THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Transcription

1 NWC 1159 THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT A Guide for Deriving Operational Lessons Learned By Dr. Milan Vego, JMO Faculty 2006

2 A GUIDE FOR DERIVING OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED Reading military history for the sake of obtaining raw knowledge of the facts is generally not very useful for a future operational commander. The study of history has utility only if past events provide lessons that can be used today or in the foreseeable future. Hence, each study should be viewed from a perspective of an operational commander and his staff. Several methods can be used to derive operational lessons learned from historical case studies. One such method is the following two-step process: Step # 1: Draw conclusions based on your analysis a historic case study. Do not focus exclusively on conclusions pertaining to the operational and strategic level, but also those at the tactical level. By focusing on a certain level you might omit some of the conclusions that, while tactical in character, might be useful at the operational or strategic level. Identifying which lessons are operational should be made during the second step of your analysis. Step # 2: Rewrite in broad, generic terms (i.e., without reference to a particular event or major decision made by a certain commander) those conclusions that you consider to have some utility for today and in the future, regardless of the geographic area, weapons, equipment, or forces involved. Specifically, draw conclusions and lessons learned in regard to the following issues (the list is not all-inclusive): Relationship among components of military art (strategy, operational art, tactics) Operational factors (space-time-force) Military organization of space (the theater and its structure; theater of operations, areas of operations, zones or sectors, etc.) Methods of combat force employment (major operations and campaigns) Elements of operational warfare (mobilization/demobilization; strategic and operational deployment/redeployment; critical factors and the center of gravity in particular; operational maneuver; culmination point; consolidation of operational/strategic success; regeneration of combat power; reconstitution, etc.) Principles of operational warfare (objective, mass, economy of effort, surprise, security, offensive, etc.) Operational functions (operational C2, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics, operational protection, operational movement and maneuver). Operational planning (theater planning process, tenets of operational planning; long-range estimate of the situation, operational design and its elements; strategic guidance, desired end 2

3 state, military objectives, identification of critical factors and center of gravity, direction/axis, and operational idea and its elements; methods of defeating the opponent, operational sequencing, synchronization, deception, maneuver, phasing, etc.) Operational leadership Major decisions made (organizational, operational, and informational decisions). Operational lessons learned can be presented in two ways: (1) immediately following each conclusion or (2) writing down all conclusions first followed by a separate section entitled Operational Lessons Learned. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES A. The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1942 (Operation MO), May 1942 Conclusion and Operational Lessons Learned The demarcation line between Southern Pacific Area and Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPAC) was rigidly laid down. Restrictions placed on CTF 17 limited their searches to the southeastern border area of SOWESPAC. This allowed the Japanese Striking Force to pass through undetected. The boundaries between the two adjacent theaters should not be so rigidly laid down to prevent one s own and friendly forces from operating in the area as required. The Japanese planning for Operation MO followed their usual pattern; the plan relied heavily on complex sequencing and synchronization. Additionally, the basic plan was changed shortly before the start of operation to accommodate secondary tasks. The accomplishment of the secondary tasks endangered the accomplishment of the primary tasks. During the plans execution, the meticulous synchronization schedule between Striking Force and Port Moresby Invasion Force was derailed. Thorough planning is critical for success of a major naval operation or maritime campaign. Sequencing and synchronization of diverse forces must be realistically and properly planned. Secondary tasks should not be added to the basic plan without fully considering their potential effect on the accomplishment of the primary tasks. The Japanese relied heavily on the element of surprise. They also naively believed that, when they so wanted, they could conduct their operations in complete secrecy. When judiciously conceived and successfully employed, surprise could be a most potent factor. However, the element of surprise should not be counted on too heavily in planning a major operation or campaign. There must be always sufficient means available to ensure success when surprise is not obtained. The Japanese estimated the enemy s courses of action, and then based their plans on their estimate of enemy intentions. They did not give sufficient weight to enemy capabilities. It is unwise and dangerous for a commander to base his plans solely on his perception of the enemy situation, as often the enemy will do something else. Therefore, operational commander should rely on the enemy's capabilities not intentions in his planning and decision-making. 3

4 Neither the Japanese or Allied commanders adequately considered the peculiarities of weather in their planning. On the Allied side, the value of factoring climate and weather in the area of operations into their planning was recognized some time after the Battle of the Coral Sea. Operational significance of terrain and weather/climate must be taken fully into consideration in making a decision and planning for major operations or campaigns. Divided command adversely affected the performance of the Allied forces. CTF 17 had no control over the land-based air searches. Thus, the commander never had a complete picture of the situation in the theater. Various parts of the theater were only partially searched and CTF 17 was not informed about the gaps in the air search coverage. Searches by land-based aircraft and seaplanes were effective in searching an area when there were sufficient number of aircraft and pilots to accomplish the task. However, there were many gaps in coverage that forced the commanders on both sides to use carrier-based aircraft for search. Divided command can adversely affect the performance of forces and units. A joint force commander should have complete control over all reconnaissance and intelligence forces and assets in his theater. Unity of effort is best accomplished through unity of command. A positive mental attitude toward the necessity to cooperate by commanders taking part in a major naval operation is as important as having a good plan. Logistical support, especially fuel requirements, is vital in any major operation. The Japanese evidently recognized this fact during their operations to seize the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. They prepared plans for fueling their forces as they proceeded on this operation. The Japanese had established fueling stations in key locations and assigned oilers to their units. The Allies, on the other hand, were forced to rely exclusively on oilers, and were limited to about one oiler per task force. The loss of an oiler could affect adversely the TF 17 operations, and the possibility of such a loss was the source of constant worry. Naval forces heavily dependent on fuel may be unable to accomplish their tasks. Therefore, every effort should be made to ensure adequate quantities of fuel are available close by and relatively safe from the enemy attack. This also applies to other logistical requirements, such as ammunition, water, and food. Neither the Japanese nor Allies made any arrangement to replace pilots or aircraft lost in combat or because of a mechanical failure. Before the start of any major naval operation or campaign adequate logistical arrangements for the immediate replacement of aircraft and pilots should be made. B. German Invasion of Norway, 1940 (Weserüebung) The German invasion of Norway was the first real contest between air and sea power. The Luftwaffe proved to be a decisive factor in the German success. German air forces bore the main burden of fight against enemy naval forces. The campaign proved that no fleet could safely operate within the effective range of a strong enemy air force. (In retrospect it seems fair to say that no degree of foresight would have prevented the Allies from suffering the full effects of German air superiority.) Strong air power must be met by stronger air power. The Royal Navy had inadequate number of destroyers; moreover, they had to carry out multiple tasks including ferrying the troops; there was a chronic shortage of landing craft especially in 4

5 Narvik. Training in amphibious warfare was sorely lacking. Deficiencies in force planning and training in peacetime cannot be easily if at all corrected after the start of hostilities. The Allied ground forces almost entirely lacked artillery and were inferior to the Germans in automatic weapons. More serious was their lack of mobility. There were no specialized troops for mountain and winter warfare. Also, the Allies did not have any operational reserve. Only equally modern or more advanced heavy weapons and equipment can oppose heavy weapons and equipment. Quality is often more crucial for a success than quantity of weapons and equipment. One of the major reasons for the Allied failure in Norway was a clear disconnect between the ends and means on the Allied side. Their forces and assets were clearly inadequate to accomplish the Allied strategic aims. There should be always a complete harmony between ends and means in planning a major operation or campaign; otherwise any such effort is doom to fail. The campaign of 1940 is one example of the influence of surprise. Without the element of surprise the German plan would probably have been quickly scotched. The Germans were very lucky. No German warship met superior forces on the high seas on return trip home, though the margin of time and space often was very narrow. The Allies lacked an understanding of limitations and possibilities of war at sea. Because the British plan was not to land troops prior to securing command of the sea, they assumed that the Germans would do the same. The possibility of the Germans invading Norway without sea control was never really considered by the Allies. Never underestimate your opponent. Focus on the enemy's physical capabilities instead intentions. In the United Kingdom there was little realization that it was open to the Germans as well as to the Allies to take the initiative. Slowness and vacillation characterized the British reaction to the German moves. The Germans obtained and maintained initiative, while in contrast the British decisions and actions were made leisurely. Little attempt was made to discover, or by trained imagination to discern, what the Germans were about to do or capable of doing. To achieve a success at the operational level it is necessary to obtain and maintain the initiative. Speed in making sound and timely operational decisions is key in maintaining initiative and thereby ultimately achieves a full freedom of action. 5