The Iraq War: Progress in the Fighting and Security

Transcription

1 1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC Phone: Fax: Web: The Iraq War: Progress in the Fighting and Security Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy February 18,

2 Introduction This report is a status report. It is not intended to support a given policy, and it is not intended to assess future risks like Arab-Kurdish tensions, the government s handling of the Sons of Iraq, or intra-shi ite tensions between the government and Sadr and the JAM. There are, however, several points that deserve special attention. The manning and funding comparisons of the US military effort in the Iraq and Afghan wars show just how critical providing adequate resources has been to progress in the war, a point often lost in discussing concepts and strategy. (pp. 8 to 11) Changes in strategy and tactics have, however, had a critical impact and here it is clear that US strategy has evolved far beyond the initial strategy often described as the surge. The Anaconda Strategy described by General Petraeus took advantage of Al Qa ida s extremism and the alienation of Iraqi Sunnis to create a far larger movement with civil and economic dimensions, not just military ones. (pp. 12 to 15)

3 Introduction - II Ethnic and sectarian differences remain a critical problem, and challenge to Ira s future stability and security. The US retained enough influence in 2007, however, to bridge over many of these divisions in spite of slow progress and a lack of support by the Iraqi central government in some areas. It is also important to note that Iraqis never supported division of the country at a popular level, and that a steady decline took place in ethnic and sectarian violence. As the graphs in this report show, this decline has led to massive decline in such violence between late 2006 and September 2007, and a further decline after the containment of the Sadrists and JAM in Baghdad in the spring of (pp. 16 to 25) The graphs showing the patterns in overall violence show a steady rise from 2003 to late 2006, and that a major reduction in violence through August Since that time, violence rose only during the clash between the central government and Sadr/JAM forces in the spring of 2008, and has continued to decline. (pp. 26 to 32) The extent to which the Anaconda strategy went beyond an increase in US troop levels is clearly reflected in the data on violence and casualties for 2006, 2007 and Advances in US intelligence,

4 Introduction - III surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities during laid the groundwork for far more effective attacks on terrorist and insurgent networks. The Sadr ceasefire enabled US and Iraqi forces to first deal with Al Qa ida in 2007, and then deal with Sadr and the JAM in 2008 aided in part by carefully targeted US efforts against the most extreme elements of the JAM in The US team in Iraq expanded the civil-military aid and governance efforts into the field in spite of the ability to quickly deploy more US civilian advisors, and expand aid and governance activity at the local and provincial level. (pp. 33 to 41) Declassified US intelligence maps show the impact on the scale of Al Qa ida and affiliated insurgent activity in Iraq and Baghdad from the end of 2006 through the fall of 2008, as well as the impact of key land and air operations, and targeting Al Qa ida s key cadres. Coupled to still classified advances in IS&R, the US effectively redefined jointness in counterinsurgency warfare. (pp. 42 to 45) Graphs showing the level of violence by type of attack also reflect these patterns (pp ), but they also provide a warning. The overall level of violence remains as high as at the beginning of the The war is not

5 Introduction - IV won or over. Suicide bombings and other bombing attacks on the Iraqi population have not been sharply reduced in number or intensity. What some US commanders call an irreducible minimum can only be addressed by political accommodation and the growing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. (pp ) Major progress has occurred in reducing the level of violence in Baghdad, which has been a key center of violence throughout the insurgency. This has only been possible, however, by US division of the city into largely Sunni, Shi ite, and mixed areas. Reaching political accommodation and creating security in the capital remain key challenges. (pp ) Iraqi civilian casualty patterns show the same decline as in the levels of violence, whether calculated by Iraq, US, or NGO count. (pp ) The same is true of US military, allied military, and Iraqi security forces, although the Iraqi security forces continue to take significant losses. (pp ) Iraqi perceptions of the surge present reporting problems because polling data are dated and do not reflect the level of progress achieved

6 Introduction - V during the fighting in 2007, and after the spring clashes with Sadr and the JAM. They do, however, reflect progress for the period shown. (pp ) Similar progress is shown when the data on violence are examined by key province, rather than aggregated at the national level. It is clear that most violence has always been concentrated in a limited number of provinces, and that even these provinces are now far less violent than in late (pp ). This is particularly apparent if the number of daily attacks counted in each chart is compared over time. Iraqi perceptions of safety show progress since 2006, and growing perceptions of safety in Iraq neighborhoods. They are disturbing, however, to the extent they do not show similar progress in perceptions of safety outside the neighborhood where those polled live. This seems to reflect the still slow progress in political accommodation and the risk that new sectarian and ethnic violence could occur. (pp ). It is also disturbing that progress in the transfer of control of provinces from the MNF-I to Iraqi government often has not reflected the level of

7 Introduction - VI security in that province. (pp ), when these charts are compared to the other data in this report. Like public opinion polling on the impact of the surge, the polling data lag current developments. They do, however, clear reflect the tensions between Iraqi belief that the invasion was not justified, a history of popular support for attacks on US and allied forces and a broad desire for the US and allied forces to leave -- and understanding that a rushed US and allied departure could undo the gains made to date. (pp ) Major progress has occurred in increasing the size and capability of Iraqi forces, and in Iraq s taking over the funding of such efforts. This progress is still, however, highly dependent on continued US and allied advisory efforts and support. (pp )

8 The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES ~49,000 AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN Land Mass 647,500 sq km Population 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: $35.B GDP, $1,000 PC Budget: $2.6; $8.9B in aid pledges Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved Restrictive terrain dominates the country IRAQ IRAQ Land Mass 432,162 sq km Population 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy Economy dominated by the oil sector: $100.0B GDP, $3,600 PCI Budget $48.4 billion; $33B+ in aid pledges Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES ~176,000

9 Iraq vs. Afghanistan 35,000,000 30,000,000 25,000,000 20,000,000 15,000,000 10,000,000 5,000,000 Afghanistan Territory (Sq Km 647, ,072 Population 31,889,923 27,499,638 GNP ($USB) Oil Export Revenues ($USB) 0 Iraq 0 41 Per Captia Income (US$) 1,000 3,600 Literacy Rate (%) Median Age % 0-14 years Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007

10 US Force Levels in Iraq vs. 160 Afghanistan FY01-02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 Bridge Iraq BA *53.4 Afghan BA *

11 Cost to DoD of Iraq vs. Afghan War FY01-02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 Bridge Iraq BA *53.4 Afghan BA *

12 Strategy No new Bush strategy since December 2006 Anaconda strategy slide provided by by General Petraeus in April 2008 testimony to Congress. Broad picture of potential long term US force cuts, and shift of US role to strategic overwatch, presented in September 2007, but with little details. No clear long term timelines: Force cuts beyond one brigade remain conditions based. Both the Iraqi MoD and head of MNSTC-I said in February 2008 that Iraqi forces would not be ready to assume full counterinsurgency role before Announced development and aid strategy do not yet reflect US cuts in aid and massive increases in Iraqi oil export revenues.

13 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Full Spectrum Operations

14 Source: MNF-I, April 9,

15 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Key Counterinsurgency Ideas

16 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Counterinsurgency Guidance

17 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 The US Joint Campaign Plan

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19 The Changes That Have Shaped the War Affect all aspects of US forces Involve major changes in doctrine. Change in leadership, training, education, communication. Changes in US Army force structure. From short wars and kinetic bursts to sustained civilmilitary operations in clear-hold-build From post conflict reconstruction to armed nation building.

20 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Changes in Doctrine

21 Changes in Leadership Development Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008

22 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Changes in Collective Training

23 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Changes in Equipping the Force

24 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Changes in Lessons Learned

25 Changes in Knowledge Management Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008

26 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Active Brigade Team: Road to Deployment

27

28 Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions, and Political Accommodation Current CIA and other estimates of Arab Shi ite,arab Sunni, Kurdish, and minority shares of population have uncertain credibility. Data on sectarian and ethnic violence only reflect deaths, not patterns of low level violence, intimidation, kidnappings, and displacement (cleansing). Data on refugees and displacements uncertain have reached more than 2 million internally and 2 million driven outside country in nation of 28 million. Some estimates reach 5+ million, but some evidence indicates may be far too high. Polling data precede Maliki offensive in Basra and fight against Sadr; Shi ite public opinion now far more uncertain. Option data show growing Sunni support for government, but date back to February 2008, and there has been significant progress since then.

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30 Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges Sectarian Challenges Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi a. 1% Other Iraq: 60-65% Shi a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other Ethnic Challenges Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, Other 4% Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3% Tribal Challenges Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized. 30

31 Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions 31

32 Three sources: CIA World Factbook, unsourced; Iraq: a Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1988, unsourced ( knowledgeable observers ); Average ABC News polls 07-08, N=6,652 via 1,386 points. CIA WFB LoC ABC Shiites 60-65% 60-65% 49% Sunni Arabs 12-22* Kurds NA 15 Non Muslims 3 NA 3 *Extrapolated Real World Ethno-Sectarian Population Parameters? Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

33 Iraqis Never Sought Division Even During Worst Part of Fighting Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. June, Pg. 1 33

34 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. September, Pg

35 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

36 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

37 Movement of Iraqi Refugees Some 2.7 million displaced within Iraq 1.2 million before February million since 300,000 in first three months of 2008 Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. Copright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 37

38 The Course of the Fighting Major gains against Al Qa ida in Iraq from mid-2007 onwards, but still face major uncertainties over remnants of Al Qa ida, Kurdish- Arab Tensions, sectarian and ethnic tensions, Sadr and JAM, role of Iran. Iraqi government data indicate major rise in violence in Baghdad in March and April of 2008 has ended. Maps cover al Qa ida,but not pattern of clashes with extreme Shi ite groups, elements of Mahdi Army. Attack data reflect sharp cuts in the level of insurgent attacks, but do not fully reflect overall climate of violence: crime, ethnic and sectarian cleansing, etc. Casualty data only reflect killing, not wounded,kidnapped, disappearances, impact of cleansing, etc. Casualty counts uncertain.

39 Mapping the Overall Pattern: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008 GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data, May Source: GAO. SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed June, Pg

40 AVERAGE DAILY ATTACKS: MAY 2003 TO MAY 2008 Source: GAO. SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed June, Pg

41 Rising Violence:

42 Iraqi Civilians Killed: Total Deaths: Jan 2003-Dec 2008: 90,335-98, High Estimate Low Estimate Source: Iraqi Body Count, as of December 28, 2008

43 Iraqi Civilian Deaths Per Day from Vehicle Bombs, Gunfire & Executions: Vehicle Bombs Gunfire/Executions Source: Iraqi Body Count, as of Feb 4, 2009

44 Rise in Terrorism in Iraq: Attacks Targeting Non-Combatants 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 Terror attacks Attacks causing at least one People killed, injured, or death, inury, or kidnapping kidnapped , Adapted from US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism. April 30, 2008, and

45 The Military Course and Impact of the Surge

46 46 The Surge - I What Went Right in Original Strategy US build-up to 20 brigades Shift in tactics to lasting forward deployment. Only fight where can both win and hold. Exploitation of major advances in IS&R. Surge airpower as well as ground forces. What Went Sort of Right Iraqi government support of operations against both Sunni & Shi ite violent extremists Iraqi Army deployment, although slower than planned and Iraqi forces far less ready. Expansion of embeds, partner units, partner cells. Focus on Baghdad

47 47 The Surge - II Synergy and Serendipity Al Qa ida extremism alienates many Sunnis and tribes Tribal uprising in Anbar is transformed into sons of Iraq Sadr declares and keeps ceasefire. Kurds wait on Article 140 What Went Wrong Central government did not reach out to Sunnis, Sons of Iraq. Police generally fell short, did not perform. Negligible progress in rule of law Extremely slow progress in political accommodation. US civilian role and aid impact fell far short of goal. Iraqi government spending on development, services, and security. Did not reduce impact of British defeat in the south, growing intra-shi ite tensions. Growing Iranian role and influence Did not affect Arab-Kurdish-Turkish tensions. Little progress in strengthening ties to other neighbors.

48 US Shifts in Strategy in December 2007: The Surge GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO June 23, 2008, p. 10

49 US Troop Levels: March 2003 to May 2008 GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO June 23, 2008, p. 19

50 Al Qa'ida in Iraq December,

51 51

52 800 OEF Close Air Support Sorties With Munitions Dropped, (Excluding 20mm and 20mm rounds and unguided rockets) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Totals Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007

53 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 53

54 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved 54

55 55

56 Al Qa'ida in Iraq March, 2008 Source for slides 18 and 19: MNF-I, April 9,

57 Patterns in Violence As Result of the Surge and Campaign Against Sadr

58 Al Qa'ida in Iraq Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7,

59 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Key Areas of Shi ite Extremist Activity: Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008

60 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 The Battle of Sadr City: March-April 2008

61 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December 2008, Pg. 18

62 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December 2007, Pg. 21

63 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Indirect Fire Attacks:

64 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 IED Explosions:

65 IED INCIDENT TRENDS Source: Bill McMichael, Pentagon Correspondent, Times News Service, Military Times News Group, 65

66 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December 2007, Pg. 23

67 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Weapons and Explosive Cache Finds: 25 March-7 August 2008

68 Trends in Baghdad: US and Iraqi Views

69 US Joint Security Stations and Outposts in Baghdad: July 2007 GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO June 23, 2008, p. 20

70 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Ethno-Sectarian Attacks: May 2006-Oct 2008

71 Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in (Trend in Total Incidents per Month by Type) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Katyusha Suicide Bomb Assasination Bicycle Bomb Car Bomb Mortar IED Source: Iraqi Official

72 Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in (Monthly Distribution of Incidents by Type) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total IED Mortar Car Bomb Bicycle Bomb Assasination Suicide Bomb Katyusha Source: Iraqi Official

73 Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in (Trend in Total Casualties per Month by Type) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Body Found ISF Dead ISF Wounded Dead Civilian Wounded Civilian Source: Iraqi Official

74 Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in (Monthly Distribution of Casualties by Type) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total Wounded Civilian Dead Civilian ISF Wounded ISF Dead Body Found Source: Iraqi Official

75 Iraqi Casualty Patterns

76 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December 2007, Pg. 19

77 Iraqi Body Count: Iraqi Civilians Killed During the Surge and Afterwards by Month of Combat 3,300 2,800 2,300 1,800 1, Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Deaths 1, ,76 1,58 2,09 2,42 3,12 2,74 2,39 2,92 2,96 2,65 2,79 2,46 2,56 2,41 2,73 2,08 2,53 2,32 1,22 1, Source: Iraq Body Count: June 24, 2007

78 350 Icasualties: Iraqi ISF Killed During the Surge and Afterwards by Month of Combat ISF Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan ISF Source: Icasualties,

79 Notice Different Axis 4000 Icasualties: Iraqi Civilians Killed During the Surge and Afterwards by Month of Combat Civ Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Civ Source: Icasualties,

80 US & Coalition Casualty Patterns

81 US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Various Wars Revolutionary1812 Mexican Civil Span.-Amer.WWI WWII Korea Vietnam Lebanon Gulf Somalia Afghan Iraq Wounded in Action , Killed in Action Non-combat Deaths Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Analysis Division, as of April 8, 2008 Civil War is Union only; Confederate dead were 74,524 battle and 59,297 other; wounded unknon.

82 Total US Killed and Wounded in Iraq: 2003-May 3, Total Deaths KIA Non-Hostile WIA Returned WIA Not Returned 19 Mar-30 Apr May 03-3 May 08 4,076 3, ,451 12,915 Dod Civilians Totals Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical analysis Division, as of May 5, 2008

83 US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Iraq by Cause: March 2003-April 5, Killed in Action Total of 3,267 hostile deaths, 738 Non-hostile deaths, and 29, 676 wounded = 33,681 Total 0 DrowningBurns/Smoke Artllery/Mortar/Rocket Explosive DeviceGrenade Gunshot NBC Agents Other WeaponeryRPG Air/Veh. Fall, Crash Cut, Other Medical Unknown Killed in Action Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Analysis Division, as of April 8, 2008

84 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December Pg

85 1500 Monthly US Casualties Operation Iraqi Freedom: March 2003 to Jan 2009 Non-Combat Deaths Killed in Action Wounded Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Note: Accidents includes other deaths; Killed in Action includes died of wounds. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

86 Total US and Allied Killed During the Surge and Afterwards 140 Total from 3/2003 to 120 1/2009 = 4237 US, 178 UK, Other, and 4,553 Total Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprMayJun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprMayJun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Other UK US Source: Icasualties: Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, accessed, Jan 31, 2008

87 Monthly US Casualties Surge and Afterwards: January January Wounded Killed in Action Non-Combat Deaths Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb MarAprilMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Wounded Killed in Action Non-Combat Deaths Note: Accidents includes other deaths; Killed in Action includes died of wounds. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

88 Perceptions of the Surge: US and Iraqi

89 89 100% 90% Impact of Troop Surge ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll % saying it's worse 80% August Now 70% 70% 68% 70% 65% 67% 60% 50% 53% 49% 43% 44% 42% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Security where forces sent Security in other areas Political dialogue Ability of Iraqi gov't Economic development Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

90 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

91 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

92 After the Surge Reducing the Uncertainties of a Long War Sunni-Shi a and Arab-Kurd political accommodation. Sons of Iraq Sadr vs. ISCI Stable autonomy for Kurds. Open list and air elections at national, provincial, and local level. Creation of Effective governance and services at at national, provincial, and local level. Resolving petroleum and national budget issues. Move from aid and government subsidies to sustained development and employment. Neighbors: Iran, Syria, Turkey, Gulf US and Iraqi domestic politics 92

93 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Legislative Progress Towards Political Accommodation:

94 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Potential Risks and Storm Clouds

95 Patterns of Violence by Province and Transfer of Responsibility Violence varies sharply by province. Violence by province diminished from mid-2007 to April 2008, but Maliki offensive in Basra and fighting with Sadr that began in March 2008 has since radically increased the level of violence and areas impacted. Polling data date back to February Reporting on transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces have consistently bordered on the absurd. Transfers have been cosmetic and Iraqi forces are not ready for the mission. Iraqi government cannot provide effective governance or presence in many areas supposedly under its control.

96 Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq for Selected Provinces, August 2005 through Early May 2008 Source: GAO. SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed June, Pg. 13 Note: Each data point represents the average number of daily attacks for the specified period of time, as reported in DOD s quarterly reports to Congress. GAO analysis of DOD s quarterly reports to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, January 2006 through February 2008; and data provided by MNF-I for March 2008 through May

97 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. March 2007, Pg

98 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. June 2007, Pg

99 QuickTime and a decompre ssor are needed to see this picture. Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. June, Pg

100 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. June, Pg

101 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

102 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2007 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. September June Pg

103 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2007 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. September Pg

104 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October 2007 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December Pg

105 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: January 2008 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. MJarch, Pg

106 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2008 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. June, Pg

107 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2008 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. September, Pg

108 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October2008 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

109 Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October2008 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

110 Saw Local Violence During Past 6 Months: August 2007-February 2008 ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK Poll Car bombs/suicide attacks 27% Baghdad 61% Snipers/crossfire 24% Mosul 58% Sectarian fighting 22% Diyala 58% Unnecessary violence by U.S. forces 28% Anbar 54% by militia 18% Basra 60% Forced separation 14% Baghdad 28% Basra 29% Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

111 Transferring Provincial Control - I Petraeus briefing Slides, April 2008 Source: Petraeus Briefing Slides, April 9,

112 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. June, Pg

113 Transferring Provincial Control - II Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. September, Pg

114 Transferring Provincial Control - II Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

115 Transfer of Forward Operating Bases to Iraqis Date FOBs # Transferred %Transferred October % June % September % November % January % Source: DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, November 2006, June 2007, September 2007, December 2007, and March Note: DoD did not report on FOBs in March Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p

116 Iraqi views of US Role in Iraq Trend has been more favorable, since victories in 2007 but Iraqi public opinion data date back to February Events since that time may have increase Sunni tolerance and support of US forces and reduced it for Shi ites. Data on Iraqi perceptions show clear conflict between nationalism, desire for US to leave,and understanding US presence still necessary. Sharp polarization of Iraqi opinion along sectarian and ethnic lines.

117 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

118 118 90% 80% 70% Views of the U.S. Presence ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll August Now 60% 57% 50% 40% 37% 49% 42% 47% 38% 30% 20% 10% 0% Invasion was right Attacks on U.S. forces "acceptable" Coalition forces should leave now Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

119 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

120 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

121 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

122 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

123 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

124 Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, War in Iraq: The Public Perspective, presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

125 Iraqi Force Development - I Iraqi Army and regular military forces continue to make real progress, but MNF-I continues to grossly overstate this progress by lumping together units that can operate independently and units dependent on US. Constant force expansion still stresses quantity over quality; shortages of officers and NCOs. Sectarian and ethnic divisions and favoritism remain a problem. Regular forces remain dependent on US support,armor, air power, embeds, partner units, IS&R, support and other enablers. Regular forces will not have counterinsurgency capability to fully replace US forces before ; capability to defend country alone until 2020.

126 Iraqi Force Development - II Data on police progress disguise reality that most police are now controlled at local and governorate level, many trained and equipped men are no longer in service, and embeds have not been provided or effective. Corruption and incompetence in MoD and MoI remain major problems. Prime minister s office continues to provide ineffective guidance and management. The future role of the tribal militias and Sons of Iraq remains uncertain in spite of slow Iraqi government efforts to deal with issue. No clear plans for transferring funding responsibilities from US aid to Iraqi government budget, but progress is taking place.

127 1 Jun Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 08 8 Feb 08 7 Mar 08 4 Apr 08 2 May May Jun Jul Aug Attack Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations IEDs and Mines (includes Explosions and Found and Cleared) Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks ~592K

128 Iraqi vs. US Force Levels 600, , , , , ,000 0 End June 06 End June 07 Early June 07 End July 08 Total US 128, , , ,000 - Total Iraqi 268, , , ,970 Total Iraqi MoD 116, , , ,362 Total Iraqi MoI 152, , , ,

129 14 Comparative Cost of Aid to Afghan and Iraqi Forces ($US Current Billions) Afghan Iraq Total Afghan Iraq Total Source: CBO, 2008

130 Source: MNF-I, April 9,

131 How US Iraqi Security Forces Aid Funds Have Been Spent 131 Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 51.

132 Iraqi Security Budget by Year Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

133 Iraqi Security Expenditures vs. Budget Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008

134 US Military Assistance Per Capita Per Year (Constant Dollars) Pakistan Afghanistan Iraq Source: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants, UN Population Prospects

135 Number of Iraqi Security Forces: March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008 Notes: a: The term operational refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term trained and equipped refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from the State Department s March 9, 2005 and January 31, 2007 Iraq Weekly Status Report and Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi Security Forces Update, January 26, b: The term trained refers to Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Counterterrorism Bureau forces. Numbers are from April 30, 2008 Iraq Weekly Status Report. c: Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces. d: Army numbers include support forces. e: Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers. f: The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway patrol forces. g: Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers. h: Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 ministries. i: Numbers reflect total Iraqi security forces trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, absence without leave, and normal separation. Source: GAO. SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed June, Pg

136 Total Size of Iraqi Security Forces (Number of Personnel) Aug 07-Jul , , , , , , ,000 Border Enforcement National Police Iraqi Police Services Special Operations Navy Air Force Support Forces Army 0 AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

137 700,000 Total Size of Iraqi Security Forces (Number of Personnel)May 08-Jul , , , , , ,000 Border Enforcement National Police Iraqi Police Services Special Operations Navy Air Force Support Forces Army 0 MAY JUN JUL Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

138 138 Iraqi Security Forces: End of October 2008 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg. 31

139 Growth of Iraqi Security Forces (Assigned Personnel) August 2007-July 31, , , , , , ,000 Border Enforcement National Police Iraqi Police Services Special Operations Navy Air Force Support Forces Army 100,000 0 Aug-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

140 Projected Growth of Iraqi Forces Source: MNSTC-I, September

141 Manning of Iraqi Regular Military Forces (Number of Personnel) July 31, ,000 AUTHORIZED ASSIGNED TRAINED 200,000 Army 171, , ,970 Support Forces 15,583 22,069 21, , ,000 Air Force 3,311 1, Navy 1,893 1,872 1,494 Special Operations 4,733 3,589 4,564 AUTHORIZED ASSIGNED TRAINED 50,000 0 Army Support Forces Air Force Navy Special Operations Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008

142 Iraqi Ground Forces Personnel By Division: November 2008 b. Data is derived from the MoD Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS), which tracks MoD manpower and payroll data. Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

143 Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008 Copyright Anthony 143

144 Source: General David H. Petraeus, Iraq Update, October 7, 2008 Iraqi Battalion Combat Readiness Assessment

145 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

146 Source: Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. December, Pg

147 Source: MNF-I April 9,

148 Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, July 30, 2008, p. 56