Vice Admiral Masanori Yoshida (Ret.) 1

Transcription

1 Japanese Perspectives on the South China Sea and the East China Sea Vice Admiral Masanori Yoshida (Ret.) 1

2 Importance of Sea-borne Transportation for Japan Percentage of trade on SLOC to the entire trade: 99.6% legend 80% 65% Export Dependence Export dependence to local area U.S. Crude Oil 99.6% Wheat 86.0% Middle East 86.7% 51.5% LPG 91.0% 98.7% 72.0% Beef 99.6% LNG 96.4% Corn 100% South-East Asia 50.9% 50.6% Oceania エネルギー白書 2014 エネルギー庁 海運統計要覧 2014 日本船舶協会 ( 社 ) 農林水産物輸出入概況 2013 年

3 Significance of the Sea for Prosperity Trade Value of Total World Trade in SCS LNG More than 1/3 Crude Oil More than 1/2 Korean Peninsula Sea of Japan Pacific Ocean East China Sea Number of Ship and Vessels at Chokepoint South China Sea Indian Ocean Sea Lane of Communication Suez Canal Singapore Strait Strait of Malacca Panama Canal Source: MOT, Jan 2015

4 Threats to Japan s Sea Lanes South China Sea

5 5 UNCLASS Location of the Main JMSDF Bases Self Defense Fleet HQ Regional District HQ Air Base for MPAs Air Base for Helos Maizuru District Ominato District Sasebo District Yokosuka District Naha (Okinawa) Kure District Iwo-to

6 Geopolitical Characteristics of Sasebo District PLAN Tokai fleet headquarters (Ninbo) Sasebo District Sasebo Senkaku 480km Okinawa 6

7 Japan s Senkaku Islands in ECS UNCLASS Strategic Importance for China 1895 Integrated into Japan s territory (No claim by China) Access Denial against the U.S. Maintain access to Pacific Ocean Restriction in Okinawa s operation Pressure for unification of Taiwan Reported oil resources on the seabed around Senkaku China started to claim her sovereignty of Senkaku China declared her Territorial Sea Law, included Senkaku Suddenly announced the establishment of ECS ADIZ 7

8 Invasion into Japan s Territorial Waters around Senkaku Transfer of the ownership of the SK to GOJ Collision incident by Chinese illegal fishing boat against JCG Patrol Ship Period of my command (BLUE: within Contiguous Zone RED: within Territorial Waters) Source : Japan Coast Guard HP

9 Activity of the Chinese government vessels in the outskirts of the Senkaku Islands In a year after nationalization (Japanese government acquisition of the Senkaku Islands ) Intruded into Japan s territorial waters ship: 216 boats Contiguous-zone cruise ship: 1055 boats 9 9 月 14 日 ( 金 ) 付の朝日新聞夕刊 1 面

10 Defense Minister Onodera FC Radar Radiated by PLAN The View of the Japanese Government February 5, 2013 Emergency press briefing by the Minister of Defense. - PLAN vessel radiated fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer on January 30 in the East 参考 JIANGWEI ー Ⅱ 級 FF China Sea. - Radiated fire-control radar is unusual. - When it makes a mistake by one step, it is a very dangerous situation. JIANGWEI-Ⅱ class FF 522 FC Radar 10

11 East China Sea ADIZ Senkaku Islands Announcement of the Establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in ECS in November 2013.

12 Our Situation Awareness and Reaction at that Time Chinese Short Term, Tactical Goal A series of incidents around the Senkaku Islands aims to appeal the issue of right of possession to international society by suggesting escalation Response of JCG and JMSDF(on the scene) Without escalating military tension into military conflict or war, make them understand Japanese will maintain presence wherever they go 12

13 Lessons Learned from the East China Sea in those Days Importance of maintaining and sharing ISR and COP (Mutual understanding of the situation) To anticipate China s intent and future action Respond to China's unique war ( Hybrid Warfare ) To suppress flare up of domestic nationalism in each country Importance of presence (Balance of power and stabilization of crisis) JCG (front) JMSDF (rear-guard) 7 Th Fleet (sub rear-guard) Importance of collaboration between politics and diplomacy (Prevention of Escalation) Application of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Provide opportunities for diplomacy 13

14 Lessons Learned from the East China Sea from other Days China-U.S. Power Conflict in Asia-Pacific Region What is Chinese Strategy? New Great Powers In the principally important China- U.S. relationship, disparity is decreased and China gains advantage. While avoiding direct confrontation, China pressures neighboring countries Changing Status-Quo by Power Non-militarized coercion Maritime-style People s War What is U.S. Strategy? Ground Strategy ex. Containment of Soviet no longer exists. Re-balancing Policy Strategy ASB, Offshore control operational concept, Military strategy Ground strategy Regional strategy Now may be Wait-and-see approach? 14

15 Beijing View (My Analysis) Power shift occurs only between the U.S. and China. China s relations with its neighbors is determined within the framework of China-U.S. relationship. Japan is no longer a great power, it is one of China s many neighbors. Assertively project power until China s national interests (that have been infringed by neighboring countries including Japan) are regained. 15

16 Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea China Philippines Vietnam Malaysia Philippines Brunei Spratly Islands Taiwan China Vietnam Malaysia Philippines Brunei

17 History of China s Occupation of Islands in SCS

18 China s Reclamation of Reefs in SCS Fiery Cross Reef Subi Reef ( DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2016 )

19 Case of USN/T-AGOS/IMPECCABLE, 2009 in SCS On the deck of Chinese Fishery boat, there is a man with a long pole who is attempting to hook IMPECCABLE s cable array in the water. Two Chinese Fishery boats are disturbing IMPECCABLE s course. IMPECCABLE is spraying water at Chinese Fishery boat approaching to her. Chinese officer on Public Vessel is on the scene and observes IMPECCABLE and their Fishery boats.

20 Differences between SCS and ECS Strategic importance of South China Sea Lack of ISR capability of the states in the region Lack of balancing power Complexity of politics and diplomacy 20

21 Measures for Stabilization in the SCS Capacity building for the states in the region (with a focus on Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia) Low-intensity presence (Joint training exercises with the surrounding states, P.P., HA/DR multilateral training) High-intensity presence (Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training, joint warning and surveillance, expansion of Japanese and U.S.-Japan ISR areas) Enactment of multi-lateral accident response plans (GSOMIA, ACSA members) 21

22 Regional Non-Traditional Challenges

23 What Are the Challenges? Challenges: Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear/Missiles Threats Changing the Status Quo by Force Hybrid Warfare in Gray Zone Situation Non-Traditional Threats

24 Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 1 Providing High Level of Vigilance Maintaining 24/7 High Density ISR Posture Preserving Credible Deterrence against Aggression Sending Collective Messages of Like-Minded Partners

25 Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 2 Bilateral/Multilateral Exercises with Regional Navies Enhancing Interoperability Sending Messages of Strong Will to Preserve Rules Based Order

26 Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 3 Capacity Building Support & Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Providing Reassurance to the Regional Partners Contributing to Prevention of Changing Status Quo by Force

27 Way Ahead: Maritime Security Web of Partners IONS WPNS