US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

Transcription

1 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT

2 US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT Lawrence Freedman Research Fellow Royal Institute of International Ajfairs

3 Lawrence David Freedman 1977 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1977 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission First published 1977 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Associated companies in Delhi Dublin Hong Kong Johannesburg Lagos Melbourne New York Singapore Tokyo British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Freedman, Lawrence US intelligence and the Soviet strategic threat. 1. Intelligence service-united States 2. United States-Military policy 3 United States- Relations (military) with Russia 4 Russia- Relations (military) with the United States I. Title '35'73 UA23 ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI / This book is sold subject to the standard conditions of the Net Book Agreement

4 'I was wondering what the mouse-trap was for,' said Alice. 'It isn't very likely there would be any mice on the horse's back.' 'Not very likely, perhaps,' said the Knight; 'but, if they do come, I don't choose to have them running all about.' 'You see,' he went on after a pause, 'it's as well to be provided for everything. That's the reason the horse has all those anklets around his feet.' 'But what are they for? Alice asked in a tone of great curiosity. 'To guard against the bites of sharks,' the Knight replied. 'It's an invention of my own... ' LEWIS CARROLL Through the Looking-Glass

5 Contents List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgements Sources Abbreviations lx X Xll XlV INTRODUCTION 2 THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 8 Speculative-Evaluative Intelligence 8 The Central Intelligence Agency Military Intelligence Other Intelligence Agencies 26 3 THE ESTIMATING PROCESS 30 The Office of National Estimates 30 National Intelligence Estimates: Estimates and Influence 41 Estimates and Planning in the Department of Defense Henry Kissinger and the Decline of the Office 44 of National Estimates 46 The Fall of the Office of National Estimates 52 The Estimating Process: Conclusion: The Structure of Power in the Intelligence Community 58 4 THE MISSILE GAP 62 The Soviet Threat: The Search for ICBMs 67 Estimating Production Rates 74 Conclusion 77 5 GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED THREATS 81 The Shift to the Defence 81 The Greater-Than-Expected Threat The 'ABM Gap' 84 86

6 Vlll CONTENTS 6 AN INVULNERABLE DETERRENT 97 The Threat to ICBMs 97 Minuteman as a 'Hard' Target 99 The Soviet Missile Force: I96I -9 IOI The US Assessment of the Soviet Build-up I I 3 7 THE SENTINEL DECISION I I8 The US Response to the Soviet Build-up I I 8 Perceptions of the Minuteman Vulnearability Problem I 20 The Sentinel Decision I 22 Conclusion I 27 8 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION: PROTECTING MINUTEMAN THROUGH SAFEGUARD The Safeguard Decision First-Strike Alarms Minuteman in Danger When is a MRV a MIRV? I29 I29 I 3 I I34 I37 No Clear and Present Danger I44 Safeguard: The Inadequate Shield I 47 Minuteman Vulnerability: A Threat Established I5I 9 PROTECTING MINUTEMAN THROUGH SALT 153 The Soviet Threat: I969-7I I53 Protecting Minuteman in the Long Term I59 Protecting Minuteman Through SALT I 6 I The 'Monster Missiles' I64 Io PREPARING FOR THE THREAT: I972-6 I69 A New Generation of Soviet Missiles I 69 MIRV and the Strategic Balance I 76 ~X I~ I I US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRAGETIC THREAT 183 Notes Bibliography Index I99 2I9 229

7 List of Tables and Figures Table 2.1 Key Government Officials: Table 6.! National Intelligence Estimates for Soviet ICBMs: Table 9 I National Intelligence Estimates for Soviet SLBMs on Nuclear Submarines: Table 10.1 Characteristics of Soviet ICBMs Figure 6. I Intelligence projections for number of Soviet ICBMs by mid-1967 and mid-1970 Figure 9 ' Intelligence projections for number of Soviet SLBM launch-tubes on nuclear submarines by mid-1971 Figure 9.2 SS-9 and SS-1 1 deployment: !56 158

8 Acknowledgements This book is a revised version of my D. Phil. thesis, The Difinition of the Soviet Threat in Strategic Arms Decisions of the United States: Ig6I -74, that was submitted to the Board of Social Studies of the University of Oxford in June The revision is quite substantial. The analysis has been brought up to date and material has been reorganised. Most important, I have been able in this book to take advantage of the large amount of material that has become available on both the content and formation of US intelligence estimates since the thesis was completed. My interest in this topic first developed while I was working on a B. Phil. dissertation at the University of York in I worked on the thesis fulltime from 1972 to 1975 at Nuffield College, Oxford -first as a graduate student and then as a Research Fellow. I have spent time revising it as a book while in the employ of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Rather than mention all the colleagues who have helped and advised me in the development of my work, I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to them collectively. I have been particularly fortunate in finding such congenial and stimulating environments in which to study and write. My two supervisors at Oxford, Professor Michael Howard of All Souls College and Philip Williams of N uffield College, deserve special mention for helping me to develop, research and express my ideas. The constructive criticisms of my two thesis examiners, Professor Peter Nailor of Lancaster University and the late Professor Alastair Buchan, were of particular value when it came to turning the thesis into a book. Most of the interviewing took place from August to November 1973 in the US. This trip was made possible by a generous short-term studies scholarship from the American Council of Learned Societies. In the US I benefited greatly from the traditional hospitality of Americans. Despite the fact that I was there during an eventful period I found those I wished to interview ready to give freely of their time and knowledge. Special thanks are due to Tom Halsted and Heidi Hansen of the Arms Control Association of Washington DC for their assistance in the provision of office facilities. In research such as this, which depends on the collection of diverse material from many sources, libraries play an important role. The Nuffield College librarian, Miss Caroline Kennedy, and her staff were of great help in chasing after numerous obscure publications. For many books and

9 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Xl articles I have relied on the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Without the maintenance of the excellent books and newspapers cuttings service by Mrs Meryl Eady, Miss Vera Lisicky and Miss Veronica Kennard, the research for this study would have been a much more daunting task. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Mrs Jocelyn Statler who checked the finished manuscript for mistakes. Finally, I wish to thank my family for their help and encouragement along the way, and especially my wife] udith for her remorseless correction of my grammar, spelling and logic.

10 Sources It might have been expected that the major problems connected with this study would have been those resulting from the difficulties of obtaining sufficient and reliable information. The functioning of intelligence agencies and the intricacies of strategic arms policy are usually thought to be highly classified matters. Obviously there are many areas of interest and relevance to this study that I have been unable to penetrate. However, the US is a very open society and the requirement of Congress that the executive branch keeps it informed as to its deliberations and decisions, and the politics of the executive branch which leads to the 'leaking' of information in attempts to influence these deliberations and decisions, means that an enormous amount of data becomes available through official and unofficial channels. In fact the major problem faced in writing this book has been one of the organisation of this material. The following represent my major sources: 1. Official Sources: These take the form of the annual statements on the defence budget by the Secretary of Defense, plus other official presentations including, in recent years, the annual report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are supplemented through answers to questions raised during congressional hearings and press conferences. Recently, under the Freedom oflnformation Act, a number of previously classified government reports have been declassified, including the 'threat' sections of the classified versions of the Secretary of Defense's statement on the defence budget. Unless otherwise stated a!! figures for current Soviet capabilities and for intelligence estimates are from such official sources. For convenience, official statements and congressional hearings have been referred to in the notes in standardised, shortened forms. Their full titles are provided in the bibliography. 2. Apart from the normal selection of books and articles, the work of a few other writers who have made use of interview material and documents not otherwise available for their theses and books has been extremely valuable. 3 Newspaper articles: The political value attached to intelligence information results in a lot ofleaks from within the defence establishment, designed to bolster a particular position. This means that few leaks are disinterested. While it is not always possible to make a judgement as to the accuracy of particular articles, familiarity with the various journals and reporters allows criteria to be developed for evaluating their reliability. It

11 SOURCES Xlll is often possible to check their articles with more authoritative information. The gradual accumulation of data on the earlier periods covered made it possible to look retrospectively at the reliability of journalists who were reporting at the time. A sense of consistent reliability starts to develop and this is reinforced when the quality of the information appearing indicates a depth of knowledge that would require good contacts or privileged 'backgrounders'. One also becomes aware of how particular journals and reporters consistently reflect the positions of major actors in the policy debates. 4 Interviews: During a research trip to the United States from August to November 1973 a series of interviews with past and current members of the defence establishment and the intelligence community were conducted. Including a few interviews conducted in England, in all about fifty interviews, from which some useful information was obtained, were completed. Many additional people were very helpful in providing me with ideas, insights and suggestions for research. All interviews were conducted on a strictly confidential basis, and have therefore been incorporated into the text without reference. This has the unfortunate result of requiring the reader to take a certain amount on trust, but there is no way round this problem if the anonymity requested by the interviewees is to be respected. Where possible I have tried to corroborate interview material before using it, but this has not always proved easy. Where this has not been possible judgement has been exercised as to the reliability of the source, usually based on whether or not a particular piece of information provided by an interviewee was based on his own expertise and experience. The interviews were perhaps skewed too much towards the 'liberal' position, as I found such people most accessible, but contact was established with most 'sides', so the bias is not overwhelming. To some extent it is compensated for by the fact that the military have been the major source of leaks to newspapers. At no time have I tried to get security clearance or obtain, through devious means, classified documents. I found most people approached were very willing to discuss questions with me. Obviously I cannot be sure as to the reliability of all the information I have used or the constructions I have put on it. In a study such as this there are bound to be inaccuracies. I am, however, reasonably confident that such inaccuracies will not affect any of the major arguments or analyses.

12 Abbreviations ABM ACDA AEC BNE CEP CFI CIA CIG DCI DDI DDR&E DE DIA DIE DIEJP DIPP ERA ERDA FBI FOBS FY GMAIC GMIC GTE lac ICBM INR IRBM ISA JCS JIC JIEP JSOP MIRV MRBM MRV Anti-Ballistic Missile Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (established I 962) Atomic Energy Commission Board ofnational Estimates (I95I-73) Circular Error Probable (measure of accuracy) Committee on Foreign Intelligence ( I976- ) Central Intelligence Agency (I ) Central Intelligence Group (I946-7) Director of Central Intelligence Directorate for Intelligence (CIA) (I 952- Director of Defense Research and Engineering (I 958- Directorate of Estimates (DIA) ( I970- ) Defense Intelligence Agency (I 96 I- ) Defense Intelligence Estimate Defense Intelligence Estimate for Joint Planning Defense Intelligence Projection for Planning Economic Research Area, component of ORR (I950-67) Energy Research and Development Agency (I 973- ) Federal Bureau of Investigation Fractional Orbital Bombardment System Fiscal Year Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (I 95s- ) Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee (I 956-8) Greater-Than-Expected Threat Intelligence Advisory Committee ( I947-58) Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State Department) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile International Security Affairs (Defense Department) Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee (JCS) Joint Intelligence Estimates for Planning Joint Strategic Operations Plan Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Multiple Re-entry Vehicle (not independently-targeted)

13 NATO NIE NIO NIPP NPIC NSA NSC NSCIC OCI ONE ORE ORR OSI oss PFIAB PSAC SAC SAM SLBM SS-6 SS-7 SS-8 SS-9 SS-I I SS-I3 SS-I6 SS-I 7 SS-I8 SS-I9 TOR ULMS USIB USIS ABBREVIATIONS North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Intelligence Estimate National Intelligence Officer National Intelligence Projections for Planning National Photographic Interpretation Center National Security Agency National Security Council National Security Council Intelligence Committee (I97I-6) Office of Current Intelligence, component of DDI, ( ) Office of National Estimates ( ) Office of Research and Evaluation, component ofcig and CIA ( ) Office of Research and Reports, component of DDI ( ) Office of Scientific Intelligence, component of DDI ( ) Office of Strategic Services ( ) President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ( President's Scientific Advisory Committee Strategic Air Command (US Air Force) Surface-to-Air Missile Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile First Soviet ICBM, deployed in 196I Early Soviet ICBM, first deployed I962 Early Soviet ICBM, first deployed I963 'Heavy' Soviet ICBM, first deployed I966 'Light' Soviet ICBM, first deployed I966 'Light' Soviet ICBM, first deployed I969 'Light' Soviet ICBM, as yet not deployed 'Light' Soviet ICBM, first deployed I975 'Heavy' Soviet ICBM, first deployed I974 'Medium' Soviet ICBM, first deployed I974 Terms of Reference (for NIE) Underwater Long-Range Missile System United States Intelligence Board (I958-76) United States Information Service XV