JIEDDO Overview presented to the. United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, San Diego Chapter

Transcription

1 JIEDDO Overview presented to the United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, San Diego Chapter April 21, 2011 This briefing is //FOR OfiL USE ONLY

2 Era of Persistent Conflict Enemy will focus on irregular warfare using asymmetric means to attack and influence advanced nations Conventional, unconventional, lethal, non-lethal, state supported, non-state, hybrid organizations, extremism produce a very complex environment Global Trends Globalization Demographics Resources Proliferation Urbanization Environment Failed States Technology Advances Closed States Threatened Criminal Environments Resource Wars WMD/E Attacks Terrorist Recruitment Dissatisfied Populations Humanitarian Crises Persistent Conflict The world will be in persistent conflict for generations and the IED will be the weapon of choice for decades 2

3 IEDs are Weapons with Tactical Effect Inflict casualties Isolate population from contact with friendly forces Explosive Filler Switch Initiator IED Main Charge Initiating System Power Sources Operational Effect Isolate population Disrupt freedom of movement Create perception of insecurity Casing Containers Strategic Effect Influence national will Create perception of lost cause Use insecurity to delegitimize host nation 3

4 Afghanistan IED Trends 1800 # of IED Events Effective IED Attacks Ineffective IED Attacks 0 Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO IED severity has decreased IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant 4

5 Iraq IED Trends # of IED Events Effective IED Attacks Ineffective IED Attacks Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Reasons for success: - Effective COIN strategy - Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces - Effective host nation security force - Political reconciliation - Lethal targeting of irreconcilables 5

6 Global IED Threat Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Monthly Global Terrorist Incidents (minus Iraq & Afghanistan) Nov Dec Jan Feb State & nonstate actors train, practice, & employ IEDs worldwide All Others IED Incidents* *actual IED attacks or devices found and cleared Nov 2008 Nov 2010 The average number of monthly IED incidents outside Iraq and Afghanistan was 245 for the last 6 months. Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Source: Triton Report (COIC/ /10 Jan 11) 6

7 U.S.: 27 Oct, Pakistani-American arrested for planning attacks against DC Metro Mexico: 10 Sep, Drug cartel use luring tactic with VBIED Colombia: 4 Nov, Colombian Army recovers 26 FARC gas cylinder bombs Argentina: 16 Sep, IED detonated in front of American Airlines and Alitalia offices. Chilean anarchist group claimed responsibility. Global IED Threat Highlights Turkey: 31 Oct, PBIED detonates in Istanbul wounding 32; Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) claimed responsibility Guatemala: 13 Sep, 1 st reported use of VBIED; device defused Algeria: Sep, AQIM conducts SVBIED against security force convoy in Zemmouri Somalia: 9 Sep, al-shabaab attacks Mogadishu International Airport with SVBIED and PBIEDs; 9 killed / Moscow: 24 Jan, PBIED attack Domodedovo Airport; 35 killed, 130 wounded Chechnya: 19 Oct, Militants wearing PBIEDs attack Chechen parliament building in Grozny; Three civilians killed,17 wounded India: 8 Nov, 2 Military Police killed by Maoist emplaced IED Pakistan: 5 Nov, 79 killed in PBIED attack on mosque outside Peshawar Philippines: 21 Oct, RCIED attack on bus kills 10 civilians, injures 40 IEDs remain an on-going and persistent threat worldwide. Source: Open Source Press Reports (J2/ 27Jan11) 7

8 DoD Response In February 2006, Department of Defense stood up the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to support Combatant Commands by leading efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations: The organization, integration and synchronization of capabilities that enable offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations across all phases of campaigns in order to defeat IEDs as operational and strategic weapons of influence. 8

9 What Makes JIEDDO Unique? Laser-like focus on the IED threat Reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Funded through Overseas Contingency Operations 3-year uncolored funding DoDs ability to rapidly respond to Warfighters Rapid Acquisition 4-24 month response window 75% solution in months An innovative, transparent organization that finds solutions to the complex challenges of the IED fight 9

10 Lines of Operation (LOOs) Attack the Network: Lethal and non-lethal actions and operations against networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) that: capitalize on or create key vulnerabilities disrupts activities eliminates the enemy s ability to function Defeat the Device: Detection, mitigation, and neutralization of IEDs once it has been emplaced through: route clearance device neutralization explosive detection disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance vehicle and personnel protection Train the Force: Actions and activities designed to enable Attack the Network and Defeat the Device through: graduate level Combat Training Center events C-IED training at Home Stations and the Centers of Excellence focused individual C-IED pre-deployment training Training in-theater to stay ahead of adaptive enemy 10

11 USSOCOM Ongoing support Federated Nodes (HQ, USASOC, and NSW) JIEDDO s Current COCOM Engagements USJFCOM C-IED Doctrine Battle Staff Training Goal is for Rest of the World to remain in Phase 0 C-IED operations USNORTHCOM TUE plan & exercise development Federated Node (JTF-N) USEUCOM NATO C-IED COE - Spain NATO EOD Center Slovakia Federated Nodes (DGS-4; Future: HQ & SOCEUR) USCENTCOM - Main Effort - Continuous Support - Federated Nodes (HQ & SOCCENT) USSOUTHCOM Colombia C-IED Program Development Identify C-IED Planning requirements Federated Node (DGS-2) USAFRICOM Responding to RFIs Federated Nodes (HQ; Future: SOCAF) USPACOM USFK C-IED Plan Development Key Resolve 2010 Asia-Pacific Fusion Center Federated Nodes (USARPAC & DGS-5; Future: SOCPAC) Working with all COCOMs to: Identify planning, training, and exercise events Nest C-IED within OPLANS using the C-IED Planning Template Build theater C-IED programs Cultivate international C-IED capacity building 11

12 Technology Challenges Predict and Prevent Social and Dynamic Network Analysis Tagging, Tracking, & Locating Detect/Prevent Pre-Emplacement Activity Persistent Surveillance Technologies Sensor Enhancement and Data Exploitation Detect Neutralize Mitigate Command Wire Detection Buried IED & Pressure Initiation Detection Standoff Explosives Detection & Confirmation Explosively Formed Projectile Detection Sensitive Radio Frequency Detection Passive Infrared Defeat Blasting Cap Defeat Counter Radio-controlled Electronic Warfare Vehicle and Crew Protection Pre-empt Use of New Technologies & TTPs Medical 12

13 Facilitates Training On Attack The Network Using A Common JIEDDO Training Support Plan Training Weapons Intelligence Teams Electronic Warfare Targeting Biometrics Law Enforcement Program Pattern Analysis Tactical Site Exploitation Home Made Explosive Intel, Surveillance Recon Find Fix Disseminate Analyze Finish Exploit Company Intel Supt Teams Counter IED Targeting Process C-IED Ops/Intel Integration Human Terrain Team We need To Train Attack the Network 13

14 Attack the Network FY Appropriated $5.4 B Defeat the Device FY Appropriated $9.4B Train the Force FY Appropriated $2B JIEDDO Capabilities to the Warfighter FY 06: $3.6B (Appropriated) Constant Hawk Warrior Alpha Jammers: Duke, Guardian, Hunter, Spirals, Chameleon Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles Engineer PIR Defeat Reconnaissance Vehicles Robotics Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells (CEXC) Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) Persistent Threat Detection System Rhino & Rhino II Knowledge & Joint Center Information of Excellence Fusion Exchange Electronic Warfare Training Surrogate Training Devices FY 07: $3.3B (Obligated) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) Law Enforcement Program CREW-Mounted 2.1 Route Clearance Blowers Counter-IED Targeting Program Ground- Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS) Victim Operated IED (VOIED) Roller Systems CREW Training Home Station Training Rapid Deployable Integrated Surv. System (RDISS) FY 08: $3.9B (Obligated) Identity InstaCheck Federated Nodes Forensic Exploitation Team (FOX) External Information Programs Base Expeditionary Target & Surv. System (BETSS-C) TOTAL: $16.6B Palantir Data Tracker Weapons Technical Intelligence Ahura Vehicle Optics Sensor System (VOSS) MARCBot/ XBot JCREW- Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer Home Station Training I & II Insurgents on the Battlefield C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams (C-MATT) JCAST FY 09: $3.1B (Obligated) Copperhead Afghan Surge: CREW- Dismounted 3.1 & SOCOM EGON IED Rollers BeachComber C-IED Live Fire Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) Desert Owl Night Eagle Entry Control Point Solutions in a Box Virtual Medical Training IED Battle Drill FY 10: $2.7B (Obligated) Afghan Surge: Keyhole Wolfhound II Route Clearance Optics Suite (RCOS) Devil Pup CREW- Fixed Site CVRJ Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer Counter Bomber As of 7 October 2010 JCAST ORSA Exploitation Labs Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) Toolkits Tactical Site Exploitation 14

15 Summary We must contain the spread of IEDs as a global weapon of choice for violent extremists The ENEMY adapts quickly we can t armor our way out of IEDs We need to institutionally integrate what we have learned We must continue to strive to make IEDs too costly to produce and too risky to employ by: Attacking networks that emplace IEDs Training our forces to protect themselves We must seek technologies and train warfighters to protect themselves and defeat the devices IEDs are not just a tactical problem 15

16 Mr. Craig S. McDonald Deputy OIC, JIEDDO USMC Detachment (760)

17 Afghanistan IED Trends IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO IED severity has decreased IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant 17

18 Iraq IED Trends No significant change in number of IED events since July; % of effective attacks trending downward Coalition Force IED casualties continue to trend down, with only 2 CF IED WIA in December Host Nation IED casualties trends continue to vary month to month Reasons for success: - Effective COIN strategy - Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces - Effective host nation security force - Political reconciliation - Lethal targeting of irreconcilables 18

19 JIEDDO s Reach Joint IED Defeat Organization, Crystal City, VA Resourcing the IED Defeat Fight Direction, Guidance, & Coordination Technology Integration DS Support from Rapid Equipping Force (REF) Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, VA Afghanistan Field Team (Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, Salerno, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Orgun-E, Sharona, Tarin Kowt & Abad) Embed with deployed units Advising Units TTP development and dissemination CREW training ISAF transition TF Phoenix Support Joint Center of Excellence, Ft. Irwin, CA Resource Training for the IED Defeat Fight Direction, Guidance, & Coordination JIEDDO Knowledge & Information Fusion Exchange (JKnIFE), Newport News, VA Global TTP, Best Practice, Lesson Learned repository Collaboration & Information Sharing Portals Knowledge Management Joint Training Support Joint Training COIC, Newport News, VA Iraq Field Team (Baghdad, Tikrit & Ramadi) Embed with deployed units Advising Units TTP development and dissemination CREW training Transition Team Support 19

20 Joint IED Defeat Organization Mission JIEDDO leads DoD actions to rapidly provide Counter Improvised Explosive Device capabilities in support of the Combatant Commanders and to enable the defeat of the IED as a weapon of strategic influence Mission Areas Operations & Information Fusion Training & Operations Support Rapid Acquisition Strategic Planning JIEDDO Lines of Operation Attack the Network Defeat the Device Train the Force Deputy Secretary of Defense Director, Joint IED Defeat Organization 20