SEPTEMBER 17

Transcription

1 SEPTEMBER 17

2 COMMANDER S NOTES Readers, A sand table conjures a mental image of Marines gathered around a terrain model exchanging ideas on how to solve a tactical problem. The ideas are not etched in stone. Instead, they are wargamed to rehearse concepts and examine alternative results. This publication serves the exact same function. It is our intention, as the MCTOG staff, to use this forum to share best practices, critical lessons learned, or key doctrinal concepts that need reinforcement to improve our collective performance and readiness as a Ground Combat Element. This is not just a MCTOG staff publication. I encourage each of our readers to submit articles, reports, book reviews, or comments that you feel will advance the dialogue on a specific topic. This is intended as a forum for our Marine Corps Ground Combat Element Community of Interest. Not all submissions will make it to print. We utilize an internal screening process to ensure that ideas presented show promise of enhancing how we conduct our profession and work effectively when practiced. The Sand Table s focus is on company through regiment level operations, though we may occasionally expand up or down to division or platoon ideas. Our spotlight sections highlight recent reports, books, equipment, or software that are of interest to our community. I hope you find this publication useful and that you look forward to next month s issue! Semper Fidelis, Col Tim Barrick Commanding Officer Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group i

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PLANNING 1 DETERMINING CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS... 1 TACTICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS... 3 THE ROUGH CUT COA KEY LINKS RECENT PUBLICATIONS FUTURE PUBLICATIONS

4 PLANNING DETERMINING CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS By: LtCol David O Brien MCTOG Executive Officer A commander who has seen a military problem before may choose a course of action (COA) based on experience. But how does a commander know if he or she has considered all the relevant factors? How does the commander ensure that he or she does not bias the solution to the problem? Bias is a strong interest in something or an ability to do something. As a force in readiness, the Marine bias for action could be the inherent ability of the Marine air-ground task force to do something. However, bias can also be systematic error introduced into testing by selecting or encouraging one outcome or answer over others. The fateful act of selecting a COA can be a willful or unconscious acceptance of lost opportunities to consider all the relevant factors. This edition of The Sand Table addresses two activities that ensure relevant factors are considered: conducting center of gravity analysis and developing a rough-cut COA. Successfull staffs integrate these activities into planning to overcome organizational problems commonly encountered throughout the operating forces. Balancing Experience and Inexperience Battalion and regimental staffs must leverage a variety of functional area and integrated planning experience. Newly formed staffs often lack the experience of planning together or lack an established standard operating procedure for planning. Key individual staff members may lack training in the Marine Corps Planning Process and in intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The commander, who is the most experienced Marine on the staff, lacks the time to personally consider all the complexities of a problem, and must depend on the staff s ability to initiate and conduct effective planning. Commanders must consider the problems their staffs are facing and decide where to inject themselves. At the outset of planning, the commander must provide focus, asking and answering key questions. What is the mission and type of operation? Are my unit s capabilities adequate to cover the threat in my assigned area of operations? What can the enemy do to prevent me from accomplishing my assigned mission? How does the commander orient the staff on the enemy during planning? A commonly 1

5 understood approach to center of gravity analyis can be a staff asset. The Time and Complexity Nexus Ground combat element practitioners work in time constrained environments where the commencement of planning can be sudden. Key leaders must quickly and effectively shift the unit s focus, reallocate and/or adjust staff resources, and obtain and integrate the commander s input. Under severe time constraints and facing a complex problem, how does the commander ensure that planning actions produce feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and suitable COAs? Complex problems demand detailed staff estimates and robust concepts of support. But what is the right way to design a COA? How do we prevent the staff from developing information that is irrelevant? Does the operations officer know how to focus the staff s attention on what is most important? What are the best graphical and conceptual tools that convey how an operation is divided in duration or activity? What is the right way to convey the action you believe will directly accomplish the mission? Commanders who instill in their staffs a common approach to presenting a COA how forces will be arranged in time, space, purpose, and resources can overcome complexity, greatly accelerate decision making, and reduce the risk of failing to consider critical factors in an operation. 2

6 LESSON IDENTIFIED Effective tactical center of gravity analysis will reveal meaningful critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited at the tactical level. The does/uses and supported/supporting validity tests help to identify a center of gravity and to distinguish it from its critical requirements. TACTICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS By: GySgt Peter Clark MCTOG ITI Course Chief Problem The COG concept exists in multiple doctrinal publications (JP 1-02, JP 2-0, JP 5-0, JP , MCDP 1-0, MCDP 1-2, MCWP 5-10, MCTP 2-10B, MCRP 2-10B.1, MCWP 3-31, MCTP 3-10F), each with subtle differences, and sometimes contradictory definitions and purposes. Additionally, there is no place in doctrine where the procedures for conducting center of gravity (COG) analysis can be found. With these limiting factors, how can a battalion or regimental-level staff conduct COG analysis to enhance their understanding of the threat and develop meaningful critical vulnerabilities that lead to decisive effects when exploited? the purpose of COG analysis is to identify how the threat s system works, its strengths and weaknesses, and to identify the most efficient and logical ways of employing limited resources to exploit those weaknesses Background The COG concept is constructed on dubious authorship and editing, underdeveloped theory, imprecise metaphors, and flawed translations. [1] Because of this, COG analysis often loses its value for understanding a threat s strengths and weaknesses, frequently resulting in flawed results and the loss of vital planning time. The proposed solution to 3

7 this problem uses the Eikmeier method, with specific guidance for conducting the process at the tactical level, along with a revised method of developing critical vulnerabilities. [2] Solution At the tactical level, the purpose of COG analysis is to identify how the threat s system works, its strengths and weaknesses, and the most efficient and logical means of employing limited resources to exploit those weaknesses. During combat operations, the tactical-level units focus on the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in combat at a particular time and place. In lower intensity operations, the tactical-level units may include the schemes and methods by which we perform other missions, such as enforcing order and maintaining security during peacekeeping operations. [3] Nations and their military forces are typically large, complex systems with numerous sub-systems that can be broken down into strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Because of this, centers of gravity exist at every level of war and vary by the goals and objectives of the system/sub-system they are attributed to. Rather than concentrating on the overall system, COG analysis at the tactical level focuses on the sub-system(s) of the threat that friendly forces can directly effect. This allows friendly forces to focus limited resources towards the neutralization/weakening of a tactical COG. Tactical COG Analysis Definitions and Descriptions Center of Gravity (See JP 1-02 for core definition.) A key source of strength without which an enemy cannot function. (MCRP ) A center of gravity is the primary entity that inherently possesses the capability to achieve the objective something that is tangible. It is a doer that is capable of achieving the goals of the organization that owns it. Capability A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). (JP 1-02) A critical capability is an action an organization needs to perform to accomplish its objective, or a way that is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). An identified COG must be able to perform the identified critical capability. Capabilities are expressed as verbs and describe the ability to perform an action, as well as the capacity at which it can be performed. Examples: The abilities to mass direct fires at the company level, maneuver at the platoon level, and mass indirect fires at the battery level. 4

8 An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. (JP 1-02) requirements are the essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to perform the critical capability. These things are used or consumed to carry out action, enabling a critical capability to wholly function. Examples: Supplies (e.g. Class III, V), command and control, indirect fire assets, air defense assets, line of sight, terrain, and obstacles (e.g. mines and wire). Vulnerability (See JP 1-02 for core definition.) An aspect of a center of gravity that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to an adversary s ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. (MCRP ) vulnerabilities are critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner that achieves decisive results. Examples: Resupply operations are vulnerable to interdiction, command and control lacks redundancy, air defense assets are vulnerable to high altitude aircraft, terrain selection is vulnerable to deception, and the fire direction center lacks redundancy. Decisive Point A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 1-02) Success can be achieved by exploiting critical vulnerabilities that are related to multiple critical capabilities, or exploiting critical vulnerabilities that create additional vulnerabilities in the threat s system. Examples: Neutralizing air defense exposes the entire system to air attacks, neutralizing command and control degrades multiple critical capabilities, and neutralizing their fire direction center reduces their ability to coordinate and mass indirect fires. Conducting Tactical Center of Gravity Analysis As each element is identified (i.e. mission, COG, critical factor), fill out the corresponding item on the tactical COG analysis model (see Figure 1 on page 6). Step One: Identify the Threat s Desired Ends or Objectives. These objectives must be selected based on the current situation and the impact to the friendly mission. To aid in this process, identify what the threat could attempt to achieve that has the greatest potential for disrupting the friendly mission. 5

9 Step Two: Identify the Capabilities. Identify the possible ways or actions that can achieve the desired ends. Select the way(s) the evidence suggests the organization is most likely to use. Remember ways are actions and should be expressed as verbs. Next, select the most elemental or essential action(s) which become the critical capability. Ways = critical capabilities. Step Three: List the s for each Capability. List the means available or required by the organization to execute the way or critical capability. that achieves the ends. Keep in mind that there may be more than one entity that possesses the critical capability. If this is the case, determine which entity performs the capability to a higher level and/or possesses a higher probability of accomplishing the mission. Step Five: Select the s from the List of s. From the remaining items on the means list, select those that are critical for executing the critical capability; these are the critical requirements. These critical requirements are supporting means that enable the tactical COG to perform the critical capability. Mission (Ends) The goal or objective the What that an organization intends to accomplish. Center of Gravity Capability 1 Capability 2 Figure 1: Tactical COG Analysis Model. Step Four: Select the Center of Gravity from the List of s. In this step, the entity (a noun) is selected from the list of means which inherently possesses the critical capability to achieve the end. This selection is the tactical COG. It is the doer of the action Step Six: Identify the Vulnerabilities. This step entails identifying the critical requirements (or components thereof) that are vulnerable to friendly actions. Remember, it is the friendly force s ability to affect a requirement that determines 6

10 whether it is a vulnerability. Use the critical vulnerability model to aid in determining critical vulnerabilities (see Figure 2). To start, examine each critical capability to determine how it is inherently vulnerable. As examples, a requirement may lack redundancy, the enemy may be vulnerable to deception so that he employs his forces in disadvantageous terrain, the enemy s line of sight may be vulnerable to obscuration, or identify the desired effect(s) of exploiting the vulnerability. As examples, neutralizing air defenses will eliminate air defense coverage for the entire system, and neutralizing command and control will limit the enemy s ability to coordinate fires. This process ensures that a vulnerability exists, identifies the friendly capability to exploit it, and identifies the desired decisive effects from exploiting it. Mission (Ends) The goal or objective the What that an organization intends to accomplish. requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner that achieves decisive results. A critical vulnerability is some aspect of the center of gravity that is, or can be made, vulnerable to attack. CR# Enemy Vulnerability Friendly Method Desired Effects TAC_039 List the # of the corresponding critical requirement Description of how the critical requirement is vulnerable within the adversary system: lack of redundancy, vulnerability to friendly engagement method List of the friendly entities capable of exploiting the vulnerability Lethally or nonlethally What is the desired affect that friendly forces want against a specific vulnerability? Should undermine the critical capability. # # # Figure 2: Vulnerability Model. enemy air defenses may be vulnerable to high altitude air strikes. Once a vulnerability has been identified, the next step is to identify whether friendly forces have the ability to exploit it. The friendly method seeks to determine what assets could be used to exploit the identified vulnerability. Last, Testing the Selected Tactical Center of Gravity A helpful validity test for identifying a COG and distinguishing it from critical requirements is the does/uses or supported/supporting test. 7

11 Supported/Doer: Only the COG is inherently capable of achieving the purpose or objective. If something executes the primary action(s) (i.e. capability) that achieves the objective, it is the COG. The COG executes the action and uses other entities or consumes resources to accomplish it. Supporting/Used: If something is used or consumed to execute the primary action (i.e. capability), it is a requirement. If something contributes to the action, but does not actually perform it, it is a requirement not a COG. Conclusion The neutralization or substantial weakening of a valid COG or critical capability should cause an enemy to change its course of action (COA) or prevent it from achieving its objectives. If analysis and/or wargaming show that this does not occur, then the tactical COG may have been misidentified. Because derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities are subject to change at any time during a mission or operation, the conclusions of tactical COG analysis while critically important to the planning process itself must be tempered with continuous evaluation and reassessment. Case Study: Operation Skorpion Background Operation Skorpion (26 27 May 1941) was a German military operation during the North African campaign of World War II, fought between Axis forces under Colonel Maximilian von Herff and British forces under Lieutenant General William "Strafer" Gott. [4] In February 1941, German troops were dispatched to North Africa to reinforce Italian forces in Libya. On 14 February, the first German units arrived in Tripoli, Libya and were sent immediately to the front line. General Erwin Rommel took command of the newly termed Deutsches Afrika Korps. With orders to defend Tripoli and Tripolitania, Axis forces quickly went on the offensive, forcing the understrength British 3rd Armored Brigade to retreat toward Tobruk and the Libyan-Egyptian border. Rommel drove the British forces from Cyrenaica across the Egyptian border, bypassing the port of Tobruk. Axis forces failed to capture Tobruk before the defenders could prepare their defense, forcing Rommel to divide his forces between a siege of Tobruk and the frontier. 8

12 The port garrison of Tobruk, held by Commonwealth and British troops, endangered Axis supply lines from Tripoli, and denied Axis forces the use of the coastal road (Via Balbia) for nearly 50 kilometers. Tactical COG Analysis Example The following is an example of conducting a tactical COG analysis on the British forces holding Halfaya Pass during Operation Skorpion from the German perspective. Figure 3: Tobruk in Relation to Halfaya Pass, and the Halfaya Pass Area. Because of this, Rommel gave priority to the siege, leaving the front line near the Libya- Egypt border thinly held (see Figure 3). On 15 May, the British attacked from Egypt to relieve the siege of Tobruk. Halfaya Pass was taken against determined Italian opposition, but additional gains were reversed by German counterattacks. The Germans immediately began planning Operation Skorpion in order to recapture Halfaya Pass, with the goal of narrowing their defensive frontage, reducing the number of troops needed to hold the front-line while the rest joined the siege of Tobruk. Situation. British forces are in control of Halfaya pass. British forces in the pass consist of a reinforced infantry battalion equipped with machine guns (24x Vickers machine guns), antitank guns (6x QF 2- punders), antiaircraft guns (2x Bofors 40mm), artillery (3x BL-6 howitzers), mortars (12x ML 3-inch), and tanks (9x Mark II Cruisers). Step One: Identify the Threat s Desired Ends or Objectives. Based on the tactical situation, the most likely British mission was to block the Germans in the vicinity of the Halfaya Pass in order to allow follow-on 9

13 forces to use the pass as an avenue of approach for a counter-offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk (see Figure 4). these two capabilities. For example, the reason that the ability to mass indirect fires is not a critical capability is because it is not as Mission (Ends) Block IVO Halfaya Pass in order to allow follow-on forces to use the pass as an avenue of approach for the counter-offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk Center of Gravity Capability 1 Capability 2 Figure 4: Enemy Mission on the Tactical COG Analysis Model. Step Two: Identify the Capabilities. Since the British mission is defensive in nature, start by listing capabilities related to defensive operations, such as: maneuver, hold mutually supporting defensive positions in depth, mass combat power (i.e. direct and/or indirect), employ a reserve, and emplace obstacles. The determination of critical capabilities depends on the terrain, the combat power of the unit, and their tactics and doctrine. In this example, the most critical capabilities for the British forces are the ability to mass direct fires and the ability to hold mutually supporting defensive positions. While this does not discount the importance of other capabilities, the British cannot accomplish their mission without critical to accomplishing the mission as the ability to mass direct fires and to hold mutually supporting defensive positions. Next, we need to identify at what capacity these abilities can be performed. For massing direct fires, the lowest level at which this can be done while still accomplishing the mission is the platoon level. This is somewhat subjective, but is based on an understanding of the terrain in which the capability is being performed, the tactics of the force, and the size of the opposing force. The lowest level at which holding mutually supporting defensive can be performed while still accomplishing the mission is the company level. This is based almost entirely on the terrain; any unit smaller than a company 10

14 would not be able to cover the entire pass, leaving the force vulnerable to being flanked. Additionally, if they spread out to cover the entire pass, they would no longer have class V supplies. Without ammunition, fires cannot be massed. For another example, artillery can be an enhancing critical requirement while not directly related to Mission (Ends) Block IVO Halfaya Pass in order to allow follow-on forces to use the pass as an avenue of approach for the counter-offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk Center of Gravity Mass direct fires at the platoon level Hold mutually supporting defensive positions at the company level Figure 5: Capabilities on the Tactical COG Analysis Model. mutual support. In this example, the most critical capabilities for the British force are their ability to mass direct fires at the platoon level and to hold mutually supporting defensive positions at the company level (see Figure 5). Step Three: List the s for each Capability. When considering requirements for a critical capability, keep in mind that they are not always directly related to the capability. requirements generally come in three forms those that support capabilities, those that safeguard capabilities, and those that enhance capabilities. For example, a supporting critical requirement for massing direct fires is the critical capabilities, the presence of indirect fires significantly enhances the ability to mass direct fires and hold defensive positions by suppressing attacking forces and creating a combined arms effect. An example of a safeguarding requirement is air defense, which prevents aircraft from attriting ground forces, preserving the critical capabilities. s the British need to execute their critical capabilities include infantry, command and control, line of sight, a counterattack force or reserve, canalizing terrain, supplies (class I, III, and V), artillery, antitank guns, engineers, and wire and mines to construct obstacles. 11

15 Step Four: Select the Center of Gravity from the List of s. The entity that possesses the capability to mass fires at the platoon level and hold defensive positions at the company level is the infantry (see Figure 6). cases, critical requirements are shared between different critical capabilities (see Figure 7 on page 9). These are important when trying to determine which critical requirements will lead to decisive effects if they are reduced. Mission (Ends) Block IVO Halfaya Pass in order to allow follow-on forces to use the pass as an avenue of approach for the counter-offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk Center of Gravity - Infantry Mass direct fires at the platoon level Hold mutually supporting defensive positions at the company level Figure 6: Center of Gravity on the Tactical COG Analysis Model. Step Five: Select the s from the List of s. The easiest way to determine a critical requirement is to envision the effect on its related critical capability if removed. The following are critical requirements needed by the British to perform their critical capabilities. To mass direct fires at the platoon level, the critical requirements are command and control, line of sight, class V, and artillery. To hold mutually supporting defensive positions at the company level, the critical requirements are command and control, artillery, wire and mines to construct obstacles, class I, and a counterattack force or reserve. In some Step Six: Identify the Vulnerabilities. The critical requirements (or components thereof) that are vulnerable to friendly actions are identified based largely on the threat s doctrine and tactics, the type and number of weapons and equipment they possess, and their disposition. First, we must identify whether a critical requirement is vulnerable. In the case of the British, there are several requirements which are inherently vulnerable. Command and control is vulnerable to deception and because of its lack of redundancy and centralized nature. Line of sight is vulnerable to obscuration, whether from smoke or weather (e.g. dust 12

16 storms). Artillery is vulnerable because it lacks redundancy (six tubes) and requires command and control and forward observers to be effective. Supplies are vulnerable because resupply must come from a single line of communications, and resupply convoys are vulnerable to interdiction. Obstacles are vulnerable to breaching assets, as well as to maneuver. Last, a counterattack artillery vulnerabilities with the same methods as for command and control. The last part of this step involves determining the desired effects of exploiting each vulnerability. The desired effect of exploiting command and control vulnerabilities is to reduce the effectiveness of both critical capabilities (i.e. massing direct fires and holding mutually supporting defensive Mission (Ends) Block IVO Halfaya Pass in order to allow follow-on forces to use the pass as an avenue of approach for the counter-offensive to relieve the siege of Tobruk Center of Gravity - Infantry Mass direct fires at the platoon level Hold mutually supporting defensive positions at the company level C2 Line of sight Class V supply Artillery C2 Artillery Obstacles Counterattack Force (reserve) Figure 7: s on the Tactical COG Analysis Model. force/reserve is vulnerable to deception. Now that the vulnerabilities are identified, we must determine whether the friendly force has the ability to exploit them. In this case, the German force has a limited ability to affect supply. The Germans can exploit command and control vulnerabilities by identifying and focusing indirect fires on command and control nodes, and can employ deception in order to confuse the British as to the time and place of their attack. The Germans also have the ability to exploit positions), as well as to reduce the effectiveness of the British artillery. Battle. On 26 May, German forces conducted a battalion-sized demonstration in the desert to the southwest of the pass in order to deceive the British into thinking it was an attack on a wide front. This caused the British to spread their forces to meet the threat, eliminating the possibility of quickly reinforcing the pass. German forces attacked on the morning of 27 May. Their forces 13

17 consisted of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion augmented with antitank guns and mortars. The Germans encountered fierce opposition from the British combined defensive artillery and small arms fire, and were forced to withdraw. The Germans attacked again on the morning of 28 May, this time augmented with a heavy motorcycle company and tanks. The motorized infantry attacked from the coastal plain, while the motorcycle company attacked from the upper plateau with tanks in support. During the combined assault, the coastal force was able to bring forward their antitank guns to engage British machine gun nests and artillery positions. British defensive positions were overwhelmed before the tank reserve could be employed, forcing the British to withdraw. British reinforcements were too far away to affect the battle, and the pass was re-occupied by Axis troops. The engagement on the morning of 28 May lasted approximately one hour and 45 minutes. The Germans were able to reduce the effectiveness of the British critical capabilities by conducting a multiaxis combined arms attack against the pass, which reduced the British ability to mass direct fires, as well as causing the delay in committing the tank reserve. Additionally, the German deception effort drew all British forces that would have been capable of reinforcing the pass in a timely manner. In this historical example, the Germans employed some methods to reduce the effectiveness of British critical capabilities, but ultimately resorted to directly attacking their tactical COG, resulting in a high level of attrition. End Notes [1] Dale C. Eikmeier, Give Carl von Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce, Small Wars Journal (July 2, 2013) [2] Dale C. Eikmeier, Center of Gravity Analysis, Military Review (July-August 2004) [3] MCDP 1, Warfighting [4] Frank Kurowski, DAS Afrika Korps: Erwin Rommel and the Germans in North Africa, (March 23, 2010) 14

18 LESSON IDENTIFIED Planning teams must quickly and efficiently develop rough cut COA's in sufficient detail within the established timeline. In a time compressed enviornment the Commander can make effective use of staff time by participating in a rough cut COA brief and selecting and giving feedback to his preferred COA. THE ROUGH CUT COA By: Maj Mike D'Eredita MCTOG Maneuver Division Deputy Problem How can a battalion or regimental-level staff efficiently develop multiple rough-cut courses of action (COAs) which meet the appropriate criteria feasible, acceptable, complete, distinguishable, and suitable (i.e. FACDS), anticipate threat actions, and apply maneuver warfare principles with a relatively small staff while planning in a time-compressed environment? Developing multiple COAs provides flexibility to the commander and ensures the planning team explores all options available for dealing with the tactical problem faced. Background Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) observes both student and operating force battalion-level planning teams conduct the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) dozens of times each year through the lense of the Tactical MAGTF Integration Course (TMIC), Servicelevel training events, and planning exercises. A trend that has been identified across most planning teams is the inability to quickly and efficiently develop rough-cut COAs in sufficient detail within the established planning timelines. Time constraints further limit the number of COAs the staff can wargame effectively. 15

19 This trend leads to two typical outcomes the planning team either focuses its efforts on building only one COA, which limits the options available to the commander, or it builds multiple incomplete COAs which lack the level of detail required to facilitate effective COA wargaming. The root cause of this trend is assessed to be the relative inexperience of most staff members in conducting the MCPP, along with the absence of a unit-level planning SOP to direct the process. The rough-cut COA development process outlined in this report is designed to reverse this trend by assisting battalion and regimental staffs in the practical application of the MCPP outlined in MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (specifically Chapter 3 Course of Action Development) when developing rough-cut COAs. Solution Rough-cut COA development focuses on the timely and efficient creation of an adaptive tactical concept of operations (CONOPS) which functions as the overarching planning framework throughout the rest of planning. Developing multiple COAs provides the commander flexibility and ensures the planning team explores all options available for dealing with the tactical problem. To do this effectively in a time-constrained planning environment, MCTOG recommends the following process. 1. The planning team meets, reviews the planning timeline, defines the work to be accomplished, establishes breakout teams and deliverables, and discusses any concerns within the staff (e.g. higher headquarters [HHQ] battle rhythm, the planning timeline, working group management, etc). The operations chief drives the timeline. 2. Relevant updated intelligence preparation of the battlespace and problem framing outputs for COA development are posted around the operations map. The following should be posted at a minimum: a. The enemy situation. b. HHQs mission (two levels up). c. Commander s intent. d. The forces available. e. Mission statement. f. The commander s COA development guidance, including the key tasks and phasing of the mission. g. The enemy s most dangerous COA and most likely COA. h. Task analysis. 16

20 i. Assumptions, limitations, and shortfalls. j. Relative combat power analysis. k. Center of Gravity analysis for friendly and enemy forces. This creates the COA Development Workspace (see Figure 1 on page 20). 3. Develop the rough-cut COAs with the core planning team (all warfighting functions represented) that spans the necessary tactical actions within HHQ s phasing model and meets the commander s COA development guidance. When formulating the CONOPS, the battlespace framework (BSF) that is utilized must address the decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions by using a construct of deep, close, rear, and/or main effort, supporting effort, reserve, and security. Additionally, conditions should be developed that indicate the transition from one phase/stage to the next. Ensure that operations NCOs are converting analogue products into digital products, and have the S-3A or assistant operations chief update the standing synch matrix format. Multiple COAs can be developed either sequentially (i.e. the core planning team develops COA 1 first, then moves on to COA 2, etc.) or simultaneously (i.e. the core planning team breaks up into groups, each developing a designated COA). If using the simultaneous method, each group must have representation across the warfighting functions. Regardless of method chosen (i.e. sequential vs. simultaneous), the following process should be followed: a. Consider the effects of terrain using a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and consider the threat by overlaying threat COAs onto the operations planning map. Ensure range rings associated with the threat s disposition are displayed. b. Array higher, adjacent, and supporting forces and relevant civil considerations 1. c. Apply the BSF to depict elements of the mission (i.e. the 5 W s). i. Bin all actions to integrate maneuver (decisive/shaping/sustaining). 1 Civil considerations should include, at a minimum, those items identified as relevant to the operation when analyzing the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) during problem framing. 17

21 1. Determine decisive actions that directly accomplish the mission. a. Determine the purpose of actions. b. Assign a task to accomplish each purpose (i.e. enemy, friendly, terrain, or population-oriented). 2. Determine shaping actions to establish the conditions necessary to accomplish the mission. a. Determine the purpose of actions. b. Assign a task to accomplish each purpose (i.e. enemy, friendly, terrain, or population-orientated). 3. Determine sustaining actions to generate and maintain combat power. ii. Bin all areas (spatially if necessary) identify deep, close, and rear areas. iii. Bin your forces and apply an organizational framework (i.e. main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve). 1. Identify generic units for decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions. 2. Identify specific units relative to decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions. 3. The single critical action must be identified in each phase and stage d. Determine task organization. e. Integrate. that will lead to mission success and will otherwise set the conditions for transition to the next phase and stage. The main effort should be focused on this critical action. The commander s vision of decisive and shaping actions should drive the designation of the main effort. i. Portray the proposed task organization within the BSF. ii. Conduct localized relative combat power analysis and refine the task organization. i. Determine the fire support (i.e. essential fire support tasks [EFSTs] task, purpose, method, and effects) and intelligence support (i.e. named areas of interest and ISR assets) for the decisive actions. Other warfighting functions take note of the discussion and update their staff estimates. ii. Determine warfighting function support requirements for shaping and sustaining actions. iii. Consider applying phasing to divide the operation by duration and/or activity (i.e. warfighting functions). 18

22 iv. Consider applying phasing to arrange tasks that cannot be conducted simultaneously. v. Consider applying phasing to extend operational reach when forces cannot accomplish the mission in a single action. f. Confirm the battlespace. i. Validate assigned battlespace boundaries (i.e. area of operations [AO], area of influence, and area of interest). ii. Review prescribed fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). iii. Review prescribed tactical control measures. iv. Evaluate relevant characteristics of the operational environment (e.g. key terrain and ASCOPE/PMESII) v. Assign AOs to subordinate commanders based on their assigned groundbased tactical tasks. 1. Identify the supporting distance and range of units and key fire support agencies. 2. Identify capabilities for all-around security for a non-contiguous AO. 3. Identify units responsibile for areas not included in subordinate noncontiguous AOs. g. Apply and portray tactical control measures (e.g. objectives, boundaries, phase lines, and FSCMs). i. Assign maneuver control measures. ii. Assign intelligence control measures. iii. Assign FSCMs. iv. Assign logistics control measures. h. Draft the COA narrative. i. Write the overview statement. ii. Provide the main effort s task and purpose. iii. Provide supporting effort task(s) and purpose(s). iv. Provide the concept for employment of the reserve (if applicable). v. Provide the concept of fires (i.e. purpose and effects achieved per EFST). vi. Provide the collections plan. i. Brief the commander (Figure 1 on page 20 shows a quick method for capturing the required information for the brief; Figure 2 on page 21 shows the rough-cut COA graphic from Figure 2 in greater detail). 19

23 j. The red cell briefs the commander on any updates to the threat COAs. 4. Following the brief to the commander and any subsequent guidance, the staff then returns to planning to complete the COA package (i.e. COA graphic and narrative, synch matrix, concepts of support, and task organization) for each COA. The COA graphic and narrative and task organization were developed in the rough-cut COA development process, and should only need to be refined at this point. The staff should focus its effort on developing the detailed concepts of support and synch matrix to ensure actions across the warfighting functions remained synchronized. Concept of Support Examples: Concept of Fires, Concept of Intelligence, Concept of Logistics, Concept of Engineering, Concept of Command and Control, and Concept of Force Protection. 5. In a time-compressed environment, the commander may elect to choose a COA immediately following the rough-cut COA brief, allowing the staff to focus all efforts on developing, wargaming, and refining a single COA. MCTOG s recommendations for how to conduct this process will be captured in the Rough-Cut COA Selection Tac Note. HHQ Mission & Intent (2 levels up) HHQ Task Org Forces Available Commander s COA Dev Guidance Friendly-Enemy Relative Combat Power Analysis Approved Mission Statement Task Analysis Assumptions Limitations Shortfalls Map with IPB & Problem Framing Overlays: Area of Operations/Influence/Interest MCOO Civil Considerations Enemy Situation Adversary COAs Higher/Adjacent/Supporting Units Friendly & Enemy COG Analysis Commander s COA Dev Guidance Figure 1. COA Development Workspace. 20

24 KEY 1. Planning timeline, or plan to plan 2. Map with required overlays (MCOO, event template, fire support overlay; top overlay is always the COA graphic) 3. Mission and commander s intent 4. Concept of operations (i.e. COA narrative) 5. tasks binned as shaping, decisive, or sustaining tasks 6. Task organization 7. High payoff targets 8. Priority intelligence requirements Figure 2. Example Setup for a Rough-Cut COA Brief. 21

25 Figure 3. Rough-Cut COA Graphic (unit boundaries not displayed). 22

26 KEY LINKS GCE Community of Interest Additional information pertaining to the lessons featured in this issues can be found by visiting the following website for GCE best practices and lessons learned: GCE Community of Interest: TMIC Course Schedule The TMIC course schedule is located on the community of interest portal and includes the schedules for Tactical MAGTF Integration Course (TMIC), the Network Engagement Train-the- Trainer Course (NET3C), and the Unit Readiness Planning Course (URPC). Course Schedule: se_schedule.pdf Battle Staff Training (BST) Course Schedules The Spartan Fury and Spartan Dawn schedules are located on the community of interest portal at the below link. GCE Community of Interest: Doctrine For docrine, references, Marine Corps Orders, and NAVMCs, visit the community of interest portal at the below link and select the icon titled References, NAVMCs, & MCOs. Doctrine: Resource.aspx 23

27 RECENT PUBLICATIONS Doctrine Circular 3-01B Air Assault Operations published in June Download: magtftc/mctog/gcecoi/pamphlets%20and %20Circulars/Doctrine_Circular_3-01B_Air_Assault_June_2017.pdf MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations (Change 1 - Appendix C Tactical Tasks) - signed and published in July 2017, this change includes updates to, and brand new population-oriented, tactical tasks. Download: 1_0.pdf MCTP 3-02A MAGTF Network Engagement - signed and published in July 2017, this document provides the doctrinal foundation for Network Engagement and its integration into fires and effects methodologies. Download: 3_02a.pdf 24

28 FUTURE PUBLICATIONS MCWP 3-10 Ground Combat Operations - signature draft is currently in the office of the DC, CD&I. This publication will update the purpose, methods, and taxonomy of the ground combat element. MCTP 12-10B Urban Operations - signature draft is currently in the office of the DC, CD&I. This is a multiservice publication with the US Army addressing urban operations at the battalion level and above. MCTP 3-01A Scouting and Patrolling - author's draft submitted to FMID and pending Servicewide staffing. This edition fully incorporates Combat Hunter doctrine. MCRP 3-10A.3 Infantry Squad - author's draft submitted to FMID and pending Service-wide staffing. MCRP 3-10A.X Infantry Platoon - author's draft submitted to FMID and pending Service-wide staffing. 25

29 Feedback We welcome your comments on what you ve read in this issue of The Sand Table. We also welcome your suggestions and submissions of additional lessons learned and best practices for future issues of this publication. Contact the Senior Editor: MCTOG XO, LtCol David O Brien, PLMSMCTOGSANDTABLE@usmc.mil 26