THE NATO COMMA~D A~D CONTROL CE~T~E OF EXCELLE~DCE

Transcription

1 EXAMINING MISSION COMMAND IN NATO DOCTRINE. WITH A FOCUS ON THE JOINT OPERA TIONAL LEVEL t THE NATO COMMA~D A~D CONTROL CE~T~E OF EXCELLE~DCE Tom Zachariassen Commander (Nor N) Staff Officer Expertise Management Branch

2 Copyright February 2016 Corn mand and Control Centre of Excellence (C2COE). All rights Reserved. Comments and inquiries on this document should be directed to the Command and Control Centre of Excellence, Kromhoutkazerne, K01-4, Post-box 90004, 3509 AA Utrecht, The Netherlands Please visit our website at or at C2coec~c2coe.org. 2jPage

3 FOREWORD Dear readers, The NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence (C2COE), located in Utrecht, the Netherlands, supports NATO, nations and international institutions or organisations by providing subject matter expertise (SME) on Command and Control. Our main level of interest is C2 at the Operational level with a focus on C2 Processes and Structures, Information and Knowledge Management and Human Factors (including Leadership). The C2COE annually executes a Program of Work (POW), vetted by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and approved by a steering board comprised of the nine contributing nations to the Centre. Human Factors are the psychological (human behaviour), sociological (human institutions) and anthropological (human culture) aspects of C2 including leadership and command philosophy. Important when it comes to leadership in NATO is the utilization of the mission command philosophy. After participation in various NATO evaluation/certification exercises, feedback from SME5 within the Centre however indicated that mission command does not appear to be a focus of discussion or debate within the Alliance, even though it is stated as the preferred command philosophy. In order to be able to coritribute more to the improvement of mission command in NATO, T decided to raise the awareness of mission command within the Centre. To get a better understanding of the utilization of mission command, centre members examined all NATO Allied Joint Doctrines and other relevant publications, containing guidance on mission command. They also identified possible shortfalls and challenges to mission command in NATO. This report provides a consolidated and easy readable overview of our examinations on mission command in NATO doctrines and publications. In addition it also provides recommendations to the NATO C2COE how to proceed with future work on mission command and NATO in general how to address the identified shortfalls and challenges. On behaif of the NATO C2COE, Captain Royal Netherlands Navy G.H. (Gerrit) Nijenhuis Director NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence Page

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD 3 1. INTRODUCTION Background s 1.2 AIM STRUCTURE SCOPE AND Limitations Discialmer 6 2. DOCTRINAL AND PUBLICATION REVIEW AJP-1 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine; (Extract) AJP-3 (B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations; (Extract) AJP-3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations; (Extract) AJP-3~2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations; (Extract) ATP Command and Control of Allied Land Forces; (Extract) AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning; (Extract) Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD Interim v2.o (04 October 2013); (Extract) Observations CONCLUSIONS AND Recommendations 33 Page

5 INTRODUCTION: 1.1 BACKGROUND The NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence (NATO C2COE) mission is to support NATO, Nations and international institutions/ organisations by providing Subject Matter Expertise (SME) on all aspects of the Command and Control (C2) process with a focus on the operational environment. The NATO C2COE continually reflects on our position within NATO to ensure we are providing the Alliance with the most relevant contributions in the field of C2. We find ourselves in a fast-paced and dynamic environment with new focus areas and challenges. Thus, the Centre constantly strives to improve C2 principles and techniques. We are contemplating specialisation in specific C2 domains and serving the Alliance by championing new initiatives within the field of C2. The NATO C2COE contributes with SME support in major exercises, working groups and conferences within NATO. Feedback from the Centre s SME5 indicates that mission command in NATO does not appear to be a focus of discussion or debate within the Alliance, although stated as the preferred command philosophy within NATO. Due to this, the Director of the NATO C2COE decided to raise the awareness of mission command within the Centre to be able to contribute to the utilization of mission command in NATO. 1.2 AIM In order to gain a better understanding of the utilization of mission command in NATO, the NATO C2COE decided as a first step, to examine NATO Allied Joint Doctrines and other relevant publications, which contain guidance on mission command. Based on an improved understanding of mission command, the aim of this study, conducted in the autumn 2015, is to identify possible shortfalls and challenges on mission command in NATO, and decide upon if and how to proceed with further studies on mission command within the NATO C2COE. 1.3 STRUCTURE In order to identify shortfalls and decide upon how to proceed with mission command studies within the Centre, we have identified and reviewed what we consider the most important doctrines and publications in regards to mission command in NATO. The first chapter in the report contains a consolidated overview of mission command in NATO. This part of the report is merely cut and paste from important NATO doctrines and publications and serves as the basis for our analysis and internal discussions in regards to mission command. In the next chapter, we summarize, on an aggregated level, the most important observations from our analysis and discussions. In the last chapter, based on the shortfalls we have identified, this report provides our recommendations to how NATO should address the identified shortfalls and challenges. Finally, the report also offers recommendations to how the NATO C2COE should proceed with future work on mission command. Page

6 1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS As mentioned, to illustrate NATO s view on mission command, the content of mission command in NATO Allied Joint Doctrines and publications is inciuded in the main body of this document. Additionally, to provide a better understanding of mission command in NATO, we had to analyse the tactical level as well. This was not part of our original plan as we intended to maintain a focus on the joint operational level. However, we noticed that in order to gain better awareness on the topic from doctrines and publications, we also had to focus on mission command at the tactical level. The following list of NATO doctrinal manuals and publications are those that directly mention mission command. These doctrines and publications were useful in our research, and relevant portions of them are therefore extracted and presented in this report: a) AJP-1 (D): Allied Joint Publication Allied Joint Doctrine b) AJP-3 (B): Allied Joint Publication for the Conduct of Operations c) AJP-3.1: Allied Joint Maritime Operations d) AJP-3.2: Allied Joint Publication for Land Operations e) ATP-3.2.2: Command and Control of Allied Land Forces f) AJP-5: Allied Joint Publication for Operational-Level Planning g) COPD V2.0: Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive COPD Interim V2.0 4 October 2013 In our extensive review, we have searched the following doctrines and publications for references or relation to mission command; however, we were unable to find any relevance. This is inciuded in this section, because it reinforces the information presented in the observations and recommendations of this report. These doctrines and publications are as follows: a) AJP-3.3: Allied Joint Publications for Joint Air and Space Operations b) AJP-3.4: Allied Joint Publications for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations c) AJP-3.4.1: Allied Joint Publications for Peace Support Operations d) AJP-3.4.9: Allied Joint Publications for Civil Military Cooperation e) AJP-3.5: Allied Joint Publication for Special Operations f) AJP-6: Allied Joint Publication for Communication and Information Systems g) AJP-3.13: Allied Joint Publications for the Deployment of Forces h) AAP-6: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions i) AAP-15: NATO Glossary and Abbreviations j) Allied Force Standards Volume 1 XI k) BI-SC Conceptual Framework For Alliance Operations 1.5 DISCLAIMER This report is a product based upon a document study by the NATO C2COE. The report does not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or that of the NATO C2COE Sponsoring Nations. Comments or inquiries related to this report should be directed to the NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence, Kromhout Barracks, K01-4, Post-box 90004, 3509 AA Utrecht, The Netherlands. Please visit our website at or us at c2coe@c2.coe.nato.mt 6IPage

7 2. DOCTRINAL AND PUBLICATION REVIEW: The following sections highlight the specific doctrines and publications that explain and give guidance to the utilization of mission command in NATO. This consolidated list is meant to give the reader and the officers within the NATO C2COE an overview and easy access to the understanding and use of mission command in NATO. Please, be aware that NATO is currently updating some of these examined doctrines. All text in the following sections have been extracted from NATO doctrines and publications and are referenced using the appropriate section / paragraph that was used within the documents (e.g., Para. 0612). The information extracted and used was not altered, but there are instances where only specific paragraphs are used and others omitted based upon their relation to the topic of mission command (i.e., Section mission command, paragraph 1(b) is used, but 1(a) is omitted). Additionally, throughout this document the word mission command is highlighted in bold for easier reference and identification for review. 2.1 A.IP-1 (D) ALLIED )OINT DOCTRINE; (EXTRACT) Para Exploit Opportunity. A Commander should exploit opportunities to seize and retain the initiative (the ability to dictate the course of events), or regain it once lost, in order to achieve his mission. Making the most of such opportunities, whether they be created through successful engagement or arise through chance, relies upon a Commander s ability not only to identify them in advance but to be able to generate the means to exploit them. More broadly, it involves not only identifying or creating opportunities, but having or obtaining the means and will to exploit them and achieving a higher tempo relative to the adversary. a) The use of manoeuvre and offensive action is fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative, which is the key to being able to exploit opportunities. Mission Command allows Component Commanders (CC5) or subordinates to exploit opportunities that present themselves, providing they are within the overall intent. b) The ability to do this successfully relies on continuous planning, including accurate risk analysis and management. Both subjective and objective risk analysis is required and intuition has a role to play. The Commander should promote a culture that is risk-aware, rather than risk-averse. This approach requires that Commanders at all levels are able to identify those areas where significant risk lies and then choose to accept, avoid or mitigate against them. The Commander who analyses, assesses and actively manages risk is frequently able to seize opportunities and take bold decisions. Key events or effects are identified in each phase of the Course of Action (COA) that are judged to be: of significant operational concern; could provide a potential opportunity for exploitation; or of unknown quantity whose outcome could be significant. 1 Page

8 Para Visualization. The centrality of the Commander to the process of operational design, with his unique blend of intellect, experience and instinct, cannot be overstated. For every mission, the Commander determines what should be achieved and begins to develop plans for the force to accomplish the mission. His visualization embodies the intent for the conduct and outcome of the operation. It is a mental picture of the current situation and intended end-state, and how (based on the higher Commander s intent, on the information available and on intuition) to move from one to the other. The Commander s Intent is an expansion and expression of how a mission is to unfold. It must include a succinct statement of a mission s overall purpose, the desired end-state, and any essential information on how to get to that end-state; it should be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate preparation of their own OPLANs and/or orders, and perhaps more importantly to provide the foundation for effective Mission Command. Para Unifying Concept. The Commander s Intent is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force as a whole rather than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what makes sense at that time or place. In this way Commander s Intent enables Mission Command. Para The Manoeuvrist Approach. The Manoeuvrist Approach focuses on shattering the adversary s overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel. It is an indirect approach, which emphasizes targeting the adversary s moral component of fighting power rather than the physical. The approach involves a combination of lethal and non-lethal means to create effects, which shape an adversary s understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion. It aims to apply strength against identified vulnerabilities. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility, which in combination lead to shock and surprise. It calls for an attitude of mmd in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a relentless determination to succeed. It is applicable to all types of military activities across the spectrum of conflict. It: a) Emphasizes defeat and disruption of the adversary rather than, for example, taking ground for its own sake and depends on the precise application force against identified points of weakness. b) Aims to defeat the adversary s will and desire to continue by seizing the initiative, and applying constant and unexpected pressure at times and places which the adversary east expects. In combat, the Manoeuvrist Approach invariably includes elements of movement, firepower and positional defence. There will usually be a requirement to fix the adversary, to deny him access to routes and objectives, and secure vital ground and key points. However, any such defensive measures should only be seen as part of the means to the end, which is the adversary s defeat. The Manoeuvrist Approach is underpinned by centralized planning and decentralized execution that promotes freedom of action and initiative Mission Command. 81 Page

9 Para 0612 Mission Command. A commander s responsibility for mission accomplishment is total, but delegation of authority to subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher commander s intentions are inciuded in the principle of decentralization. Through mission command, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise, and exploit favourable opportunities. Mission command encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making. Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide sufficient forces, resources and authority required to accomplish their assigned tasks. Although the emphasis given to a mission command style in the doctrine and practice of different services and nations may differ, commanders and their staffs should employ the principle of mission command. Successful mission command has the following prerequisites: a) Commanders and staffs should concern themselves primarily with joint operational matters, taking account of component issues only as necessary. b) The subordinate commander must understand fully the operational commander s intentions and what he is required to achieve, and be free to exercise initiatives based on that understanding, within a minimal level of control imposed from the higher level of command. c) There should be an active involvement in the doctrine development process by the nations and a common understanding of the operational doctrine governing the employment of forces. The latter is achieved through education, training and exercises. d) Trust (total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another) is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams. Trust expands the commander s options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. Trust is based on the mutual confidence that results from the demonstrated competence of each member of the team. The opportunity to observe each member s capabilities in training builds trust and confidence in a Joint Force. Para In stating his intent, the Commander provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the broader context of the mission, rather than within the restrictions of a particular CONOPS or scheme of manoeuvre. The Commander s Intent provides subordinates with the flexibility to adapt their actions to achieve success. By focusing on the end-state rather than sequential events, it allows Commanders to operate with increased speed and confidence in decision-making. This allows 9IPage

10 subordinate forces, and hence the whole force, to operate faster, and with greater agility, than the adversary, which keep him off-balance and unable to respond coherently. This end-state focus supports the initiative of Commanders at all levels by freeing them to focus on the desired resuits, even when the CONOPS should be adapted to changing events, when communications are disrupted, or additional guidance or directives are lacking. The Commander s Intent also provides subordinates with the platform to develop a vision of their end-state, as it supports that of the force as a whole. Para Without unity of effort and the necessary trust to plan and execute a joint and multinational campaign or major operation, there can be little chance of success. Shared operational understanding of the problem and environment couples with a mutual understanding of strengths and weaknesses provides the foundation of cooperation and trust, which is vital in the planning and successful execution of joint and multinational operations. This should stem from the highest levels. Mutual understanding also rests on a common application of joint doctrine. Familiarity with the procedures of each service and nation is best achieved through joint and multinational training. A common approach should be inherent in thought and practice; joint and multinational training should be undertaken whenever possible, but t is particularly important, should time be available, prior to any operation. The greater the degree of standardization (in terms of both equipment and doctrine), the better the prospects are for fruitful cooperation, mutual understanding, and ultimately, for success. Para Command. The operational commander should decide where and how best to exercise command of the force within the Alliance s command philosophy. This philosophy, described in Section T, highlights the importance of Mission Command. 22 AJP-3 (B) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERA TIONS; (EXTRA CT) Commander s Intent. This is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force as a whole rather than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what makes sense at that time or place. In this way commander s intent enables mission command. Para Mission Command. Within the principle of mission command the JFC should seek to ensure that his FC/CC5, his COS and the functional heads in the JF HQ and the commanders of the subordinate formations and elements are all given appropriate freedom to act. How this is then implemented 10 1 P a g e

11 downwards will vary according to best practice in each of the sub-elements. The JFC s direction should include, as a minimum, the commander s intent and a dear statement on how he sees the operation unfolding. The JFC should also identify those operational level decisions, which rest with him, while offering maximum latitude to his subordinates in how they conduct their tactical activities, battles and engagements. Thereafter, while encouraging feedback to ensure balance is maintained, he should expect CC5 to determine their implied tasks and keep him, and each other, informed of progress. In turn, they should disseminate their own operation orders to support the part they have to play along the various lines of operation as detailed in the concept of operations in the OPLAN. The JFC should insist on regular situation reports and should seek advice from the CCs in order to inform the operational level decisions that he has to make. This does mean that under exceptional circumstances, usually where fleeting opportunities for decisive exploitation present themselves, JFC may have to reach down to whatever level is necessary and take charge of the situation. 2.3 AJP-3.1 ALLIED JOINT MARITIME OPERA TIONS; (EXTRACT) Methods of Control 1. Historically, in striking a balance between orchestrating operations and granting freedom of action to subordinates, commanders have used two methods of control detailed control and mission command mission type orders. a. Detailed Control. When using detailed control, a commander manages with a tight rein. Command and control is centralized. Orders and plans are explicit, as when a formation of ships is conducting tactical manoeuvring. Such control emphasizes vertical information flow, with information flowing up and orders flowing down the chain of command. Detailed control is often the preferred method when time is not a critical factor, when procedures must be closely adhered to for safety reasons, or when restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) demand close monitoring and extensive reporting of events. Detailed control, however, neither works well in a rapidly changing situation; nor does t function well when the vertical flow of information is disrupted. Therefore, it is not the preferred method of control under conditions of great uncertainty and time constraints. b. Mission Command. In contrast, mission command seeks to cope with the effects of uncertainty and time by creating a system that can respond quickly in combat. Rather than seeking certainty prior to making decisions, a commander lowers the degree of certainty needed before deciding to act. When using mission command, a commander controls with a loose rein. Command and control is decentralised and flexible. Orders and plans are succinct. In addition to keeping the commander informed, mission command emphasizes horizontal information flow among subordinate commands. The commander guides the actions of subordinates by imparting an understanding of mission requirements, and allowing them freedom of action. Unity of effort is not attained by conformity imposed from above, but grows instead from spontaneous cooperation 11 1 P a g e

12 among all elements of the force. By decentralising decision-making authority, the tempo of operations is heightened and the force s ability to deal with rapidly changing situations is improved. Moreover, because it relies on implicit understanding of mission requirements, mission command is much less vulnerable to disruption than detailed control. Mission command has the following key elements: 1) Orders given in a manner that ensures that subordinates understand the commander s intentions, the mission, and the context of the mission. 2) Telling subordinates what affect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved. 3) Allocating sufficient resources to subordinates to carry out their missions. 4) Using a minimum of control to avoid limiting subordinate freedom of action. 5) Allowing subordinates to decide within their delegated freedom of action how to best achieve their missions. c. Command by Veto. In many aspects of maritime warfare, it is necessary to preplan the actions of a force to an assessed threat and to delegate some command functions to a subordinate. Once such functions are delegated, the subordinate is to take the required action without delay, always keeping the commander informed of the situatiori. The commander retairis the power to veto any particular action. 2. In practice, no commander will rely solely on either detailed control, mission command or command by veto. The type of control used will depend ori the nature of the operation or task, the environment, the nature and capabilities of the enemy, and, perhaps most of all, the qualities of the force. Detailed control may be more appropriate in performing specific, precise tasks of a procedural or technical nature, such as controlling airspace, but t is less effective in the conduct of high-tempo operations where judgment, creativity, and initiative are required. Mission command is the more demanding, as it requires the highest standard of interoperability and understanding of the commander s intent. 2.4 AJP-3.2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND OPERA TIONS; (EXTRA CT) The Environment Para The command of land forces is characterised by the need for concerted action across a complex set of inter-related headquarters, many of which are physically distant from each other. This places considerable emphasis on unity of effort, mutual understanding and common intent across the force. The complexity of command varies with the size and organization of a force. The larger and more diverse the force, the more difficult it is to preserve its cohesion. Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability 12 1 P a g e

13 Para 0606 The exercise of command inciudes the process by which a commander makes decisions and transmits his intentions to, his subordinates. It entails authority, responsibility and accountability. Authority involves the power of influence or command thought, opinion, or behaviour. While a commander can devolve specific authority to subordinates to decide and to act within their own areas of delegated responsibility, he retains overall responsibility for his command. Responsibility is thus fundamental to command. Accountability involves a liability and obligation to answer to a superior for the proper use of delegated responsibility, authority and resources; it inciudes the duty to act. A joint force commander should grant sufficient authority to subordinates to carry out assigned responsibilities. In exercising command and control over the forces assigned to him, a land component commander has a wide range of responsibilities. Further details of land component command responsibilities and processes are at Annex 6A. Decision-Making, Leadership and Control Para 0610 The remainder of this chapter is developed from the command model. It explains the philosophy of mission command, the role of the commander, how he exercises command, and what support he requires in order to undertake this function. Further amplification and detail on command and control can be found in ATP Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. MISSION COMMAND Approach Para Mission command is a philosophy of decentralised command intended for situations that are complex, dynamic and adversarial. It underpins the manoeuvrist approach and has 4 enduring tenets: a) Timely decision-making. b) The importance of understanding a superior commander s intention. c) A dear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil that intent. d) Determination on the part of the commander to see a plan through to a successful conclusion. Para The underlying requirement is the fundamental responsibility to act, or in certain circumstances to decide not to act, within the framework of the commander s intent. The commander s intent binds the activities of a dispersed force into a whole while maximising his subordinates authority to act. It is the principal output of decision making and is further described in Annex 68. Expressing and conveying intent is a commander s personal responsibility. This approach requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative. Mission command is a central pillar of Joint and Army doctrine. It has the following key elements: 13 1 P a g e

14 a) A commander gives his orders in a manner that ensures that his subordinates understand his intentions, their own missions, and the context of those missions. b) Subordinates are told what effect they are to create and the reason why t needs to be created. c) Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions. d) A commander uses a minimum of control measures so as not to unnecessarily constrain his subordinates freedom of action. e) Subordinates then decide for themselves how best to achieve their missions. Para~ 0613 Principles. The command of land forces also requires an understanding of several key principles of mission command. These inciude unity of effort, main effort, freedom of action, trust, mutual understanding, and timely and effective decision making. Unity of Effort Para Unity of effort in a fighting force sterns from a number of inter-related means. These include: the cornmander s ability to formulate a dear intent and rnission staternents; the use of cornmon doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; a cornrnon language of command; a high sta ndard of collective training and tearnwork; and the designation of a main effort. Taken together, these generate comrnon understanding throughout a force. They also assist the coordination of actions in time and space on the battiefield and the ability to anticipate and respond swiftly to changes in the situation. Failure to achieve unity of effort will, at best, lead to confusion and missed opportunities. At worst, the result can be catastrophic. Para A commander has a duty to enforce common doctrine in the execution of command. This ensures that the cornmander, his staff and subordinates work together efficiently to a cornrnon purpose. The employment of cornmon doctrine should not lead to standard responses to every situation. Mission command encourages initiative at all levels within a common framework of military thought. The use of common doctrine and language applies to principles, practices and procedures, all of which should be adopted flexibly on operations and training. Para Unity of effort is enhanced by subordinates understanding the intentions both of their irnmediate superiors and of those two levels up. This is described as vertical integration and allows subordinates to nest their own plans within those of their superiors. The concept of horizontal integration, which helps subordinates understand how their missions interact with others at their own level, is equally important. Horizontal and vertical nesting is essential to understanding a formation s or a unit s contribution to the battle and hence the part it plays in fulfilling the superior cornmander s intent. 14 P a g e

15 They support decentralised decision-making in fluid operations and ensure that a concept of operations is coherent. Main Effort Para 0618 While main effort is not a principle of mission command, nor should it be confused with decisive operations, it is an essential concept that balances unity of effort and freedom of action. The main effort is a concentration of forces or means by which a commander seeks to bring about a decision. It is a mental tool to provide a focus for that activity which a commander considers crucial to the success of his mission. Unity of effort is enhanced through the selection and maintenance of the aim and concentration of force. Both are supported by designating a main effort. Freedom of Action Para Decentralisation. At the tactical level, freedom of action is largely achieved through decentralisation of responsibility and authority. Freedom of action is the aim; decentralisation is the principal means. Decentralisation has marked the practice of many successful commanders in military history. Decentralisation applies to all levels. It allows subordinates to use, within their authority, their initiative within their delegated freedom of action and provides them with a greater sense of involvement and commitment. Decision levels should be set as 10w as possible. This permits decisions to be made swiftly in the confusion and uncertainty of battle. It also reduces the need for any but essential information to be passed up and down the chain of command and ensures that decisions are taken by the commander with the most up-to-date information. The more fluid the circumstances, the lower the decision level should be set. Para Delegation of Authority. Decentralisation of decision-making requires delegation of authority in the exercise of command. It underlies much of the practical application of command, from creating the conditions for freedom of action for subordinate commanders on the battlefield to granting financial responsibility to designated budget holders in peacetime. Assessing which authorities to delegate is therefore an essential part of decision-making. Control, in the form of reporting performance and progress to a higher commander, remains an important component of command. The quality of a superior s decision-making depends upon honest and frank reporting from subordinates. The term reach-down refers to a state of affairs where, for whatever reason, a higher commander directs actions at a subordinate level 2 or more levels below him. While there may be legitimate and exceptional occasions that demand jumping across echelons in this way, its repeated use will rapidly undermine confidence in the chain of command, not least at intermediate levels. Therefore any decision to direct 2 or more levels down should be very carefully considered by the senior commander involved. Any potential short-term gains involved will almost certainly be outweighed by a loss of morale, confidence, and cohesion in the force. This applies particularly within a joint or multinational force, where trust and mutual understanding across national contingents may be insufficiently robust to withstand such practices. 15 P a g e

16 Trust Para Trust must be earned, not demanded. Personal trust can only be built up over time with experience, rather than by reputation. The spirit of mission command requires a presumption of trust between superior and subordinate, and between peers, that should develop through shared experience. In the first instance a commander should formulate and express his intent clearly and succinctly, delegate authority, and provide the necessary resources. He should then trust his subordinates to act as required. Likewise, a subordinate should trust that his superior has decided wisely, given effective direction, and that he will be supported when required. This bond of trust includes the tolerance of weil-intentioned mistakes. 1f a subordinate cannot trust his superior to support him in such circumstances, the bond of trust will be eroded; the subordinate will not act on his own initiative and the moral fabric of mission command will be destroyed. Para Trust is based on a number of qualities including professional competence, personal example and integrity. Once established and sustained, trust brings its own rewards for commanders and subordinates alike. It is a vital constituent of the maintenance of morale and so, ultimately, of victory. Soldiers should not only consider that they can trust their immediate superiors but should also have confidence in the ability of commanders right to the top of the chain of com mand. For mission command to function effectively, a superior needs to have the trust of his subordinates and they of him. The basis of this two-way trust is respect and mutual understanding. Mutual Understanding Para Like trust, mutual understanding requires time to establish. With experience, commanders should be in a position to understand the issues and concerns facing their subordinates. Professional knowledge and study will give subordinates, in turn, an insight into command at levels higher than their own. Thus a good commander ensures that he understands his subordinates and that they understand him. Only then can they together conduct operations in a cohesive and effective manner. Mutual understanding is also based on sharing a common perception of military problems. Here a common doctrine and philosophy of command bonds commanders and subordinates together by providing a unifying framework of understanding. This does not imply any requirement to come to identical solutions, since mission command stresses that an understanding of what objective has to be achieved is more important than concurrence over how it is to be achieved. Para A common approach to command assists mutual understanding and is a fundamental tool of mission command. It should be based on a professional understanding of doctrine, drills and procedures, including the language of command. Commanders intentions must be quite dear to subordinates if they are to understand what they are to achieve. On operations there may be little time for questions or debate over the meanings of tactical terms or command expressions. For those who aspire to 16 1 P a g e

17 corn mand or hold key operational staff jobs, there is no substitute for professional corn petence, including fluency in the language of command. Para 0630 Where shared experience and common doctrine do not exist, the commander should pay particular attention to the generation of mutual understanding between himself and his subordinates. Orders may have to become longer to allow more detailed descriptions of intent. The commander may consider visiting subordinates more often, and capable Ilaison officers who understand the commander s intentions will be particularly useful. Differences in language and culture tend to limit mutual understanding. Timely and Effective Decision-Making Para 0631 Successful command requires timely and effective decisions at all levels. Much of the art of command depends on recognising when to decide, which depends on good judgement and initiative. This seeks to pre-ernpt an adversary and to seize the initiative. The ability to know if a decision is required and, if it is, when it must be taken, is critical. Only occasionally should a commander delay making a decision if he has insufficient information, or when he is waiting for others to decide. Ro~e of the Commander Creating the Climate Para A comrnander has considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of his staff and subordinate cornmanders due to his authority, personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour. This applies both in training and on operations. Thus it is a cornrnander s responsibility to create and maintain an effective climate within his command. Para Successful mission command depends on a culture of cornmand that encourages subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently and to take the initiative. Subordinates should also understand the rationale for their superiors decisions. A wise cornmander will recognise this. He should explain his intentions to his subordinates in order to foster a sense of involvement in decision making and to develop shared commitment. Command on Operations Para P a g e

18 Position of the Commander. A commander should consider his position in relation to the forces he commands and his mission. His decision as to where to position himself can have important consequences for the conduct and outcome of operations. The basic factors influencing that decision are common to both the operational and tactical levels: a) The ability to assess the situation, inciuding the requirement to judge the condition and morale of his forces and to impose his will on his command. b) Access to other mission-critical information such as assessments of enemy forces. c) Secure and reliable communications to his points of command. d) Access to staff to support him in planning and decision-making. The continu ity of forward or tactical command may be limited by the availability of supporting staff. e) Security, inciuding physical and electronic protection. In general terms, the greater the footprint of the headquarters, the greater the signature and associated vulnerability. The most suitable position of the commander is that point where he can best lead his command by making timely decisions appropriate to his level of command. Digitised communications such as video-telephone conferencing should allow greater choice of location for the commander, but can constrain that choice. The enduring requirement to lead troops in combat will influence his decision, particularly at the tactical level. Conversely if a commander remains too close to the action, he risks becoming embroiled in a sideshow that obscures his overall vision. Role of the Staff Para A prerequisite for successful cooperation between the commander and his staff is mutual understanding and trust. The staff should seek guidance when the commander s intent is unclear. The Exercise of Command Promoting Common Understanding Para Doctrine. Common understanding is a product of sound and dear doctrine and the dissemination of battlefield information such as operational assessments. It is enhanced through rehearsal and effective training across a force. Common understanding is imparted through standardisation of terminology, symbology and low-level procedures as much as in the less tangible issues such as the philosophy of command or the manoeuvrist approach. Explicit, written and widely taught doctrine is critical to achieving truly common understanding across a force. The Duty to Act Para P a g e

19 At the tactical level a mission to a subordinate is a direct order. It should describe what he is to achieve and why, and be contained in orders which state the situation as perceived by the superior commander together with his intent, at the time the order was issued. The subordinate s duty to carry out the order extends to recognising 1f the situation changes to the point where his mission is no longer appropriate. In such a case he should, in the first instance, report the situation to his superior with an intended course of action. 1f he is unable to report to his superior, he should exercise his initiative within the spirit of the superior s mission and intent. In short, a subordinate has a duty to act in variation to his given mission if he judges that the circumstences require it. However, he remains fully accountable to his superior both to explain his reasons and for the consequences of his actions. Para Personal Initiative. Commanders at all levels can seize and gain the initiative in combat through personal initiative. Taking the initiative is a duty; failing to display initiative is failing to do one s duty. Initiative in support of the commander s intent should be encouraged in subordinates. To foster initiative: a) A superior from the subordinate s perspective should consider cases of apparent error. The results may be highly instructive to both parties. b) Initiative should be rewarded from all ranks, especially at lower levels. Repressing initiative early on will make it more difficult to develop it later in a career. c) The greatest censure should be reserved for inactivity in cases where action was clearly required. Plans and Orders Para An operation order should include only such detail as is necessary for commanders of subordinate formations or units to act purposefully, to issue their own orders and to ensure coordination. Mission command requires orders that concentrate on imparting an understanding of the context of the operation and what needs to be done rather than how it is to be achieved; hence the importance of the higher commander s intent. Para Mission command also requires a minimum of control measures to be imposed from above and included in operation orders. It has specific consequences for the length of operation orders and the manner in which the staff conduct control. At the beginning of a campaign or major operation, the initiating operation order may have to be highly detailed. Thereafter, operation orders that run to more than a few pages in total are inconsistent with mission command. Short orders are a key feature of mission command at the tactical level and should be a key training objective. Not only do long orders take time to prepare, they take time to transmit, read, interpret and analyse. They 19 P a g e

20 act as a brake on tempo and may constrain freedom of action. Guidance on the approach to the formulation of missions and concepts of operations is given in Annex 6B. 2.5 ATP COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIED LAND FORCES; (EXTRA CT) Section 1 - NATURE OF COMMAND Para Leadership. As the senior leader of an organization, the commander directly applies the Ieadership element of combat power. Subordinate commanders and smali~ unit leaders reinforce that element. Having the legal authority of command and issuing orders does not fully suffice for leadership in battie. Para Control. Within the context of command, t implies the continuing oversight, direction, and coordination of assigned forces in accordance with the commander s plan and intent. It inciudes collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating information for creating the common operational picture and using information, primarily by the staff, during the conduct of operations. a) Threats. The threats to mission accomplishment that act before, during, and after operations create the requirement for control. First is the enemy. He may act against the friendly commander himself, or the commander s C2S and forces. He may act using lethal weapons or non-lethally with information operations (Info Ops). The second is the environment. The final impediment to mission accomplishment is the actions of friendly forces themselves: human error, equipment limitations, and the physics of executing an action. These factors often cause deviations from the plan during execution. b) Elements. The elements of control are as follows: 1. Information. Information is the most important element of control. It is the meaning assigned to data. It also inciudes any form of description or representation from data to understanding that relates to military operations. Information gives structure and shape to the material world, thus allowing commanders and their staffs to give meaning to and gain understanding of the events and conditions in which they make decisions and conduct operations. Chapter 3 discusses information. a) Data and information from all echelons of command and shared among all users generate the common operational picture. By applying judgment to the common operational picture, the commander can achieve SA, from which he begins the 20 P a g e

21 decisionmaking process. The commander directs to implement his decision by disseminating execution information, typically as orders and plans. He receives feedback from subordinates and supporting forces in the process. This information flow creates a reciprocal influence between the commander and subordinate forces. b) One important piece of information for a commander in multinational operations is whether his subordinates understand his intent. 1f the commander is assured that his subordinates understand his intent, he may require less detailed information from them. 1f the subordinates do not understand his intent, his information requirements must be more intensive and he will have to have a higher degree of participation in the C2 process. 2. Communication. Communication conveys information from one person or place to another. Communication allows the organization to disseminate and share information from one person, element, or place to another. It links information to decisions and decisions to action. No decision in combat can be executed without dear communication to the commander s subordinates. Communication among the parts of an organization supports their coordinated action. a) How the commander communicates contributes to or detracts from leading. Through it commanders exercise immediate, personal, and positive control over their forces. A major purpose of communication lies in sharing images, particularly the commander s intent. b) Communication has an importance far beyond exchanging information. Effective communication strengthens bonds within an organization; it builds trust, co operation, cohesion, and mutual understanding. 3. Structure. Structure is a defined organization establishing relationships among its elements - or process establishing relationships among activities. This structure or organization is both internal (HQ structure - CPs) and external (States of command) among subordinate forces. a) In military terms, this relationship is between the commander and his staff and subordinate forces. (Command support discussed in Chapter 3 is the structure of C2.) b) Structure also determines interactions among the elements of the organization, whether units or individual people. The effectiveness of these interactions affect the collection, dissemination, and processing of information. Para Principles of Command. The principles of command guide how the elements of command fulfil the fundamental responsibilities of command: mission accomplishment and people. Figure 2-2 graphically relates these responsibilities to the principles of command listed below. The principles of com mand are as follows: 21 1 P a g e

22 a. UnityofEffort: 1) Mission command reconciles the absolute requirement for unity of effort at all levels with decentralization of execution by emphasizing the commander s intent. Decentralization of execution is sustained by, and contributes to, timely and effective decisionmaking through subordinates nitiative. Mission command can only work in an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Mission command provides a common baseline for command not only during operations but also in peacetime activities. To employ mission command successfully during operations, the unit must understand, foster, and frequently practice the principles of command during training. The principles of command apply to all levels of command. 2) Unity of effort is coordination and co-operation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, even if the forces are not necessarily part of the same command structure. The commander s intent provides a focus for separate but coordinated efforts by subordinates and delegates decisionmaking to them. Designating priorities in operations also aids unity of effort, and t is part of understanding intent. 3) Understanding the commander s intent two echelons up further enhances unity of effort, while still providing the basis for decentralization of decisionmaking and execution in fluid operations. Subordinates aware of the commander s intent are far more likely to act with initiative, yet purposefully, in unexpected situations. In mission command, subordinates have an absolute responsibility to fulfil the commander s intent. (Duplication, but as stated in the Doctrine) 4) Understanding the commander s intent two echelons up further enhances unity of effort, while still providing the basis for decentralization of decisionmaking and execution in fluid operations. Subordinates aware of the commander s intent are far more likely to act with initiative, yet purposefully, in unexpected situations. In mission command, subordinates have an absolute responsibility to fulfil the commander s intent. 5) However, unity of command may not be possible in certain circumstances, such as NA5CRO, but commanders may still organize to achieve unity of effort. When unity of command is not possible, organizational decisions must achieve unity of effort through cooperation and coordination among all elements of the force - even if they are not part of the same command structure. b. Decentralized Execution. Decentralized execution allows and requires subordinates to use their initiative to make appropriate decisions to further their higher commander s intent. Decentralized execution allows subordinates with up-to-date information to make decisions, and reduces the amount of information passed up and down the chain of command. Generally, the more fluid the circumstances, the greater the need for decisions at lower levels. However, decentralized execution must be exercised routinely or it will rapidly disappear as subordinates become used to waiting for instructions from higher HQ: 1) Decentralization of execution, central to mission command, requires delegation of specific decisionmaking authority. This delegation may be explicit, as in the detailed tasks outlined in orders, or implicit, as in the implied tasks and decentralized execution found in mission orders. Delegation of authority also reduces the number of decisions made at the higher levels. It allows increased agility through reduced response time at lower levels of command. This 22 1 P a g e

23 delegation not only applies to subordinate commanders but also to the organization s staff members. 2) When delegating authority to a subordinate, a commander allocates sufficient resources to subordinates to accomplish their assigned mission. These resources should include information as well as forces, materiel, and time. The commander stili synchronizes the activities of his subordinates. c. Trust 1) Trust goes up and down the chain of command; like respect, it must be earned. Subordinates more willingly exercise the initiative required in mission command with trust. Likewise, commanders delegate greater authority to subordinates whom they trust to act within their intent. 2) Trust is based on personal qualities, including professional competence, personal example, and integrity. It starts with technical and tactical skills in military operations because those are the easiest to demonstrate. Often slowly gained, trust can be lost quickly. d. Mutual Understanding. Commanders can aid mutual understanding by using a demeanour and personal mannerisms that reinforce, or at least do not contradict, the spoken message. Units develop the ability to communicate nonverbally through familiarity and a shared philosophy and experiences. Officer professional development meetings, terrain walks, and professional discussions can lead to mutual understanding. SECTION II - ROLE OF THE COMMANDER Para General The commander creates and maintains an effective command climate through leadership actions. They rest on values, attributes, and skills he possesses and develops. Part of the command climate must be the commander s style and philosophy of command. The organization should become accustomed to how he commands. Para Foster a Positive Command Climate Successful mission command depends on a command climate that encourages subordinate commanders at all evels to think independently and to take the initiative. Subordinates also expect to know the reason why. A commander explains his intentions to his subordinates and fosters a sense of involvement in decisionmaking and shared commitment. The following factors help create a positive command climate: 23 1 P a g e

24 a. Accept Risk and Errors 1) The commander inculcates acceptance of risk within his command in two ways. First, leading by example, he makes decisions in training and on operations that accept risk. At such times, he informs his subordinates either at the time of the decision (if time permits) or in the after-action review (AAR) what risk he accepted and why. He ensures that risk management does not become risk aversion, particularly for tactical risk. Second, he accepts risk in his subordinates decisions. In training he might allow them to take the consequences of a too-risky tactical decision, instructing them afterwards on a more appropriate level of tactical risk. 2) Accepting risk goes hand in hand with accepting errors. The commander trams subordinates to act within his intent when they exercise initiative. Likewise, commanders give subordinates latitude to make mistakes and learn. 3) There are two basic types of errors: errors of corn mission and errors of omission. Errors of commission occur when a person attempts to act toward some end, such as accomplishing a mission. Errors of ornission occur because a person failed to act, often because he did not want to accept the risk associated with that action. Subordinates willing to risk errors of corn mission show initiative, and they stand a greater chance of seizing initiative or opportunity. Subordinates committing errors of omission - failing to act - would not be as apt to seize initiative or opportunity. For this reason, commanders prefer errors of commission to errors of omission in fostering mission command. b. Foster Trust and Mutual Understanding 1) Trust and mutual understanding are critical to the tempo of decentralized operations. The commander fosters this trust and mutual understanding by word and deed. Such trust and rnutual understanding contribute to co-operation among multinational forces. 2) Commanders educate and train themselves, their staffs, and their subordinates in the common doctrine to establish mutual understanding. A common approach to C2, based on a professional understanding of doctrine including that of a common terminology - assists mutual understanding and is fundamental to mission command. Para 0210 Train Subordinates in Command and Control Training subordinates in C2 includes command prior to operations, promoting leadership qualities, and assessing subordinates. While training subordinates is normally a national responsibility, a NATO commander may train staff and commanders to ensure that they understand his practice of NATO doctrine. a. Prior to Operations. Before operations, a NATO commander directs, trams, and prepares as much of his command as has been made available to the extent permitted by the states of command of his forces. Mission command requires an understanding of operations two levels up; training subordinates reflects this requirement. NATO commanders coordinate with national commanders in this training P a g e

25 1) Foster an Understanding of War. Professional development includes the critical study of campaigns and battles, and the study of human behavlour, to learn relevant lessons for the future. While there is a scientific side to the war, the science of war is an applied science rather than a theoretical one. Professional development activities inciude: a) Participating in tactical exercises without troops. b) Participating in simulations of tactical problems. c) Developing new technical skills. d) Reading and discussing current military doctrine and unsolved problems. 2) Develop Staff Procedures. Commanders develop their own TTP for those areas where doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance and adapting doctrinal TTP to their command s situation. These procedures and interactions, which NATO formation standing operating procedures (SOPs) capture, incorporate the elements of mission command. Commanders train their units to use these SOPs to govern routine actions. Training subordinates in this way develops a command where simple intent or concept statements by the commander lead to swift, coordinated, effective actions. Such training can develop the organization s command principles. 3) Train Staffs and Subordinates. Commanders can train subordinates to operate in the absence of detailed orders. With information available to all levels of the command and increasing dispersion on the battlefield, the commander trams subordinates to counter unexpected enemy actions and to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. a) Training provides the means to practice, develop, and validate - within constraints - the practical application of a common doctrine. It also provides the only peacetime basis for first-hand experience to commanders and staffs in exercising C2. Commanders can use training experiences to create experience and trust within their organizations, fostering teamwork and the confidence of the force. b) NATO commanders train themselves, their staffs, and subordinates in making decisions and developing plans. This training includes: Decisionmaking using the decisionmaking process (see Chapter 4) under both unrestricted and time-constrained conditions. ii. iii. iv. Emphasis on seizing fleeting opportunities, reacting to unforeseen enemy actions, and quickly modifying plans when conditions change. Producing a product that is timely (beats the enemy s decision cycle) and effective yet not perfect. Maintaining proficiency in using procedures flexibly through drilis. Drills are strict, methodical training, or exercising, of procedures. The quicker the unit executes these drills, the better the force develops and maintains tempo P a g e

26 Section III Concept of Command and Control Para General The preferred C2 concept for allied forces is mission command. However, in practice no commander relies on purely detailed or purely mission command techniques. The degree to which he ncorporates some detafled command techniques depends on a variety of factors such as: a) The nature of the action or task. b) The qualities of his staff and subordinate commanders. c) The nature and capabilities of the enemy. Para Mission Command Elements. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Successful mission command rests on the following four elements: a) Commander s intent b) Subordinates initiative c) Mission orders d) Resource allocation. 1. Commander s Intent. The commander s intent is a dear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and to the desired end state. It is his personal expression of what should be achieved. All subordinate commanders must clearly understand the commander s intent for adequate preparation of their own orders. Its focus is on the force as a whole. The commander formulates and communicates his intent to provide unity of effort during operations. 2. Subordinates Initiative. Subordinates initiative is the assumption of responsibility to decide and initiate independent actions within the commander s intent when their commander s concept of operations or order no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to accomplishment of the commander s intent presents itself. Subordinates decide how to achieve their missions within delegated freedom of action and exercise initiative during execution, but they have an absolute responsibility to fulfil the commander s intent. 3. Mission Orders. Mission orders are a technique for completing combat orders to allow subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions that leave the how of mission accomplishment to the subordinate. Mission orders state the: a. Task organization. b. Commander s intent and concept of operation. c. Unit mission. d. Subordinates mission. e. Minimum essential coordinating instructions P a g e

27 The mission assigned to a subordinate must inciude all the normal elements (who, what, when, where, and why) with particular emphasis on the purpose (why) in order to guide, along with the commander s intent, the subordinate s initiative. A properly written mission statement becomes especially important in mission command. While commanders supervise subordinates execution of operations, they only intervene to direct operations to coordinate, restore operations, or exploit success. 4. Resource AHocation. Commanders allocate appropriate resources to subordinates to accomplish their missions. In mission command, commanders consider information a resource - comparable to more traditional ones, such as forces and means - and share it through all levels of command. Para 0114 Exercisîng Mission Command 1. Mission command concentrates on the objective of an operation and not on how to achieve that objective. This C2 concept emphasizes timeliness of decisionmaking, understanding the superior commander s intent, and a dear responsibility of subordinates to fulfil that intent. With the commander s intent to provide unity of effort, mission command relies on decentralized execution and initiative by subordinates. The fundamental basis of mission command is creating trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates. Mission command applies to all operations, including crisis response operations (CROs). 2. Orders and plans in mission command are as brief and simple as possible, relying on subordinates to coordinate and the human capacity to understand. By decentralizing decisionmaking authority, mission command increases tempo and improves the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. 3. Given the characteristics of CR0, mission command retains applicability. Achieving unity of effort becomes even more complex yet remains desirable, and the commander s intent becomes key. Circumstances of remote locations or rapidly arising situations can force commanders to conduct decentralized operations, and subordinates must use their disciplined initiative to solve problems as they arise. 2.6 AJP-5 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR OPERA TIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING; (EXTRACT) Para Exploit Opportunity. A JFC should exploit opportunities to seize and retain the initiative (the ability to dictate the course of events), or regain it, in order to achieve his mission. Making the most of such opportunities, whether they be created through planning or arise through chance, relies upon a JFC s ability not only to identify them in advance but to be able to generate the means to exploit 27 1 P a g e

28 them. More broadly, it involves not only identifying or creating opportunities, but having or obtaining the means and will to exploit them and achieve a higher tempo relative to the adversary. a) The use of manoeuvre and offensive action is fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative, which is the key to being able to exploit opportunities. Mission command allows component commanders (CC5) or subordinates to exploit opportunities that are presented, providing they are within the overall intent. b) The ability to do this successfully relies on continuous planning, including accurate risk analysis and management. Both subjective and objective risk analysis is required and intuition has a role to play. Para Basics for Command Involvement 1) Apply intuition and experience when making decisions on the basic operational design and strive for simple patterns. 2) Grant freedom of action to subordinate commanders by enforcing mission command as a fundamental principle of C2 in all fields of planning. 3) Accept and take calculated risks. Provide elements of surprise in the operational design. Be unpredictable by avoiding routine in planning for the use of capabilities. 4) Consider that the operational plan reflects more than knowledge of doctrine and manuals. The application of creative imagination by commanders and their staffs, supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience, is required to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. 5) Be agile. Agility is the ability to think and act faster than opposing actors. Para~ 0363 Commander s Analysis of the Refined Intent. A commander s analysis of the refined COA and the draft refined intent prepared by his staff should provide the critical link between the mission analysis, the commander s intent and his selected COA. It summarises the main conciusions that the JFC has drawn from his own mission analysis (operational objectives, factors, assumptions, requirements, limitations on his freedom of action, and risks), COG analysis, and the operational design (LoOs, decisive points / DCs, and main effort). The JFC established his initial intent, based on his mission analysis and his operational design, to guide COA development. Since then, he has continued to refine his operational estimate leading to his COA decision. The ]FC must now refine his intent accordingly to ensure absolute clarity as to the critical aspects of the operation including: a) The purpose of the operation, its main phases and activities. b) The main effort P a g e

29 c) How the entire campaign or major operation will achieve the operational-level objectives and contribute to the accomplishment of military strategic objectives. d) Acceptance of risk. This will inform and launch the CONOPS and OPLAN development. The commander s intent will serve as a guide that allows mission command and initiative by subordinates. 2.7 ALLIED COMMAND OPERA TIONS COMPREHENSIVE OPERA TIONS PLANNING DIRECTIVE COPD INTERIM V2.0 (04 OCTOBER 2013); (EXTRACT) 1-6, para. b. (2) Mission Command. Through mission command, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise, and exploit favourable opportunities. Mission command encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision making. Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide sufficient forces, resources and authority required to accomplish their assigned tasks. 1-9, para. b. (1) An objective is defined as [a] clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved. In NATO, in the spirit of mission command, objectives are assigned to a commander by the next higher level (i.e. operational objectives assigned to the operational commander by SACEUR). 3-29, para. b. (1) Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders. Based on the MSO5 assigned by the NAC, SACEUR s mission and the strategic framework of the selected MRO, and in the spirit of mission command79, SACEUR will assign missions8 (including operational objectives) to subordinate commanders as a basis for their planning. The missions/operational objectives contained in the SPD will ideally be discussed between the RDG and JOPG prior to the issue of the SPD. At this stage the operational commander will not have yet conducted a mission analysis. Therefore, the operational commander may seek from SACEUR amendments to the assigned mission/objectives, if required, following its completion. Footnote reference: For explanation of mission command see AJPO1D. A mission is a dear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be achieved, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted. It includes, by its nature, the authority and freedom of action required to achieve the assigned objectives while clearly articulating the role of the subordinate command in contributing to the higher command s mission 29 1 P a g e

30 accomplishment as envisioned in the higher Commander s Intent. For every command there is only one mission. 4-26, para. k. (2) Analyse Provisional COM JHQ Mission, inciuding Operational Objectïves. The purpose of this analysis is to consolidate what is known about the assigned mission, and then to determine the actor systems to be influenced. As a part of the Mission Command approach, the mission63 and its operational objectives are assigned by a higher commander. SACEUR will have provided a provisional64 COM JHQ mission, inciuding operational objectives, in the SPD, which ultimately provides the focus for the employment of military force to influence strategic and operational COG5 and achieve changes required in the operational behaviour or capabilities of specific actor systems. The JOPG analyses the provisional mission and its operational objectives to draw out the implied conditions to be established and/or sustained. The JOPG can develop criteria for success65 for each operational objective, especially if their wording is vague, to assist determining the conditions to be established. These criteria for success may also assist in determining if wording of the operational objectives can be improved for clarity. Footnote reference: 63 A mission is a dear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what ito be achieved, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted. It includes, by its nature, the authority and freedom of action required to achieve the assigned objectives while clearly articulating the role of the subordinate command in contributing to the higher command s mission accomplishment as envisioned in the higher commander s intent. For every command there is only one mission. (Duplication of footnote 80) 64 At this point, the COM JHQ mission and its operational objectives are still provisional; COM JHQ may approach SACEUR to seek their amendment if deemed required following mission analysis. As such, the JHQ must continually consider the assigned mission and operational objectives during their analysis through the mission analysis and develop, if warranted, recommendations for change. 65 Criteria for success provide tests for determining when the objective has been achieved. They can be useful to the operations assessment process and decisions related to transition and termination of operations. At the strategic level, criteria for success may be used to describe conditions that must exist for the NATO end state or a military strategic objective to be achieved including any conditions that cannot exist. Their use at the operational level is not mandated; depending on the clarity of the wording of operational objectives, DCs and effects, they may not be needed in the operational design. They may however be a useful mechanism at this point to assist the JOPG to determine the conditions to be established and to evaluate if the wording of the provisional operational objectives needs amendment P a g e

31 4-35, para. h. (2) Provisional missions, including objectives, for subordinate commands. These must be developed in conjunction with subordinate commanders; their development is a collaborative process but led by the JOPG and the Commander, and should reflect the spirit of Mission Command to allow components the freedom of action to determine the how at the component level. AnnexA, 2b In NATO, with mission command, military objectives are normally inciuded in the mission statement of the responsible command (Le. strategic-military level or operational level) given by the level above (Le. North Atlantic Council (NAC) for the strategic-military level (Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR))). B-4-2 Footnote Reference ~ The MC133/4 illustrative NID format includes a mission statement described as a precise statement of NATO s overall mission to achieve its end state. In the spirit of mission command, the NAC should give SACEUR a mission; draft SACEUR mission statements will have been submitted with the MRO5. 1f the NAC does not include a SACEUR mission statement, the NATO mission should be placed in the Situation paragraph and a SACEUR mission statement developed here under Mission, which will be later refined as necessary by the NAC and approved with the approval of the strategic CONOPS P a g e

32 3. OBSERVATIONS: In the main part of this report, mission command is cited from what we have defined as the most relevant doctrines and publications in NATO. Therefore, this part of the report gives a good and consolidated overview on NATO s current guidelines in regards to mission command. The main reasons for citing specific doctrine and publications in this analysis on the utilization of mission command in NATO are as follows: Primarily to serve as a reference document and consolidated list of doctrines and publications that describe the term mission command, used to capture the possible shortfalls and challenges in the utilization of mission command in NATO. Secondarily, this information provides the foundation of our analysis so far, and if a future assessment of mission command is requested, this overview serve as the baseline for the development of assessment objectives. Note: some of these doctrines are currently under review in NATO. When It comes to content, observations in the Joint, Land, Maritime and Air doctrines indicate the following: a) Mission command is addressed in most of the relevant NATO doctrines, though not defined in NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06 edition The most structured and detailed explanation on how mission command should be applied in NATO is found in AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. Further elaboration can be found in ATP Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. AJP-1 (D) Allied Joint Publication has paragraphs that explain how mission command should be understood and applied in NATO. The content is not well structured, and therefore not easily understood. The Maritime Doctrine, AJP-3.1 Allied Joint Publication Maritime Operations contains limited information in regards to mission command. however, the content is well structured and understandable, but mission command is not explained in details to how it should be applied in maritime warfare. The Air Doctrine, AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Publication Air Operations does not contain the term mission command at all. No observations or references to mission command have been found in SHAPE s Allied Force Standards or the BI-SC Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations. Joint Warfare Centre and SHAPE are responsible for the certification of the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure. Both have been contacted, but we have not identified any SME or structural approach to how or if mission command has a focus in the certification process of NATO P a g e