Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the 101st Congress

Transcription

1 s>«order Code'IB89084 Nuclear nproliferation Policy in the 101st Congress Updated October 11, 1990 by Warren H. Donnelly Senior Specialist, ENR

2 CONTENTS SUMMARY ISSUE DEFINITION BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Background Changing Definitions of Proliferation Wherewithal for Nuclear Weapons International nproliferation Regime U.S. Nuclear nproliferation Policy U.S. Nuclear Agreements with Eastern Europe Link to Arms Control Analysis Proliferation Situation in Factors that Can Influence Proliferation Latent Proliferation An Issue for the 1990s? Shortterm Issues Longer Term Issues A Potential New Reporting Requirement CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS CHRONOLOGY FOR ADDITIONAL READING RELATED CRS ISSUE BRIEFS Argentina, Brazil and Nuclear Proliferation (IB89084, archived) India and Nuclear Weapons (IB86125) Israel and Nuclear Weapons (IB87079) Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons (IB86110) South Africa, Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA (IB87199) Iraq Nuclear Arms Control: Disposal of Nuclear Warheads (IB88024) The Nuclear nproliferation Treaty (IB90092) Proposals for Ending U.S. and Soviet Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons (IB89141)

3 IB Nuclear nproliferation in the 101st Congress SUMMARY Preventing the spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons continues to be important for U.S. security and foreign policy. Five states have nuclear arsenals (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China); one has tested a nuclear explosive (India); and six are seen by many analysts either as having some undeclared nuclear weapons or as able to make them (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa). In addition, there is some concern about the nuclear intentions of Iran, Iraq, and rth Korea. Factors likely to influence future proliferation trends include the deterrent and political value seen in nuclear weapons; the still unfolding effects of events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; changes in regional tensions in South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East; the state of U.S. influence in these regions; the further spread of missiles and chemical weapons; the possibility that terrorists might try to get or to make nuclear explosives; and the comparative weights given to U.S. nonproliferation and other policies when conflicts occur. Shortterm nonproliferation issues have included the Bush Administration's nonproliferation policies and goals, conditions for continued economic and military aid to Pakistan, further measures to stop illicit international nuclear trade, dealing with possible attempts to suspend South Africa and Israel from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1990, and U.S. preparations for and participation in the 1990 review conference for the nproliferation Treaty (). Longer term issues include monitoring the nuclear activities of certain states, extension of the in 1995, U.S. support for the IAEA, a possible arms control role for the IAEA, implementing the revised U.S.Japan agreement for nuclear cooperation ~ especially for reprocessing and the transportation and use of plutonium, nuclear proliferation implications of the broadening use of missiles and chemical weapons by nonnuclear weapons states, linkage of the and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and what to do with nuclear materials recovered from dismantled warheads. Looming over short and long term issues are the potential effects of changes now taking place in U.S.Soviet relations and in eastern Europe, including the reunification of Germany. If the changes continue to be favorable to U.S. interests and security, they could lessen superpower interest in nuclear weapons and help to convince other nations that nuclear weapons have little use. This could improve the climate for extension of the in However, a reversion to past U.S.Soviet tensions could revive the superpower nuclear arms race and give other nations reason to seek the deterrent and military advantages that might then be seen in nuclear weapons. Also, a possible revival of historic European animosities could revive national interests there in nuclear arms.

4 IB ISSUE DEFINITION Preventing the spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons continues to be important for U.S. security and foreign policy. This issue brief tracks notable events and trends relating to nuclear proliferation during the 101st Congress; the responses of Congress and the executive branch; and the responses of other countries and international organizations. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Background Changing Meaning of Proliferation. Nuclear proliferation originally meant the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonweapons states. This is the definition in the Nuclear nproliferation Treaty (), which took effect in By the mid1970s, the meaning of nuclear proliferation was broadened, at least for Congress and for some independent analysts, to include the spread of the ability to make nuclear weapons, mainly through the spread of technology and facilities that produce weaponsgrade nuclear material. Lately some academic and other unofficial observers would further broaden the terms to include the spread of undeclared nuclear weapons, which they call "latent proliferation." From their viewpoint, keeping states from declaring a secret arsenal or from quickly producing the nuclear weapons, or, in the worst case, from using nuclear weapons is called "managing proliferation." The meaning of "proliferation" is also being expanded by the Bush Administration to include biological and chemical weapons and missiles capable of carrying them and nuclear warheads. Oversight of these forms of proliferation has been brought together in the office of Reginald Bartholomew, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. During Senate debate on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act on May 17, 1990, Senator McCain proposed extending sanctions for violation of controls for biological and chemical weapons to include nuclear weapons. However, he withdrew his amendment with the understanding that the Foreign Relations Committee would address this issue at the earliest opportunity (Congressional Record, May 17, 1990, S6413). The wherewithal for nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are made from highquality, weaponsgrade plutonium or uranium235 (U235). Some advanced nuclear weapons states also use tritium to increase the energy release, or yield, of nuclear explosives. Plutonium is made by exposing U238 to neutrons in a nuclear reactor and then extracting the plutonium created from the transmutation of the uranium by chemical separation (called reprocessing). Weaponsgrade U235 is made by increasing the concentration of U235 from the 0.7% in natural uranium to more than 90% or better, using various isotope separation processes. U.S. production of enriched uranium uses the "gaseous diffusion" method. Two improved separation, or "enrichment," processes being developed use centrifugatiori of a gaseous form of uranium (uranium hexafluoride, UF6) or exposure of uranium atoms or molecules to CRS2

5 IB laser beams. Additional details about these materials and their production appear in Appendix A. The international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The United States was a leading architect of the assembly of treaties, voluntary commitments, and international organizations intended to prevent further proliferation. Major components of the regime include the, which will be up for extension in 1995; the voluntary nuclear suppliers guidelines, which add to the 's conditions for nuclear cooperation; and inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to assure that there are no diversions to make nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is a composite of treaty commitments, executive branch statements and actions, and legislation and congressional advice. Especially important are the Nuclear nproliferation Treaty of 1968, the Convention on Physical Security for Nuclear Materials (1987), the voluntary nuclear suppliers guidelines, the Nuclear nproliferation Act of 1978, a series of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act most notably the GlennSymington amendments and key statements by Presidents Carter and Reagan. U.S. policy imposes conditions and restrictions on U.S. nuclear exports. For a nonnuclear weapons state to receive U.S. nuclear exports, it must agree to open all of its peaceful nuclear activities to inspection by the IAEA (fullscope safeguards). U.S. policy also imposes controls over what a recipient state may do with U.S.supplied items and nuclear materials derived from their use, which is given by DOE via "subsequent arrangements." It is also U.S. policy to cut off economic and military aid to countries that under certain conditions supply or receive the wherewithal to enrich or to reprocess uranium (the GlennSymington amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act). This has been considered only in the case of Pakistan and was waived for foreign policy and national security reasons after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Also, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended provides for cutoff of U.S. nuclear cooperation to states that violate a U.S. agreement for nuclear cooperation or test a nuclear explosive. As for the development and use abroad of the "sensitive" nuclear technologies of enrichment and reprocessing, the Carter Administration tried to discourage it. The Reagan Administration did not seek to inhibit such technologies in countries with advanced nuclear power programs that were not proliferation risks (i.e., countries in Europe and Japan), but opposed it in others (Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan). The Bush Administration has made no special public statement of policy, but implicitly endorsed Reagan Administration policy when it submitted to Congress the annual nonproliferation report for 1989 (Appendix D). While the State Department has consolidated in one office policy for nuclear, chemical, and missile proliferation, administration remains dispersed. U.S. Nuclear Agreements with Eastern Europe. With the breaking of the ties between many countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and with strong concern in some of those countries about the safety of Soviet designed nuclear CRS3

6 IB power plants, the 102nd Congress can expect to receive for review several new agreements for nuclear cooperation. The State Department is discussing a model agreement with Hungary arid has provided copies to Poland and to Czechoslovakia. U.S. nuclear cooperation with East Germany would come through the Euratom agreement after reunification. Romania probably will not be interested since most of its nuclear assistance comes from Canada, and the United States can supply nuclear fuel to Romania via a trilateral agreement among these three governments. The chances are that the agreements will not be controversial and will fully comply with requirements of the Nuclear nproliferation Act of Link to arms control. Bills introduced in the Senate and the House would have the President negotiate a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union to stop production of U235 and plutonium for weapons, but permit continued production of tritium to maintain existing weapons and of U235 and plutonium for nonweapons purposes. The International Plutonium Control Act (S and H.R. 2403) would also anticipate that ultimately safeguarding of civil nuclear facilities in both countries be assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Bush Administration opposed these bills in hearings before the panels of House Armed Services Committee (June 6, 1989) and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (June 20, 1989). Subsequently the House approved an amendment that would urge the President to negotiate a verifiable end of U.S. and U.S.S.R. production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The Conference Committee did not adopt this provision. However, its report called on the President to submit a report on implications for U.S. national security of any ban on production of fissile materials for weapons, to be submitted before July 15, 1990 (Congressional Record, v. 6, 1989: S14987). A Potential New Reporting Requirement. On May 17, 1990, the Senate passed H.R. 3033, to control the export to countries pursuing or expanding the ability to produce or deliver chemical or biological weapons, of items that would assist them in acquiring such ability. An amendment by Senator McCain as modified by an amendment by Senator Pell would require an annual report by the President to Congress "detailing efforts by countries or subnational groups that threaten United States security interests or regional stability" to acquire the materials and technology to develop, produce, stockpile and deliver chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, together with an assessment of their present and future capabilities to do so (Congressional Record, May 17, 1990 S6411). Analysis The Proliferation Situation in Only one country, the United States, has used nuclear weapons (against Japan in 1945). Four others have nuclear arsenals: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. India tested a nuclear explosive in Israel and Pakistan are widely seen by unofficial sources as having some undeclared nuclear weapons^and suspicion remains in these circles about the nuclear intentions of Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, rth Korea, and South Africa. On the other hand, most major nations have taken the noweapons pledge of the and have accepted inspection by the IAEA to detect significant diversions of nuclear materials from existing nuclear power plants. Such materials include normal or low enriched uranium. Also, the major nuclear supplier states, CRS4

7 IB including the United States and the Soviet Union, butqnott'rance and West Germany, have agreed to voluntary guidelines that require LffiA safeguards for all nuclear exports, and restraint in helping other countries with enrichment and reprocessing. netheless, the refusal of some countries to join the or to accept IAEA inspection of all their nuclear facilities means that several of them have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, which can produce high enriched uranium and plutonium. These countries and their unsafeguarded facilities are listed in Appendix B. A comparison of their nonproliferation commitments and those of 16 other nonweapons states appears in Appendix C. Factors that can influence proliferation. Several factors that can affect future nuclear proliferation, include political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which might affect their attitude towards nuclear weapons; economic conditions and trade opportunities, which affect world use of nuclear energy and any spread of technological capability to make fissile materials for nuclear weapons; U.S. influence over how other countries produce and use fissile materials, especially plutonium and highly enriched uranium; the further spread of longrange missiles able to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads; concern that terrorists might try to steal plutonium and make a nuclear bomb; and disputes over a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Latent proliferation an issue for the 1990s? Several nonnuclear weapons states that have the technological means to produce nuclear weapons may see them useful as a deterrent to attack by hostile neighbors or as a source of prestige. Indeed, many private analysts conclude that Israel, Pakistan, and India probably have some undeclared nuclear weapons, and call them "latent nuclear weapons states." ne of these estimates has been officially confirmed in Washington or elsewhere. If any of these nations do have nuclear weapons, a policy of benign neglect can put off for a while facing the questions that would arise after their declaration or demonstration, or, in the worst case, their use, and whether U.S. security would be served by assisting such nations with command and control of whatever weapons they might have. ShortTerm Issues (1) Bush Administration policy. What changes, if any, has the Bush Administration made during this Congress in the executive branch component of nonproliferation policy? How has the Administration dealt with the suspicious nuclear activities of Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa? CRS5

8 IB (2) Economic and military aid to Pakistan. Continued U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan required that by Sept. 30, 1990, President Bush certify to Congress that Pakistan does not have nuclear explosives. This certification is required by Section 620E of the Foreign Assistant Act of 1961 as amended by P.L in August (For further information, see CRS Issue Briefs and ) Also, on Apr. 1, 1991, the President's authority will end to waive another cutoff of U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan, a cutoff triggered in 1979 by Pakistan's attempts to import items for its Kahuta enrichment plant. Should Congress extend this waiver, and if so, under what conditions? (3) Outcome of the fourth Review Conference. In August 1990 the final 5year conference to review the nonproliferation treaty was held in Geneva. It ended without consensus on a final statement because of differences between Mexico and the United States over what should be said about a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. At issue is the significance of this failure (see Issue Brief 90092). (4) New agreements for nuclear cooperation. One consequence of changes in Eastern Europe is that the State Department is negotiating an agreement for nuclear cooperation with Hungary, and there are signs that Czechoslovakia and Poland also may want such agreements. Before these can take effect, they must be submitted to Congress for review as specified in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended. (5) Possible attempts to suspend South Africa and Israel from the IAEA. Over recent years, blocs of IAEA members have tried to suspend South Africa and Israel from participating in the agency's activities because of South Africa's social policies and because of Israel's refusal to open its Dimona reactor to international IAEA inspection and its position with regard to the Palestinians. While the United States would probably object to the suspension of South Africa, it might withdraw from the IAEA if Israel were suspended. These matters were smoothed over at the 1990 General Conference, but could come up again in What will the Bush Administration do to avoid either situation? Longer Term Issues (1) Monitoring nuclear activities of certain states. Most states party to the are secure and not threatened by hostile neighbors. However, Iran and Iraq, rth and South Korea, and Taiwan are not. Of these, only South Korea and Taiwan have nuclear powerplants. ne has known reprocessing or enrichment capacity to produce weaponsgrade materials, although there are rumors of suspicious nuclear facilities in rth Korea. In earlier years, the United States intervened to stop reprocessing development in Taiwan and South Korea. Iran and Iraq, before their war, were building a nuclear base. Iran was constructing several large power reactors, but work stopped with the revolution and has not restarted. Iraq was establishing a major nuclear research center with a powerful research reactor, but Israel bombed its nuclear reactor in Depending upon what happens to tensions affecting these states, one or more of them might want a nuclear weapons capability during the 1990s despite their noweapons pledge. With this in mind, their nuclear activities warrant monitoring in the coming decade. CRS6

9 IB (2) Stopping sensitive nuclear trade. Pakistan's ability to obtain items to build its Kahuta enrichment plant and news reports of unauthorized diversions of heavy water shipments from West Germany to India and Israel and of materials for uranium centrifuges to Iraq indicate a need for tighter national and international controls on nuclear exports and assistance particularly for dualuse items. What can the United States do to get other nuclear suppliers to upgrade their nuclear export controls both in principle and practice? (3) Extension of the in With the failure of the 1990 Review Conference to produce an endorsement of the treaty, the countdown has begun for the 1995 Conference to vote on its extension. Sustained preparation will be necessary if the is to be extended on terms favorable to U.S. interests. At issue is whether, and if so to what extent, the Bush Administration is preparing for the 1995 Conference. (4) Support for the IAEA. Despite the continuing increase of nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards, particularly plutonium, and an increasing demand for IAEA assistance with nuclear power safety, the United States and other major IAEA members for 6 years have imposed a zerogrowth budget except for inflation. Also the United States during the Reagan Administration delayed its payments to the IAEA as part of overall U.S. pressure on international organizations to adopt U.S.desired reforms. At issue is the level and predictability of U.S. support, and how much a continued budget freeze will cut muscle from IAEA safeguards. (5) Implementing the revised U.S.Japan agreement for nuclear cooperation. The U.S.Japan agreement for nuclear cooperation was substantially revised in One feature is a 30year advance consent for what Japan can do with U.S.origin nuclear materials and equipment, including transferring and reprocessing spent fuel and transporting the recovered plutonium. At issue will be the Bush Administration's position on this matter and in what ways, if any, it will differ from that of the Reagan Administration. (For further information, see CRS Issue Brief ) (6) The and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. For some time a bloc of parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) have sought to convert it into a comprehensive treaty that would extend the ban on nuclear testing to nuclear weapons states. Recently this bloc collected enough votes to request an amending convention now scheduled for January At issue is what the United States can do to avoid potential damage to the from efforts to broaden the LTBT. (7) Arms control: the linkage between the spread of missiles and chemical weapons. The continuing spread of missile technology to more countries causes concern that some nations might equip missiles with nuclear warheads. Increasing attention is also being given to chemical weapon proliferation. Such weapons could be chosen for a deterrent instead of nuclear weapons. How nuclear, missile, and chemical proliferation might affect each other, however, and whether an attempt to combine proliferation policy would stall the formulation of policy or negotiations on any one form of proliferation are not clear at this time. CRS7

10 IB (8) Arms control: verified dismantling of nuclear warheads and disposal of their nuclear materials. If there is further strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1990s, one question will be whether to dismantle their warheads. Another will be what to do with the many tons of plutonium and weaponsgrade uranium that would become available from the dismantled weapons. Should it be set aside for use in future bombs? Should it be used to fuel nuclear power plants? What other disposal options are available and how would they serve U.S. domestic and foreign policy interests? How would disposal be verified? (For further information, see CRS Issue Brief ) CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS. REPORTS. AND DOCUMENTS U.S. Congress. House. Nuclear cooperation with the European Community. Communication from the President of the United States. Mar. 13, (101st Congress, 1st session. H.Doc ) CHRONOLOGY 04/01/91 Expiration of the President's authority to waive cutoff of U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan. 01/08/91 United Nations, New York. Tentative date set by the Repository Powers for start of an amendment conference for the Partial Test Ban Treaty. 10/10/90 Washington. Documents obtained by the Washington Post indicate that Pakistan tried at least three times this year to buy Americanmade hightemperature furnaces that can be used in manufacturing nuclear weapons. (Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1990: Al, A14) 10/09/90 Washington. Secretary of State James A. Baker HI informed Pakistani Foreign Minister Shabzada YaqubKhan that further U.S. aid would be impossible unless Islamabad provides convincing new evidence that no Pakistani "nuclear device" exists. (Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1990: A14) 10/09/90 The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing on proliferation and regional security in the 1990s. 10/02/90 The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Relations, held a hearing on Democracy and Nuclear Developments in Pakistan. 09/30/90 Washington. The United States decided to withhold aid from Pakistan as it sought new assurances from the Pakistani Government that it was slowing down its nuclearweapons program, Administration officials said. (New York Times, Oct. 1, 1990: A3) Due date for President Bush's determination whether Pakistan has nuclear explosives. CRS8

11 IB /25/90 Washington. The Senate approved by unanimous vote the Treaty with the USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, and the Treaty with the USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. 09/20/90 Geneva. West German Foreign Minister HansDietrich Genscher announced at the Review Conference that West Germany would require fullscope safeguards for all nuclear exports and other measures to stiffen German foreign trade law. (Nuclear Fuel, Sept. 3, 1990: Alf) 09/1721/90 Vienna. The IAEA 34th General Conference. 08/2009/14/90 Geneva. The fourth Review Conference met and closed without consensus on a final statement because of controversy over a comprehensive review test ban treaty. 08/02/90 Iraq invaded Kuwait. 07/15/90 Due date for President Bush to report to Congress on implications for U.S. national security of any ban on production of fissile materials for weapons. 07/13/90 President Bush transmitted to Congress the annual report on government activities relating to preventing nuclear proliferation. (Congressional Record: H4699, S9729) 07/11/90 The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, held a hearing on the Administration's views on proliferation and arms control. 06/28/90 Dublin. The European Council issued a statement that it "strongly supports and is fully committed to the objective of nuclear nonproliferation," expressing concern that there is a "...continuing risk that further countries may acquire nuclear weapons and that a number of countries remain outside the nonproliferation regime." It called on all states "to join in efforts to eliminate the risk of nuclear proliferation." 06/04/90 Washington. The White House released a joint U.S.Soviet statement on nonproliferation stating their opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles capable of carrying them, and certain other missiles and technologies, including 13 specific points about nuclear proliferation. 05/17/90 The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, held a heading on Proliferation and Arms Control. 04/03/90 Representative Stark introduced H.R and H.R to impose trade sanctions on foreign nations that are not signatories to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the nonproliferation treaty by Jan. 1, CRS9

12 IB /30/90 Senators Glenn and Boschwitz introduced S.Con.Res. 113 calling for application of fullscope safeguards for all nuclear sales or transfers to nonnuclear weapons states, and continued efforts to encourage Pakistan, India and other nonnuclear weapons states not party to the to agree to fullscope safeguards. (Congressional Record, Mar. 30, 1990: S3634) 03/13/90 President Bush transmitted to Congress his determination to continue nuclear cooperation with Euratom (H.Doc.. 154, Exec. Comm. 2685, referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.) 10/05/89 Washington. President Bush certified to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. In a transmittal letter he expressed concerns about Pakistan's continuing efforts to develop nuclear weapons. (New York Times, Oct. 12, 1989: Al; the text of the letter and the Presidential finding appear in the Congressional Record, v. 16, 1989: S15883) FOR ADDITIONAL READING Loans The Aspin Strategy Group. New threats: responding to the proliferation of nuclear, '" chemical, and delivery capabilities in the third world. Lanham, Md., University ^ fo p Press of America, 1990, 273 p. Charles, Dan. Exporting trouble West Germany's freewheeling nuclear business. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, April 1989: Khan, Sadruddin Aga (ed.). nproliferation in a disarming world. Prospects for the 1990's. Geneva, Bellerive Foundation, 1990, 347 p. Leventhal, Paul and Yonah Alexander, eds. Preventing nuclear terrorism. The report and papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. Lexington Books, p. Nuclear weapons and South Asian security. Report of the Carnegie Task Force on nproliferation and South Asian Security. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. Scheinman, Lawrence. The International Atomic Energy Agency and world nuclear order. Washington, Resources for the Future, p. Simpson, John, ed. Nuclear nonproliferation: an agenda for the 1990s. Cambridge University Press, 1987, 237 p. Spector, Leonard S. New players in the nuclear game. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, January/February 1989: CRS10

13 IB Nuclear ambitions. The spread of nuclear weapons Westview Press, 1990, 450 p. Boulder, Co., The undeclared bomb. The spread of nuclear weapons Cambridge, Ballinger Publishing Co., p. CRS11

14 of HY Appendix A: Nuclear Materials for Nuclear Weapons A state wanting to make nuclear weapons would require a supply of U235 or highquality plutonium. While in theory U233 could also be used, in practice there is no public record that it has ever been used for this purpose. The amount of U235 or plutonium needed to make a nuclear weapon depends upon the weapon design. For the simplest design, about 52 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), i.e., about 25 kilograms of 93% U235, is required, or 8 kilograms of Pu239. With certain design improvements, the amounts can be reduced to about 15 kilograms of U235 or 5 kilograms of Pu239. These materials, however, are not interchangeable. "Special nuclear materials" as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 include uranium of any enrichment and all plutonium. Concentrated U235 does not exist in nature. Instead, natural uranium is a mixture of U235 and U238, with the former only 0.7% of the total. The enrichment method used by the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United States is gaseous diffusion. Gas centrifuges are also being used for enrichment in Europe, and several other countries are developing this technology. Japan is planning a large centrifuge plant, and many now say that Pakistan can successfully operate plants able to produce weaponsgrade uranium. In the United States, DOE began construction of a large centrifuge plant at Portsmouth, OH, but cancelled it in favor of development of laser isotope separation (LIS), which offers substantial technical and economic advantages. LIS for uranium enrichment is now under development in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Production of weaponsgrade uranium by the gaseous diffusion process requires uranium in gaseous form as a "feed material." This in turn requires a supply of uranium and means to convert uranium concentrates from the ores into uranium hexafluoride. If laser isotope separation becomes feasible, metallic uranium would be used. Plutonium only exists in nature in trace quantities. It is made by exposing U238 atoms to neutrons, usually in a reactor, which transmutes some U238 into several isotopes of plutonium, primarily Pu239. As the uranium is exposed, some Pu240 also is formed, which is undesirable for weapons use. The longer the uranium stays in a reactor, the more Pu239 and Pu240 are produced. Weaponsgrade plutonium contains less than 7% Pu240, while plutonium in power reactor fuel usually contains 19% or more Pu240. Plutonium is extracted from exposed uranium (spent fuel) by chopping it up, dissolving it in acids, and chemically separating the plutonium and residual uranium from the intensely radioactive fission products (reprocessing). The plutonium is then converted to metal or oxide depending upon its intended use. Production of plutonium requires a supply of uranium ore, the means to convert ore concentrates into metallic uranium, nuclear reactors, and reprocessing plants.

15 of H/ APPENDIX B. n States Thought to Have Unsafeguarded Facilities for Uranium Enrichment or Plutonium Separation State Enrichment Reprocessing Argentina Large pilot plant near completion Brazil Experimental unit India Pakistan Israel South Africa Productionscale centrifuge system Pilotscale enrichment plant Two industrial processing plants Incomplete industrialscale plants Small reprocessing plant Source: Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 1988.

16 of f/ Agrees to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines... Agreement for U.S. Cooperation Inactive Active Via Euratom Inactive Active Via Euratom Inactive Active Via Euratom Active Via Euratom Inactive Active Active Active Active Via IAEA APPENDIX C. nproliferation Commitments of TwentyTwo nnuclear Weapons States Country Limited Test Ban Treaty n Treaty of Proliferation Tlatelolco Treaty Physical Protection Convention IAEA Safeguards Agreement Un Safeguarded Facilities Argentina Australia Belgium Brazil Canada Czechoslovakia East Germany West Germany India Indonesia Israel Italy Japan Libya Netherlands Pakistan South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Taiwan Yugoslavia only only only with conditions not yet met.... Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial Some Some Some Some Some Some