyards has been less than 200 curies. Most of this has been into the ocean greater than twelve miles from shore. The total tritium from the entire nuclear Navy is less than single electrical generating nuclear power stations typically release each year (reference 21). Total tritium released into harbors within twelve miles was less than one curie in Such releases are too small to increase measurably the tritium concentration in the environment. Therefore, tritium has not been included in the data in other sections of this report. -6-

73 67 Carbon 14 Carbon 14 is also formed in small quantities in reactor coolant systems as a result of neutron interactions with nitrogen and oxygen. Carbon 14 decays with a half-life of 5730 years; however, only low energy beta radiation is emitted as a result of this decay process. As a result, the radioactivity concentration guide for carbon 14 in its chemical form in air issued by the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and by other standard-setting organizations is three thousand times higher than for cobalt 60. Carbon 14 occurs naturally in the environment. It is generated from cosmic radiation interactions with nitrogen and oxygen in the upper atmosphere and oxidized to form carbon dioxide. Carbon 14 is chemically indistinguishable from other radioisotopes of carbon. The carbon dioxide diffuses and convects throughout the atmosphere and enters the earth's carbon cycle. Reference 22 states that the earth's carbon 14 inventory is estimated to be about three hundred and ten million curies. The total amount of carbon 14 released during each of the last 5 years from the operation of all U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and their supporting tenders, bases and shipyards has been less than 100 curies, most of which is released into the atmosphere at sea beyond twelve miles from shore. Since the inventory of naturally occurring carbon 14 is so large, it is extremely unlikely that releases from Naval nuclear reactors could result in a measurable change in the background concentration of carbon 14. Therefore, carbon 14 has not been included in the data in other sections of this report. Liquid Waste Releases at Sea Radioactive liquids incidental to the operation of the nuclear propulsion plants are released at sea under strict controls. These ocean releases are consistent with recommendations the Council on Environmental Quality made in 1970 to the President in reference 23, and consistent with the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, reference 24. Procedures and limits for ocean disposal have been consistent with recommendations made by the National Academy of Sciences National Research Council in reference 15 and by the International Atomic Energy Agency in reference 16. These releases have contained much less radioactivity than these reports considered would be acceptable. Total long-lived radioactivity excluding tritium, released farther than twelve miles from shore by U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and supporting tenders is shown in Table 2 for recent years. This is the total amount released from over 100 ships at different times of the year in the open sea at long distances from land in small incremental amounts, and under rapid dispersal conditions due to wave action. The quantity of radioactivity released to the open ocean in 1975 was 0.4 curie, which is less than the naturally occurring radioactivity in a cube of sea water approximately 100 yards on a side. -7-

74 68 TABLE 2 TOTAL RADIOACTIVITY IN LIQUID WASTE RELEASED AT SEA ORIGINATING FROM U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR-POWERED SHIPS Radioactivity Curies (less tritium)

75 69 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL During maintenance and overhaul operations, solid low-level radioactive wastes consisting of contaminated rags, plastic bags, paper, filters, ion exchange resin and scrap materials are collected by nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities. Transfers of these low level radioactive materials from nuclear-powered ships to support facilities are required to be strictly controlled in accordance with Navy accountability procedures to prevent loss, including serialized tagging and marking and signatures required by radiologically trained personnel. Solid radioactive waste materials are packaged in strong tight containers, shielded as necessary and shipped to burial sites licensed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a State under agreement with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Shipyards and other shore facilities are not permitted to dispose of radioactive solid wastes by burial on their own sites. Solid radioactive materials from Naval nuclear-powered ships have not been dumped at sea since 1970 when the Navy issued procedures prohibiting sea disposal of solid radioactive materials. The Navy procedures require all packaging and shipping of radioactive materials to be performed in strict compliance with U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements. Table 3 summarizes total radioactivity and volumes of radioactive solid waste disposal for the last five years. Table 3 includes material generated at the listed facilities and all other radioactive waste generated by U. S. nuclear-powered ships and transferred to the listed facilities. The quantity of solid radioactive waste in any one year from a particular facility depends on the amount and type of support work performed that year. Approximately two hundred waste shipments to land burial sites are made each year from all these facilities. Table 3 does not include expended fuel or high level radioactive material associated with expended fuel. These materials are shipped from the refueling shipyard to U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration facilities for processing in the same manner as other expended nuclear fuel. Shipments of spent fuel are made infrequently since U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships need refueling infrequently. Expended fuel is required to be shipped in specially designed shielded shipping containers in_accordance with the requirements of the Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Because of efforts to minimize solid waste and the utilization of compaction equipment, total volumes have remained nearly constant in spite of increasing work caused by increasing numbers of ships. The average annual volume for the entire Naval nuclear propulsion program could be contained in a cube measuring fifteen yards on a side. The total annual volumes of solid radioactive waste from the Naval nuclear propulsion program listed in Table 3 are less than one tenth of the total volumes of radioactive solid waste buried in all U. S. commercial burial grounds each year (reference 25). -9-

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77 71 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING To provide additional assurance that procedures used by the U.S. Navy to control radioactivity are adequate to protect the environment, the Navy conducts environmental monitoring in harbors frequented by its nuclear-powered ships. Environmental monitoring surveys for radioactivity are periodically performed in harbors where U. S. Naval nuclearpowered ships are built or overhauled and where these ships have home ports or operating bases. Samples from each harbor monitored are also checked at least annually by a U. S. Energy Research and Development A'dministration (USERDA) laboratory to ensure analytical procedures are correct and standardized. These USERDA laboratory results have been consistent with shipyard and operating base, results. Navy Environmental Monitoring Program The current Navy environmental monitoring program consists of analyzing samples of harbor water and sediment, supplemented by shoreline surveys, posted dosimeters and effluent monitoring. Sampling harbor water and sediment each quarter year is emphasized since these materials would be the most likely affected by releases of radioactivity. Marine life samples have also been collected from some harbors. Five water samples are taken in each harbor once each quarter year in areas where nuclear-powered ships berth and from upstream and downstream locations. These samples are analyzed for gross gamma radioactivity and for cobalt 60 content. A sodium iodide scintillation detector with a multichannel analyzer is used to measure gross gamma activity in an energy range from 0.1 MeV to 2.1 MeV expressed in terms of cobalt 60 equivalent and to analyze the resulting gamma data for the presence of cobalt 60. Procedures for analysis will detect cobalt 60 if its concentration exceeds one three hundredth of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission limit of reference 11. No cobalt 60 has been detected in any of the water samples from all harbors monitored. A radiological laboratory of the Environmental Protection Agency analyzed samples from harbors to identify radionuclides present in sediment. These analyses showed cobalt 60 was the predominant radionuclide added to sediment from Naval nuclear reactor operations. Therefore, Navy monitoring procedures require collecting in each harbor approximately 20 to 120 sediment samples once each quarter year for cobalt 60 and gross gamma analyses. Locations and numbers of sediment samples for a particular harbor depend on the size of the harbor and,the number and separation of locations where nuclearpowered ships berth. Sampling points are selected to form a pattern around ship berthing locations and to provide points in areas away from these berthing locations. The sampling locations are selected individually for each harbor considering characteristics of the harbor. Sediment samples are collected using the dredge shown in Illustration 2. The dredge samples a surface area of 36 square inches and has -11

78 72 been modified to collect only the top one-half to one inch of sediment. The top layer was selected because it should be more mobile and more accessible to marine life than deeper layers. After the dredge is lowered to the harbo 1 " bottpm the messenger weight lowered on the support from the surface causes the spring-loaded jaws on the dredge to close and trap the sediment. The samples are placed directly in a one quart container lined with a plastic bag. Each sediment sample is analyzed for gamma activity in the container in which collected using a sodium iodide scintillation detector with a multichannel analyzer. Gross gamma activity in an energy range from 0.1 MeV to 2.1 MeV is expressed in terms of equivalent cobalt 60 and the resulting gamma data is analyzed for the presence of cobalt 60 activity. Results of the sediment samples from harbors monitored by the Navy in the U. S. and possessions for 1975 are summarized in Table 4. Messenger Weight ILLUSTRATION 2 DREDGE FOR SAMPLING HARBOR SEDIMENT Support Line- -12-

79 1 73 IN BOTTOM SEDIMENT OF U. S. HARBORS WHERE : BEEN REGULARLY BASED, OVERHAULED OR BUILT LU O > Total Bottom Area Estimated Total*' with Cobalt 60 Cobalt 60 in Top over 3 pci/g** Layer of Sedimen (Square Kilometers) (Curies) with Cobalt 60 greater than 30 pci/<3 O ^t I/I CO CT O 0 O CM O o O O o o o o a o o 0 0 o a i o o o 1=1 0 0 Q O o a o o O 00 «-> 'c Oi in "5. E 3 0! E -r- C -i- CO re -u r- O Ol 0. > i 01 3 i. +-> O in oi s- +J Ol > O o: o Q. o ^ s ^ "re. Q >> O E S. T- O ai cj «<u+-> DJCVI.C -r- C S- Ol ai i t- in 3 <n r- O 3 O. U Ol $. r i- S- 3 <n j: i Q. o X re in o O Ol O o s-xi o co r- ^ Ol a. ii s- c 4-> ~* oi re i cno oi o -w xi ~-» Q-t O. O r- r *r 1 1/1 O o E s- in o. re oi i. oi oi i re o o o i ens- r- +j ^» re o in o SVr r- 4J i O O C Ol O. in S- +-> 4J cn ai re E o i- re 4J O ^C X 0) 4-> 3 0 S- vo «c oi -^ wo c_> 1C 1 O T- o LO o o o O CM o o o O OO i 4-> Ol c s: Q. a. re Ji aj in 1 CO E O, O. > i re re s- ^ in CQi-H CO Ol 3 O T3S- in 03: o co 4- c * in j= ot- Ol o 10 ^ P Ol in J2 3 O IO O s- >> in >> oi Oi re in O LU S- 4J -i VO cn cn LL. ct: 01 o CVJ r- CO CO CM LO CM -CO LO CSJ 5 4-> a> i in CVJ CM IO r ID i f in ^ +J re in S- re E oi co 4-> E S- = s- re LU Q. z i U S- f- Ol in oi ai «re 3 x T- > >> O) o o o ex oi ai re ai ED<!-> 0 T- <t- S- CO LU IO ai o a. lire o a. o 01 J= 4J "~ 01 in TJ LO O CO Ol S. re S- 4-> (0 O 4-> c 10 oo > re ca >, i- s- re cn z oi M Ol i- ai c ai i- C C l/l -O in I 1 ai >, ai ai o in 4-> l - <+- C in o in Q. V) o s- -rc o re r IO f IO re re 3 re S -2 "~ 'c VO D- C3 u. «t.c Of- CO IO >- ca o ca CL cn re ca ca co -o re s--r- in >> O > in O l/l r- 3 i- CL C IO CO c 4-> E ai u S 4_1 >- Z E» > c~^"o. c o c in -o c s- c rei i- C O Ol S- Q) > re.c > 10 ia in i s- r- re ^ 0 10.C ^ *r- O, * cn re 4->l - E J3 +-> 4J -ic > c ico" == I'ELZ ai o oi O O 4->! i o o c o 5? ~5"c +J E > C i. 3 S- CO XI f- ^"S cn-i- re M--t- n3 =3. S XI Ul i- re o re re re lim"o!^^ S s- S - i. E S- Ol Ol (-> C 0) "O in re re CD r O co 3 z >>_J O 3 3 cn>,co >, se-'-'io «>, re 3 re "a re oi-a «- Q- ca co in <u s- o. a. > r- 3 3 Z «CO I-!- re re o->- s- ai O O S- io T3 O) > ^ c ^re XM IO E 4J 3 S- 4J CO Z'«- C Z 4-> CO O CO r in o r- 0 CO in ceo s- co xi re r- E 3-^ C l/l 3 S- <0 i. 4-> 3 i end. re o re s- c ai re re E 4-> O O f Ol Ol r~ o f^stc S- f" Ol 3 *io c o i. 1- Q. r re oi re 01 re T- >>ca re r-j Ol S- "io re sco 01 -IJ E E LU Ul > O Ol 9) 0 3 < > 'sl > re cno? > 01 S- O 4)^ - <-> c: re cn re 1 re- LU 0. C 01 s-zoluouszs-ziozini-iczcz' soiziozs-s-i s-ioro -cs: 4->=fc r- cn -13-

80 74 Evaluation of the data summarized in Table 4 shows that low-level cobalt 60 radioactivity in harbor bottom sediment is detected around a few piers at operating bases and shipyards where nuclear-powered ship maintenance and overhauls -have been conducted over a period of several years. The activity detected is from operations in the early 1960's since releases such as shown earlier in Table 1 are too small to be detectable in the harbors. Cobalt 60 is not detectable above background levels in general harbor bottom areas away from these piers. Maximum total radioactivity observed in a I). S. harbor is less than 0.1 curie of cobalt 60. This radioactivity is small compared to background; based on the typical concentrations of naturally occurring radioactivity such as potassium 40, radium, uranium and thorium which are described in reference 19 for marine sediment, the natural radioactivity in the sediment of a typical harbor amounts to hundreds of curies. Comparison to previous environmental monitoring data in references 1 through 10 shows that these environmental cobalt 60 levels have been steadily decreasing. The first data column in Table 4 includes all samples with less than three picocuries of cobalt 60 per gram of sediment. Most of the sediment samples did not contain detectable cobalt 60 and are tabulated in this range. In this range cobalt 60 is difficult to distinguish from the levels of naturally occurring radioactivity such as potassium, radium, uranium and thorium. Cobalt 60 in sediment in this low range may also be detectable as a result of world wide dispersion from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. The value of 30 picocuries per gram was selected for the top of the second range of data in Table 4. A measure of the significance of this range is that if a person's food consumption were to contain cobalt 60 in this range of activity throughout the year, he would not exceed radiation exposure levels permitted in references 11, 12, and 13 for members of the general public. Only a small fraction of the sediment samples are in this second range and none of the samples exceeded this range in Data on uptake of cobalt 60 by marine life obtained to date show that in the salt water harbor bottom environments, no significant buildup of cobalt 60 occurs in marine life. EPA evaluation in reference 26 shows that the cobalt 60 from Naval nuclear propulsion plants is in the form of metallic corrosion product particles which do not appear to be concentrated in the food chain. Because of the- nature of the. radioactivity and low concentrations noted in Table 4, extensive monitoring of radioactivity in marine life has not been necessary as part of routine environmental monitoring programs in these harbors. In addition to Navy analysis of environmental samples at least two sediment samples have been sent each year to a laboratory of the U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration, as a check of Navy results. The samples were analyzed for gamma radionuclides in a manner similar to Navy procedures but with greater sensitivity. -14-

81 75 Illustration 3 depicts the gamma spectra for two such samples. Both spectra show the presence of abundant naturally occurring radionuclides which contribute to measured radioactivity even if cobalt 60 were not present. The upper spectrum is for a sample to which cobalt 60 has been added to an activity of approximately 3 picocuries per gram and shows recognizable energy peaks due to the presence of this small activity of cobalt 60. The lower spectrum depicts the appearance in the cobalt 60 energy range of most of the sediment samples in the first column in Table 4. In addition to the extensive routine monitoring of harbor water and sediment selected samples of marine life such as mollusks, bottomfeeding fish, barnacles and starfish have been collected infrequently in recent years from selected harbors. Marine life samples are also analyzed using a sodium iodide scintillation detector with a multichannel analyzer. No cobalt 60 associated with U. S. Naval nuclearpowered ships has been detected in these samples of marine life. For comparison, references 27, 28 and 29 contain evaluations by laboratories of the Environmental Protection Agency and of the Energy Research and Development Administration of the effects on the environment from the accumulation near points of discharge of radionuclides from several nuclear facilities. The referenced reports conclude for these other facilities that radioactivity levels much greater than shown in Table 4 have caused no significant radiation exposure to the general public. In all monitored harbors, twice per year shoreline areas uncovered at low tide are surveyed for radiation levels with sensitive scintillation detectors to determine if any radioactivity from bottom sediment washed ashore. All results were the same as background radiation levels in these regions, approximately 0.01 millirem per hour. Thus, there is no evidence in these ports that radioactivity from sediment is washing ashore. Ambient radiation levels are measured using sensitive dosimeters continuously posted at locations outside the boundaries of areas where radioactive work is performed. More sensitive thermoluminescent dosimeters have replaced film dosimeters at most facilities. These dosimeters are also posted at locations remote from support facilities to measure background radiation from natural radioactivity. Results of dosimeters posted at support facilities between radiologically controlled areas and the general public are compared with dosimeters posted at remote background locations up to several miles away. These results showed that radiation exposure to the general public from radioactive work on Naval nuclear propulsion plants was not above that received from natural background radiation levels. Naval nuclear reactors and their support facilities are designed to ensure there are no significant discharges of radioactivity in -15-

82 j 21 -j Jj 18 1 in 1 15 i,, I'm fii-'i"-! j 12 r i r SAMPLE WEIGHT: 338 grams COUNTING TIME: 200 MINUTES 1024 CHANNELS: MEV -U +TMX-RAY) U r NATURAL URANIU M DAUGHTER r-ra-226(u) Th=NATURAL THORIUM DAUGHTER Pb-212 (Th) r Pb-2l4(U) i Th-208(Th ) I r-bi-2!4(u), Ac-228(Th) Co-60 r Co i ' f i" 1 ''i ; i (! ST., r-k-40 1 I ft i'ii- It* i I. r II 1')'" ' "'ik^ U J»u, i ' i '"', " r "%w,',.«*,,,,.,.,,. -.i-..,,,! SAMPLE WEIGHT: 1468 grams COUNTING TIME: 2OO MINUTES 1024 CHANNELS; MEV U=NATURAL URANIUM DAUGHTER Th=NATURAL THORIUM DAUGHTER ^(-K-40 i Y-w.^^-^' l *%. lt,, H^^..,^,, GAMMA ENERGY IN MEV ILLUSTRATION 3 GAMMA SPECTRA OF HARBOR BOTTOM SEDIMENT SAMPLES -16-

83 77 airborne exhausts. Radiological controls are exercised in support facilities to preclude exposure of working personnel to airborne radioactivity exceeding limits such as specified in reference 11. These controls include a.tota.1 containment concept for radioactive materials and provide a barrier to prevent significant radioactivity from becoming airborne. Further, all air exhausted from these facilities is passed through high efficiency particulate air filters and monitored during discharge. There were rfo discharges of airborne radioactivity above concentrations normally present in the atmosphere O

84 78 Results of monitoring of environmental media described above have shown that environmental radioactivity levels have not been changed appreciably and therefore radiation exposure to the public from operations of nuclear-powered.ships and their support facilities is too low to measure. Nevertheless, a detailed analysis has been performed to provide a quantitative estimate of the radiation exposure to which any member of the general public might be exposed as a result of radioactivity in liquid and airborne effluents. This analysis has been performed in a conservative manner which ensures that the estimated exposure is higher than any actual exposure would be. For example, the sites chosen for analysis were shipyards since the amount of radiological work at these facilities is considerably higher than at other types of support facilities. Quantities of radioactivity from shipyard releases used in this analysis are higher than have been measured from any shipyard in the last five years. Values of environmental parameters including meteorological conditions and radionuclide concentration factors have been chosen to provide conservative results. In addition, the analysis assumes the individual receiving the maximum exposure is located right at the site boundary. Thus, the actual exposures to members of the public are expected to be lower than the results of this analysis. The environmental pathways which were considered are depicted in Illustration 4, which is based on reference 13. The hypothetical releases assumed are listed in Table 5. Table 6 shows the assumed useage parameters which are based on reference 30. Concentration factors for radionuclides in the marine environment were assumed as published in reference 31 and are also in Table 6. The pathways analysis, including meteorology, population distribution, and radiological exposure rates was performed in a manner consistent with that employed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in reference 30. Results of the analysis are summarized in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 compares the estimated maximum exposure to a member of the public with guidelines of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, although these guidelines are not applicable to nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities. Those numerical guidelines on calculated radiation exposures have been issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in reference 18 for implementing the concept that radioactivity in effluents from light water nuclear electric power reactors should be limited to amounts and quantities as low as reasonably achievable. Table 8 presents the estimated total whole body radiation exposure to the total population within 50 miles from the assumed radioactivity releases compared with the radiation exposure received by the same population from natural background radioactivity, as reported in references 17 and 22. As shown in Tables 7 and 8, conservative estimates of the exposures to members of the public from the Naval nuclear propulsion program are far less than either the guidelines of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the exposure from natural background radioactivity. -18-

85 79 EXTERNAL INTERNAL ILLUSTRATION 4 PATHWAYS FOR EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EXPOSURE OF MAN FROM AIRBORNE AND LIQUID RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS -19-

86 80 TABLE 5 Assumed Annual Release, Curie Radionuclide Cobalt 60 Tritium Carbon 14 Krypton 83m Krypton 85m Krypton 85 Krypton 87 Krypton 88 Xenon 131m Xenon 133m Xenon 133 Xenon 135 Argon 41 Liquid Release * * * * * * * * * * * Airborne Release *These gaseous radionuclides are released into the air, not into water..

87 81 TABLE 6 ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE TIMES, CONSUMPTION AND CONCENTRATION PARAMETERS ASSUMED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PATHWAYS ANALYSIS Assumed Parameter Value Pathway Parameter* For Highest Individual For Average Individual Fraction of Year Occupancy For Air Immersion 1 1 For Land Deposition 1 1 Along Shoreline Swimming Boating Food Consumption Leafy vegetables, Kg/year Water, liters/year Fish,** Kg/year Mollusks,**Kg/year 9.25 Crustacea,** Kg/year 9.90 Sediment, Kg/year 1.10 * Refer to Illustration 4 ** Cobalt 60 was assumed to concentrate from sea water to the edible flesh of fish, mollusks, and Crustacea by factors as follows: fish, 650; mollusks, 170; Crustacea, 1700, based on reference

88 82 TABLE 7 ESTIMATED MAXIMUM RADIATION EXPOSURE TO AN INDIVIDUAL FROM ASSUMED LIQUID AND AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASES FROM SHIP- YARDS ENGAGED IN NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION WORK. From Radionuclides In Liquid Releases From Gaseous Radionuclides In Airborne Releases From Other Radionuclides In Airborne Releases Maximum Exposure To An Individual NRC Guideline Estimated Value millirem/year mi 11i rem/year 3 whole body, or 10 any organ 5 whole body, or 15 skin 15 any organ less than 1 less than 1 less than 1 TABLE 8 ESTIMATED TOTAL WHOLE BODY RADIATION EXPOSURE TO GENERAL PUBLIC WITHIN 50 MILES FROM ASSUMED LIQUID AND AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASES FROM SHIPYARDS ENGAGED IN NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION WORK. Exposure Due to Natura-1 Background Radiation Approximately 100,000 man rem per year Exposure Due to Assumed Radioactive Releases less than 1 man rem per year -22-

89 83 AUDITS AND REVIEWS The requirements and procedures for control of radioactive waste are important parts of.the training programs for everyone involved with radioactivity in the Navy nuclear propulsion program. Such training is part of the initial qualification of shipyard workers and of Naval personnel assigned to ships and bases, and is required to be repeated regularly. Emphasis on this training is part of the concept that radiological control personnel alone cannot cause radiological work to be well performed; production and operations personnel and all levels of management are required to be involved in the control of radioactivity. Checks and balances of several kinds are also set up to help ensure control of radioactivity. First, written procedures exist which require verbatim compliance. Radiological control personnel monitor various steps in radioactive waste processing. In each shipyard an independent organization, separate from the radiological control organization, audits all aspects of radioactive waste processing. Audits are performed by representatives from Naval Reactors headquarters who are assigned full time at each shipyard. Radiological control personnel from headquarters also conduct periodic inspections of each shipyard. In addition, shipyards have made detailed assessments of the environmental effects of shipyard operations and have published reports on the results of these assessments. Similarly, there are multiple levels of audits and inspections for the other Navy shore facilties, tenders, and nuclear-powered ships. The Navy has reviewed radioactive waste disposal and radiological environmental monitoring with the states where Navy nuclear-powered ships are based or overhauled. The Navy is continuing its longstanding policy of ensuring that state radiological officials are notified of occurrences that might cause concern because of radiological effects outside the ships or shore facilities. Although there were no occurrences in 1975 which did cause radiological effects to the public outside these facilities, states were notified when inquiries showed public interest in the possibility that such events had occurred. The Navy has encouraged states to conduct independent radiological environmental monitoring in harbors where Naval nuclearpowered ships are based or overhauled. The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducts detailed reviews of the Navy's procedures for radioactive waste and for radiological environmental monitoring. An EPA laboratory has conducted detailed environmental surveys of selected U. S. harbors (references 26, 32, 33, 34). This laboratory has performed these surveys in the harbors at Charleston, South Carolina; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; San Diego, California; Vallejo, California; New London, Connecticut; Newport News, Virginia; Norfolk, Virginia; and Bremerton, Washington. At the Navy's invitation in 1974 the EPA also conducted a detailed evaluation of the adequacy of shipyard radiological controls to protect the environment. Navy monitoring results have been consistent with these EPA surveys..23.

90 84 CONCLUSIONS 1. The total radioactivity in liquids, less tritium, released into all ports and harbors from the U. S. Naval nuclear propulsion program was less than curie in The total tritium released into all ports and harbors was less than one curie in No increase of radioactivity above normal background levels has been detected in harbor water where Or S. Naval nuclear-powered ships are based, overhauled, or constructed. 3. Liquid wastes from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and support facilities have not caused a measurable increase in the general background radioactivity of the environment. 4. Low-level cobalt 60 radioactivity in harbor bottom sediment is detectable around a few piers at operating bdses and shipyards from low level liquid releases in the 1960's. Cobalt 60 is not detectable above background levels in general harbor bottom areas away from these piers. Maximum total radioactivity observed in a U. S. harbor of less than 0.1 curie of cobalt 60 is small compared to the naturally occurring radioactivity. Comparison to previous environmental data summarized in references 1 through 10 shows that these environmental cobalt 60 levels are continuing to decrease. 5. Conservative estimates of radiation exposures to members of the public from the Naval nuclear propulsion program are far less than either the guidelines of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the exposure from natural background radioactivity. 6. Procedures used by the Navy to control discharges of radioactivity from U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships and their support facilities have been effective in protecting the environment and the health and safety of the general public. Independent evaluations and radiological environmental monitoring performed by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency have confirmed the adequacy of these procedures. -24-

91 85 REFERENCES (1) U. S. Navy Report--"Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-powered Ships and.their Support Facilities, 1965", by J. W. Vaughan and M.. Miles issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, May (2) U. S. Navy Report--"Disposal of Radioactive Waste from U. S. Navy Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1966", by M. E. Miles and J. J. Mangeno, issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, December (3) U. S. Navy Report--"Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1967", by M. E. Miles and J. J. Mangeno, issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, April (4) U. S. Navy Report "Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1968", by M. E. Miles and J. J. Mangeno, issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, September (5) U. S. Navy Report--"Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1969", by J. J. Mangeno and M. E. Miles issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, August (6) U. S. Navy Report--"Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1970", by M. E. Miles, J. J. Mangeno and R. D. Burke, issued in Radiological Health Data and Reports, May (7) U. S. Navy Report--"Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of.. Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1971", by M. E. Miles, G. L. Sjoblom and R. D. Burke, issued in Radiation Data and Reports, September (8) U. S. Navy Report--"Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1972", by M. E. Miles and 6. L. Sjoblom, issued in Radiation Data and Reports, September (9) U. S. Navy Report--"Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1973" by M. E. Miles, G. L. Sjoblom and J. D. Eagles, issued in Radiation Data and Reports, October !

92 86 (10) U. S. Navy Report - "Environmental Monitoring and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear-Powered Ships and Their Support Facilities, 1974", by M. E. Miles, G. L. Sjoblom and J. D. Eagles - NT-75-1, May (11) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation". (12) National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Report No. 22, "Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and Water for Occupational Exposure", (Published as National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69, Issued June 1959, superseding Handbook 52). (13) International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 2, "Report of Committee II on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation (1959)", with 1962 Supplement Issued in ICRP Publication 6; Publication 9, "Recommendations on Radiation Exposure (1965)"; and ICRP Publication 7 (1965), amplifying specific recommendations of Publication 9 concerning environmental monitoring. (14) Federal Radiation Council. Memoranda, approved by President Eisenhower on May 13, 1960, President "Kennedy on September 20, 1961, and President Johnson on July 31, (15) National Academy of Sciences National Research Council, Publication 658, "Radioactive Waste Disposal from Nuclear-powered Ships", (16) International Atomic Energy Agency, "Radioactive Waste Disposal into the Sea", Safety Series No. 5, Vienna (17) National Council on Radiation Protection and,measurements, Report No. 39, "Basic Radiation Protection Criteria", January (18) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, Appendix.!, "Radioactive Material In Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents" published in Federal Register, May 5, (19) National Academy of Sciences National Research Council, "Radioactivity in the Marine Environment," (20) U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Report "Sources of Tritium and Its Behavior Upon Release To The Environment," by D. G. Jacobs, T1D-24635,

93 87 (21) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report--"Summary of Radioactivity Released in Effluents From Nuclear Power Plants During 1973," NUREG-75/001 National Technical Information Service, (22) National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Report No. 45, "Natural Background Radiation In the United States," November (23) Council on Environmental Quality Report to The President "Ocean Dumping: A National Policy," October (24) Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, United States Public Law (25) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Report "A Summary of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Buried at Commercial Sites between , With Projections to the Year 2000" by M. F. O'Connell and W. F. Holcomb, issued in Radiation Data and Reports, December (26) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Report "Radiological Surveys of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Environs," by D. F. Cahill, H. D. Harvey, Jr., et al., issued in Radiation Data and Reports, June (27) Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report--"Clinch River Study" ORNL-4035, April (28) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Report "Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State," by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, issued in Radiation Data and Reports, July (29) U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Savannah River Laboratory "Radioactivity From Savannah River Plant Operations in a Downstream Savannah River Swamp," DP-1370 by W. L. Marter, September (30) "Final Environmental Statement Concerning Proposed Rule Making Action: Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion 'As Low as Practicable" for" Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents," Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, July (31) "Concentration Factors in the Aquatic Environment," S. M. Jinks and M. Eisenbud, issued in Radiation Data and Reports, May

94 88 (32) U. S. Public Health Service Report--"Radio1ogical Survey of Major California Nuclear Ports," by D. F. Cahfll, D. C. McCurry and W. D. Breakfield, Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information No. PHI78728, April (33) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Report--"Radiological Survey of New London Harbor, Thames River Connecticut and Environs," by S. T. Windham and C. R. Phillips, issued in Radiation Data and Reports, November (34) U. S. Public Health Service Report--"Radiological Survey of Hampton Roads (Norfolk--Newport News), Virginia," by H. D. Harvey, Jr., E. D. Toerber and 0. A. Gordon, Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information No. AD683208, January 1968.

95 89 ENVIRONMENTAL APPENDIX MONITORING SURVEY CHARTS Environmental monitoring survey charts for harbors monitored for radioactivity associated with U. S. Naval nuclear-powered ships in the U. S. and possessions during 1975 are listed below and included in this appendix. The sampling locations for harbor water and harbor sediment are shown. In addition, shoreline survey areas and the locations of posted dosimetry devices are shown on the figures. Figure No. Location California 1 U.S. Naval Air Station, Alameda 2 Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco 3 Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo 4 Long Beach Harbor 5 Long Beach Harbor, Anaheim Bay Area 6 San Diego Harbor 7 San Diego Harbor, Ballast Point Area Connecticut 8 Electric Boat Division, Groton 9 U. S. Naval Submarine Support Facility, New London Harbor 10 State Pier, New London Florida 11 Port Canaveral 12 Hawaii 13 Pearl Harbor Area 14 Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 15 U. S. Naval Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor Mississippi 16 Ingalls Shipbuilding Division, Pascagoula New Hampshire/Maine 17 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard South Carolina 18 U. S. Naval Station, Charleston 19 Charleston Naval Shipyard 20 U. S. Naval Weapons Station, Charleston -29-

96 90 Virginia 21 Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., Newport News 22 Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth 23 U. S.-Naval Station Norfolk, Destroyer and Submarine Piers 24 Norfolk Portsmouth Virginia Area Washington 25 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 26 Bangor/Hood Canal -30-

97 91 SAN FRAMCISCO BAY FIGURE 1

98 92 -Dl?r DOCK MO. 7 D(?Y DOCK MO. 6 DRY DOCK WO. 5 NAVAL a PO-STCO- DO6IMETPC A WATER. SAMPLE SHORELINE SURVEY WAITEE EhJVIKQNM MoSJITbRIN^ AT TH& FIGURE 2.

99 93 MAIM - NAVAL f POPEfZTY o COSTCO Cto^MBT o ^EPIMBKT ^VMPUB A WAfEK. SAMPLE WATBZ CARQUIK462 STRAIT FIGURE 3 I^LAKP VALLEJ0, CAU FOI5.NIA O

100 94 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SURVEY CHART LONG BEACH HARBOR, CALIFORNIA UJ -> CO Q? tt FIGURE 4

101 95 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SURVEY CHART LONGBEACH,CALIFORNIA ANAHEIM BAY AREA

102 96

103 97 o LEGEND A Harbor Water Sample Point o Harbor Sediment Sample Poinl n Film Badge Location Shoreline Survey Area O O ZuHiija Pt. NORTH O o A FIGURE?

104 98

105 99 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SURVEY CHART 1 l x UNITED STATES NAVAL SUBMARINE SUPPORT FACILITY NEW LONDON HARBOR, CONNECT CUT LEGEND A Harbor Water Sample Point o Harbor Sediment Sample Point D Film Badge Location.UHShoneline Survey Area

106 100

107 101

108 102 OUTER HARBOR t LEGEND A HARBOR WATER SAMPLE POINT O HARBOR SEDIMENT SAMPLE POINT QFILM BADGE LOCATION "^ SHORELINE SURVEY AREA FIGURE 12 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SURVEY CHART MARIANAS - >U'AM APRA

109 103 Pacific 0cean LEGEND O A SEDIMENT SAMPLE POINT WATER SAMPLE POINT OVERALL MAP OF PEARL HARBOR SHOWING ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING LOCATIONS IN OTHER AREAS OF PEARL HARBOR FIGURE 13

110 104 PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD O D SEDIMENT SAMPLE POINT PERIMETER DOSIMETRY DEVICE

111 105 O D SEDIMENT SAMPLE POINT PERIMETER DOSIMETRY DEVICE - ' -o f, K. W ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING LOCATIONS PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE FIGURE 15

112 106

113 107

114 108 IEGEND''. ;....'...' ;.'.'. VX - V V Shoreline survey' -.'.'.'...-".' 'O Sediment sample pot t,-.-.'. '... -.,-.-..** Water sample point. ' \'.... ', '.O Perimeter dosimetry device

115 109 FIGUEE 19 I^EGEND vv> Shoreline survey O Sediment sample point Q ' IfiO O i

116 110 NAVAL WEAPOMS STATION - CHMIIESTON. FIGURE 20 TO NWS JAIN GATE N k^^k.shoreline survey O Sediment sample point & Water sample point Q Perimeter doaimetry device

117 Ill NMPORT MS SMirWILNK AMD WY DOCK COM>ANT ENVIMMMNTAL MONITORING SMVEY LOCATIONS NEWPORT NWS JAMES HIVE* O SEDIMENT SAMPLE POINT Q PERIWTER DOSIMETtY DEVICE A HATER SAMPLE POINT ////// SHORELINE SURVEY FIGURE 21

118 112

119 113 HUH **.~s3# W: 10

120 114 OJ LJ cr

121 115

122 116