Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan

Transcription

1 Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/ Afghanistan November 8, 8 Jason H. Campbell Jeremy Shapiro For more information please contact Jason Campbell at jhcampbell@brookings.edu

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS. Security Indicators. Estimated Number of Afghan Civilian Fatalities as a Direct Result of Fighting Between Pro-Government Forces and Anti-Government Entities (AGE), 7-8 UPDATED.. U.S. Troop Fatalities since 7,.5.3 Cause of Death for U.S. Troops.5. American Military Fatalities by Category, 7, -Present 6.5 U.S. Troops Wounded in Action since 7,..6.6 British Military Fatalities in Afghanistan since Canadian Military Fatalities in Afghanistan since Non-U.S. Coalition Troop Fatalities by Country since 8.9 Estimated U.S. War Funding for Operation Enduring Freedom by Agency, FY -FY 9 Bridge Funds Estimated Order of Battle Map for U.S. and NATO-ISAF Troops.. 9. American Troops Deployed to Afghanistan by Mission... Troops Committed to NATO s International Security Assistance Mission (ISAF) by Country..3 Total NATO-ISAF Manpower by Regional Command....Size of Afghan Security Forces on Duty..5.A Annual Growth of Afghan National Army (ANA), by Number of Troops, 3-Present Capability Milestone (CM) Assessment of Afghan National Army (ANA) Units and Headquarters..6 Annual Recruitment Figures for Afghan National Army (ANA)...7 Detailed Breakdown of Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces....8 Defense Assessment of Afghan National Police (ANP) Capabilities....9 Recruitment Figures for the Various Programs of the Afghan National Police (ANP), March 7-March Number of U.S. and NATO Teams/Personnel Required and Assigned to Train and Mentor Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)..3. Number and Nationality of Personnel Devoted to the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission to Afghanistan...3. U.S. Departments of Defense and State Support to Train and Equip the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan by Province, January, 7-March 8, 8... Comparison of Incidents Carried Out by Taliban/Anti-Government Elements (TB/AGE), Weeks -7 (January thru Mid-) for 7 and U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Authorized/On Hand Staffing by Location Country Leadership and Location of Non-U.S. PRT s 6.7 Estimated Number of Afghan Refugees in the Region by Location Afghan Refugees Voluntarily Repatriated by Country, UPDATED..7.9 Estimated Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP s)..7. Governance & Rule of Law Indicators. Afghanistan Population and Demographic Information...8. Size, Gender, and ethnic Makeup of Afghanistan s Main Legislative Bodies.8.3 Where Afghans Choose to Take Different Types of Legal Cases.9. Highest Level Degree Acquired by Judges Responding to a Random Survey 9.5 Access to Legal Resources for Judges Responding to a Random Survey 9.6 Annual Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan (Hectares) and Percentage of Global Cultivation, Annual Opium Production in Afghanistan (Metric Tons) and Percentage of Global Production, Opium Poppy Cultivation Levels in Afghanistan (with Top-Producing Provinces), Snapshot Comparison of Afghanistan s Top Opium-Producing Provinces, Based on Amount of Land Devoted to Cultivation, & 8..9 Monthly Farm-Gate Cost of Dry Opium Since September (US$/KG). Afghanistan s Rank in Reporters Without Borders Index of Press Freedom, Afghanistan s Rank in Transparency International s Annual Corruption Perceptions Index..3. Afghanistan s Rank in the Brookings Institution s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, Economic & Quality of Life Indicators 3. Annual Inflation. 3. Real GDP (Total, Per Capita and Growth), GDP Growth and Sector Contributions to Growth, Breakdown of Afghan Annual Budget (Core vs. External), FY 5/6 thru 7/8 NEW Comparison of Electricity Supply Sources and Capacity: 979, and Estimated Number of Telephone Users in Afghanistan by Year, Estimated Percentage of Afghans with Access to Water/Sanitation Facilities Healthcare Metrics Education Metrics.6 3. Poverty Levels, Foreign Aid Pledged, Committed and Disbursed, Annual Value of Imports and Exports, with Top Trade Partners, Microfinance Clients, Borrowers and Loan Amounts.7. Pakistan. Comparison of Various Metrics from Pakistan s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) vs. the Rest of Pakistan...8. Health Metrics for FATA.8.3 Force Strength of Pakistani Security Forces Who Regularly Operate in FATA 8.3.A U.S. Special Forces (USSOF) Conducting Counterinsurgency Training to Frontier Corps (FC) Officers.NEW.. 8. Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed Towards Various Programs in Pakistan s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Border Region, -7..9

3 .5 Pakistani Public Opinion Polling & Public Opinion Afghanistan in 8: A Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation)..NEW & UPDATED Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications (Charney Research)

4 NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE AFGHANISTAN INDEX: Although the footnotes to the Afghanistan Index document our sources in detail, it is worth noting here a few broad points. The majority of our information comes from the U.S. Government, though we must often analyze it and process it further to show trends over the full period since. Some information comes from foreign journalists on the ground and from nongovernmental organizations; a very modest amount to date comes from Afghan sources. Most tables and charts are straightforward representations of data as we obtain it from the above primary sources, with only modest further analysis and processing required. However, a few graphics, such as those on crime and unemployment rates, require more methodological work (and more assumptions) on our part and are as a result also perhaps somewhat less precise than most of the tables and charts.. SECURITY INDICATORS (FIGURE.) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF AFGHAN CIVILIAN FATALITIES AS A DIRECT RESULT OF FIGHTING BETWEEN PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT ENTITIES (AGE), Non-Attributable AGE Pro-Government * FIGURES IN DETAIL 6 7 8* TOTAL 99,633,5 Attributed to: Pro-Government Forces 3 (5%) 3 (7%) 577 (%) AGE 699 (75%) 95 (58%) 8 (55%) Could not be attributed 9 (5%) 68 (5%) *Through August 8 NOTE: Pro-Government Forces include Afghan Government and all international forces. Figures from 6 and 7 are from Human Rights Watch. 8 figures provided by UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan. UNAMA estimate for 7 was,5 total such civilian fatalities. According to UNAMA, the total of,5 civilian fatalities through August 8 compares with, through the same period in 7 (representing an increase of 3%).

5 (FIGURE.) U.S. TROOP FATALITIES SINCE OCTOBER 7, Oct- Jan Jan Jan- Total from 7, through November 7, 8: Fatalities (all kinds): 63 Fatalities in hostile incidents: 8 Fatalities in non-hostile incidents: Jan-5 Jan Jan Jan * The actual figure for non-hostile fatalities is shown only for months in which there were more than such incidents. Indicates the start of a new calendar year Year (FIGURE.3) CAUSE OF DEATH FOR US TROOPS, BY YEAR 3 Improvised Suicide Mortars/RPG s/ Helicopter Explosive Landmine Bombs Rockets Losses* Device Aircraft Losses* Other Hostile Fire Non- Hostile Causes* (%) (%) (%) (%) (6.7%) (%) (33.3%) 6 (5.%) 5 (.%) (%) (.%) (.%) (8.%) 8 (36.7%) (.5%) 8 (6.3%) 9 3 (.%) (%) (%) (%) 9 (39.6%) (%) (5.%) 6 (33.3%) 8 (3.%) (%) (.9%) (.9%) (3.8%) 3 (5.8%) (9.%) 3 (.%) (8.%) (%) (.%) 5 (5.%) 36 (36.%) (.%) (.%) 7 (7.%) (7.6%) 3 (3.%) (.%) (.%) (.%) (%) 33 (33.7%) (.%) (8.%) (.9%) 9 (7.7%) (.9%) 3 (.%) (%) 35 (9.9%) 5 (.%) (5.6%) (.6%) 7 (.6%) (.3%) (.3%) (%) 35 (3.%) 9 (.5%) 5 Total 79 (8.5%) 8 (.3%) Through November 7, 8 (3.3%) (.8%) 99 (5.8%) (3.5%) 6 (5.7%) 6 (.%) *Helicopter and aircraft losses include deaths caused by both non-hostile accidents and those downed by hostile fire. The Non-Hostile Causes data then does not include non-hostile helicopter or aircraft losses. Total 67 5

6 (FIGURE.) AMERICAN MILITARY FATALITIES BY CATEGORY OCTOBER 7, NOVEMBER, 8 Category Total fatalities as of November, 8: 6 Gender Male: 67 Female: Age Younger than : 8 -: 9 5-3: : 9 Older than 35: Component Active: 5 Reserve: 3 National Guard: 88 Military service Army: 8 Marines: 66 Navy: 3 Air Force: 3 Officers/Enlisted Officer: 98 E5-E9: 7 E-E: 5 Race/Ethnicity American Indian or Alaska Native: 9 Asian: 8 Black or African American: 5 Hispanic or Latino: 5 Multiple races, pending or unknown: 5 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander: 8 White: 9 (FIGURE.5) U.S. TROOPS WOUNDED IN ACTION SINCE OCTOBER 7, Oct- Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan-8 Total from 7, through November 7, 8:,586 The daily Department of Defense casualty reports that we use for our monthly estimates on U.S troops wounded does not make it entirely clear when in a -hour period casualties were incurred. Since the reports are published at AM daily, there is possibility that our numbers for January 5 and onwards are slightly off due to uncertainties about whether casualties occurred on the first or the last of each month

7 (FIGURE.6) BRITISH MILITARY FATALITIES IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE START OF Jan-6 February March May June August September November December Jan-7 February March May June August September November December Jan-8 February March Total through November 7, 8: 5 NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: From -5, the British military suffered 5 fatalities that are reflected in the total. May June August September November (FIGURE.7) CANADIAN MILITARY FATALITIES IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE START OF Jan-6 February March May June August September November December Jan-7 February March May June August 7 September November December Jan-8 February March May June August September Total through November 7, 8: 97 NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: From -5, the Canadian military suffered 8 fatalities that are reflected in the total. November

8 (FIGURE.8) NON-U.S. COALITION TROOP FATALITIES BY COUNTRY SINCE OCTOBER United Kingdom Canada Germany Spain France Netherlands Denmark Italy Poland Romania Australia Czech Republic Estonia Norway Hungary Portugal Sweden Finland Latvia Lithuania South Korea Total through November 7, 8: 38 (FIGURE.9) ESTIMATED U.S. WAR FUNDING FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM BY AGENCY, FY -FY 9 BRIDGE FUNDS ($ BILLIONS) 9 FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY 9 & BRIDGE TOTAL Department of Defense $. $. $. $7. $7.9 $3.9 $3. $.5 $6. Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops $.8 $.7 $. $.8 $. $.9 $. $.6 $. VA Medical $. $. $. $. $. $. $.3 $. $. TOTAL $.8 $.7 $.5 $. $9. $36.9 $3.8 $3. $7.9 AS OF: 5, 8 8

9 (FIGURE.) ESTIMATED ORDER OF BATTLE MAP FOR U.S. AND NATO-ISAF TROOPS AS OF: JULY 8 NOTE: Map produced and provided by Christopher Radin of The Long War Journal ( ) Estimates based on open source data. 9

10 (FIGURE.) AMERICAN TROOPS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN BY MISSION Operation Enduring NATO International Security Month TOTAL U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Freedom (OEF) Assistance Force (ISAF) September 8 9, 5, 3, (FIGURE.) TROOPS COMMITTED TO NATO S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES (ISAF) BY COUNTRY AS OF: 6, 8 Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name Snapshot figure that includes overlapping rotations. (FIGURE.3) TOTAL NATO-ISAF MANPOWER BY REGIONAL COMMAND AND DATE REGIONAL COMMAND TOTAL TROOPS JUNE 8 TOTAL TROOPS SEPTEMBER 8 TOTAL TROOPS OCTOBER 8 CAPITAL 5,9 6,3 5, EAST 6, 5,5 8,8 SOUTH 3,8 9, 9, WEST,5,5,98 NORTH,3,, TOTAL 5,7 7,6 5,7 AS OF: 6, 8 (FIGURE.) SIZE OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES ON DUTY 3 Ministry of Defense Ministry of Interior Month Forces Forces Total Afghan Security Forces 8 57,8 79,9 37,7 8 68, 79,9 7,9

11 (FIGURE.5.A) ANNUAL GROWTH OF AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA), BY NUMBER OF TROOPS, 3- PRESENT 7, 6, 5,, 3,,, * NOTE: Figures for 3-7 are as of year end. 8 figure is through March. (FIGURE.5) CAPABILITY MILSTONE (CM) ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) UNITS AND HEADQUARTERS CM Level Battalion/Squadron (85) Brigade HQ () Corps HQ (5) Air Corps HQ () N/A AS OF: March 8 NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: Number of units and headquarters based on an end goal of 8, personnel, 7, of whom are projected to be operational by the end of 8 with the remainder operational by the end of 9. CM levels are rated on a scale from - (definitions below). CM : capable of operating independently CM : capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support CM 3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces CM : formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions N/A: Not yet formed or not reporting

12 (FIGURE.6) ANNUAL RECRUITMENT FIGURES FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) 6 YEAR RECRUITS 3-9,67-5 5,79 5-6,85 6-7, ,35 NOTE: As of March 8, Year-to-Date re-enlistment is 5% for soldiers and 56% for non-commissioned officers. NOTE ON THIS TABLE: Years run from March through the following February of respective periods. (FIGURE.7) DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF AFGHAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES 7 Number Authorized Number Assigned Percent Assigned Ministry of Interior Headquarters 6,5 5,37 87 Uniformed Police,39, Border Police 7,97,3 68 Auxiliary Police 9,38 N/A* Civil Order Police 5,365,53 8 Criminal Investigation Division,8,85 68 Counter Narcotics Police 3,777,65 6 Customs Police 63 N/A* Counter Terrorism Police 6 Standby/Highway Police,536 N/A* TOTAL 8, 79,9 97 AS OF: 8 *The auxiliary police, customs police, standby police and highway police are no longer authorized. (FIGURE.8) DEFENSE ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP) CAPABILITIES 8 POLICE UNITS (NUMBER OF UNITS) CM CM CM 3 CM N/A Uniformed Police Districts (365) Border Police Battalions (33) 33 Civil Order Police Battalions () 6 Counter Narcotics Police Units (5) 3 TOTAL (%) (3%) 8 (%) 33 (77%) 69 (6%) AS OF: 8 CM : capable of operating independently CM : capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support CM 3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces CM : formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions N/A: Not yet formed or not reporting (FIGURE.9) RECRUITMENT FIGURES FOR THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP), MARCH 7-MARCH 8 9 Afghan Border Patrol (ABP),795 Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Uniform Police (AUP),65 ALL ANP RECRUITS 7,7 NOTE: The AUP serve at the regional, provincial and district levels and carry out local day-to-day policing activities. The ABP provide law enforcement at borders and entry points. The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force that is split into urban and rural units and conducts operations in areas where government control may be weak or where added support is needed for counterinsurgency operations.

13 (FIGURE.) NUMBER OF U.S. AND NATO TEAMS/PERSONNEL REQUIRED AND ASSIGNED TO TRAIN AND MENTOR AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF) U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) Personnel for Afghan National Army (ANA) Number Required,39 Number Assigned,6 Fill Rate % U.S. Police Mentor Team (PMT) Personnel for Afghan National Police (ANP) Number Required,358 Number Assigned 9 Fill Rate 39% NOTE: Each PMT is comprised of approximately 6 U.S. personnel., of the 3, U.S. Marines deployed to southern Afghanistan during the spring of 8 are assigned to conduct ANP training missions, but only for approximately 7 months, thus they are not included in the Number Assigned column. NATO Operating Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT s) for Afghan National Army (ANA) Teams Committed 7 Teams Assigned 3 Fill Rate % NOTE: NATO OMLT teams number between -9 personnel each, depending on the size of the unit with which they are embedded. Nations that have Contributed Full ETT s/omlt s Canada Germany Poland United States Croatia Italy Spain France Netherlands United Kingdom AS OF: September 7 Nations that have Contributed Personnel for Multinational ETT s/omlt s Canada France Norway United Kingdom Croatia Germany Slovenia Czech Republic Netherlands Sweden AS OF: September 7 (FIGURE.) NUMBER AND NATIONALITY OF PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE (EUPOL) MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN 3 POLICE STRENGTH EU CONTRIBUTORS Czech Republic () France () Lithuania () Spain () Denmark (7) Germany (3) Netherlands (3) Sweden (3) Estonia () Hungary (3) Poland (3) United Kingdom () Finland () Italy (3) Romania (5) TOTAL EU CONTRIBUTION: NON-EU CONTRIBUTORS Canada () Croatia () Norway () TOTAL NON-EU CONTRIBUTION: TOTALS TOTAL POLICE CONTRIBUTION 6 OTHER INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN EXPERTS 53 LOCAL STAFF 7 TOTAL STAFFING FOR EUPOL MISSION AS OF: OCTOBER, 8 3

14 (FIGURE.) U.S. DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE SUPPORT TO TRAIN AND EQUIP THE AFGHAN ARMY AND POLICE, FISCAL YEARS -8 (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS) 6, 5,,88, $ (millions) 3,,7 ANA ANP,,737,7,3, , NOTE: FY 8 figures reflect requested funds. Annual totals rounded to the nearest million.. TOTAL AID (FY -8 request): ANA $,73,,; ANP: $6,99,, *Fiscal year 8 includes approximately $,5 million that has been appropriated (approximately $,8 million for the ANA and $3 million for the ANP) and approximately $,378 million that has been requested (approximately $6 million for the ANA and approximately $76 million for the ANP). (FIGURE.3) INSURGENT ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVINCE, JANUARY, 7-MARCH 8, Count of Kinetic Events 5 5 Helmand Kunar Kandahar Paktika Uruzgan Zabul Ghazni Paktya Khost Nuristan Kapisa Wardak Laghman Logar Nangarhar Farah Kabul Parwan Badghis Hirat NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: Figures include direct fire, indirect fire and IED explosions. of the 3 provinces in Afghanistan are not included as they experienced less then attacks during this period.

15 (FIGURE.) COMPARISON OF INCIDENTS CARRIED OUT BY TALIBAN/ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS (TB/AGE), WEEKS -7 (JANUARY THRU MID-JULY) FOR 7 AND 8 6 REGIOANAL COMMAND/ PROVINCE 7 8 % CHANGE RC CAPITAL KABUL % RC EAST PARWAN 3 3% WARDAK % PANJSHER N/A LOGAR % KAPISA 6 8 % KHOST 3 5% PAKTYA 69 36% GHAZNI 3 96% PAKTIKA 5 8% NANGARHAR 7 93 % LAGHMAN 7 7 9% NURISTAN 3% KUNAR % BAMYAN % RC EAST TOTAL,37,863 36% RC SOUTH KANDAHAR % HELMAND 7 33 % NIMROZ 9 3% URUZGAN 9 % ZABUL % DAI KUNDI 8 -% RC SOUTH TOTAL 673,8 75% RC WEST BADGHIS % HERAT 5 6 % GHOR 9 73% FARAH 7 9 5% RC WEST TOTAL % RC NORTH FARYAB % JAWZJAN 5 8% SARI PUL -86% BALKH 3 5-9% SAMANGAN 3-5% KUNDUZ % BAGHLAN -5% TAKHAR 7 % BADAKSHAN % RC NORTH TOTAL % TOTAL, ALL REGIONS,7 3,59 9% 5

16 (FIGURE.5) U.S. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) AUTHORIZED/ON HAND STAFFING BY LOCATION 7 MILITARY CIVILIAN DATE PRT PROVINCE U.S. Department of CREATED Department of State USAID Authorized On Hand Agriculture Authorized On Hand Authorized On Hand Authorized On Hand RC EAST Asadabad Konar February Bagram Parwan/Kapisa November Gardez Paktia February Ghazni Ghazni March Jalalabad Nangrahar January Khowst Khowst March Mehtar Lam Laghman Kalagush Nuristan November Panjshir Panjshir November Sharana Paktika RC SOUTH Qalat Zabul RC WEST Farah Farah September TOTAL,, 3 NOTE ON THIS TABLE: The United States operates out of the 6 PRT s in Afghanistan. All American PRT s are under military command and led by a military officer. (FIGURE.6) COUNTRY LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF NON-U.S. PRT S 8 DATE OF PRT LEAD NATION COMMAND DATE CREATED AND PREVIOUS COMMAND NATION (IF DIFFERENT) RC NORTH Konduz Germany November 3 March 3 (USA) Mazar-e-Sharif Sweden March 6 February 3 (United Kingdom) Feyzabad Germany Pol-e-Khomri Hungary 6 (Netherlands) Meymaneh Norway September 5 (United Kingdom) RC WEST Herat Italy June 5 December 3 (USA) Qala-e-Naw Spain August 5 Chaghcharan Lithuania August 5 RC SOUTH Kandahar Canada August 5 December 3 (USA) Lashkar-Gah United Kingdom May 6 September (USA) Tarin Kowt Netherlands August 6 September (USA) RC EAST Bamyan New Zealand August 3 Wardak Turkey November 6 Logar Czech Republic March 8 6

17 (FIGURE.7) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN THE REGION BY LOCATION 9 COUNTRY NUMBER OF REFUGEES Pakistan,, Iran 9, Other 9, TOTAL 3,, As of: March 8 (FIGURE.8) AFGHAN REFUGEES VOLUNTARILY REPATRIATED BY COUNTRY, -7 3,6 5.,.5., Returnees Per Year (thousands), Total Number of Returnees (millions) Pakistan Iran Cumulative *. *Thru September 8 (FIGURE.9) ESTIMATE NUMBER OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDP S) 3 As of: May 8 TOTAL 5, Southern Provinces, 7

18 . GOVERNANCE & RULE OF LAW INDICATORS (FIGURE.) AFGHANISTAN POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 3 TOTAL MALE FEMALE POPULATION (millions) (5%) 5.9 (9%) ETHNICITY Pashtun 3.7 (%) Tajik 8.8 (7%) Hazara.9 (9%) Uzbek.9 (9%) Aimak.3 (%) Turkmen. (3%) Baloch.7 (%) Other.3 (%) (FIGURE.) SIZE, GENDER, AND ETHNIC MAKEUP OF AFGHANISTAN S MAIN LEGISLATIVE BODIES 33 Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) TOTAL SEATS MEN WOMEN GENDER 9 8 (7%) 65 (6%) ETHNICITY Pashtun 8 (7%) Tajik 53 (%) Hazara 3 (%) Uzbek/Turkmen 5 (%) Non-Hazara Shi a (%) Arab 5 (%) Ismaili 3 (%) Pashai (<%) Baluchi (<%) Nuristani (<%) NOTE: The Wolesi Jirga consists of directly elected provincial representatives. The number of representatives each of Afghanistan s 3 provinces receives is calculated according to population. The Wolesi Jirga constitutes the first step in passing legislation, with all bills passing with two-thirds majority being forwarded to the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) and then the President. The Wolesi Jirga also has final say on the appointment of government ministers and other high-ranking officials. Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) TOTAL SEATS MEN WOMEN GENDER 76 (75%) 6 (5%) ETHNICITY Pashtun 36 (35%) Tajik 3 (3%) Hazara 6 (6%) Uzbek/Turkmen 8 (8%) Baluchi 3 (3%) Nuristani 3 (3%) Others (3%) NOTE: Two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga is indirectly elected by the Provincial and District Councils while the remaining third is appointed directly by the President. Provincial Councils (3 total, one for each Province) TOTAL SEATS MEN WOMEN GENDER 96 (7%) (3%) NOTE: Provincial Councils consist of between 9 and 9 directly elected representatives, based on the population of the Province. 8

19 (FIGURE.3) WHERE AFGHANS CHOOSE TO TAKE DIFFERENT TYPES OF LEGAL CASES 3 Dispute Over Land 55% 38% 7% Other Property Dispute % 3% 7% Commercial Dispute 5% 3% 8% Divorce Pick-pocketing 53% 6% 3% 7% 7% % State Court Shura/Jirga Other Community Forum Robbery/Burglary 58% 6% 6% Physical Assault 5% 3% 8% Murder 8% % 6% % % % 3% % 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% % NOTE: Results based on survey of approximately 6, Afghans polled in February 7. Answers refer to a hypothetical situation and not actual events. (FIGURE.) HIGHEST LEVEL DEGREE ACQUIRED BY JUDGES RESPONDING TO A RANDOM SURVEY 35 5% 5%.% % 35% 3% 5% %.5% 6.% 5%.6% % 7.7% 5% % University (Shariat) University (Law) Other University Non University (Madrassa or Equivalent) Non University (Primary/Secondary) NOTE: Results based on a May 6 random survey of 57 judges, of whom 7 work with the Supreme Court, 8 on Provincial Appeals Courts and 9 on Urban or District Primary Courts. Shariat refers to a degree received from an Islamic Law faculty. Madrassas are schools below the university level whose curriculum focuses mostly on traditional Islamic scholarship. (FIGURE.5) ACCESS TO LEGAL RESOURCES FOR JUDGES RESPONDING TO A RANDOM SURVEY 36 ACCESS YES NO Statutes or other governmental regulations 63.7% 36.3% Textbooks on the law 5.% 5.8% Written decisions of the Supreme Court 7.% 8.8% Professional support from an experienced mentor 9.% 8.9% NOTE: Results based on a May 6 random survey of 57 judges, of whom 7 work with the Supreme Court, 8 on Provincial Appeals Courts and 9 on Urban or District Primary Courts. 9

20 (FIGURE.6) ANNUAL POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN (HECTARES) AND PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL CULTIVATION, % 8% 8% 8% 67% 69% 7% 6% 5 % 37% 7% % 93 5% % Hectares ('s) % Global Cultivation 65 6% 7% 5 3 8% % % % 3% 6% 9% % NOTE: % Global Cultivation for 8 not yet reported % % % % (FIGURE.7) ANNUAL OPIUM PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN (METRIC TONS) AND PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION, % 9% 9% % 87% 89% 75% 75% 8, 7,7 9% 8% % % 6% 5% 5% 8% 3,6 7% 6% 58% 5%,565 3,76,8,693 6,,, 3, 3,6 7% 6% 5% % 3% Metric Tons % Global Production,33,98,97,335,8 %,57 % % 85 % NOTE: % Global Production for 8 not yet reported

21 (FIGURE.8) OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION LEVELS IN AFGHANISTAN (WITH TOP-PRODUCING PROVINCES), -8 (HECTARES) 39, 8, 6,, Hectares,, 8, ,,, All Afghanistan Helmand Farah Kandahar Nangarhar (FIGURE.9) SNAPSHOT COMPARISON OF AFGHANISTAN S TOP OPIUM-PRODUCING PROVINCES, BASED ON AMOUNT OF LAND DEVOTED TO CULTIVATION, & 8 Nangarhar % Kandahar 9% Uruzgan Nangarhar 6% % Rest of Afghanistan 9% Rest of Afghanistan % Farah % Uruzgan 8% Kandahar % Farah % Helmand % Helmand 66% (3, total hectares) 8 (57, total hectares)

22 (FIGURE.) MONTHLY FARM-GATE PRICE FOR DRY OPIUM SINCE SEPTEMBER (US$/KG) 9 US$ per Kilogram September November January 5 March May September November January 6 March May September November January 7 March May September November January 8 March May THROUGH JULY 8 (FIGURE.) AFGHANISTAN S RANK IN REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS INDEX OF PRESS FREEDOM, -7 YEAR SCORE RANK NUMBER OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED NOTE ON INDEX OF PRESS FREEDOM TABLE: The Index is based on a questionnaire with 5 criteria for assessing the state of press freedom in each country. It includes every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation issues, searches and harassment). In addition to taking into account abuses attributable to the state, those carried out by armed militias, clandestine organizations or pressure groups are also considered. The lower the score attained, the higher the degree of press freedom in that respective country. Although there is no specific information given regarding how the overall score was compiled, the top-rated countries for 7 received an overall score of.75, with the median receiving a score of 5.3. The overall average score for the 7 Index was 3.5.

23 (FIGURE.) AFGHANISTAN S RANK IN TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL S ANNUAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI) YEAR RANK NUMBER OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED 7 7 (T) 8 6 NO DATA (T) 59 (T): Indicates years Afghanistan s score tied with one or more other country. NOTE ON THIS CHART: The CPI is a composite index that draws on expert opinion surveys. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten indicating low levels of perceived corruption. Due to a lack of reliable data, Afghanistan was not included in the CPI survey for the years 6. (FIGURE.3) AFGHANISTAN S RANK IN THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION S INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, 8 3 RANK COUNTRY OVERALL SCORE Somalia.5 Afghanistan.65 3 Democratic Republic of Congo.67 Iraq 3. 5 Burundi 3. NOTE: nations were surveyed. Each nation was allocated a score of - points for each of broad categories (Economic, Political, Security, and Social Welfare). Overall scores were calculated by taking the average of the scores. The median score (Benin, #7) received a score of 6.36 while the highest score (Slovak Republic, #) received a score of 9.. 3

24 3. ECONOMIC & QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS (FIGURE 3.) ANNUAL INFLATION FORECAST (FIGURE 3.) REAL GDP (TOTAL, PER CAPITA AND GROWTH), * 8^ TOTAL ($US billions) PER CAPITA ($US) GROWTH (% change YOY) 5.% 9.% 6.% 6.% 3.9% 8.6% *Data based partly on estimates. ^IMF forecast (FIGURE 3.3) GDP GROWTH AND SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH, % Industry Services Agriculture GDP Growth NOTE: Data for 7 are estimated.

25 (FIGURE 3.) BREAKDOWN OF AFGHAN ANNUAL BUDGET (CORE VS. EXTERNAL), FY 5/6 THRU FY 7/ , ,8 3,957 $ US (millions) 5,73,5 Core Budget External Budget Total Budget 5,3,636,5,55 5 5/6 6/7 7/8 NOTE: The Afghan government has direct control of the Core Budget, while having only limited or no control over the External Budget. (FIGURE 3.5) COMPARISON OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SOURCES AND CAPACITY: 979, AND 7 8 YEAR HYDRO THERMAL IMPORTED OTHER* TOTAL SUPPLY (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) *Includes diesel, micro-hydro and renewable NOTE: As of 7, it is estimated that only % of the population (3% in rural areas) have access to public power on certain days for a limited number of hours. (FIGURE 3.6) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TELEPHONE USERS IN AFGHANISTAN BY YEAR, ,, 5,,,, 3,,,,,, (FIGURE 3.7) ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF AFGHANS WITH ACCESS TO WATER/SANITATION FACILITIES 5 Access to safe drinking water 3% Access to adequate sanitation % As of June 8 5

26 (FIGURE 3.8) HEALTHCARE METRICS % PEOPLE LIVING IN DISTRICTS WHERE BASIC PACKAGE OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAM (BPHC) IS BEING IMPLEMENTED 5 3 9% 5 77% 6 8% NOTE: The BPHC is a program started in by the Ministry of Public Health to provide essential basic healthcare throughout Afghanistan s districts. 6 Men Women 3 INFANT AND CHILDREN UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY RATES (PER, LIVE BIRTHS) Infant 65 9 Children Under Five 57 9 % OF AFGHAN CHILDREN RECEIVING VARIOUS VACCINATIONS BCG Vaccine 57% 7% Polio Vaccine 3% 7% NOTE: The BCG is a vaccination to prevent tuberculosis. (FIGURE 3.9) EDUCATION METRICS 55 LITERACY (7 Estimate) OVERALL 8% Male 36% Female 8% PRIMARY/SECONDARY EDUCATION (7 Statistics) TOTAL ENROLLMENT (millions) 6+ million Girls million NUMBER OF SCHOOLS 9,6 All Girls,337 Co-ed,35 NUMBER OF TEACHERS,5 Women, Schools Burned Down 7 Schools closed due to severe threats 7 Students and Teachers killed by violence 57 NOTE: It is estimated that in less than million students were enrolled in primary/secondary education, virtually none of them girls. (FIGURE 3.) POVERTY LEVELS, 7 56 % Population Living Below the Poverty Line* % Population Living Slightly Above the Poverty Line % Population Experiencing Food Poverty^ % % 5% *Defined as living on a monthly income of US $/month or less ^Those unable to purchase sufficient food to guarantee world standard minimum food intake of, calories/day 6

27 (FIGURE 3.) FOREIGN AID PLEDGED, COMMITTED AND DISBURSED, - ($ MILLIONS) 57 DONOR AID DISBURSED -8 AID COMMITTED BUT NOT DISBURSED -8 AID PLEDGED - (NOT COMMITTED/DISBURSED) US/USAID 5,.9 5,377.,389. Japan/JICA, United Kingdom, European Commission, World Bank ,3.8 Germany Canada Asian Development Bank 57.8, Italy. Netherlands Norway Sweden Iran ECHO* India Australia UN Agencies 7. Denmark Russian Federation 39. Aga Khan 9.3 France Saudi Arabia Finland Switzerland 5.6. China.. 8. Spain Turkey TOTAL,76.3 9,685.9,775.6 AS OF: February 8 *ECHO: European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office NOTE: PLEDGED aid is promised but yet to be devoted for a specific purpose, COMMITTED aid has been earmarked for a specific purpose but not yet changed hands and DISBURSED aid has been earmarked and delivered. (FIGURE 3.) ANNUAL VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, WITH TOP TRADE PARTNERS, -6 ($ MILLIONS) Exports, total Pakistan India United States Imports, total,3,68,97 3, 3,633 Pakistan 5 9 5,7,375 United States Germany India Republic of Korea Turkmenistan Japan (FIGURE 3.3) MICROFINANCE CLIENTS, BORROWERS AND LOAN AMOUNTS 59 Number of Active Active Amount of Loans Loans Clients Borrowers Disbursed ($ millions) Disbursed Loans Outstanding ($ millions) TOTAL 3,7 375,,55,56 $53.3 $.3 URBAN 38,88 6, 8,7 $37. $8. RURAL 3,858 3,7 35,9 $6. $3. AS OF: May 8 7

28 . PAKISTAN (FIGURE.) COMPARISON OF VARIOUS METRICS FROM PAKISTAN S FEDERALY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) VS. THE REST OF PAKISTAN 6 FATA REST OF PAKISTAN PER CAPITA INCOME (ANNUAL, $ US) % POPULATION LIVING BELOW POVERTY LINE $5 $5 ~66% %^ OVERALL LITERACY RATE 7% 56% Women 3% 3% ^FY 5/6 estimate 6 (FIGURE.) HEALTH METRICS FOR FATA 6 Hospitals to serve population of 3. million Doctor-to-Population Ratio -to-6,76 (FIGURE.3) FORCE STRENGTH OF PAKISTANI SECURITY FORCES WHO REGULARLY OPERATE IN FATA 63 Constabulary Forces 3,+ Frontier Corps (FC) ~8, NOTE: The Constabulary Forces operate under the local political agent and are trained to do light policing, guard government facilities and secure public figures. The FC is the primary paramilitary force in FATA, traditionally serving as a border control and counter-smuggling force that is on call for law enforcement duties. It is locally trained and administered, yet reports to Pakistan s Ministry of Interior and has historically been greatly under-resourced. (FIGURE.3.A) U.S. SPECIAL FORCES (USSOF) PERSONNEL CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING TO FRONTIER CORPS (FC) OFFICERS 6 Number of USSOF Trainers 3 Number of senior FC Trainees 6 AS OF NOVEMBER 8 NOTE: As of November 8 the training is limited in scope and focused on training a select number of senior Frontier Corpsmen who will then become the principal counterinsurgency trainers for the remainder of the force. This training is being conducted at an undisclosed location in northwest Pakistan. 8

29 (FIGURE.) PERCENTAGE OF U.S. FUNDING DIRECTED TOWARDS VARIOUS PROGRAMS IN PAKISTAN S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) AND BORDER REGION, FY Border Security Program, $87, 3% Devlopment Assistance, $, % Military Efforts, $5,573, 96% NOTE: Total $ shown in $US millions. Percentages based on an approximate expenditure of $5.8 billion. Total aid to Pakistan for this period was approximately $.5 billion. PAKISTANI PUBLIC OPINION TERROR FREE TOMORROW/NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION SURVEY, 8 66 (.36 Pakistanis were surveyed throughout the country from May 5-June, 8) (FIGURE.5) QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF EACH COUNTRY? United States 7% 7% 9% Afghanistan 6% 9% 6% Saudi Arabia 9% 5% 6% Very/Somewhat Favorable Very/Somewhat Unfavorable Refused/Don't Know India 36% 53% % United Kingdom % 6% 8% Iran 69% 5% 5% % % % 3% % 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% % NOTE: Not all line items add up to % due to rounding 9

30 5. POLLING & PUBLIC OPINION AFGHANISTAN IN 8: A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE 67 Asia Foundation, 8 (6,593 Afghan adults from throughout the country were interviewed) (FIGURE 5.) QUESTION: GENERALLY SPEAKING, DO YOU THINK THINGS IN AFGHANISTAN TODAY ARE GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, OR DO YOU THINK THINGS ARE GOING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION? (6, 7 & 8) 6% 5% % % % 38% 3% % % 3% 9% 5% 3% % % % Right Direction Wrong Direction Some in right, some in wrong direction SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 6, SEPTEMBER 7, AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.) QUESTION: WHY DO YOU SAY THINGS ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION? (COMPARISON WITH 6 & 7) 5% % 39% 39% 3% 3% 3% 9% 3% % 6% % % 6% 9% 9% % % 9% 9% 9% 9% 3% % Good Security Peace/End of the War Freedom/Free Speech Reconstruction/Rebuilding Schools for Girls have Opened Good Government SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 6 AND SEPTEMBER 7, AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY 3

31 (FIGURE 5.3) QUESTION: WHY DO YOU SAY THINGS ARE MOVING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION? (COMPARISON WITH 6 & 7) 6% 5% 5% 8% % 3% 7% % % % % 6% 3% 9% % 7% 5% 5% 5% % % 5% 9% % % % % Insecurity Corruption Bad economy Unemployment Bad government High Prices Administrative Corruption % SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 6 AND SEPTEMBER 7, AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.) QUESTION: WHAT IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN YOUR LOCAL AREA? (COMPARISON WTH 6 & 7) % 35% 35% 3% 5% 6% 8% 5% 7% 3% % 9% % % 7% % 9% 8% % 5% % 3% 5% 5% % % % % 8% 7% 5% % % Unemployment Electricity Water Insecurity High Prices Healthcare Education Roads SURVEYS RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 6 AND SEPTEMBER 7, AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY 3

32 (FIGURE 5.5) PRESENT CONDITION OF VARIOUS INFRASTRUCTURE IN LOCALITIES, 7 & 8 INFRASTRUCTURE VERY/QUITE GOOD (%) QUITE/VERY BAD (%) Availability of clean drinking water Availability of water for irrigation Availability of jobs Supply of electricity Security situation Availability of medical care Availability of education for children Freedom of movement 7 8 SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.6) PUBLIC FEELINGS TOWARDS THE PERFORMANCE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF ITS WORK, 7 & 8 ASPECT OF WORK VERY/QUITE GOOD JOB SOMEWHAT/VERY BAD (%) JOB (%) Education Healthcare system Creating job opportunities Maintaining relations with neighboring countries Reviving/developing the economy Fighting corruption SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.7) QUESTION: WOULD YOU SAY THAT TODAY YOUR FAMILY IS MORE PROSPEROUS, LESS PROSPEROUS OR ABOUT AS PROSPEROUS AS UNDER THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT? (6, 7 & 8) 6% 5% 5% 9% % 39% 36% 3% 6% 8% % 3% % 6% % 7% 8% 7% % More Prosperous Less Prosperous About as Prosperous Absent During Taliban Rule SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 6 AND SEPTEMBER 7, AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY 3

33 (FIGURE 5.8) PUBLIC S AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT TOWARDS VARIOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP), 7 & 8 STATEMENT Strongly/Somewhat Agree (%) Strongly/Somewhat Disagree (%) Is honest and fair with the Afghan people: ANA ANP Is unprofessional and poorly trained: ANA ANP Needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself: ANA ANP Helps improve the security: ANA ANP SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.9) QUESTION: HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ON ITS OWN WILL BE ABLE TO CONDUCT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS? (7 & 8) 6% 5% 5% 9% % 3% 7 8 3% % 9% % % 8% % % % 7% % Very Confident Somewhat Confident Somewhat Not Confident Not Confident At All Refused/Don't Know SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.) PUBLIC S AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH VARIOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE STATEMENT Strongly/Somewhat Agree (%) Strongly/Somewhat Disagree (%) Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. 85 Despite our differences, as Afghans we have many values that unite us. 88 Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don t worry about helping people SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 33

34 (FIGURE 5.) PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE WHO STRONGLY/SOMEWHAT AGREE WITH RESPECT TO VARIOUS STATEMENTS RELATED TO THE STATE COURT AND JIRGAS/SHURAS, 7 & 8 STATEMENT State Court (%) Jirgas/Shuras (%) They are accessible to me They are fair and trusted They follow local norms and values of our people They are effective at delivering justice They resolve cases timely and properly SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.) QUESTION: DO YOU OWN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING HERE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD IN FUNCTIONING ORDER? (7 & 8) % 9% 88% 8% 8% 7% 6% 58% 5% % 5% % % 37% 38% 7 8 3% 3% 5% % % % Radio Bicycle Mobile phone TV set Motorcycle Fixed phone line 3% % SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY (FIGURE 5.3) QUESTION: WHICH IS THE MAIN SOURCE FROM WHERE YOU NORMALLY GET INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE COUNTRY? (7 & 8) 7% 6% 6% 6% 57% 57% 5% 5% 5% % 3% 6% 8% 3% 7% 8% Radio TV Friends/Family/Neighbors % % % % 6% 6% % % 5% % All Rural Urban All Rural Urban 7 8 SURVEY RELEASED: SEPTEMBER 7 AND OCTOBER 8, RESPECTIVELY 3

35 AFGHANISTAN: PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 68 Charney Research (Multiple Surveys Conducted from March - November 7, each with 8-, Afghan respondents) (FIGURE 5.) OPINION ON THE DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY 9% 8% 77% 7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 55% 5% 5% % % % Right Direction Wrong Direction 3% 8% % % % % % % % % 6% % Mar Oct 5 Jun 6 Oct 6 Nov 6 Jun 7 Sep 7 Nov 7 (FIGURE 5.5) QUESTION: HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN? 8% 7% 68% 6% 57% 5% 5% % % % Excellent/Good Fair/Poor 3% 3% % % %

36 (FIGURE 5.6) QUESTION: DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING THINGS CAN BE JUSTIFIED OR NOT? TACTICS JUSTIFIED (%) UNJUSTIFIED (%) Attacks against government officials 9 Attacks against the police 6 9 Attacks against teachers or schools* 95 Attacks against civilians* 5 9 Suicide bombings 8 89 Attacks against US military forces 7 75 *6 data. All other data reflects 7 survey. (FIGURE 5.7) QUESTION: HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE WORK OF HAMID KARZAI AS PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN? 9% 8% 83% 7% 67% 6% 6% 63% 5% % Excellent/Good Fair/Poor 36% 3% 3% 3% % 6% % % SURVEY RELEASED: NOVEMBER 7 36

37 (FIGURE 5.8) QUESTION: IN YOUR VIEW, WHAT IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FACING AGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE? WHAT IS THE NEXT BIGGEST PROBLEM? (PROBLEMS MENTIONED BY 5% OR MORE IN 7) 6% 5% 5% 7% 3% % % 38% 38% 3% 33% 3% 33% 35% 3% 7% 5% % % 3% % Security Taliban Economy Corruption % % (FIGURE 5.9) QUESTION: WHAT IS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN YOUR LOCAL AREA? WHAT IS THE NEXT BIGGEST PROBLEM? (PROBLEMS MENITONED BY 5% OR MORE IN 7) 5% % 39% 39% 35% 35% 3% 33% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 6% 5% % 9% % % 9% 8% % 6% 6% 5% 6% 5% % % 8% 8% 9% 5% % Electricity Economy Roads Education Security Water 37

38 David Wood, Afghan Air War Grows in Intensity, Baltimore Sun, 8, 8. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Humanitarian Factsheet, June 9, 8. Accessed at: United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Armed conflict and Civilian Casualties, Trends and Developments January-3 August, 8 Accessed at: U.S. Department of Defense Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty page. Accessed at: Historical data accessed at: 3 Icasualties.org Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty Count website. Accessed at: Military Casualty Information, Statistical Information and Analysis Division, Department of Defense. Accessed at: 5 U.S. Department of Defense Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty page. Accessed at: Historical data accessed at: 6 Country specific data for the United Kingdom on icasualties.org website. Accessed at: 7 Country specific data for the Canadian military on icasualties.org website. Accessed at: 8 icasualties.org Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty Count website. Accessed at: 9 Congressional Research Service, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/, Updated 5, 8, p.. Accessed at: Michael R. Gordon and Thom Shanker, Plan Would Shift Forces From Iraq to Afghanistan, New York Times, September 5, 8 ISAF Troops Placemat, NATO-ISAF website. Accessed at: Ibid. 3 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 8 National Defense Authorization Act, June 8, p.. Accessed at: GAO-8-66, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, Government Accountability Office, June 8, p. 33. Accessed at: Major General Robert Cone, Press Conference from Afghanistan, November, 8. Accessed at: Ann Scott Tyson, More Recruits, U.S. Arms Planned for Afghan Military, Washington Post, December 5, 7 5 GAO-8-66, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, Government Accountability Office, June 8, p. 33. Accessed at: 6 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 8 National Defense Authorization Act, June 8, p. 8. Accessed at: 7 GAO-8-66, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, Government Accountability Office, June 8, p. 33. Accessed at: 8 GAO-8-66, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, Government Accountability Office, June 8, p. 3. Accessed at: 9 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 8 National Defense Authorization Act, June 8, p. 7. Accessed at: U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 8 National Defense Authorization Act, June 8, p. 8. Accessed at: Michael Gisick, Afghan Police Depend Heavily on U.S. Support, Stars and Stripes, August, 8. NATO-ISAF website, Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) Programme, September 7. Accessed at: 3 European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, Police Strength Fact Sheet,, 8. Accessed at: European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, EU Police Mission for Afghanistan, Mission Fact Sheet, June 8. Accessed at: GAO-8-66, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, Government Accountability Office, June 8, p.. Accessed at: 5 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 8 National Defense Authorization Act, June 8, p.. Accessed at: 6 Attack figures compiled by Vigilant Strategic Services Afghanistan. 7 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 8 National Defense Authorization Act, June 8, p. 6. Accessed at: Robert M. Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, Special Report: United States Institute of Peace, 5, p. 5. Accessed at: 8 NATO-ISAF website, Provincial Reconstruction Teams Topic Page. Accessed at: 9 Center for Policy and Human Development, Afghanistan Human Development Report 7, pp Accessed at: United Nations High Commission on Refugees,, Returnees in First Month of Repatriation from Pakistan, UNHCR Kabul Briefing Note, March 3, 8. Accessed at: 3 UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, Paris 8 Fact Sheet. Accessed at: United Nations High Commission on Refugees, UNHCR helps more than 5, Afghans return home since January, UNHCR Kabul Briefing Note, 7, 8. Accessed at: 3 United Nations High Commission on Refugees, First Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Convoy leaves Heart for Badghis, UNHCR Kabul Press Information, May 5, 8. Accessed at: 3 CIA World Factbook, Afghanistan Country Page, last updated, 8. Accessed at: 33 PBS, A Woman Among Warlords: Afghanistan s National Assembly Accessed at: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, The A to Z Guide to Afghan Assistance, Sixth Edition, February 8, pp Accessed at: 3 Center for Policy and Human Development, Afghanistan Human Development Report 7, p. 7. Accessed at: 38