United States Marine Corps Power Projection Requirements: Naval Mine Countermeasures

Transcription

1 United States Marine Corps Power Projection Requirements: Naval Mine Countermeasures BGen Neller Director, Operations Division Plans, Policies, and Operations Headquarters Marine Corps Brief for the Mine Warfare Association Panama City, Florida 24 May

2 Purpose Outline Marine Corps Mine Countermeasures Requirements Touch Upon: Participation in Navy MCM Efforts Efforts to Improve Ground MCM Capabilities Issues 2

3 Power Projection Supported by the Sea Base Assembly Closure NSFS ESB TMD SAG Employment MPG CSG JSOF ARF Sustainment Reconstitution 3

4 STOM CONOPS Surface Assault Force Multiple axes of attack 25 NM OTH, 200 NM inland Time Distance Vertical Assault Force Inserted in one 8 hour period of darkness Sustainable: C2, Fires, Logistics 100 NM Ship-to-Objective distance Flexibility Response MCM support required throughout the battlespace 4

5 Observations Seabasing Will Reduce -- But Not Eliminate -- Our Footprint Ashore Can t Fly Everything In. Not Enough Assets. Weather. Significant Surface Transport Requirement Remains Proliferation of Cheap but Effective Mines Precludes Detect and Avoid Only Strategy Through the 2015 Timeframe Few Assaultable Beaches in High-Interest AOs Suitable Ports and Approaches Known / Prepared Unencumbered Maneuver 5

6 Naval Requirements A Family of Homeport-to-Inland Objective MCM Capabilities that Enable the U.S. to Project Power at Time/Place of It s Choosing Critical Navy-Marine Corps Transition Vicinity the BZ Commanders Must be Able to Detect and Avoid Mines when Possible, and Breach Them when Necessary Deep Water, SW, VSW, SZ, BZ and Ashore Opposed and Unopposed 6

7 Naval Requirements ISR Capabilities that Allow Clandestine Detection and Identification of Mines on the Beach and in all Depth Realms Deployable by / Responsive to Afloat Commanders Key to Detect and Avoid and Detect and Breach Precision Navigation Capabilities that Enhance Ability to Avoid / Reduce the Demand on Breaching Assets Dimes Invested in ISR/Navigation Will Save Dollars in Breaching/Neutralization 7

8 Naval Requirements Breaching/Neutralization Capabilities that: Are Deliverable from Over the Horizon Are Effective in VSW, the SZ, and Ashore Get Men and Mammals Out of the Minefield Are Employable by and Responsive to Afloat Commanders Offer Flexibility to Match OMFTS/STOM Tactics Have Acceptable Logistical Impacts on Amphibious and MPF Shipping 8

9 Capability Summary Through ~ 2017? Beach Zone/ Operations Ashore USMC MCM Requirements: EMW / Operations Ashore HWM 10 Surf Zone Line Charge AAV w/mk154 NSW M1A1 w/twmp APOBS COBRA ACE Assault Breacher Vehicle AN/PSS-14 (AMD) JABS Very Shallow Water 40 NSCT-1 (Divers Mammals UUVs) Shallow Water Navy Amphib MCM Requirements: Blue in Support of Green 200 Deep Water Hunt and Sweep with: 14 MCMs / 12 MHCs NSCT-1 15 EOD LCS? Dets MH-60Ss ALMDS, AMNS, RMS, OASIS, RAMICS Navy Deep MCM Joint MCM Requirements: Logistics from the Sea 9

10 Key Navy MCM Programs with Marine Interest/Participation JDAM Assault Breaching System (JABS) (FY06/07) GBU-31 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance Analysis (COBRA) Sensor Transitioned from USMC to USN in Oct 04 Block 1 (FY07) MIW Mission Modules for LCS flight 0 Block 2 (FY09) Block 3 (FY13) 10

11 Key Navy MCM Programs with Marine Interest/Participation Family of Far-Term Assault Breaching NGFS Systems (FY15/16) SAIC HYDRA-7 Lockheed Martin MODS Boeing CRW deployed at low altitude CRW Release outside SAM range Venom Chemical & Explosive Darts MINE CLEARAN CE C RW stabilized Prox fuze detonates CRW Beach Area to be cleared W ater <10 ft Venom fired ft Pre takeoff Plan mission Breakout, load bom bs Load mission data on aircraft GP ppt Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) MIW Mission Module Flight 0 (FY07) General Dynamics Lockheed Martin 11

12 Key Navy MCM Programs with Marine Interest/Participation J8 (JUSS) Sponsored Functional Solutions Analysis & Alternate CONOPS for Mine Countermeasures (N75 lead service) Development of NTTP (MCM in Support of Amphibious Operations) 12

13 USMC Land MCM Efforts 13

14 Marine Corps MCM POR and Way Ahead AN/PSS-14 Hand Held Mine Detector Provides Improved Capability to Detect Mines Up Close AAO = 582, IOC = 05, FOC = 07 Assault Breaching Vehicle Addresses Capability to Breach Minefields and Complex Obstacles In Stride AAO = 33, IOC = 06, FOC = 07 MAGTF MCM Master Plan Fix MCM by 2015 MAGTF Mine Countermeasures Master Plan September

15 MAGTF MCM Master Plan Provides annual update to MROC MAGTF MCM Working Group (a standing WG) Chartered by the MROC in Apr 03 Developed MAGTF MCM Master Plan -- currently executing MP MROC approved Master Plan in Sept 04 Addresses MCM across DOTMLPF spectrum Identifies MCM capability gaps and provides recommendations to close them Focuses on MCM to support mobility operations Develops MCM S&T/Experimentation Plan Examines Marine Corps interface with the Navy on MCM transition responsibilities Leverages sister service MCM Programs Conforms recommendations to current POM MCM Master Plan provides the roadmap required to 15 overcome current MCM operational deficiencies ISO EMW

16 MAGTF MCM MP ConOps (Current) Enduring Efforts MCM Master Plan UNSs MCM T&R Manuals MCCS MCM/IED Doctrine Development of JCIDS Requirements Documents MCM PMC/S&T Initiatives 16

17 MAK Cargo Flanks Countering IED Threats in OIF/OEF Dragon Eye Hardened MTVR Cougar V E H I C L E H A R D E N I N G CHANGE AND PERSISTENT DETECTION Equipping the force to Counter-IEDs INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION E-SAPI R O B O T S ECM TO DEFEAT RCIEDs FIXED, MOBILE & MAN PORTABLE Dragon Runner Talon Robot RONS SPECIALIZED WORK DOGS M1114 CPE 17

18 Issues Training Unit Individual Embark Funding 18

19 Questions? 19

20 Naval Mine Countermeasures Backup Slides 20

21 Marine Corps Requirements 8 Breached Lanes per MEB Scenario: Two Surface/One Air Delivered BLTs Assumption: No Exploitable Gaps in Minefield LPS LPPs (x8) LPS LPS ~ 3 Kilometers Direction of Attack Axis of Advance LPS 2 Potential LPSs per BLT => 1 Actual 4 Potential LPSs per MEB => 2 Actual 8 Potential LPPs per LPS => 4 Actual 32 Potential LPPs per MEB => 8 Actual BLT BLT BLT AF(MEB) 21

22 Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV) Prototype (Dec 02) 22

23 AN/PSS-14 23

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25 Power Projection Supported by the Sea Base Phased Arrival and Assembly at Sea Selective Offload Sea Basing is about projecting sovereignty around the world I believe that this will be more important than ever in the 21 st century. CNO Jun 02 STOM Humanitarian Assistance Reinforcement of the ATF Sea Basing, as a national capability, can have a significant effect on our ability to project combat power. CMC 03 Reconstitute and Redeploy Next Mission First Mission 25

26 Current MCM Capabilities Development Responsibilities DoN Congressional Certification Deep Water Maneuver Forces Cannot Afford an Operational Transition Point Land MCM S&T Initiatives (Way-Ahead) Very Shallow 10 Shallow Surf 200 Water 40 Water Zone NAVY HWM Beach Zone Beach Exit Transition Point???? USMC Planned Land MCM S&T Initiatives FY06 across the FYDP Mechanical Equipment NDI Side/Top Attack MCM Systems Self Powered Proofer/Small Area Clearance System Spot Neutralization Weapon (SNW) Magnetic Signature Duplicator Self Breacher/Track Width Plow (Light Combat Vehicles) Change Detection Minefield Validation Weapon (MVW) Forward Looking Detector Sensor Fields UGV w/detector and Marking System Vehicle Standoff Neutralizer ONR has made substantial Sea MCM S&T Investments - over $100M/yr (FY 93-04) Land MCM S&T Investments have been limited to congressional funding for AMD MAGTF MCM Master Plan re-establishes Land MCM S&T initiatives Deep Water Shallow Water Very Shallow Water Surf Zone Beach Zone Beach Exit to Objective Supports EMW by 2015 From Beach Exit to Objective 26