A COMMAND POST IS NOT A PLACE. Summary

Transcription

1 15 Sep 1980 A COMMAND POST IS NOT A PLACE Smmary A field experiment in video-conferencing, sing commercial video, TACFAX, and millimeter wave radio in conjnction with isse radios, points toward a capability to disperse a division Main Command post over a circle 6-10 kilometers in diameter, and to make a remote TAC CP, for all intents and prposes, part of the Division Tactical Operations Center. Theory and Doctrine Experiments in Erope The Battle Center Decision Graphics TACFAX Reports CP Configrations Proposi tions

2 A COMMAND POST IS NOT A PLACE Or need not be. Within the past two years, Army experiments have pointed toward techniqes and eqipment which cold free a general commanding a division or larger formation in the field from the gemmating congeries of vehicles, radios, antennae, generators, cables and people srronding his place of bsiness. And while compters are part of the problem-yet more vans, more thermal and electronic telltales, more vlnerable flesh per acre within the command post-for the foreseeable ftre compters are nlikely to be part of the soltion. This paper reports good news-the experiments,* have shown that collocation of staff elements with each other and the commander may no longer be either necessary or desirable-whether compters are in play or not. Theory and Doctrine In the first place, why have a command post at all? I have little dobt that, given American romanticism abot leading in battle, most division commanders wold prefer to operate from a TAC CP, roaming arond p front in a jeep, popping p in the nick of ~ time at each Schwerpnkt, a genine force-mltiplier like the piece "Rommel" in the commercial board game AFRIKA KORPS, which adds to the striking range of any other piece with which it is positioned. Yet, while a division commander mst be forward from time to time, the bewildering pace of mechanized battle and the propensity of the new, powerfl intelligence systems to terminate at the Main Command Post, raises his risk in prolonged stay away from Main. Until the Army finds ot how better to commnicate with the roving commander-a sbject to which this article is in part addressedhe who commands from p front, or from a TAC CP, however often he may, by that practice, better sense the battle by eavesdropping on FM nets, or by presence boost performance in a microcosm, relegates to sbordinates crcial macrocosmic decisions on concentration of force, fire, manever or sstainment. Or to pt it another way, the wold-be Rommel mst prchase opportnity to follow and inflence action in one manever sb-element at the price of an ability to sense and direct developments in all the several fnctional components of his command. These have been described as a series of * The writer is advantaged by his experience in USAREUR, bt has been led to believe that no sbstantial inconsistencies exist in reslts from a similar trial in FORSCOM. 2

3 "There will always be a tendency to expand the fnctions and, so, the size of any cannand post. '1hls particlarly so in the case of the tactical oanoand post since the comnander nocnal1y takes.station there. T~fore, it is neoes8a%y to gan'i.against expansion lest the cmmmd post beoanes cnbersane, less dile, and IIPre identifiable by enemy infomation-gat:hering aqencies. For or five.. aj::iipz'ed cannand control 'lehicles shold be sfficient for.. operational neeas.". FM , p. 7-11(1978) "stand-alone" or "closed-loop" sbsystems, inter-linked by the command system, of which the commander is, of corse, the key component: It is the commander and his closest staff officers who bring abot that synergy of information and response which multiplies the combat power of anyone sbsystem. Intelligence Manever ---':""" /!:m,ery. ~COMMAND.... SYSTEM _ Close A~r.../ Spport ~~~~~e~ ~ ~ Spport ~ ~sppression of / Enemy Air Defense Mobility- Contermobility Air Defense When I was abot to assme command of a division, I soght ot my predecessor for his advice. I vividly recall that foremost among the few topics he chose to address was a stern enjoinder to forget all the doctrinal lore abot commanding-forward, and to discont the advantage of monitoring the FM of nits in contact, so as to "stick with yor VHF," meaning to operate from a place where I cold se secre mlti-channel voice commnications with sbordinate, flank and spporting nits. In practice, he seldom left his Main Command Post-and he was respected for his tactical adroitness 3

4 afield. I noted, sbseqently, on manevers in Erope, that most other division commanders who tried to operate forward, whether from an APC, a jeep or a helicopter, invariably lost effectiveness proportionate to their time away from Main. Battle staffs for spport of commanders forward, sch as at a TAC CP, no matter how skillfl, were sally handicapped after 24 hors or so by awkward access to the flow of information throgh Main, and limited in commnications, were vlnerable to jamming and other commo breakdown. r"'~ \ C ' >.. > ~... ~ ~ '''\I.~;,f,. '.., 0". ~ d~... jl i. J' I! \ ~.'.. \ ':..t.!...' I ~.,n..j. ':1'~! 1~g\ N i.~ i USIGIPLT'I SE~Rlr i OM cq,. "dp ill \~:~,':,.;. t~~~\l.. :..:... :.. :::.=~. :::: =.:Ji' t:; I'/~.,.",.. MAIN is primarily a coordi, information, and comm- 10"'",,,;... OJ... center. Planning for '. ftre operations is also done there..; Its primary fnctions are to J" 1 '. coordinate those activities not l'r'.;.: 1. ;r!..'", coordinated by the TAC-CP,! AINT~:I ',: '. ;-~ provide necessary reports and i I~ i~ :i,.: \ information to the TAC-CP and I~.. '., 4,..(\~..., '. to corps, and to integrate and.. \'.: SECURITY disseminate intelligence from ';'. ". ~:.. all'sorces. FM ,1978. And my own experience parallels theirs. Now, whether the commander operates forward or not, the Main Command Post of a division or corps is a dangeros place. Soviet doctrine assigns high priority to finding and netralizing or destroying sch a command post. And it oght to be easy to find-a monstrosly large gaggle of distinctive vehicles and emitters, with a frther "signatre" of the comings and goings of command helicopters, and the vehicles of messengers, liaison officers, and visitors. And it is vlnerable-canvas shelters, and soft-skinned, otsize vehicles, awkward off-road, for which either cover or concealment is hard to provide. Why do we so expose or vitals? A commander reqires some means for processing the flow of information pon which he mst base his decisions-a flow which has become increasingly rich as intelligence and commnications have modernized. That means is the "command system" referred to above. FM , Armored and Mechanized Division Operations (1978), indi- 4

5 cates that "commanders generally organize command posts to sit themselves," and "the staff assists the commander by providing information, data, consel, preparing plans and orders as he may direct, and by exercising sch spervision over the exection of his orders as he may prescribe."* There are other perspectives on how the "command system" fnctions. In one view, the system performs seven tasks: Sensing-finding ot what is happening Commnicating information-passing information among sbsystems Decision-making-determining what action to take Stabilizing-adjsting the several sbsystems to a new sitation or corse of action Commnicating implementation-directing action Coping-dealing with the nexpected Feedback-ascertaining the reslts of directed action These tasks can be aggregated into three, as follows: Reality Testing.Sensing.Commnicating information Feedback Adapting.Decision-making.Commnicating implementation. Coping Integrating.Stabilizing * See also TRADOC Pamphlet 525-2, 20 Jne 1980, Tactical Command Control 5

6 From another perspective, the "command system" fnctions like this: Receive~ Here reality testing is described as the "receive" and "screen" modes, pls the internal commnication (among sbsystems) via the "circlate" mode. The "learn", "remember," "adjst", and "decide" modes are the adapting and integrating actions. "Translate" and "send" are the way decisions are commnicated to those who implement, an adapting fnction. These fnctions are all essential for the generation and direction of combat power, and are sally smmed as C3 -commnications, command, control. In practice, they inevitably reflect the personality of the commander, in terms of how the commander prefers his interface-an interpersonal relationship or the lack of same-or in terms of how he performs his role as the dominant jdge and decision-maker. A commander who relies on his intition, or who makes snap-jdgements on fragmentary information (a cop d'oeil, or mit Fingerspitzengefhlen) cannot, or may not choose to, assimilate more information. A commander who prefers long-winded, elaborate briefings may elicit mch extraneos information. C3 is then a demand - spply relationship in which the commander is the casal factor. Providing information in battle is, as we all know well, a strggle: the hmans in the system tend to stop if they sense a lack of demand, or receive no feedback that information provided proved sefl. Hence, even the most mechanically versatile C3 system is crcially dependent pon the ability of the commander to shape and to drive the system to inform his decisions. EXPERIMENTS IN EUROPE The experiments referred to at the beginning were condcted dring schedled CPX and FTX in 1979 and They were rather 6

7 narrowly directed at how information flows within a command post, rather than why, bt they may have shed light on how to increase incentives for hman C3 nodes to perform efficiently. The following constrct describes the information processing for C3 in the experiment: COLLEer TRANSMIT... -' '-----STORE PRESENT' (l) To collect information, to bring into the command post data abot the enemy, the environment, own forces, etc., either for the prpose of sensing a need for decision, or for ascertaining the reslts of a previos decision. (2) To store information, since almost all inpts are relatively meaningless for decision ntil aggregated or collated with other information, and analyzed. (3) To retrieve information for analysis. (4) To present information to the commander for decision. (S) To transmit information or a decision based thereon otside the command post to higher, lower, spporting, or spported echelons. These five fnctions are not necessarily seqential. Collection, or intake, from a sbordinate commander cold be followed immediately by transmittal, or otpt, to a sperior-tasks most command posts perform relatively well. Storage, retrieval, and presentation, however, are more problematic for most nits, and difficlties here lead to big command posts: to compensate for awkwardness and inefficiency in these fnctions, staffs and sbordinates have to congregate. In effect, following the sal practice, nits 7

8 habitally store information between the ears of officers and NCOs, or on an acetate overlay with grease pencil. The commander "retrieves" by sending for the Ops Officer, the G-4, or whomever, and that information-bearer "presents" information by confronting the commander directly, orally and visally by chart, overlay, or message form. The archetype of this methodology is the "commander's briefing," which in most divisions is the staff's dirnal flowering, its show-and-tell for the commander. Of all the evil habits etched on the Army's consciosness by the Viet Narn years, that of the schedled briefing is one of the more debilitating. Late in the war, in one ptatively light division of I Corps Tactical Zone, the daily briefing had become high theaterin a hge, bnkered amphitheater, on a stage nder spotlights, each event of the day was chronicled by a Greek chors of briefers, crisp alike in speech, pointer techniqe, and movement. These strtting and fretting yong officers had no other dties: each day they wold retrieve information collected and stored for them by operations dty officers and NCOs, and rehearse their presentation. When the overtre began (scraping chairs and a monting bzz of conversation among arriving divisional dignitaries), each wold strip, mont a chair, step down into fresh-starched trosers so as to leave knife-edge creases intact, btton on a matching boardstarched shirt, nervosly flex his telescoping pointer a time or two, and, in trn, stride into his performance, exding professional aplomb. Of corse, these briefings served a very sefl fnction, presenting to key leaders and staffers salient information on the division's sitation-enemy, own forces, logistics, personnel, and commnications-and permitting all present to share the commander's reaction to same-in itself, not infreqently a dramatic performance. The latter often clminated in stormy gidance for staff planning, orders for sbordinates, or instrctions on reqests to "higher." Bt however sefl sch an information processing procedre may have been in the context of war afoot in the jngle, it is dysfnctional for combat between mobile, monted formations where fire, manever, and EW capabilities on both sides presage a flidity and pace for which sch infreqent reality testing, adapting, and integrating wold be tterly inadeqate. Moreover, the assembling of key aditors wold indce grave vlnerability for the division as a whole. * * If these were the only prices the briefing charade extorts for effective C3, the practice wold be too expensive. Bt it sally also indces bad staffing: principal staff officers develop Pavlovian responses to the briefing event, and tailor their work for the grand finale, regardless of the actal flow of battle. Too, the commander may be misinformed by the neatness and polish. n n n 8

9 U Therefore, as a matter of rgency, we mst otlaw the large-congregation "commander's briefing," do away with the practice altogether. Some armored/mechanized commanders have chosen to command from the Operations van of their Division Tactical Operations Center - the DTOC's "pit," the tmltos center of its activities. The commander is "forward" vicariosly, for amid the ringing phones, barking radios, and shots, the hstling and bstling of watch officers and NCOs, he can "sense" excitement, even get a "feel" of battle. Bt the practice has the grave disadvantage of mtal interference between commander and staff. When combined with the periodic briefing, it assres that the commander cycles between information too strctred, and information totally nstrctred. The Battle Center Bt what can take the place of sch practices? Sppose that a commander cold bring together his key staffers and sbordinates for a real-time exchange of information and decisions at any moment dring the 24 hor day withot their leaving their place of dty? The CP experiment mentioned at the otset demonstrated that a corps or division commander can be provided with a facility-the division in Erope labeled it a Battle Center*-in which he cold call for staff briefings on demand, and from whence he cold talk to key sbordinates afield, or interact with his staff for estimates of the sitation, or for issance of planning gidance or instrctions. In the Eropean experiment, the divisional signal battalion, in addition to its cstomary intra-headqarters telephones, provided staff vans with television cameras and monitors, and facsimile transmitters. Additionally, millimeter wave radios, broad-band line-of-sight carriers of both mltichannel VHF and the video signals, were sed to separate physically key command post elements some 3 to 5 kilometers, eliminating cables. Ths eqipped, the Battle Center-a single expando-van trck-no longer had to be in the same location as radiating antennae, and cold, in fact, operate qite on its own, since it was sed only by the Command Grop and two or three Operations Sergeants. For information processing, these commnications means were interrelated as follows: * This cold be the "battle coordination team" in TRADOC Pam 525-2, p.10, that:"... continosly analyzes the operation: coordinates intelligence collection efforts against enemy forces in the division area of inflence and interest; and develops corses of action which provide for interdiction, deception, and repositioning of forces, reallocation of logistical spport, and offensive action... " 9

10 Fnction Collect Store Retrieve Present Transmit Information inpt and otpt were facilitated by adding the sal radio linkages (A), tactical facsimile devices (B) capable of sending or any divisional land line or radio carrier, flly encrypted, a monochromatic 8 1/2" x 14" chart or diagram in abot 2 mintes. Statistical data and periodic smmary reports were stored, kept crrent in staff sections in the 8 1/2" X 14" format, so that they cold readily be transmitted by facsimile. For retrieval, circlation to the Battle Center or among staff sections, the same 8 1/2" X 14" format cold be set in front of a television camera (C)i alternatively, the camera cold be trained on a map or other display. ~ A videotape recorder permitted adio and visal storing of important transactions with the commander. Hence, television (C) served commander or staff officer alike as a means for both retrieving and presenting information stored anywhere in the command post, elements of which cold be physically dispersed via sbstitting mmwave radio (D) for the sal cables. PLANNING MAP (TRAFFIC ABILITYI' 1: BATTLE CENTER SITUATION MAP 1: GRA 39 SPEAKERS TABLE Q Q Q Q SEATING Q Si SITUATION MAP. 1: The Battle Center, one van, was laid ot like this, with the "decision graphics" posted on the 1:50,000 map to the front of the commander's table, and a video monitor immediately to its left. The table had inset telephones and speakers for adio commnications, either internal or external. VIDEO CAMERA ft OPERATOR. TACFAX OPN SGT DESK 10

11 .. ~. The "tacfax" or tactical facsimile employed was the AN/GXC 7A, with these characteristics: TACFAX Size Weight 19.6" X 16.9" x 7.9" 47 lbs Power 115/230 VRMS, 50 watts Paper size 8 1/2" X 14" Printing 8 shades grey or B&Wi hard copy or transparency Speed was a fnction of the encryption eqipment sed and desired definition: TACFAX AN/GXC 7A OPE.RATING CHARACTERISTICS COPYTIME - CONNECTION INTERFACE MINUTES GRAY I- (FULL PAGEl SHADES. FIELD WIRE WD l TA :l -(.) PHONE AUTOVON ACOUSTIC NETWORK DOD COUPLER a: VOICE 4.6 (.) VHF ANNRC AN/PRC KY 8/28138 Z KY 57 0 VHF RADIO X MODE AN.VRC SECURE (WIDE BANDI i-~!erc.e _ KY WHITE - HF RADIO VOICE AN/GRC l Z KG 30 :l BLACK AND HF RADIO VOICE MODEM 4.6 :E SECURE AN/GRC 16 WHITE MULTI CHANNL WIRE KG 27 :E SECURE (VOICEI ANITRC MIL STD BPS 4. 6 (.) DIGITAL BLACK AND ~ WHITE CIRCUITS 4800 BPS en X MODE ~ BLACKANO- (.) Note that with the VHF 2 minte copy times for a fll page of black/white are possible. A sketch, diagram, or report arriving in the Battle Center cold be handed to the commander in hard copy, or, as a transparency, be displayed to the right front of the commander's table. 11

12 Decision Graphics Presentation via TV proved challenging. The color television eqipment-ordinary, relatively inexpensive commercial gear-cold not transmit in enogh definition the detail, cltter, and reflections of the sal maps and acetate overlays posted in grease-pencil with standard signs and symbols. Bt it proved possible to simplify and emphasize for the TV's eye: to layer-tint or color-contor the macro-relief of terrain, inter-visibility, or trafficability on the maps, and to post the sitation in a symbology eqally prominent. And these steps together trned ot to be important to the commander's eye as well, so sefl that they were termed "decision graphics"-a vivid depiction of most tactically relevant aspects of the terrain pls a bold portrayal of both friendly and enemy sitations. The non-standard symbology not only simplified the map visally, bt also conveyed more commander level information at a glance. Ths, the standard symbol for a mechanized battalion task force designed for an era with more time and less demand for information, looks like this: f) " ' Note that one cannot tell whether the nit is attacking or defending, how Standard mch armor is present, how many teams /-13 Symbol it disposes of, or what its effectiveness overall may be. r-) A "decision graphic" provides all sch information; here is a "stick on" symbol for the same task force: Decision Graphic The symbol depicts a defending task force and its orientation and center of mass, identifies the parent headqarters, shows a task organization of two tank teams and one mechanized infantry team, and indicates (pie chart) the commander's estimate that, while he has taken losses, he can still accomplish mission. 12

13 Here are some other examples: Tank regiment advancing Infantry task force defending. TWO mach inf teams, one armor team. Task force flly capable of mission. Depleted tank regiment advancing Motorized rifle regiment advancing. Armor task force defending. TWO tank teams, one cay troop, 'one mach inf team. TF depleted bt capable of mission. TACFAX Reports Reprodced below are examples of formatted reports transmitted by TACFAX. First, the twice daily Commander's Sitation Report (SITREP) which acconts for task organization and major weapon systems, and gives each commander's evalation of effectiveness. The effectiveness reports are recorded as dots nder the "Cdrs Eval" (Commanders Evalation), and "E" colmns for each major weapon system, a jdgemental scale in which a code of one to 3 dots is a scale of difficlty in performing mission (corresponds to the "piechart" on Decision Graphics) : CDR. DECISION COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT. EVAL. GRAl'tIIC & CODE OF ABILITY TO PERFORM ~ ~ "CAN'T" "NO PROBLEM" "SOME DIFFICULTY" "MAJOR PROBLEMS".. Note that the SITREP "location" indicates center of mass of each nit, and shows principal weapons on hand U~H" compared to TO&E "B" (for base). The second report, Battle Smmary (BATSUM) is sent on demand. 13

14 COMMANDERS SITUATION REPORT TASK ORG TANKS TOWS SQUADS UNIT MSC M T C LOCATION CDAI EVAL OH B E OH B EOH B E ~a=13 IP ~:;~ -'~ii;.s ti.~.-~. ~?r...: :i~i~~ ~1~ :~li~ ~... B ~ rf ;~' ~f ttf J V Q.3Lb.. - ~11~ (~ f!d lie..::;~?..., r... 'P t? If:!(! f ~., If#- 1# 'L 3/ lit... i' /..j... il~ - \~ ~ ~1f:".~= ::~~ j~~" ~.'~ :~ :~~ YQJI/e,D ~ ~~~.' ti. /~:6Zi.p::r-![~g-jfji- _.- {, : " I'i(j~ ~ _..._ _._ _ '-_ f ' r f-'! ~. I-..J ".HU.. ~L... L. L.. -.1,1-1.1,-- I L.. I.1... L I COMMAND POST LOCATIONS UNIT MAIN TAC UNIT MAIN TAC - FLOW.s {~ /9'.Rt> '3 I TIME PREPARED BATTLE SUMMARY.. UNIT' LOCATION 1St" B06 if ~-~'6" NO '3 J 70 F ;/-8'7 NO 3177 Ft/-6t:; 11/0337 dol'll) B()e r }-)'3 AI [) 33f!'6 f 1-3") Nt) 3St') F /-((7 /110 3S~S F / - 6ff till) '1ri~tJ F ~-6~ NO 3t>7C" JRPBOt; F ~ )3 3.6S' FS-6~ rl-f /Vt> Cp,..,.ldc f ~/'.-vc~ ~t;($)z. I3s f,'w) c..1ccl B~fI~//fJ.IV S/ze tj~,'1 I)1"V,'A-~ Scv-fheasrI3IDr./1 HW/~f)3 II/a. Alt);1.7LJ1ob A/t' C~Nt~e+ S/IVC e O~()I)z.J TF ii1-1317,vd TF S'-6t'" Be-!pl,v $CJ% 5~~..yCf fa 14

15 I, ~. Reports sch as the foregoing, like Decision Graphics, are not doctrinal: they are non-standard, not enshrined in Field Manals or taght in schools. Bt they proved to be easy to teach, and very easy to se. In short the Battle Center system seemed a cltrally relevant way for soldiers to commnicate, exploiting or strong ideographic propensity, and eliminating mch alphanmeric copying which is always error-prone. (These observations may point to a soltion to the problems which compter-based systems have encontered at the hman-machine interface.) Intra-CP commnications sed cable and the Norden millimeterwave commnicator, a solid-state transceiver abot 5" X 5" X 9", weighing 5 ponds with batteries, the latter good for hors of continos operation (it cold also operate from 12 volt vehicle systems, drawing 6 watts). Tripod-monted, highly-directional pairs of these cold pass VHF and fll-color video signals p to 3 miles, line-of-sight range. These links eliminated cable, made fast displacement more achievable, and provided line-of-sight secrity. CP Configrations In the simplest configration the Battle Center was appended to the Tactical Operation Center, as shown below: TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER VANS ASIC '02 G3 BATTLE IFIIEI OPS CENTER 'Here, the Battle Center served to permit briefing on demand, to obviate large-gathering briefings, and to provide the CG, or the officer acting for him, with a qiet place to think, to plan, or to commnicate. In effect, mt+-,--~"""oio.._--"""---'''''''''''''''--i-11'ttt'1 the Batt I e Center became the "br i dge, " CAUSEWAY STEPS PLANS. APE FSE FSE -CHEM VANS DAMI DAVND -ALO ADA where the CG cold keep an eye on progress, issing orders as appropriate, isolated from the engine-roomlike noise and confsion in other TOC vans. For the staffers, the TV distribtion system offered the major advantage of their being able to monitor exactly what the commander is dealing with, to anticipate tasks, and to interact with him as necessary. Staff awareness, intra-staff commnication, and staffer interest went p-participatory management increased, and the training vale of any experience heightened. This trned ot to be a sefl way to break-in the overall concept, to train commanders and staff alike, weaning them from schedled briefings, and teaching them how fast-breaking battles oght to be managed. 15

16 One division staff officer noted that the system also solved some of the more acte problem of displacing the Main CPo "When the division sent 60+ helicopters toward the Main CP dring Reforger'7, the G-staff was reqired to relocate qickly. The TAC CP was p and operating, bt the key staff arrived at the TAC with different versions of the battle. With TV in the Main CP, the CG cold have annonced to all: 'I am moving to the TAC. Helicopters at the pad in 05. TAC Team join me. Chief of Staff move the Main to the designated alternate.' Everyone aboard that helicopter wold have been on the same sheet of msic. TV has great potential for lending sanity to sch sally frenetic moments in the life of Headqarters Commandants, NCOle, and the like." At the USAREUR Commnication-Electronics Conference of November 1979, the division Signal Officer who had been participating in the experiment reported to commnicator colleages as follows: "[In re TACFAX] -The device not only works, it works well! It not only works well, it tends to revoltionize procedres within the DTOC and CP'S. -Commanders and their staffs almost immediately recognized the ~ advantages and changed their way of doing bsiness - for the better - to take advantage of this capability. -Handwritten orders, assessments, reports, sketches, qickly became the accepted method. "Tactical facsimile is a Godsend becase it provides a qantm increase in responsiveness that is immediately evident to the ser - at long last we've provided an improvement over the message center/commcenter maze and it isn't bried in the middle of an atomated system - it's literally p front, sitting on the G-3's desk, operated by G-3 personnel and all this withot a selling job - it sold itself, immediately! "Admittedly or experience has been somewhat limited by nmbers of devices and to mltichannel operation. We've primarily sed the tactical facsimile between the major headqarters of the division. For example, the Division TAC CP is on radio listening silence except for a single AN/TRC-145 shot - the facsimile operates on one channel of this shot - secre - continosly providing detailed pdates to the TAC CP, - insring that the TAC CP has identical r-1 information to that held at Division Main so that it can take OPCON withot missing a beat. 16

17 "Throghot the division, new reports and displays have been designed becase of tactical facsimile. Its vale is clearly recognized by all and it drives operational changes. "My biggest problem with tactical facsimile is not having enogh. "It is transportable, relatively simple, operates on a variety of power sorces, takes virtally any combination of paper/carbon - I need more jst as soon as I can get my hands on them. "The TV receivers in each staff section display the CG's battle map. Staff sections can immediately see new information, correct erroneos information and keep abreast of the entire crrent sitation. "The scanning, display, presentation and assimilation of information is a continos process within the DTOC and rarely are special charts or formal briefings reqired. "The combination of TV and facsimile gives another distribtion means that, as mch as possible, are compatible and efficient. The se of standard information displays, their availability to all on a continos basis and the ability to reprodce/transmit the displays via facsimile add tremendosly to the entire commnications process - we literally operate off the same sheet of msic. Commnications is not an afterthoght, an adjnct - it's totally and continosly imbedded in the command and control apparats." "We have had the millimeter wave radio for only short period of time and comparatively little work has been done with it, bt we have done enogh to recognize that it has tremendos potential - particlarly for what is referred to as "down the hill" applications. This radio is a broadband, line of sight radio that operates at extremely high freqencies. It has a limited range, bt within that range it has the capability of extending p to 100 voice channels sing or conventional PCM mltiplexing eqipment. Since the radio can also be sed in conjnction with or normal mltichannel secre eqipment, we can establish or commnications nodal on a hilltop, offset or CP down in a more protected area (EW as well as physical) and then relay or command control circitry via the millimeter wave radio instead of by conventional, time consming cable rns. We sed these radios on a operational system in NATO FTX CON STANT ENFORCER (Fall, 1979) and it performed excellently on a continos basis dring an 8 day period. We have also passed color TV over the system with good reslts. We definitely need an alterna- 17

18 ,. tive to the present cable capability and the millimeter wave radio looks extremely promising." HILL "'IIiC MILLIMETER-WAVE... TRANSCEIVER... MM-WAVE PATH. RANGE 3-5 Kril. TOWN '/IIIbc I WOODS G1 - G4 The "down the hill" application referred to locating the antennae farm ("commnications nodal") apart from the rest of the CP, perhaps as shown (left). HILL Bt it wold be possible, given enogh of the millimeter wave radios, and training for sers, to disperse CP elements even frther, perhaps like this (left). ~ MM-WAVE TRANSCEIVERISI -- MM-WAVE PATH. RANGE 3-5 K.m. WOODS Once it becomes possible to pass video signals over the long-range commnications system - the VHF- the Battle Center can be detached from the DTOC to serve a division commander forward as his TAC CP, and provide him the same rich information he wold have at his disposal at his Main CPo It does appear feasible, with special TV eqipment (e.g., band- 18

19 width compression, or slow scan) to extend the video-links otside the CP over VHF, so as to spplement commnications with sbordinate, sperior, or flank commanders. A slow-scan TV system, now commercially available, cold send images via the existing encrypted voice-grade channels. Moreover, one version of sch eqipment wold permit drawing or sketching directly onto the televised image while conversing, the added graphics being instantly visible to both sender and receiver(s). Here, for example, is a diagram of teleconferencing eqipment assembled by the INTERAND Corporation called T/MACS (Telestrator Monitoring, Assessment and Consltation System) : OVERVIEW TIMACS SYSTEM INTalAND No This version has featres not necessary for a TOC or Battle Center, sch as the stylscontrolled TV cameras, bt having seen it working over commercial telephone lines, I am persaded sch interactive-graphics for teleconferencing wold he a powerfl adjnct to military field commnications. Moreover, it is potentially cheap and rgged. With sch eqipment, it wold be possible to position the Battle Center at the TAC CP, tied 24 hors per day into the Main as thogh collocated with the DTOC. Bt the commander cold, at will, tie into the Battle Center-DTOC "conference" any or all of the command posts shown in the diagram on the page 20. At a minimm, even withot band-width compression for video transmission, each of the CP's cold be eqipped with a video-disc playback device. Each disc can store p to 56,000 maps, each individally indexed. The transmitting headqarters cold index the map display, and, with a T/MACS graphic transmitter, provide graphic overlay information throgh existing voice circits, either VHF or FM. The Army has been waiting a decade for the "atomated battlefield," those ADP systems sch as TDS, TACFIRE, and BETA which wold interact with the commander to insre his commnications, his command, his control. Bt TOS, the "exective system," will not be available for years. It is hard, in the absence of experience, to 19

20 arge that sch compters will not help C3. Bt it is possible to state that the manal, video-aided information processing system sch as described above might do mch of the job we hoped TOS ~ cold. Interfaced with TACFIRE, BETA, or even mini compter assisted sbsystems, the Battle Center system cold enable s to spread ot, bild or resilience for electronic warfare, and permit commanders to se their combat power to better advantage. r AVN BN CP DIV MAIN CP. I DISCOM CP OTHER CP ELM >II<.. j II, I.;r DTOC, I /.. ~~/ A'JE~~~LE SIG CEN ~--... G1/G4 ~ ENGR BN CP DIV TACCP ;f f~/ BATTLE ~ CENTER,, ~ DIVARTV CP ~ BDE CP ADA BNCP ~ BDE CP ~ BDE CP n DIVISION ZONE WITH VIDEO-CONFERENCING VIA VHF BATTLE CENTER AT TAC CP 20

21 Propositions In smmary, my experiences lead me to advance these for propositions: 1. TV and TACFAX, spplemented with interactive graphics, are commnication devices which: -Use existing radio and encryption gear. -Facilitate graphic-spported teleconferencing. -Are cltrally relevant: any general, colonel, captain or sergeant easily adapts to sing them. -Can be prchased and fielded in the near ftre. 2. Command posts can be dispersed, and with the fll site of sch eqipment, a TAC CP for a commander operating forward cold have all the information available in the Battle Center at Main. 3. Video-conferencing and TACFAX obviate many freqent serios errors introdced by translating map locations into alphanmerics for transmission, and retranslation into a mapped presentation at the other end. Moreover, they free commanders of the tyranny of the Message Center. 4. Whether or not the Army moves to TOS, TACFIRE, or other central processors, a system like that described above wold enhance C3I, making command control relatively invlnerable, and more gracefl in degradation. Gorman Maj. Gen., USA 21