Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence. AUTiiORS: John G. Hines, Senior Author. Ellis M. Mishulovich JohnF.ShuU BDM FEDERAL, INC.

Transcription

1 m BDM Pedera., c BDM Way Mcea, VA SOVET NTENTONS Voume Soviet Post-Cod War Testimoia Evidece. ' AUTiiORS: oh G. Hies, Seior Author Eis M. Mishuovich ohf.shuu BDM FEDERAL, NC. September 22, 1995 CONTRACT #MDA C-0147 OSD-NET ASSESSMENT

2 .. ' -1 : '1 j c ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS Co~~ts o terview Process... ~... i Marsha Sergei F. Akhromeev Mu-sha Sergei F. Akhromee.v ~ Ge.-Lt Geii Vik.torovich Batei... 7 Sergei Bagovoi... ~... :... : ; Harod Brow Zbigtrew Brzeziski... :..... : :... ~... ;..... ;... ~... ~... :... : Dmitrii S. Chereshki Ge.-Co. (Ret.) AdriaA. Daievich Ge.-Co. (Ret.) AdriaA Daievich Ge.-Co. (Ret.) AdriaA. Daievich Ge.-Co. (Ret.) Adria A. Daievich... :... ~ ~ Ge.-Co. (Ret.) AdriaA Daievicb Ge.-Co. (Ret.) Adria A. Daicvich... :... ~... :... :.:.. 58 Ge.-Co. (Ret.) AdriaA Daievich... :... ~ Ge.-Maj. Vadimir Ziovicvich Dvorki... :... : Ge. Makhmut A. Garecv Ge. Makbmut A. Garcev Fred c. ke... ~... ~.: Ge.-Co. gor' V. Darioov..., Ge.-Cot gor' V. arioov ;... ; ~ A. S. Kaashikov A. S. Kaasbikov... ;... ; ::... ~ Vitaii Leoidovich Kataev Vitaii Leoidovicb Kataev... ~. :... :... : Ge.-Maj. (Ret.) urii.a Kirsbi... _ Ge.-Maj. (Ret.) urii A. Kirsbi... : Robert W. Komer Ge.-Co. (Ret.) Varfoomei Vadimirovich Korobushi Ge.-Lt. (Ret.) Nikoai Vasi'cvich Kravets... ;_ Ge.-Co. Gregorii Fedorovich Krivosbeev... ~ Cooe Petr M. Lapuov... ~... :... ~... ~... :... :... ;.. 115

3 ' 1. m m. Adrew W. Marsha Rod McDaie u. A. Mozzhori... : u. A. Mozzhori... : Vadimir Rubaov... ~...:...: ~ aes R. Schesiger Vitaii V. Shykov... ~..;...:.....:... :.~:...' Boris Aeksadrovich Strogoov Viktor M. Surikov Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Tsygicbko Dr. Vitaii Nik:oacvich Tsygicbk.o Dr. Vitaii Nik:oaevich... :....-.~... ~ Dr. Vitaii Nikoiaevich Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich... ~... :... ;~... ;:... ; Dr. Vitaii Nik:oa.evich Ge. Co. Dmitrii Vokogoov.. ;... ~... : APPENDX A: Partia List of Decisio Makers ad Aaysts APPENDX B: Research Questios for Soviet terview Respodets APPENDX C: Research Questios for U.S. terview Respodets APPENDX D: List of Acroyms ad Abbreviatios APPENDX E: Tsygicbk.o's Kommetarii k iterv'iu v godu.... ~... ; dex , j

4 ~..:. terviews ad Discussio118 with Cod-War Er4 Pa:e 4d Aaysts This voume cotais much of the ~aw materia o which this study is based. A items i this coectio represet the testimoy, i some form, of Soviet ad America strategic paers ad aaysts whose professioa careers were argey domiated by the eed to uderstad ad respod effectivey to the miitary threat from their Cod War oppoets. Most of the items are structured as records or simaries of iterviews coducted o the basis of a specific ist of questios. foow-up iterviews or iterviews with difficut subjects, the questios served oy as a geera guide to research. Log, arrative resposes aso ofte did ot address questios i the same format ad sequece i which the questios were preseted. For may reasos, items do ot foow precisey the sequece ad cotets of the iterview questios. Soviet iterview subjects ofte were ucomfortabe with the iterview situatio, the questios, or the impicatios of the research (the Cod War was over ad the West had wo). As a resut, the ature of the record of iterview or discussio varies from iterview to iterview. Trascripts of taped iterviews are the record of choice, of course, foowed by records based o otes ad, fmay, summaries based o the memory of the iterviewer prepared shorty after the iterview. May Soviet iterview subjects were ucomfortabe with tape recorders~ especiay eary i the project ( ) whe severa were far from coviced that the Cod War was, ideed, over. Likewise, severa of the questios caused discomfort which forced rephrasig ad specia promptig (provocative statemets or ausios to other iformatio) o the part of the iterviewer. Some iterview subjects respoded with amost a stream-of-cosciousess fow of iformatio that moved from associatio to associatio through a etire series of reated issues. Stoppig such a respose to adhere precisey to our questios coud resut i the oss of vauabe isights ad iformatio ot aticipated by the questioer.

5 .'.- 1 ' ~ 1 c 1 ' 1 w ~... Cod War terviews This resuted i icompete coverage of some questios requirig, whe possibe, subsequet, suppemetary iterviews focused o specific issues. To compesate whe possibe, we revisited some of the most kowedgeabe iterview subjects severa times over the course of 3 or 4 years. We tried, whe possibe, to isoate the iterview subject from his coeagues. durig questioig to avoid mutua itimidatio, coegia resposes, ad cotamiatio of data ad observatios. We were geeray successfu i meetig this objective but were sometimes forced by those who heped arrage a give iterview to ivove them i the process. Whe possibe, we woud subsequety isoate the iterview subject ad revisit oe or two key questios to vaidate the origia respose. The record that foows, therefore, is icosistet i eve of detai ad comprehesiveess despite the paig ad good itetios of the researchers. mperfect as they are, they evertheess represet a uique record of iformatio ad beiefs of Cod War participats who were abe to trust their former eemies sufficiety to share their thoughts ad beiefs i some detai before they themseves passed ito history. For the coveiece of the reader, a ist of acroyms ad abbreviatios appears i the appedices, as we as a seective ist of decisio makers ad aaysts cited or referred to i the iterview record. ii

6 SUMMARY OF NTERVEW Subject: Positio: Locatio: terviewer: Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Seior Aayst, A-Uio Scietific-Techica stitute For Systems Studies (VNS), Academy of Scieces, USSR; Director, Ceter for Natioa Security ad Strategic Stabiity Studies Room 716, VNS Buidig; 9 Prospekt 6Q...et Oktiabria, Moscow oh G. Hies '') _ a Date/'ime: Duratio: Laguage: Prepared by: "Purpose of terview" December 13, 1990, 11:00 a.m. 1.5 hours Russia oh G. Hies, based o otes - To review with Dr. Tsygicbko his views o the product ad process of Soviet miitary assessmets i the 1970s ad 1980s. Of specia iterest was the Soviets' thikig about miitary competitio, assessmets of Wester capabiities ad itetios reative to their ow, ad expectatios of the ature of war shoud it occur. The roe ad expected efforts of strategic ad theater. weapos of mass destructio was of cetra cocer as was covetioa war. "Ge~ra" Vitaii Tsygicbko is a former artiery cooe who johed the SoViet Geera Staff i 1964 where he was ivoved i some of the eary efforts to subject force structure ad operatios to systematic aaysis usig mathematicay based methodoogies ad modes. Betwee 1967 ad 1977 he was head of the Theater Force Modeig Departmet withi the Scietific Research stitute [Naucho-ssedovate'skii stitut Number 6 (N-6) of the Mm teigece Directorate (GRU) that provided quatitative aaytica support to the Miistry of Defese. (There are five such purey miitary istitutes that support the Miistry of Defese i various areas). He eft the istitute ad the Army i 1977 because be fet that the best work of his divisio was beig suppressed or igored. He becam.e a seior aayst at VNTS of the Soviet Academy of Scieces at that time. His reputatio as a aayst ad a officer is very positive amog both former ad servig Geera Staff geeras ad officers who seem eager to associate themseves with him ad his work. Oe seior Geera Staff cooe, Kabysh, who cotiues to work as a Geera Staff aayst kew of by reputatio, idetifyig him as oe of the pricipa architects of the Geera Staffs approach to quatitative aaysis of force operatios. Geera-Major Luziai, a departmet head withi the Ceter for Operatioa Strategic Studies (TsOS) of the Geera Staff (ad a coeague of Tsygicbko's o the Geera Staff i the 1970s), caed Dr. to the Geera Staff 136

7 - ' } '} ' 1 ~ 1. Cod War terviews o December 10, 1990, to offer him a cotract to support the ceter's aaysis. Dr. Tsygicbko accepted ad wi be providig support over the ext severa moths. ( eared idirecty from Adrei Kokoshi, who is fairy we coected to parts of the Geera Staff, that much of the work doe i TsOS is desiged to meet the eeds of Geera Ladygi's Geera Staff Directorate for ~ga ad Treaty Affairs.) Some of Dr. Tsygicbko's coeagues who had bee preset at a iterview give by Miister of Defese azov to deputies of the RSFSR o November 5, 1990, reported that.. Tsygicbko's ame was brought up by azov durig the discussio. Specificay, Marsha azov was compaiig that sef-described civiia defese aaysts were demostratig their icompetece wheever they attempted to dea with miitary aaytica or operatio questios. He specificay cited the work of Vitaii ad his ceter as a exceptio to this geera rue, statig that the ceter was doig very good work.. '... This is oe of a series of iterviews that have coducted with Dr.. There is some dupicatio amog iterviews because have revisited some themes to carify poits from previous discussios ad have tried to provide eough iformatio to estabish the cotext for his aswers. This particuar iterview brigs out the differeces i uderstadig ad attitudes about theater ucear use amog three groups of officers: the Geera Staff aaysts ad geera officers routiey exposed to serious aaysis of the operatioa ad coatera effects of ucear use; the "army" geeras, those fied geeras who commaded armies, Frots, miitary districts, ad High Commads of Forces i TVDs;86 ad the top miitary eadership, the Miistry of Defese, the Chief of the Geera Staff ad his deputies a of whom were exposed to the product of the aaysis beig doe withi the Geera Staff but whose attitudes were shaped by other tha purey miitary aaytica cosideratios. ''Three Views o Nucear Warfare" Geera Staff officers i the 1970s were very kowedgeabe about the tremedous difficuties ad ucertaities that woud be ivoved i use of ucear weapos at the strategic, operatioa, ad tactica eves. the 1960s ad 1970s may of the best ad brightest mids i the Soviet scietific. commuity were workig i uiform withi the Geera Staff i the areas of aaysis ad paig. Severa modes had bee deveoped ad appied to test the operatioa ad geera coatera effects of ucear use at various eves ad o various scaes of empoymet (some of these modes are discussed beow as we as i other iterviews). The cocusios of the Geera Staff aaysts ad other officers ivoved was essetiay that ucear use was operatioay couter-productive ad geeray sef-destructive. Eve these officers, to icude Tsygicbko. carried out their work without ay systematic cosideratio of the socia or ecoomic impicatios of their fmdigs. As a resut, they were uabe to gauge the importace of their research i ay but a purey miitary cotext. Seior Geera Staff geeras were routiey exposed to this aaytica work ad uderstood the cosequeces of ucear use. Thus, Marshas Grechko ad Kuikov (Miister of Defese ad Chief of the Geera Staff respectivey i the eary to mid- 1970s) kew, uderstood, ad beieved that ucear use at ay eve by either side woud be catastrophic for the Soviet Armed Forces ad the Soviet state they were required to protect. These seior Miister of Defese ad Geera Staff geeras evertheess formay rejected the aaysis to which they were exposed ad typicay suppressed it by 86 TVD - Teatr voeykh tkistvii-theater of (Strategic) Miitary Actio, for ex~e, Ce~ ~ from Ukraie to the wester shore of read. 137

8 Cod War terviews assigig to the aaytica products extremey high cassificatios ad by deyig further dissemiatio ad discussio. The reasos for such deia ad wifu adherece to ucear thikig [iaderoe mysheie were ideoogica, bureacratic, ad ecoomic c..0 1 R. '1 ~ -. Dr. asserted that the Brezhev Poitburo deegated a miitary matters to the Miistry of Defese to icude a force procuremet decisios. Threat defmitio was aso a miitary fuctio carried out withi the Geera Staff by the Mai Poitica Directorate. There was essetiay o poitica oversight over the force buidig process ad o serious chaege from the Poitburo to what was ceary a decisio situatio i which there were serious coficts of iterest This "hads-off' attitude of the Brezhev Poitburo ad the midess ucear force-buidig that resuted was strogy cofmed by Geera-Cooe Daievich. To officiay ackowedge that ucear use was seseess ad basicay catastrophic woud require severa chages i the etire Soviet poitica-miitary-ecoomic system that were competey uacceptabe to the. seior officers who were the products ad beeficiaries of that system. These chages woud icude: - Ackowedgmet that victory woud be impossibe i ucear war-a vioatio of basic Marxist-Leiist dogma. - Deep reductios i miitary spedig. - The ucear weapos ad weapos deivery [missies, aircraft, submaries idustry was massive ad importat to the [aready very distorted} ecoomy. The ogic of the Geera Staff aaysis woud udermie directy the program of quatitative competitio with the U.S. that was beig pushed by the seior miitary eadership ad miitary idustriaists at that time. - Covetioa a.mamets productio was expadig as was the size of the Aed. Forces based o expectatios of high [but somehow acceptabe osses of covetioa forces i the evet of ucear war. The impicatios of deep reductios i ucear ad perhaps covetioa forces ad forma ackowedgmet by the Soviet eadership that they were deterred by the prospect of a uwiabe ucear war woud have affected profoudy Soviet society i geera ad the miitary roe i that system i particuar: - The Soviet ecoomy woud be forced to udergo radica adjustmets which few were abe or wiig to cotempate. - Forty percet of the Soviet GDP was beig spet o the miitary. The MoD was spedig 20 biio rubes per year o persoe costs aoe. [A impressive umber cosiderig that the Soviet Armed Forces were comprised of very-ow-paid coscripts. - The roe of the miitary i geera probaby woud be dimiished. - The domiat positio of the miitary as a istitutio woud be threateed..:. Reducti.o i the size of ucear ad covetioa forces woud eimiate,ooos of officer ad geera officer positios. The third group, to which Dr. frequety refers as the army geeras. [armeiskie geeray, coud ot, accordig to. imagie war without ucear 138

9 .., weapos. Uike the Geera Staff geeras, however, who uderstood the c.osequeces of ucear use, the Groud Forces operatioa commaders ad CNCs were basicay uiformed ad geeray did ot kow or uderstad what woud happe i the evet of ucear use. They routiey used expressios such as the eed to be prepared ''to attack to the thuder of ucear strikes." [Whie it was cear that hed them i ow regard because of their igorace ad mispaced macho ethusiasm for sef-destructive behavior, it is cear that these officers were kept i igorace by the seior Geera Staff geeras for the reasos cited above. As wi be cear whe some of the modes are discussed, the rea fidigs o uc1ear effects ad cotamiatio ever made it to the fied i the 1970s, eavig the "army geeras" with exercise scearios that reiforced their impressio that ucear use i theater woud be somehow maageabe. "Geera Staff Modeig of Nucear War i Europe" 1 Betwee 1972 ad 1979 a tremedous amout of work was doe i 's istitute ad esewhere i the Geera Staff's aaytica support apparatus to aayze possibe war i Europe, icudig ucear war. the course of doig this aaysis; the Geera Staff costructed severa differet modes desiged to test various outcomes ad effects.. The overa purpose of the aaysis was to determie what war might be ike ad, i particuar, to determie the effects of osses o the coduct of operatios ad o the cotiuity of the avaiabiity of reserves ad rear services. Some of the modeig work accompished i this period ad the maer i which the fidigs were received by the Geera Staff eadership are discussed beow: Modeig of Atmospheric ad Other Effects from a Nucear Exchage i Europe ad o a. Goba Scae 1971 ad 1972 the Geera Staff studied the ciiatic ad cotamiatio effects from a goba exchage ad cocuded that there woud be serious egative cosequeces for the USSR ad for the orther hemisphere i geera. )r. wated to poit out that "ucear witer'' was ot discovered by Aeksadrov or Saga i 1987 [sic.87 The Geera Staff did ot use the expressio ''ucear witer," but the aaysts cosidered may of the effects that received so much pubic attetio amost 20 years ater. These fidigs were summarized i a memo to the MoD ad ~e Cetra Committee ad were igored because of the impicatios discussed earier ad 1973, Dr. '.s istitute did a great dea of work modeig ucear war i Europe. this work, which icuded the deveopmet of a mode, the istitute studied the operatioa effects of the expected high oss eves ad disruptio of the rear (discussed i detai i a earier iterview) but aso cacuated ucear cotamiatio give prevaiig (eastward) wid patte~s i Europe. The study foud that, i executig eve the basic pa to pace a ucear strike o every NATO airfied, the Soviet side woud create extremey high eves of cotamiatio i Europe. The worst effects woud be upo Warsaw Pact forces. ad upo the Pact's strategic miitary rear i Easter Europe ad the Europea USSR. Withi a reativey short period of time, cotamiatio woud have a severey egative effect o the Warsaw Pact's abiity to 87 Ameiica scietist Car Saga, together with his coeagues, popuarized the otio duri~g the eary 1980s th~t a goba ucear war woud iduce a artificia witer across the orther hemisphere. Aeksadrov coducted simiar work i the Soviet Uio i the eary 1980s. Authors were ot abe to idetify Aeksadrov's first ame ad positio. 139 '...

10 ,- Cod War terviews cotiue the war ad woud have mid- to og-term heath cosequeces for the civiia popuatios of a members of the Pact. This study was of sufficiet importace that the istitute ad the Mai Operatios Directorate of the Geera Staff devoted a additioa 6 moths to a idepedet vaidatio of the mode ad its fidigs. The vaidatio process resuted i the cosidered cofirmatio of the aaytica resuts achieved by the istitute. 1 : ~ } ' Dr. briefed the fidigs of the mode to Marsha Kuikov, the Chief of the Geera Staff, i Kuikov ordered (the a ieuteat cooe) to modify the cocusios or face forced retiremet. Tsygicbko said he fet sufficiety secure to refuse (sice be aready had his doctorate). The director of his istitute met with ater o the same day he had his cofrotatio with Kuikov ad asked him to be more fexibe. Tsygicbko refused. The fidigs were suppressed by meas of overcassificatio ad severe restrictios o dissemiatio. was ot forced to retire. poited out that oe of the cosequeces of this suppressio was that the fidigs were ever icorporated ito routie Soviet exercises. As a cosequece, exercise maps typicay depicted eat, maageabe baoo-shaped cotamiatio patters that coud be circumveted easiy by army commaders. Hece the exercise ucear effects did ot seriousy affect operatios, much ess impose severe disruptios o the strategic rear ad popuatios of the Warsaw Pact. Vitaii stressed that, i his cofrotatio with Kuikov ad his geeras, it was cear to him that they a uderstood the correctess of his fmdigs but were uwiig to accept ad dissemiate them because of what those fmdigs impied for the Geera Staff i the areas of force deveopmet, doctrie, miitary ivestmet, etc. "The Competece of Geera Staff Modeers ad Quatitative Aaysts''. Dr. had cotmeted earier o the ufavorabe impressio he had of servig Geera Staff modeers ad aaysts whe he participated, by ivitatio, i a Geera-Staff hosted aaytica semiar i ue earier coversatios, he made it cear that he was commetig specificay o the work of the aaysts from the TsOS whe he said that the quaity of the modeig work had reverted to what it had bee 20 years ago, before major advaces i sophisticatio had bee made. a coversatio we bad o December 12, 1990 he carified ad expaded o his earier commet. The ue 1990 semiar icuded participats from TsOS but aso aaysts from the Mai Directorate for Orgaizatio ad Mobiizatio (headed by Geera-Cooe Krivosheev) ad the Mai Operatios Directorate (headed by Geera Omeichev). Dr. made it cear that Krivosheev's peope were equivaet i their ow eve of competece to the TsOS aaysts. He added that the oy rea aaysts that appear to be eft o the Geera Staff are workig for Geera Omeichev i the Mai Operatios Directorate which is cocered with doig the assessmets of the correatio of forces gobay ad by regio ad which support directy Geera Staff decisios o force depoymets ad chages i readiess status. This must be cosidered i the cotext of the steady brai drai" of top aaysts who have eft the Geera Staff ad supportig aaytica istitutes for the Soviet Academy of Scieces sice the mid-1970s. "} 140

11 "1 " " - Cod War terviews Geera-Major Medvedev, Deputy Director for Sciece of the TsOS, cofied to me i Germay i November 1990, that this tred is cotiuig. He vouteered that they have over 60 sots i the Geera Staff istitutes for civiia aaysts ad that few, if ay, were fied. 's cotmets suggest that the remaiig quaified aaysts are beig pued out of the more theoretica or rums-cotro sup_;port positios to keep aive the " operatioa core of the Geera Staff, the Mai Operatios Directorate, which is much more cocered with appicatios ad expoitatio of mathematica modes tha with their deveopmet or improvemet ;j 0 1 }.. ) L ~ '. 141

12 -~ SUMMARY OF ~RVEW Subject: Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich 0 j : Positio; Locatio: terviewer: Date: Prepared by: Seior Aayst, A-Uio Scietific-Techica stitute For Systems Studies (VNUS), Academy of Scieces, USSR; Director, Ceter for Natioa Security ad Strategic Stabiity Studies Moscow oh G. Hies December 17, 1990 oh G. Hies, based o otes Brezhev ad the Poitburo eft miitary doctrie to the professioas ad gave the miitary great reig i determiig resource aocatio ad threat defiitio. Geera Staff officers uderstood that ucear use woud be operatioay couterproductive, but Frot ad TVD commaders [aeiskie geeray expected to fight with ucear weapos. Modes showed that goba ucear war woud have drastic effects o cimate ad that ucear strikes agaist a NATO airfieds woud cotamiate the atmosphere i Easter Europe ad the USSR. Memos about this were set to MoD ad the Cetra Committee but were igored. the eary 1970s, modeig predicted that use at the Frot eve of 15-20% of ucear arseas o both sides woud cause eough destructio to ed war at this eve. Moreover, modes were used to coduct sesitivity aaysis o ucear use at Frot eve to determie at what percetage of use the ucear arsea avaiabe to both sides woud the operatioa impact be acceptabe. That is, how much of the arsea coud each side absorb ad have osses sufficiety ow to aow the Soviet Frot to cotiue miitary operatios. The aaysis was begu at 20% of the arseas avaiabe to both sides ad the exercise was hated whe the modeers had exercised strikes comprised of 2% of the arsea. The osses, eve at a exchage of 2%, were so. great that a operatios ad movemet ceased for 2 days whie survivig commaders ad staff assessed the potetia for regroupig ad resumig operatios. Eve the, resumptio of Frot operatios was probematica, depedig upo assumptio about osses of key commad ad cotro persoe ad faciities. The mai Operatios Directorate spet 6 moths to vaidate the mode. Gareev chaeged the fidigs (Gareev' s work o the correatio of (orces predicted osses [from ucear strikes that were sma eough to peit the cotiuatio of operatios after each phase); Kuikov uderstood that the fidigs were true but suppressed them because their impicatios for defese spedig were uacceptabe. 142

13 Cod War terviews exercises Soviet troops cotiued simpy to move aroud areas cotamiated by ucear use. '!azov i Red Star [Krasaia zvezda praised the work of 's istitute. the 1960s ad 1970s exceet aaysts worked i Geera Staff paig ad aaysis but they had o serious reaity referece (they did ot kow bow to measure the socia or ecoomic vaue of their work). ~ - i' D 1 ~.. ) g... ~. 143

14 SUMMARYOFfERVffiW Subject: Dr. Vitai Nikoaevich TsygiChko '" f - :. u Positio: Locatio: terviewer: Date!'ime: Duratio: Laguage: Prepared by: ''Purpose of terview'' Seior Aayst, A-Uio Scietific-Techica stitute For Systems Studies (VNTS), Academy of Scieces, USSR; Direc~or, Ceter for Natioa Security ad Strategic Stabiity Studies Room 716, VNTS Buidig, 9 Prospekt 60-et Oktiabria, Moscow oh G. Hies.. December 20, 1990, 11:00 am. 1 hour Russia oh G. Hies, based o otes - To review with Dr. his views o the product ad process of Soviet miitary assessmets i the 1970s ad 1980s. Of specia iterest was the Soviets' thikig about miitary competitio, assessmets of Wester capabiities ad itetios reative to their ow, ad expectatios of the ature of war shoud it occur. The roe ad expected efforts of strategic ad theater weapos.of mass destructio was of cetra cocer as was the Soviet perceptios of the effect of quaitative improvemets o the ature of covetioa war. This is oe of a series of iterviews that have coducted with Dr.. There. is some dupicatio amog iterviews because have revisited some themes to carify poits from previous discussios ad have tried to provide eough iformatio to estabish the cotext for his aswers. This iterview expads o issues raised i the iterview of December 13, ''Thikig About Nucear War- ssues of Poey, Theory ad Practice" Uti 1980, Soviet poicy o ucear retaiatio as expressed i the Geera Staff Academy ectures caed for a fu ucear respose agaist the homead of ay state auchig eve tactica (battefied) ucear strikes o the territory of the Warsaw Pact (of ay member, ot oy the USSR). This Dr. idetified as the poitica approach to miitary doctrie i this area. practice, o rea paig was doe for a massive ucear respose to the use of tactica ucear weapos o a ess tha massive scae o the territory of a member of the Warsaw Pact. vouteered that he beieved persoay that the USSR woud defiitey ose the war if Soviet forces did ot respod quicky to iitia NATO ucear use with a avaiabe ucear capabiities. This is a statemet from someoe who persoay beieved that victory i such a war woud be meaigess. 144

15 " " ~ ~. L ~ - j d ' ~,:< :;.. Cod War terviews We revisited. the questio of who i the Geera Staff fuy uderstood the cosequeces of a ucear exchage. He respoded that the effects were reay we uderstood at the Daievich eve." Whe asked he added that, i the mid- to ate 1970s, Geera Daievich served as Deputy Director of the Mai Operatios Directorate. The Chief of the Geera Staff had some idea of the cosequeces but Ustiov, the Miister of Defese, did ot reay comprehed the eve of destructio ivoved. Accordig to Marxist-Leiist theory, victory was possibe, eve i ucear war. practice, the Geera Staff did ot have ay rea workig defiitio of victory i a ucear war ad the operatio simpy was ot discussed i those tes. t was we uderstood o the Geera Staff that the Soviet Uio woud ot come out of such a war i aywhere ear the same state i which it bega the war. The geera hope was that some udestroyed pocket of civiizatio woud survive, perhaps i Siberia that might form the basis for rebuidig the state. Dr. expaied that Geera Staff thikig did ot focus o the cosequeces of a ucear exchage for the Soviet Uio but cocetrated istead o the amout of destructio the USSR coud impose o the eemy. Soviet pubished miitary doctrie caed for cotiuous operatios i a theater of strategic miitary actio (TVD) regardess of whether or ot ucear weapos were used, as if such use woud do itte to chage the battefied eviromet. practice, the Geera Staff did o actua paig beyod the iitia exchage of ucear weapos o a tactica or operatioa scae.. Soviet decaratory poicy, at the Poitburo eve, rejected deterrece as a faacious ad eve immora cocept fact, accordig to Dr., the Poitburo accepted deterrece i 1965 whe the USSR first acquired CBMs. This acceptace was evidet i some speeches ad i the ectures at the Geera Staff Academy. raised with the distictio made i Soviet. poitica discussios betwee sdehivaie (restrait, or moray correct, Soviet deterrece) ad ustrasheie (terrorizig, or immora, Wester deterrece). He repied that eve o a theoretica eve the distictio was meaigess. The cocept adopted by the Poitburo ad hece by the Geera Staff was that war woud ot be iitiated by either side because both sides were hed at risk of highy destructive retaiatio eve after iitia surprise use of ucear weapos. Deterrece was based o mutua fear or terror. Rejectio of ustrasheie i the press was propagada. offered the opiio that, eve i the 1960s ad 1970s, the Soviet poitica eadership woud have supported egotiatios to prevet the iitiatio of ucear war. The Geera Staff. he beieves, woud have supported this approach. This is cosistet with Geera Daievich' s assessmet of Brezhev' s viscera fear of ucear use. Fiay. Dr. expaied that he ad severa others i the Geera Staff viewed the "U.S. poicy of arms racig" as a idirect attempt to udermie ad beed white the Soviet ecoomy. He ackowedged that the strategy worked because the Soviet eadership did ot kow how to dea with it effectivey. He idicated that the effects of such ecoomic warfare are evidet today. 145 :.

16 S~YOFuERVffiW Subject: Positio: Locatio: terviewer: Datefime: Laguage: Prepared by: Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Tsygicbko Seior Aayst, A-Uio Scietific-Techica stitute For Systems Studies (VNS), Academy of Scieces, USSR; Director, Ceter for Natioa Security ad Strategic Stabiity Studies Washigto, D.C. oh G. Hies March 21, 1991, 1:00 p.m. Russia oh G. Hies, based o otes 1974,.Ge. Shabaov asked Tsygicbko's stitute (NU-6)88 at the Geera Staff to use modeig to aayze the beefits of various kids of techoogies ad weapos. Shabaov wated a aaytica basis for pacig orders for differet types of weapos i. various quatities. The modes icuded weapos with various theoretica sets of techica characteristics (precisio, rage, destructiveess, ad possiby cotro).. reprogrammed existig modes (which were desiged primariy to test operatioa cocepts) i order to buid fictioa forces that were chaged i differet rus of the mode ad thus to estabish criteria for seectig ad ivestig i weapos systems. The cost of weapos was aso a serious cosideratio. The objective was to get the most combat effectiveess for the smaest ivestmet. ad his coeagues made.the modes, prepared a set of recoim.edatios, ad briefed Shabaov. Shabaov foud the recommedatios soud ad scietificay based but coud ot use them because they woud seriousy ru afou of the prerogatives of the Services ad the VPK [miitary-idustria compex i this case eaders resposibe for productio of armamets, missies, ad air defese systems. Based upo his positive impressio of's work, i 976 Shabaov formed his ow istitute [stitut Shabaova out of some of 's best peope for the specific purpose of doig force-deveopmet aaysis. Dr. cotiued to work with his former subordiates i Shabaov' s istitute. Athough the Directorate for Armamets was ot created uti the ate 1970s, Shabaov was resposibe for aamets i MoD sice the ate 1960s. Shabaov had the authority to work o geera criteria for weapos deveopmet. The Uio of VPK [miitary-idustria compex Directors of Heavy dustry, [Soiuz Direktorov VPKa Krupykh Predpriiatiz, was orgaized to obby the USSR Supreme Soviet to iberaize export costraits o products from the heavy idustry sector. As of March 1991, trade i fiished (techica) products was sti costraied by cocers about miitary secrecy, but firms were aready carryig out a fairy arge 88 N-Naucho-issedovate' skii istitut-scietific Research stitute. 146

17 Cod War terviews ' 1 busiess i exchagig haf-fiished products ad raw materias for hard currecy. Much of the hard currecy earigs were stored overseas. 0 1 '. j j 147

18 Subject: Positio: Locatio: SUMMARY OF NTERVEW Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Seior Aayst, A-Uio Scietific-Techica stitute For Systems Studies (VNS), Academy of Scieces, USSR; Director, Ceter for Natioa Security ad Strategic Stabiity Studies Washigto, D.C. terviewer: oh G. Hies Date: March 30, Laguage: Russia : Prepared by: oh G. Hies, based o otes After he formay retired from th~. Geera Staff i 1977, ad moved to the A Uio Scietific-Techica stitute For Systems Studies (VNS), cotiued to work part-time uti 1982 for the Geera Staff stitute of Operatios Research ad kept his high-eve cearaces because peope at the stitute did ot kow eough about the modes had deveoped to keep them workig. The Geera Staff prepared a report o Russia ad British imperia experieces i Afghaista. The report cocuded that a ivasio was a very bad idea i terms of fufiig possibe strategic objectives, gettig bogged dow, ad beig compromised by ivovemet i the regio. Ogarkov strogy edorsed the fidigs ad forwarded them through the MoD to.the Cetra Committee. After Ustiov became Defese Miister, the ifuece of the Geera Staffs.. aaysis o future forces deveopmet weakeed appreciaby over time reative to the Services workig with the VPK.. 89 The mai coisimer of the Geera Staffs stitute for Operatios Research (NT~ 6)90 was the Geera Staffs Mai Operatios Directorate, ad withi it, the Subdirectorate for Operatioa Paig (Napraveie Strategicheskogo Pairovaiia. Co. Oeg Poomarev, [ater Geera-Cooe, who retired i 1987 Director for Operatioa Paig uti1987,. supported modeig as a approach to decisio makig. Capt. Voosatov, who was assiged to Poomarev by, reay wrote the two artices (pubished i 1976 ad 1977, respectivey) that were siged by Poomarev. Ge.-Co. Kozov ad others aso supported the modeig effort. Co. Terekhov, a aayst at the Fruze Academy, took part i the debate o a ew roe for modeig. His modes were desiged to ru i rea time i order to 89 VPK- Voeaia Prom.ysheaia Kommissiia- (Miitary dustria Commissio): 90 Ni-Naucho-issedovate'skii istitut- Scietific Research stitute. 148

19 ' 1 0 " Cod War terviews vaidate or ivaidate tactica-eve decisios (by captais through cooes, patoo to regimet eves) as those decisios were beig made durig traiig ad exercises. Terekhov' s work addressed a differet eve of probem sovig from that which was the subject of the work of ad the Geera Staff stitute of Operatios Research. Terekhov created tactica modes, theater strategic ad Frot-eve modes.. Marsha Nikoai Ogarkov - Whe asked about the issues that might have ed to the remova of Marsha Ogarkov as Chief of the Geera Staff i September 1984, vouteered that Marsha Ogarkov authorized a study o the structure of the Aed Forces that was highy critica of their orgaizatio as we as maig practices. The study, circuated i the summer of 1984 amog seior MoD miitary eaders as we as seior aaysts advocated, amog other chages, the foowig measures: - Deep reductios i the size of the Armed Forces, as much as 50%. - Professioaizatio of the Armed Forces. The paper cited amog other justificatios, the high maiteace costs associated with abuse of sophisticated weapos ad equipmet by iexperieced coscripts. The cetra cotro radar for a SA-2 surface-to-air missie system, for exampe, historicay required capita repair after oy 2 years of operatios by a coscript crew. The same system woud operate for 6 years before capita repair whe crewed by professioa sodiers. - Reassigmet of Air Defese Forces Commad assets to other commads PVO air assets to the Air Forces, SAMs ad AAA to the Groud Forces. geera, the paper took the positio that the Armed Forces required more rapid moderizatio to be competitive ad that modem forces required reativey fewer persoe with much better skis. 149

20 SUMMARY OF NTERVEW., Subject: Positio:.: Dr. Vitaii Nikoaevich Seior Aayst, A-Uio Scietific-Techica stitute For Systems Studies (VNS), Academy of Scieces, USSR; Director, Ceter for Natioa Security ad Strategic Stabiity Studies. :. ; Locatio: terviewer: Date/Time: Duratio:. Laguage: Subjects discussed: Prepared by: Washigto, D.C. oh G. Hies December 21, 1991, 8:00p.m. ad December 23, 1991, 11:00 a.m. 3 hours Russia CBM Sio Vuerabi1ity, Vuerabiity of Persoe to Bast Overpressure, Modeig Comparisos of Soviet with Wester Ecoomies, the Roe ad Power of the Miitary Departmet of the Cetra Committee vis-a-vis the Geera Staff, Cetra Committee depedet Assessmet of the Chiese Threat, Mobiizatio Modeig, Effect of Medica Support o Rate of Advace i Theater Operatios, Stoppig the War for 2 Weeks to Resuppy, Persia Guf Mobiizatio Modeig Appicatios for U.S., Review of Weapos Programs by the Geera Staff, Remarks o Previous terviews oh G. Hies, based o otes CBM Sio Vuerabiity the cotext of a discussio about modeiig strategic ucear warfare Dr. Vitaii Tsygichk:o expaied that he was persoay ivoved i a series of tests, carried out by the Geera Staff o a aua basis betwee 1964 ad 1966, to test the vuerabiity of sio-based CBMs to groud-burst attack. The tests were coducted at Semipaatisk... Each test i the series required moths of preparatio, icudig egieer preparatio of a overhead scree (perhaps as arge as oe square kiometer) to cocea the test activities from U.S. sateite observatio. Missies idetica to those i operatio were put i sios desiged to actua operatioa specificatios. Charges were paced i the groud at various distaces from 20 meters to over 1 kiometer) from the sios, ad the effects of the basts were measured. The charges used did ot exceed the bast eergy effect of a 500 kioto ucear warhead. The tests took geoogica coditios ito accout ad tried to approximate the impact of a actua U.S. ucear attack o Soviet CBM sios. The measure of effectiveess (MOE) for a missie ki was the post-strike abiity of the etire missie system to be reiaby auched i the prescribed time (measured i hours at that time) ad to effectivey destroy its target. A jammed sio door, a ruptured fue system, a disorieted missie guidace system, or disruptio of the auch cotro system woud costitute a missie ki. (The damage was ormay much more extesive 150

21 Cod War terviews ad required days, weeks, ad eve moths to repair.) geera, the test data showed that groud bursts were extremey effective i destroyig sio-based CBM systems. (As a miimum, eve with distat strikes, sio doors ofte jammed.) Uder certai geoogica coditios, a groud wave from a strike as far away as. 1 km was powerfu eough to. drive the etire sio 3 m out of the groud, rederig competey ioperabe the missie system iside. Ay groud burst coser tha 1 km away was highy ikey to "ki" a siobased missie system. f two sios were ess tha 2 km apart, typicay both woud be disabed by oe icomig strike. Dr. was give the task of creatig modes to compare the effects of groud bursts ad air bursts. He used the masses of data coected i 1963 ad earier (before impemetatio of the ucear test ba treaty) from tests at Semipaatisk o the impact of ucear exposios o structures ad sios. Accordig to aaysis performed with the hep of his modes, a air burst (80 pus meters above groud) was 15-25% as effective i kiig a CBM as a groud burst of the same yied goig off at a equa distace from the target91 9 : 1966, Dr. took. part i briefig the Geera Staff o the tests ad modeig of sio vuerabiity. Because Soviet sio-based systems were show to be extremey vuerabe to groud-burst strikes i empirica testig, the Soviet miitary eadership took a series of decisios to dea with the direct ad idirect impicatios of the fidigs. First, they iitiated a major program to rebuid sios, whe feasibe, at distaces of greater tha 2 km from each other. Secod, they iitiated a program for the deveopmet ad depoymet of mobie CBMs. Third, scietists assumed that U.S. aaysts "were ot stupid" ad had coducted simiar experimets ad reached simiar cocusios regardig the reative effectiveess of groud bursts ad air bursts. O the basis of sateite photography, Soviet paers observed that U.S. missies were ot very we protected by overhead cover ad were grouped reativey cose to each other as we as to the auch cotro ceter. These observatios coviced the Geera Staff that U.S. ad-based CBMs were ot iteded to ride out a attack but istead were first-strike weapos [vooruzheiia pervogo udara ad were routiey referred to as such by Soviet miitary paers i a subsequet discussios ad itera writigs. Based o these cocusios, the Soviets took two iitiatives, oe operatioa ad the other programmatic. First, they adopted a acb-uder-attack doctrie, that is, to auch whe it was cear that U.S. missies bad bee auched. The doctrie coud ot be effectivey executed, however, because Soviet missies required a cosiderabe time to acb. The Soviet Uio's programmatic respose was the iitiatio of a arge-scae program i Miistry of Geera Machie Buidig to deveop both soid- ad iquid-fueed missie systems that coud be auched withi 5 miutes of a auch order. To describe the expected sceario, the USSR defied a ew kid of strike, a retaiatory-meetig strike [otveto-vstrechyi udar whereby Soviet missies were expected to pass America missies i mid-air o the way to targets o U.S. territory. Dr. Tsygicbk.o expaied that, to his kowedge, Soviet missies were to strike at miitary targets other tha sios ad at U.S. ifrastructure because of the assumptio that U.S. sios woud be empty uder a auch scearios This was the first comprehesive appicatio of mathematica modeig to a m)\jor area of Soviet miitary paig. The success of the modeig of sio-vuerabiity ad of strategic exchages i geera created cosiderabe ethusiasm i the Geera Staff for appicatio of modeig to other probems, sucb as aaysis of outcomes of theater war. Accordig to Dr., experiece with modeig of strategic warfare ad sio-werabiity were of itte or o hep i modeig theater warfare but it did buid cosiderabe credibiity for modeig as a!waytica too. 92 Some U.S. aaysts regard the SS-18 as too powetfu for empoymet agaist ifrastructure ad soft miitary targets. Likewise suspected Soviet missie-reoad capabiity woud be of1itte use i auchig a retaiatory strike if a Soviet sios were expected to be destroyed uder a cosidered scearios. The strategic forces directorate withi the Mai Operatios Directorate of the Geera Staff, at a decisio eve perhaps ot accessibe to Dr., might have targeted U.S. sios with the most capabe (highest yied) part of the 1'iC18 ad might have paed for the possibiity of. 151 :.

22 Cod War terviews Vuerabiity of Persoe to Bast Overpressure or. was aware of tests, coducted i the ate 1950s ad eary 1960s, o the effects o aimas of overpressure from both covetioa ad ucear weapos. Based upo expoitatio of pre-1946 Germa data ad other testig, Soviet scietists cocuded that a dog's respose to was cosest to that of humas. Based o.,... that Modeig Comparisos of Soviet with Wester Ecoomies Aroud 1978, a America ecoomist pubished a book93 assessig the itersectorbaace [mezhduotrasoi baas withi the Soviet ecoomy ad comparig the U.S. ad Soviet ecoomies. The book forecast a beak future for the Soviet ecoomy because of sigificat distortios, madistributio of ivestmet, ad excessive oproductive expeditures such as those devoted to defese. A Soviet poicy or ecoomics expert, Dr. beieves, must have brought the book to the Poitburo's attetio. 1979, Geera Chervov, the head of the formatio Directorate [upraveie with the Maio teigece Directorate (GRU). asked Dr. to determie whether the book's aaysis was based upo ope sources or o iteigece. Dr. examied the documetatio over severa weeks ad cocuded that the book was based upo opeyavaiabe sources. 0 The Cetra Committee the commissioed a study i 1979 to test the book's cocusios. Dr. is absoutey coviced the work was ispired by at east oe ifuetia member of the Poitburo itsef. The study wet o at east uti t was ru by the Director of the stitute of Ecoomics of the Soviet Academy of Scieces ad carried out by severa experts from severa istitutes to icude the stitute of Ecoomics, the stitute of Mathematics ad Physics, ad the VNTS (the a-uio stitute for Systems Research) to which Dr. was assiged. The project commaded support from the Mai teigece Directorate (GRU) of the Geera Staff, to icude arge amouts of data o Soviet miitary productio. despite the fact that the miitary was suspicious of ad eve hostie, to the effort. Dr. payed the roe of systemik i the effort, which meas that he heped to structure the aaysis ad modes to coduct the aaysis. The study bega with a assessmet of the itersector baace withi the Soviet ecoomy ad the compared the Soviet ecoomy to the advaced idustria ecoomies of the U.S., apa, ad Wester Europe. The fidigs essetiay cofirmed the cocusios of the America ecoomist. The Soviet GNP was estimated to be at aroud 40% the size of U.S. GNP, ad the gap betwee U.S. ad Soviet Poitburo authorizatio to auch eary eough to imit damage to the USSR. Other iterviews with Marsha of the Soviet Uio Akhromeev ad Marsha Ogartov's specia assistat, Geera Cooe Daievicb, strogy suggest, however, that Geera Staff paers asstimed that they woud ot get authorizatio to auch i time to imit damage. Other iterview subjects, such as Vitaii Kataev of the Soviet Cetra Committee, ad Geera Darioov, seemed to beieve that Miister of Defese Grecbko ad others i the seior miitary eadership showed itte iterest i reducig the vuerabiity of Soviet missies because they expected to strike preemptivey agaist U.S. auch preparatio. 93 Subsequet research did ot serve to fuher idetify the book i questio. 152.

23 . Cod War terviews output was wideig at a oiear rate. Dr. was uaware of exacty what impact, if ay, the study might have had o Soviet poicy.94. The Roe ad Power of the Miitary Departmet of the Cetra Committee vis-a-vis the Geera Staff ~ ~- 1 f1..\ : a Dr. beieves that U.S. aaysts geeray overestimated the Geera Staff's ifuece o miitary paig ad force deveopmet ad grossy uderestimated the importace of the Cetra Committee (CC) ad its Miitary Departmet [voeyi otdej. At east 60% of the membership of the Cetra Committee's Miitary Departmet were defese idustriaists, both miisters resposibe for arms productio ad chief desigers [gavye kostruktory. ad the remaiig 40% were poitica officers fpoiticheskie ofitsery who were very much the party's officers withi the miitary. The officers withi the Miitary Departmet of the CC wieded ifuece that far trasceded their miitary rak. The Defese Miister ad a chief desigers (who virtuay cotroed miitary productio) were members of the Cetra CoiD.!ttee ad its Miitary Departmet. The Chief of the Geera Staff ad the service chiefs were ot members ad, therefore, hed a fractio of the authority ad ifuece ejoyed by the Miitary Departmet of the CC, especiay i the areas of miitary poicy [voeaia poitika ad force deveopmet [voeoe stroite'stvo. As Dr. expaied it, the Miitary Departmet of the CC fuctioed as the de facto sittig Defese Couci, settig miitary poicy [voeaia poitika which govered miitary doctrie ad force deveopmet, ad supported the forma Defese Couci comprised of the Geera Secretary ad MoD, the chiefs of the KGB ad MVD [itera troops, the Miister of Foreig Affairs, ad severa major miitary idustriaists. Cetra Committee depedet Assessmet of the Chiese Threat ate 1979, the Cetra Committee iitiated a idepedet evauatio of the Geera Staff's assessmet of the Chiese threat Cooe Maasheko, the a member of the Cetra Committee's Miitary Departmet,95 paced Dr. i charge of a major reevauatio ad forecast of Chia's miitary potetia ad eve tried usuccessfuy to covice Dr. to retur to active duty to ru the study. Dr., the a seior aayst at VNTS, ra the study out of the stitute of the Mai teigece Directorate (GRU) [or N-6, a GRU Operatios Research stitute that primariy supported the Mai Operatios Directorate-GOD. Backed by the authority of the Cetra Committee's Miitary Departmet. Dr. was abe to coect a the iformatio he eeded from the miitary ad to eist aaysts from the etire Academy of Scieces. At the GRU stitute, 20 aaysts-mosty from VNTS, the GRU, ad the Geera Staff-worked o the project directy uder 's supervisio. (Dr. said that the Geera Staff ad GRU supported the work at Cetra Committee directio despite the essetiay "hostie" purpose of the study.) Aother 39 aaysts from various istitutes of the Academy of Scieces participated i the study ad cotributed data ad aaytica support at Dr. 's directio. Dr. ad his coeagues were excited by their power to commad resources for the study ad his ethusiasm was evidet eve as he discussed the effort i the iterview. Work bega i eary 1980 ad wet o for 5 years. There was substatia high-eve iterest i the study. 94 The ature ad resuts of this work were probaby kow to Oorbachev ad his supporters i the mid-1980s ad coud have provided "scietificay deveoped" aaytica support to boster Gorbachev's push agaist Party coservatives for radica chage. 95 Later a specia assistat to Presidet Gorbacbev uti the ed of the atter's presidecy. 153

24 : " ~.)! 0 ~ ~1 j Cod War terviews Dr. coducted yeary briefmgs to seior officias of the Defese Miistry ad the Miitary Departmet of the Cetra Committee. [He recaed that 1983 was the frst year i which the work was sufficiety we deveoped to provide a coheret story to the eadership. The study resuted i the deveopmet of four separate modes that aayzed Chia's ecoomic, mobiizatio ad depoymet, trasportatio, ad TVD-scae warfare capabiities. Nucear weapos were excuded from the study ad might have bee cosidered separatey by other aaysts. The modes idicated that Chia did ot pose a serious threat. Over the 15-year period projected by the aaysis, Chia was foud to ack the miitary-idustria capacity ad the ifrastructure to threate the USSR. For exampe, Chia woud eed weeks to move its forces because of a ack of trasportatio etworks. Moreover, Dr. ad his coeagues did ot detect ay Chiese itetio to attack the Soviet Far East. The Geera Staff ad the GRU, whose assessmets of Chia teded to be aarmist, did ot support the fidigs of Dr. 's study. Despite these disagreemets, the Chief of the GRU ad the Geera Staff siged off with approva o the study's fidigs without writte reservatios because of the authority of the Cetra Committee. Mobiizatio Modeig aayticai work they did i the 1970s at the Geera Staff's N-6. Dr. ad his coeagues made a distictio betwee ogistics support (icudig resuppy ad attritio fis) durig the course of combat operatios, o the oe had, ad strategic atiowide mobiizatio ad depoymet o the other. The mode for war i the TVD ecompassed a modue to assess the secod echeo ad reserve commitmets ad ogistics support. A separate mode aayzed strategic mobiizatio ad depoymet [strategicheskoe razvertyvaie i the USSR precedig, ad more ofte foowig, the outbreak of war. The strategic mobiizatio ad depoymet mode estimated the time eeded to make divisios combat-ready ad to move them to the frot ies. A umber of factors were cosidered: the eve of a give divisio's readiess at the momet that the mobiizatio order is issued; the time required to assig peope to divisios, to get divisios up to stregth, to prepare the equipmet ad to trai troops ad make them combat-ready (this cosisted of idividua ad sm!-uit traiig as we as combied traiig [sozhaia uckeba at the divisio eve); ad the time spet trasportig (through poits of embarkatio ad disembarkatio) ad depoyig troops. The mode accouted for the deays expected i movig suppies through trasshipmet poits (such as those at the Soviet-Poish border), ad it assumed destructio of trasshipmet ad disembarkatio poits as we as damage or destructio to dowoadig faciities o a wide scae, that varied i detai i modeed scearios depedig upo whe ad where the war bega. the mode, a divisio was ot depoyed uti it was fuy traied up to the divisio eve ad rated combat-ready [boesposobaia. Dr. expressed the covictio that depoymet of ocombat-ready uits (as defmed) was ot cosidered to make sese ad was ot seriousy cosidered i the paig he was aware of. 154

25 } Cod War terviews Effect of Medica Support o Rate of Advace i Theater Operatios ~...} The TVD mode showed that high eves of osses woud quicky decrease combat readiess. Medica studies from the 1970s predicted substatia umbers of casuaties i a war i Cetra Europe, which woud require extesive mobie medica support The TVD mode, usig the medica data, exposed a serious deficiecy i Soviet mobiehospita capabiities (icudig grossy iadequate umbers of doctors ad medica techicias), ad thus aticipated very high serious ijury ad fataity rates. Uits whose osses exceeded 50% i a matter of hours were rated ocombat-ready ad withdraw. Their repacemet by ew uits put a severe strai o a trasport etwork aready uder attack. The deciig combat readiess of first-echeo divisios due to urepaced osses, combied with the time spet repacig first-echeo divisios with operatioa reserves ad the shrikig avaiabiity of arge-scae repacemets i a war of high attritio, was expected to sow the Soviet advace dramaticay. Dr. said that the work of medica services aaysts ad eve the modeig appicatios of their fidigs did ot ifuece the Geera Staff to correct deficiecies i fied medica support because, utimatey, it was ot as "iterestig" as ivestmet i miitary hardware. He sesed a reuctace o the part of seior Geera Staff geeras to reay dea with the reaity of warfare ad its cosequeces, ad the iattetio of the geeras to the critica shortcomig i medica support was idicative of their idifferece. Stoppig the War for 2 Weeks To Resuppy Accordig to Dr. Tsygicbko's modeig, a iitia operatio woud ast 9 to 12 days (this might put them at the Frech border i some ocatios ad at the Rhie River i others) ad the come to a compete hat for days to permit resuppy ad troop repacemet. The pause woud be a uavoidabe costrait o the offesive because the resuppy woud be too sow to maitai the mometum of the first echeo beyod the advace expected i the iitia TVD operatio.. Whe asked about the cocept that secod-echeo Frots woud simpy pick up the offesive from exhausted first-echeo Frots at the ed of the iitia operatio, expaied that there were basic rea-word physica costraits ad, to a esser extet, orgaizatioa costraits that woud make the "secod-echeo Frot" soutio impossibe to execute. The "commitmet of secod-echeo Frots" was actuay a assumptio of commad by secod-echeo Frots Qf first-echeo armies ad divisios aready i pace, suppemeted by some fresh divisios ad perhaps armies. The fuctioig of the ogistics support system i the TVD was, i most respects, isesitive to the idetity of the Frot.or Frots to which the ogistics commad structure was subordiated. other words, fue, ammuitio, ad food suppies were or were ot avaiabe ad trasportabe regardess of the idetity of the commad superstructure. Moreover, Geera Staff modeig ad aay.sis coducted by Dr. 's departmet idicated that basic suppies woud ot be avaiabe to sustai operatios beyod approximatey 2 weeks because of expected high osses ad protracted trasport times exacerbated by extesive destructio of the trasportatio ifrastruc.ture. Uder these coditios, the umber of Frots did ot matter \, 155.

26 Cod War terviews Persia Guf Mobizatio Modeig Appicatios :1.f) ~;.f D ' } 1984, the Geera Staff asked Dr. to estimate how rapidy the Uited States coud depoy 500,000 troops to the Persia Guf(!). The Geera Staff had assumed that a haf-miio U.S. troops coud reach the Guf ad be prepared to fight i 1 moth. cotrast, Dr. Tsygicbko's modeig idicated that the U.S. woud eed at east 4-1/2 moths to carry out such a depoymet. The U.S. woud be costraied primariy by the trasportatio etworks iside the U.S. ad by the umber of bottoms ad aircraft avaiabe to carry the forces fotward ad to brig i the requisite ogistics support. Combat readiess of U.S. uits was rated fairy high at the uit ad divisio eves whe mobiiza~o bega. Reew of Weapos Programs by the Geera Staff the ate 1960s ad eary 1970s, Dr. participated i a aaytica support roe i two separate weapos system program review board meetigs. The purp.ose of such meetigs was to deveop a fia recommedatio o productio, oproductio or modificatio o a weapos system that was preseted by its sposorig desig bureau as ready for series productio. A participats were expected to have reviewed ad evauated a reevat materias ad to have deveoped orgaizatioa positios before attedig the decisio meetig. Such meetigs usuay were chaired by a three-star geera from the Geera Staff, ofte from the prestigious Mai Operatios Directorate (GOU) ad atteded by represetatives of the "buyig" service, the Geera Staff, ad the miitary idustria coiddssio.. The meetigs atteded were chaired by the Deputy Director of the Geera Staff's Mai Operatios Directorate. Oe system review meetig easiy deve()ped a cosesus to support series productio of the weapos system imder review. The other just as ceary disapproved series productio. the secod istace, the meetig chairma himsef preseted voumes of documetary evidece to estabish the iabiity of the weapos system to meet operatioa requiremets. His view refected the cosesus which recommeded agaist productio O the basis of his experiece at th~ meetigs, Dr. expected the supported system to be produced ad the egativey evauated system to be caceed. fact, both systems wet ito productio o schedue, eadig to cocude that the review board meetigs were a empty formaity desiged to moify the Geera Staff ad other payers outside the miitary idustria commissio (VPK)96 but which had o rea effect o program deveopmet. Remarks o Previous terviews Dr. Tsygicbko commeted further o a paper he had prepared earier, Kommetarii k iterv'iu V. N. v godu:97 the 1960s ad 1970s, Vitaii Tsygicbko expaied, the Soviet Uio had a comprehesive pa for retaiatio agaist ucear attack. The pa, which was updated every 6 moths, caed for a Soviet auch- 96 VPK- Voeaia Promysheaia Kommissiia- (Miitay dustria Commissio). 97 Remarks, i Russia, o the terviews ojv.n. Tygichko give i are i Appedix E: of this voume. 156