A REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER POLICING CAPACITY BILKIS OMAR

Transcription

1 SAPS COSTLY RESTRUCTURING A REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER POLICING CAPACITY BILKIS OMAR ISS MONOGRAPH SERIES NO 138, OCT 2007

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3 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABOUT THE AUTHOR LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ACRONYMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CHAPTER 1 1 Introduction and methodology CHAPTER 2 7 Background and legislative framework CHAPTER 3 15 SAPS restructuring in 2001 CHAPTER 4 25 SAPS restructuring in 2006 CHAPTER 5 39 Capacity to perform public order policing CHAPTER 6 53 The role of metro police and SAPS Visible Police in crowd management CHAPTER 7 63 Public order policing and the 2010 FIFA World Cup CHAPTER 8 77 Recommendations CHAPTER 9 81 Conclusion ENDNOTES 83 REFERENCES 85 iii v vi vii ix

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5 III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The ISS would like to thank the Open Society Foundation South Africa for its generous support in the research and publication of this monograph. The author would also like to thank the following for their invaluable support and advice during the study: Assistant Commissioner Moorcroft and Senior Superintendent Schnetler of SAPS National Strategic Management Division Gauteng Provincial Commissioner Naidoo Director Schutte, Head of Operational Response Service in Gauteng Assistant Commissioner Groenewald of SAPS National Operational Coordination The unit commanders of the Crime Combating Units in Gauteng, Superintendent Makhubela of the Johannesburg Unit, Superintendent Smith of the East Rand Unit, and Superintendent Heyneke of the Pretoria Unit Captain Merkel and Inspector Van Der Merwe of the Johannesburg Crime Combating Unit and Captain Wilken of the East Rand Crime Combating Unit Senior Superintendent Ally of SAPS National Training Division Chief McBride and Director Armstrong of the Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department Stefan Badenhorst from the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority Monique Marks of the University of Kwazulu Natal Mr Majola from the Premier Soccer League Mr Phasha from South African Football Association Mr Kwinika, Mr Machekela and Mr Truter from the South African Police Union Ricky Meyer and Charlene Smith of Ellis Park stadium Colleagues at the ISS s Crime and Justice Programme The author would in particular like to express her sincere appreciation to Superintendent Vernon Day of SAPS National Operational Response

6 iv A review of public order policing capacity Services for the many discussions and constructive comments he made from the start of the study. Finally, thanks to the many respondents without whom this study would not have been possible.

7 v ABOUT THE AUTHOR Bilkis Omar is a researcher in the Crime and Justice Programme. She has been working at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) since 2002 and has a particular interest in policing and criminal justice issues. She has an honours degree in criminology from the University of South Africa.

8 vi LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1: Operational crime successes for the Johannesburg ACCU Figure 1: Organisational structure of Crime Combating Units Figure 2: Procedures of authorisation to gather or demonstrate Figure 3: Total crowd management incidents, Figure 4: Total violent and peaceful crowd management incidents, Figure 5: The seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Figure 6: Organogram of the seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Figure 7: The three Gauteng Crime Combating Units after the 2006 restructuring Figure 8: Organogram of the three Gauteng Crime Combating Units after the 2006 restructuring Figure 9: Organisational structure of Gauteng s Crime Combating Units

9 vii ACRONYMS ACCU CAF CCU DFA EMPD ER FCS FIFA FLOM FXI HSF ICPRA INTERPOL ISD IRIS-BIS JHB JMPD JOINTS JOC LOC NATJOINT NCCS NIA OCT ORS OSF PCT PMT POP POPU POPCRU PSIRA PSL Area Crime Combating Unit Confédération Africaine de Football Crime Combating Unit Department of Foreign Affairs Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department East Rand Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit Federation Internationale de Football Association First Line Operational Managers course Freedom of Expression Institute Hanns Seidel Foundation International Council of Police Representative Associations International Police Internal Stability Division Incident Registration Information System Business Intelligence System Johannesburg Johannesburg Metro Police Department Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure Joint Operational Centre Local Organising Committee National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure National Crime Combating Strategy National Intelligence Agency Operational Commanders Training Operational Response Service Open Society Foundation Platoon Commander Training Platoon Members Training Public Order Police Public Order Police Unit Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union Private Security Industry Regulating Authority Premier Soccer League

10 viii A review of public order policing capacity SATAWU SAFA SANDF SAP SAPS SAPU SSSBC SVC VISPOL VOC South African Transport and Allied Workers Union South African Football Association South African National Defence Force South African Police South African Police Service South African Police Union Safety and Security Sector Bargaining Council SAPS Serious and Violent Crimes (Unit) SAPS Visible Police members from police station level Venue Operational Centre

11 ix EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The public order police units of the South African Police Service have undergone many changes in the last 15 years. Under the apartheid government, the units started off as the Riot Units, and in 1992 became the Internal Stability Division. In 1996 the units were reorganised as Public Order Police Units, and in 2002 they were transformed to become the Area Crime Combating Units. In 2006 they underwent yet another restructuring, and they now operate under the name of Crime Combating Units. Each of these changes has meant different chains of command as well as different training and deployment structures, which has affected the skills and capacity of the units. Some of the changes, particularly the most recent one in which the manpower of the units has been severely reduced at a time when crowd control incidents are on the increase, have not been to the benefit of the units or to public order policing. The task of this monograph is to assess the Crime Combating Units capacity to manage protest marches and the impending 2010 FIFA World Cup. The research was confined primarily to two Crime Combating Units in Gauteng: Johannesburg and East Rand. In addition, interviews were conducted with metro police in Ekurhuleni because the mandate of their newly established Public Order Unit overlaps to some extent with that of the Crime Combating Units. Interviews were also conducted with various other organisations concerned with security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup: the South African Football Association, the Premier Soccer League, the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority and the management at Ellis Park Stadium. The research shows that in its respect for human rights, public order policing has improved since the advent of democracy in South Africa. However, the size and distribution of the Crime Combating Units, and the maintenance of their skills, have been severely eroded. A full consideration of the findings leads to a strong recommendation that SAPS management reassess the recent restructuring of the CCUs. It is recommended that in Gauteng the public order policing structure should revert back to the more decentralised formation of the seven

12 x A review of public order policing capacity previous Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). However, given the recent dissolution of the area policing level to which these former ACCUs were accountable, the reinstated public order units should be made accountable to the provincial police office. Thus Gauteng would have seven fully capacitated Provincial Public Order Policing Units, primarily performing crowd management and, when required, assisting neighbouring stations in the combating of crime. Concerning the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the way the police have coped with past international events in South Africa suggests that they will be able to undertake crowd management competently. However it is important to ensure that the public order/crowd control units are sufficiently resourced. In addition, the dynamics of soccer crowds internationally present some unique problems which the units will have to take into account. Given the media attention, the FIFA World Cup is a likely target for additional protest marches which will place even more demands on the already over-stretched Crime Combating Units. The following challenges and recommendations arise out of the study: Legislation, policy and regulations The Regulation of Gatherings Act (Act 205 of 1993) governing crowd management needs to be updated. While the 14-year-old Act is a most useful piece of legislation, practical experience in the management of events has shown that there is a need to more clearly define the role and responsibility of march organisers and marshals. Crime Combating Units need a new working document providing guidance on their new roles. With the dissolution of the area level, Standing Order 262 and other policy documents have become outdated and have to be revised. Management and restructuring Decisions from the national level that affect provincial or local level police should be discussed with the provincial commissioner s office before being made. Many directives issued at the national level supersede the provincial office, thus creating confusion and challenges for units, stations and the provincial office. Communication and consultation is essential.

13 Bilkis Omar xi The restructuring which diminished the role of the Crime Combating Units in September 2006 should be re-assessed. Trends show an increase in protest marches and the FIFA World Cup in 2010 is looming. The management of the South African Police Service is urged to reconsider the restructuring process. Although the area policing level has been disbanded, the buildings located in the previous policing unit areas could still be utilised; the units could become accountable to the provincial office, and be renamed Provincial Public Order Police. The Crime Combating Units are experiencing serious human resource shortages. The restructuring has resulted in the units being depleted by 50 per cent, while continuing to service the same geographical areas. The additional travelling now required of members has exacerbated the problem. If this issue is not addressed, members could potentially suffer severe stress and fatigue. The South African Police Service needs to, as far as possible, refrain from using the Crime Combating Units for tasks other than those which their specialist skills are intended to serve. In this respect the statistics showing the outcome of Operation Trio a three month national crime prevention operation which drew on the units will be telling. If the statistics look favourable for the police, this could spur the South Africa Police Service s management to permanently or at intervals, call on the Crime Combating Units to support general policing operations. Members of the CCUs who have been sent to stations to assist in crime combating should be returned to the units from which they came. If necessary, they can be deployed from their units to assist stations with crime prevention operations. It is recommended that the CCUs be returned to the structure used under the ACCU arrangement, and be made accountable to the provincial office rather than the area office which has been disbanded. Training While Crime Combating Unit members seem to be well informed about the Regulation of Gatherings Act, an in-depth refresher workshop spanning at least three days is required, and should be run at least once every three years. Some of the outdated terminology that is still occasionally used by the members of Crime Combating Units needs to be addressed. Crowd

14 xii A review of public order policing capacity control is now referred to as crowd management, and riots are referred to as protests. Unit commanders and trainers should ensure that the issue of terminology is addressed in training sessions. Training must be made a priority by unit commanders even if it is at the expense of crime combating duties. In-service training had for some time been neglected by the units, and since the most recent restructuring it has come to a total standstill. This means that members are becoming de-skilled. Fortunately, the specialist crowd management skills have not been lost because the units are largely staffed by police officials with between 10 and 20 years relevant experience. Nonetheless the skills base is eroding, and more seriously, incoming members are not receiving in-service training. With regard to the use of firearms in crowd control, the police need better and more regular training, including when and how it is appropriate to use firearms. The same applies to metro police officers, some of whom have tended to be over-zealous in their use of firearms. Role of private security in 2010 The training of private security guards has to be made a priority in view of their role in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Since this is not the responsibility of the SAPS, it could be co-ordinated at ministerial level. The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) has a vital role to play if the World Cup is to be a success. Private security companies have been tasked with an important role so proper training in crowd management and registration of stewards is essential. PSIRA must also ensure that security officers wear their registration cards.

15 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY Introduction This monograph assesses the effectiveness of the SAPS Crime Combating Units (CCUs) in order to determine the extent to which they are able to ensure security both at protest marches and for the upcoming 2010 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. By way of background, it begins with a description and explanation of the legislation regulating gatherings and events, and the powers accorded to police to manage gatherings. It then moves on to describe the structural and functional changes made to the units during both the 2001 and the 2006 restructuring processes, examining the effect of these changes on the units, especially with regard to the specialist crowd management function. The capacity to perform public order policing is influenced by the challenges facing the police in relation to the legislation, the type of training received by units, the ongoing maintenance of the training, the equipment available, and the fitness, experience and age of members. These matters are considered in some detail. The capacity challenges of the units in relation to human resources and logistics, which are well known to police management, are also discussed. The main concerns relate to the impact of the changes that have been imposed on the units by the restructuring of The monograph interrogates the ultimate aim of policymakers what their intention is with regard to the CCUs and how willing they are to act in order to reduce the harm caused to these units. Besides the official public order units, the metro police and the SAPS Visible Police (VISPOL) division have been given significant responsibilities for public order management and are receiving appropriate training. The metro police s training is necessary because they are often the first to respond to spontaneous public order incidents. VISPOL s training in crowd management aims to assist the Crime Combating Units in maintaining order

16 2 A review of public order policing capacity at medium to low risk gatherings, as well as during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. VISPOL s role in public order is explained and examined. The 2010 FIFA World Cup will be one of the biggest international events ever to take place on South African soil. The security measures put in place have to take into account the general state of crime in the country, as well as soccer hooliganism, and the role of private security. Methodology In 2006, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) received permission from the South African Police Service (SAPS) to undertake a study of the Area Crime Combating Units in Gauteng 1. The ISS considered the study necessary because of a noticeable increase in service delivery problems at local government level and also because South Africa is gearing up to host the FIFA World Cup in The purpose of the research was to assess the capacity of the police service s Crime Combating Units (CCUs) to manage both protest marches and security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It also sought to look at the role played by the other policing agencies involved in crowd control and the management of events: the metro police, SAPS Visible Police division, and private security companies. Funding for the research was obtained from the Open Society Foundation South Africa (OSF-SA). At the outset, consultations were held with the SAPS, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and academics, in order to refine the methodology. Interviews were conducted with police members using a semi-structured questionnaire, on a one-on-one basis. Since a major focus was the capacity of the units, several of the questions related to the constraints imposed on the units as a result of the restructurings in 2001 and Training, specialised equipment and the fitness levels of members were also taken into account in determining capacity challenges. Further questions were asked regarding the relationship of the units to other role-players such as metro police, VISPOL members and private security companies. A time graph of protest marches taking place in South Africa was constructed to determine if these marches had increased or decreased in number and frequency. The necessary data was obtained from the SAPS

17 Bilkis Omar 3 database and the Incident Registration Information System (IRIS), which registers violent and peaceful marches, as well as other policing functions. Interviews at the Johannesburg CCU began in November In total 49 members of a total of 225 operational members were interviewed. These included seven managers (Unit Commander to Captain level), 34 platoon members, and eight support services members including information officers and trainers. The members, who were chosen according to their availability, were interviewed one-on-one. The researcher observed the operation of the Crime Combating Unit members at gatherings and events, and attended golden triangle meetings with the Johannesburg CCU information officer in order to determine the content of the meetings and how they were conducted. In December 2006, formal training of police station members in crowd management began at a SAPS training centre in Rooiberg. This was a new SAPS initiative and the Institute for Security Studies was invited to observe the training. Informal interviews with station members attending the course were conducted, as well as with five SAPS national trainers who were conducting the training. Interviews at the East Rand CCU commenced in early February 2007, with 57 members of a total of 197 operational members being interviewed. Ten managers, 32 platoon members, and 15 support services personnel, including information officers and trainers, were interviewed. The researcher also attended preliminary security meetings for a soccer event in Germiston, as well as the actual event, to observe the workings of the Joint Operational Command (JOC). The JOC is a committee of commanders from the SAPS, metro police, SAPS Visible Police, Disaster Management, Emergency Services, and other relevant departments, that oversees the execution of an event on the day of the event. Interviews at the Pretoria CCU started in late February 2007, but had to be stopped because the SAPS had just embarked on Operation Trio, a threemonth high-density crime prevention operation. In this operation CCU members from all units in the country were redeployed to high priority stations. During this time, the Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department (EMPD) granted permission to the ISS researcher to conduct research at the department. Eight officers were interviewed, in addition to the chief superintendent of training, the director of operations of the southern region, and the director of training.

18 4 A review of public order policing capacity Permission to conduct the research at the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) was denied because the JMPD management was in the process of finalising the structure of their Public Order Unit. To cover private security companies, the National Manager of Law Enforcement of the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority (PSIRA) was interviewed regarding regulation of private security companies, as well as the mechanisms that were being put in place for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The National Safety and Security Officer of the South African Football Association (SAFA), the National Safety Officer of the Premier Soccer League (PSL), and the General Manager of Operations and Events of Ellis Park Stadium, were interviewed regarding security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Research challenges and shortcomings The following challenges must be recognised: The fact that the Johannesburg unit had been restructured only a few weeks prior to the interviews being conducted meant that some interviews were carried out with officers who had only recently joined the unit from other areas, including the West Rand and Soweto. These members had little experience in their new posts and were consequently unable to provide information about the working of the Johannesburg CCU. This was also the case in the East Rand unit. Members kept alluding to experiences they had had in their previous Area Crime Combating Units, with the result that not much detail was provided about the recently restructured and renamed Crime Combating Unit being studied. The Johannesburg and East Rand interviews had to be conducted early in the morning before members went on duty, or sometimes while they were on duty. While this did not affect the quality of the interviews, in some instances an interview could not be completed because members had to attend to their duties. While the focus of the research was on three CCUs in Gauteng (Johannesburg, East Rand and Pretoria), interviews were conducted only at the Johannesburg and East Rand units because members from

19 Bilkis Omar 5 the Pretoria unit had been deployed to Operation Trio. The interviews at the Johannesburg and East Rand CCUs also included some interviews with members from four other units (West Rand, Soweto, Vaal Rand and North Rand) which were not part of the initial research study. This meant that the study actually looked at the issues affecting six units as opposed to the originally planned three. The broader focus did not compromise the study, because the issues highlighted by members from the additional four units (West Rand, Soweto, Vaal Rand and North Rand) were similar for all six units. In essence, the challenges that were commonplace in the Johannesburg and East Rand units were similar to those at the West Rand, Soweto, North Rand, and Vaal Rand units. Terminology The public order policing unit or crowd management component of the police has been renamed several times, with the result that the units have been known as the: Public Order Unit, Area Crime Combating Unit and Crime Combating Unit. Although the various names have at times been used interchangeably, the following table shows which name has been officially used for different periods. Date formed Establishment of public order units Early 1970s Riot Unit 1992 Internal Stability Division 1996 Public Order Police Unit 2002 Area Crime Combating Unit 2006 Crime Combating Unit The term member is used to refer to all unit members of the SAPS who hold the rank of constable, sergeant, and inspector. The term manager refers to captains, superintendents and senior superintendents. Metro police are referred to as officers.

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21 CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK Background The public order policing units of the South African Police Service (SAPS) are tasked with managing protest marches and events. They are also tasked with performing crime combating functions. The units have undergone considerable changes in the past 15 years. Operating as the notorious apartheid-era Riot Squads in the 1980s, then as the feared Internal Stability Division (ISD) in the early 1990s, the units had to be transformed after the democratic elections in 1994 to conform to international policing standards. They became the Public Order Police Units (POPU) in 1997 and their approach became more community-oriented, emphasising crowd management as opposed to crowd control. Public order units have a unique organisational structure. At the head of the unit is the Unit Commander. Next in line are the Operational Commanders or Company Commanders. As the managers in charge of the operational planning of the units and they decide, for example, how many members will perform crowd management in a particular area on a particular day, and how many will assist in crime combating duties. The Operational Commanders or Company Commanders also oversee the information office of the units, whose members are tasked to attend events and golden triangle meetings (meetings between those seeking permission to march and law enforcement agencies). The members of the information office, while falling under the ambit of support services, may also be tasked to perform operational duties. Each Operational or Company Commander has platoons that fall under his command. The number of platoons varies from unit to unit. While some units may have two platoons per command, others may have five. Ideally each platoon should consist of 36 members, but this number varies from unit to unit and according to the tasks that members are deployed to perform. Falling under each platoon are sections, with approximately eight to ten members in each section. Once again the number of sections and the number of members per section varies from unit to unit.

22 8 A review of public order policing capacity Figure 1: Organisational structure of Crime Combating Units (CCUs) Unit Commander Company Commander Company Commander Company Commander Platoon Commander Alpha Platoon Commander Delta Platoon Commander Charlie Platoon Commander Foxtrot 1 Platoon Commander Support services Section 1 10 members Section 2 9 members Section 1 9 members Section 2 9 members Section 1 9 members Section 2 10 members Section 1 10 members Section 2 9 members Information office 9 members Logistics 3 members Human Resources 5 members In 2002 the SAPS management made a decision to transform the Public Order Police Units into Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). The decision was based on the decrease in the number of protest marches since the demise of apartheid. In addition, the Public Finance Management (Act 1 of 1999) was demanding value for money in departments budgeting process; the implication being that the POPUs were not being utilised effectively. Under the post-2002 name of ACCUs, crime combating became the primary function of these public order units, while crowd management was relegated to a secondary function. The ACCUs were decentralised to the seven area policing levels in Gauteng, reporting to the area commissioner. Then in 2006, the ACCUs underwent a further restructuring and were renamed simply as Crime Combating Units (CCUs) reflecting the fact that the previous decentralisation of the ACCUs had been reversed. Although reduced in size in comparison to the ACCUs, and operating from a smaller number of more centralised locations, the CCUs were still required to service the same population and overall geographical area. In effect, the restructuring meant that there were fewer CCU members doing the same work as the former ACCUs. Of equal importance was that, in terms of the capacity of the newly formed CCUs, this restructuring had taken place at a time when the number of crowd control incidents was escalating quite

23 Bilkis Omar 9 dramatically, due largely to the increasing number of demonstrations and protest marches. The Regulation of Gatherings Act Public gatherings in South Africa are regulated by the Regulation of Gatherings Act (205 of 1993). The Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) was developed in response to the findings of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry which was set up to investigate and expose the background and reasons for violence, thereby reducing the incidence of violence and intimidation (National Peace Accord 1991). The Goldstone Commission found that violence and police brutality were widely prevalent at mass marches and demonstrations in the early 1990s. It recommended that citizens be accorded the right to participate in peaceful public gatherings, and that the role of the police in these gatherings be changed. Figure 2: Procedures of authorisation to gather or demonstrate Written notice to local council or metro police to gather Notice to SAPS Meeting between roleplayers (Golden Triangle meeting) Convenor metro police SAPS Authorisation of gathering Prohibition of gathering Challenging a decision to prevent or impose conditions The legislative framework considers the role of the police and event organisers in the planning and execution of mass gatherings, reflecting on the practical lessons learnt in the 11 years since the Act was passed. Procedures prior to an event The Regulation of Gatherings Act requires organisations and associations intending to hold gatherings to undertake certain procedures before permission to gather can be granted. These procedures require a meeting,

24 10 A review of public order policing capacity referred to as a golden triangle meeting, between the convenor of the organisation making the application, the responsible officer (either a metro police officer or the local council representative responsible for authorising events), and the authorised member of the SAPS. At the meeting the manner in which the gathering or demonstration will be carried out is discussed in relation to the planning and logistics of the event (A Guide to the Regulation of Gatherings Act 2007:6). To obtain authorisation for a gathering or demonstration, convenors have to submit a notification form to the responsible officer of the metro police or to a local council representative. There is a limited period within which this application may be submitted: it may not be submitted more than seven days before the planned date of the event, and it must be submitted at least 48 hours before the commencement of the event. Within 24 hours of the responsible officer receiving the notice, the convenor is notified of a date that has been set for a meeting with the responsible officer and the authorised member of the SAPS to discuss the logistical issues of the gathering or demonstration. The decision to authorise or prohibit a planned gathering is made according to the outcome of this meeting. If a gathering takes place without notice being given to the responsible officer, or when notice has been provided but authorisation to hold the gathering has been refused, then the gathering is regarded as unlawful. The court can impose a prison sentence of up to one year, or a fine of up to R20 000, or both (The Regulation of Gatherings Act 1993:17). The point regarding the punishment is significant because many unlawful gatherings take place and the public is in general unaware of the punishment involved. Planning the event The golden triangle meeting includes the convenor of the organisation making an application, the responsible officer (either a metro police officer or the local council representative responsible for authorising events), and the authorised member of the SAPS. These meetings play an important role in creating a cooperative environment between the various parties. The meetings allow law enforcement agencies to plan adequately for the event, and they make each party responsible for the behaviour of their members. In planning for an event (i.e. after authorisation), the SAPS Crime Combating Unit (CCU) information officer or designated person draws up a detailed operational plan. This includes:

25 Bilkis Omar 11 A Joint Operational Command (JOC) list consisting of the SAPS Crime Combating Units (CCU), metro police, disaster management, emergency services, SAPS Visible Police (VISPOL), a member of SAPS legal services, a SAPS media officer, and the convenor of the organisation. A situation report on the gathering, which includes the route for the march and the key points (point of assembly, start of march, time of handing over of memo, and time of dispersal). The number of participants, marshals, and the venue for parking buses and taxis is also included. Possible threats and factors relating to disruption of traffic, blocking of entrances, refusal to disperse, looting, and damage to property is also furnished. The situation report also provides information on whether counter-participants 2 will affect the event. The document also has to reflect the number of SAPS CCU members, metro police officers and SAPS VISPOL members who will be present. The operational plan states the mission of the SAPS which is to establish uncompromising security measures, limit the probability of critical incidents occurring, and limit the impact of any critical incidents through contingency planning. The operational concept of the SAPS is also clearly laid out in the operational plan: to ensure a safe and secure environment, for VISPOL and CCU members to protect the public and property from any dangers that may result from the marchers, for members of metro police to regulate traffic along the designated routes, for members of SAPS Crime Intelligence to gather and collect intelligence regarding threats before, during, and after the event, and assist the management of operations to confiscate dangerous weapons. All arrests are to be coordinated via the operational commander and reported immediately. The operational commander is also responsible for tactical decisions regarding the use of force, unless force is used in self defence by a member (Van der Merwe 2006a). The operational plan also provides information on procedures on the day of the event, as follows: Execution or overseeing of the event is done by commanders of metro police, SAPS VISPOL and the CCUs. A Joint Operational Command is set up on the day of the gathering and each commander briefs his/her members prior to the event. The task of metro police is to patrol the

26 12 A review of public order policing capacity area, assist with escorting marchers and regulate traffic. VISPOL members patrol along the route to prevent crime, and CCU members patrol, keep ready, escort, and if necessary, block the participants. Coordinating instructions are instructions designed to follow the operational plan, which serve to synchronise all the parties. An element of coordination is the provision of situation reports after every movement and incident, utilising the same communication channels, and radio procedures, coordinating members posts, registering the incident on the IRIS system, and providing instructions to the media officer. Admin and control instructions pertain to instructions regarding equipment, uniforms, arrests, casualties and evacuations, supplies, record keeping, command posts and coordinating lines (Van der Merwe 2006a). The role of the police as defined in the Regulation of Gatherings Act The policing of gatherings and demonstrations has improved considerably since the introduction of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in 1993 and the political transition in South Africa in While ensuring that the police operate in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights, the Act does allow the police to take action if they have reasonable grounds to believe that people or property will be damaged as a result of a gathering or demonstration (Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 Chapter 3 [subsection 9(2)(a)]). The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 Chapter 3 (subsection 9(2) (a)) stipulates that police officers may take the following steps: Ask the crowd to disperse. In a loud voice and in two languages, order the crowd to disperse and depart from the place within a specified time. If within the specified time, the crowd has not dispersed, a police member may order members under his command to disperse the participants and may for that purpose order the use of force, excluding the use of weapons likely to cause serious bodily injury or death. The degree of force must not be greater than is necessary for dispersing the participant/s, and must be in proportion to the circumstances of the case and the object to be attained.

27 Bilkis Omar 13 If any person participating in the gathering kills or seriously injures or attempts to kill or seriously injure any person, or destroys or does serious damage to or shows a manifest intention of destroying or doing serious damage to, any movable or immovable property, a police manager can order members under his command to take the necessary steps to prevent the action, and if he finds other methods ineffective or inappropriate, order the use of force, including the use of firearms and other weapons. The degree of force must not be greater than necessary and be proportionate to the circumstances of the case. Before calling for participants to disperse, ongoing negotiations between the police and the convenor have to take place. The police are also required in the interim to determine the level of threat based on available tactical information in terms of risk, discussions with the convenor, the history of the organisation, past experiences, aggravating factors, and the presence of weapons and firearms. The use of force, as mentioned above, means the use of minimum force, i.e. the use of shields, tonfas (rubber batons), stun grenades, water cannons, and shotguns with rubber bullets. Maximum force is only to be used when there is a threat to the life any person including a police member himself/herself. Training The formal crowd management course for police members consists of Platoon Members Training (PMT), and a formal crowd management course for commanders called Platoon Commander Training (PCT). The duration of these courses is two to three weeks, and they have theoretical and practical components. (See Chapter 6 on key issues affecting the capacity to perform public order policing for details on the training). The training course begins with theoretical work on crowd management. This includes an understanding of Act 205 and definitions and abbreviations. Other legislation includes the Constitutional Act, Road Traffic Act, and the relevant SAPS Standing Orders. The research attempted to determine the extent of Crime Combating Unit members knowledge and practice of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in the course of their duties. Findings included that every member interviewed from both the Johannesburg and East Rand units had attended formal crowd

28 14 A review of public order policing capacity management training courses. In addition, the contents and applicability of the Act were regularly studied during in-service training sessions. All the members stated that their units adhered to the requirements of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in their daily tasks. One manager stated that the use and knowledge of the RGA is a skill and members use it all the time. Conclusion The Regulation of Gatherings Act is an important piece of legislation, particularly in the light of past human rights violations in the policing of public gatherings. While not without problems (see Chapter 5 for challenges facing the police), the Act serves to guide both civil society organisations and the police in the regulation of marches and demonstrations. Current procedure and practice ensures that all the relevant role-players are included, a cooperative relationship is established, and the outcome is to the satisfaction of all parties. Having said that, practical experience suggests that the time is right for the Act to be updated and revised.

29 CHAPTER 3 SAPS RESTRUCTURING IN 2001 The policing of public order in South Africa has long been surrounded by controversy. The Riot Control Units, which were established under the banner of the South African Police (SAP) in the 1970s in response to the revival of the anti-apartheid resistance movements, remained in place until 1995 when they were merged into the new SAPS. In 1992, the Internal Stability Division (ISD) was formed for the purpose of policing of unrest through proactive (preventive) and reactive measures and the prevention of crime in unrest-plagued areas (Meyer 1999). The Internal Stability Division adopted a paramilitary approach and became notorious for its use of abusive policing methods. Controversy led to the unit being disbanded in 1995, and its members being re-absorbed into the SAPS. After 1994, policing in general, but particularly public order policing, changed dramatically in its approach. In 1996, the Public Order Police (POP) unit was conceived under new SAPS policy. The focus of the unit was the management of crowds as opposed to the control of crowds. This initial overhaul of the public order units was clearly important to overcome the problems of the past. However, ongoing debate and internal issues within the SAPS meant that the policy was only adopted in 2002 into SAPS Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management during Gatherings and Demonstrations (Omar 2006:9). In 2002 the SAPS management decided on another structural change to the Public Order Police units. What had been the primary focus of the units the management of crowds and events became a secondary function, while combating and preventing crime became the primary focus. The units were decentralised to the area level, reporting to the area commissioner, and were deployed to attend to area priorities on a daily basis. Renamed as Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs) these units began assisting police stations and other units in VIP protection, domestic violence complaints, stop and search, roadblocks, vehicle check points, patrolling of malls and streets, monitoring hijack hotspots, and other crime combating functions.

30 16 A review of public order policing capacity The argument given by the SAPS management for the change was that public protests had decreased with the demise of apartheid, and the new Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 demanded value for money budgeting (SAPS Policy 2004:1). The SAPS had also just launched its National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) in 2000 to combat crime in hotspots and was looking for more resources to ensure the success of the initiative. The Area Crime Combating Units could help to ensure that this was possible. While the broadening of the Area Crime Combating Units responsibilities made financial and operational sense, the concern was that a shift to crime combating would result in a dilution of the specialised crowd control skills of these units. This study set out to determine what impact the change in function had on the activities and effectiveness of Area Crime Combating Units. Views on the impact of restructuring The research results suggest that the change impacted differently on different units. Members of the Johannesburg ACCU said that the change was one of name only, because they had in fact always been involved in crime combating activities such as stop and search, roadblocks, vehicle check points, and patrolling of malls and streets. The perception of members of the East Rand unit was different, however. Both unit members and managers stated that their crime combating activities had increased with the restructuring. While this increase was noted by the members, it did not appear to concern them because they did not believe it detracted from their capacity to perform their original public order duties. To understand the different perceptions of the two units, some background is needed. As mentioned earlier, the effect of the restructuring (from Public Order Police units to Area Crime Combating Units) was to decentralise the units to the area level (they had formerly reported to the provincial commander of operational response services at the provincial office). For the Area Commissioners, the ACCUs represented a large pool of human resources that could be utilised for crime combating operations. The increase in the level of crime combating activities noted by the East Rand unit after the 2001 restructuring can therefore be attributed to a new trend whereby area commissioners utilised ACCU members largely for

31 Bilkis Omar 17 crime combating operations. By contrast, for the Johannesburg public order police, tackling criminal activities had been commonplace before the creation of the ACCUs in It is also interesting that many members of the ACCUs attributed the restructuring (from POPs to ACCUs) to a change in crowd management tactics. Members spoke about negotiating with the people instead of being aggressive, and the rights of people to march, and using different types of equipment. The changes in the style of crowd management (more democratic and internationally acceptable) had in fact been introduced in 1997 in a SAPS policy document, but it was only in 2002 that the document directive was adapted as standing Order 262 3, and then introduced to the members (Omar 2006:9). The ACCUs workload: Frequency of protest marches after 2001 The study also set out to determine if protest marches had increased or decreased after 2001 in the Johannesburg and East Rand policing areas. Issues of service delivery and other local government-related problems like transport were featuring prominently at this time, and trends were suggesting an increase in protest marches. More protest marches would have meant that the SAPS management would have had to revisit the roles and functions of the ACCUs. A study of the SAPS Incident Registration Information System, Business Intelligence System (IRIS-BIS), a system that records public events and marches, confirmed that protest marches between 2002 and 2005 had increased from in 2002 to a high of in 2005 an increase of 50 per cent (Figure 3). This was significant because it meant that the specialist crowd management capability of the ACCUs was required more than ever. Research showed that protest marches in the Johannesburg area had increased. This was not surprising as protest marches generally tend to take place in areas where there are offices of both provincial and local government departments, which facilitates the handing over of petitions to relevant government officials. In the East Rand area by comparison, protest marches had not increased much between 2002 and 2005; in fact many members stated that the rate had decreased. The East Rand area (including the newly incorporated Vaal

32 18 A review of public order policing capacity Figure 3: Total crowd management incidents, ,000 Number 10,000 8,000 6,000 6,190 9,287 8,707 7,787 7,913 6,757 7,337 10,162 8,559 4,000 2, Source: SAPS Operational Response Services, Pretoria and North Rand areas) does not house many government head offices, but because it has many industries and businesses, disputes do arise, mostly in the form of strikes and protests at specific times of the year. Wage increases are generally negotiated between March and June, and a higher occurrence of protest marches at this time is not unexpected. Other disputes that are commonplace in the East Rand are taxi strikes and service delivery protests. Whatever the trends in crowd management incidents in specific areas, the 2002 decision to form the ACCUs was based on a police management perception that the number and intensity of major demonstrations, marches, and incidences of labour unrest throughout the whole the country had decreased since Apart from a sharp increase in 1998, this was indeed the case (Figure 3). After 2002, however, the picture changed dramatically. Data relating to incidents of violence or unrest at mass gatherings between 2002 and 2005 show a massive increase of 64 per cent over the period (Figure 4). This change necessitated an assessment of whether the ACCUs, in the light of the restructuring they had undergone, had managed to retain the ability and skills to deal with the increase in number of marches, and especially the increase in the violent nature of the marches, in addition to carrying out

33 Bilkis Omar 19 Figure 4: Total violent and peaceful crowd management incidents, ,000 10,000 8,000 Number 6,000 4,000 2, Violent incidents 880 1, Peaceful incidents 5,310 8,102 7,971 7,074 7,281 6,187 6,811 7,997 9,230 Source: SAPS Operational Response Services, Pretoria their intensified crime combating duties. It also raised the question of whether the crowd management function was being neglected in favour of crime combating activities. One of the goals of the ACCUs at this point of the restructuring was to maintain public order by combating serious and violent crime, policing public gatherings, rendering specialised operational support to other units/components/divisions and ensuring effective information management (SAPS Policy 2004:1). The changes from Public Order Police units to ACCUs saw the Gauteng units decentralised to seven policing areas. This meant that each ACCU had to focus on a specific policing area where it would perform both crime combating and crowd management functions. The demands on the units were further increased because their members were serving on both provincial and area task teams, as well as assisting neighbouring policing areas and performing border duties and other special duties. The number of ACCU police members on duty was further depleted because some members were also on annual leave or on sick leave.

34 20 A review of public order policing capacity Given the multiple tasks that the units had to deal with, a shortage in human resources was not unexpected. Despite this and despite the increase in the number of marches, members in both the Gauteng and East Rand ACCUs believed that they managed the operations of marches quite well. Even when asked to assist other areas, they said they were able to cope. The research showed that in terms of priority, crowd management was always seen as the foremost priority for the ACCUs, even when they were deployed to crime combating operations. Only a few Johannesburg ACCU members and managers stated that crowd management had been neglected in favour of crime prevention and other area-level priorities. However, despite their statements that they were able to manage the operations of marches, respondents indicated that juggling dual functions was not an easy task. While officially ACCU members were meant to be specialists in crowd management, the members of the Gauteng and East Rand units said they were stretched to such a limit that sometimes a platoon was left with five members for the day. The following statements from other ACCU members indicate similar perceptions regarding the diminished crowd management capacity of the units: The demand from area level was high Stations became dependent on the ACCUs Obtaining crime statistics was more important for station commissioners While crowd management was not neglected, logistically the units struggled The shortage of members or vehicles could not be an excuse in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. When a march was scheduled to take place, the police had to ensure that it took place. Impact on specialist crowd management skills While the crowd management function of the ACCUs seemed to have been administered well despite the units dual function, the research sought to establish whether members were losing their specialist crowd management skills because of their other tasks. Specialist skills can be lost if training is not maintained, equipment is not upgraded, and if the members do not work together regularly.

35 Bilkis Omar 21 Most Johannesburg and East Rand members agreed that their units had not lost their specialist skills. Almost all of the East Rand managers attributed this to the maintenance of in-service training. East Rand members and managers further stated that they had retained their skills because crowd management was (and had always been) a priority. Some Johannesburg ACCU members did, however, state that their unit had become deskilled because in-service training had not been done regularly. Views on ACCUs impact on crime Asked about their success rate in dealing with crime since the 2002 restructuring, the East Rand managers responded with very positive assessments: East Rand was leading, especially over the weekends. However the managers felt that they did not get credit for the successes. Some said that they were number one in crime prevention in Gauteng. One manager stated that if they were deployed to an area for a long enough period then the successes were better, but this was not sustainable because they had other duties. The Johannesburg managers similarly believed that their success could be measured by the decrease in crime in the area, but the impact of the ACCUs on crime control was often not known. Ascribing credit was complicated, since the crime control operations were carried out jointly with station level police members. This meant that the police stations that took the credit because they had cells in which to lock up those who had been arrested. The ACCUs did however keep records of arrests that their own members had made, and the head of the operational response services at the provincial office was aware of their successes. Unfortunately, the successes of the ACCUs in crime combating could not be measured against the crime statistics of the individual stations. However the weekly operational statistics for the Johannesburg unit are available for the period 28 June to 10 October 2006 (Table 1). While the statistics cannot prove the success of the Johannesburg unit, they provide sufficient information to illustrate the extent of crime combating undertaken by the ACCU. Furthermore, the provincial head of operational response services confirmed that the ACCUs have been beneficial to the stations (Schutte 23 July 2007). Similar statistics for the East Rand ACCU were not available.

36 22 A review of public order policing capacity Table 1: Operational crime successes for the Johannesburg ACCU 2006 Arrests Vehicle seizures Firearm seizures Ammunition seizures Stations assisted 4 28 June 4 July July 11 July July 18 July July 25 July July 1 Aug Aug 8 Aug Aug 15 Aug Aug 22 Aug No stats No stats No stats No stats No stats 23 Aug 29 Aug Aug 5 Sept Sept 12 Sept Sept 19 Sept Sept 26 Sept Sept 3 Oct No stats No stats No stats No stats No stats 4 Oct 10 Oct No stats Source: Johannesburg Crime Combating Unit Conclusion The decision to prioritise and increase the crime combating functions of the ACCUs could be said to have been beneficial, given the fact that there were more police to combat crime, and marches were showing a downward trend in the late 1990s. After 2002, however, protest marches and violent protest marches increased steadily with the result that ACCU members workload, in terms of both crime combating and crowd management, increased. The effects of the change from Public Order Police units to ACCUs in 2001 was summed up well by one member, who said:

37 Bilkis Omar 23 It was a name change only people thought that the function had changed; the primary function did not change. It may have changed for the [policies] of the national department, but not for the ground members. The units became accountable to the area level, and stations would fight for ACCU members to increase their statistics. From the interviews it appears that the crowd management function was not neglected in favour of crime combating and that it remained a priority for the units. ACCU members did not believe that they had become deskilled to the extent that they did not know how to perform their crowd management functions. However it is clear that, given the increased incidence of crowd management events subsequent to the 2002 restructuring, crime combating would necessarily have been relegated to a secondary role.

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39 CHAPTER 4 SAPS RESTRUCTURING IN 2006 Background to the restructuring In mid-2006 the SAPS announced 5 a restructuring of the way in which the whole organisation would be managed. The changes were intended to address a duplication of functions, weak command and control, and poor service delivery at police station level. The restructuring meant that the area level of SAPS management which was viewed as an unnecessary level of authority was eliminated. This meant that SAPS management would now operate at national, provincial and station level in line with the requirement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996:119). The overall intention of the changes was to improve service delivery to the public. Specialised units affected were the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS), the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC), and the Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). It was proposed that these specialist units should be decentralised to police stations. In Gauteng the restructuring was implemented in late September The Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences units and the Serious and Violent Crimes units were decentralised to stations. The Area Crime Combating Units, after much deliberation, were not fully disbanded but were reduced from seven to three units. Before this restructuring, when the area level management of the ACCUs was still in existence, the Gauteng ACCU had had operational members within its seven units (see Figures 5 and 6). After the restructuring, and the dissolution of the area level management structures, the ACCUs were renamed Crime Combating Units (CCU). The three Gauteng units that remained comprised only 614 crowd management members. The remaining 769 members of the disbanded ACCUs were redeployed to police stations to perform ordinary crime combating activities as station members. The three new Crime Combating Units that exist currently in Gauteng are located in Johannesburg, East Rand and Pretoria. The Soweto and West Rand ACCUs were incorporated into the Johannesburg CCU (based in Diepkloof,

40 26 A review of public order policing capacity Figure 5: The seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Figure 6: Organogram of the seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Gauteng Policing Areas 7 areas 122 Police Stations Operational ACCU members Vaal Rand 12 stations North Rand 15 stations East Rand 24 stations Johannesburg Central 21 stations Soweto 11 stations West Rand 11 stations Pretoria 28 stations ACCU 190 operational members ACCU 150 operational members ACCU 230 operational members ACCU 179 operational members ACCU ACCU ACCU 550 operational members

41 Bilkis Omar 27 Johannesburg) with 225 operational members. The East Rand CCU (consisting of Vaal Rand and North Rand and based in Nufield) has 197 operational members. The Pretoria CCU (based in Rosslyn) has 202 operational members (Schutte 2006). The new arrangement means that the three Gauteng CCUs service the same geographical areas previously serviced by seven Area Crime Combating Units but with far fewer operational members. The Johannesburg unit, which previously serviced a single policing area with 197 operational members, is now servicing three such areas with approximately 225 operational members. Johannesburg CCU members living in the West Rand area travel from as far as Krugersdorp to the Diepkloof base to report for duty, a distance of 30 km. In the East Rand, the situation is similar: some members travel from Vereeniging to Springs, a 103 km trip. And while the Pretoria CCU does not cover a greater geographical area within Gauteng province, parts of the North West province (Garankuwa, Mabopane, Loate, Dube, and Themba) have been incorporated into the Pretoria unit s jurisdiction. Figure 7: The three Gauteng Crime Combating Units after the 2006 restructuring