NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California

Transcription

1 ^ ^^«^^»'^""" ^ ^^... m..,.,, NPS iim HL ^ NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California m in < i Q DTIC,<^ELECTE %* OCT 7 e* *! ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: by A STRATEGY PRIMER JAN S. BREEMER JULY 1988 > Final Report for Period Marh June 1988 Approved for publi release; distribution unlimited. Prepared for: Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA * 6 IOS

2 ^^^w^w**«***^m UNCLASSIFIED skui>'n C'LAKIF'ICAT'IOIH 8* TH.< *A6E ij «PORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ^CLASSIFIED U SECuR'Tr CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY ^b DECLASSIFICATION'DOWNGRAOING SCHEDULE REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE ib RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS 3 DISTRIBUTION'/AVAHAHUTV OF REPORT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: UNLIMITED DISTRIBUTION 4 PERFORMING ORGANISATION REPORT N'JMBERIS) NPS S MONITORING ORGANISATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 6«NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 6b OFFICE SYMBOL (if tppikibit) 6< AOORESS (Cry Stiff *nd MCodt) DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MONTEREY, CA Jt NAME OF MONiTORiNG ORGANISATION 7b AODRESS(Cry. Sut* tnj I* Cod*) s* NAME OF FUNDING'SPONSORING ORGANISATION NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 9 ADDRESS (dry Sr*f*.j«d S^Coo» «b OFFICE SYMBOL (if ippikibto) 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IOENT.HCATION NUMIER 1 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMIERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO RROiECT NO TAS«NO WORK JNIT ACCESSION NO f.ue imduo* itajrity Otwiitttton) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: A STRATEGY PRIM UNCLASSIFIED ; PERSONA^ AUTHQR(S) JAN S. BREEMER Ij '*»i OF REPORT FINAL REPORT *\\ WW TQM\1 88 '6 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION 14 OATi o» WKWLAft. Mo** * r» *nw 'S PAGE COwNT 13 ' EiD V COSAT, COOES GROUP SulGROuP 9 Alt TRACT (Conlinu* on r»**nt if ft«<fimry tnt$ <d»ntify by N<X» nuntwl i SuiiE MS (CoAfrnut on r»v#rw >f nttujry trd id»m.fy by *>'(» nvmtfrl W 15 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, STRATEGY«TM4*3, >la L/ ia~ This report reviews the naval planner's basi "menu" of operational antisubmarine warfare (ASW) strategial hoies. Basi ASW strategies, disussed from a historial perspetive, are: (1) destrution of the submarine (2) ontainment of the submarine, and (3) limiting the submarine's effiieny. The report has been prepared for inlusion in.the International Military and Defense Enylopedia (IMADE), sheduled for publiation by Pergamon-Brassey's in DS'R JuTiON'AVAiLAailiTY * AtSTHACT D.NCLASSiF'EO'UNl'MtTIO lit SAME O' RESPONS.RLE inoivioual JAMES J. TRITTEN. CHNM. NSA OO FORM «MA«Q SAME AS >»T Q QT< use«s 1 APR»tf.tion»i, bt glm ynl'l htwttbtf All otr>t' rt'loftl *' obtol«««1\ ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED JJft TELEPHONE f(o*u* Art«CO*) Hi OFFICE SYMIOL 56 SECURITY ClASSlF-CATlQN OF THIS PAGE

3 w ^ Li^esslon F I I NTIS GRA*i DTIC TAB ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: A STRATEGY PRIMER / toatitu by Jan S. Breemer Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA Introdution Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is probably the most omplex form of maritime onflit. The searh for solutions of the "submarine menae" tends to be foussed on tehnologial "fixes" - more powerful and longer-range means of surveillane, faster and more aurate detetion systems, and stand-off, high-probability-of-kill weapons. Little about the tehnologies of modern submarine and anti-submarine warfare is omparable with the methods of history's first ASW ampaign. World War I. By ontrast, ASW strategies have basially remained the same ones that were first tried out more than 7 years ago. It is the purpose of this "primer" to set forth the fundamental hoies of ASW strategies that are the framework for the exploitation of ASW tehnologies. Ami-Submaring Warfare Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is a form of warfare, fought mainly at sea, that is aimed at defeating the war-fighting purposes of the submarine. ASW is pratied at three levels of planning: strategi, operational, and tatial. Basi ASW strategies are of three kinds: (1) destrution of the opponent's submarines (2) ontainment of enemy submarines, and (3) limitation of the war-fighting effiieny of the hostile submarine fleet. The operational level of ASW planning is onerned with where and how to destroy, ontain, or limit the effiieny of hostile submarines. The basi operational hoie is whether to defeat the submarine at (1) its soures, i.e. operating bases and onstrution yards, (2) in the transit areas (the

4 ^p so-alled "hokepoints") that the submarine must pass through to and from its soures, or (3) in the patrol areas themselves. ASW tatis are onerned with the loal oordination of platforms, weapons, and sensors in the area of enounter itself. The tatial ASW enounter onsists of four phases: (1) surveillane and reonnaissane, (2) detetion, (3) traking, and (4) attak. Historial Bakground ASW emerged as a strategi preoupation for naval planners during World War I. Pre-war defensive measures against the "submarine torpedo-boat" were little more than ad ho adaptations of tatial proedures that had been adopted by most fleets to guard agains the other "sneak attak" weapon, the torpedoboat. The prinipal offensive measure relied on the warship's superior speed to run down and ram the underwater opponent; defensive measures inluded sailing a "zig-zag" ourse and, in port, the eretion of physial obstales (suh as harbor booms and blokships, and antitorpedo nets), and nighttime illumination. The pre-1914 failure to antiipate the strategi sope of the submarine problem an be attributed to the dominant "image" of the submarine. First, the submarine was expeted to seek out "legitime," meaning naval targets; few Allied or Entente naval planners on the eve of World War I foresaw that the submarine would be a ommere-raiding weapon first and an anti-fleet weapon seond. Furthermore, most naval professionals doubted that the submarine "auxiliary" would be more than a "nuisane;" between its inferior speed, limited ombat radius, and near-blindness when submerged, the submarine was expeted to limit its wartime ontribution to oastal defense and oasional souting missions on behalf of the "real" fleet of battleships and battleruisers. Six months into the war, the prognosis of a quik onlusion had ollapsed - so had the image of the submarine as an oasional nuisane. At sea, the pre-war

5 plans for a "deisive battle" gave way to the searh for long-term ways and means for defeating the most diffiult opponent in reorded Naval history. ASW Strategies of Destrution All things equal, the preferred ASW strategy is one that results in the physial destrution of the submarine the outome is permanent and, with the underwater opponent eliminated, resoures an be released for other wartime duties. Strategies of destrution have also proven to be the most diffiult and risky; depending on the quality and quantity of the opposing submarine fore, its omplete elimination may take more time and tie up more soures than an be afforded. A different kind of risk may be assoiated with "strategi" ASW against strategi missile submarines. The destrution (or even the threat of destrution) of this partiular type of submarine, laim some ommentators, undermines the stability of mutual strategi deterrene, and ould fore a deision to "use-them-instead-of-losethem." Destrution at the Soure The preferred operational strategy of destrution is aimed at the soures of the submarine menae, i.e. operating bases, onstrution, repair and maintenane yards, and industries that manufature ritial omponents. The single most important advantage of this approah is that it irumvents ASW's most diffiult problem: finding the opponent. Unfortunately from the point of view of the ASW strategist, enemy submarine bases and building yards also tend to be heavily defended and an therefore usually only be attaked at great risk to one's own fores. The allied naval planners of World War I shared President Woodrow Wilson's "despair of hunting for hornets all over the sea when I know where the nest is." But very few among them shared Wilson's willingness to "sarifie half the navy Great Britain and we together have to rush the nest... "

6 The pratie and planning of destrution at the soure has known four methods: (1) physial seizure and oupation of bases and yards, (2) fleet bombardment, (3) aerial bombardment, and (4) mining. For reasons that are obvious, the first method will be the most deisive one. Yet, for reasons equally obvious, the physial seizure and oupation of enemy submarine bases and yards is likely to be attempted and rowned with suess only if they are part of a general ampaign of territorial onquest. The Anglo-Amerian and Soviet oupation, in , of the Frenh and Balti oastal areas, respetively, deprived the German U-boat fleet of key operating and onstrution soures. This outome was not the result, however, of a deliberate ASW strategy, but instead the "bonus" reward of the Allies' general advane. Exepting the sporadi shelling, by the Royal Navy, of Germany's U-boat bases on the Belgian oast in World War I, the strategial hoie of destroying the submarine menae at its soure through fleet bombardment has historially been stymied by the fear of disproportionate losses. Some post-fato ommentators have insisted that, had the British Grand Fleet fought the Battle of Jutland (of 1916) to a "deisive" (and presumably vitorious) onlusion, Germany's main U-boat onentrations in the Heligoland Bight would have been "sitting duks." Aording to Winston Churhill, "It was the poliy of Jutland whih led diretly to the supreme submarine peril of 1917." On balane, however, Churhill's other omment a. propos the risks and unertainties faing the ommander-on-the spot, Sir John Jellioe, was the weightier one; Jellioe, he wrote, was "the only man on either side who ould lose the war in an afternoon." The destrutive reord of mining and aerial bombardment of submarine bases and yards is a mixed one. During World War I a single U-boat was lost among the more than 44, mines that were sattered in the Heligoland Bight; altogether 14 U-boats were destroyed in their Balti Sea training grounds during World War II. Arguably, the most produtive result of the Balti mining offensive

7 was the interferene with rew training and new-onstrution workup, i.e. with the U-boats's effiieny. The offiial British history of The Strategi Air Offensive Against Germany suggests that the ampaign may have prevented 2 Type XXI U-boats from beoming operational. Espeially disappointing were the results of the World War II air offensive against the operational and industrial soures of the U- boat. Prinipal operational targets were the onrete submarine shelters on the Frenh and Norwegian oasts. Even the heaviest bomb of the war, the 12,5-pounds "Tallboy," failed to penetrate the roofs up to eight meters thik. One U-boat was destroyed at its base in Trondheim, Norway in July Post-war tests by the Amerians indiated that a future air assault against "hardened" submarine pens would probably require nulear weapons. Industrial soures for the Allied bombing ampaign inluded four broad target sets: (1) the U-boat building yards themselves (2) enters for the manufature of key omponents (e.g., the Hagen enter for the onstrution of batteries) (3) the German industrial and transportation system generally, and (4) the labor fore. The British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU) report on The Effets of Strategi Bombing on the Prodution of German U-Boats onluded that the bombings diretly and indiretly ontributed to a prodution loss of 111 U-boats. It reported that another 42 operational units were destroyed in port. The report aknowledged, however, that the estimated prodution loss of 3Ü Type XXIs due to the "indiret" effet of the bombings was, in effet, an "eduated guess." Furthermore, most of the U-boat prodution losses aused by the "diret" effet of bombing ourred in 1945, when no time was left for suh boats to beome operational. The reasons for the low profitability of the ami-soure bombing ampaign were these: (1) the inadequay (mainly in terms of auray) of ontemporary bomb-laying tehniques (2) the enemy's better-than-exyeted reovery apabilities (3) the generally

8 effiient German air defense system, and (4) the "ylial'' pattern of the "diret" offensive against U-boat pens, yards, and other failities. Destrution in the Transit and Patrol Areas Beause of the diffiulty, in fat, of destroying the submarine at the soure, the ASW defender is usually ompelled to find ways to defeat it at sea, inluding the submarine's transit and operational patrol areas. A key determinant for the suess of a strategy of destrution in the transit areas is loal geography, i.e. the length, width, and depth of the "hokepoint." The olletive ASW benefit of a long, narrow, and shallow area of submarine passage is: (1) a high preditability of the submarine's omings and goings (2) multiple opportunities for attak, and (3) minimum submarine esape volume. The opposite onditions usually exist if the submarine's patrol area is on the high seas. It follows that an ASW strategy aimed at finding and destroying the opponent in the open oean is highly dependent on strategi intelligene about his general whereabouts, strength, and diretion of movement. Put another way, a hunt-andkili (HUK) strategy without the benefit of strategi "ueing" has historially shown to be a ost-ineffetive searh for a "needle in the haystak." Strategies of destrution in the transit areas have generally relied on minefields, sometimes baked up by mobile surfae and air patrols that are linked to "bell-ringer" detetion devies. A suessful ASW barrier system will destroy few enemy submarines. After the first few losses, submarines are likely to be diverted to another and less dangerous route of passage; if this does not exist, they are effetively ontained. The latter was the fate of the submarines of the Soviet Balti Fleet during World War II. From the spring of 1943 until the apitulation of Finland in September 1944,

9 the German-Finnish "Walross" barrier of steel nets, mines, and mobile patrols aross the Gulf of Finland exluded the Soviet underwater flotillas from the Balti Sea. Destrution strategies in the patrol areas have been pratied in two basi and one "hybrid" forms. The basi forms are "offensive" HUK, and "defensive" armed esort of the targets of the submarine, i.e. the onvov system. Between the two falls the system of "proteted lanes" or defense of the so-alled "foal points" of friendly shipping. This last strategy ba. ially proposes to ombine intensive HUK and lose esort operations in the approahes to ports and harbors where seagoing traffi is "funneled," and where enemy submarines may be expeted to onentrate. Although a failure in the past, some Western naval planners today believe that, between muh improved detetion apabilities and a shortage of onvoy esorts, the strategy an and must work. Today, as in the past, the prospet of a HUK strategy is vitally dependent on strategi ueing. During World War II, Allied "hunting groups" ahieved spetaular suesses thanks to two soures of "strategi" intelligene: (1) the intereption and loation of U-boat radio traffi through high-fregueny diretion-finding (HD/DF), and (2) the de-ryption of the U-boat fleet's "Triton" ipher. Contemporary strategi intelligene about enemy submarime movements still relies, in part, on ommuniation intereption. The ASW plans of the major powers annot depend, however, on a repeat of the Triton-breaking suess of World War H's "Ultra" group. Instead, billions of dollars and rubles have been and are being invested in extremely long-range aousti and non-aousti oean floor-mounted and satellite-arried ASW "early warning" systems. Today still, the onvoy system is frequently labeled a "defensive" ASW strategy and, by onnotation, "inferior" to "offensive" HUK. The reord of the two world wars is this: (1) the onvoys were the single most suessful means for defeating the purpose of the U-boat, i.e. sever the Allies' eonomi and military

10 arteries, and (2) ships and airraft on onvoy esort duty destroyed more submarines than did their ounterparts that engaged in HUK operations. ASW Strategies of Containment Destrution of the enemy's submarines is a bonus: the essential purpose of the ASW strategist is to defeat the war-fighting purpose of his opponent. Containment strategies have historially depended on physial obstrution of the submarine's movements, inluding minefields, nets, and "bloking ships." The reation of the strategi missile submarine has added the idea of psyhologial ontainment by similar ("ountervailing") fores. The advantage of an ASW strategy of ontainment is twofold: (1) it minimizes the risk of asualties that is part and parel of destrution strategies, and (2) it redues the need for urrent intelligene about the submarine enemy's plans and movements; in theory at least, all the ASW defender needs doing is to find the right "ork" to "bottle up" the opponent. The disadvantage of ontainment is also twofold: (1) it is quite diffiult to reate a hermetiallysealed barrier, and (2) ontainment shemes are likely to tie up fores that are badly needed elsewhere. Containment at the Soure Most lose-in ASW ontainment shemes have relied on minefields. Few have proven effetive for the same basi strategi reason that has historially deterred "fleet ation" against the soures of the submarine. Suess in mine warfare ultimately depends of the relative stamina of the two sides, i.e. the relative persistene of the mine-laver and the mine-learer. The Allied mine-laying ampaigns of the two world wars failed to ontain the U-boats inside their bases beause the Allied navies were unable or unwilling to patrol the fields within easy reah of enemy ounter-attak, and prevent the Germans from learing a safe passage through the ordon.

11 British efforts in World War I to ontain the U-boats inside their bases by sinking blokships failed, in part, for the same reason. On April 22-23, 1918, a Royal Navy flotilla "pratied" a small-sale version of Admiral Jellioe's proposal to lose off the U-boats' Heligoland Bight exits by sinking 83 old warships filled with onrete. Two blokships were laid athwart the hannel to the U- boat base at Zeebrugge on the Flanders oast. The physial portion itself of the operation was suessful, but, within less the one month, the U-boats were bak-in-business thanks to a hannel dug around the obstrution. The operation, for all its gallantry and ingenuity ould have been no more than a short-lived suess as long as the British fleet was not prepared to guard against enemy efforts to remove the obstale. Containment in the Transit and Patrol Areas "Stati" ontainment strategies withe v.t the presene of mobile reative fores have proven equally unprodutive in the submarine's transit and patrol areas. The basi problem is that a determined submarine opponent is likely to eventually to find means and methods to find or "reate" a rak. The most famous (if not most suessful anti-transit barriers of the two world wars were the Dover and Northern "barrages." The first one involved a ombination of minefields and "tripwires" laid aross the English Channel; the seond depended on tens of thousands of mines planted in the Greenland- Ieland-Uniied Kingdom (GIUK) "gap." The World War I version of the Dover Barrage failed during most of its lifespan due to the British failure to maintain reative patrols after daylight hours and the wintermonths from Deember through April. Its -Vo;id War II variant was irumvented by the German oupation of Frane. The Northern Barrage of the "Great War" strethed aross the 4 kilometers of water that divide the Orkney Islands from Norway. Established in the spring of 1918 (when the onvoy system had already proven its effetiveness), the system proved more dangerous to the Allied mine-laying fore than to the U-boats. The tendeny of the mines to explode prematurely was part of the problem; more

12 important, the Allied patrol ships that were to harass the intruders and fore them into the deep minefields, were withdrawn for other duti;s. Four-to-six U-boats were lost on the barrier. A single U-boat may have fallen vitim to World War II's northern barrage; more Allied ships were lost to mines broken loose from their moorings. Contemporary barrage shemes ombine ontainment and destrution tatis, using "smart" mines (suh as the Amerian Mk 6 "enapsulated torpedo, " or Captor), mobile or stationary aousti "fenes," and long-range patrol airraft. One possibility is to ompletely enirle the submarine's suspeted patrol area with airdropped aousti buoys, and the methodially shrinking the fened area by plaing one buoy row inside another until the enemy has been pinpointed for final proseution. Strategies for Limiting the Submarine's War-Fighting Effiieny If the enemy submarine annot be destroyed or ontained, yet is denied the full use of its destrutive apabilities, the ASW strategist has ahieved his purpose. The hoie of effiieny-limiting strategies begins at home, and is dependent on the war-fighting purpose of the enemy submarine fleet. For example, if the purpose is eonomi strangulation, the ASW defender may ounter by reduing his dependene on seaborne ommere (e.g., food rationing, boosting domesti soures of supplies). If the threat is one of strategi missile attak, various passive and ative "damage limitation"measures are possible. Limiting Effiieny at the Soure One possible method to degrade the submarine's operational effiieny has alread been mentioned, namely the mining of rew training areas. Prodution effiieny may be attaked by aerial "harassment raids," aimed at foring yard workers to repeatedly stop 1

13 work and seek shelter. One of the hoped-for effets of the Allied ity bombings was the lowering of the morale and hene fighting effiieny of U boat rews. Limiting Effiieny in the Transit and Patrol Areas The purpose of effiieny-limiting strategies in the transit or patrol areas is to minimize the submarine's produtive patrol time. As already noted, the measure of suess of a barrier system is not neessarily the number of submarines destroyed, but may be instead the extent to whih the enemy is fored to seek an alternate and more time-onsuming route. For example, the suess of the "improved" Dover Barrage of lay in the fored re-routing of the U-boats via the more distant waters between Norway and Sotland. A suessful means in the past to degrade the submarine's produtivity has been broad area searh and surveillane by patrol airraft. The tendeny of the submarine to avoid an opponent who ould look over-the-horizon was disovered by aident with use of kite balloons (ship-towed balloons with a human observer) in the Mediterranean theater in World War I. During World War II, the fear of airborne disovery fored the U-boats in transit through the Bay of Bisay to spend inreasingly more time at slower underwater speeds. Similarly, an unquantifiable measure of effetiveness of the World War II onvoy air esorts was the frequeny that their mere presene fored the U-boats to break tatial ontat, and look for easier prey elsewhere. The submarine's produtive period is determined, in part, by the amount of fuel and weapons it arries. The first onsideration is irrelevant for the nulear submarine, but the seond is still so today. The impliation is that a submarine, nulear or otherwise, an be denied its full potential by interfering with its logistis infrastruture. The best-known illustration of this partiular strategy is the systemati Allied ammpaign of World War II to 11

14 destroy the "Milh Cows"- the U-boats' fuel replenishment submarines. The Foreseeable Future The hoie of ASW strategy is determined by two fators: (1) the prevailing balane between submarine and anti-submarine tehnologies, and (2) the partiular war-fighting purposes of the submarine that need defeating. The foreseeable tehnologial balane will hinge on (a) the submarine's "stealth" versus ASW detetion apabilities, and (b) the ability of the ASW defender to attak the submarine quikly and aurately at "stand-off" ranges. As long as the oeans do not beome "transluent," prospets are that the submarine will ontinue to evolve and assume tasks that have traditionally been the prerogative of surfae fleets, for example, air defense of the airraft arrier. New submarine roles will prompt a new "menu" of ASW strategies. The table below ompares the destrutive produtivity of different ASW methods during the two world wars. Not shown are submarine losses due to suttling, ollisions and other marine aidents, apture, or own fores. 12

15 <a w Sri > rh in f> OS o ET ) > CD tr, *S"» in in H fm U> <T fm o rh 1 r» rh rh ih a X o r- Cfv C5 *f on fm rh *r v to u ro kl dl X. 4J o fl in 1 OD O r- i 1 1 rh rh 3 rh E E M> r* m fm <N rh ( fm fm T kl k ih u E- rh «4 4-» U < > E ) o to V. V).H ü -Q r. u s 1 H kl <C E J2 a tfl (A -U CUj.H ( C ki 1 u W <L» ^ (C IC IM <C u a 1 w IM IC M U ki H < ( a H in <D U IC IM M 3 W oo i m l t ) t-i «r rh rh \ in 3 rg OO rh er < a JB 1 ü 'S IM port, o mines, lian submari o <H 1 r» *} 1 ki C 4J «3 in 3 ( H 'S > IC troyed i ly" due 2 Austr 1 CJ 1 tpw J"C kl 11 fs HJ tj IC j; o in in n n in u W ki rh fm r-j QJ 1 m C t -rh -H Ti IS ÖJ a ki to ig rh Ü C Ü f3 E M «3 > JQ W U IQ»D 3 C»Hin IC ( m to to <u h Oi 3 w ^o "o T» IX> in eo in IN o 3 ^i * rsi H vo m f\ i-h e> HrlH fm u rh j 1 2) ine 3) ine 4) ine -H < 4J H kl >1 C HJ U E HJ u ) V kl i: t3 -I 4J H kl to tu IC 4J w -4 C 3 >i Cä C T -J 4J ü > <T E IC 4-1 IC»H M ki 4 Q. r. > k. 13 XJ U Ü p»-! r-l K

16 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST No. opies 1. Dudley Knox Library 2 Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA Diretor of Researh (Code 12) Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA Chairman 1 Department of National Seurity Affairs (Code 56) Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA Adjunt Professor Jan Breemer Department of National Seurity Affairs (Code 56) Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA CAPT Peter T. Deutermann Strategi Conepts Branh (P-63) P-63/Room 4E4J86 Offie of the Chief of Naval Operations 6. Professor Neagle Forrest (Code 71) ASW Aademi Group Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA CDR D. P. Klmball (Code 3A) Antisubmarine & Eletrial Warfare Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA Captain James W. Mueller (Code 38) National Seurity and Intelligene Programs Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA Oean Gordon E. Shaher Dean of Siene & Engineering Naval Postgraduate Shool Monterey, CA

17 1. Rihard Sabat 1 MITRE Corporation Matl Stop Z55 MLean, VA 2211 No. Copies 11. Brian Engler CNA Center for Naval Analysis 441 Ford Avenue Alexandria, VA Offie of Chief of Naval Operations OP-9 PNT 4E Offie of Naval Warfare OP-95 PNT 4E536 Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 14. Offie of Naval Warfare OP-951 PNT 4E536 Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 15. Offie of Researh Development 4 Aquisition OP-98 PNT 5C686 Offie of Chi»»/ of Naval Operations 16. Undersea & Strategi Warfare & Nulear Energy Development Division OP-981 PNT 5C67S Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 17. Department Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare) OP-2 PNT 4E524

18 No. of Copies 18. Strategi Submarine Division 1 OP-21 * PNT 4534 Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 19. Dir Attak Submarine Division OP-22 PNT 4D482 Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 2. Surfae Warfare Division OP-32 PNT 4D547 Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 21. DCNO A1r Warfare OP-5 PNT 4E394 Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 22. Strategy, Plans & Poliy Division OP-6 PNT 4E566 Offie of Chief of Naval Operations 23. Andrew Marshall Diretor, Net Assessment OSD/NA Room 3A93 Offie of the Seretary of Defense Washington, D.C PA&E General Purpose Fores PNT 2D312 Offie of the Seretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 231

19 25. Defense Tehnial Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA Center for Naval Analyses 441 Ford Ave. Alexandria, VA