Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck

Transcription

1 10th Annual Conference of the Group of Experts on Amended Protocol II April 2013 Counter-IED in AFGHANISTAN from a German perspective. Lessons learned and best practices Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck

2 Curriculum Vitae Director, C-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck Date of Birth: 3 December 1956 Place of Birth: Bitburg/Germany Marital Status: Married, 2 children From - To Assignments 76 Entry into the Bundeswehr, Signal Intelligence Battalion 940 (Daun) Training to become signals intelligence NCO/officer Education studies at the Bundeswehr University (Munich) Platoon Cdr and Company Cdr, 3 Coy/Signal Battalion 220 (Donauwörth) Departmental Head of Mobile Signal Intelligence at the Army Office (Cologne) Company Cdr, 4 Coy/Signal Battalion 220 and Chief Evaluation, Signal Battalion G2 Ops, II (GE/US) Corps (Ulm) Cdr, Signal Regiment 320 (Frankenberg/Eder) Chief Evaluation, Signals and Electronic Intelligence Brigade 94 /Signal Group 93 (Daun) Electronic Warfare Staff Officer, J3 Division, Strategic Reconnaissance Command (Rheinbach) MoD, Army Staff III 5 (Bonn) Director, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Information Centre (Grafschaft-Gelsdorf) Since 2012 Director, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre (Grafschaft-Gelsdorf) 2

3 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 3

4 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 4

5 2. The IED Threat Djerba, Tunisia Instanbul, Turkey Madrid, Spain Beslan, Russia Damascus, Syria Damaskus, Syrien From open internet sources Madalla, Nigeria Madalla, Nigeria Northwest province, Pakistan Dahab, Egypt London, Great Britain 5

6 2. The IED Threat (UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO) 25-MONTH AVERAGES 1. IED-Events (per month) -525 INCIDENTS 1, 272 DETONATIONS 253 FINDS -69 CACHES 2. Casualties (per month) 319 KILLED 854 WOUNDED 3. Top Countries Colombia Pakistan Syria India USA 1 Incidents includes detonations and finds Source: CFC - JIEDDO - (without IRQ & AFG) 6

7 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 7

8 2. The IED Threat - AFG TKM UZB TJK RC NORTH CHN JOWZJAN BALKH KUNDUZ TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN RC WEST BADGHIS FARYAB SAR-E POL SAMANGAN BAMIAN BAGHLAN PARWAN PANJSHIR NURESTAN KAPISA LAGHMAN KONAR PAK IRN HERAT GHOWR DAYKONDI VARDAK GHAZNI KABUL NANGARHAR LOWGAR PAKTIA KHOWST RC CAPITAL FARAH ORUZGAN ZABUL PAKTIKA RC EAST RC SOUTHWEST NIMRUZ HELMAND KANDAHAR RC SOUTH High Considerable Medium Low Threat Source: C-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM 8

9 2. The IED Threat - AFG IED Trend 2008 JANUARY ,394 16,295 14,690 AFG ,054 Vorfälle ,275 Trend JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN Casualties 2008 JANUARY Killed 9000 Injured/Wounded ISAF ANSF ZIV Gesamt 0 ISAF ANSF ZIV Gesamt 9

10 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 10

11 3. IED Fundamentals An attacker is only limited by the components available and his own resourcefulness. 11

12 3. IED Fundamentals What is an IED? Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are one of the weapons of choice for an asymmetrically operating enemy. They are still the biggest threat to military forces in an asymmetric scenario. An IED is a device manufactured and emplaced in an improvised manner, incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary or pyrotechnic substances. It is designed to kill, injure or destroy, harass or distract. C-IED Concept, FMOD, Armed Forces Staff IV 3/V 1 dated 4 December

13 3. IED Fundamentals WHY IEDs? Employment and Effects The The enemy enemy is is innovative, adaptive and and unscrupulous! INEXPENSIVE, EASY to build using commercial technology and easy to emplace IED components readily available throughout the area, no lengthy procurement processes Small RISK Big SUCCESS, precise and lethal Demoralise the population, create an instable security situation Turn the population against governmental organisations / ISAF Unlimited opportunities for production and proliferation Production of HME Storage of HME 13

14 3. IED Fundamentals Building an IED An IED usually contains five components. Firing Switch Main Charge + - Power Source Initiator Container 14

15 3. IED Fundamentals Common Explosives in IEDs Main Charge Commercial Explosives Military Explosives Homemade Explosives (HME) 15

16 3. IED Fundamentals HME Mixtures in Afghanistan More than 80 per cent of the main charges in Afghanistan are made from homemade explosives (HME). Commercial explosives were found only in a small number of IED incidents. Main ingredients in HME in Afghanistan: Ammonium nitrate (AN) Ammonium nitrate/aluminium (ANAL) Potassium Chlorate (PC) Potassium Nitrate Urea nitrate other 59 In per cent of analysed IEDs 16

17 3. IED Fundamentals Production Facilities and Smuggling Routes Match Facility AN Facility Urea Facility AN Flow PC Flow 17

18 3. IED Fundamentals Electronic firing switches Example: Radio Controlled IED (RCIED) Vehicle Track A radio-controlled IED is a command-operated IED (COIED). RCIEDs use a remote controlled firing system consisting of a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter sends a signal to the receiver. Upon reception of the signal, the firing circuit is completed, the electrical initiator is activated by the power source and the IED is caused to detonate. Main Charge Battery Receiver Transmitter The most common RC switch in Afghanistan is based on a modified commercial garage door opener. Commercial receiver board with self-made decoder board Commercial transmitter 18

19 3. IED Fundamentals Electronic firing switches Most of the commercial electronic components used in IEDs in Afghanistan are made in China. They are sold worldwide by several (internet) shops. 19

20 3. IED Fundamentals INS SIED CWIED RCIED VOIED LMCPP NMCPP ECM equipment Protection and jamming equipment Increased use of RCP and metal detectors RCIED RC-N 20

21 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 21

22 Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Technology ENY RCIED Switch Techniques RCIED Switch Type RCIED Switch Type RCIED Switch Type RCIED Main Switch Type Threat LESSONS IDENTIFIED RCIED ENEMY TTP Different Switch Type Threats LESSONS IDENTIFIED RCIED Programmable Switch Type Threats LESSONS IDENTIFIED? ECM Conclusion FP against RCIED main threat LESSONS IDENTIFIED ECM programmable OWN TTPs FP against various RCIED threats LESSONS IDENTIFIED ECM responsive FP against various RCIED threats responsive switch type signal detection flexible reaction Threat assesment LESSONS IDENTIFIED ENY forces developed their TTPs and proved themselves as flexible and challenging opponents using various & cunning RCIEDs (uneducated does not mean dumb ) non programmable programmable OWN one forces fits all strengthen their efforts signal to further power develop flexible ECM techniques and systems solution to respond to the threat, frequency conduct an effective threat assessment and waveform take the initiative in the invisible electronic war? 22

23 Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Technology ENY RCIED Tactics Target Acquisition unprotected predictable Countering EOR/EOD EOR procedures dismounted patrols RCIED Against vehicles / mounted CF RCIED ENEMY TTPAgainst LESSONS IDENTIFIED mounted / dismounted CF LESSONS IDENTIFIED? Conclusion no ECM no FP against RCIED LESSONS IDENTIFIED OWN ECM TTP vehicle mounted LESSONS IDENTIFIED ECM vehicle mounted & manpack ENY forces reacted immediately to the lack of deployed or ineffective ECM systems during all operations. They used RCIEDs as the weapon of choice in the RC North. No awareness of ECM FP OWN forces first misunderstood ECM as a limiting factor (communications etc.) the RCIED threat mounted and not as a part of force protection. movements Then they started deploying ECM systems and implemented ECM into pre-deployment convoys training, leadership training and operations planning. ECM FP mounted/ dismounted movements static operations EOD/EOR procedures 23

24 Technology Fitting selected existing vehicles with demining systems for convoy protection. Advantage Improved protection for patrols/convoys Independence of engineer support (scarce resources: RC Sys, EOD) time, reduced exposition to hostile reconnaissance Disadvantage Additional attachment (cost, driver training) IFV Bradley (USA) with mine roller ATF Dingo with SPARK OEF+ mine roller SOUVIM 2 with KALIF mine roller LEMIR mine roller fitted to armoured multipurpose vehicle ESV Stryker (USA) with mine roller MRAP Bushmaster (AUS) with mine roller 24

25 Technology Transport case with evaluation equipment Can be carried in backpacks during dismounted operations Employed to evaluate IED incidents Geared to field evaluation needs 25

26 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 26

27 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods EOR Procedures: Qualified Capability Extended Capability Basic Capability 5/25 Check 4 C VP Check A B C 27

28 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods Improvised Explosive Device 4 C s Policy CONFIRM CLEAR CORDON Confirm suspected IED (from a distance, then SWEEP, if required ) Clear the area - no passing the location again, no pushing through or splitting up, to 400 m, depending on terrain and vehicles, - continued line of sight to the suspected location/scene of attack, check Cordon off - self-protection, - no-one must approach the site, - bypass site on foot, if required CONTROL Control the situation - report - secure - establish reporting point to receive support forces 28

29 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods Improvised Explosive Device 5-25 Check Short halt (about 2 minutes) check 25 m 25 m - Communication 5 m 25 m 5 m - All-round security 5 m Longer halt - Security areas - Vehicle checkpoints - Situation adapted - Communication Attack check SVBIED SITE Bild Search for IEDs - Holes - Colours - Cables - Markings - Antennas - Changes 29

30 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods Ground Sign Awareness Ground Sign Awareness Defensive Offensive Protection C-IED Tracking Combat Tracking EOR procedures Personal Traces Tracking Hostile Forces Aerial and Imagery Reconnaissance Note: The GSA capability has manifold applications. The graph only shows C-IED relevant GSA methods used to contribute to the protection against the general IED threat in AFGHANISTAN. 30

31 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 31

32 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Equipment Adapt and enhance personal equipment of every soldier Test ballistic underwear Ballistic Underwear Version III (only soldiers with direct interface to IdZ*-system) Version II (vehicle crew, support troops) basic equipment Version I (HQ staff) *IdZ (DEU: Infanterist der Zukunft = Future Infantryman Future Infantryman Equipment 32

33 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 33

34 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training Counter-IED Training IAW Joint Training Concept C-IED, Army Office, dated 31 October 2012 Level Personnel C-IED personnel in Brig/Div-HQ and special assignment (C-IED distinctive competencies) C-IED personnel in Btl-HQ (C-IED advisor) C-IED personnel in Coy (C-IED/EOC/EOD/IEDD Officer/NCO) Qualified Capability Extended Capability 1 every soldier Basic Capability 34

35 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training Pre-Deployment Counter-IED Training to Date Orientation Courses - Orientation for Command Personnel at BwJFOCOM - Counter-IED Module for Command Personnel (C-IED Seminar) National Counter IED Courses - For C-IED Personnel in Staff Assignments - For Instructors at Central Training Facilities - Operator Course for Counter-IED Devices 1. Mission-oriented oriented conflict prevention and crisis management training 2. Counter-IED training as part of mission-oriented oriented conflict prevention and crisis management training 3. Pre-deployment Counter-IED training to date 4. Pre-deployment Counter-IED training since

36 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training Mission-Oriented CPCM Training Concept In Theatre Training (Outdoor) Deployment 36

37 4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training Mission-Oriented CPCM Training Concept 0 In Theatre Training (Indoor) Entrance for Vehicles (Large enough for MRAP Front 5m 10m 15m 20m 25m 30m 35m 0 0 5m 7m 3 m,5m,5m 5m 20 feet 10m 15m 6m 10m 15m 35 meters 20 feet Back 20m 20m Entrance for Vehicles (Large enough for MRAP 25m 25m 30m 8m 30m 20 feet 1m 7m35m 35m 35 meters 20 feet Side,5 m 40m,5 m,5m,5m 40m 16 m 45m 50m 10 m 45m 50m 80 meters Top View 10 m 55m 15 m 60m Car 55m 60m 2 m (Depth) 65m Mud Wall Complex 65m 35 meters 70m 70m 80 meters 75m 80m Elevation of the Road and Track (2 feet) 75m 80m 37

38 Agenda 1. The IED Threat WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN 2. IED Fundamentals 3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training Own TTPs 38

39 4. Organisation DEU Route Clearance System (RCSys) ADDITIONAL BEAM EQUIPMENT Sensor: - Camera (Stereo RGB) - Detector (GPR/MD) TOOLS: - Culvert-Camera - Grabber - Fork - Water- /Air Spade 39

40 4. Organisation National ISAF VorlAuswK SOP h 24h/ 72h/ 7d 72h 28d 72h/ 10d/ 28d 20h 100d 5d/ 30d/ 100d 40

41 IED Exploitation in Afghanistan Level 3 Out of Theatre Technical and scientific investigation Forensic examination Tactical assessment German Capability Level 2 In Theatre Laboratory Chemical identification Electronics identification Biometrics preservation (DNA, latent prints) lead nation USA, German participation Level 1 Field Exploitation Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Police Intelligence German capability 41

42 4. Organisation AFG CAPTURED MATERIAL EXPLOITATION (ACME) LABORATORIES ACME at CAMP MAZAR-E-SHARIF - Operational Readiness since October Timely Examination of Evidence from RC-N Possible. Optimisation of Attack Analysis. - DEU Contribution: Two Posts. - Electronics Specialist - Specialist Personnel for Weapons Effects Vor-Ort Ort-Unters. von Zwischenf. Technical Evaluation Biometric Analyses 42

43 4. Organisation Exploitation Technical Evaluation Biometric Analysis Field Exploitation ASIC C-IED Advisor CCIRM Targeting SOFLE ICC & ICCT Combat Development Pre- Deployment Trg OPLAN 43

44 German Level 3 Out of theatre exploitation Aims of ETAV* Incident Threat Analysis TTP Test Procedures Development of Vehicles Construction of New Vehicles *Expert Group for the Technical Analysis of Incidents 44

45 Counter-IED in AFGHANISTAN From a German Perspective. Lessons Learned and Best Practices Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck Thanks For Your Attention! 45