Contents. (1969)... Page 157 Appendix 4 Sino Vietnamese conflict at Paracel Islands

Transcription

1

2 Acknowledgement This book is a translation of a book written in Chinese. The original book in Chinese is Topic 1 of Selected Topics of the book entitled The revival of China written by the author. The book The revival of China has many versions, all available at websites and 1

3 Contents Section 1 The pre war situation Page 3 Section 2 Outbreak of the war...,,... Page 7 Section 3 The U.S. military landed in Inchon,,.. Page 10 Section 4 Formation of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army... Page 14 Section 5 The First Battle Page 24 Section 6 The Second Battle....Page 28 Section 7 The Third Battle...Page 35 Section 8 The Fourth Battle... Page 44 Section 9 The Fifth Battle..... Page 47 Section 10 The MIG Alley Page 59 Section 11 Start of the peace talk... Page 61 Section 12 The Shangganling Battle Page 63 Section 13 Prisoners of war.....,. Page 78 Section 14 Hero title winners.....page 131 Appendix 1 Sino Indian border war (1959)..Page 135 Appendix 2 Sino Vietnamese border war (1979).Page 147 Appendix 3 Sino Russian conflict in Zhenbao Island (1969) Page 157 Appendix 4 Sino Vietnamese conflict at Paracel Islands (1974).....Page 164 Appendix 5 Sino Vietnamese conflict at Spratly Islands (1988).... Page 174 2

4 Section 1 The pre war situation In the year of 1950, i.e. one year after the founding of People's Republic of China, there was a war between South Korea and North Korea contiguous to China's Northeast. In the history, after Japan's surrendered in 1945, South Korea was occupied by the American army and North Korea by the Soviet army. The two Koreas were divided by the north latitude line of 38 degrees. Later, North Korea people and South Korea people set up their own regimes separately. North Korea's leader was KIM Il-sung. Before becoming the leader of North Korea, he was a member of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and was dispatched in 1932 by the CPC s Dongman special committee to Antu County, Jilin Province, China, where he established an anti Japanese guerrilla brigade and became the political commissar of the brigade. Subsequently, he served as political commissar, division commander and army command (Note: Such an army had only about one thousand people and was actually equivalent to a battalion) in the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army of China. Under siege of the Japanese troops, the army suffered heavy losses and its remnants were forced to withdraw in 1941 to the territory of the Soviet Union. In there, they established Anti Japanese Amalgamated Army of the Northeast and KIM Il-sung became a lieutenant and the commander of the 1 st Battalion in the Training Brigade of the Amalgamated Army. In 1945, he returned to North Korea from the Soviet Union by a warship, and established a communist party in north Korea. After the establishment of the North Korea regime, KIM planed to achieve Korean reunification through a war against South Korea. The South Korean leader was LI Cheng-wan, who 3

5 advocated going northward, also for Korean unification. LI wanted going northward and KIM southward, and therefore fire incidents occurred frequently near the 38-degree line. KIM Il-sung understood that he must get approval and help from Moscow and Beijing in order to achieve unification through a war. So, he first went to Moscow and visited Joseph Stalin in early March 1949, requiring to get military assistance. Stalin only agreed to equip with two guard brigades, however. In May, KIM Il-sung sent KIM Yi to secretly visit Beijing, expressing to MAO Ze-dong their intention to take military action against South Korea and asking MAO to transfer the two divisions composed of ethnic Koreans in Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to the army of North Korea. The two divisions mentioned here are PLA s 164 th Division (of 10,821 people, commanded by LI De-shan) and the 166 th Division (of 10,320 people, commanded by FANG Hu-shan). The two divisions were belong to the Northeastern Military Region of the Chinese PLA. MAO replied that we can let the two Korean divisions be transferred to North Korea if needed, and that if there is a war on the Korean Peninsula, China "will provide all assistance within its capacity, especially supplies and weapons needed by the two ethnic Korean divisions. After KIM Yi left, MAO immediately instructed GAO Gang of the Northeast Military Region to let the two Korean divisions, stationed in Shenyang and Changchun of China respectively, be transferred to North Korea. The two divisions entered North Korea in July In addition to these two divisions, there were more than 16,000 ethnic Korean soldiers in PLA's Fourth Field Army marching forward to southern China. After these ethnic Koreans had heard that the two ethnic Korean 4

6 divisions in the Northeast China have transferred to Korea, they also expressed their wish to form another ethnic Korean division and to be sent to North Korea. The China side immediately notified KIM Il-sung that because combat operations in China are ending, the existing troops consisting of ethnic Koreans in Chinese people's armed forces are gradually being idle, and that if the North Korean government wishes, they can also be transferred to North Korea. Soon, the newly formed ethnic Korean division, the 156 th Division, was also transferred to North Korea. At the beginning of 1950, the army of North Korea, called "People's Army", had nearly 140 thousand people and ten divisions, among which, the 5 th, 6 th and 7 th Divisions are the three ethnic Korean divisions transferred from China. In the ten divisions of the People's Army, four division commanders, two division chiefs of staff and some regimental cadres had served in Chinese PLA previously. Each division of the People s Army had about fifteen Soviet advisers. The Soviet Union had also trained thousands of military officers for North Korea, and provided the People's Army with a total of 120 Soviet-made T-34 tanks. The South Korea's army, called "National Army", had a total of nine divisions and nearly 100 thousand people. Their military officers were mostly trained by Japanese or Manchuria's military schools. The number of their artillery, tanks and aircraft was only a fraction of that of the North Korean People's Army. In comparison, the North Korea accounted for the absolute advantage over South Korea. At the beginning of April 1950, KIM Il-sung went to Moscow and talked with Stalin again. Stalin spoke first on the story 5

7 given in the book "Giants' biography", and then said that people are just like sheep who always follow the head sheep, irrespective of where the head sheep goes. He went on to say that military action against the South Korea must satisfy two pre-conditions: the United States will not intervene it, and China's leaders support it. KIM immediately guaranteed to Stalin that the attack will be decisive, there will be 200,000 South Korean Communists who will uprise, establish guerrillas and cooperate with the offensive of the powerful People's Army, and so the offensive will get victory in three day and therefore Americans will have no time even if they want to intervene. He also said to Stalin that MAO Ze-dong had repeatedly said to us that after the success of the Chinese revolution, they will help the reunification of Korea. However, he immediately went on to say that we are fully capable to rely on our own forces to reunify Korea. After listening these words, Stalin stressed repeatedly that the Soviet Union will not send troops to Korea to be directly involved in the Korean issue even if the United States send troops to North Korea, and therefore you must negotiate with and get support from MAO Ze-dong. However, Stalin promised to provide KIM with weapons and ammunition needed for the war. On May 13, KIM Il-sung secretly went to Beijing and talked with MAO Ze-dong and other Chinese leaders, stating that they are ready to attack the South immediately. In the next day, MAO said to KIM that we had envisaged that you attack the South after China liberated Taiwan, so that China will be able to provide full support to you. However, since you have decided to hit now, we are ready to give the necessary assistance, and if American troops would enter Korea, China 6

8 will send troops to help you. MAO asked KIM: Do you need us to transfer some of the Chinese army near the border between China and Korea? Do you need us to provide weapons and ammunition? KIM thanked MAO for the offers, but did not accept the offers. It appears that the reason he came to China was just to get MAO's okay for launching a war against South Korea, as suggested by Stalin, but he does not think he will need help of China. KIM Il-sung met MAO Ze-dong. Section 2 Outbreak of the war On June 25, 1950, the People's Army of North Korea crossed the 38-degree line and launched a surprise attack on South Korea, and the Korean War broke out. On June 27, U. S. President Harry Truman announced that the United States will send troops to aid South Korea, and will send the 7th Fleet to be stationed in the Taiwan Strait in order to defend Taiwan. On June 29, six destroyers, two cruiser and a transport ship of 7

9 the U.S. 7th Fleet entered and stationed in Taiwan Strait. On July 7, the United Nations' Security Council passed a resolution, while Soviet Union, who has a veto power, avoided attending the meeting: Form the "UN forces" and send it to Korea, and appoint the commander of the U.S. Far East Army, Five-star Admiral Douglas MacArthur, as commander in chief of the UN Forces. People's Army advanced to the South very smoothly, and soon occupied more than 80% of the territory of the South Korea including its capital Hancheng (i.e. Seoul). Troops of the North and the South Korea were in a state of confrontation along Ledong River in the southeastern part of South Korea. In this situation, the vanguard of the American troops arrived at South Korea. KIM Il-sung ordered the People's Army to resolve the battle before August 15, as a must, and therefore desperately mobilized technical workers and students to join the army. MAO Ze-dong was closely watching the development of the Korean war. He let ZHOU En-lai meet with Soviet ambassador Luoshen, telling China's estimate on the Korean War's further development that the United States may land in some ports of South Korea and match northward along the railways. He further suggested that the People's Army should deploy strong defense forces in the ports, particularly in the Inchon Port area to prevent the U.S. Marines landing there. ZHOU also told Luoshen that if the U.S. military force would cross the 38-degree line, China could send troops against the U.S. military; that China has currently concentrate three armies of about soldiers in the Northeast China; and 8

10 that China hope that the Soviet Union could provide air cover for the Chinese troops. Stalin immediately replied: "We think that immediately concentrating nine Chinese divisions in the China-Korea border is right, because it can facilitate immediate action in Korea when the enemy would cross the military demarcation line. We will do our best to provide air cover for these Chinese forces." In August and early September, MAO met North Korea representative LI Xiangzhao twice, pointing out the problems of the People's Army: They did not establish a sufficient reserve force, deploy their force equally, and just want to seize territory but not to annihilate the enemy. MAO also pointed out in particular that major hubs, such as Inchon-Hancheng and Nanpu-Pyongyang, may be attacked by the enemy, and you should take into account the future retreat and re-deployment of troops. LIU Shao-qi said to LI Xiang-zhao that North Korea should be prepared for a protracted war. On September 4, the political counselor of the embassy of the People's Republic of China in North Korea, CHAI Cheng-wen (Note: Ambassador NI Zhi-liang recuperated at home at the time) said to KIM Il-sung that the war is in a deadlock now. But KIM was confident and said that the battle in Busan has begun, and when the elite force of the assault troops arrives at the position, it will break the deadlock. CHAI also mentioned that the U.S. troops might land in the rear. KIM affirmatively answered: "We estimate that a current U.S. military offensive is not possible. They do not have strong reinforcements, and therefore landing in our rear ports will be difficult." On September 10, CHAI returned to Pyongyang after giving a report in Beijing, and emergently hoped the Korean army to 9

11 consider the issue of strategic retreat. KIM answered: "I have never thought of a recession." Section 3 The U.S. military landing in Inchon As early as in the fourth day after the outbreak of the Korean War, that is, in June 29, 1950, MacArthur had proposed landing in Inchon Port after visiting the Korean battlefields. He estimated that Seoul will fall and believed that the haggard, mobility-lacked, poor equipped army of South Korea cannot stop North Korean forces continuing to attack even when getting the U.S. military s reinforcements. He believed that only implementation of decisive military actions in the rear of the enemy can improve the situation, and therefore he proposed landing near Inchon, so to cut off the North Korean army's supply line, to make it lose their battle force, and to win the war. Douglas MacArthur The waterway of Inchon Port is an actual waterway only at high tide, but a mud flat at low tide. At high tide, the water can 10

12 be up to 29 feet deep and the waterway can allow a landing craft to pass, but difficult to make a U-turn because the channel is still narrow. If there is a warship sunk in the watercourse or mines deployed in the channel, the channel will be completely blocked. Landing in such a port has a little risk. However, MacArthur still choose Inchon Port as the preferred location of the planned landing, because Inchon is located in the narrow waist of the Korean Peninsula and landing there can therefore cut off the enemy's supply line. He convened a meeting in Tokyo, roughly told the reason he chooses Inchon to land, as well as the stories that he commanded amphibious landings successfully during the Second World War. But the chief of staff of U.S. Army, J. Lawton Collins, who was also attending the meeting, had reservations for Inchon landing, and therefore requested MacArthur to submit a detailed plan report, including assessment for possibility of achieving the expected results in particular. Soon after, MacArthur submitted a detailed report. In September 8, MacArthur sent a cable to Washington, stating: "I think there is no problem with the feasibility of the action nor the possibility of a great success." On the second day, the Joint Chiefs of staff briefly responded: "Your plan has been approved and has been reported to the President. So the debate over the Inchon landing is over." Then, MacArthur received a report from meteorological experts, stating that September 15, October 11 and November 3 are the good dates for landing in Inchon. Macarthur selected the first date, September 15, because he thought that the key for a battle victory is the speed. The troops for the landing were the 10th Army of a total of more than people, consisting of the 1st Division of the Marine Corps as the main body, together 11

13 with the Navy's 7th Fleet that had 232 vessels, and 318 aircrafts. The landing troops composed the "Joint Task Corps". In order to confuse the enemy, MacArthur ordered repeated bombing on bridges, railways and motorways in the vicinity of Qunshan Port (another port on the west coast, located south to Seoul); sending troops to have landing exercises in nearby islands; and intentionally sending false telegrams that North Korea can receive. The purpose of all these actions was to let the People's Army of North Korea mistakenly believe that the U.S. military will land in Qunshan Port. As expected, KIM Ilsung was fooled: He sent crack troops, rushing to Qunshan Port, while not expecting that a huge fleet of the U.S. military was quietly heading for the Gulf of Inchon. The U.S. fleet arrived off the coast of Inchon at midnight of September 14. At 5 AM of September 15, tens of thousands of shells overwhelmingly flied from the U.S. warships into Yuewei Island outside the port of Inchon. At the same time, dozens of aircraft took off the aircraft carrier, bombed North Korean defenders in the Inchon port area, killing a large number of North Korean soldiers and destroying all the facilities on the ground. Just when the bombing stopped, U.S. Marines rushed onto the beach of Yuewei Island. Two hours later, they took the whole island. In this landing fight, U.S. troops suffered 17 casualties, and the North Korean suffered more than 200 people killed and 136 people captured. At 5 PM, the 5th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division landed in the shipyard area of Inchon Port after half an hour of military shelling. They rushed to the steep shore, climbed along ladders, quickly reached the top of the revetment wall. 12

14 Then the 1 st Battalion of the regiment advanced to Cemetery Height, confronting with the defenders while sending a small force to bypass the Height and rushed to the Height from the rear side. The North Korean army had to give up the position because enemies were in both front and rear. At this time, the regiment's 2 nd Battalion had won the fight on Youlan Hill, and joined with the 1 st Battalion. Another branch of the landing force was the 1 st Regiment of the 1 st Marine Division. They landed at the swamp area in the south side of Inchon Port, used ladders and smoothly climbed the revetment wall of five meters high, and advanced to Inchon City almost without encountering any blocking. Although having some resistance by the defenders when advancing on the way, they successfully cut down the motor road between Seoul and Inchon in the next morning. In the morning of September 16, the 1 st Marine Division established a circular beachhead centered at the landing point and with radius of ten kilometers. Then, the 7 th Division of the U.S. Army arrived at ashore in Inchon. To the evening of September 18, the UN Forces had 26,000 soldiers, more than 4,500 vehicles and nearly 15,000 tons of supplies on the shore. The UN Forces rapidly expanded to inland and cut off the retreat route of the North Korean People's Army who were fighting in the southern part of Korea. At this point, MacArthur's Inchon landing operation had achieved a full success. In the landing operation, the U.S. military casualties was 203 people, and the North Korean People's Army had a total of 1594 people of casualties and captured persons. On September 22, the People's Army in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, a total of 70,000 people, began to 13

15 retreat northward. The 8 th Army of the U.S. in the southern part of Korean Peninsula immediately pursued northward, while the U.S. military landed in Inchon hit southward. So, the People's Army was surrounded and hit by the U.S. troops, utterly routed, and was almost totally wiped out. On September 28, the American troops occupied Seoul. On October 9, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized MacArthur that you should continue to act according to your own judgment, as long as the troops under your control may win; but in any case, if you want to carry out any military activity on a target in the territory of the People's Republic of China, you must get approval from Washington in advance. On October 11, MacArthur ordered the UN Forces to cross over the 38-degree line. On October 19, the U.S. troops occupied the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. MacArthur planed to wipe out all the People's Army and occupy the whole Korea before heavy snow comes. He said: "Let the children (Note: Refers to the American soldiers) to go back for the Thanksgiving!" Thanksgiving Day of that year was November 23. Section 4 Formation of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army On September 21, 1950, i.e. the sixth day after the U.S. military's Inchon landing, Korea Labor Party's Political Bureau held a meeting devoted to discuss whether or not to ask the Chinese troops please to come. There were different opinions in the meeting. PU Xian-yong said: "The situation is critical, and it is difficult to rely on our own strength to 14

16 confront against the U.S. military. We should request the Chinese government for assistance." But KIM Il-sung believed that Chinese troops can not solve the problem but we should place our hope in our own People's Army. The meeting had no conclusion. A few days later, the battlefield situation deteriorated further, and the People's Army had been locked up and hit by the U.S. military. At this time, KIM Il-sung sent a letter to Stalin, requesting that the Soviet Union provides "direct military assistance" and if not, please help us to establish an "international volunteer force in China and in other people's democratic countries". On October 1, Stalin telegraphed MAO Ze-dong, suggesting that the Chinese army participates in the name of a "volunteer army". On the same day, KIM Il-sung sent a letter to MAO, requesting China to send troops to Korea and to combat. MAO Ze-dong had been closely watching the development of the Korean War. In August 9, 1950, he had said at the meeting of the Central People's Government Committee: "The Korean people have greatly helped the Chinese revolution. They helped in several stages of the Chinese revolution. Now the U.S. Army has reinforced in South Korea, and the endurance of the war has increased. We should be prepared for the war not to be small but large, not to fight in short period of time but long, and not to be general but with atomic bomb. We Chinese people are used to fight battles and prepared for you to use atomic bomb. We don't want you to fight. But if you are determined to fight, we let you fight. You fight in your way while we in our way. You use atomic bomb, while we use grenade, grab your weakness, go where you go and finally beat you.... The imperialist US has a lot of difficulties such as 15

17 internal strife and un-consistency with other countries. The imperialist US has only one advantage in the military, that is, iron. In addition, it has three weaknesses. Put all together, it has 'One advantage and three weaknesses'. The three weakness are: First, the fight line is too long, from Berlin to Korea; Second, the transportation line is also too long as it should cross the two big oceans (the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean); And third, their combat ability is too weak, weaker than German or Japanese army. The imperialist U.S. should not be feared, but it might act recklessly. For this, we should fully estimate." Later, when meeting two of his long-time friends, WANG Ji-fan and ZHOU Shi-zhao (Note: Both are "Democrats") in Zhongnanhai District, MAO said, pointing to the doubts in their hearts: "Yes, we are in urgent need for peaceful development. If you want me to write down reasons for peaceful development, I can write down hundreds of thousands of reasons, but these hundreds of thousands of reasons are not as strong as the statement of we should not ignore it (Note: Refers to the Korean War). Now the imperialist U.S. is advancing in the direction to the Northeast of China. If they really put North Korea disrupted, even not crossing the Yalu River (Note: The river divided China and Korea), our Northeast would often live under their threat, making our peaceful development difficult. So, we should not turn a deaf ear to the Korea problem, the imperialist U.S. will inevitably be insatiable, following the old road of the Japanese invasion of China, engage more fiercely than Japan, and want to put three knives into China's body. The first knife is from North Korea, inserting in the head of our country; The second knife is from Taiwan, inserting in our country's waist; And the third knife is from Vietnam, inserting in our feet. When 16

18 something occurs in the world, it will attack us from the three directions, and then we will be passive. Our movement of 'Resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea' is just not to allow their calculations based on wishful thinking be realized and, as the old saying goes, 'hit a fist, so to avoid one hundred fists coming'.... As you all know, I do not fight a battle when I am not sure of winning. This time, we have decided to send the Volunteer Army abroad, although some people do not agree and believe there is no certainty for winning. But I and some comrades in the Central have carefully studied it, developed a protracted war strategy, and are sure of victory. We estimate that the army of the imperialist U.S. has one advantage and three weaknesses. It has more steel, more aircraft and more cannons than us, and it is the only advantage it has. But it has many military bases in the world, have enemies everywhere, have to defend everywhere and lack of manpower, which is its first weakness; It is ocean apart, which is its second weakness; And it fights for aggression, sending the army out without a righteous cause and its morale is low, which is the third weakness and is fatal. Although there is an advantage, but it can not match the three weaknesses. We shall carry on a protracted war, eliminate its effective force step by step, and make it more casualties every day. If it does not retreat on a day, we hit it for the day; If it does not retreat in a year, we hit it in the year; If it does not retreat for ten years, we hit it for the ten years. In this way, the U.S. military will have more and more casualties, and can not stand any further and then will have to be willing to carry out a peaceful settlement. As long as it is willing to make a peaceful settlement, we can end the war. We want peace from the very beginning." 17

19 MAO wanted LIN Biao to lead the Volunteer Army into Korea, but LIN was not for sure if the battle would win, and therefore his attitude was ambiguous. MAO had also favored SU Yu to lead the Volunteer Army, but SU s health condition was indeed bad, and MAO had to agree with him to recuperate. As so, MAO decided to let PENG De-huai lead the Volunteer Army, and immediately called PENG coming to Beijing from the Northwest of China. In October 2, MAO called an enlarged meeting of the Party's Secretariat to discuss the issue. At the meeting, the majority of participants believed that we should be careful on sending troops to Korea. On October 4, the Political Bureau continued the discussion, when PENG De-huai arrived by plane from Xian City. When PENG stepped into the conference hall, MAO stood up and shook hands with him, and said: "PENG Lao-zhong, you should be tired, but you come just in time. The U.S. imperialist forces have started to cross over the 38th parallel line to attack northward. Now, the Political Bureau is discussing the issue for China to send troops to help North Korea. People are making their comments. You please be prepared to talk about your opinion." PENG sat down, quietly listening to the speeches. The discussion was not heated, but the opinion of the majority is clear: It is best not to fight this battle unless it is absolutely necessary. Their reasons include: We have fought in war for more than 20 years and some parts of the country still have not liberated yet; Our regime was founded not long time ago, thousands of things are waiting us to do, the strength and vitality of the country have not been restored and there is an urgent need to recuperate for the country; And it is only one year after the founding of the People's Republic of China, there are many difficulties, and our country's strength is weak 18

20 and does not have the ability to have a big fight again. Some people said: Though our army has ability to defeat JIANG Jie-shi's army, but we have never contested with the American Army that has a huge ground force, navy and air force, superiority in the air and on the sea, atomic bombs, and a strong industrial base; If being pushed to a corner, the U.S. may drop atomic bombs or bomb China by plane in a large scale, which would be hard for us; If we could not withstand the U.S., the battle would be no boundaries, and could lead to our country, which would be a mess. At the end of the meeting of the day, MAO said: "What you are saying are all reasonable but, no matter what you say, my heart will be sad if we would just watch in the sideway when the others (Note: Refer to North Korean people) are in an national crisis." PENG did not speak on that day. He spoke in the second day, however. He said: "Sending troops to help North Korea is necessary. Even if the battle would be a mess, it would be equal to, at most, a delay of the victory of our liberation war. Otherwise, the United States would occupy the whole Korea, and future problems would be more complex. If the U.S. army would stationed in the bank of the Yalu River and Taiwan, i.e. stationed in front of our house, then they can always find a reason when they want to launch an invasion at any time. Doing it earlier is better that doing it later. Do our construction and development after this fight is finished." MAO immediately followed: "In these days, many comrades said a lot of reasons for not sending troops to North Korea.... Even if there are a hundred reasons or a thousand reasons for not sending troops, which however can not contradict one reasoning, that is, we should have patriotism and internationalism, and should stand out and support our 19

21 neighbor when it has difficulties. We are determined that we use our grenades while you use atomic bombs...." He drank a mouthful of tea and went on to say that if Korea would be disrupted by imperialism, even if the enemy does not cross Yalu River, then our Northeast would live under their threat and be difficult to construct and develop, and we would be passive when something would occur in the world. The final resolution of the meeting was to send troops to help North Korea. The meeting also agreed with MAO's proposal and decided that PENG De-huai will command the Volunteer Army into North Korea. In October 8, CMC Chairman MAO Ze-dong signed an order: "PENG, GAO and HE (Note: Refers to PENG De-huai, the Northeast Military Region's commander and political commissar GAO Gang, and chief of staff HE Jin-nian), DENG, HONG and JIEe (Note: Refers to the 13th Corps' commander and political commissar DENG Hua, deputy commander HONG Xue-zhi, and chief of staff JIE Fang) and Chinese People's Volunteer Army s officers at all levels: (1) In order to aid the liberation war of Korean People, to against attack of American imperialism and its lackeys, and to defend interests of the Korean people, Chinese people and the people of orient countries, we order the Northeast Border Army to be changed to Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and to immediately dispatch to Korea, cooperating with North Korean comrades to fight invaders and to get glorious victory. (2) The Chinese People's Volunteer Army consists of the 13th Corps (including the 38 th, 39 th, 40 th and 42 nd Armies), and the Border Artillery Command Headquarter (including its 1 st, 2 nd and 8 th Artillery Division). The troops must immediately be ready and waiting 20

22 for the order of dispatching to Korea. (3) Appoint PENG Dehuai as commander and political commissar of Chinese People's Volunteer Army. (4) The Chinese People's Volunteer Army takes Northeast Administrative Region as its rear base. All affairs of supplies in the rear and of assistance to the Korean comrades are uniformly commanded by and of responsibility of Comrade GAO Gang, the commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region.... " The commander and deputy commanders of the Volunteer Army 21

23 In the evening of October 19, the four armies of the 13th Corps of the Chinese Volunteer Army, walked across the brige on Yalu River and entered Korea. In the Chinese side bank of the Yalu River, PENG De-hui gave handshakes and said goodbye to GAO Gang and other send-off people. PENG Dehuai wore an old yellow uniform of coarse woolen, sit in a jeep, and shouted: "Drive!" The jeep rushed to the Yalu River bridge. Accompanying in the jeep were staff officer YANG Feng-an, and guards GUO Hong-guang and HUANG Youhuan. The jeep was followed by a truck loaded with radio equipments. The vehicles arrived in the Korean border city of Xingyizhou in rain and snow. It was dark and there were no pedestrian in the downtown area of the city. A leader of North Korea, PARK Xian-yong, who was sent to meet PENG and accompanies, steered them to a room and anxiously said: "Today, the enemy occupied Pyongyang, and now Prime Minister KIM (Il-sung) has been evacuated from Dechuan Region. I am contacting with Prime Minister KIM. Commander PENG, you please wait a moment here." About two hours later, PARK asked PENG to please go to the hydroelectric power station Shuifang, and said we will meet KIM in a nearby place. On the way to go there, PENG sit in the jeep, his cheek was thin and eyes red and swollen, and he seemed very tired. Staff officer YANG advised him taking the chance to nap for a while, but PENG said: "I have commanded troops in war for decades, but never encountered the passive situation like today's: We do not know where is the enemy and where is the army of our friend, and how the topography around is!" The road was very crowded. PENG's jeep was facing north going military personnel and civilian of North Korea, vehicles and livestock. The jeep was reverse-driving with difficulty, 22

24 and the radio truck was lost on the way. After a hard night trip with stop and go, PENG and PARK finally arrived at a place called Datong. PARK led PENG to walk and reached a thatched cottage where they met China s charge d'affaires, CHAI Jun-wu. After washing face in a broken earthen pot to refresh himself, PENG asked CHAI about the situation in the fight front. They had been talking until the dawn. At 8 AM of the next day, KIM Il-sung sent a person to invite PENG to see him, accompanied by CHAI Jun-wu. They came to the front of a neat Korean-style house, where KIM Il-sung was waiting at the outdoor. KIM smiled and greeted PENG, and said: "On behalf of the Korean party and government, and the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I sincerely and warmly welcome Comrade PENG De-huai!" He then guided PENG and CHAI to take off shoes and enter the house. Then, PENG and KIM began talks for the first time. Chinese People's Volunteer Army were across the Yalu River. 23

25 Section 5 The First Battle After crossing the Yalu River, the four armies of the Volunteer Army moved forward in a hidden way to the Guicheng-Taichuan-Qiuchang-Dechuan-Wulaoli line, planning to defense along the line and stabilize the war situation. The UN Forces had not known that the Chinese troops had entered Korea, and continued to advance rapidly to the Yalu River in the unit of division or regiment. PENG De-huai decided to let the Volunteer Army, in the unit of army or division, surround and destroy the aggressive enemy. In October 26, MAO Ze-dong telegraphed PENG, agreeing with PENG s plan and further instructing him to hit the South Korean troops first, and then to hit the troops of the United States and the Britain. The 118 th Division of the 40 th Army of the Volunteer Army encountered with a battalion and an artillery squadron of the 6 th Division of the South Korean army in the vicinity of Wenjing, and immediately annihilated all of them. On October 28, the 40 th Army of the Volunteer Army launched an attack on two battalions of the 6 th and 8 th Division each in the Guitoutong area, and wiped out most of them in the next morning. In the night, the 118 th Division advanced to the Guchang area, and wiped out most of the 7 th Regiment of the 6 th Division of the South Korean army. At the same time, the 39 th Army of the Volunteer Army advanced to the Yunshan area, and surrounded the 1 st Division of the South Korean army in three directions. The 66 th Army advanced into the area west of Quichang, preparing to fight the 24 th Division of the U.S. army. And the 38 th Army occupied the Xichuan area after 24

26 the 8 th Division of the South Korean army withdrew southward. At that time, the UN Forces had confirmed that China has sent troops to Korea, but believed that the Chinese troops are just symbolic and therefore continued to advance northward. Seeing this, PENG decided to send the 38 th Army going forward along the Qingchuan River to the Yuanli area, so to outflank the 1 st, 7 th and 8 th Divisions of the South Korean army, and then to destroy them. This circumlocution of the 38 th Division was crucial. In this regard, MAO Ze-dong telegraphed PENG twice, stating: "The key for the whole situation lies in that the 38 th Army takes a quick action to capture the Junyuli-Jiazhou-Anzhou-Xinganzhou line, to cut connection between the enemy in the north and the enemy in the south, and to resolutely wipe out the 2 nd Division of the U.S. army who were advancing northward. This is the most important thing, and the rest are secondary." The 38 th Army is the main force of the Volunteer Army. Its commander was LIANG Xing-chu, nicknamed "LIANG Big-tooth" because his front teeth are unusually big. The 112 th Division of this Army sent an urgent telegram to LIANG after roundabout to the east of Xichuan, stating that an officer of the People s Army of North Korea told them that there is a "black regiment", referring a U.S. regiment composed black American soldiers. LIANG thought that a black regiment is also a military force of the U.S., and we must be careful and not to attack immediately. In October 28, the 38 th Army encountered with enemy forces outside Xichuan, but LIANG commanded not to attack again. As late as in the evening of October 29, he still didn't let the troops began to attack. As 25

27 delaying as such, his troops arrived at the destination of Diyuanli area until November 2, resulting that the 8 th Division of South Korea stationed there safely escaped. The 38 th Army delayed fight and did not complete the key task assigned by PENG De-huai. PENG was mad and said: "LIANG Xing-chu, you miss the military key action, and I won't forgive you!" On November 4, the UN Forces all evacuated to the south of Qingchuan Rive. After occupying the north shore of Qingchuan River, the Volunteer Army stopped advancing further. As so, the first battle ended. In the battle, although the Volunteer Army had pushed the UN Forces from the Yalu River back to the south of Qingchuan River, but did not achieve the desired purpose of circumlocution, surrounding and destroying three divisions of South Korea army. After the battle ended, PENG held an enlarged meeting of the party committee of the Volunteer Army. He said at the meeting: "The reasons that the enemy we routed (14 battalions) was more than the enemy we annihilated (11 battalions) in this battle are, objectively, hasty of time, incomplete preparation, high mountains and dense forests, unacquainted roads, language barrier and difficulty in catching skirmishers, etc. But the main reason is our tactical mistakes: When our force is equivalent to the enemy's, some of our troops do not understand that the most effective tactics to annihilate the enemy is to use only a small force to block the enemy in the front but let the main force attack the enemy from behind and flank, to completely cut off the enemy's retreat first, and to make a dorsal attack on the enemy." He first praised the 39 th and 40 th Armies for playing tough, the 42 nd Army for resisting 26

28 the enemy's repeated onslaughts in the east coast. After PENG finished the praise, his face had a sink and he struck his hand on the table. The meeting participants looked up and saw PENG's face becoming blue. "LIANG Xing-chu!" PENG roared. The commander of the 38 th army, LIANG Xing-chu, stood up. PENG continued to roar: "Why did you, the 38 th Army, move so slowly and drag along? I let you advance to Xichuan, why did you not? What happened to you?" LIANG replied with a low voice: "I decided to proceed with caution while taking into account that the U.S. military has good equipments and strong firepower...." PENG said: "What's the big deal of the 'Black Regiment'? The enemy hit by the 39 th Army in Yunshan is a white regiment and a trump card of the U.S. army, and the 39 th Army destroyed more than thousand enemy's people. Why can't we attack the Black Regiment? What a 'main force'! Just a fart!" LIANG said: "Don't curse, please." After listened this, PENG became more anger, and heavily strike his right palm on the table again, and said: "I, PENG De-huai, do not have much ability, but do have ability to cut MA Su's head!" The venue was in perfect silence. LIANG whispered: "Cut my head because I missed the opportunity for combat." PENG said: "Chairman MAO instructed us repeatedly, requiring us to do a good job in this first battle abroad, letting you, the 38 th Army, cut off the enemy's retreat road, but you, the 38 th Army, repeatedly postponed the attack! You not only did not destroy the enemy in Xichuan, but also delayed to advance to Junouli and Xinganzhou! What is this behavior?" After a while, PENG's tone eased down and said: "I, PENG De-huai, also have a responsibility, and should not put all responsibility on you." After the meeting ended, LIANG went out of the meeting 27

29 room with his head lowed. PENG's secretary, YANG Feng-an hailed LIANG: "Command LIANG Xing-chu, let us go and eat!" LIANG replied angrily: "Eat? When the cgief commander is going to cut my head off, do I still have a heart to eat?" YANG smiled and said: "That was angry words of Chief Commander PENG. Will he really cut your head off? No. Let's go!" LIANG said: "The 38 th Army did not fight well, and I, LIANG Xing-chu, take the main responsibility. I'm sorry to the people of the 38 th Army. Wrongdoing is wrongdoing, you go to tell Chief Command PENG this and ask him not be angry with me. I, LIANG Xing-chu, is backboned and so is the 38 th Army, and the 38 th Army is not a coward. I will go back and hold a meeting of the Party committee to summarize the lessons we should learn, and to do a good job in the next battle by fighting to my death!" Section 6 The Second Battle After the end of the First Battle, MacArthur believed that the Volunteer Army's force is not large, and therefore decided to continue advancing northward and to end the war before Christmas of this year. The details of his plan were: The air corps destroy and blockade the Yalu River Bridge and ferries, preventing more Chinese troops coming to Korea; In the western front, the 8 th Army crosses Qingchan River and advance northward; In the east front, the 10 th Army advances westward along the Changjing Lake; The two armies join at Wupingli and then advance northward together, and occupy the whole North Korea before froze of the Yalu River. At the time, the UN Forces had a total of 220 thousand people and more than 1200 aircrafts. 28

30 PENG De-huai's strategy is to lure the enemy going further. His specific battle plan was: In the west, decoy the enemy troops to the Daguantong-Wenjing-Miaoxiangshan- Pingnanzhen line, and concentrate all forces of the 13 th Corps to annihilate the enemy; In the east, entice the enemy coming to the Jiujingli-Changjing line, and let the 8 th Corps, which has just entered Korea, annihilate the enemy. At this time, the Volunteer Army has nine armies in Korea, a total of more than 380 thousand people but no aircraft, not even one. In November 6, the United Nation Forces began to make tentative attack. The Volunteer Army, according to predetermined lure plan, let some of its troops to fight against the enemy step by step but let the main force to retreat. It had abandoned Huangcaoling, Feihushan, Buochuan, Dechuan and other areas, so to lure the enemy going further. On November 10, all the UN Forces advanced northward, but with caution and slowly. On November 16, the Volunteer Army stopped blocking the enemy and retreated further northward. MacArthur judged that the Volunteer Army is "shy and retreating" and that its force has "only 60 or 70 thousands people at most". Therefore, the UN Forces speeded up the advancing northward. To November 21, its troops in the west front had advanced to the Jiashan-Longshantong-Dechuan- Ningyuan line, and in the east front to the Changjing Lake area. As so, the UN Forces had been lured to the area predetermined by the Volunteer Army, but not perceived. In the evening of November 25, the Volunteer Army suddenly attacked in the west front. The 38 th and 42 nd Armies attacked 29

31 the 7 th and 8 th Divisions of the South Korean army in Dechuan and Ningyuan, destroyed most of the two divisions, and occupied the Dechuan and Ningyuan areas on November 26. The UN Forces urgently mobilized the 1 st Cavalry Division of the U.S. and the Turkey Brigade for reinforcements. PENG De-huai issued an order: The 38 th Army fights the enemy and advances toward the Junouli-Sansuoli line, and implements an inner circuitous; The 42 nd Army captures Beichangli and then advances to Jiachangli, and implements an outer circuitous. In this way, the Volunteer Army planned to carry out a double outflank against the UN Forces. For the inner layer of the detour task, the 38 th Army defeated the Turkish Brigade's blocking in the Gariling and Yukouzhan areas, and occupied the Beidezhan and Wuayuan areas. On the evening of November 27, the 113 th Division moved from Dechuan along a path to Sansuoli for implementation of the roundabout. They marched more than 70 km within 14 hours, and arrived in Sansuoli at 8 AM of the next morning, cutting off the escape route of the 9 th Army of the U.S.. The division beat the Cavalry 1 st Division's attacks for more than ten times in Sansuoli. In addition, the 113 th Division also sent a regiment to and occupied Longyuanli, cutting off another retreat route of the 9 th Army of the U.S. to Inchon. At the same time, according to PENG De-huai's order, the 39 th and 66 th Armies had advanced to the south region of Ningbian, the 40 th Army to the Yuanli area, and the 50 th Army to the west region of Puchuan. At this point, the 2 nd and 25 th Divisions of the 9 th Army of the U.S., the Turkey Brigade, a part of the Cavalry 1 st Division of the U.S. and a part of the 1 st Division of South 30

32 Korea, were all caught in the siege of the Volunteer Army of China. On November 29, besieged troops of the 9 th Army of the U.S. shrunk to the Jiachuan and Junouli areas, and planned to divide the troops into two parts and to break out of the encirclement toward Inchon via Longyuanli and Sansuoli. At the same time, MacArthur urgently mobilized a part of the Cavalry1 st Division of the U.S. and a part of the 29 th Brigade of Britain located in vicinity of Pyongyang to go northward for reenforcing the encircled troops. Knowing this, PENG Dehuai issued orders: The 38 th Army in the inner roundabout rapidly moves to the position where its 113 th Division is, and resolutely block both the enemy fleeing southward and the enemy advancing northward to help the encircled UN forces; The 42 nd Army in the outer roundabout rapidly advances to Inchon and Shuchuan; And the remaining armies in the front line accelerate attacks toward Anzhou and Junouli. In November 29 and 30, the 38 th Army wiped out most of the 25 th Division of the U.S. in the Fengming area. The 113 th Division of the 38 th Army stuck to the positions in Sansuoli and Longyuanli, which made the encircled American troops unable to break out and escape southward and the American reinforcement troops unable to advance northward. While recognizing there is no hope of breakthrough via Sansuoli or Longyuanli, the 9 th Army of the U.S. was forced to abandon a large number of baggage and equipments and to break out in the Anzhou direction. The 42 nd Army of the Volunteer Army in the outer roundabout was failed to timely intersperse in place, which resulted in that the 9 th Army of the U.S. returned to Pyongyang via Anzhou and Suchuan. 31

33 In the east front, the 20 th Army and 27 th Army (with commander PENG De-qing) of the 9 th Corps of the Volunteer Army surrounded the 1 st Regiment and a reinforcing regiment of the 7 th Divisions of the U.S. Marine Corps, separately, in the morning of November 28. On November 29, the encircled U.S. troops launched onslaughts on the enemy in the front positions of Shiingling and Fushengli. In Fushengli, the 60 th Division of the 29 th Army of the Volunteer Army repulsed several attacks of the American troops, and killed, wounded or captured nearly a thousand enemies. In the night of November 30, the 27 th Army of the Volunteer Army concentrated two divisions and launched attack on the 32 nd Regiment, a battalion of the 31 st Regiment and the artillery battalion of the 7 th Division of U.S., and wiped out all these units completely on December 1. In December 1 and 2, the 27 th Army and the 59 th Division of the 20 th Army of the Volunteer Army fought with the 1 st Division of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Qiushui and Shiyingling regions, and annihilated a part of them. On December 3, the 1 st Division of the U.S. dropped heavy equipments and withdrew to Xiaheouli, and continued to break out of the encirclement southward via Gutuli in the morning on the December 6 under the cover of a large number of aircrafts and tanks. The 27 th Army of the Volunteer Army followed and attacked the enemy. On December 12, the 1 st Division of the U.S. withdrew to Wulaoli with the help of the 3 rd Division. Previously, the North Korean People's Army had occupied Wuanshan, thus cut off the land retreat route of the U.S. and the South Korean troops. Recognizing impassability of land retreat, the U.S. troops decided to retreat via the sea. In Xingnan Port, the retreating troops of the UN Forces in the 32

34 east coast boarded onto more than 300 ships and successfully withdrew from the sea, under the cover of armed firepower from the see, land and air. In December 3, MacArthur ordered all troops to retreat to the 38-degree line. The Chinese Volunteer Army and the North Korean People's Army followed up the victory with hot pursuit. On December 6, a part of the 39 th and 40 th Armies of the Volunteer Army and the 1st Corps of the People's Army re-captured the capital of the North Korea, Pyongyang. On December 16, the UN Forces evacuated to the south of the 38- degree line. PENG De-huai ordered the cessation of the pursuit after advancing to the 38-degree line. The second battle was then over. In the Second Battle, the Volunteer Army had destroyed the most of the 7 th and 8 th Divisions of the South Korea and a part of Turkey Brigade, and dealt a severe blow to the U.S. 2 nd, 7 th and 25 th Divisions, the 1 st Cavalry Division, and the 1 st Marine Corps Division. In the battle, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army had killed, injured or captured 36 thousand people of the enemy, including 24 thousand Americans; seized or destroyed more than 1000 cannons, 3000 vehicles and more than 200 tanks or armored vehicles; and seized six aircrafts. In the combat, the Volunteer Army had casualties of more than 30 thousand people. In this battle, the 38 th Army rendered an outstanding service in cutting off the retreat route of the UN Forces. For this reason, PENG De-huai deliberately wrote his handwriting of "Long lives the 38 th Army!" in an award document. Since then, the 38 th Army has been often called "Long live Army". 33

35 PENG De-huai wrote the words of "Long live the 38 th Army" on the award document. 34

36 Section 7 The Third Battle After the Volunteer Army pushed the battlefront back to the 38-degree line, North Korean party, government, military and civilian's sentiment rose high, a blindly optimistic mood started to grow. In a report to the central government of China, PENG De-huai stated: "The Soviet ambassador said that the U.S. troops will escape soon, and asked our troops to advance rapidly southward. This is not only the opinion of the Soviet ambassador, but also the requirement of the majority of the comrades in the Central of the Korean Party." He went on to state his own point of view: "The Korean War will still be a quite lasting war and a hard war. Now, the enemy has transferred from the offensive attitude to the defense attitude, and therefore their front line becomes shorter, their force more concentrated, and the front battlefield narrower. They can strengthen in the depth, which are beneficial for a combat with the combined arms.... Our troops should adopt the policy of advancing slowly and stably." Surprising to PENG De-huai, MAO Ze-dong demands the Volunteer Army in the rest to cross the 38-degree line and occupy the South Korean capital Seoul, and then retreat back for 10 kilometers and take a rest. PENG had to obey, and launched the third battle in December 31, It was very cold at the time, minus 20 degrees Celsius. The Volunteer Army walked on foot across Han River filled with ice. The soldiers' body was covered with ice. The only antifreeze measure they had was to use lard and suety to cover their feet to prevent frostbite. After the Volunteer Army and the People's Army inserted and persuaded the enemy for two 35

37 days and one night, the 1 st and 2 nd Divisions of South Korea in the east to Seoul fled on January 2, 1951, and the Chinese and North Korean forces in the west of Seoul implemented farreaching surrounded. As so, more than 100 thousand people of the UN Forces in the Seoul area were in a danger situation that they will have to fight when their back is the Han River. The new commander of the 8 th Army of the U.S., Matthew Ridgeway, ordered to abandon Seoul. He then had an inspection while riding on a jeep, and saw the scene that the South Korean army was panic and fled. He tried to stop the escaping troops, but trucks ran through him even without reducing the speed a bit. He ordered the commander of the 24 th Division of the U.S., John Church, to let the retreating officers and soldiers to return their units, though even he himself doubted this order can be executed. The Volunteer Army fully pursuit the enemy, but their feet could not catch the motorized U.S. troops. On the night of January 4, the 50 th Army and a division of the 39 th Army of the Volunteer Army, and the 1 st Corps of the People's Army occupied Seoul. On January 8, the 1 st Corps of the People's Army occupied Inchon. On the same day, the Chinese and the North Korean troops arrived at the 37 degrees north latitude line. PENG Dehuai resolutely ordered to stop the pursuit, because he realized: "The enemy induces us go southward step by step and assault their fortified positions. After we would be exhausted, they will counter-attack us in the front line while landing at coast sides to cut off our back route. In less than three months after entering Korea, the Volunteer Army continuously had three big battles; it is winter now, we do not have air cover nor a rest, and the troops are very fatigue as everybody can see; and our combat attrition and the non-combat attrition are close to 36

38 half of our total military force. We must continue to rest in order to be ready for future fights." It is also clear to PENG that it needs at least a month for a reinforcement of the Volunteer Army to arrive at the battle front from the Yalu River, because they will face all the way the endless and ammunition-generous bombing of U. S. military aircrafts, and the only umbrella they have is darkness of the night and they walked toward the front in the road of death. Many generals of the Volunteer Army said that hardness in the North Korean battlefield is far more than hardness of climbing the snow-capped mountains and walking over the Great Grass Field in the Long March. But MAO Ze-dong instructed that the Volunteer Army should immediately launch the fourth battle, requiring the troops to advance southward further, even to reach "the 36-degree line", which as he stated, is needed politically. In PENG De-huai's view, if the military can not achieve victory, the political goals can not be achieved either. It is very clear to PENG that many soldiers of the Volunteer Army are hungry, and some of them march in the snow even by barefoot. He said in a telegram to the Central: "Shoes, ammunition and food are not complied. The eariest date to complete complement of five Chinese pounds per person will be February Currently, the 9 th Corps is able to dispatch only 8 regiments of the 26 th Army, and the earliest date for them to arrive at Tieyuan and become a reserve troop is February 18, because the soldiers could not walk well due to frostbite.... The third battle was already with some reluctance (fatigue), and the planned battle is with even greater reluctance." Fortunately, MAO finally agreed with 37

39 PENG s opinion of not advancing southward further but taking a rest immediately. So, PENG ordered that all troops stop attacking the enemy and take a rest. This immediately caused strong opposition from North koreans. Just at the day of stopping the attack, KIM Ilsung said to the Chinese Ambassador CHAI Cheng-wen that the rest period of the troops should not be too long, and a month is sufficient. Soviet ambassador Zakharov was also dissatisfied and said that how can a victorious army not pursuit of the enemy and not develop the fruits of victory? Exactly at this time, Stalin telegraphed stating that in order to avoid international criticism of China, we recommend the North Korean People's Army to continue southward pursuit, while the Volunteer Army take the task of controlling the 38th parallel, and both east and west coast lines. MAO immediately transferred this telegram to PENG, and advised him: If KIM Il-sung thinks that they can advance southward without complement and rest, you may agree and let the People's Army move forward to hit the enemy nuder directly command of the North Korean government own. (Note: The North Korean People's Army had been commanded by PENG in the Korean War); You may let the 1 st, 2 nd, 3 rd and 5 th Corps of the People s Army be in the front line south of the Han River; and let the Volunteer Army withdraw to Inchon on the north side of Han River, take rest for two or three months, and serve as garrison for Inchon and Seoul. But KIM said to PENG that the Volunteer Army should have three armies continuing to advance southward, and let the other troops joint the attack after taking a rest for a month. After listening these words, PENG was impatient and loudly shouted: "No! Not 38

40 even a division! We have fifty thousand soldiers lost life in the battles, and another fifty thousand died of cold and starvation!... You expect your success based on luck and gamble in the cause of the people! You used to say America will not send troops, never envisaged what to do if the U.S. does send troops. Now you say that the U.S. military will exit from Korea, and do not consider what to do if the U.S. does not exit.... The Volunteer Army will need complement and rest for two months, not less, not even one day less. And it might need three months. Cannot go southward if not quite ready, not even a division.... The Volunteer Army may be responsible for all the coast guard and for maintaining the traffic in the rear. The People's Army will be under your own command and continue to go southward, as you desire. If American would exit Korea as you imagine, I would celebrate the liberation of Korea. If the American forces would not retreat, the Volunteer Army will go southward and fight the enemy according to the pre-determined schedule." Hearing this, KIM had to say that the People's Army is not ready, its strength has not been restored, and it cannot move forward alone. When learning the argument, Stalin sent a telegraph that stated: "The leadership of the Chinese Volunteer Army is correct.... Beyond all doubts, the truth is in Comrade PENG De-huai's hand." He praised that PENG De-huai with such disadvantaged equipments has defeated the world's most powerful imperialism, the U.S., and that PENG is a modern genius of military. Stalin also criticized the Soviet ambassador for not understanding military affairs, and asked him not to interfere with PENG De-huai's command. MAO Ze-dong also sent a telegraph that stated: "We have to be fully prepared to continue fights. Otherwise, we will make the same mistakes 39

41 that the North Korean army made from June to September, 1950." At this point, KIM Il-sung had to give up. PENG De-huai returned to Beijing to report on the Korean War. After arriving in the Xijiao Airport of Beijing, he immediately rode to Zhongnanhai District, but only to find that MAO was not there. PENG then rush to Yuquan Mountain in the west suburb of Beijing to meet MAO. MAO was taking a nap when PENG arrived there. Regardless discourage of the guard personnel in MAO s residence, PENG pushed the door and enter MAO's bedroom. MAO immediately got up, and joked while addressing: "Only you, PENG Lao-zhong, would break into one's bedroom when he is sleeping." When learned that PENG had not had lunch, MAO said: "You have to eat first. If not, I will not listen to your report." PENG had to go to the canteen, hastily picked a few mouths of food, and then quickly returned back. He said to MAO: Now our army is fighting abroad, which is very different from a domestic combat. There are four outstanding differences. First, personnel replacements could not take from the captured enemy. Therefore, though the Volunteer Army has many casualties but could not get supplement timely. Second, the enemy bombs heavily, and roads and vehicles are so seriously destructed or distroyed that we could not get needed material supplement in a timely manner. Third, it is in winter season now, but our soldiers still wear thin and tattered clothes, and there are a large number of sick and frostbite soldiers. Forth, hundreds of thousands of officers and soldiers of the Volunteer Army do not have an adequate supply of food, our officers and soldiers depend on fried noodles and snow in combat, which seriously impacts on operations. After 40

42 listening to PENG, MAO thought for a moment and said: "It seems that we should not be in hurry. We should win quickly if we can win quickly, and we should win slowly if we can win but slowly." PENG suggested sending new forces into Korea, replacing the old forces with heavy casualties, so to prepare for carrying out a big counterattack in the coming spring. MAO agreed and said that the troops will take turns in Korea. Then, PENG reported to MAO about sacrifice of MAO's son, MAO Ai-ying, in the beginning of the Korean war: In a U.S. aircraft bombing, MAO Ai-ying did not go to shelter and an enemy plane dropped a bomb hitting the headquarter of the Volunteer Army, and MAO Ai-ying sacrificed unfortunately. Then, PENG made a self-criticism and said: "Chairman, you let Ai-ying go to the Korean War front with me and he had been very active in the work. You and (ZHOU) En-lai have urged us to pay close attention to air defense issue for several times, but I did not follow the instructions seriously enough, resulting in unfortunate sacrifice of Ai-ying and staff officer GAO, which I should bear responsibility. I and comrades of the headquarter of the Volunteer Army are still very sad." MAO listened and was silent. He wanted to smoke but could not take a cigarette out from the cigarette box, and then his guard helped him to take a cigarette out. He gulped a cigarette smoke, his eyes stared at depressed switchgrass outside of the window, and gently recited the ancient poetry "On deadwood": "Grafted switchgrass in the passed years in Hannan. Now seeing it falling in the desolate riverside. A tree is so already, what we can say on human being!" He raised his head and said slowly: "In a battle, there would always be men dead.... You 41

43 go back and tell the others: Ai-ying is an ordinary soldier of the Volunteer Army; You should not take it as a major event just because he is son of the Party s Chairman, and therefore should not sacrifice. There is no such reasoning in the world! Which soldier's flesh and blood were not born from the parents?" MAO Ai-ying and his father MAO Ze-dong, stepmother JIANG Qing, wife LIU Si-qi and sister LI Ne. In the second day, ZHOU En-lai and PENG De-huai presided a meeting of the responsible persons in various headquarters of the Central Military Commission at the meeting room of the General Staff Department in Jurentang Hall in the Zhongnanhai District. At the meeting, PENG s face was dignified, and he introduced serious difficulties of the Volunteer Army in the war front, and wanted the country to 42