Striking the balance: US Navy weighs quality and quantity to stay ahead

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1 Jane's Navy International [Content preview Subscribe to Jane s Navy International for full article] Striking the balance: US Navy weighs quality and quantity to stay ahead Looking at a range of issues from strategic re-balancing to sequestration, Grace Jean and Dr Lee Willett examine the choices and challenges the US Navy must consider The US Navy (USN) remains the most powerful navy in the world. With presence in each of the world's oceans, involvement in almost all of the international community's core maritime activities, taking the lead role in implementing the rules by which the international maritime system operates today, and managing an equipment programme and budget that (despite perennial challenges) remains vastly superior in size to that of any other navy, the USN will retain this dominant global position for some time to come. Some assessments, including data published by the USN itself, suggest that the service's total tonnage is larger than the next 13 navies combined; many also note that 11 of such navies are close US allies. An F/A-18 Hornet aircraft lands on the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C Stennis. In recent years Nimitz-class carriers have come to be seen as an archetypal symbol of USN and wider national power around the world. (US Navy) Moreover, today's wider global geostrategic focus on maritime matters - with traditional and emerging navies noting the growing importance of the use of the sea - will only highlight to US political leaders the central role that US global presence, as represented by the USN, will play in the maintenance of the country's security interests. Article 1 Page 1 of 17

2 However, retaining a position of such pre-eminence is not without its challenges. Most significantly, the USN finds itself towards the sharper end of the budgetary pinch currently squeezing US defence spending. With major equipment programmes - perhaps, most notably, the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and the Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine replacement programme - to be delivered across many of the core elements of the USN's force structure, the navy may find itself facing a number of difficult programme choices in the near term. Moreover, while the navy's technological pre-eminence remains in many areas (due to its relative strength in funding new technological research), the smaller numerical size of the USN set against enduring global commitments have led some to suggest that, at least in presence terms, the USN advantage is no longer what it was. In addition, the spending constraints the navy has faced in recent years have already had an operational impact, with some deployments delayed and gapped. As reported by IHS Jane's, in 2013 the deployment of the Harry S Truman Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the USN Fifth Fleet area of operations in the Middle East was delayed for five months in order to help the service meet spending cuts totalling USD4 billion that came into effect on 1 March 2013 because of sequestration. At a time of growing concerns about the crisis in Syria, but with the USN wishing to maintain a carrier at sea in the Gulf region, concern was expressed in some quarters that the absence of a second carrier would put the US at a strategic disadvantage. US Marines assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) board MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft onboard the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) in March The Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group, with the 31st MEU embarked, was deployed in the East China Sea. (US Navy) Article 1 Page 2 of 17

3 Peer competition Despite the broad concerns, the enduring strength of US naval presence and the navy's role in the fabric of the current world order mean that it is unlikely that the USN's overall global pre-eminence will be placed at strategic risk any time soon. This does not mean, however, that there will be no geographic and strategic peaks in any threats to this presence. In terms of state-on-state peer competition, the USN is likely to have four areas of focus: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. China sits at the centre of much US strategic thinking currently. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is making some significant capability developments, and is pragmatic enough to learn from others in order to speed up its chase. However, as Professor Andrew Erickson noted in IHS Jane's Navy International in July 2014, even in a key area such as aircraft carriers where China is pursuing a force structure including at least four carriers by the 2020s, at just that point the USN carrier force structure (which is still underpinned by a commitment in law to 11 ships) will be taking another step forward with the entry into service of the Fordclass carriers and the F-35. Many analysts perceive the US strategic re-balance towards the Asia-Pacific region - as set out in the muchdiscussed Department of Defense January 2012 strategic guidance, Sustaining US Global Leadership - Priorities for 21st Century Defense - as being focused on and driven by China's growing military strength. How the strategic balance between the United States and China, as well as the myriad other power balances in the region, are maintained will be central to regional and wider international stability. Yet perhaps this US focus on the Asia-Pacific region comes at a time when China is already stepping well outside of its traditional sphere of focus - and may even be stepping into what some might see as geostrategic voids created elsewhere by the US Asia-Pacific shift. Now well-established in the Indian Ocean as a result of a six-year contribution to the international counter-piracy campaign, the PLAN has been a regular visitor to the Mediterranean Sea since 2011 and, maybe as it looks north towards the Arctic and its resources, recently visited ports in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In the wake of the Asia-Pacific re-balance announcement, geopolitical discussions often focused on whether the United States would be able to maintain commitments in regions such as Latin America, Africa, and Europe. The USN's new maritime strategy appears to reinforce a focus on Europe - perhaps in no small part because of re-emerging concerns over Russia's strategic direction and disposition. However, China arguably now is a factor to be considered in the European security equation. Where one sits often depends on where one stands, and the European view on the rise of China is interesting in the context of US relations with China. With there now being a regular PLAN presence in European waters but with China's aims and intent arguably still unknown, it is not yet clear how this growing Chinese presence might affect European security affairs. Certainly, it is arguable that a number of European states may see more economic benefit than security risk in this Chinese presence. Article 1 Page 3 of 17

4 The lead US Joint High Speed Vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1) is seen here visiting Souda Bay, Greece in February The ship supported US operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea in 2014, and conducted activities off West Africa. In the future, the USN hopes to deploy JHSVs to other regions such as Latin America. (US Navy) Closer to home, China may be moving to increase its presence in the Latin American region. The USN's engagement there has been curtailed since 2012, with budget cuts and reduced force levels limiting ship deployments. The US Coast Guard (USCG) is attempting to maintain broader US presence via its countertrafficking missions and, in the future, the USN hopes to deploy Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) to the region once enough units have been delivered to the fleet. China's growing interest in the region has been underscored by its recent pursuit of economic and military initiatives. In January 2015 reports surfaced of Beijing hosting a China-Latin America forum that drew leaders from 30 Caribbean and Central and South American countries. China's use of the Panama Canal has also increased to the point where it is second only to the United States, accounting for more than 22% of the canal's trans-oceanic trade (according to a USMC Security Initiative Group report in January 2015). Nicaragua is also working with Chinese shipping and construction firms on building a 172-mile long canal. China has bolstered its military-to-military interactions in the Latin America region via PLAN ship visits and expanded equipment sales. Its military presence at sea began with support for HADR activities, such as the post-earthquake mission in Haiti, and has evolved into military visits and exercises (for example, with the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean navies in 2013). Returning to the European theatre, the other interesting issue is Russia. Arguably, despite perceptions of Western 'success' in the Cold War, Russia has never gone away. Today, though, it is back at the centre of the international stage and, under President Vladimir Putin, has been using its armed forces and especially its navy to flex national muscles. Moreover, Western policy decisions not to intervene on the ground in Article 1 Page 4 of 17

5 Libya or Syria, and possible Russian reading of the Western response to its annexation of territory in Georgia and the Ukraine, may have generated a view in Moscow that the West may not respond to continuous Russian geostrategic probing. Yet, despite some analysts seeing Europe as facing reduced US focus in the wake of the Asia-Pacific rebalance, the USN presence in the region has not gone away. Rear Admiral James J Shannon, deputy assistant secretary of the navy for international programmes, told the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition at National Harbor, Maryland, in April 2014 that it was not a question of the US being "less interested in other parts of the world [such as Europe]... We are there. We haven't walked away from Europe. We're just trying to balance things... and make security happen. That's what it all comes down to, to provide some level of presence and to provide some alternative solutions" to reduce security risks. Adm Shannon referred specifically to the forward-basing of four DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers in Rota, Spain, and noted also the Aegis capability in European navies such as Spain's Armada Espanola and the Royal Norwegian Navy, along with the United States establishing an 'Aegis Ashore' capability in Europe. USS Donald Cook was the first of four DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers to be forwarddeployed to Spain to support NATO's ballistic missile defence effort. The ship, seen here transiting the Black Sea in April 2014, also was part of a prominent USN presence in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea during the Crimea crisis in early (US Navy) Article 1 Page 5 of 17

6 The USN's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington leads a flotilla of US and South Korean ships during joint drills in July (Republic of Korea Navy/Press Association Images) Whose rules? The CG 47 Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy, seen here in 2005 providing maritime security for Iraq's Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT). International navies provide global presence to enable the free flow of critical resources. (US Navy) The challenge for the USN from such state-on-state competition is also not necessarily a direct, military one. A core component of the USN's role in the international maritime security balance is its stewardship Article 1 Page 6 of 17

7 of the international maritime system, providing ships and other forms of physical and diplomatic influence to ensure stability is maintained, co-operation continues, and trade flows freely. This naval 'free good', something navies provide for the international community on a daily basis simply by having ships at sea, is seen as a key part of the international order. Key components of this order arguably flow through rules and norms established by nations with predominant naval power, either regionally or else more broadly across the world's oceans. China again presents an interesting example for the USN. The debate about the South China Sea is well documented, with Chinese views about access to certain key waters at odds with what other actors, including the United States, would argue is international law. China's approach in the region, for example building new land masses in areas where it claims territorial rights, sometimes appears at odds with its stated aims of seeking co-operative constructs through which to manage the security balance. Speaking at the Royal United Services Institute's annual sea power conference in July 2014, the PLAN's North Sea Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Qiu Yanping said that China was seeking to "write a new chapter" in Asia-Pacific maritime security, with concepts advocating "common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security in Asia" and with the PLAN undertaking to improve co-operation with regional navies. However, China's actions seem designed to reduce the influence of others in the region - especially the United States. Strategic re-balance A key focus for the USN remains supporting the Asia-Pacific strategic re-balance. Originally announced by President Barack Obama in late 2011, the new focus on the Western Pacific in particular seeks to bolster US interests and ties by drawing on increased resource from across numerous government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD). For the USN, the bottom line means shifting forces so that 60% of its platforms are based on the US west coast or in the Pacific by In early 2015 that proportion was at greater than 52%. Admiral Harry B Harris, commander of US Pacific Fleet, told IHS Jane's in July 2014 that the submarine force had already rebalanced, with 60% of the fleet based at Pacific coast locations, along with six of 11 aircraft carriers. Article 1 Page 7 of 17

8 The US Navy's Virginia-class SSN USS North Carolina, seen berthed at Changi Naval Base, Singapore, in As part of the US strategic re-balance towards the Asia-Pacific region, new capabilities across the navy, including the Virginia-class SSNs, are being dedicated to operations in the region. (IHS/Kelvin Wong) Many of the USN's newest assets will be dedicated for missions in the Western Pacific, Adm Harris noted. Those assets will include LCS (with IHS Jane's reporting on current plans to forward-deploy 11 LCSs to overseas bases in the Pacific, along with those homeported on the west coast), the new aviation-centric America-class amphibious assault ship, Virginia-class fast-attack submarines, Mobile Landing Platforms, the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye early warning aircraft, the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers, and the JSF. Article 1 Page 8 of 17

9 The Littoral Combat Ship USS Fort Worth (left) and the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain conduct replenishment-at-sea from the Military Sealift Command replenishment vessel USNS Pecos during the annual 'Foal Eagle' exercise off Korea in March Fort Worth is based in Singapore for a 16-month deployment; the USN has plans to forward-base up to 11 LCSs in the Asia-Pacific region. (US Navy) Collectively, the new military technology is seen as playing a key role in the re-balance, said Adm Harris. "These new platforms ensure that we are unstoppable in war - unbeatable, if it comes to that. They're going to help us prevent war, I think," he said. "There's a value in deterrence alone associated with the rebalance... but if deterrence fails, we have to do kinetic operations." Yet while the re-balance has largely been interpreted as a hedge against China's military rise, the USN also has been trying to offset these fears by reaching out to the PLAN. In recent years there has been a concerted effort on the part of both nations to increase bilateral ties, with highly visible port visits, plus China's first-time participation in the 'Rim of the Pacific' ('RIMPAC') exercise in 2014, with four PLAN ships attending. Operational concepts To help contend with future military threats in the post-afghanistan and -Iraq era and in particular - some commentators argue - in the Asia-Pacific region, the DoD's leadership in 2011 defined a new warfighting concept called 'Air-Sea Battle' (ASB). Formulated after the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010, ASB was conceived as a new focus for the USN and the US Air Force (USAF) in particular, concentrating especially on how to overcome anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) postures in strategically critical regions around the world. With the expectation that potential state and non-state adversaries would develop more lethal military capability to deny access and manoeuvre to US forces and their allies, ASB would require holistic integration of sensors and weapons to deliver an output whereby, for example, a USN ship might employ data from US Army ground radar to help guide a USAF aircraft to engage a target. Article 1 Page 9 of 17

10 An ASB office was established in the Pentagon in August 2011 and the incumbent USN, USAF, and USMC personnel sought to improve co-ordination and collaboration between the services to help deliver the concept, with a prominent focus on integrating air and naval capabilities. DoD officials listed the following as emerging A2/AD threats: conventional ballistic missiles, long-range precision-guided cruise missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defence systems, electronic and cyber warfare, submarines, surface combatants, and modern combat aircraft. When the DoD initially rolled out the ASB concept, there was prominent discussion of what it entailed and what sorts of technology would be required to deliver it. The Asia-Pacific re-balance was largely seen as being tied to the concept, although planners disassociated the two by claiming that the concept was applicable to any global region. In recent years, while the concept remains live, its profile perhaps has been reduced. For its part, the USN seems to have shifted the discussion towards a focus on enabling its CSGs to possess a capability designed to deliver similar integrated effect - in other words, the naval integrated fire control-counter air (NIFC-CA) concept. At the CSG level, NIFC-CA enables ships to develop an integrated air-sea picture with consolidated command-and-control of all air and surface weapons at the CSG commander's level. Thus, the group's collective eyes, ears, and effects would have greater reach. Maritime strategy On 13 March 2015 the chiefs of the USN, USMC, and USCG unveiled a revised US maritime strategy updating the three services' first joint output launched in The new strategy reflects evolving global security challenges and lays out maritime priorities by region - with emphasis on supporting the Asia-Pacific re-balance but also highlighting key areas including the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. The strategy will serve as a blueprint for how the three services will organise and employ their forces to meet global operational requirements while also having to contend with budget challenges. The 40-page document underscores fleet requirements for the USN-USMC team as well as for the USCG, and includes general plans for forward-deploying and operating ships, aircraft, and personnel in key regions. In contrast to the 2007 version - which was seen by some as giving broad but non-specific guidance for future operations - the revised strategy names potential adversaries including extremist groups such as the Islamic State, and delineates the platforms that US maritime forces could employ to address regional challenges. Sequestration and acquisition As part of a plan to reduce national spending and debt, the 2011 Budget Control Act stipulated that Congress would agree to at least USD1.2 trillion in deficit reduction measures. If lawmakers were unable to come to an agreement on how to deliver on this target, automatic spending cuts - known as sequestration - would go into effect over nine years. For the DoD, this would mean a total reduction across FYs of USD500 billion. Article 1 Page 10 of 17

11 Back in 2012, the then-vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mark Ferguson warned that 10 years of mandatory budget reductions would reduce the number of USN ships and submarines to as few as 235 (set against, as noted above, an enduring requirement for in excess of 300 platforms), with the navy having to execute a commensurate manpower reduction. The cuts were intended to be implemented on 2 January 2013, but the 2012 American Taxpayers Relief Act delayed this until 1 March By that date, Congress and the administration had not managed to reach an agreement, thus triggering funding caps across all of the DoD's budget lines with the exception of uniformed personnel and combat operations. The 7.5% reduction in all eligible programmes and accounts resulted in a USD46 billion cut in the Pentagon's FY 2013 budget. For the USN, sequestration meant an additional USD4 billion reduction for FY 2013 on top of a USD4.6 billion shortfall plaguing the service due to a stop-gap funding measure, known as a Continuing Resolution, which was maintaining federal government spending at FY 2012 levels. The additional cut forced navy officials to take measures including cancelling several attack submarine deployments, ceasing naval operations in and around Latin America, cancelling all non-ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments to Europe, and reducing BMD patrols in the Middle East, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, as well as grounding nearly half of the fleet's nine active carrier air wings. In a plan circulated ahead of the 1 March 2013 deadline to avert sequestration, USN officials announced that, to help close the shortfall, they also would cancel surface ship and submarine maintenance availabilities, plus aircraft depot availability. In mid-december 2013 Congress approved a two-year deal - called the 2013 Bipartisan Budget Act - that would keep the US government running and avoid further legislative impasses over federal spending such as had led to a government shutdown in October 2013 (the beginning of FY 2014). The deal provided partial relief from sequestration in FY 2014 and 2015 because it raised mandated caps on discretionary 'national defence' budget authority to USD520.5 billion in FY 2014, up from the USD498.1 billion under sequestration. However, it was meant as a temporary measure to stave off any cuts. Article 1 Page 11 of 17

12 The USN's next aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford. The US remains committed to an 11-ship carrier force. (Huntington Ingalls Industries) Conclusion Yet matching budgets to requirements is nothing new for the USN, and neither is the risk of operational overstretch. Heads of navies across the world recognise the reality of the financial situation they face and continue nonetheless to respond to the politico-strategic tasks placed at their door. In the USN's case, with other naval powers rising and political leaders more aware today of the strategic importance of the use of the sea in supporting national interest than at any time since the end of the Cold War, the USN may be facing some big waves but, no doubt, remains focused on the course it must take. Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015 Article 1 Page 12 of 17

13 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world. IHS defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Navy International. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Navy International online, offline or print visit For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Article 1 Page 13 of 17