National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) Secretariat Issue Paper

Transcription

1 National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) Secretariat Issue Paper Subj: Hurricane Isaac and Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/Federal SAR Coordination Group (FSARCG) Lessons Learned Issue (20 December 2012) On 05 Dec 12, the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) Correspondence Work Group held an ESF #9 Hotwash at DOI/NPS Headquarters, Washington D.C. The purpose of the Hotwash was to review lessons learned and observations concerning the ESF #9 response to Hurricane Isaac and Hurricane Sandy and develop recommendations for improving Federal SAR support to the States. Enclosures (1) through (3) are lessons learned and observations collected by the ESF #9 Primary Agencies, States and other ESF #9 stakeholders. The focus of these lessons learned is to improve: National ESF #9 Primary Agency support to the FEMA Regions and impacted States in the conduct of Federal SAR operations during a disaster; ESF #9 Primary Agency processes and procedures in coordinating the use of ESF #9 resources in the response to a disaster; and ESF #9 Federal SAR Coordination Group (FSARCG) processes and procedures. These lessons learned were obtained by the NSARC Secretariat from all ESF #9 Primary Agencies. Lessons learned and recommendations will be submitted to the NSARC and ESF #9 Primary Agencies, in particular, for consideration and action. Enclosure (1): Provides an overview of Hurricane Isaac; Describes the use of the FSARCG during Hurricane Isaac; and Provides the ESF #9 Primary Agencies with lessons learned from the response. Enclosure (2): Provides an overview of Hurricane Sandy; Describes the use of the FSARC during Hurricane Sandy; and Provides the ESF #9 Primary Agencies with lessons learned from the response. Enclosure (3) provides additional lessons learned and observations that were mentioned during the ESF #9 Hotwash. Enclosure (4) is a list of participants to the 05 Dec 12 ESF #9 Hotwash. Federal SAR Coordination Group (FSARCG) Overview Prior to 2011, it became apparent to the ESF #9 Coordinator and other Primary Agency representatives that there was a gap in obtaining critical information concerning ongoing

2 Subj: Hurricane Isaac and Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/Federal SAR Coordination Group (FSARCG) Lessons Learned Catastrophic Incident SAR (CISAR) operations and determining which ESF #9 Primary Agency would fill a requested ESF #9 Federal SAR requirement. As a result of centralized Federal (and State) integrated CISAR planning successes during Hurricane Ike (2008) and Midwest Flood operations ( ), a Federal SAR Coordination Group (FSARCG) concept was developed by FEMA (ESF#9 Coordinator) and the other ESF #9 Primary Agencies (DHS/FEMA, DHS/USCG, DoD/NORTHCOM, DOI/NPS). The purpose of the FSARCG is to: Enable timely communication and seamless coordination between ESF #9 Primary Agencies and other responsible SAR authorities; Disseminate information to the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency and Primary Agencies concerning ongoing CISAR operations; Identify timely and accurate SAR resource capability gaps during a response; and Determine which ESF #9 Primary Agencies will provide the requested Federal SAR resource(s) (Goal: Provide the right Federal SAR resources to the right location(s) at the right time). The FSARCG is comprised of at least one representative from each ESF #9 Primary Agency. When FEMA designates the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency for a particular event, the overall Primary Agency representative to the FSARCG is designated as the Team Leader for the event. The first time the ESF #9 Primary Agencies activated FSARCG was during the 2011 response to Hurricane Irene. The FSARCG was again activated for the responses to Hurricane Isaac (AUG 12) and Hurricane Sandy (OCT 12). Because both Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy were designated waterborne events, the FSARCG USCG representative was designated Team Leader for each response. Page 2

3 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned Hurricane Isaac - Overview Hurricane Isaac was a slow-moving tropical cyclone that caused severe destruction along the northern U.S. Gulf Coast in late AUG 12. The ninth tropical cyclone and fourth hurricane of the 2012 Atlantic hurricane season, Isaac developed from a tropical wave located east of the Lesser Antilles on 21 AUG, strengthening into a tropical storm later that day. Isaac passed over Hispaniola and Cuba as a strong tropical storm, killing at least 34 people in Hispaniola, before it entered the Gulf of Mexico. Once Isaac went into the Gulf, it was forecasted to become a Category 2 hurricane. However, the land interaction with Hispaniola disrupted the system and prevented a solid core from developing until just before landfall. Due to its size, a high storm surge and a gigantic area of tropical storm force winds was observed. 28 AUG: Isaac reached hurricane strength. The storm made its first U.S. landfall at 6:45 p.m. CDT that evening (2345 UTC), near the mouth of the Mississippi River. It made a second and final landfall at 2:00 a.m. CDT (0700 UTC) the next morning at Port Fourchon, Louisiana. At least 9 fatalities were confirmed in the U.S. (5 in Louisiana and two each in Mississippi and Florida). FSARCG during Hurricane Isaac As Hurricane Isaac approached U.S. landfall and assessments indicated a unified Federal SAR response may be required in support of Louisiana and neighboring Gulf Coast States: FEMA Mission Assignment (MA) for FSARCG activation was approved; ESF #9 Primary Agency FSARCG representatives were identified and deployed to Baton Rouge, Louisiana: o DHS/USCG: CDR Steve Pearson/LCDR Steve Cerveny (Coast Guard Atlantic Area); 1 o DoD/NORTHCOM: Mr. Patrick Merrigan (USNORTHCOM J36); o DHS/FEMA: Mr. Jeremy Schaefer; and o DOI/NPS: Ranger Ken Phillips and Ranger John Evans. DHS/USCG was designated ESF #9 overall Primary Agency (PA) for the Hurricane Isaac response. Mr. Jeremy Schaefer (DHS/FEMA Region VI Emergency Service Branch Director at the Louisiana Governor s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP)) was the FSARCG s primary Point of Contact for ESF #9 operational guidance and planning 1 CDR Pearson was designated FSARCG Team Leader.

4 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned (Louisiana as well as regional). The FSARCG was able to acquire working space co-located with the Louisiana National Guard and Air Coordination Group (ACG), AFNORTH EPLO, and FAA LNOs. 2 On request, the FSARCG: Provided SAR planning enhancements to the DHS/FEMA Region VI and Louisiana State SAR plan; Discussed and coordinated Federal SAR asset integration and interoperability issues in support of the State SAR plan; Provided centralized additional SAR resource contingency plans to include forward deployed Title 10 SAR assets pre-positioned at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for any potential future Federal SAR resources requested by other State(s)/FEMA Region(s); and Ensured appropriately coordinated approvals for proper demobilization and/or standdown of all Federal SAR assets (DHS/FEMA US&R Task Forces (TFs)/Incident Support Teams (ISTs), 3 DHS/USCG, DOI/NPS, and other DoD resources). Although Hurricane Isaac resulted in a relatively uneventful incident from a unified Federal SAR response perspective, what follows are issues the FSARCG was involved in and/or provided assistance: Coordinated the flow of ESF #9 SAR information between the ESF #9 Primary Agencies; Connected to and collaborated with ESF #9 Primary and Support agencies in anticipation of filling State and DHS/FEMA Region SAR resource requests; Collaborated with Louisiana State and DHS/FEMA in standing up the ACG, under the leadership of the Louisiana Air National Guard (LANG). Due to neighboring proximity, FSARCG benefited from working closely with the LANG ACG; Provided Federal ESF #9 SAR planning assistance in implementing the Louisiana State SAR Plan; DoD/NORTHCOM coordinated the staging of the following resources at Fort Rucker, Alabama (MA 3347-EM-LA-DoD-04): o 4 U.S. Army H60 helicopters from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; o 4 U.S. Navy MH60 helicopters from NAS Norfolk, Virginia; and o U.S. Air Force Pararescuemen (PJ). Collaborated with DHS/USCG (ESF #9 overall Primary Agency) for relocation contingencies of DoD assets from Fort Rucker Alabama (if required) to: Naval Air Station (NAS) Joint Reserve Base (JRB), New Orleans, Louisiana; DHS/USCG Air 2 This location was ideal for the FSARCG; it became a center of gravity for State SAR planning issues. 3 As described in the CISAR Addendum, the US&R IST is a DHS/FEMA support team that provides Federal, State, and local officials with technical assistance in the acquisition and utilization of Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9 resources through advice, incident command assistance, management and coordination of US&R task forces, and obtaining ESF #9 logistic support. Page 2

5 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned Station New Orleans, Louisiana; or DHS/USCG Aviation Training Center, Mobile, Alabama; Rostered 18 DOI small boats (6 NPS, 6 USFWS, and 6 USGS) for contingency response; Connected with and prepared to provide Federal ESF #9 assistance as may be required to Louisiana GOHSEP/ESF #8 request for DoD immediate assistance. Commander, NAS JRB Belle Chasse, New Orleans, Louisiana, executed Commander s Immediate Response Authority (IRA) and provided evacuation assistance and housing for nursing home personnel (evacuation operations conducted by the Louisiana National Guard); Provided DHS/FEMA Region VI assessment for DoD support to Lake Tangipahoa dam failure threat under MA 3347-EM-LA-DoD-04. Assessment recommended Title 10 assets not redeploy and remain at Ft Rucker as a contingency until the evacuation in response to the upper Tangipahoa Parish dam/flood threat was complete. A the request of DHS/FEMA, FSARCG had DOI provide six USGS small boats prepared for immediate deployment from Lafayette, Louisiana; 4 Assisted DHS/USCG FEMA Region VI EPLO with drafting DART and ESF #10 MAs; and Assisted in seamlessly communicated and well-choreographed demobilization of ESF #9 deployed personnel and assets. Hurricane Isaac: ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned 1. Use of the FSARCG. (DoD/NORTHCOM FSARCG Team Member) In previous operations requiring a unified Federal SAR response, there were limitations to achieving the most efficient and effective use of all available SAR resources in support of the affected State authority having SAR jurisdiction. Comms and coordination between the ESF #9 Coordinator (FEMA), ESF #9 Primary/Support Agencies, affected Regional Operational Commanders (FEMA Region, USCG RCC, NPS, DoD DCO, National Guard, etc.) and most importantly, the affected supported State SAR Coordinator, was lacking. Although the FSARCG was employed only once before during the 2011 response to Hurricane Irene, again, the integrated collaborative structure of the FSARCG enabled interagency synergy and provided seamless coordination among all Federal and State SAR participants to the incident, dramatically improving situational awareness and the efficiencies and effectiveness of a unified SAR response. RECOMMENDATION. DHS/FEMA continue to employ the FSARCG for future incidents requiring a unified Federal SAR response. 4 This action was to support report of a dam failure at Lake Tangipahoa within Mississippi's Percy Quin State Park (near Louisiana State border). Page 3

6 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned a. (ESF #9 Coordinator, State SAR Coordinator s Council (SSARCC)) The FSARCG should be activated to support ESF #9 coordination, particularly with respect to supporting and coordinating with the State SAR Coordinator. b. (ESF #9 Coordinator) For future operations, FSARCG activation should be a formalized action item, at the onset of the disaster/event when Federal SAR operation is deemed necessary. c. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies, SSARCC) Clarification regarding FSARCG roles and responsibilities is required. Inform State SAR Coordinators regarding the composition of the FSARCG; specifically, that the FSARCG is composed of representatives from the four ESF #9 Primary Agencies. The FSARCG provides the overarching coordination picture to the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency, Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) and/or the State SAR Coordinator. Also, degrees/levels of support that FSARCG provides are State and disaster-specific. FSARCG is not for incident command; however, there are certainly linkages across multiple incident response elements. As such, the FSARCG does not include decision-makers, because having such members may give the misleading impression that the group has authority, which the group does not. If an FSARCG member has decision-making authority, then the group s perceived roles may become confusing. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies, SSARCC) For coordination with the State(s), the ongoing challenge is that States are not fully aware of the process to request Federal assistance. The ESF #9 Primary Agencies should help the State(s) understand to whom the State(s) should reach out and the process for which to request resources. o o (SSARCC) State SAR Coordinator should develop an understanding that they are requesting Federal capabilities, not specific assets or quantities of assets. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies, SSARCC) An in-person venue to engage State SAR planners may be the upcoming State Search and Rescue Coordinating Council (SSARCC) meeting. ESF #9 Primary Agencies will be invited by the SSARCC. (ESF #9 Coordinator) Diagram and/or Organization Chart of how the FSARCG integrates with other incident command components may be beneficial. ESF #9 Primary Agencies may also consider including an ESF#9 Frequent Asked Questions (FAQs) document in the ESF #9 State Section of the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue (CISAR) Addendum and the next edition of the FSARCG Handbook. 2. Timely movement of the FSARCG. (DoD/NORTHCOM FSARCG Team Member) The FSARCG could have benefited from being in place and fully operational earlier than what was executed. The recommended timeline for notice hurricane response is to be in place and fully operational no later than H-48. (Note: This timeline also applies to all DoD/NORTHCOM deployable SMEs and resources.) Page 4

7 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned RECOMMENDATION. Through DoD/NORTHCOM pre-incident coordination and planning with DHS/FEMA, recommend FSARCG activation and movement mirror activation and movement of DHS/FEMA Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT). An IMAT is normally the initial Federal assistance on site footprint to an incident and includes all Emergency Support Functions (ESF), to include ESF#9. Operationally, the ESF #9 Primary Agencies would benefit from synchronizing FSARCG unified SAR deployment/planning/operations with IMAT deployment/planning/operations. See Enclosure (2). 3. USCG Incident Management with State EOC. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) The State ESF #9 Desk in the Louisiana State EOC at the GOHSEP was manned by a representative from Louisiana Dept of Wildlife and Fishers (LDWF) and DHS/USCG officers (O-4, 2 O-3s on a rotating basis) from Sector New Orleans (NOLA). They started by taking calls from the Parishes and ended up taking calls direct from the 911 call center. Some calls went directly from the 911 call center to Sector NOLA. Occasionally, either would call the other to hand cases off. The EOC ESF #9 Desk would task assets through the Forward Command Post (FCP) or sometimes directly, and would make follow-up calls to reporting sources to make sure they had been picked up. The DHS/USCG representative here did not have visibility on Louisiana National Guard assets (perhaps because there was a separate ESF #16 National Guard Desk). However, they had a great working relationship and this process seemed to work well. a. (DHS/USCG) For DHS/USCG consideration. b. For clarification, the FSARCG officially reports to the DHS/FEMA IMAT/Joint Field Office (JFO) Operations Section - if activated, and ESF #9 overall Primary Agency. To reiterate, the FSARCG is not for Command and Control (C2) but to coordinate with the ESF #9 Primary Agencies for the provisioning of requested Federal SAR resources. In effect, the FSARCG does support the DHS/FEMA IMAT (or analogous DHS/FEMA SAR response component) as tactical level subject matter experts (SMEs). 4. Coordination Observation. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) State air assets were coordinated through a Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC), two trailers just outside the GOHSEP. The EOC ESF #9 DHS/USCG representative did not have visibility on this, and there were no DHS/USCG representatives in the JOAC. The role of the FCP in Ponchatoula was not clear, either. a. (DHS/USCG) Coordinate SAR and air management with the interagency response with the State. b. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies, SSARCC) The State in this case had National Guard Bureau (NGB) assets as well as State assets. However, there was limited to no mutual Page 5

8 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned communication. Challenge for future operations is to coordinate SAR specifically air management with interagency partners and the State. c. (DHS/USCG) DHS/USCG needs to better integrate with existing air assets already operating in-theater. DHS/USCG is a small component of the larger air operation. In addition, the issue is not air equipment (e.g., availability of helicopters), rather, how to coordinate air space. As such, ESF #9 operations must bear in mind that it is a component of the overarching Federal response in which multiple ESFs are involved. d. (SSARCC) To address this issue, the Federal Air Operations Plan (currently under development) may help address various aspects of the interagency coordination for managing air operations. Specific priorities for air operations coordination will be on a disaster-specific basis where individual missions and specific priorities are managed and established. In addition, air management is also a State-specific issue; each State is in various stages of planning for such operations during disaster response. e. (DoD/NORTHCOM/PACOM) Title 10 missions need to be better integrated with the State response structure/system. f. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) The ESF #9 Primary Agencies face similar issues there are multiple agencies responding and it is a multifaceted interface. The ESF#9 Primary Agencies will also need to be better integrated through collaborative efforts with the State. Specific to air operations, this issue and potential resolution come back to the Federal Air Operations Plan. 5. Sensitivity of using DoD SAR resources. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) The proactive Federal response to bring DoD assets into the area was good, but created a perceived infringement of State sovereignty with Louisiana, and included redundant assets. DoD provided 4 Army H-60s and 2 Navy H-60s, plus Pararescuemen (PJs). DHS/USCG provided 6 offshore SAR capable helos, and the State had access to 21 State helos and 20 via EMAC for inland SAR. There was greater need for offshore SAR capability than Army helos. Much of this controversy probably reflects poor comms and salesmanship on the part of DoD. Louisiana perceived these as unnecessary assets infringing on their operations, and they were worried about DoD taking over operations. If these had been better advertised as regional support that would not be flown until State requested it, as well as being mobilized for other States, it might have smoothed things over. This may reflect personality conflicts within the DoD representatives on the ground, a conflict over roles and responsibilities, and inability to communicate needs or intentions within DoD. a. The issue speaks to better engagement with all SAR operation partners. Given effective collaboration among ESF #9 Primary Agencies at the Federal levels, there needs to be better collaboration and integration with State-level SAR planning and operations. b. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies, NSARC Secretary, SSARCC) (ESF ESF #9 Primary Agencies should collectively develop a 2-3 page ESF #9 FAQ to communicate with ESF #9 partners at the Federal, Regional, State, and local levels. Overarching purpose and goal of the FAQ is to describe the roles and responsibilities of Page 6

9 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned the FSARCG, the ESF #9 Primary Agencies, and ESF #9 functions. The audience will be the FEMA Regions, the States, the ESF#9 Primary Agencies, the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) Secretary, State SAR Coordinators, and local jurisdictions. [Hotwash participants will provide input to the NSARC Secretary in order to develop the FAQ.] c. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) perspective: Need to better define who is doing what with the State(s)? (DoD/NORTHCOM, AFRCC) With every State, AFRCC has existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the coordination of SAR operations, and these have worked well in the past. AFRCC should consider modifying/adapting these to establish agreements with other States, if possible. These are not in place from the CISAR perspective; these need to be in place for when States are coordinating with the DoD on specific SAR issues. d. (DoD/NORTHCOM, SSARCC) Army perspective: In theory, DoD does not have to coordinate with the State(s) when moving assets between Federal/DoD facilities. However, to ensure proper collaboration with the State(s) and not give the misleading impression that the Federal government/military is taking over response operations, the State(s) should be informed that Federal assets are being pre-deployed/staged at Federal facilities in the State. This was an issue during Hurricane Isaac response. e. DHS/FEMA perspective: DHS/FEMA faced the same challenges; it is a public-relations issue. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies, SARCC) To ensure State(s) are informed, DHS/FEMA should/will reach out to the State(s) through the Joint Information Center (JIC) before Federal assets are pre-deployed/staged. As part of this communication process, DHS/FEMA will work with the State(s) to understand that the assets were proactively deployed, and will not be employed until the State(s) request such assets. The key is to build and sustain relationships with the State(s). The emphasis is on notice/anticipated events, because there is reaction time. The perception from those not involved in the response is the question Are they [DHS/FEMA and associated Federal ESF #9 Primary Agencies] doing what they say they would do? In the case of pre-deploying Federal assets, ESF #9 Primary Agencies have to be able to justify the rationale for asset pre-deployment. 6. Cooperation between States and DHS/USCG. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) There is a difference between how DHS/USCG and the State view CISAR. DHS/USCG is primarily concerned with taking survivors out of danger. State seeks to put them into the transportation system and move them to shelters. The impression from the JPRC was that DHS/USCG needs to be more aware of State lily-pads drop-off points for survivors. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader concurs with comment. Impression was that DHS/USCG District 8 was not familiar with State SAR plan and was uncomfortable at first. DHS/USCG Page 7

10 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned Districts need to have visibility on all their State SAR plans and partner with them during exercises.) (DHS/USCG) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group noted the issue but did not discuss in detail; deferred to DHS/USCG for future resolution. 7. Observation concerning DHS/USCG and State Helo Operations. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) A contrast between State and DHS/USCG SAR operations during the Hurricane Isaac response occurred during the flooding in LaPlace, Louisiana. The State coordinated 3 helos to spot survivors for pick-up by smallboats, transfer to high-water vehicles, and shuttle to a lily-pad at I- 10 and I-55 for triage and transfer to busses. 1,092 people were evacuated in seven hours during this initial response. In contrast, a DHS/USCG helo was used to rescue three people and two dogs from a house in LaPlace. DHS/USCG response appears to stay within our lane, and our assets are not folded into the larger incident command system (which may be the best way of doing it.). (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader: Good point. But should DHS/USCG be in the State EOC and coordinate with State air assets vice conducting separate missions? This effort would be outside FSARCG. But what about if District needs additional DHS/USCG aircraft? Does this fall into the FSARCG coordination or DHS/USCG normal Request for Forces (RFF) process?) (DHS/USCG) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group noted the issue but did not discuss in detail; deferred to DHS/USCG for future resolution. 8. DHS/USCG Public Affairs Missions. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) The Louisiana National Guard was resentful of two DHS/USCG helos flying CNN crews during the response. (This probably reflects State s failure to engage the media, and the robustness of DHS/USCG public affairs. Still, it is something we should be aware of and perhaps do our part to tell others stories in addition to our own, to strengthening partnerships. ) (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader: No visibility on this. The State did ask for DHS/USCG support to fly dignitaries vice using Louisiana ANG aircraft.) (DHS/USCG) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group noted the issue but did not discuss in detail; deferred to DHS/USCG for future resolution. 9. ESF #9 SAR Support. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) While DHS/USCG was designated ESF #9 overall Primary Agency, the impression at the State EOC was that Federal SAR response was being run by the FEMA Region VI ESF #9 rep and the DoD rep on the FSARCG. (This was the JPRC rep s observation, and may have been due to the close proximity of the FSARCG to the State EOC, or their personal conflict.) (DHS/USCG FSARCG rep: Interesting comment. The FSARCG did not run any SAR, nor should it. No MAs were received.) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group noted the issue. DHS/USCG already addressed the problem. Page 8

11 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned a. Emphasis regarding the FSARCG is that the group is designed to support the IMAT and State SAR operations. 10. DoD/NORTHCOM Coordination Issues. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) The JPRC was established to act as a broker of DoD SAR assets to the State. The FSARCG, which is equivalent in function and purpose to the JFO ESF #9, is tasked with coordination of all Federal SAR assets. The DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer) is also supposed to be the main POC to the State for all DoD MAs. DoD has not established clear lines of coordination and control numerous players with overlapping responsibilities and this created a lot of misunderstandings and conflict over what was actually a very minor movement of assets. Until they straighten this out, it s going to be a mess every time, and as ESF #9 overall PA, we re going to have to deal with it. (DoD/USCG FSARCG Team Leader: Completely agree with LCDR Kendrick's (CGLO JPRC) thoughts. JPRC and FSARCG possible duplicative? Need to define roles/responsibilities. I am still not completely sure of just what ESF #9 overall Primary Agency means.) a. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies, NSARC) FSARCG roles and responsibilities need to be developed. FSARCG does not coordinate SAR assets. Responsibility: FEMA ESF #9 Coordinator. Information should be placed in the FSARCG Handbook and CISAR Addendum. Develop FSARCG Section for the CISAR Addendum. Incorporate into ESF #9/FSARCG FAQ. b. Regarding the following statement in the observation: The FSARCG, which is equivalent in function and purpose to the JFO ESF #9, is tasked with coordination of all Federal SAR assets. This is not true DHS/FEMA has not done this, but it was how the FSARCG was perceived. Coordination of resources is under the authority of the Operations Section Chief in the IMAT. c. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies need to identify and resolve any potential duplication in roles and responsibilities regarding coordination of SAR assets. The emphasis should also be that the FSARCG does not coordinate SAR assets. For future planning, the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities among ESF#9 Primary Agencies, as well as the FSARCG, should be detailed in the FSARCG Handbook and the CISAR Addendum. The convening group will also consider developing an FSARCGspecific section for the CISAR Addendum. d. (DoD/NORTHCOM, JPRC) Question: Does the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) understand its roles once they are in the State? It depends on the State, because different States have different understandings of how to coordinate SAR operations. For example, some State SAR Coordinators will handle catastrophic incident SAR operations, while others will not. 11. DHS/USCG Coordination Challenges. (DoD/NORTHCOM JPRC) Moving forward, I think there may be a challenge for DHS/USCG when designated as ESF #9 overall PA in differentiating between coordination and control. Because of our existing Page 9

12 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned authorities, we have a direct control responsibility, with Incident Command at the Sector or District, taking calls and putting assets on tasks. As ESF #9 overall PA, our role is coordination, providing assets to the State(s) and balancing resources between ICSs. DHS/USCG typically has great working relationships with States, and although we may not work within their systems, we know our role and know how to communicate. There are State sovereignty concerns that arise when other Federal Agencies arrive, especially DoD or DHS/FEMA a perception that the Feds are here to take over. As ESF #9 overall PA, we have to be aware of this, and make sure we are selling the Federal assets as waiting until you need us, to be included in the State s ICS. Under the principles of Unified Command, not to mention State sovereignty, those assets should be direct support to the State, following their plans and taking tasking from the State Incident Commander. How we do this while running SAR under our own statutory authorities is not clear. a. This issue again addresses the need for effective communication between the Federal Government and the State(s). The notion of waiting until you need us is accurate but not entirely precise. For notice/anticipated disasters, in reality, Federal assets will be predeployed/staged, then these assets will be ready until they are requested by the State(s). An ESF #9 FAQ will be helpful in clarifying the need to pre-deploy Federal assets. b. (DHS/USCG) DHS/USCG LANTAREA/PACAREA need to work with the Districts, who must plan for these events with their respective States. Goal: Effective communication before a disaster occurs to ensure understanding, coordination and planning. c. (DHS/USCG) From the USCG perspective, LANTAREA and PACAREA will work with their respective Districts to plan pre-deployment requirements (e.g., need for space at Federal facilities within a State) and communicate such requirements with the State(s). d. (DHS/NORTHCOM) Title 10 missions also need to integrate with the Unified Command at the State level. 12. Coordination. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader) Need to have better coordination up front with ESF #9 Coordinator and Primary Agencies. I kept asking DHS/FEMA liaison on Saturday and Sunday about activation but was constantly told no. Recommend adding section or expanding a section that discusses how to get to the FSARCG, conference calls, pre-event coordination, etc. We should start conversation with ESF #9 Coordinator from the beginning. Once dialogue was established with Dean Scott (DHS/FEMA HQ US&R), then all was good. Confusion here about who decides within DHS/USCG, is it the Areas or COMDT (CG-SAR)? How is the designation of ESF #9 overall PA promulgated (Only received an )? (ESF #9 Coordinator) FEMA ESF #9 Coordinator will issue Operations Order when the FSARCG is activated. Even if funding is not available, ESF #9 Coordinator issue FSARCG Alert Order prior to activation. For consideration: When the ESF #9 NRCC Desk is activated, the FSARCG should also be activated. Page 10

13 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned 13. FSARCG Situation Report (SITREP). (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader) Suggest adding a sample FSARCG SITREP with format to FSARCG Handbook. FSARCG Team Leader used the Hurricane Irene format, which worked well. RECOMMENDATION. Standardize FSARCG SITREP in the FSARCG Handbook. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies will: 1) develop a standardized FSARCG SITREP format/template; and 2) include the FSARCG SITREP format/template in the FSARCG Handbook. 14. FSARCG Battle Rhythm. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader) Should the FSARCG establish a battle rhythm (i.e EST conference call with ESF #9 Coordinator, transmission of FSARCG SITREP, etc.)? a. It is critical to establish the process for information flow specifically the sequence of information flow across all response coordination elements. This process will dictate how the battle rhythm may be established and coordinated. b. (ESF #9 Coordinator) ESF #9 Coordinator, with input from the ESF #9 Primary Agencies, will develop an FSARCG battle rhythm, which will be incorporated into the FSARCG Handbook. c. (ESF #9 Coordinator/ESF #9 Primary Agencies) Regarding FSARCG activation: when the NRCC ESF #9 Desk is activated, should the FSARCG also be activated? The ESF#9 Primary Agencies will take this under consideration for future operations. 15. State Representative on FSARCG. (DHS/USCG FSARCG rep) Should the effected State have an LNO in the FSARCG? a. Not recommended. The FSARCG is for coordinating Federal SAR resources between the ESF #9 Primary Agencies. This may confuse the issue of coordination versus management of SAR resources. b. The State should be working closely with the FEMA Region ESF #9 representative. 16. Suggested Additions to the FSARCG Handbook. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader) Should the FSARCG handbook have a gear list? Should the following be added to the FSARCG handbook: a. Lessons learned. b. Rent SUV. c. Computer access may be an issue (may require MIFI). d. Need flash light (hotel lost power). Page 11

14 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned e. Straw man distribution list for FSARCG SITREP. f. DHS/USCG: Add s and phone numbers of District and LANT Incident Management Teams (IMATs), command center, NRCC DHS/USCG Desk. a. (ESF #9 Coordinator, NSARC) Will incorporate into FSARCG Handbook. b. Regarding phone numbers of DHS/USCG Districts and IMATs, unless the phone number is permanent/long standing, then the handbook phone number listings should be limited to only those that the FSARCG needs once the group has been activated. 17. FSARCG WebEOC Accounts. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader) All FSARCG Team Members should have a DHS/FEMA WebEOC account. Recommend as a requirement before the event. Where does FSARCG input on WebEOC go? [Another comment about WebEOC is provided below.] WebEOC is better than HSIN for data entry at the NRCC ESF #9 Desk. a. A WebEOC module specifically designed for ESF #9 is under development for future implementation. b. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies) Consider creating WebEOC accounts for FSARCG members, once the WebEOC module for ESF #9 is finalized. Procedures for FSARCG members to access WebEOC will be detailed in the FSARCG Handbook, as appropriate. 18. NRCC ESF #9 Desk Comms with FSARCG. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) NRCC ESF #9 Desk comms with FSARCG was difficult. Two way comms were non-existent. FSARCG did not keep the NRCC ESF #9 Desk up to date on what their plans were. At one point they were stationed in one area, then we found thru reading reports they moved somewhere else. We also did not get any daily updates either. I think it is because we have new people at FSARCG and they may not be familiar with the process. They may have also been overwhelmed. (FEMA ESF #9 Coordinator) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group concurred with this observation. Procedures for establishing lines of communication between the NRCC ESF#9 Desk and the FSARCG is currently being developed for incorporation into the FSARCG Handbook. 19. FSARCG Activation USCG Question. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) From my understanding, senior leadership wanted FSARCG activated because ESF #9 was activated and we would be the conduit for information to DHS/FEMA. This rarely happened. We made it work and got the needed info but it was a struggle. Page 12

15 Enclosure (1): Hurricane Isaac ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned a. Statement correction: senior leadership wanted ESF #9 FSARCG activated because FSARCG ESF #9 was activated ] b. Similar to the previous observation, the line of communication between the FSARCG and the NRCC ESF #9 Desk needs to be better defined. Communication procedures between the two groups should be detailed in the FSARCG Handbook. 20. FSARCG and the NRCC ESF #9 Desk Coordination. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) a. I believe the NRCC ESF #9 Desk should be manned but we (DHS/USCG support of the NRCC ESF #9 Desk) are being underutilized. We need to be tied to the hip to the FSARCG especially if DHS/USCG is the ESF #9 overall PA for the event. b. When the FSARCG is stood up, the NRCC ESF #9 Desk becomes an admin desk. Recommend that DHS/USCG only support if DHS/FEMA NRCC ESF #9 Desk is overwhelmed. The DHS/Coast Guard Liaison Officer (CGLO) and FSARCG can handle any SAR specific questions (probably better than the NRCC ESF #9 Desk since they are at the heart of the event with direct comms with the Operational Commander). c. DHS/USCG does not need to staff the NRCC ESF #9 Desk during ESF #9 activation/deactivation. During these times, it is admin again; tracking units as the preposition/demobilize. DHS/USCG should be staffing the NRCC ESF #9 Desk prior to (for a notice event) or as soon as practicable (after a no-notice event) until SAR is over (or changes to recovery or response). DHS/USCG does not need to be involved during the de-mobilization of teams. d. NRCC ESF #9 Desk should be stood down as soon as we switch from ESF #9 SAR operations to Search and Recovery or Search and Respond; these are other ESF functions, but not ESF #9 functions. (Note: This is a DHS/FEMA decision. Normally, as soon as SAR operations cease, the NRCC ESF #9 Desk is stood down.) a. (DHS/USCG) Develop proposal for DHS/USCG NRCC watchstanders between ESF #9, ESF #10 and DHS/USCG Liaison Officer (CGLO) Desk. b. Interagency leadership needs to be aware that the NRCC desks are not for making operational decisions; but is an administration/communication, not operational watch. Page 13

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17 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned Hurricane Sandy - Overview OCT 12: Hurricane Sandy was a tropical cyclone that devastated portions of the Caribbean, Mid-Atlantic, Northeastern U.S. and Eastern Canada. The eighteenth named storm and tenth hurricane of the 2012 Atlantic hurricane season, Sandy was the largest Atlantic hurricane on record (as measured by diameter). Sandy is estimated in early calculations to have caused damage of at least $20 billion. Preliminary estimates of losses that include business interruption surpass $50 billion, which, if confirmed, would make it the secondcostliest Atlantic hurricane in history, behind only Hurricane Katrina. 22 OCT: Sandy developed from a tropical wave in the western Caribbean Sea, quickly strengthened and was upgraded to Tropical Storm Sandy six hours later. Sandy moved slowly northward toward the Greater Antilles and gradually intensified. 24 OCT: Sandy became a hurricane, made landfall near Kingston, Jamaica, a few hours later, reemerged into the Caribbean Sea and strengthened into a Category 2 hurricane. 25 OCT: Sandy hit Cuba, then weakened to a Category 1 hurricane. 26 OCT: Sandy moved through the Bahamas. 27 OCT: Sandy briefly weakened to a tropical storm and then restrengthened to a Category 1 hurricane. 29 OCT: Sandy curved north-northwest and then moved ashore near Atlantic City, New Jersey. In the U.S., Hurricane Sandy affected at least 24 states, from Florida to Maine and west to Michigan and Wisconsin, with particularly severe damage in New Jersey and New York. Its storm surge hit New York City on 29 OCT, flooding streets, tunnels and subway lines and cutting power in and around the city. FSARCG during Hurricane Sandy As Hurricane Sandy approached U.S. landfall and assessments indicated a unified Federal SAR response may be required in support of Louisiana and neighboring Gulf Coast States: Mission Assignment (MA) for FSARCG activation was approved; On 28 OCT the FSARCG deployed to Herndon, Virginia, and embedded with DHS/FEMA US&R Incident Support Team (IST) RED and included the following ESF #9 Primary Agency representatives: o DHS/USCG: Mr. Rick Button (DHS/USCG HQ) and CDR Steve Pearson (DHS/USCG Atlantic Area); o DoD/NORTHCOM: Mr. Patrick Merrigan; o DHS/FEMA: Mr. Joe Hiponia; o DOI/NPS: Ranger Kevin Moses; and

18 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned o Mr. Bill Squires (National Guard Bureau (NGB)). 1 DHS/USCG was designated ESF #9 overall Primary Agency (PA) for the Hurricane Sandy response. FSARCG Team Leaders: o 28 OCT 01 NOV: Mr. Rick Button (DHS/USCG); 2 and o NOV, CDR Pearson (DHS/USCG) OCT: FSARCG deployed to Herndon, Virginia, to embed with DHS/FEMA US&R IST RED. It was initially anticipated that the IST and FSARCG would deploy north to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JBMDL), New Jersey. However, as the CISAR response gained momentum, DHS/FEMA (ESF #9 Coordinator) believed the best course of action was to remain in Herndon. 4 As an alternative, DHS/FEMA activated IST WHITE to augment IST RED in Herndon and to forward deploy an IST detachment to (JBMDL) that would support DHS/FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces conducting CISAR operations in New York and New Jersey. Appendix (1) is a summary of FSARCG operations for Hurricane Sandy provided by the DHS/FEMA FSARCG Team Member. Appendix (2) is a summary of the DHS/FEMA US&R Task Force Hurricane Sandy Response. Appendix (3) is a summary of the DHS/USCG Hurricane Sandy response. Hurricane Sandy: ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned 1. FSARCG: Did it work? (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader (1)) While not necessarily a lesson learned, FSARCG s activation and participation in the ESF #9 CISAR response to Hurricane Sandy was critical. The FSARCG obtained ESF #9 SAR requirements from FEMA Regions and FEMA HQ in support of US&R Task Force (TF) operations. These requirements were coordinated through the FSARCG between the appropriate ESF #9 Primary Agencies. In after action discussions with the ESF #9 Coordinator, it was agreed that the FSARCG fills a gap in the coordination of requested ESF #9 Federal CISAR resources. RECOMMENDATION: ESF #9 Primary Agencies must continue to improve FSARCG guidance and implementation processes and procedures based on lessons learned from real-world disaster response operations. 1 This is the first time that NGB provided a representative to the FSARCG which proved extremely beneficial NOV: Mr. Button departed the FSARCG when DHS/FEMA assumed ESF #9 overall Primary Agency from DHS/USCG. 3 Due to the potential for significant ESF #9 Federal SAR response anticipated, DHS/USCG activated two persons for the FSARCG. Mr. Button initially assumed Team Leader responsibilities and CDR Pearson to manage DHS/USCG support to the CISAR response. Mr. Button departed on 02 NOV and CDR Pearson assumed Team Leader responsibilities until FSARCG demobilization. 4 Deploying to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst would have caused at approximately 4-5 hours of downtime for both the IST and FSARCG. Based on the increasing SAR response, forward mobilization was cancelled. Page 2

19 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned a. The FSARCG played a critical role in the Hurricane Sandy ESF #9 Response. b. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed with this recommendation. ESF #9 Primary Agencies will take this item for action. c. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies should continue to improve FSARCG guidance based on lessons learned from real-world response operations. 2. FSARCG: Where to deploy? (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader (1)) There has been considerable discussion as to where the FSARCG should deploy. One suggestion is for the FSARCG to be activated and remain at FEMA HQ. During the Hurricane Sandy response, FSARCG deployed with the FEMA US&R IST Red, in Herndon, Virginia. Another suggestion is that the FSARCG deploy to the site of the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency - for a waterborne event such as the Hurricane Sandy response, that would have been at DHS/USCG Atlantic Area, Portsmouth, Virginia. However, for Hurricane Sandy, deploying with the DHS/FEMA US&R IST was ideal. While Hurricane Sandy was considered a waterborne event, with DHS/USCG as ESF #9 overall Primary Agency (28 OCT 01 NOV), the primary CISAR response was urban, conducted by the DHS/FEMA US&R TFs in New York and New Jersey. 5 The FSARCG and IST worked together to coordinate ESF #9 CISAR resource requirements and share information to improve situational awareness. In addition, with the NGA DMIGS deployed to support the IST and FSARCG, we were able to obtain near real time information on Hurricane Sandy impacts to coastal areas, what areas were hardest hit and where limited ESF #9 CISAR resources, in support of State and locate authorities, could be best utilized. RECOMMENDATION: The ESF #9 Coordinator (DHS/FEMA), based on the severity of the event, consider deploying the FSARCG with the FEMA US&R IST for coordination of ESF #9 SAR resources, or to the effected State if the IST is not activated. [From the DHS/FEMA FSARCG Team Member: FSARCG should be co-located with US&R IST to support critical life-saving operations, and reduce reflex time to rapidly developing missions.] [From ESF #9 Deputy Group Supervisor on the IST: Worked well having the FSARCG colocated with the IST. Having them fully integrated and physically located in the same room as the IST seemed critical. This should be a common practice in future deployments.] a. FSARCG deployment location will be disaster specific. In cases when the US&R IST is not available or not activated, then the FSARCG may be deployed to the FEMA IMAT location. b. IST may or may not (more likely scenario) be collocated with the IMAT. For Hurricane Sandy, SAR missions were focused highly on IST operations. 5 The Coast Guard did have several coastal and offshore SAR operations, including the rescue of 14 crewmembers from HMS Bounty, which sank on Monday, 14 NOV. Page 3

20 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned c. FSARCG can have a multi-state footprint during the response; however, IMAT is specific to the disaster, so there may be multiple IMATs. d. FSARCG also may not necessarily deploy to a physical location; more importantly, it is the reporting chain and reporting location that are more critical. For example, reporting location for the New Jersey IMAT team may report to Herndon, Virginia, before deploying to the actual disaster location. e. (ESF #9 Coordinator) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed that the ESF #9 Coordinator (in support of the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency) should decide where the FSARCG should be deployed. Default location is FEMA IMAT; secondary location will be FEMA US&R IST or FEMA Headquarter location. 3. FSARCG Team Leader. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader (1)) In previous disasters, FSARCG deployed with one representative from each ESF #9 Primary Agency. In every instance, the event was a notice, waterborne response with DHS/USCG assuming the role of ESF #9 overall Primary Agency. DHS/USCG decided to send two personnel to support the Hurricane Sandy FSARCG. This worked extremely well. The FSARCG Team leader was able to focus on the overall event and support each team member. DHS/USCG team representative was able to coordinate DHS/USCG issues. RECOMMENDATIONS: a. ESF #9 Coordinator (DHS/FEMA) add the FSARCG Team Leader position to the FSARCG MA (also support by the ESF #9 Group Supervisor on the IST). b. Based on the severity of the disaster, the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency consider deploying one additional person to serve as FSARCG Team Leader. a. The current structure of the FSARCG is adequate; however, an additional member Team Leader may be added, if the severity of the disaster requires such an addition. b. It should be noted that the FSARCG is not a 24-hour operational unit (usually hours per day); but the group is capable to surge for extended periods, if necessary. c. (ESF #9 Coordinator) For future operations, the ESF #9 Coordinator will add another position, as needed. 4. FSARCG National Guard Bureau Team Member. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leaders (both)) When the FSARCG was activated for the Hurricane Sandy response, for the first time a National Guard Bureau (NGB) team member was added to the FSARCG. This worked extremely well in assisting in the coordination of National Guard ESF #9 SAR resources. RECOMMENDATION: The ESF #9 Coordinator (DHS/FEMA) include one NGB representative when the FSARCG is activated. This recommendation is also supported by DHS/USCG and DHS/FEMA Team Member. Page 4

21 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned a. (ESF #9 Coordinator, DoD/NORTHCOM) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed that the FSARCG NGB representative was invaluable during the Hurricane Sandy response. For future operations, DoD/NORTHCOM and NGB will request DHS/FEMA to activate an NGB representative for the FSARCG. b. The NGB representative may not be a permanent member on the FSARCG, but should be incorporated into future ESF #9 guidance and the FSARCG Handbook. 5. FSARCG Organization. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader (2)) More detailed understanding of how the FSARCG fits in the overall ESF #9 organization must be developed. RECOMMENDATION: Develop an organization chart linking FSARCG to: The ESF #9 Primary Agencies; DHS/FEMA Regions; States; NRCC; Anything else? a. (ESF #9 Coordinator) Develop an FSARCG organization chart for inclusion in the FSARCG Handbook and CISAR Addendum. Organization chart should link the FSARCG to the following: The ESF #9 Primary Agencies; DHS/FEMA Regions; States; NRCC; and IMAT. b. In the proposed organization chart, it should specifically detail the process of information flow and also the type of information that should be shared (e.g., types and locations of available assets). c. This is also relevant to a previous observation regarding an information depository and information sharing mechanism for the FSARCG; specifically, the WebEOC module specific to US&R may be the appropriate mechanism. 6. Length of FSARCG MA to Support Deployment. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader (1)) ESF #9 Primary Agencies must anticipate deploying FSARCG team members for a minimum of two weeks. FSARCG MA must support funding all team members for this minimum deployment period. Page 5

22 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned RECOMMENDATION: Incorporate this minimum FSARCG deployment standard in the FSARCG Handbook, CISAR Addendum and ESF #9 Primary Agency policy. a. (ESF #9 Coordinator) The ESF #9 Coordinator agreed that the FSARCG should be deployed for a minimum of 14-days. For future operations, the FSARCG Mission Assignment (MA) will be expanded to the recommended 14-day period. b. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies will incorporate this deployment standard/requirement in the FSARCG Handbook, CISAR Addendum, and relevant agency policies. 7. ESF #9 Mission Assignment Process. (DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader (2)) After coordinating the ESF #9 SAR support for several disaster operations, it has become apparent that the standard MA process for the use of Federal ESF #9 SAR resources is not effective. ESF #9 Federal SAR support is critical for the first hours in a disaster. 6 The normal MA process can be slow, frustrating and cumbersome when critical lifesaving resources must be immediately deployed to a disaster location. ESF #9 Primary Agencies should not be encumbered with writing MAs, or trying to determine how much SAR resources will cost in attempting to provide the right resource to the right location at the right time. 7 MAs provide funding for resources, but not conducive to the conduct of immediate, lifesaving operations. Example (From JPRC): An MA was routed Monday morning from Region 1 FCO (no state demand) to acquire four SAR and four utility helicopters. It took until Monday evening to clarify the wording, then up through Tuesday morning to go through FEMA region 1. Early Tuesday morning it received DCO concurrence, and was routed up the chain. Tuesday night the DCO received a call from ARNORTH asking if other sources had been asked. It arrived in NORTHCOM on Wednesday morning; forces were scheduled to move Wednesday morning, delayed for weather, arrived in the afternoon. Crews reset their clock and were available Thursday morning. RECOMMENDATION. ESF #9 Coordinator, in coordination with the other ESF #9 Primary Agencies, analyze the MA process in the conduct of ESF #9 operations. Evaluate other alternatives that can be implemented to streamline implementation of ESF #9 with the goal of implementing new procedures for the 2013 hurricane season. (ESF #9 Coordinator) Ensure DHS/FEMA leadership is aware of this concern. 6 This can be extended based on the type of event, but normally CISAR planning assumptions anticipate the conduct of CISAR operations for the first hours. 7 The decision as to whether ESF #9 SAR resources should be deployed or not should NOT be based on how much a particular resource will cost. When this occurs, ESF #9 operational planning is relegated to budget managers and SAR planners. Page 6

23 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned (ESF #9 Primary Agencies, DHS FEMA Regions, SSARCC) ESF #9 Primary Agencies must work to meet the SAR resource requests on time; the time requirement must be stipulated in the ESF #9 MA. a. During the Hurricane Sandy response, there were delays in conducting certain SAR missions, and some were attributed to delays in obtaining MA approvals. b. The ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed that the MA process is a known and significant issue; there are ongoing efforts among the ESF #9 Primary Agencies to clarify the MA process, specifically in obtaining MA approvals quickly during disaster response. The ESF #9 Hotwash Group emphasized the fact that without MAs, the deploying agency may have to assume all mission costs. c. The ESF #9 Hotwash Group noted that cost considerations while a valid concern may hinder the process to obtain MA approvals. A DoD representative emphasized that NORTHCOM does not have a surge account, which may make executing missions more difficult, if an approved MA is not in place. d. (ESF #9 Coordinator) For future operations, the MA approval process should consider the need for launch on warning, so missions can be promptly approved and executed. e. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies will investigate proper mechanisms to commit funding processes/sources for future SAR operations. f. (ESF #9 Coordinator) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed that the MA approval process for lifesaving SAR missions may have to be distinct from the routine MA approval process; specifically, rapid MA processing procedures must be considered and implemented for future missions, so the approval process can be expedited. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies, DHS/FEMA Regions, SSARCC) ESF #9 MA approval for no-notice disasters is not an issue; however, MA approval for pre-deployment of assets can be more problematic. The ESF #9 Hotwash Group reemphasized the need to clearly specify the priority level and time requirements of specific MAs. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies must collaboratively facilitate an understanding among each agency s leadership on the urgency of certain missions, such that the ESF #9 MA process can be expedited when necessary. 8. Boat Resources Availability Roster. (DOI/NPS FSARCG Team Member) DOI (NPS, USFWS, and USGS) should consider assembling a "Boat Resources Availability Roster" that inventories a detailed listing of all their boats, by region, including hull descriptions, motor type (jet vs. prop), which agency owns them, home unit location, operator availability, and point of contact phone numbers and addresses. Ken Phillips generated a regional version of this for the Hurricane Isaac response (along with a very helpful map), and I did the same for Sandy (minus the map). Then we worked with our EICC (Emergency Incident Coordination Center) at Shenandoah to take the initial steps preparing for FEMA's anticipated approval of an MA (which, in the case of Sandy, never occurred). It might save time and hassle if DOI already had a full inventory of their resources from which to draw. I have a general idea of where NPS has boats, but USFWS and USGS both have scores of boats that are also available that the DOI Page 7

24 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned FSARCG rep might not be aware of without such a roster. DOI needs better bureau to bureau coordination on this, and perhaps it's something we can attend to internally. Once the above list is assembled, the DOI FSARCG rep can start calling and/or ing the boat resources closest to the anticipated storm impact area to determine if their home units are planning to hold onto their resources to utilize on site. If home units are willing to release their boat resources to the greater incident response, it might be a good idea to have them moved out of the storm impact area and into some staging area prior to the storm's landfall. (DOI/NPS) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group noted this observation; DOI)/ NPS) will take this item for action. 9. Communication. (DOI/NPS FSARCG Team Member) During Sandy, it seems like some better communication could have happened with FEMA and the State OEMs, specifically regarding their anticipation of needing Federal boat resources, and then actually generating MAs for those resources. For all boat resources other than those already "in theater," travel time will be a minimum of one day, and 2 or 3 days for others. If there is strong anticipation for their need, we really should consider finding a way to get MAs approved PRIOR to landfall, at least for their mobilization. If they're not needed after a day or two, they can be sent home, but it's my guess that if they're already mobilized and "standing in the door," they'll end up getting assigned to missions. (DOI/NPS) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group noted this observation; DOI)/ NPS) will take this item for action. 10. MA Language and Process. (DOI/NPS FSARCG Team Member) DHS/FEMA's "canned" MA language for DOI boats (their prepared, pre existing MA language) is a great idea, but it needs some fine tuning (not the language itself, but the process). Seems like by the time we got around to utilizing a "canned" boat MA, it was a couple days after landfall, and other resources had already been tapped into, thus diminishing the need for DOI's boats. If we jumped on the "canned" boat MA right away, prior to landfall or immediately afterwards, I think we might have better luck getting the MA authorized. (ESF #9 Coordinator) DHS/FEMA will refine the ESF #9 MA language and work with DOI/NPS on the process for coordinating future MA approvals. 11. Coordination Efforts On Scene (DOI/NPS FSARCG Team Member). Lastly, we learned through Sandy that sometimes DOI will have assets near or in the impact zone that can be utilized for SAR and for recovery efforts. Specifically, the concern is available space. During Sandy, space at the NPS's Floyd Bennett Field, Riis Park, and Fort Wadsworth (all at Gateway Nat'l Recreation Area) became a premium for staging resources, establishing an Incident Command Post (ICP), and for stockpiling debris during the recovery stage. In some cases, adjoining land was owned and managed by the DHS/USCG, DOD, etc. Recommend the FSARCG reps better communicate with their forward operating folks about sharing this space with fellow agencies to best stage SAR resources. Page 8

25 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned a. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies will take for action. b. The ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed with the proposed recommendations and emphasized that pre-planning is critical for efficient utilization of physical space. 12. Use of Acronyms. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) Many organizations have own acronyms language that does not translate between all agencies. The NRCC ESF #9 Desk received notification that a SAR team was conducting a Property Disaster Assessment (PDA) along the beach in New Jersey. My understanding of PDA is Public Display of Affection; not what a SAR team should be doing. Some research showed that PDA was Property Damage Assessment. Makes me wonder what other acronyms I misunderstood. RECOMMENDATION. Agency specific acronyms should not be used, but words should be stated precisely. In addition, the NRCC ESF #9 Desk should have as a reference: FEMA s Acronyms Abbreviations &Terms: A Capability Assurance Job Aid (FEMA P-524), July This reference will be added to the NSARC website as well. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies will take this item for resolution. Each agency has its own acronyms reference documents (e.g., FEMA Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Terms; CISAR Addendum Glossary). However, the ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed that interagency communications should be as clear as possible to avoid potential confusions attributed to inconsistent and/or unfamiliar terminology. 13. NRCC ESF #9 Desk Staffing. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) On Thursday, 01 NOV 12, the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency transitioned from DHS/USCG to DHS/FEMA. The NRCC ESF #9 Desk did not know what the Desk staffing should be after the change in overall Primary Agency. RECOMMENDATION. The requirement is that the NRCC ESF #9 Desk will be staffed by the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency. When overall Primary Agency transitioned to DHS/FEMA, DHS/USCG should have stood down from the NRCC ESF #9 Desk watch, but this did not occur until Friday. The NRCC ESF #9 Desk watch should be stood by the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency. If additional support is required, the overall Primary Agency should solicit assistance from the other ESF #9 Primary Agencies. (ESF #9 Coordinator) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group agreed that the NRCC ESF #9 Desk should be staffed by a DHS/FEMA US&R specialist who is knowledgeable in SAR operations, ESF #9 concepts and related topics. 14. NRCC ESF #9 Desk COOP Standard. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) In 2011, with the landfall of Hurricane Irene and based on the severity of the storm, the NRCC COOPed to Mount Weather. However, with landfall of Hurricane Sandy, the NRCC did not COOP, although the severity of the storm was greater. Page 9

26 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned RECOMMENDATION. What s the weather severity standard that would mandate the NRCC COOP to another location? This can be a critical issue when personnel are required to transit through potentially hazardous weather to and from the NRCC watch. Does DHS/FEMA HQ have a weather severity standard for the conduct of a COOP and if so, what is that standard? (DHS/FEMA) This is a DHS/FEMA issue, not an ESF #9 Primary Agency issue. 15. Lack of DHS/USCG SAR Data. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) The NRCC ESF #9 Desk was asked by the DHS S-1 Staff on the number of rescues conducted by DHS/USCG. When the DHS/USCG Atlantic Area (LANTAREA) Incident Management Team (IMT) was queried, the ESF #9 Desk was told that information was not available. The LANTAREA IMT stated on several occasions that the DHS/USCG Districts were handing it, and that the NRCC ESF #9 Desk should call the Districts. RECOMMENDATION. In these disaster events, the statistics are critical. DHS/USCG must provide daily SAR statistics to the NRCC ESF #9 Desk. SAR statistics should include lives saved and number of cases. (DHS/USCG) Will take for action. 16. Use of DHS/USCG SAR Resources. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) At one point during the Hurricane Sandy response, FEMA HQ mission planners decided that DHS/USCG was going to reposition the DART 8 to an entirely different area of operations/fema Region. At no time did DHS/USCG get briefed on this change of OPAREA. The ESF #9 Desk spent several hours trying to determine the status of the DARTs and verifying where they were to be deployed to. This brings up a larger issue. The ESF #9 Desk must be briefed on all ESF #9 operations conducted by the Primary Agencies. RECOMMENDATION. Ensure the NRCC ESF #9 Desk is updated on ongoing operations. (DHS/USCG) Will take for action. 17. Manning the FSARCG or NRCC ESF #9 Desk not both. (DHS/USCG NRCC ESF #9 Desk) The CISAR Addendum states that when an ESF #9 Primary Agency is designated overall Primary Agency for an event, that agency staffs the NRCC ESF #9 Desk, in addition to the normal FEMA watchstander also at the ESF #9 Desk. The problem is that when the FSARCG is activated, both the FSARCG and the overall Primary Agency rep at the NRCC ESF #9 Desk perform similar duties why is the additional watchstander required? Why can t the DHS/FEMA watchstander at the NRCC ESF #9 Desk manage the watch? There is not enough work at the NRCC ESF #9 Desk to support two watchstanders. 8 DART: Disaster Assistance Response Team. Page 10

27 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned RECOMMENDATION. Revise current CISAR Addendum guidance to state that when the FSARCG is activated, that the ESF #9 overall Primary Agency does not have to provide a watchstander to the NRCC ESF #9 Desk. (DHS/USCG) Will draft an issue paper to discuss the issues and provide recommendations. 18. FSARCG Force Laydown Information. (JPRC) FSARCG Handbook, page 15 states: The Federal Agency designated ESF #9 overall Primary Agency by DHS/FEMA (ESF #9 Coordinator) will: Determine what SAR resources are available and required from the other ESF #9 Primary Agencies. Recommend if additional resources are needed to FEMA; Provide a consolidated (Federal, State and local, as available) ESF #9 SAR resource laydown to FEMA and the other ESF #9 Primary Agencies on a daily basis, or as required; Provide incident reports, assessments, and situation reports on a daily basis, or as required; Problem: FSARCG force laydown product was not provided to FEMA Region 1 DCO or SAR Planner. DCE and JPRC both compiled own force laydown product, which was incomplete and usually out of date. No SAR operations information from inside the region reached the Region ESF 9 desk, and no SAR operations from outside the region was on JPRC or DCE slides. As CGLO JPRC and R1 SAR SME, had to DHS/USCG Districts for slides/slbs. [DHS/USCG FSARCG Team Leader (1) Comment: The FSARCG Handbook is only guidance developed by the ESF #9 Primary Agencies to help the FSARCG Team Members in the conduct of operations. It is not interagency policy. The FSARCG does not have the personnel or the capacity to develop SAR force laydowns for a disaster response on behalf of the ESF #9 Primary Agencies (this was never intended to be a FSARCG requirement.). What the FSARCG can do is obtain force laydown information and disseminate that information to the ESF #9 Primary Agencies so their staffs can determine the force laydown for their situational awareness, which is always a challenge in CISAR operations. The FSARCG was implemented to be a resource broker for the ESF #9 Primary Agencies in support of the State(s) and FEMA Region(s), not to manage the SAR operation.] RECOMMENDATION. a. Change the FSARCG Handbook, page 15, second bullet, to read: Disseminate any information obtained concerning SAR operations to the ESF #9 Primary Agencies; 1. Change the FSARCG Handbook, page 15, to read: Determine what SAR resources are available and required from the other ESF #9 Primary Agencies. Recommend if additional resources are needed to FEMA; Page 11

28 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned Reach out to Federal Agencies and provide a consolidated (Federal, State and local, as available) ESF #9 SAR resource laydown to FEMA and the other ESF #9 Primary Agencies on a daily basis, or as required, included forces activated and on PTDO; consolidate slides from NGB, CG, NPS, FEMA, DoD and other Federal Partners; Provide incident reports, assessments, and situation reports on a daily basis, or as required; ensure reports are being received by national coordination centers and operational representatives in the field, including: NRCC, RRCC, JFO, IMAT, DCO/DCE, JPRC, NC, AFNORTH, all ESF #9 desks. a. (ESF #9 Coordinator, NSARC) The ESF #9 Hotwash Group concurred with the revised language shown in the observation statements. b. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies) ESF #9 Primary Agencies will develop Federal/national operating picture, specifically with respect to the overall force laydown of ESF #9 SAR operations. The ESF #9 Coordinator will discuss the process and work on force laydown for ESF #9 SAR resources. 19. ESF #9 Information Coordination. (JPRC) Who is IN the Federal ESF #9 enterprise and who is OUT, by which I mean, who needs to be included on SITREPS/TELECONS/ s, and who should be contacting those who are in to stay informed? For example, at the Regional level, possible members include: DHS/FEMA Air Coordinator, DHS/FEMA ESF 9 desk (CG/USAR), DCO, DCE Ops, DCE SAR SME (JPRC). At the National level: NORTHCOM, AFNORTH, ARNORTH, USFF, MARFORNORTH, NGB, JPRC, AFRCC, DHS/USCG LANTAREA and others are all currently in the loop. Multiple staffs are duplicating efforts of developing force laydowns, SITREPs, etc. Within DOD, there are more people involved in the decision to move assets than assets being moved. RECOMMENDATION. Remove people and agencies from the process, designate one responsible nexus and have them collect and promulgate the information everyone wants. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) For future operations, each ESF #9 Primary Agency will determine: 1) who is responsible for sharing information; and 2) where/to whom the information should be sent within the agency. 20. Multiple Briefings. (JPRC) Multiple briefings for regional representatives: AM FEMA, PM FEMA, DCO, FEMA TELCON, NC OPSYNC telecom, SAR TELCON, etc. RECOMMENDATION. All briefings should be scheduled in ZULU time. Every briefing should have a designated lead that controls attendance and coordinates timing/conflicts. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies) Similar to a previous observation regarding establishing a battle rhythm, briefing schedules should be established by the authority with command and control of the disaster. Briefing times should be established in Eastern Standard Time (EST) format, as they are done currently, since FEMA Page 12

29 Enclosure (2): Hurricane Sandy ESF #9/FSARCG Lessons Learned Headquarter operates in the EST time zone. Operations in other time zones may adjust accordingly. 21. Establish early DHS/FEMA US&R IST/DoD Air Ops Coordinators. (DHS/FEMA FSARCG Team Member) a. (DOD/NORTHCOM) From the DoD/NORTHCOM perspective, there should be better coordination for addressing DHS/FEMA US&R transportation requirements. For future operations, DoD will be more proactive in specifying air operations requirements/guidelines with DHS/FEMA. b. (ESF #9 Coordinator) DoD requests FEMA to develop a clearer understanding of DoD flight requirements, so air operations coordination can be more seamless. 22. Topics for Discussion (DHS/FEMA FSARCG Team Member). Identify tactical US&R operations earlier to assist with overall Air Operations Coordination and scheduling sorties on a regular basis if required. Include FSARCG in Command and General Staff (C&GS) daily meetings for overall SA and input on practically of tactical operations; a. (DHS/FEMA, DoD/NORTHCOM) To ensure mission effectiveness, DoD and IST should collaboratively develop an understanding of the process for IST to request assistance from DoD. Specifically, the language and phrasing of individual requests must meet DoD requirements in order for DoD to meet such requests. This may also help with scheduling overall air operations. b. (ESF #9 Coordinator) Regarding the recommendation to Include FSARCG in Command and General Staff daily meetings for overall situational awareness and input on [practicality] of tactical operations, the ESF #9 Coordinator will incorporate this suggestion into the FSARCG Handbook. c. As a reminder: In regard to assets under the operational command of NORTHCOM, they can be deployed with a Verbal Order. 23. Topics for Discussion (DHS/FEMA FSARCG Team Member). Discuss on mobile re-fueling capabilities. Not an FSARCG issue. It is an operational issue. Page 13

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31 Enclosure (3): Additional Considerations/Lessons Learned (Added during ESF #9 Hotwash (05 Dec 12) 1. ESF #9 Guidance and agency policy should keep up with national expectations for the conduct of CISAR operations. 2. Funding plays a role in CISAR operations this is clearly a challenge in providing ESF #9 SAR resources. 3. (DoD/NORTHCOM, AFRCC, SSARCC) ESF #9 Planning with States needs to improve. Possibly develop a catastrophic incident SAR agreement with each State. As an initial planning initiative: Should the AFRCC revise their existing AFRCC/State MOUs/MOAs with each State? The best resource is to discuss with the SSARCC. Will probably depend on each State. 4. (DoD/NORTHCOM, DOI/NPS, AFRCC, SSARCC) Is there a need for a deployable, tactical SAR planning element (SAR Planning SMEs)? Perhaps a SAR Incident Management Team (IMT)? Comparable to the wild land firefighting model. Many States really do not have the man power to conduct effective SAR planning and operations. This group would be separate from the FSARCG, but would feed into the FSARCG. 5. (DoD/NORTHCOM, DOI/NPS, AFRCC) ESF #9 Primary Agencies should conduct a capabilities assessment of SAR resources available for ESF #9 operations. Need to do a better job of helping the States determine what SAR resources they required from the ESF #9 Primary Agencies. Improve/revise the CISAR Addendum Planning Section that will better describe how to define SAR requirements. Possibly provide in the FAQ. 6. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies) FSARCG involvement in SAR exercises. Anticipate using the FSARCG in the 2013 Ardent Sentry. 7. (ESF #9 Coordinator, ESF #9 Primary Agencies) FSARCG roles and responsibilities need to be better understood. 8. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) We need to change the Federal ESF #9 mindset: If Federal ESF #9 SAR resources are deployed, but conduct no missions is not a bad thing. It is ok to be bored. Perhaps put in an ESF #9 FAQ. 9. (ESF #9 Primary Agencies) Revise the ESF #9 Handbook and CISAR Addendum to reflect the use of the FSARCG. 10. (ESF #9 Coordinator) JFOs need to understand the ESF #9 SAR resource requirements process.

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33 Enclosure (4): ESF #9 Hotwash Participants Participant Agency 1. Dean Ross NPS 2. Dean Scott FEMA 3. Fred Endrikat FEMA 4. Steve Pearson USCG 5. James Rae ARNG 6. Mark Turner USCG 7. Dan Hourihan NASAR/SSARCC 8. Joel Kinnunen NGB 9. Paul VanderWeide JTR-AK 10. Darrin Slaten NGB 11. Gus Bannan USCG 12. Jason Barrett USCG 13. Clifton Gibson DPMO/OSD 14. Robert Russell AFRCC 15. Nathan Kendrick CGLO JPRC (USCG) 16. Allen Hahn USARNORTH 17. Scott Lundgren USCG 18. Joe Sokol USNORTHCOM 19. Bill Squires ARNG 20. Yang Li FEMA 21. Rick Button USCG 22. Pat Merrigan USNORTHCOM

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35 Appendix (1): Federal Search and Rescue Coordination Group (FSARCG) Support to Hurricane Sandy FSARCG Overview: 28 OCT NOV 12 (Prepared by DHS/FEMA FSARCG Team Member) 1. Sunday, 28 OCT 12: FSARCG was activated and began assembling at the Herndon, Virginia warehouse until the contract at the Hyatt Dulles was signed for further assembly as the IST base of operations. 2. Monday, 29 OCT 12: IST base of operations established with FSARCG agencies represented by, USCG, DoD, USPS/DOI, FEMA, and invited agency, National Guard Bureau (NGB). 3. The FSARCG was co-located with the RED IST. It is suggested that the most appropriate location for the FSARCG is with the US&R IST. a. After the initial mission brief by IST Leader, the FSARCG immediately began reaching back to their respective agencies with real time SA as provided by US&R Branch Office. Changes to the US&R mission scope, and operational and tactical operations occurred at fairly rapid pace and required constant collaboration between the FSARCG. As such, had the FSARCG been located away from the IST BoO, undue delay would have contributed negatively to the overall coordination and success of the US&R mission. 4. Due to the potentially large geographic area to be impacted by Hurricane Sandy, the FSARCG obtained early SA on all available T-10 and T-32 and CAP aviation assets. a. As the US&R Area of Responsibility (AOR) became more clearly defined, it became evident that the areas of primary concern be NY, NJ, and Conn. The FSARCG obtained early clarity regarding the mission support available at JB McGuire, and it was determined that JB McGuire would become the forward staging area for US&R Task Forces and the Air Operations Base supporting this mission. b. FSARCG assisted in coordinating the billets and feeding at Joint Base (JB) McGuire as well as establishing the Air Operations Base to support the eight Air National Guard (ANG) rotary wing platforms assigned to Task Force Guardian. In addition to movement of passengers and equipment, observation flights, a rotary wing MEDEVAC unit was equipped and on call to support the US&R mission. 5. FSARCG was instrumental in navigating through obstacles which had earlier prohibited US&R from executing sorties for insertion and extraction of SAR equipment and personnel. a. As stated earlier US&R operational and tactical operations changed at a rapid pace. As the IST defined the tactical requirements almost on an hourly basis, FSARCG coordinated air lift and coordination from Herndon until the Air Coordinator arrived at JB McGuire. Without this early coordination from the FSARCG/IST these missions could have been further delayed due to the minimum US&R staff available at JB McGuire. 6. FSARCG was instrumental in identifying nationally available water rescue resources. a. Very early in the response, DOI and USCG were able to identify the location and availability of DOI boat teams and USCG DART resources. Further coordination to air lift USCG DART and DOI water resources took place throughout the early stages of the

36 Appendix (1): Federal Search and Rescue Coordination Group (FSARCG) Support to Hurricane Sandy response. Through collaborative efforts, contingency plans to deploy this equipment were discussed if a requirement were identified and acted on. 7. Due to the limited availability of diesel fuel and gasoline in the areas impacted by the hurricane, a. FSARCG researched the sources and facilities that may have the ability to provide fuel to the US&R vehicles already conducting wide area search operations in Nassau County. b. DOI identified a potential fuel source using their MA to provide fuel to the NYC marathon at Floyd Bennett Field. NGB provided fuel for these units through an agreement reached through 8. FSARCG was instrumental in evaluating the air lift of two west coast task forces, as well as defining the advantages, disadvantages, execution time and practically should this mission be directed by FEMA Headquarters. Topics for discussion 1. FSARCG should be co-located with US&R IST to support critical lifesaving operations, and reduce reflex time to rapidly developing missions. 2. USANG should be included on all future US&R missions. 3. Establish early US&R IST / DoD Air Ops Coordinators. 4. Identify tactical US&R operations earlier to assist with overall Air Operations Coordination and scheduling sorties on a regular basis if required. 5. Define clearer language to better identify specific and general overarching tasks when populating the MA for US&R support. 6. Include FSARCG in C&GS daily meetings for overall SA and input on practically of tactical operations. 7. Discussions on mobile re-fueling capabilities. 8. Discussions on ground support capabilities to support air-lifted US&R resources at POA. Page 2

37 Appendix (2): DHS/FEMA US&R Hurricane Sandy Response Summary Hurricane Sandy Response Milestones 1. Largest deployment of Federal ESF #9 (search and rescue) resources since Hurricane Ike in 2008; 2. Second deployment of FEMA s National US&R Response System task forces with integrated water operations equipment and appropriately trained personnel with two ISTs, 11 task forces activated, nine deployed to conduct standard search and rescue operations, and four on alert, that resulted in a total of: a. 47,154 structures searched in two states; b. 1,214 civilian assists completed; c. 1,417 civilian health & wellness checks completed; d. 11 hazardous materials incidents investigated; and e. One civilian rescue conducted. 3. First use of FEMA National US&R Response System resources to engage in a nontraditional mission to assist survivors, working with the New York City Mayor s Office and the New York City Office of Emergency Management. Task Force personnel were utilized to support humanitarian and ancillary mission needs in the priority areas of Queens, Brooklyn, and Staten Island as identified by New York City. US&R s non-traditional mission operations set up a logistical distribution system and conducted health and wellness checks, and distributed vital commodities that resulted in the distribution of: a. Important storm-related contact information to survivors; b. 4,419 cases of Meals Ready to Eat; c. 5,189 cases of bottled water; d. 9,523 blankets; e. 2,700 jackets; f. 1,250 baby supplies; g. 1,500 baby clothes; and h. 75 military jackets st deployment of one of the new National US&R Response System s Hazardous Materials Push Packages to support operations in Hazardous Materials / Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosives contaminated environments; and 5. Response thoroughly supported by: Federal Search and Rescue Coordination Group; National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency; FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications; DoD; NGB; and Emergency Support Function # According to all four Primary Agency partners, most successfully coordinated Federal ESF #9 (search and rescue) catastrophic incident response to date.

38 Appendix (2): DHS/FEMA US&R Hurricane Sandy Response Summary US&R Resources Utilized for Hurricane Sandy 1. Two FEMA US&R Incident Support Teams (29 persons) deployed: a. Red & White activated, merged, and deployed; and b. Operational in Virginia, Connecticut; Maryland; New York; New Jersey; and Pennsylvania FEMA Type I (80 persons) US&R task forces activated and nine deployed: a. Two activated & deployed 28 Oct: MD-TF1; and VA-TF2; b. Five activated & deployed 29 Oct: IN-TF1; MA-TF1; OH-TF1; PA-TF1; and VA-TF2; c. Two activated and deployed 30 Oct: MO-TF1; and TN-TF2; d. Six alerted 30 Oct: AZ-TF1; CA-TF2; CA-TF6; CO-TF1; FL-TF2; and WA-TF1; and e. Two activated 31 Oct, not deployed: AZ-TF1; and WA-TF1. 3. Four Staging locations: a. Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; b. Republic Airfield, Farmingdale, New York; c. Resorts World Casino, Jamaica, New York; and d. Floyd Bennett Field, Queens, New York. 4. Response Successfully Supported by: a. Federal Search and Rescue Coordination Group interagency coordination; b. National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency mapping; c. FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications communications; d. Both DoD and NGB; and e. Emergency Support Function #13 force protection. Standard US&R Operations Hurricane Sandy 1. In State of New York: a. In Brooklyn, New York City: (1) 1,062 structures searched; (2) 407 health and wellness contacts made; (3) 352 cases of civilian assistance provided; and (4) 14 medical evaluations completed. b. In Queens, New York City: (1) 4,285 structures searched; (2) >1,000 health & wellness contacts conducted; (3) Numerous minor injuries to civilians reported; Page 2

39 Appendix (2): DHS/FEMA US&R Hurricane Sandy Response Summary (4) Four civilian assists/evacuations were accomplished; (5) Numerous carbon monoxide assessments conducted due to generator usage; (6) One fuel spill involving three 10,000 gal. tanks investigated & stabilized; and (7) Three natural gas leaks were identified. c. Staten Island: (1) 5,558 structures searched with health and wellness checks; (2) Two minor medical assists provided; and (3) One human remains located during search. d. Nassau County: (1) 35,184 structures searched with health and wellness checks; (2) 40 cases of civilian assistance provided; (3) Six patients evaluated (two transferred to EMS); and (4) Three hazardous materials incidents. 2. In the State of New Jersey : a. In Moonachie: (1) 208 structures searched; (2) One civilian rescue was conducted; and (3) 818 cases of civilian assistance provided. b. Seaside Heights: (1) 857 primary searches and structural evaluations and civilian assists; (2) Six secondary searches; (3) Eight health and wellness contacts; and (4) 48 structures significantly damaged. 3. Standard US&R operations resulted in a total of: a. 47,154 structures searched in two states; b. 1,214 civilian assists completed; c. 1,417 civilian health & wellness checks completed; d. 11 hazardous materials incidents investigated; and e. One civilian rescue conducted. Page 3

40 Appendix (2): DHS/FEMA US&R Hurricane Sandy Response Summary Non-Traditional Mission Hurricane Sandy 1. FEMA US&R task forces engaged in a non-traditional mission, working with the New York City Mayor s Office and the New York City Office of Emergency Management to assist survivors. 2. Task Force personnel were utilized to set up a logistical distribution system and conducted health and wellness checks, and distributed to survivors vital commodities such as: important storm-related contact information; Meals Ready to Eat; bottled water; blankets; jackets; baby supplies; and baby clothes. 3. FEMA US&R task forces supported humanitarian and ancillary mission needs in priority areas identified by New York City to include the distribution of: a. In Brooklyn, New York City: (1) Important storm-related contact information to survivors; (2) 987 cases of Meals Ready to Eat; (3) 1,092 cases of bottled water; and (4) 4,823 blankets. b. In Rockaway, Queens, New York City: (1) Important storm-related contact information to survivors; (2) 2,352 cases of Meals Ready to Eat; (3) 3,017 cases of bottled water; (4) 4,698 blankets; (5) 2,700 jackets; (6) 1,250 baby supplies; (7) 1,500 baby clothes; and (8) 75 military jackets. c. Staten Island: (1) Important storm-related contact information to survivors; (2) 1,080 cases of Meals Ready to Eat; (3) 1,080 cases of bottled water; and (4) Two pallets of blankets. 4. US&R s non-traditional mission operations resulted in the distribution of: a. Important storm-related contact information to survivors; b. 4,419 cases of Meals Ready to Eat; c. 5,189 cases of bottled water; d. 9,523 blankets; Page 4

41 Appendix (2): DHS/FEMA US&R Hurricane Sandy Response Summary e. 2,700 jackets; f. 1,250 baby supplies; g. 1,500 baby clothes; and h. 75 military jackets. Page 5

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43 Appendix (3): DHS/USCG Hurricane Sandy SAR Statistics 1. DHS/USCG District One, Boston, Massachusetts. The following SAR statistics are from DHS/USCG that were conducted in DHS/USCG District One during the response to Hurricane Sandy: a. Lives rescued: 2; b. Lives assisted: 5; 2. DHS/USCG District 5, Portsmouth, Virginia. The following SAR statistics are from DHS/USCG that were conducted in DHS/USCG District Five during the response to Hurricane Sandy: a. Lives rescued: 33; b. Major SAR operation: The sinking of HMS Bounty with 16 persons on board, 90 miles east of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. Two Air Station Elizabeth City MH-60 helos recovered 15 persons (1 deceased). The search was suspended for the missing master.