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1 Missile Defense and Missile Threats: Middle East Trends Uzi Rubin The Radical Alignment and its new doctrine of Hybrid War. The continued buildup of rockets and missile threats. Iran s missile and space programs an update. All information herein come from open sources. Copyright Rubincon Ltd 1
2 Iran s Lengthening Shadow: The Rise of the Radical Alignment Hamas in Gaza 2
3 The Radicals New Military Doctrine: Hybrid Warfare We have devised a new type of warfare that is unlike anything the world has ever seen, a kind of warfare that is somewhere between regular war and guerilla Hassan Naserallah, 2008 The underlying assumption is that Western societies are inherently weak, morally corrupt and fearful of casualties. They lack the moral fiber and willpower to sustain prolonged attritions. In contrast, the practitioners of Hybrid Warfare are strong, morally upright, heroic and fearless they embrace death. Hybrid Warfare seeks to exploit these perceived strengths and weaknesses to defeat the antagonist s society rather than his armed forces. 3
4 Main Features of Hybrid Warfare Hybrid Warfare consists of three elements: Deterrence by overt and highly visible threat of attritional warfare against the adversary s homeland and population. Once hostilities commence attrition of the adversaries mainly by rocket and missiles fired from within population centers into population centers. Preservation of the attritional capacity against counterattack by decentralization and hiding of weapons, troops and command structures. Defeat and setbacks are neither conceded or permitted, regardless of cost in human lives. Victory is invariably declared in each and every engagement. Offensive assets are deliberately embedded in population centers, exploiting the aggressors own civilian casualties to publicly deligitimize Western adversaries. Hybrid warfare characterization by Brig Gen Itai Brun, IDF Genral Staff 4
5 10 Rounds Basement Pop Up Launcher (Southern Lebanon) 5
6 Credit: Dr. Natan Farber Converted Dumpster 9 Round Pop Up Launcher (Location Unknown) 6
7 Converted Donkey Cart Launcher (Baghdad) 7
8 Credit: Dr. Natan Farber Conceptual basement Pop Up launcher for heavy rockets (Southern Lebanon, Gaza) 8
9 Syria s Scud Variants Missiles SCUD B Range: 300 Km Warheads: Explosive, Cemical SCUD C Range: C. 600 Km. Warheads: Exploseive, Chemical 9 SCUD D Range: C. 700 Km. Warheads: Explosive, Chemical Cluster Runway demolition Antipersonnel, Fuel/Air, Probably terminally guided
10 Syria s Heavy and Medium Rockets Fatah 110 Image from www. Globalsecurity.com 220 mm Range C. 70 Km. M600 rocket Range C. 300 Km. Fully guided 302 mm Range C. 120 Km. China WS-1 10 (Russian Ouragan 220 mm MLRS)
11 Syria s Ballistic Missiles and Rockets in Regional Context M 600 Scud D 11
12 Syria s Ballistic Missiles and Rockets in Regional Context M 600 Scud D 12
13 Lebanon/Hizbullah Acquire Ballistic Missiles SCUD B Range: 300 Km Fatah 110 guided rocket Range: C. 200 Km. 13
14 Gaza/Hamas Rockets Kassam home made rockets Ranges: 4 12 Km Grad 122 mm artillery rocket Range: 20 Km Fajer 5 rocket Range: 75 Km 14 Grad ER 122 mm artillery rocket Range: 43 Km
15 A New Missile Player: Turkey? Chinese/Turkish B611/Yildirim Guided Rocket 15
16 The Gulf States Response: Mini National Missile Defenses PAC 3 THAAD, PAC 3 UAE rationale: Selecting between Deterrence without Defense, Deterrence with Defense and Defense without Deterrence, the last option was adapted. 16
17 Israel s Response: The Multi Tier National Missile Defense System Arrow 2 Arrow 3 David Sling Iron Dome Cost: 1 Cost ratio ~0.75 Cost ratio ~0.1 Cost ratio ~0.01 Interoperable with Patriot, THAAD and AEGIS 17
18 Are Iran s ballistic missiles Nuclear Capable? No Dong Shahab 3 18 Ghauri
19 Evolved Shahab 3 Variants Shahab 3 As Acquired Stretched Shahab 3 Lightweight Shahab 3 (Renamed Kadir 1 ) Range 1300 Km Range 1800 Km? Declared range 2000 Km 19
20 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The Shahab 3/Kadir 1 Liquid Propellant IRBM Program Army Day Parade April 18 th
21 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The Shahab 3/Kadir 1 Liquid Propellant IRBM Program Army Day Parade April 18 th
22 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The Shahab 3/Kadir 1 Liquid Propellant IRBM Program Ongoing RV Evolution 22
23 From Ballistic Missiles to Space Launch Vehicles 2004: Shahab 3/Kadir : Kavoshgar test vehicle 2009: Safir Space Launch Vehicle 23
24 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The New Liquid Propellant Simorgh Space Launcher Announced Goal: Orbit the 70 Kg Masbeh in
25 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The New Liquid Propellant Simorgh Space Launcher and Launch Pad Weight: 85 Tons. Lifting Capability to LEO: 700 Kg (?) 25
26 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The New Liquid Propellant Simorgh Space Launcher Iran s Rocket cluster 26
27 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The New Liquid Propellant Simorgh Space Launcher Russia s RD 107 Iran s Rocket cluster 27
28 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The New Liquid Propellant Simorgh Space Launcher Single turbopump Multiple turbopumps Russia s RD 107 Iran s Rocket cluster Lateral Control Rockets 28 No Lateral Control Rockets
29 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update The New Liquid Propellant Simorgh Space Launcher A work in progress 29
30 Iran s Missile and Space Launcher Programs- an Update Simorgh Growth Potential Source: Norbert Brugge 30
31 From Scud Era Technology to Modern Solid Propellant Technology Kadir 1 single stage liquid propellant IRBM Sejjil two stage solid propellant IRBM 31
32 The Sejil/Ashura Solid Propellant IRBM Program Declared Range: Almost 2000 Km Calculated Range: More than 2400 Km September December ?
33 Guessing Game #1: When Will Iran Be Able to Threaten Europe? EWI report May 2009 Iran will not be able, for at least ten to fifteen years, to master independently the critical technologies for advanced mobile or silo-based IRBMs and ICBMs because it does not have the scientific, economic, and industrial infrastructure for developing these critical technologies. IISS report May 2010 It is.. logically sound and safe to conclude that the Sejjil 2 should be deployed to the Iranian military forces no sooner than 2012 A three stage version of the Sejjil 2 delivering a 1 tonne warhead to 3700 Km is at least four or five years away from possible deployment 33
34 Guessing Game #1: When Will Iran Be Able to Threaten Europe? Calculations by Wilkening, Mantague and Rubin using the EWI Addendum figures for the Sejjil dimensions, weights and ISP figures yield a range of no less 2460 Km. with a one ton payload. This is the distance between Tabriz and Warsaw. Accordingly, Iran will be shortly capable of targeting 6 EU countries (Poland, Slovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece) 34
35 Relevant Ranges for Europe Territorial Threats 35
36 Guessing Game #1: When Will Iran Be Able to Threaten Europe? To target London and most of the EU, a relatively modest upscale of the Sejjil might be sufficient: First Stage: Second Stage: Warhead: Take off weight: ton 5,78 ton 1,0 ton ton This missile might be compact enough to be transportable on an scaled up Shahab mobile launcher 36 Not to scale
37 Guessing Game #2: When Will Iran Be Able to Threaten the US? EWI May 2009 Iran will not be able, for at least ten to fifteen years, to master independently the critical technologies for advanced mobile or silo-based IRBMs and ICBMs. IISS May 2010 It is reasonable to conclude that a notional Iranian ICBM based on No Dong and Scud technologies is more than a decade away from development. DOD May 2010 With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States by 2015," 37
38 Iran s Missile Capabilities in Retrospect 2000: Iran is testing an imported single stage, 1300 Km missile. 2010: Iran is in space, testing an indigenous two stage solid propellant 2400 Km missile, is reputably 5 to 10 years away from ICBM. 38
39 Assessing Iran s Long Term Capabilities Iran s SLV orbits a 27 Kg. satellite, February 3 rd 2009 Second launch planned for 2011 with the heavier Masbeh 70 Kg. satellite Declared roadmap: Earth observation (spy) satellites to LEO Communication Satellites to GEO Iranian man in space. 39
40 An Optional Backdoor to Iranian ICBMs: Solid Propellant Space Launchers Sejjil based heavy SLV (notional) Sejjil 40
41 An Optional Backdoor to Iranian ICBMs: Solid Propellant Space Launchers Sejjil based heavy SLV (notional) ICBM (notional) Sejjil 41
42 Possible Implications of Iran s nuclear and missile programs Iran is making extraordinary efforts to portray its missile and nuclear programs as unlinked, normative and non threatening to world peace: The missile program is portrayed as non nuclear and limited to regional ranges (2000 Km). The space program is portrayed as scientific and commercial. The nuclear program is portrayed as an necessary addendum to commercial power production and as limited to low level, non weapon grade enrichment. Nevertheless, the overall impression is that of a persistent, well coordinated effort to acquire the wherewithal infrastructure, materials and human resources for an indigenous Iranian arsenal of global range nuclear missiles, once it decides to build it. This could be one component in a vision to elevate Iran to the top echelon of world powers, on par with the US, Russia and China. 42
43 Excerpts from Ahmadinejad s Speech To Iranian Intellectuals Isfahan, December 4 th 2009 (Die Welt, December 12 th 2009) We must not allow those who have dominated the world for 400 years to continue to oppress us and saddle us with their arrogance. The economic powers of America and the Western World are in decline. Latin America is on its way to monotheism. A country that has ASAT but does not have oil cannot be important in the world. (presumably China) We want to put the World s economy and politics in order, but we have only a limited time. We need to seek a new way of exercising power to manage the world. 43
44 The Next CEO of Planet Earth? 44
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