Red Cell - Green Cell

Transcription

1 MSTP Pamphlet Red Cell - Green Cell MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. U.S. Marine Corps October 2011

2 MSTP Pamphlet Red Cell - Green Cell This pamphlet supports the academic curricula of the Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP). DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. U.S. Marine Corps October 2011

3 UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS MSTP Center (C 467) TECOM 2042 South Street Quantico, Virginia October 2011 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE. MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1, Red Cell - Green Cell, is designed to assist the staff officer in establishing and running a Red Cell and/or a Green Cell as part of the Marine Corps Planning Process. 2. SCOPE. This pamphlet is arranged in separate parts covering the Red and Green Cells, respectively. They discuss basic Red/Green cell concepts and the actions of these cells during problem framing, course of action development, course of action wargaming, and appropriate postwar game action. While the pamphlet is primarily focused at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level, its information is applicable to the Marine Corps component and major subordinate commands. 3. SUPERSESSION. MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1, The Red Cell, published 4 March CHANGES. Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands as well as from individuals. The attached User Suggestion Form can be reproduced and forwarded to: Commanding General Training and Education Command (C 467) MSTP Center 2042 South Street Quantico, Virginia Recommendations may also be submitted electronically to: MSTP_OPS@usmc.mil 5. CERTIFICATION. Reviewed and approved this date.

4 R. P. NEWMAN Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Director MAGTF Staff Training Program Center Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia Throughout this pamphlet, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either sex. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

5 USER SUGGESTION FORM From: To: Director, MSTP Center (C467), 2042 South Street, Quantico, Virginia In accordance with the Foreword, individuals are encouraged to submit suggestions concerning this pamphlet directly to the above addressee Page Line No. Article/Paragraph No. Figure/Table No. Nature of Change: Add Delete Change Correct 2. Proposed Text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on additional pages as necessary. 3. Justification/Source: (Need not be double-spaced.) NOTE: 1. Only one recommendation per page. 2. Locally reproduced forms may be used for submissions to:

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7 MSTP Pamphlet Record of Changes Change No. Date of Change Entry Date Organization Signature

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9 Table of Contents Part I The Red Cell Chapter 1-R Introduction... Red Red Cell Fundamentals... Red a What is a Red Cell?... Red b Purpose of the Red Cell... Red Red Cell Relationships... Red The Red Cell and the OPT... Red Staff Cognizance of the Red Cell... Red-3 Chapter 2-R Problem Framing... Red Coordinate with the G-2/S-2... Red Analyzing Adversary Strengths and Weaknesses... Red Develop Enemy Planning Tools... Red Advise the Operational Planning Team... Red-7 Chapter 3-R Course of Action Development... Red Develop/Refine the Enemy Course of Action... Red a Detailed Enemy Course of Action Development. Red b Enemy Capabilities... Red c Predictive Analysis... Red d Comparison of Enemy and Friendly Forces... Red Course of Action Development Products... Red a Mini-War Game... Red b Develop Synchronization Matrix... Red c Course of Action Graphic and Narrative... Red d Advise the Operational Planning Team... Red-12 Chapter 4-R Course of Action War Game... Red Preliminary Actions... Red a Select War Game Technique... Red b Pre-Start Presentations... Red Conduct of the War Game... Red Recording the War Game... Red-17 i

10 Chapter 5-R Post-War Game Role... Red Post-War Game Products... Red Future Operations... Red Disestablishment... Red-22 Appendix A Example Red Cell Products... Red-23 A-1 Enemy Mission Statement... Red-23 A-2 Enemy Commander s Intent... Red-23 A-3 Enemy Center of Gravity Analysis... Red-23 A-4 Relative Combat Power... Red-24 A-5 Most Likely Course of Action... Red-25 A-6 Most Dangerous Course of Action... Red-26 A-7 Synchronization Matrix... Red-27 A-8 Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix... Red-29 Part II The Green Cell Chapter 1-G Introduction... Green Green Cell Fundamentals... Green Composition of the Green Cell... Green Staff Cognizance of the Green Cell... Green-3 Chapter 2-G Problem Framing... Green Coordinate and Organize... Green Model the Environment... Green a Five Dimensions of Operational Culture... Green b A Structured Approach to Problem Framing... Green c District Stability Framework... Green Problem Framing Brief... Green a Sources of Conflict... Green b Sources of Resiliency... Green c Transition to COA Development... Green-15 Chapter 3-G Course of Action Development... Green Toolbox for COA Development... Green Course of Action Development Products... Green a Develop Synchronization Matrix... Green b Mini War Game... Green c Advise the Operational Planning Team... Green COA Brief... Green-20 ii

11 Chapter 4-G Course of Action War Game... Green Preliminary Actions... Green a Select War Game Technique... Green d Pre-Start Presentations... Green Conduct of the War Game... Green Recording War Game... Green-24 Chapter 5-G Post War Game Role... Green Post-War Game Products... Green Future Operations... Green Disestablishment... Green-26 Appendix B Examples Green Cell Products... Green-27 B-1 ASCOPE/PMESII Matrix... Green-27 B-2 Population Support Overlay... Green-28 B-3 Social Network Analysis... Green-29 B-4 Link Diagrams... Green-30 B-5 Scenarios analysis... Green-31 Appendix C District Stability Framework... Green-33 Glossary... Glossary-1 Acronyms... Glossary-1 Definitions... Glossary-3 References... References-1 Figures 2-G-1 The Five Operational Culture Dimensions... Green-7 2-G-2 Three Questions for Understanding the Environment... Green-8 2-G-3 Three Characteristics of Key Influencers... Green-12 B-1 ASCOPE across PMESII... Green-27 B-2 Population Support Overlay... Green-28 B-3 Social Network Graphs... Green-29 B-4 Link Diagram... Green-30 B-5 Defining Outcomes Using Key Influencer Characteristics... Green-32 B-6 Pairing the Defined Outcomes... Green-32 B-7 Plausible Scenarios Defined for Each Pairing... Green-32 iii

12 C-1 District Stability Framework Four Step Process... Green-33 C-2 Analyzing Causes of Instability... Green-35 Tables A-1 Example of Relative Combat Power... Red-24 A-2 Example of Synchronization Matrix... Red-28 A-3 Example of Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix... Red-29 iv

13 Part I The Red Cell

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15 Chapter 1-R Introduction Red Cell Fundamentals The Red Cell is a commander s planning tool to help better understand the environment he is in with respect to the enemy, to better understand the nature of the problem he is facing writ large, and ultimately to make more informed decisions. Its proper use ensures enemy capabilities and friendly courses of action (COA) are thoroughly assessed and improved against adversary capabilities and other critical factors within his area of operations. It is essential that the Red Cell stand up at the same time as the operational planning team (OPT) and has sufficient resources to assist the OPT with Problem Framing. During the COA war game the Red Cell models the reactions of a thinking enemy (in accordance with an established enemy course of action) in order to test and strengthen the OPT s selected COA(s). a. What is a Red Cell? The Red Cell is an ad hoc working group within the OPT. Ideally it consists of individuals of varied operational backgrounds and specialties. Combining their own operational experience with enemy tactics, weapons and doctrine, the Red Cell provides enemy reactions to the friendly COA(s) during the COA war game. b. Purpose of the Red Cell The purpose of the Red Cell is to assist the commander in assessing COA(s) against a thinking enemy. Depending on the size of the organization, a red cell can range in size from an intelligence officer to a task-organized group of subject matter experts (SME). While a red cell s principal duties center on COA development and the COA war game, it participates in the analysis of COA(s) and also supports the commander s understanding of the problem during problem framing. Red-1 - MCWP 5-1

16 During the COA war game step of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), the Red Cell employs an enemy COA against the OPT s COA(s). This step ensures the enemy s capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions are realistically considered with respect to proposed friendly COA(s). Properly used, the Red Cell will help the commander and staff: Visualize the flow of operations Plan against the full range of enemy COA(s) The objective of the Red Cell is not to defeat friendly COA(s) during the war game, but to assist in testing, improving, modifying and gaining a greater understanding of friendly COA(s) Red Cell Relationships The Red Cell is a sub-component of the OPT, which by definition is an ad hoc organization. Getting the right people for an OPT/Red Cell is critical, but who these people are will depend entirely on the situation and the resources available. At a minimum the Red Cell leader should be someone who is very familiar with the planning process. Red Cell members should have high levels of experience and knowledge. An effective Red Cell should include personnel who can represent maneuver, intelligence, fires, logistics and aviation from an adversary perspective. It should be task organized to model the mission(s), strengths and capabilities of the enemy force, paying special attention to potential COA(s) and terrain and weather factors. Other desirable skills/experience for Red Cell members would be in the areas of engineering; in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons; and command and control. Individuals who have been commanders or who have served on higher level staffs (or are weapons and/or tactics instructors) can provide useful insights to Red Cell analyses and the COA war game. Other Red Cell members should be subject matter experts, such as in intelligence, culture, civil agencies, etc., to the extent the overall manning situation permits The Red Cell and the OPT Red Cell members should be present and engaged throughout all phases of the problem framing step; the design dialog, the Commander s Orientation, Initial Intent and Guidance and the resulting staff actions. Red-2

17 The OPT must keep the Red Cell informed about changes in planning guidance and criteria, as well as the planning schedule. This includes: New or changed commander s war game guidance and commander s evaluation criteria Changes in the rules of engagement (expected use of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorist activity, or attempts to enforce extended territorial waters, no fly zones, maritime exclusion zones) When the war game will start. In a counterinsurgency (COIN) or Stability Operations environment it is important for the Red Cell to also coordinate and share information with the Green Cell. The Green Cell, which will be described in Part II of this pamphlet, operates as part of an OPT to model the civil population just as the Red Cell models the adversary. Interaction between the adversary and the population will affect the operating environment and the OPT should consider it throughout its planning Staff Cognizance of the Red Cell As stated in MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, the Red Cell operates under the staff cognizance of the G-2. However, in practice, the Red Cell Officer in Charge (OIC) is often an experienced planner who reports directly to the G-3/5 plans section via the OPT leader. Regardless, the G-2 provides the Red Cell with the initial detailed information on enemy locations, weapons, tactics, doctrine, order of battle, and assessed COA(s). As the Red Cell conducts its own analysis, it should continue to coordinate with the G-2. For example, the Red Cell through its own research and analysis may conclude that the enemy will employ armor and artillery in a unique way. Alternatively, the Red Cell may decide that a COA completely different from the one provided by the G-2 is the one the enemy is most likely to use. Together, the Red Cell and G-2, must hold free and open discussions of Red Cell conclusions regarding enemy COA(s). The G-2 must approve any changes to the most likely or most dangerous enemy COA(s). This ensures the information the G-2 briefs to the OPT and the commander is consistent with what the Red Cell is refining and preparing for the COA war game. Furthermore, the G-2 and the Red Cell must collaborate on collections and other Red-3

18 intelligence efforts to provide the best possible information throughout the planning process. Bottom Line: To be effective, the OPT, G-2/S-2, Red Cell and (if required) Green Cell must exchange information and analysis continually throughout the planning process. Red-4

19 Chapter 2-R Problem Framing During Problem Framing, the Red Cell collects and analyzes information and conducts parallel planning efforts from the adversary s perspective. The Red Cell builds on the OPT s efforts to understand the problem and the environment, especially from the adversary s point of view Coordinate with the G-2/S-2 During Problem Framing, the first priority of the Red Cell is to gain and develop situation awareness. It accomplishes this through close coordination with its primary source of information the unit intelligence section. The G-2/S-2 briefs the Red Cell on the current enemy situation and provides it with the latest intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) products. The flow of information from the G-2/S-2 will continue throughout the planning process until the Red Cell is disestablished. As the Red Cell analyzes the enemy, its assessment of the enemy and analytic products may differ from those provided by the G- 2/S-2. These products should be coordinated with the G-2/S-2, before release to the staff and OPT, to ensure a coherent intelligence picture is portrayed throughout the command Analyze Adversary Strengths and Weaknesses Using the initial guidance from the commander and OPT, the Red Cell reviews and analyzes enemy doctrine as modified by the current intelligence picture provided by the G-2/S-2. This information is used to focus the Red Cell s efforts on identifying the enemy center of gravity (COG) and associated critical vulnerabilities (CV) for each enemy COA. The purpose is to validate or revise the G-2/S-2 s analysis of the enemy COG and CV(s). Any differences are immediately shared with the G- 2/S-2. In addition to reviewing the enemy COG, the Red Cell must determine which aspects of the friendly forces are perceived by the enemy as Red-5

20 COG(s). Once that step is completed, the Red Cell should carry the analysis further and determine what the enemy will perceive as friendly CVs. These may differ from the US perspective. The results are key, because they indicate where the enemy places his focus. This analysis will guide the OPT s COA development, and force protection actions. The results will also assist the Red Cell once it begins analysis of the enemy COA Develop Enemy Planning Tools The Red Cell should establish a set of planning tools similar to those used by the OPT. This is not an attempt to mirror image the adversary after the way friendly forces plan or fight, but simply a way to organize the Red Cell s analysis to support the conduct of the COA war game. The Red Cell must draft an enemy mission statement that captures what they assess the enemy has been instructed to do by its higher headquarters (essential tasks) and the five elements of a mission statement: Forces to conduct the operation Type of operation Time the operation will start and end Location of the area of operation Purpose of the operation The Red Cell should also draft a commander s intent for the enemy. This should be based on information available from higher headquarters as well as open source reporting, enemy doctrine, recent operational patterns and available biographic information about enemy commanders. The Red Cell should try to define the enemy s goals and objectives as well as how the enemy commander envisions achieving them. The Red Cell reviews the relative strengths and weaknesses of the enemy forces as developed by the G-2/S-2 and attempts to determine whether the enemy shares these conclusions. For example, in Somalia, conventional wisdom indicated the lack of sophisticated communications was a weakness of the Somali warlords. Yet the Somalis saw their use of cell phones and civilian runners as a strength that reduced their need for support infrastructure and minimized the chance of intercept by US forces. Red-6

21 The Red Cell examines the weaknesses and strengths of the friendly forces and confirms potential high value targets (HVT), or those assets and things the enemy considers essential for the friendly forces to carry out its mission. Remember the Red Cell is tasked to think from the perspective of the adversary. At the MEF level, HVT(s) may not be maneuver or fires targets; instead the enemy may focus on more vulnerable targets associated with command and control nodes, logistics nodes, airfields, port facilities, or lines of communication. Often there is a link between CV(s) and HVT(s). By identifying those MEF facilities, installations, or nodes the enemy would most likely target, the Red Cell can help the MEF force protection planners. If the G-2/S-2 has been unable to provide them, the Red Cell should attempt to determine enemy current and projected unit boundaries based on the current force disposition and enemy doctrinal templates. Together with the mission and intent, this should reveal the area of operations and probable geographic objectives for the enemy force Advise the Operational Planning Team The Red Cell must be an integral part of the OPT during Problem Framing. Although the G-2/S-2 will have a representative in the OPT whose role is to provide intelligence to the OPT, the OPT will frequently need an assessment and interpretation of enemy intent and probable COA. The Red Cell should provide that information. Additionally, at the conclusion of Problem Framing, the Red Cell should, following coordination with the G-2/S-2, present a briefing of its analysis to the OPT. Red-7

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23 Chapter 3-R Course of Action Development During COA development, the Red Cell refines enemy COA(s) specified by the G-2/S Develop/Refine the Enemy Course of Action a. Detailed Enemy Course of Action Development The G-2/S-2 will provide the Red Cell with (at a minimum) the most likely and most dangerous enemy COA(s). The Commander (friendly, not the Red Cell OIC) may also include other less likely COA(s) in his planning guidance. The Red Cell now begins the process of assessing the COA(s) in detail. The Red Cell may also determine potential enemy branches and sequels, or if warranted, develop and present new COA(s) that become apparent during analysis. The specified COA(s) are developed and refined based on the priority established by the G-2/S-2 or the commander. Each COA is developed using operational capabilities of the enemy and validated enemy doctrine. The Red Cell determines realistic time/distance factors for enemy movement and maneuver for each enemy COA based on enemy doctrine and tactics. Red Cell personnel should consider each warfighting function of the enemy force and identify or define its role in the enemy COA. The Red Cell must remember to not mirror image they must think like the enemy and not like Marines. As it refines the enemy COA(s), the Red Cell should also be able to identify and refine the following: Enemy COG and critical vulnerabilities Likely enemy movement rates and associated time phase lines Enemy responses during the war game G-2/S-2 s analysis of potential HVT(s) Friendly CV(s) Enemy targeting plan Enemy threat to the friendly forces rear area Red-9

24 Enemy intelligence collection and counter-reconnaissance capabilities Enemy engineering and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capabilities b. Enemy Capabilities The Red Cell focuses on the enemy s capabilities. If possible, the cell will also attempt to articulate what it believes are the enemy s intentions. The following are some questions about the enemy to help focus the OPT and the Red Cell: How can he hurt me? (enemy capabilities) What threatens me the most? (friendly COG(s)) When will he reach a certain point in the battlespace? (Doctrinal rates of movement) Who among the enemy forces is most capable of hurting me in the near future? (Committed forces and reserves available) How fast and by what means can he reach me? (Avenues of approach) How and when did he get to his present location? (Situational awareness) What has he done recently? (Pattern analysis of current operations) c. Predictive Analysis The Red Cell should use predictive analysis to depict future enemy activity. Predictive analysis is the use of intelligence to examine past and present enemy actions to paint a picture of future enemy activities. Based on the integration of enemy doctrine and capabilities with environmental effects, the Red Cell develops a list of enemy options or COA(s). These things prepare the commander and the staff for a variety of potential enemy actions (most likely, most dangerous, and any branches. The Red Cell must prepare branches to the basic enemy COA(s) for the war game. These branches must be reviewed and coordinated with the G-2 before presentation to the staff. Red-10

25 d. Comparison of Enemy and Friendly Forces The Red Cell should remain tied in to the OPT as the planners develop friendly COA(s). As the friendly COA(s) become more mature, enemy capabilities, together with enemy and friendly CV(s) and COG(s) (identified during Problem Framing) are evaluated for each enemy and friendly COA. This is a critical element of the ongoing dialogue between the OPT and the Red Cell. Without this information the Red Cell cannot effectively prepare for the COA war game, and the friendly COA(s) will consequently suffer. Furthermore, the Red Cell keeps the OPT updated on their detailed analysis of the enemy COA(s), allowing the OPT to shape friendly COA(s) Course of Action Development Products a. Mini-War Game The Red Cell should conduct an internal mini-war game of their COA(s) against OPT-developed friendly COA(s) in order to ensure the enemy COA is fully prepared for presentation during the wargaming step. The Red Cell must adequately stress the friendly COA(s). The mini-war game is an informal thought process conducted by the Red Cell that examines the execution of the enemy COA. The standard action, reaction, counteraction gaming sequence works well for this process. b. Develop Synchronization Matrix During the mini-war game, the Red Cell begins to develop the enemy synchronization matrix. This matrix will help determine if the enemy COA(s) are feasible and realistic. The matrix can also provide a detailed script for the Red Cell during the COA war game with the OPT. The matrix can be posted on a wall for the OPT and the Red Cell to refer to during the war game. It ensures units and assets are allocated in a reasonable way to support the enemy COA(s) within the given time and space. Most importantly, it captures in a written form the details of the enemy COA for reference during the COA war game. As the matrix is filled in, the Red Cell members should discuss each warfighting function s activities during certain events. Prior to the COA war game, the OPT leader and the Red Cell OIC must coordinate details and requirements of the synchronization matrix if the Red-11

26 war game is to proceed smoothly. If the COA(s) are segmented into phases or stages, both the OPT and the Red Cell may want to design their respective synchronization matrices to correspond accordingly. This coordination will facilitate comparing and contrasting the strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COA(s) versus the enemy COA(s). c. Course of Action Graphic and Narrative The COA graphic and narrative are critical tools used by the Red Cell to record planned enemy actions in the correct sequence. The graphic overlay clearly portrays where and how the enemy intends to accomplish its mission, guided by appropriate maneuver control measures such as boundaries. The narrative includes the purpose and tasks of the main effort, support efforts, reserve, and the sequencing and timing of the operation from the enemy perspective. d. Advise the Operational Planning Team The close communication between the OPT and the Red Cell must continue throughout COA development. The OPT will increasingly rely upon the Red Cell for information about the enemy COA as it develops the friendly COA. The Red Cell must be prepared to respond to OPT questions with additional details and analysis. Additionally, at the conclusion of COA development, the Red Cell should coordinate its analysis with the G-2 before briefing the OPT on the elements discussed above. Red-12

27 Chapter 4-R Course of Action War Game No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed. Red-13 - MCDP 1 ( p. 14) During the COA war game, the Red Cell presents doctrine-based enemy reactions to friendly actions. War game: A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation. (JP 1-02) Preliminary Actions This step in the MCPP pits friendly COA(s) against enemy COA(s) in a war game. The war game is controlled and run by the OPT Lead Planner with the Red Cell role-playing the enemy. The OPT Lead Planner establishes the rules of engagement and appoints the war game facilitator to control the functioning of the war game. The commander issues guidance on the conduct of the war game, which may include: Friendly COA(s) to be wargamed against specific threat COA(s) The timeline for the phase or stage of the operation Critical events to be wargamed Level of detail of the war game a. Select War Game Technique Based on the commander s wargaming guidance (provided simultaneously to the OPT and the Red Cell), the OPT will choose a

28 wargaming technique suited to the particular situation or type of command. The basic types are as follows: Sequence of Essential Tasks. The sequence of essential tasks highlights the initial shaping actions necessary to establish a sustainment capability and to engage enemy units in the deep battle area. At the same time, this technique enables planners to adapt if the Red Cell commander executes a reaction that necessitates the reordering of essential tasks. Using this technique allows wargamers to concurrently analyze the essential tasks required to execute the concept of operations. Avenue in Depth. Avenue in depth focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This technique is good for offensive COA(s) or for defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support. Belts. Belts divide the terrain into areas or sections that span the width of the sector (defense), zone (offense), or area of operation. This technique is most effective when the terrain is divided into well-defined cross-compartments during phased operations (e.g., a river crossing or helicopter-borne assault), or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined echelons. This technique is based on the sequential analysis of events in each belt; that is, events are expected to occur more or less simultaneously. This type of analysis is preferred because it focuses on essentially all forces affecting particular events in one timeframe. Box. The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, (e.g., colored landing beach, infiltration route, raid objective). It is most useful when time is limited and it applies to all types of units. The OPT isolates the area and focuses on the critical events within that area. The assumption is that the friendly units not engaged in the action can handle the situations in their area of the battlespace and the essential tasks assigned to them. b. Pre-Start Presentations Prior to execution of the first moves and countermoves, the Red Cell should brief the OPT on the results of its analysis of the enemy COA. Virtually all of this information should already have been presented to the OPT but it is useful to formally present once again a synopsis of the Red-14

29 enemy force posture, mission, intent, as well as a brief description of the enemy COA. Neither the OPT nor the Red Cell should keep secrets from each other in order to gain an advantage during the COA war game. The goal here is not so much to win as to learn. New commander s guidance plus any new intelligence or other information that might significantly impact OPT planning should be revealed as soon as possible. The OPT leader should determine what information merits consideration during the war game. The event template (MCWP 5-1, p. E-6) can be used to graphically depict enemy COA(s). It is developed by the Red Cell using the MOS skills of its members. For example, the engineer representative in the Red Cell would ensure the event template includes likely enemy minefield and obstacle locations, while the artillery representative would indicate potential enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket firing sites. Additionally, the Red Cell should describe those actions the enemy would take prior to the commencement of operations. These actions could include such issues as establishment of logistics sites, reconnaissance screen, assembly areas, and obstacle belts. The enemy synchronization matrix can be reproduced as a handout and disseminated to the OPT and the Red Cell for the war game. It can serve as a readily available source on the enemy s capabilities and thought process Conduct of the War Game During the war game, the role of the Red Cell is to accurately portray the enemy while the friendly commander executes his various COA(s). The ultimate goal is to produce a concept of operations that will allow the friendly commander to accomplish his mission, not for the Red Cell to win (or to roll over). The Red Cell should ensure enemy actions are realistic, operationally sound, and indicative of the enemy s perceived thought process. It should address all functional areas and highlight enemy capabilities and limitations. If any issues or disputes are encountered during the war game, the facilitator should intervene, make a decision, note the issue, and continue the process. Game Move Sequence A game turn covers all friendly and enemy actions planned to occur during a specified time interval and focused on a specific task or event. Red-15

30 Each game turn usually consists of at least three moves two by the friendly force, one by the enemy force. If a Green Cell is established, it will also require a move. The friendly force has two moves because the activity is intended to validate and refine the friendly forces COA, not the enemy s. If necessary, additional moves may be required to achieve desired effects. If there is a Green Cell, the facilitator will determine whether its move occurs before or after the adversary reaction. In either case the Red Cell must be able to account for the adversary s actions towards and interactions with the civil population. Friendly Actions. After the various pre-war game friendly and enemy briefs are given, the war game begins with the first friendly action. The war game then proceeds through each warfighting function representative to give the details of the friendly COA. Representatives explain how they would execute actions in accordance with the COA and the expected enemy force disposition. Enemy Reactions. Normally the Red Cell OIC will speak for the Red Cell and respond to friendly actions. He will use an enemy synchronization matrix and event template to describe the enemy s activities. The event template will be updated as new intelligence is received and as a result of the war game. These products will depict named areas of interest (NAI) and when to collect information that will confirm or deny the adoption of a particular COA by the enemy. The information will serve as a guide for collection planning. The Red Cell OIC will describe enemy actions by warfighting function. He should present the enemy s concept of operations, and concept of reconnaissance and surveillance. What intelligence collection assets does the enemy have? How and when will he employ them? Also, the Red Cell OIC should describe how the enemy will organize its battlespace: rear area, main battle area, and security area. Are there potential engagement areas, fire sacks, etc? He should identify the location, composition, and expected strength of the enemy reserve, as well as the anticipated decision point (DP) and criteria the enemy commander might use in committing his reserve. Other enemy DP(s) he might identify include likely times, conditions, and areas for the enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and friendly NBC defense requirements, when the enemy might begin a withdrawal, where and when the enemy Red-16

31 might use unconventional forces, etc. Based on the experience level of the Red Cell OIC, he might also offer insight on the likely effectiveness of friendly actions. For example, the initial most dangerous enemy COA did not take into account the projected friendly force lay down of the friendly COA that is to be wargamed. This may permit the enemy to adopt a different COA that could become the most dangerous COA in this particular context. The friendly commander will want to know what decisions the enemy commander will have to make and when those decisions will be made ( Are they event driven? ). When a deception plan is being wargamed, the Red Cell should outline target biases and predispositions, how and when the enemy would perceive the desired misleading indicators and enemy actions that will indicate the deception has been successful. Counteractions. After the enemy reaction is executed, friendly forces will provide a counteraction and the various warfighting functions activities will be discussed and recorded before advancing to the next series of events. If necessary, the war game facilitator authorizes more moves by both (or all three, if there is a Green Cell) sides in order to achieve the desired fidelity. If possible, the staff analyzes each critical event by identifying the tasks the force must accomplish one echelon down using assets two echelons down Recording the War Game At selected points, the map picture should be annotated and recorded to provide a time-referenced graphic for each COA to support later comparison and decision. Also, recording the war game results gives the staff a record from which to build task organizations, synchronize activity, develop DST(s), confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and analyze COA(s) based on identified strengths and weaknesses. The Red Cell should ensure that the maps accurately reflect the enemy disposition at the designated times. The OPT starts the war game with clear overlays (electronic or acetate). It should use any available automated tools (e.g., Command and Control Personal Computer [C2PC]) to aid in the conduct of the war game and Red-17

32 the recording of its results. This will become especially important as war game results are reproduced and disseminated. It will be helpful if the OPT retains the start and the finish overlays for each war game. These overlays can be used to graphically show the commander the thought process of the war game. The overlays can also be handed off to the staff officers who will develop the order, thus making them useful transition tools. The retention of these war game overlays will also help add detail to the branches and sequels of the war game. Data Collection The OPT must concentrate on collecting data to support the commander s evaluation criteria. The commander articulates his criteria after COA development but prior to the war game. Examples of areas the commander s criteria may cover include: the principles of war, assumptions, shortfalls, speed and tempo, and asymmetrical application of combat power. The criteria will also identify strengths and weaknesses of each COA and point out any necessary corrections. As the sequence of events continues, the OPT identifies branches and sequels that may require closer scrutiny. These actions can be accomplished with a side bar or as an ongoing part of the OPT war game. Each adjustment, branch, and sequel should be recorded with the initiating time/event. These should then be added to the DST as decision points (DP). When events occur that cause a deadlock, or create unacceptable circumstances, the commander/opt leader decides whether to abandon that COA or revisit previous actions to modify his counteraction to the enemy. During the action-reaction-counteraction process, the friendly force intelligence representative should point out to the OPT the location and the activities of enemy HVT(s). Remember, HVT(s) are those targets or capabilities the enemy needs to accomplish its mission. The Red Cell may highlight points during the war game where specific HVT assets are important to the enemy COA. This may prompt the OPT to consider nominations of certain enemy HVT(s) as high payoff targets (HPT), making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA under consideration. As a result of this process, the OPT updates the situation and event templates associated with the enemy COA to reflect NAI(s) and targeted Red-18

33 areas of interest (TAI) supporting the acquisition and engagement of those HPT(s). The synchronization matrix and decision support template (DST) are particularly valuable tools. Targeting information, such as collection requirements, desired firing systems, target movement rates, and engagement times and locations should be captured in the synchronization matrix. As a result of the war game s action, reaction, and counteraction process, the OPT may identify targets, branches, or sequels that will require a decision to be made. Each time the OPT identifies such a DP, the recorder makes appropriate entries in the DST and synchronization matrix. Red-19

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35 Chapter 5-R Post-War Game Role The Red Cell records its findings for the OPT, and continues to assist future operations as required Post-War Game Products The OPT recorder must capture the significant decisions made during the war game. The strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COA(s) are recorded. Vulnerabilities and weaknesses in friendly forces or friendly COA(s) identified by the Red Cell must be captured and recorded. This information may be in the friendly synchronization matrix, the war game worksheet, or it may be recorded separately. Regardless of where or how it is recorded, it must be presented as part of the COA war game back brief to the commander. The friendly and enemy synchronization matrix and the war game worksheet should also be available for the commander to review. Certain useful products will result from the war game in addition to wargamed friendly COA(s). The OPT entered the war game with a rough event template and must complete the war game with a refined, more accurate event template. The event template with its NAI(s) and time phase lines help the G-2 focus the intelligence collection effort. An event matrix can be used as a script for the intelligence representative in the OPT during the war game. It can also indicate if the commander is relying too much on one or two collection platforms and has overextended these assets. The draft DST and decision support matrix (DSM) also come out of the COA war game. The commander may identify critical events and potential DP(s) early in the planning process, perhaps as he articulates his commander s orientation. Normally, DP(s) and TAI(s) should be on the draft DST as developed in the war game. Of course, as more information about friendly and enemy forces becomes available, the DST and DSM may change. Red-21

36 During the war game brief to the commander, the Red Cell should be prepared to brief the enemy COA(s) and defend the data produced by the Red Cell. Besides enemy reference materials, the Red Cell should have available the enemy mission statement, commander s intent, relative strengths and weaknesses analysis, COG/CV analysis, initial synchronization matrix, order of battle, and IPB products. After a detailed analysis of the friendly COA(s), the commander is now ready to compare those friendly COA(s) against each other and decide which is best. The commander identifies the COA which has the highest probability of success against the enemy s most likely/most dangerous COA (as based on the commander s evaluation criteria). This COA is then used to prepare the concept of operations that in turn forms the basis for orders development Future Operations If the commander anticipates further operations in the same theater of operations and the OPT continues to plan for future operations, the Red Cell may be kept intact. This would ensure continuity and reduce time lost reorienting a replacement team of analysts for the new Red Cell. As the OPT continues to plan future operations, the Red Cell should continue to analyze enemy future operations and provide the required support. The G-2 will continue to provide intelligence analysis and products and guide the Red Cell for as long as the Red Cell is in existence Disestablishment Once orders development begins and no future operations are anticipated, the role of the Red Cell is normally over. All products should be transferred to the OPT or G-2 or they should be destroyed in accordance with standard information handling procedures. Support equipment should be conveyed to the appropriate control authority, and the Red Cell members can then return to their original organizations and resume their normal work. Red-22

37 Appendix A Example Red Cell Products These products will be drafted by the Red Cell as though the enemy created them. They will duplicate equivalent US doctrinal products but will use the enemy voice to demonstrate his perspective. A-1. Enemy Mission Statement The Northern Operational Group (NOG) will conduct defensive operations to inflict maximum casualties on US forces in order to force their withdrawal from Tunisia thereby allowing us to gain joint sovereignty of the offshore oilfields through a negotiated settlement. Be prepared to prevent the US from threatening the homeland. A-2. Enemy Commander s Intent I want to force the US to withdraw their forces from Tunisia. Inflicting casualties on the US forces is more important than holding terrain. I view the landing of an amphibious force as an excellent opportunity to inflict maximum casualties on the Americans. I want to make the enemy pay in blood for every inch of Tunisian soil they occupy. The sooner we inflict these casualties the faster we will wear down the American will to fight. I see us wearing down the American forces in their rear areas and as they build their combat power in Tunisia. We will accomplish this through unconventional means. Do not risk the destruction of your forces, pull back when necessary, but be prepared to defend in earnest vicinity Gabes. Chemical weapons will not be used unless the Americans attempt to breach our border. A-3. Enemy Center of Gravity Analysis Orangeland Strategic Center of Gravity: Orangeland s de facto one-man rule and lack of formal governmental structure has focused power in the hands of Field Marshal Chilmand Sondo. There are no legal political parties. Opposition groups are for the most part in exile. The Army represents a latent political bloc inside the country, as does the Red-23

38 religious and tribal order, and other tribal groups. Sondo has encouraged in-fighting among his potential political and military successors to reduce internal threats to his power. Operational Center of Gravity. The NOG is the operational center of gravity. It is composed of eight separate brigades and two artillery regiments. The NOG has the personal sponsorship of Sondo and is allowed to recruit personnel from the remainder of the armed forces. As a result, the quality of personnel and equipment within this unit is without equal within the armed forces. Tactical Center of Gravity. The 102nd and 103rd Armored Brigades are the tactical center of gravity for the NOG. These are the best equipped (they are the only ones with T-72 tanks), most effectively led units within the NOG. In both exercises and in recent operations, the NOG has used the armored striking power of these brigades as its counterattack/exploitation force. MEF Center of Gravity. The NOG sees the MEF COG as its logistics tail. The upcoming campaign will test its capability to move, stockpile, and distribute fuel and water in a desert environment with few improved roads. The NOG believes it has identified several chokepoints (supply, ammunition, fuel dumps) it can attack, using irregulars, special operations forces, and surface-to-surface missiles. Successful attacks will disrupt MEF logistics, impose an unanticipated operational pause, and limit the ability of MEF forces to move and attack. A-4. Relative Combat Power Friendly Forces Enemy Forces Type Unit Nos. Value Weight Type Unit Nos. Value Weight Tank Bn Tank Bn Atk Helo Sqdn Atk Helo Sqdn Arty Bn Arty Bn MRL Bn MRL Bn FW Sqdn FW Sqdn EW Sqdn EW Sqdn R&S Assets R&S Assets Total 284 Total 150 Notes: Table A-1: Example of relative combat power Red-24

39 A-5. Most Likely Course of Action Phase I Delay/Withdraw a. The 202 nd and 203 rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades will initially occupy prepared positions vicinity Mezzouna Oil Fields and Sfax. Do not take Sfax this could prevent smooth withdrawal should it become necessary. Once confronted with a major allied ground offensive, these two brigades will begin, during darkness, to displace by echelon south towards Gabes, making maximum use of minefields and other obstacles to slow the American advance. The 102 nd Armored Brigade will conduct limited counterattacks to prevent penetration of our lines and to cover the withdrawal of our slower infantry. The 205 th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will occupy positions vicinity Gafsa in order to provide early warning and to delay an envelopment by US forces. Priority of fires from the 401 st Artillery Regiment will go to the 202 nd and 203 rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades. Engineer Battalion will assist the 202 nd and 203 rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades develop defensive positions vicinity Mezzouna Oil Fields and Sfax. The Engineer Battalion then supports the 204 th Mechanized Infantry as it builds the second echelon defenses vicinity Gabes. b. The 301 st Motorized Infantry Brigade will continue to occupy Djerba Island. The 103 rd Armored Brigade will be the NOG reserve. Second echelon brigades will continue to secure the coastal road (Route 1) for resupply of the NOG, and will establish an in-depth defense from the Orangeland border to Gabes. Operational control of the forward brigades will be delegated to the 102 nd Armored Brigade commander. The rear echelon brigades will be under the operational control of 201 st Mechanized Infantry Brigade commander. c. Organic AAA and SA-7s, along with the NOG Air Defense Regiment, will support NOG forces. All fixed-wing aircraft will remain in Orangeland and will only be used to defend the homeland. Naval forces will primarily lay mines and attempt to hinder any attempt by US forces to conduct an amphibious assault. Phase II Defense of Gabes a. Taking advantage of the constrained terrain, minefields, and obstacles around Gabes, the 202 nd, 203 rd, and 205 th Mechanized Infantry Brigades will occupy and defend the prepared positions at Gabes. The 102 nd Red-25

40 Armored Brigade will support the defense by sealing off and eliminating local penetrations. The 103 rd Armored Brigade will act as reserve. Priority of fires from the 401 st Artillery Regiment will go to the defending Mechanized Infantry Brigades. Should the second defensive belt be penetrated, all units are to fall back by echelon behind the third defensive belt at Medenine. b. Prior to occupation of the second defensive belt, the 204 th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will displace south and assist in the establishment of the third defensive belt vicinity Medenine. The remainder of NOG forces will be under the operational control of the 201 st Mechanized Infantry Brigade. c. Fixed wing aircraft and naval forces will have the same concept of operations as in Phase I. A-6. Most Dangerous Course of Action Defense of Gabes. a. Taking advantage of the recent operational pause to resupply and refit, the NOG will establish a defense in depth from Gabes to our border. This course of action takes advantage of more defensible terrain. Our analysis of the enemy indicates his objective is to defeat our forces and force us from Tunisia. This forces him to attack into our strength, attempt an envelopment of our western flank over long distances and very inhospitable terrain, or attempt an amphibious landing along our eastern flank. Any one or a combination of these actions are to our advantage and will either drive the enemy to fight through a successive layer of defenses or diminish his combat power by attempting to fix us near Gabes and then proceed with one or more envelopments. b. The NOG s first echelon maneuver forces, consisting of the 102 nd and 103 rd Armored Brigade and the 202 nd, 203 rd, and 205 th Mechanized Brigades, will establish defensive positions north and west of Gabes. Their mission is to defeat US forces attacking south along Route 1 and its adjacent corridors and from the west along Route 15. These forces will execute localized counterattacks and exploitation, as opportunities for such are presented. The 401 st Artillery Regiment is in general support of the first echelon. First echelon forces are under the tactical control of the 102 nd Armor Brigade. Red-26

41 c. The NOG s second echelon force, consisting of the 101 st and 104 th Armored Brigades, the 201 st and 204 th Mechanized brigades, and the 301 st Motorized Infantry Brigade, will establish a defense in depth from Gabes to our border. The 402 nd Artillery Brigade is in general support of the second echelon. The 204 th Mechanized Brigade is the NOG s operational reserve and is to be prepared to counterattack or reinforce penetrations of first echelon forces along either Route 1 or Route 15. The 301 st Motorized Infantry Brigade is to pay particular attention to potential amphibious landing sites along Djerba Island and immediately attack to repel an enemy landing. Remaining second echelon forces, while remaining in defensive positions, will be prepared to counter any attempt to envelop our western flank; the 201 st Mechanized Brigade will give particular emphasis to identifying likely routes for enemy armor/mechanized units to move through that restricted terrain and effecting those measures and plans to prevent a breakthrough to the coast if an envelopment is attempted. The 101 st Armored Brigade will be prepared to reinforce the 201 st Mechanized Brigade or counterattack any amphibious landing along the coast south of Djerba Island. The 302 nd Motorized Infantry Brigade, 105 th and 106 th Armored Brigades, and 206 th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will stage along the border, with the mission of counterattacking any amphibious landing. d. Organic AAA, SA-7s, and the NOG Air Defense Regiment will support NOG forces. All fixed-wing aircraft will be used for defense of the homeland. Rotary-wing aircraft will be used to combat US forces. Naval forces will continue mining and harassment operations against enemy shipping. A-7. Synchronization Matrix A synchronization matrix indicates when critical functions occur over time and their relationship with other events. It is used during COA development and the COA war game and focuses capabilities and asset allocation in relation to the enemy (selected COA), time and space, and events (DP). Red-27

42 Enemy Most Likely Course of Action Time/Event Phase I (Sousse-Sfax) Phase II (Sfax-Gabes) Delay/Withdraw Defend Enemy Action Maneuver Intelligence Fires Logistics Deep Security Close Reserve Mobility Counter-mobility Rear Area Lethal Non-Lethal Sustainment Transport SCUD attacks at ports/airfields. Conduct rear area operations Covering force engages forward/delays/withdraws. Counter-reconnaissance actions. Operations security enforced. Rear area patrols Civilian shields and refugees to block roads. No decisive engagements. Priority withdrawal: artillery, mechanized, armor. 103 rd Armored Brigade remains in position Maintain lines of communication and facilitate rearward movement to Gabes and forward movement of supplies to Gabes. Blow bridges, Hasty mine fields. Force refugee movement to block roads. Anti-tank ambushes. Begin to establish third echelon positions in vicinity of Medenine. Active security operations. Identify main efforts at corps, division, and regimental level. Support friendly rear area operations Focus on attriting enemy and slowing his forward movement. Attack tactical command and fire direction nets. Employ propaganda to support forces in the field. Buildup supply points in the vicinity of Gabes. Emphasis on pushing supplies to Gabes and evacuating casualties. Same with added emphasis on enemy s extended lines of communications Reestablish security zone north of Gabes. Engage, disrupt, fallback. If second defensive belt is penetrated, fall back. Withdraw flank elements at Gafsa based on enemy maneuver. Reposition in vicinity of Medenine. Maintain lines of communication to border. Same. Withdraw FARP at Gabes. Position rear elements in vicinity of Orangeland border. Continue to identify main efforts. Watch for indications of amphibious assault. Same. Same. Same. Same. Table A-2: Example of synchronization matrix Red-28

43 A-8. Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix MANEUVER INTELLIGENCE FIRES LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL FORCE PROTECTION Deep Operations Security Close Operations Reserve Rear Operations Mobility Counter-mobility NAI TAI Lethal Non-Lethal Sustainment Transport NBC Air Defense RED Lead elements are in defensive positions and hold key terrain. Aviation forces not well trained; normally operate under ground based control. Mine warfare, mobile coastal missile and cruise missile armed fast attack craft capable of threatening Blue littoral operations. Capable of accurately massing artillery fires in support of offensive and defensive operations. Extended supply lines vulnerable to air interdiction Overall command and control at Brigade and higher level is poor Capable of employing weapons of mass destruction. Integrated Air Defense System unable to expand beyond border. BLUE Superior tracked mobility assets. Capable of fullspectrum operations throughout the AO. Small reserve Limited obstacle and mine-clearing assets. UAS and aerial recce. Multiple Launch Rocket System Aerial electronic warfare assets. Dedicated USA PSYOP assets. Table A-3: Example of strengths and weaknesses matrix Red-29

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45 Part II The Green Cell

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47 Chapter 1-G Introduction It is now time to recognize that a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred: from armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field to strategic confrontation between a range of combatants, not all of which are armies, and using different types of weapons, often improvised. The old paradigm was that of inter-state industrial war. The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the people. (General Rupert Smith; The Utility of Force) War in the twenty-first century will require a U.S. military that is as capable of operating through successful enduring relationships with local sheikhs as it is at combined arms operations. Our wars will be wars amongst the people not wars against the people, and not wars oblivious to the people. (Operational Culture for the Warfighter) Green Cell Fundamentals The Green Cell is a commander s planning tool to help better understand the environment he is in with respect to the indigenous population, to better understand the nature of the problem he is facing writ large, and ultimately to make more informed decisions. Employed properly, the Green Cell improves the commander s, staff s, and OPT s understanding of the problem, which leads to a more informed mission statement and more comprehensive COAs. During the COA Development, the Green Cell models other relevant and dynamic aspects of the environment (cultural, political, ecological, etc.) when the Commander deems these relevant to the success of his planning efforts. In COA War Game, the Green Cell participates by assessing the COA(s) against these relevant and dynamic aspects of the environment to provide the Commander more comprehensive, complete COA(s). What is a Green Cell? The Green Cell is an ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of education and experience capable of identifying and Green-1

48 considering the perspective of the population, the HN government and other stakeholders within the operating environment. The green cell helps to inform the Commander, his Staff and the OPT, creating a better understanding of the operating environment throughout the MCPP. Purpose of the Green Cell The purpose of a green cell is to consider the population in order to promote a better understanding of the environment and the problem. At a minimum, the green cell provides for the independent will of the population. The green cell may also provide consideration for non-dod entities, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Green cell membership can range from an individual to a task-organized group of SMEs that include liaisons from the local populace and non-dod agencies. (MCWP 5-1) The Green Cell supports the planning efforts of the commander, staff and OPT. Especially within the context of population-centric irregular warfare operations, the Green Cell provides the OPT with valueadded context for a better understanding of the environment, particularly the civil aspects of the battlespace. It ensures the dynamics of the operating environment are realistically considered with respect to proposed friendly COA(s). Because the Green Cell is principally focused on social and behavioral systems, it requires a holistic approach and a structured set of tools. These tools build context for improved understanding of the operating environment. The Green Cell looks primarily at the inter-relationships of people (e.g. local populace, government and tribal leaders, etc), and for this reason it should look at the complexities of the entire social network. When it comes to making sense of the dynamic issues and relationships of the key stakeholders, the devil is always in the details. The Green Cell serves as an important tool for making sense of these details. It reduces uncertainty by assessing the will of the population, projecting their reaction to friendly actions and understanding their true motivations Composition of the Green Cell The Green Cell is a sub-component of the OPT and getting the right people is critical, but who these people are will depend entirely on the situation and resources available. Ideally, the Green Cell should be led Green-2

49 and facilitated by personnel knowledgeable in the MCPP and also capable of facilitating production of Green Cell products. The Green Cell may consist of individuals of varied operational and cultural backgrounds and specialties. Composition might include the following: cultural intelligence analysts, foreign area officer (FAO), civil affairs (CA) subject matter experts (SMEs), interagency representatives, information operations (IO) reps, local populace reps, and/or persons with expertise relevant to the area of interest. In cases where security clearances prohibit the inclusion of outside SMEs in the OPT, it is incumbent on the Green Cell leader to capture the knowledge and perspectives of these SMEs and ensure it is included in the analysis and the OPTs understanding of the operational environment (OE) Staff Cognizance of the Green Cell As an ad hoc working group, the Green Cell functions within the OPT rather than under a staff section. It is essential that the Green Cell works closely with G-2 Plans, G-9 Plans and the Red Cell. The collective efforts of all of these planners will serve to paint a more complete, synthesized picture of the operating environment for the Commander, his staff and the OPT. The Green Cell leader must understand the MCPP and champion the need to account for the perspectives of all external stakeholders during Problem Framing, COA Development and the COA Wargame. Bottom Line: An effective Green Cell integrates diverse perspectives and skill sets into the planning process and produces appropriate products or dialogue that strengthens the overall planning effort. Throughout the planning process, it is imperative the Green Cell be in close communication with the OPT and staff. Green-3

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51 Chapter 2-G Problem Framing During Problem Framing, the OPT strives to understand the environment and to understand the problem. The Green Cell plays a critical role by helping the Commander and the OPT consider the civil aspects of the environment and how they feed into understanding the nature of the problem. In a COIN or Stability Operations environment, the Green Cells analysis should weigh heavily on the OPTs Center of Gravity Analysis Understanding the environment provides background information, facts, status, connections, relevant actors, habitat, local beliefs, and a broad range of other factors that serve as context for the commander and his staff to better understand the problem (MCWP 5-1, 2-2) Coordinate and Organize During Problem Framing, the Green Cell has the dual focus of gaining and developing its own situational awareness as well as ensuring that the OPT integrates civil and cultural considerations into its understanding of the operating environment. It accomplishes this through close coordination with its primary sources of information, such as: The unit intelligence section and products Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) databases Civil Affairs (CA) representatives Department of State or United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives Academia Political Advisor (POLAD) and/or Cultural Advisor (CULAD) Additionally, the Green Cell should participate in the design dialog and contribute to the IPB and all other OPT briefings. Green-5

52 2002. Model the Environment What do we mean by modeling the environment? Simply collecting information about the environment is of little value to the OPT. In order to take full advantage of the Green Cell s experienced and knowledgeable people, their meaningful and nuanced understanding of the environment must be integrated into the OPT s entire planning effort. They must produce more than just generic bullet points in a brief. A realistic model of the environment requires a holistic and interactive look at the dynamic relationships between different aspects of the operating environment. Such a model represents a synthesis of differing layers of information (derived from various tools, overlays, geographic depictions, trend graphs, etc). By the time the OPT gets to the war game, the Green Cell should be prepared to describe and project how the friendly COA(s) and the civil environment will affect one another. a. Five Dimensions of Operational Culture Understanding the environment, particularly the human elements, provides critical context for effective military planning. From the perspective of Operational Culture 1 this understanding involves a multistep, iterative process that synthesizes information from all available sources (such as the intent of HHQ, IPB, the Country Handbook, and other intelligence and CIMIC). The goal of this iterative process is to develop greater understanding of the relevant dynamics, existing relationships, and mechanisms inherent to the environment. Regardless of the time available, a structured set of tools enables the Green Cell planners to work systematically while taking a holistic approach in considering diverse and dynamic elements of the environment. A popular tool for understanding the civil aspects of the environment is The Five Operational Culture Dimensions. This is simply one of many potential lenses through which to view the environment. The Physical Environment: This dimension covers the way in which a cultural group determines who has access to its physical resources (such as water, land, food, building materials, etc.). It also covers how the culture views the resources themselves (for example, is possession of or access to them a collective or individual right?). 1 A key reference for the Green Cell is Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications by Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber. Green-6

53 The Economy: This dimension refers to the way that people in a culture obtain, produce and distribute physical and symbolic goods (such as food, clothing, cars or currency). The Social Structure: This dimension covers how people organize their political, economic, and social relationships. It also covers how this influences the distribution of positions, roles, status, and power within a given culture group. The Physical Environment Beliefs and Symbols The Social Structure The Economy The Political Structure Figure 2-G-1: The Five Operational Culture Dimensions 2 The Political Structure: This dimension covers not only political structures, but also the unique forms of leadership existing within such structures (bands, societies, councils, hereditary chiefdoms and tribal structures, electoral political systems, etc.). Distinctions between formal or ideal political structures and actual power structures should be noted. Beliefs and Symbols: This dimension measures the beliefs that influence the world view of members of a given culture. It includes the rituals, symbols and practices associated with these beliefs and how these beliefs control and affect behavior. b. A Structured approach to Problem Framing One way a Green Cell can develop an operationally applicable understanding of the environment is to ask the three simple (yet not simplistic) questions shown in Figure 2-2. This approach helps the Green Cell ensure that the nuances of its cultural understanding (and other environmental aspects) are translated into their operational implications. 2 Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications by Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber (from CAOCL) Green-7

54 This set of questions can drive effective learning across the planning, execution, and assessment continuum as it encourages planners to think of themselves as continuous learners. They will begin by asking, What do I see? What does the data tell me? From the answers to such initial questions, planners can move on to ask, So, what are the relationships within what I see? How do those relationships work? So, what will this mean to us? Finally, they can link this understanding to potential actions by asking, Now, what are my options? Now, what decisions must I make? Now, what can we project about possible impacts of planned military operations? What? So What? Now What? Answer this question by collecting and organizing available data: People, Places and Things in the Environment as well as; Relevant characteristics (religious, political, criminal, etc) Tool(s): ASCOPE / PMESII, Population Support Overlay, Cultural Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH) Describe the significance of what you know about the environment: Map the relatio nships between people, places, and things; and Describes the way those relationships work (Dynamics) Identify the operationally relevant strengths (resiliencies) and weaknesses (drivers of conflict) Tool(s): Social Network Analysis (SNA), Link Diagrams, District Stability Framework (DSF), Key Influencer Dynamics Attempt to project (far enough for the current planning purposes) the dynamics of people, places, things and relationships. Identifies opportunities that can be leveraged Identifies undesired outcomes and risks to be managed or avoided Prepares planners to dynamically explore specific courses of action during wargaming Tool(s): Scenarios Analysis Focus during Problem Framing Focus during COA Development Figure 2-G-2: Three Questions for Understanding the Environment For time management considerations, the Green Cell should plan to focus on answering the What? and So What? during Problem Green-8

55 Framing, and then focus on the Now what? during COA Development (discussed in Chapter 3G). 1. Answering What? Answering the What? begins with the civil considerations of the environment. According to MCWP Civil considerations concern how the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations influence the conduct of military operations At the tactical level, civil considerations directly relate to key civilian areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events [ASCOPE] within the area of operations (AO). Using the initial guidance from the commander, the Green Cell should begin by assessing and analyzing the information available. The ASCOPE / PMESII matrix (See Appendix A-1) (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events) / (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information) is an organizational tool that is increasingly popular for categorizing information about the civil aspects of the environment. Each Box depicted below should have a supporting narrative, overlay or amplifying data with appropriate analysis that informs the Green Cell and OPT. It is not enough to list a bullet in each box. One tool for graphically depicting ASCOPE / PMESII information is the Population Support Overlay (See Appendix A-2), which geographically depicts defined segments of the populace. Again, this tool is useful for organizing and displaying data, but the Green Cell will need to understand why segments of the populace are oriented as they are. Eventually the Green Cell will have to anticipate how and why this situation might change. 2. Answering So What? Another tool available to the Green Cell is Social Network Analysis (SNA) (See Appendix A-3). SNA is a picture of the population, how it is put together and how the members interact with one another (MCWP ). The SNA should be a collaborative tool developed between the G-2, G-9 and the Green Cell. When considering the stability of a populace, closely assessing the appeal of individual leaders or the attraction of a particular group is just as critical, and often more Green-9

56 informative, than simply studying underlying cause of conflict (e.g. tribal or ethnic tension, competition for resources). SNA can help the Green Cell to appreciate the present and potential spheres of influence held by key groups and individuals. Again, the point of Green Cell activities are to appreciate dynamics and to anticipate potential changes. Although time for research, discussion and planning is always limited, putting in the effort to getting it right the first time can avoid potential missteps of force-fitting familiar problem descriptions onto unfamiliar and poorly understood situations. Consider the following vignette: The problem in northern Nowhereville is that smuggling is attractive to many young men because their pastoral lifestyle has collapsed in the wake of drought and overgrazing. They re unemployed and have no better options to earn income. This isolated bulge of young men needs their own source of income, and they will find illegal ways to get it if legal ways aren t available. Obviously if we get them some jobs, the smuggling will fall off. Let s draft them into the Nowheri Army and take care of the smuggling problem. But consider also that further investigation of the key influencers and the dynamic relationships revealed a very different perspective: While it is a fact that these young men are unemployed, it is also a fact that many of them are unemployable because they are from the wrong clans. They are caught up in gangs, a large number of them are essentially street children with no family-related social structures to influence or sustain them. Smuggling is not seen by the Nowheris as an illegal activity, but is instead an accepted commercial practice that goes back centuries in a country where evading taxes and other forms of perceived government interference and control is considered worthy of respect and admiration. The Nowheri Army is dominated by southerners that have no desire to share with the ethnically different northerners the economic and political opportunities that come from military service. Now imagine how the OPT would approach each vignette and how this will affect COA development. Clearly the differing perspectives in these two vignettes call for different approaches. The goal of SNA is to peel back some of the assumptions and gain a deeper understanding of the environment. Green-10

57 Link Diagrams One of the most useful tools for mapping SNA information is the Link Diagram (See Appendix A-4). Link diagrams may be created on paper or white board, or by using a variety of computer-based software tools designed specifically for this purpose. The link diagram graphically depicts relationships between people, events, locations, or other factors deemed significant in any given situation. Link diagrams help analysts better understand how people and factors are interrelated in order to determine key links. (MCWP ) Characterizing the Key Influencer Dynamics Since link diagrams are static representations of relationships, the next step is to examine the dynamics of those relationships. In describing dynamics, the Green Cell addresses the question: What effect does a change in one part of the system (environment) have on other parts? Considering the dynamics of the operating environment requires the Green Cell to identify key influencers things and people that affect changes in other people and things. Importantly, key influencers are not just people or organizations, but also things and places. Rising rivers, shrinking forests, and dry crop lands have as much of an effect on behaviors and other aspects of the environment as policy changes, violence, or charismatic leaders. Who and what are key influencers? What is the nature of the influencing effect? o What exactly is the effect? o Who does it impact? What is the speed at which the effect occurs? o How long will it take before an influencing event has a meaningful effect? What is the magnitude of the effect? o How widely and deeply is the effect s impact felt? o How many are affected? How much? How far? What is the response to the effect? o How do other elements (people, places, things) respond to the effect? o How does the source of the initial effect change or respond? Green-11

58 How are key influencers influenced to change? Further Refining Dynamics of Groups and Individuals When further refining the Green Cell s understanding of the key influencers, particularly of groups and individuals, consider the following three characteristics: power, legitimacy, and urgency (see Figure 2-G-3). The basic idea of the model below is that in considering various players, the greater the overlap of these three characteristics, the greater the significance of that person or group. Though a local leader is viewed as legitimate, so long as he has neither a power base nor a motive for change, he is not likely to be very active or influential. Urgency can be thought of as both time-sensitive and of critical interest for the individual or group it affects. Because urgency is a matter of time, considering this characteristic provides the Green Cell insight into the dynamics of potential actions. Figure 2-G-3: Three Characteristics of Key Influencers c. District Stability Framework (DSF) Whenever data, resources and time, are available, the Green Cell s understanding of the populace should seek to leverage tactically collected information (census reports, food distribution program database, HUMINT and OSINT reporting, etc). One program currently used by civilian and military at the tactical level is the District Stability Framework (DSF) [note: DSF was formerly called Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework or TCAPF]. DSF is a methodology developed by USAID to assist in collection and analysis of data to determine drivers of conflict at the tactical level. (See Appendix B for a detailed example.) Green-12

59 2003. Problem Framing Brief Generalizing about mass populations does not help the warfighter, because such generalizations miss the important, multilayered and multifaceted nature of human existence. (Operational Culture for the Warfighter. p. 42) If incorporated correctly, the Green Cell s model (or holistic understanding of the environment) will resonate throughout the problem framing brief to the Commander and his staff. Findings from the Green Cell should be evident within the COG analysis, recommended commander s critical information requirement (CCIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), assumption, task analysis, etc. In addition, the Green Cell will likely present a summary of the civil aspects of the operating environment, ensuring that the OPT knows where to find the detailed analysis. An example of how this may be portrayed is demonstrated below through the use of sources of conflict and sources of resiliency. This method provides a logical transition from Problem Framing to COA Development regarding the civil considerations. a. Sources of Conflict The sources of conflict will likely be presented as a dynamic situation resulting from groups or individuals mobilizing social groups around core grievances or issues. Items to address may include: Grievances factors that can cause instability Ethnic or religious tensions Political repression Population pressures Competition for natural resources Key actors /groups motivation and means possible ways they transform grievances into widespread instability. Who? o Political revolutionary o Organized crime group o Violent Extremist group o Who are the natural competitors? Green-13

60 Where? o Geographically? o Positions of power and influence? o Network of potential growth? How? o o o o How do they exert their influence? Capacity for violence or intimidation? Mass support? Other resources? Windows of Vulnerability moments when events threaten to rapidly change the balance of political or economic power; widespread instability is unlikely unless a window of vulnerability links grievances to means and motivations Elections Natural Disasters Invasion Loss of a key leader Economic shocks Humanitarian crisis Etc. b. Sources of Resiliency If a situation is unstable or violent, ask questions such as: Why are things not worse? (e.g. What stabilizing factors are influencing people to abstain from joining an insurgency?) What opportunities are emerging? (e.g. the pressures of a food shortage may have made people more flexible in their willingness to try new methods or behaviors.) Processes, relationships, and institutions that can reduce the effects of the grievances: Accessible, legitimate judicial structures Political outlets Stable livelihood Key actors or groups (such as an Imam who can settle disputes) Green-14

61 Windows of Opportunity situations or events that can strengthen resiliencies Natural disaster (if the immediate situation calls for opposing groups to work together) Events (success of a national sports team fostering a transcending identity) Holidays c. Transition to COA Development The model that the Green Cell develops during Problem Framing serves the OPT as an important transition to COA Development. For example, the grievances identified during problem framing are carried forward either as tasks to subordinate units or as intermediate objectives to be measured by the assessment cell while moving toward the desired end state. Identified key influencers may be moved into the effects cell to be the subject of further collections and/or non-kinetic targeting or shaping. The OPT can further develop windows of opportunity and windows of vulnerability as tools to facilitate the friendly COA development and mitigate whatever risks the final COA may entail. Green-15

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63 Chapter 3-G Course of Action Development During COA development, the Green Cell continues to increase the OPT s understanding of the environment, identifies opportunities that can be linked to relevant actions, resulting in directly actionable options; refines products; and prepares for wargaming Toolbox for COA Development 1. Answering Now What? Now what? is the third question that leads to an understanding of the environment already introduced by Figure 2-G-2. To answer this question, the Green Cell projects (far enough in advance to be relevant to current planning) what the dynamics of people, places, things and relationships within the environment will be. In accordance with the Commander s guidance, the Green Cell assesses dynamic responses to this future environment in greater detail. It continues to consider those aspects of the environment most relevant to the command s stated mission. During Problem Framing, the Green Cell began by looking at the various civil components of the operating environment, identifying key influencers, and mapping the dynamic nature of interrelated effects. Since an important byproduct of steps completed so far is the identification of key influencers and those who are influenced, the Green Cell can now focus on recommending actions to develop even greater understanding: collection methods, leadership engagements, information operations, civil military operations, etc. The Green Cell should be mindful to not mirror image they must consider the context, dynamics, motivations, and incentives of key influencers. If possible, the cell will also attempt to articulate what it believes are the intentions of key influencers. The Green Cell should also be able to identify and refine the following: Windows of vulnerability and opportunity Sources of conflict and resilience Green-17

64 Anticipated civil responses for wargaming Indicators and collection requirements for assessments 2. Scenarios Analysis Scenarios are plausible and provocative stories about how the future might unfold Scenarios Analysis provides a framework for considering multiple plausible futures. (Heuer and Pherson, 2011) One tool the Green Cell can use to prepare for the war game is scenarios analysis. Since the Green Cell is unable to predict the future with any certainty, it is more useful to define a range of possible scenarios, and to equip the commander to weigh options and risks. The point of the Green Cell s scenarios analysis is to maintain focus on the key influencers and dynamics, rather than on a particular end state. One of the strengths of this technique is that plausible scenarios provide indicators. These indicators may point to decision points (DPs) during the war game and execution. These indicators can then be further refined into collection requirements, against which empirical evidence can be used to validate or invalidate these potential scenarios as they begin to play out. Scenarios Analysis can be used as follows: Provide a framework for considering multiple plausible futures Help focus attention on the key factors most likely to influence how a situation develops Suggest indicators to monitor (collection plan) that a particular scenario is becoming more or less likely (may lead to decision points for the Commander) Help the OPT develop plans to exploit opportunities and avoid risks Scenarios analysis can be done quickly and informally by the Green Cell discussing a few probing questions such as: Based on what we know so far What is the best possible response? How do things need to change to get there? What is the worst possible response? How do things need to change to get there? What other possible responses are likely? Which of these are advantageous or disadvantageous to our mission objectives? How do things need to change to get there? Green-18

65 The Green Cell should quickly determine which scenarios are the most useful for wargaming against Friendly COAs. Develop the scenarios further to highlight opportunities and/or vulnerabilities as they relate to achieving mission objectives. Based on these scenarios, what strategies can be used to mitigate or shape the effects of friendly actions? Finally, generate a list of indicators and collection requirements to observe during the war game, as well as execution. If time and situation permit, the Green Cell may choose to conduct a more thorough and deliberate scenarios analysis (see Appendix B-5) Course of Action Development Products a. Develop Synchronization Matrix The Green Cell should have an understanding of the friendly COA(s), the concept of operations, and how they are phased. This will allow the Green Cell to create a synchronization matrix that will support the OPT in the War Game. During the internal war game, the Green Cell begins to develop the synchronization matrix or timelines depicting the most plausible scenarios. These products will also provide a detailed script for the Green Cell during the COA War Game with the OPT. The matrix can be posted on a wall for the OPT and the Green Cell to refer to during the COA war game. It ensures key influencers and assets are considered in a reasonable way to reflect each scenario within the given time and space. Prior to the COA war game, the OPT leader or war game facilitator and the Green Cell leader must coordinate details and requirements of the synchronization matrix if the war game is to proceed smoothly. If the COA(s) are segmented into phases or stages, both the OPT and the Green Cell may want to design their respective synchronization matrices to correspond to the COA war game phases and stages. This coordination will facilitate comparing and contrasting the strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COA(s). b. Mini-War Game The Green Cell should conduct an internal war game of their scenarios against OPT-developed friendly COA(s) in order to ensure plausible scenarios are fully prepared for presentation during the more formal war Green-19

66 game step with the rest of the OPT. The standard action, reaction, counteraction gaming sequence works well for this process c. Advise the Operational Planning Team The close communication between the OPT and the Green Cell must continue throughout COA Development. The OPT will increasingly rely upon the Green Cell for information about the civil responses as it develops the friendly COA, and the Green Cell must be prepared to respond to the OPT s questions with additional details and analysis. The friendly COA(s) the OPT presents to the Commander at the end of COA Development should be shaped and informed by Green Cell analysis and input COA Development Brief Similar to the Problem Framing Brief, the Green Cell s analysis should permeate within the COA Development brief and in each of the OPT s recommended COAs. In addition, the Green Cell may provide the Commander and the Staff with an update of the relevant, evolving analysis of specific civil considerations. Incorporated into the brief should be the results of the Green Cell s scenarios analysis. This represents the range of possible actions and outcomes that may occur within the population based on their perception of the situation. Ideally, while providing wargaming guidance, the Commander will also provide guidance to the Green Cell and the OPT leader directing which of these scenarios he wants the Green Cell to focus on during the COA War Game. Green-20

67 Chapter 4-G Course of Action War Game War game: A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation. (JP 1-02) During the COA War Game, the Green Cell models the civil-aspects of the environment, and is prepared to discuss anticipated civilian population (and/or other actors) responses to friendly and adversary actions, reactions, and counteractions. These inputs allow the OPT to modify or improve their COA(s) to account for opportunities and risks based on the Green Cell s analysis of the population. Armed with a model of the relevant aspects of the environment, the Green Cell is ready to contribute to the war game by responding to the OPTs actions, as well as the Red Cells reactions, by highlighting dynamic aspects of the environment. There are three good reasons to conduct a war game: 1. Evaluation the war game will help determine the advantages / disadvantages of each COA based on the Commanders Wargaming guidance. It will also allow us to evaluate how well these complex COAs are integrated. 2. Validation the war game helps validate each COA against an independent and thinking adversary (Red Cell), and a dynamically modeled set of civil considerations (Green Cell). This is the most reliable basis, short of execution, for understanding and improving COAs. It is important for the Green Cell to not only consider responses directly related to friendly or adversary actions, but also consider and model the fact that these key influencers are working with their own agendas and objectives. 3. Understanding the war game helps develop a common understanding of friendly (and possible adversary) COAs. Most importantly, this helps to prepare our commanders for the Green-21

68 inevitability of fog and friction which will force them to adapt during execution Preliminary Actions This step in the MCPP pits friendly COA(s) against an adversary COA in a war game, and models both against the civil response. The OPT leader establishes the rules of engagement and appoints the war game facilitator t o control the functioning of the war game. The commander issues guidance on the conduct of the war game, which may include: Friendly COA(s) to be wargamed against specific threat COA(s) and likely civil scenarios The timeline for the phase or stage of the operation Critical events to be wargamed Level of detail of the war game a. Select War Game Technique Based on the commander s guidance, the OPT will employ one of the following wargaming techniques Sequence of Essential Tasks, Avenue in Depth, Belts, Box Refer to MCWP 5-1 (or Chapter 4-R of this pamphlet) for full descriptions of these techniques b. Pre-Start Presentations Prior to execution of the first moves and countermoves, and following the Red Cell s presentation of the adversary COA, the Green Cell should brief the OPT on the results of its civil assessment. Virtually all of this information should already have been presented to the OPT but it is useful to formally present once again a synopsis of the key influencers and the most relevant and plausible scenarios. The Green Cell should also establish a baseline context to facilitate all members of the war game being able to anticipate civil responses. This can be accomplished by identifying the key influencers and reiterating their goals and objectives Conduct of the War Game During the war game, the role of the Green Cell is to accurately portray the civil environmental responses to friendly actions and Red Cell reactions. The ultimate goal is to produce a COA that will allow the Green-22

69 friendly commander to accomplish his mission, not for the Green Cell to naysay every use of force (or to discount the importance of the civil response). Game Move Sequence A game turn covers all friendly, adversary and civil actions planned to occur during a specified time interval and focused on a specific task or event. Each game turn usually consists of three moves two by the friendly force, one by the adversary force. The friendly force has two moves because the activity is intended to validate and refine the friendly forces COA, not the adversary s. Friendly Actions. After the various pre-war game friendly and adversary briefs are given, the war game begins with the first friendly action. The war game then proceeds through each warfighting function representative to give the details of the friendly COA. Representatives explain how they would synchronize and execute actions in accordance with the COA and the expected adversary force disposition. Adversary Reactions. The Red Cell, or adversary representative, will react to friendly actions by briefing the adversary s (or the element that represents a threat to friendly success) actions according to its plan. Green Cell Turn. The war game facilitator will determine whether the Green Cell turn is played after the Red Cell reaction or following any friendly counter-actions. Again, it is important for the Green Cell to not only consider responses directly related to friendly or adversary actions, but also consider and model the fact that these key influencers are working with their own agendas and objectives. Counteractions. After the adversary reaction is executed, the counteraction will require some degree of synthesis in order to respond to the Red and Green Cells initial actions. The war game facilitator determines the outcome, whether failure, success, losses, or casualties, as a basis for the next cycle. The war game continues until the entire avenue in depth, belt(s), box, or sequence of essential tasks has been thoroughly wargamed. Green-23

70 4003. Recording the War Game At selected points, the map picture should be annotated and recorded to provide a time-referenced graphic for each COA to support later comparison and decision. Also, recording the war game results gives the staff a record from which to build task organizations, synchronize activity, develop DST(s), confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and analyze COA(s) based on identified strengths and weaknesses. The Green Cell should ensure the maps accurately reflect the civil disposition at the designated times. The OPT starts the war game with clear overlays, whether electronic or acetate. The OPT should seek to use any automated tools (e.g., Command and Control Personal Computer) to aid in the conduct of the war game and recording its results. This will become especially important when the war game results are reproduced and disseminated. Data Collection The OPT must concentrate on collecting data to support the commander s evaluation criteria. The evaluation criteria are articulated at the end of COA Development prior to entering the war game. These criteria may be concerned with the following examples: the principles of war, assumptions, shortfalls, speed and tempo, and asymmetrical application of combat power. Strengths and weaknesses of each COA are identified, and if required, adjustments can be quickly addressed. Each recommended modification, branch and sequel should be recorded with the time/event that initiated their required action. The Green Cell may highlight points during the war game where opportunities or vulnerabilities are important for achieving mission objectives. This may prompt the OPT to consider nominations of certain adversary or civil HVT(s) as high payoff targets (HPT), making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA under consideration. See the MCDP 5-1 for further discussion on HVTs and HPTs. Green-24

71 Chapter 5-G Post War Game Role Post-War Game Products The OPT recorder must capture the significant observations made and/or lessons learned from the war game. The strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COA(s) are recorded. Vulnerabilities and weaknesses in friendly forces or friendly COA(s) identified by the Red Cell must be captured and recorded. Finally, the OPT considers the projected scenarios modeled by the Green Cell to consider potential outcomes of combined actions, reactions, and counter-actions. This information may be in the friendly synchronization matrix, the war game worksheet, or it may be recorded separately. Regardless of where or how it is recorded, it must be presented as part of the COA war game back brief to the commander. The friendly and adversary synchronization matrix and the war game worksheet should also be available for the commander to review. Certain useful products will result from the war game in addition to wargamed friendly COA(s). The OPT entered the war game with a rough event template and should complete the war game with a refined, more accurate event template. The event template with its NAI(s) and time phase lines helps the G-2 focus the intelligence collection effort as well as inform other assessment efforts. The draft decision support template (DST) and decision support matrix (DSM) also come out of the COA War Game. The commander may identify critical events and potential DP(s) early in the planning process, perhaps as he articulates his commander s orientation. Normally, DP(s) and TAI(s) should be on the draft DST as developed in the war game. Of course, as more information about friendly and adversary forces becomes available, the DST and DSM may change. During the war game brief to the commander, the Green Cell leader should be prepared to brief the key relevant dynamics affecting the wargamed COAs as well as projected advantageous and disadvantageous Green-25

72 scenarios. The Green Cell representatives should have all planning tools and products as ready references if required for further discussion. After a detailed analysis of the friendly COA(s), the commander is now ready to compare those friendly COA(s) against each other and select the COA he believes will best accomplish the mission. The Green Cell leader should be available to provide the Commander and his staff explanations and lines of thinking for the results of the COA war game based on the Commander s comparison criteria Future Operations If the commander anticipates further operations in the same theater of operations and the OPT continues to plan for future operations, the Green Cell may be kept intact. This would ensure continuity and reduce time lost reorienting a replacement team of analysts for the new Green Cell Disestablishment Once orders development begins and no future operations are anticipated, the role of the Green Cell is significantly reduced. Much of the Green Cell s analysis should be captured in the Situation paragraph of the Order or in the Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex G (CMO). All products should be transferred to the OPT, appropriate staff section, or destroyed in accordance with standard information handling procedures. Support equipment should be conveyed to the appropriate control authority, and the Green Cell members can then return to their original organizations and resume their normal work. The Green Cell leader should remain on-call to assist in the transition process to ensure higher and subordinate commanders have a clear understanding of the CONOPS and the associated effects on the population. This can occur through participation in Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills or Confirmation Briefs. It is essential that the cultural factors of the IPB are understood by all levels of command, not just within the OPT. Green-26

73 Appendix B Example Green Cell Products These products are used by the Green Cell as tools to help convey the civil scenario to the OPT. B-1. ASCOPE/PMESII Matrix The ASCOPE / PMESII matrix (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events) / (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information) is an increasingly popular tool for analyzing information about the civil environment. Each Box depicted below should have a supporting narrative, overlay or amplifying data with appropriate analysis that informs the Green Cell and OPT. It is not enough to list a bullet in each box. A Areas S Structures C Capabilities O Organization P People E Events P Political District Boundary, Party affiliation areas Provincial / District centers, Shura halls, Polling sites Dispute resolution, Local leadership, INS ability to have impact Political parties, INS group affiliation, Gov & NGO org. Governors, councils, elder mullahs, parliamentarians Elections, Shuras, Jirgas, Provincial council meetings, speeches M Military Coalition/ANSF bases, historic ambush/ied sites Provincial / District police HQ, INS Known leader house/business ANSF provides 24/7 security? QRF present? INS strength / weapons Coalition/ANSF present, INS groups present Coalition, ANSF, INS military leaders Kinetic events, unit RIPs, loss of leadership, operations E Economic Bazaar areas, livestock dealers, auto repair shops Bazaar, Wheat storage, Banks Access to banks, Ability to stand drought? Development Banks, large landholders, Merchants, money lenders Bankers, landholders, merchants, money lenders Drought, harvest, business openings, loss of business, good/bad crop Green-27 S Social I Infrastructure Traditional Irrigation picnic areas, networks, water bazaars, tables, areas outdoor shura with medical sites services Mosque, Wedding halls, Popular restaurants Roads, bridges, Electric lines, Gabion walls, dams I Information Radio/TV/paper coverage areas, word of mouth gathering points Cell, radio, TV Towers. Print shops Strength of tribal/village Ability to build / maintain roads, Literacy rate, availability of traditional walls; check electronic structures, dams, irrigation media, Phone Mullahs systems service News Tribes, class, Government organizations, families, sport, ministries, influential shuras, youth Construction mosques, INS shuras companies IO groups Mullahs, Maliks, elders, Shura members, Influential families Friday prayers, holidays, weddings, deaths, births, bazaar days Figure B-1: ASCOPE across PMESII Builders, road contractors, local development councils Road/bridge construction, well digging, center/school construction Media owners, mullahs, maliks, elders, heads of families Friday prayers, publishing dates, IO campaigns, project openings CIVCAS incidents

74 Although this matrix may be useful for organizing data and identifying gaps in information, it is i mportant to go beyond just the elements themselves and establish an understanding of their interactions and relationshi ps how any one aspect affects and is in turn affected by other aspects. This web of effects is described by mapping the relationships, or describing the paths of influence from one element to another. B-2. Population Support Overlay The population support overlay can graphically depict the sectors of the populace that are pro-government, anti-governmentinsurgent, uncommitted, and neutral. (See figure B-2.) These overlays pro-insurgent, anti- are important because they help analysts determine whether the local populace is likely to support the HN government or the insurgency. Figure B-2: Population Support Overlay Green-28

75 B-3. Social Network Analysis (SNA) Social network analysis (SNA) is a tool for understanding the organizational dynamics of a given population. It allows analysts to identify and portray the details of a network structure. It shows how key influencers are interconnected, and how that connectivity affects behavior. SNA allows analysts to assess the network s design, how its member may or may not act autonomously, where the leadership resides or how it is distributed among members, and how hierarchical dynamics may mix or not mix with network dynamics. SNA supports a commander s requirement to describe, estimate, and predict the dynamic structure of a particular group within the larger civil network. It also provides commanders a useful tool to gauge their operations effectiveness. SNA allows analysts to assess changes to the operational environment and how they will affect friendly operations. Figure B-3: Social Network Graphs The social network graph is the building block of social network analysis. A social network graph consists of individuals and connections between them. Individuals in a network are called actors or nodes. (Actor and node are often used interchangeably.) The contacts between nodes are called links. The basic element of a social network graph is the dyad. A dyad con sists of two nodes and a single link. In the simplest Green-29

76 form of a network, the two nodes represent people and the link represents a relationship between them. See the following references: MCWP Counterinsurgency An in-depth discussion of SNA can be found in, Appendix B. Operational Culture for the Warfighter The five operational cultural dimensions provide a useful framework for appreciating the web of interconnections. Keep in mind the difference between networks and groups. Groups act as units; networks describe the interactions of individuals. It is dangerous to assume that everyone in a person s social network is part of similar groups. For example, the fact that someone is in a social network with a terrorist says nothing whatsoever about the person s politics. He may be in a relationship based on school ties or some other affiliation that is too weak for the terrorist to effectively mobilize him. (Cultural GIRH, MCIA) B-4. Link Diagrams Figure B-4: Link Diagram Green-30

77 Link diagrams graphically depict relationships between people, events, locations, or other factors that may significantly affect a given situation (see Figure B-4 and FM ). Link diagrams help analysts better understand relationships between people and other factors. Link diagrams can grow into large and complex monstrosities. While they are still enormously useful for analyst and working group collaboration, the massive amount of data they contain can make them confusing. The key for using them in briefings is to remember to extract only those elements required for the presentation. B-5. Scenarios analysis Scenarios analysis can also be done more deliberately as follows: Based on what we know so far Example vignette: There is an unseasonal flood situation in a third world country. This country has had a democratically elected government for the past 35 years, but there are still deep tensions and divisions between the ruling majority and several of the minority populations. So even though there is clearly a growing humanitarian crisis, the flooding is only affecting one of the minority clans and the government officials are slow to respond. The leader of this minority clan has been for many years quietly petitioning for independence with limited, but growing international support. He also has the loyalty of a small, but well-armed and disciplined militia. Although this leader has a track record of nonviolence, he has potential to mobilize against the government, and presently his intentions are unknown. From the list of key influencers already created, select those whose future behaviors are most difficult to predict. For example: A. Charismatic minority leader B. Response of the majority group-led government C. Role of international intervention Define the best and worst, or most likely, cases for each using the three principal characteristics of key influencers (Figure B-5). For example, the charismatic minority leader may choose to work peaceably with the government and appeal for assistance, or he might rally the militia and demand independence. Green-31

78 Opportunity to seize independence (By force if necessary)?? Intentions of Charismatic Leader Peaceful and cooperative Figure B-5: Defining Outcomes Using Key Influencer Characteristics The next step is to pair the key influencers as shown below. Each key influencer is paired with each of the others (Figure B-6): B C C A A B Figure B-6: Pairing the Defined Outcomes For each quadrant, develop the plausible scenario that characterizes the dynamic of the key influencers. For example: A B Government provides assistance Government acts to mitigate humanitarian crisis This scenario is not Militias maintain local plausible order for food distribution Opportunity to seize Intentions of Charismatic Leader independence (By force if Militia employed Minority leader reaches necessary) defensively but civil out for international aid war is uncontainable Tensions are deferred Potential for displaced but not resolved persons to cross the border for refuge R es ponse nt Governme A C B Peaceful and cooperative C Government turns its back Figure B-7: Plausible Scenarios Defined for Each Pairing Green-32

79 Appendix C District Stability Framework The DSF is based on the following four premises: Instability results when factors fostering instability overw helm the ability of the society or government to mitigate them. Assessment of the local environment is necessary for effective targeting and strategic planning. The pop ulation s perceptions must be included when identifying causes of instability. Measures of effectiveness are the only true measures of success. Situational Awareness Monitor & Evaluation Analysis Design Figure C-1: District Stability Framework Four Step Process 1. Situational Awareness: Gain population-centric and stability oriented situational awareness a. Identify Stability and Instability factors and their relevance to the population using the Operational Variables of PMESII and the civil considerations of ASCOPE for a local Operating Environment. Green-33

80 b. Understand the Cultural Environment by determining culture specific dynamics that exist in the local environment; traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, traditional au thorities, limits to the traditional mechanisms and how Anti- Government Elements exploit them. c. Apply Stability and Instability Dynamics using gained situational awareness to further refine possible factors of Instability, possible factors of Stability (Resiliencies), and determine what Key Actors with the means and motivations to foster stability and instability are present in a local area. d. Understand Perception Dynamics by determining priority issues (grievances) that are effecting the local population. 2. Analysis: Determine the sources of instability (SOIs) and their contributing systemic and perceived causes within an operating environment. Determine required impacts (effects). a. Identify the actual SOIs: Screen possible factors of instability identified in DSF step one to determine the actual SOIs that are fostering instability in the area. b. Identify the perceived and systemic (root) causes that are contributing to the continuation or exploitation of a SOI. c. Develop an effect oriented objective: designed to orient to the desired end state of diminishing the SOI. d. Determine Impact Indicators and their data sources: Identify the impact (effect) required to see change in the environment as a result of diminishing each systemic cause. 3. Design: Target SOI(s) by diminishing the systemic (root) causes that contribute to the SOI(s). a. Design Activities: Does the activity Increase support for Host Nation? Decrease support for Anti-Government Elements? Increase institutional and societal capacity and capability? b. Identify Output Indicators and Data Sources: Identify Output Indicators (measures of performance) that allow them to determine whether an activity is being completed as expected and when it is completed. Green-34

81 c. Synchronize Activities: Synchronize and prioritize identified activities by establishing logical sequence for activities, coordination of activities along the lines of operation, and prioritize activities. 4. Monitor & Evaluate: Measure change in the stability environment with respect to specific SOI as well as overall stability trends. Three levels: output, impact and overall. a. Level 1, Activity Output: Have your activities been completed? Are your activities being implemented successfully? Are there external factors affecting the implementation of your activities? b. Level 2, Impact: Are you seeing the intended impact/change in your environment? Does this change represent progress towards the objective and a diminishment of a root cause? How are external factors influencing and/or causing the changes you are observing? c. Level 3, Overall Stability: Monitoring and evaluating overall stability effects in a local operating environment in order to determine if those activities targeting identified SOIs are having a stabilizing effect. Figure C-2: Analyzing Causes of Instability Green-35