Collection of Recent USASOC Academic Research Topics

Transcription

1 Collection of Recent USASOC Academic Research Topics Today, we open up our ideas and put our thinking to paper to strengthen our force and support our partners as we encounter these complex gray zone challenges in order to preserve liberty against forces that rule through subjugation and intolerance. - Major General James B. Linder, Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence In accordance with continuing efforts to synchronize ARSOF student research efforts and USASOC research priorities, this document incorporates recent USASOC academic research topics for ARSOF students. Consider these Command research priorities as you manage your research and writing endeavors. The following sites provide research information useful to the Command and ARSOF students. ARSOF Graduate Students Research Papers Database (USSOCOM/USASOC network sharepoint access): SOF Research Topics and How to Guides (SWCS public site): mil/swcs/sweg/researchpapers.htm The Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne) (SWEG (A)) of the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence is ready and willing to assist by providing research and writing assistance; linking ARSOF students with research mentors within the Command; and fielding research RFIs from ARSOF students and the Command. For more information, contact SWEG (A) POC Clare Bradley, ARSOF Academic Research Program Manager, clare.m.bradley.ctr@socom.mil. Source: USASOC/SOCoE Research Topics Submitted for JSOU Special Operations Research Topics Workshop for JSOU AY 2018 Publication (Jan 2017) Research topics submitted by USASOC/SOCoE during the JSOU Special Operations Research Topics Workshop in Jan Most of these topics will be included in the upcoming JSOU Special Operations Research Topics AY 2018 publication to be released during summer USASOC #1: The Indigenous Approach; Measuring the Effectiveness of SOF Operations. The Indigenous Approach is one of the value propositions SOF provides to the Nation and can be characterized as a lens through which to view challenges to regional stability as problems to be solved by empowered populations living in the region. It includes such core activities as Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare that build and/or enhance the capabilities of foreign military, security, and/or resistance forces. Through an indigenous approach, SOF live among, train, advise, assist, and fight alongside people of foreign cultures, achieving effects with and through partner forces. This approach provides a low cost, small footprint option to address security 1

2 challenges of 21st century in an era characterized by constrained resources and public sentiment adverse to large scale military intervention. That said, the value of SOF as a strategic option is not widely understood amongst senior leaders and decision makers. How can or should we measure the success (or failure) of SOF campaigns when operations in the human domain do not easily lend themselves to quantifiable analysis? What metrics (measure of effectiveness) are relevant for operations in the human domain? Can observing and collecting qualitative data from various social media domains and platforms be converted into relevant, quantifiable data for measuring the effectiveness of SOF operations? Building partner military, security, and police forces can have a deterrent effect on those state and non-state actors possessing nefarious intent to US partners, allies, and other security interests. How we prove SOF causation, in other words, prove a negative? USASOC #2: Developing Understanding and Wielding Influence Thru Expanded Maneuver. Developing understanding and wielding influence are an essential component of the value SOF provides the Nation. The SOF network of personnel, assets, and formations represent means by which to obtain early understanding of trends, emerging transregional threats, and opportunities. Employment of the SOF network also provides capabilities needed to shape and influence outcomes. In an era characterized by an increasing interconnected and complex environment highlighting the relevance of the population-centric aspects of competition and conflict, SOF must operate as part of a whole of government approach to mitigate our Nation s challenges. Therefore, the Army and Joint Force writ large require an expanded concept of maneuver that considers both physical and cognitive maneuver in and across multiple domains to move both force and ideas in time and space in pursuit of physical and cognitive objectives across the entire operational continuum, but particularly so in security environments below the threshold of Major Combat Operations (MCO) where state & non-state actors seek to gain an asymmetric advantage by operating in the seam between peace and war. How can SOF, as the premiere practitioners of cognitive maneuver, expand the Army s current frame for Unified Land Operations beyond physical to consider outmaneuvering adversaries both physically and cognitively to ensure the Joint Force is better positioned to maintain a competitive edge over our Nation's adversaries? How can SOF, as part of the joint force, better prepare and shape the contemporary and future operating environment for success through the conduct of Cognitive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)? Conceptually, Cognitive IPB could be considered a synthesizing process, harnesses the methodologies and processes from within the defense enterprise as well as from entities outside of the enterprise to generate a keen sensing of the human environment. This requires a broad look at adversaries, threats, and populations writ large, with an eye toward challenges and opportunities. Such a processes would elevate the scope of understanding to the 2

3 operational level where human aspects become significant elements of operational design and campaigning, vital to success in the 21st Century security environment. USASOC #3: Precision Targeting Operations; C4ISR and C-UAS. Precision targeting operations is one of the value propositions SOF provides to the Nation and involves Direct Action and counter-network activities enabled by SOF unique intelligence, technology, and targeting capabilities and processes. Precision targeting can be employed against uniquely difficult target sets that require long range movement and careful application of force. They can be employed to buy time and space for other operations to gain traction, as seen in counterinsurgency efforts. Precision targeting operations also collapse trans-regional threat networks through deliberate targeting of critical enemy nodes, as seen in counterterrorism campaigns. C4ISR. How does SOF achieve flexible, networked C2 and accurate COP that enable nodes in global and regional networks providing for understanding of friendly opportunities and adversarial actions, threats, indicators and warnings through advanced technologies and processes to rapidly synthesize and disseminate relevant tactical and operational information? Counter-UAS. In an era characterized by the proliferation of technology, in particular the adversary s use of Unmanned Arial Systems, what capabilities and/or technologies exist that can mitigate the intelligence and strike capabilities these platforms present to SOF personnel and missions? USASOC #4: Contemporary Unconventional Warfare. The proliferation of A2AD capabilities within the contemporary and future operating environment poses an extremely high risk to SOF personnel and missions; and in some cases, has the potential to render areas completely inaccessible. This is particular relevant in the conduct of Unconventional Warfare (UW) which requires US Forces to operate for extended periods of time in denied or contested environment. How could SOF potentially leverage existing technology within the cyber domain to remotely train, advise, and assist resistance forces as part of a joint UW campaign? What risks does this both mitigate and present from a force protection and/or OPSEC perspective? How are Violent Extremist Organizations utilizing the internet to organixe and execute operations? Where have their efforts succeeded and failed? How could Offset UW where US Forces are operating from a safe haven serve to mitigate risk? USASOC #5: Operational Utilization of Artificial Intelligence. There have been numerous advances in Artificial intelligence over the past several years, and though the potential exists for military adaptation that could dramatically affect the operational and strategic effectiveness of US SOF (and the Joint Force), very few if any AI capabilities have been fielded for operational use. What various artificial intelligence capabilities exist? What is the potential military utility? 3

4 Which AI capabilities could be adapted for immediate use and which warrant further investment? What are the pros and cons of fully autonomous systems vice those requiring a man in the loop? How is the private sector utilizing these capabilities? It is implied that their use creates efficiencies sufficient to justify their cost in a commercial enterprise. Given this, what efficiencies could be expected from employment of AI? Could this be the next evolutionary change, much in the same way robotics has changed the manufacturing process? USASOC #6: Alternative Campaign Planning Construct. In an era of persistent competition and conflict characterized by security challenges below the threshold of major armed intervention or war, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) has proved to be an inadequate phasing construct for campaign and operations planning. Currently, the JS J-7 with input from the services is developing a Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) with an associated military problem statement is: How will the Joint Force design, plan, and execute joint campaigns in conjunction with inter-organizational and multinational partners to overcome the emerging complexities of the future operating environment? This recognizes that a Phase 3 MCO focus does not address the majority of Irregular Warfare (IW) scenarios in the 21st Century Security environment. Question: How does SOF, as part of the joint force, operationalize the JCIC to design campaigns which do not fit within the traditional campaign planning paradigm? SOCoE/NDU CISA Project Gray Russian Engagement in the Gray Zone Symposium Topic 1: Identity and Narratives Shaping Interstate Relations in the Gray Zone. Modifying Upon USSOCOM 2017 Research Topics D5: Unraveling Identity: Assessing Multiple Levels of Personal and Communal Identity and the Overlaps Within Them. Evaluate the meaning and definition of identity as it relates to challenges within the operating environment. How can the United States operationalize identity? Within the human domain, what are the boundaries of influence operations, social norms, cognition, and narratives? Consider the strengths/weaknesses for beliefs and what makes them that way. What kinds of internal/external actors have the potential to shape beliefs and motivate actions? What are the costs/benefits for USSOCOM in challenges that involve identity? Evaluate strategies and tactical/operational mechanisms available currently and those that would need to be developed. How does the geopolitical identity of a state affect the U.S. Government s (USG) understanding of the human terrain? o Discuss potential concerns associated with assigning identity to groups or individuals. Consider problems that could arise from those labels. o How does Russia s geopolitical identity affect the USG s understanding of Russian human terrain and of U.S. to Russia relations? 4

5 o How does Russian subversion in the 21st Century differ from Soviet Cold War subversion campaigns? o How did the Soviet subversion in s affect American identity? What are parallels to those actions today? How should the USG manage and prioritize research and studies on issues of identity to enhance understanding of military/security matters? o What sources or methods are required to study these questions? e.g., Historical records (U.S. or Russian), political polls, open source materials, memberships in ideological organizations. o What are the ethical considerations for these studies? Does the USG have an inherent need to: o Always looking for a "solution"? o Work with tangible factors; does the USG attempt to reduce intangibles to tangibles. If true, how does SOF counter this? o Seek a quick victory, and lack long-term presence? If so, how can SOF counter this? SOCoE/NDU CISA Project Gray Russian Engagement in the Gray Zone Symposium Topic 2: State-Society Relationships: How Domestic Politics Shape/are Shaped by International Relations in the Gray Zone. Consider the strategic implications of the interplay between domestic politics and international relations in the state-society relationship. Evaluate the economic, political, social, and additional external/internal factors that forge how states and their respective bureaucracies operate. As the U.S. Government (USG) seeks to influence these dynamics, what authorities or boundaries should be amended or created to support these activities more effectively? How does the USG gain international consensus on what the threat is? o How does the USG identify an international course of action? o Who is the next biggest threat? o What are the vulnerabilities? o What traits identify vulnerability? How does the USG become proactive vs. reactive in the Gray Zone? How does the USG develop a framework from which to identify Gray Zone challenges? Can the USG determine an algorithm to identify Gray Zone threats? Where are future Gray Zone threats likely to emerge? How does the USG identify potential Gray Zone threats? Is an actor s former superpower status relevant? Which geographical region is most vulnerable to Gray Zone threats? How does the USG combat Gray Zone threats in this region using DIMEFIL? Is DIMEFIL a useful framework to combat Gray Zone threats? How can the USG encourage domestic and international support, and possibly funding, for a unified regional strategy? How does the USG prioritize the threat and region? What regions were historically susceptible to Gray Zone activities? How and why were they susceptible? What ways did those regions attempt to mitigate their vulnerabilities to these types of activities? Compare and contrast successful and 5

6 unsuccessful mitigation efforts. What efforts could the USG adopt to assist regions in mitigating their historical susceptibilities to Gray Zone activities? Using Bulgaria as a case example: Could Bulgaria's economic and political ties with Russia lead to Bulgaria's exit from NATO or the EU? o How are Bulgaria s economy and politics interconnected with Russia? How has the financial crisis in Bulgaria increased Russian influence in Bulgaria? o How is Bulgaria s economy tied to the EU? How is Bulgaria s economy tied to the US? Are U.S. policymakers interested or willing to counter Russian influence in Eastern Europe? Which domestic policies or limitations prevent the USG from countering Russian influence in Eastern Europe? How can nationalism be leveraged throughout Eastern Europe to promote U.S. interests and counter Russian influence in the Gray Zone SOCoE/NDU CISA Project Gray Russian Engagement in the Gray Zone Symposium Topic 3: Perspectives on Time and Actors in the Gray Zone. Explore the nature of perspectives. How do perspectives endure or change over time? What is the role of history? How much can perspectives change and who can changes them? Within the Gray Zone, how do paradigms, policies, and practices shape whether an actor s perspective is considered status quo or revisionist? In what ways do vital or peripheral interests change an actor s perspectives? U.S. Domestic Considerations on Perspectives: o Can the United States operate effectively in the Gray Zone given existing domestic policies? o Are changes or modifications to U.S. domestic policies required to operate in the Gray Zone more effectively? E.g., Title 10 v Title 22 v Title 50 authorities. o Are domestic structural changes required to address Gray Zone challenges? E.g., Directorate of Political Warfare, National Irregular Warfare Center. United States Russia Relationship Perspectives: o Are U.S. Government (USG) policies impacting or preventing Russian Gray Zone activities? How? o Is the USG s goal to penalize Russian Gray Zone activities or to force Russian behavior modification and submission to international laws/norms? From Russia s perspective, is there a difference between penalization and modification? o Is the Gray Zone term helpful? Is Gray Zone another name for peace or international politics? o Are there policy connections that trace Gray Zone activities from the Cold War through today? 6

7 Source: USASOC Research Topics for Consideration by SAMS and CGSC Students for Research (Jul 2016) CAC CDR reached out to CG USASOC for research topics ISO SAMS for FY17. USASOC submitted these research topics in response. 1. Cognitive Maneuver for the Contemporary and Future Strategic Operating Environment. Central Idea: The changing character of conflict, contextualized as transregional, multidomain, multifunctional, forces us to rethink how the Joint Force looks at the operational environment. Global challenges such as the rise of radical terrorism, state aggression through subversion, territorial expansion through incremental land grabs, and the ability of highly empowered individuals to influence disparate populations through social technologies indicate an alternative nature to conflict that harnesses cognitive influences. Cognitive maneuver is the tactics of a campaign to shape the conditions of the global environment and influence actors' decision-making behaviors. We shape and influence to continually maintain positions of advantage, adapting to the changing nature and character of conflict. Maneuver is a principle of Joint operations that involves the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy" (Joint Publication 1-02, March 15, 2015). This implies the application of physical aspects to achieve desired cognitive outcome. It also implies a certain degree of understanding or expectation as to what the challenge is and against whom force should be directed. Combined arms organizations accomplish their mission by synchronizing the contributions of functions to execute these forms of maneuver. These actions apply force in physical domains air, sea, land, space - to achieve an advantage over an adversary. However, Cognitive Maneuver posits that the changing nature and character of conflict shifts the emphasis of maneuver to a strategic nexus between the land and human domains. Seeking advantages in the human domain necessarily demands an altogether different form of maneuver, one predicated on cognitive maneuver to shape environmental conditions and influence decision-making behaviors. Research Question: Given an evolving global operating environment where human domain-centric factors are increasingly the decisive features of today's challenges, how can the Joint SOF Force, contribute to TSOC and GCC efforts to create and execute strategies that incorporate cognitive campaigning? 2. Who Are the Intellectual Motivators of Insurgencies and Resistance Movements Today? Central Idea: In a hyper-connected, social-media enabled cognitive world, the positive perceptions, beliefs, trust and credibility that others (Nation-States, Non-State Actors, Sub-Groups, and yet known entities) hold of the United States will be the center of gravity in relation to our ability to conduct successful campaigns, operations and activities to advance U.S. interests. Social, Political, Informational and Ideological trends among State and Non-State actors for the relative superiority over the physical, cognitive, moral security and adequate governance of populations is increasing. Super- 7

8 Empowered / Hyper-Connected Individuals more than ever have the ability to provide an operational and organizational framework to achieve political change. Individuals or Groups historically or in the contemporary environment have provided the big idea to achieve political change. These Intellectual Motivators develop ideas and then propel them forward which in turn causes a state leader to resist those values or metanarrative. Research Are there current and / or emerging intellectual motivators of insurgencies and resistance movements that represent a challenge to U.S. interests. Are there non-traditional means to query the social media network to find those emerging Intellectual Motivators before they are highly visible to external audiences? Can we anticipate who the next generation of Intellectual Motivators using nontraditional indicators that are anticipatory and picking up on small details that are indistinguishable to current methods? 3. Comprehensive Deterrence: SOF and the Whole-of-Government Approach. Central Idea: Comprehensive Deterrence is a whole-of-government approach that retains the positional advantage of the U.S. by preventing an adversary s action through the existence of credible physical, cognitive and moral threats by raising the perceived benefit of action to an unacceptable risk level. Transregional aspects of competition and conflict require new planning models for comprehensive deterrence, new operational constructs, new ways of thinking, and a fully integrated partner network to rescale security challenges earlier in their trajectory (the gray zone) and at a much lower level of national effort. Research What are the changes are required - if any - to current deterrence thinking to better compete against state and non-state actors in the early 21 st Century security environment. What constitutes strategic power and strategic risk in a complex and hyper-connected world? How can these risks, opportunities, and threats be communicated across DoD and other departments in a common language to ensure mutual support? What is the role of SOF as part of a whole-of-government approach to mitigate threats earlier in their development and risk profile before they limit our ability to respond in a manner consistent with our National values? 4. Perceiving Gray Zone Indications. Central Idea: Traditional strategic indications predominantly focus on state adversaries capable of employing large-scale conventional forces and/or nuclear weapons, with conflict envisioned as occurring on the right side of the operational continuum. We must continue to see, assess, and understand risk for state and non-state capabilities on the right side of the operational continuum. The competition unfolding in the Gray Zone requires that we develop indicators and warning to assess, sort, form responses, and rescale security challenges much earlier in their development and risk profiles. Key themes are: Understanding the character and nature of conflict in the Gray Zone and USG actions within it will be critical in maintaining a competitive edge over our Nation s adversaries. 8

9 Strategic Indicators and Warnings is a Cold War construct that largely focuses on ballistic missile defense and high-end conflict on the right side of the operational continuum. Conflict in the early 21 st Century Security Environment will require a shift from primarily observing and assessing adversary physical capabilities to perceiving and assessing the physical, cognitive, and moral frames within the strategic operating environment. Critical to this effort will be how we think about more comprehensively about influence and how we visualize and describe maneuver in the Human Domain. The growing trans-regional implications of competition and conflict will require exploration of the trans-regional indications for state and non-state actors. Strategic indications for the Gray Zone will require a multi-disciplinary approach to better inform planning, risk, readiness and decision-making. Research What are the human domain indicators that inform comprehensive deterrence decisions and enable decision makers to prioritize force readiness to meet security challenges early, particularly in gray zone environments? How do we expand the strategic start point - well left of the current Joint Planning Construct - to broaden the range of strategic options for our National leaders? 5. Modern Political Warfare / Role of SOF in Political Warfare. Central Idea: Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as an example, the Marshall Plan), and white propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of friendly foreign elements, black psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. Economic globalization, nuclear stalemate, and U.S. dominance of traditional warfare (force projection, major combat operations) change the face of warfare for the foreseeable future. Nation states and non-state groups that possess the elements of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, and economics) are adapting to the environment and circumstances to develop and implement strategies and achieve objectives that would have previously been accomplished through traditional warfare. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela are executing formal strategies to combat U.S. strengths in order to gain geopolitical concessions, advantages, and advancements. These strategies can best be characterized as political warfare. Since George Kennan s State Department Planning staff defined political warfare in a 1948 memorandum, the United States is still grappling with elements and processes associated with political warfare and how to counter them when adapted by adversaries. Research How can the U.S. engage more effectively in political warfare? What changes will need to be made for the U.S. to conduct agile political warfare, and what will be SOF s role in this effort? 6. Broadening Considerations of Strategic Risk. Central Idea: Calculating strategic risk (positional advantage, strategic power, influence, governance, access, and cumulative effects) can help define how the U.S. competes for positional advantage in a disordered world, and - with it - determine what 9

10 strategic success / risk looks like. This includes ensuring sufficient strategic depth and options for an acceptable political / operational outcome for the U.S. and its international partners. SOF are an important part of this calculation, as they provide a critical operational capability within the human domain to expand considerations of strategic risk. Research Does the U.S. possess sufficient perspective, thinking, and models to consider risk in the current and emerging strategic environment? Does the current and future strategic environment represent a different context for existing threats, or does the U.S. face new threats altogether? Can USSOCOM more effectively develop concepts and conduct joint experimentation with JIIM partners to tackle emerging threats and opportunities? 7. Redefining the Win. Central Idea: Redefining the Win centers on proactive U.S. competition with State / Non-State Actors for the relative superiority over the physical, cognitive and moral security of key populations in the areas we choose to campaign. Theater Special Operations Commands, enabled by the SOF Network and the Landpower Network, conduct Special Warfare Campaigns to solve security challenges outright, or rescale these challenges to manageable levels. If a security challenge cannot be rescaled, the option for conventional major combat operations always exists. The Special Warfare Operational Approach assumes an earlier Strategic Start Point and envisions three conceptual operational lines effort to meet current and emerging National Security challenges. These are: (1) Expanded SOF Support to Joint Forcible Entry, (2) Unconventional Warfare, and (3) SOF Support to Political Warfare. An earlier Strategic Start Point requires new thinking about the traditional, military Phase 0 and most importantly for this effort, new thinking about Left of Phase 0 campaigns and operations to consider how we assess, sort, form and rescale security challenges to win early and preserve strategic depth and decision space for our National Leaders. The framework for this approach centers on a persistent SOF forward presence in and around the people with deep knowledge of the environment to generate decisive situational awareness to better inform the strategic start point for campaigns where the Win occurs at a much lower level of National effort. Research How does ARSOF, as part of the Joint SOF Force, help set conditions for an acceptable political outcome in the areas that matter to the United States. Is a win or success in the early 21 st Century security environment suitable defined as gaining and / or retain positional advantage in terms of operational time, geography, forces, relationships and ideas / perceptions to advance U.S. interests? 8. Cognitive Joint Force Entry. Central Idea: The ARSOF provides Cognitive Joint Force Entry capability to support Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and Joint Force Commanders (JFC) using information and influence activities to prepare the environment for follow-on actions. Cognitive Joint Force Entry is a proactive, Human Domain-centered strategy that synchronizes and employs all components of the global information environment to predispose populations of a foreign country or countries to favorably view U.S. activities or operations. It reflects campaigning to win in the shaping phase of an operation, and it 10

11 is a component to achieve persistent influence within the operating environment to create decisive influence. It achieves strategic depth, builds cognitive security, and it provides scalable options to achieve favorable outcomes. Research How will Army Special Operations Forces provide the United States with information and influence activities to gain greater strategic depth, provide enhanced security, and set favorable conditions for follow-on actions? What capabilities are needed to maintain a persistent, comprehensive understanding of the global information environment? What capacity must ARSOF establish to assess and analyze data to support Cognitive Joint Force Entry? Other Themes for Consideration: 9. Unaccompanied Advise and Assist Methodology. Case studies of efforts and why they were successful or unsuccessful. Lessons learned. Develop proposed framework for how to execute these activities. DOTMLPF approach. 10. Optimal Application of Special Operations in a 4+1 Competition / Threat Environment. Broaden visibility of the SOF portfolio of options to senior decision makers beyond CT. SOF strategic employment in efforts to address these challenges. 11. Revisit of C2 Expectation Management in a UW campaign. UW requires a different style of decentralized C2 compared to the common COIN experiences of the last decade. UW operations require us to reprogram CDR expectations of C2 reach down. CONOPs and micro-management via SATCOM are not reasonable expectations for true denied area UW operations. We need to address and capture this reality in some codified manner. 12. Optimizing the Effective Employment of SOF Through C2. SOF C2 construct that avoids redundancy in theater. Operationalizing the CONUS base to further optimize effective SOF employment. Mission Command (COMREL and intel/trans-regional CIP and COP). 11

12 Source: USASOC Research Topics in JSOU Special Operations Research Topics AY 2017 Publication (Jan 2016) Full version of JSOU Special Operations Research Topics AY 2017 publication available here: In addition, you will find the Keywords List for the JSOU AY 2017 publication completed by SWEG (A) that operates as an index to assist students in locating research topics with ease. A4. Strategic Indicators and Warnings in the Gray Zone. The United States and its allies need to recognize the indications and warnings of nascent threats far left of a problem (i.e., during peacetime steady state operations) and apply appropriate mitigation measures before they materialize into national or international crises. To address this topic, the following themes need to be considered: Gray zone activities largely take place in the human domain. There is a need to examine how maneuvering in the cognitive space is an important aspect of systematic influence on the left side of the operational continuum; Gray zones present nuanced security and governance challenges demanding proactive comprehensive deterrence approaches; Perceiving security challenges early requires a paradigm shift from passively observing the environment to actively engaging with the environment. SOF cannot wait for security challenges to become clear. They must interact with the security environment to perceive new patterns; and An iterative, multidisciplinary, multimodal approach to understanding indicators and warnings is fundamental to furthering understanding of how SOF maneuver in the cognitive space and better compete in the human domain. How can the future joint force and SOF develop human domain indicators and warnings that inform comprehensive deterrence decisions and enable decision makers to prioritize force readiness to meet security challenges early, particularly in gray zone environments? What political considerations policies, authorities, ally interests, etc. constrain, limit, or shape the ability to achieve left of bang solutions either broadly speaking or in a specific geography? Many of the crises dealt with originate from a fragility in a gray zone system. If fragile systems unravel when disrupted, how do SOF measure the fragility or robustness of a system (political, social, economic, and environmental)? Can historical case studies be used to help model these systems and their robustness in the face of crises? How do gray zone conflicts look based on SOF s doctrinal perspective, or does that matter? A6. Modern Political Warfare/Role of SOF in Political Warfare. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as an example, the Marshall Plan), and white propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of friendly foreign elements, black psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. Economic globalization, nuclear stalemate, and U.S. dominance of traditional warfare (force projection, major combat operations) change the face of warfare for the 12

13 foreseeable future. Nation states and non-state groups that possess the elements of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, and economics) are adapting to the environment and circumstances to develop and implement strategies and achieve objectives that would have previously been accomplished through traditional warfare. Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela are executing formal strategies to combat U.S. strengths in order to gain geopolitical concessions, advantages, and advancements. These strategies can best be characterized as political warfare. Since George Kennan s State Department Planning staff defined political warfare in a 1948 memorandum, the United States is still grappling with elements and processes associated with political warfare and how to counter them when adapted by adversaries. How can the U.S. engage more effectively in political warfare? What changes will need to be made for the U.S. to conduct agile political warfare, and what will be the SOF role? How do SOF minimize unintended consequences of UW, such as empowering possible future adversaries? A9. Comprehensive Deterrence: SOF and the Whole-of-Government Approach. Comprehensive Deterrence is a whole-of-government approach that retains the positional advantage of the U.S. by preventing an adversary s action through the existence of credible physical, cognitive and moral threats by raising the perceived benefit of action to an unacceptable risk level. Transregional aspects of competition and conflict require new planning models for comprehensive deterrence, new operational constructs, new ways of thinking, and a fully integrated partner network to rescale security challenges earlier in their trajectory (the gray zone) and at a much lower level of national effort. How do SOF reframe what constitutes strategic power and strategic risk in a complex and unpredictable world? How can these risks, opportunities, and threats be communicated across USSOCOM and other government organizations in a common language to ensure mutual support? What is the role of SOF as part of a whole-of-government approach to mitigate threats in the nascent stage before they spiral beyond their ability to respond? E3. Broadening Considerations of Strategic Risk. Calculating strategic risk (positional advantage, strategic power, influence, governance, access, and cumulative effects) can help define how the U.S. competes for positional advantage in a disordered world, and with it determine what strategic success/risk looks like. This includes ensuring sufficient strategic depth and options for an acceptable political/operational outcome for the U.S. and its international partners. SOF are an important part of this calculation, as they provide a critical operational capability within the human domain to expand considerations of strategic risk. Does the U.S. possess sufficient perspective, thinking, and models to consider risk in the current and emerging strategic environment? Does the current and future strategic environment represent a different context for existing threats, or does the U.S. face new threats altogether? Can USSOCOM more effectively develop concepts and conduct joint experimentation with JIIM partners to tackle emerging threats and opportunities? 13

14 F2. Preventive Medicine Specialist Core Competencies in Support of SOF in Complex Environments. SOF continue to face challenges associated with long-term, forward, small footprint operations in austere environments. The durations and recurrent nature of these missions pose unique challenges from public health perspectives that are not routinely encountered by CF. SOF preventive medicine personnel must be well-trained and educated in order to apply rigorous technical and scientific assessments and evaluations to develop non-standardized solutions to support the asymmetrical battle space that SOF operators work in. Further, the long-term and repetitive engagements that SOF conduct, specifically in special warfare [FID and UW], require that SOF live and work with host nation and partner forces in extremely close conditions to be effective. The use of U.S. standards and restrictions, such as only authorizing approved food sources for consumption, restriction on use of host nation pesticides and vector control measures, mandating U.S. water and waste management standards, and other policies can result in U.S. personnel being isolated due to the appearance of cultural insensitivity. What additional specialized education and training is required to better prepare SOF medics for operations in austere environments to be prepared for some of these unusual health threats and illnesses? Should foreign language capable preventive medicine specialists also become SOF qualified? 14