Introduction. GORDON R. SULLIVAN General, United States Army Chief of Staff

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2 Introduction Word War II was the argest and most vioent armed confict in the history of mankind. However, the haf century that now separates us from that confict has exacted its to on our coective knowedge. Whie Word War II continues to absorb the interest of miitary schoars and historians, as we as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity argey unaware of the poitica, socia, and miitary impications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a peope with a common purpose. Highy reevant today, Word War II has much to teach us, not ony about the profession of arms, but aso about miitary preparedness, goba strategy, and combined operations in the coaition war against fascism. During the next severa years, the U.S. Army wi participate in the nation s 50th anniversary commemoration of Word War II. The commemoration wi incude the pubication of various materias to hep educate Americans about that war. The works produced wi provide great opportunities to earn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificenty in what has been caed the mighty endeavor. Word War II was waged on and, on sea, and in the air over severa diverse theaters of operation for approximatey six years. The foowing essay is one of a series of campaign studies highighting those strugges that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army s significant miitary feats from that war. This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Miitary History by Cayton D. Laurie. I hope this absorbing account of that period wi enhance your appreciation of American achievements during Word War II. GORDON R. SULLIVAN Genera, United States Army Chief of Staff

3 Anzio 22 January 24 May 1944 During the eary morning hours of 22 January 1944, troops of the Fifth Army swarmed ashore on a fifteen-mie stretch of Itaian beach near the prewar resort towns of Anzio and Nettuno. The andings were carried out so fawessy and German resistance was so ight that British and American units gained their first day s objectives by noon, moving three to four mies inand by nightfa. The ease of the anding and the swift advance were noted by one paratrooper of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, who recaed that D-day at Anzio was sunny and warm, making it very hard to beieve that a war was going on and that he was in the midde of it. The ocation of the Aied andings, thirty mies south of Rome and fifty-five mies northwest of the main ine of resistance running from Minturno on the Tyrrhenian Sea to Ortona on the Adriatic, surprised oca German commanders, who had been assured by their superiors that an amphibious assaut woud not take pace during January or February. Thus when the anding occurred the Germans were unprepared to react offensivey. Within a week, however, as Aied troops consoidated their positions and prepared to break out of the beachhead, the Germans gathered troops to eiminate what Adof Hiter caed the Anzio abscess. The next four months woud see some of the most savage fighting of Word War II. Strategic Setting Foowing the successfu Aied andings at Caabria, Taranto, and Saerno in eary September 1943 and the unconditiona surrender of Itay that same month, German forces had quicky disarmed their former aies and begun a sow, fighting withdrawa to the north. Defending two hastiy prepared, fortified bets stretching from coast to coast, the Germans significanty sowed the Aied advance before setting into the Gustav Line, a third, more formidabe and sophisticated defensive bet of interocking positions on the high ground aong the peninsua s narrowest point. The Germans intended to fight for every portion of this ine, set in

4 the rugged Apennine Mountains overooking scores of rain-soaked vaeys, marshes, and rivers. The terrain favored the defense and, as esewhere in Itay, was not conducive to armored warfare. Luftwaffe Fied Marsha Abert Kessering, whom Hiter had appointed as commander of a German forces in Itay on 6 November 1943, promised to hod the Gustav Line for at east six months. As ong as the ine was maintained it prevented the Fifth Army from advancing into the Liri vaey, the most ogica and direct route to the major Aied objective of Rome. The vaidity of Kessering s strategy was demonstrated repeatedy between October 1943 and January 1944 as the Aies aunched numerous costy attacks against we-entrenched enemy forces. The idea for an amphibious operation near Rome had originated in ate October 1943 when it became obvious that the Germans were going to fight for the entire peninsua rather than withdraw to northern Itay. The Aied advance foowing the Saerno invasion was proving so arduous, due to poor weather, rough terrain, and stiffening resistance, that Genera Dwight D. Eisenhower pessimisticay tod the Ango-American Combined Chiefs of Staff that there woud be very hard and bitter fighting before the Aies coud hope to reach Rome. As a resut, Aied panners were ooking for ways to break out of the costy strugge for each ridge and vaey, which was consuming enormous numbers of men and scarce suppies. When the British conducted a successfu amphibious operation at Termoi on 2 3 October, anding behind German positions on the Adriatic front, hopes were raised that a simiar, arger assaut south of Rome coud outfank the Gustav Line. Such an operation coud faciitate a breakthrough aong the main ine of resistance in the south and cut German ines of retreat, suppy, and communications. On 8 November British Genera Sir Harod R. L. G. Aexander, commander of the 15th Army Group (consisting of the Fifth and Eighth Armies under Lt. Gen. Mark W. Cark and Genera Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, respectivey), passed down orders to Cark from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They directed him to formuate a pan for anding a singe division at Anzio (codenamed Operation SHINGLE) on 20 December 1943 as part of a projected three-pronged Aied offensive. The subsequent ack of progress, however, and a chronic shortage of troops and shipping due to the ongoing buidup for the cross-channe invasion of France (OVERLORD), soon made the initia anding date impractica. 4

5 The entire Anzio operation was sheved on 18 December. But changes in the Mediterranean theater command structure woud soon ead to its resuscitation. Genera Eisenhower formay reinquished command of Aied forces in the Mediterranean to Genera Sir Henry M. Wison in eary January Previousy, Mediterranean strategy had been driven argey by U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marsha, the eading spokesman in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who had frequenty communicated directy with his American subordinate. When Eisenhower eft to prepare for Operation OVERLORD, however, Marsha ost this abiity to infuence Mediterranean events as panning responsibiity passed to Britain s Sir Aan Brooke and the British Chiefs of Staff. Genera Wison s argey British command resurrected the Anzio pan with his superior s approva. Heaviy infuenced by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchi, the British Chiefs of Staff continued to advocate a arge Mediterranean effort as part of the soft underbey or periphera approach to defeating Nazi Germany. To Churchi the quick iberation of Rome offered the key to the success of this strategy and the rapid capture of Rome impicity required a anding at Anzio. Churchi prevaied upon the Americans in eary January 1944 to deay further transfers of amphibious shipping from the Mediterranean to Engand so that a anding coud take pace in Itay by the end of the month. The anding was schedued tentativey for ate January Anzio was seected because it was considered the best site within striking distance of Rome but sti within range of Aied aircraft operating from Napes. The initia beachhead was to be fifteen mies wide by seven mies deep. The terrain at Anzio consisted of roing, often wooded farm country on a narrow coasta pain extending north from the town of Terracina to across the Tiber River. The entire region was part of an eaborate recamation and resettement project that had been undertaken by Mussoini to showcase Fascist agricutura improvements and was studded with pumping stations and farmhouses and crisscrossed by irrigation ditches and canas. Twenty mies inand from Anzio on the approach to Rome were the Aban His, around whose southwest side ran Highway 7, a major north-south route. To the southeast of the Aban His was the Veetri Gap eading inand to another main north-south route, Highway 6, at Vamontone. East of the Veetri Gap were the Lepini 5

6 Mountains aong whose southeastern edge ran the Pontine Marshes extending to Terracina. The proposed beachhead was bounded in the north by the Moetta and Incastro Rivers, in the center by open fieds eading to the viages of Padigione and Apriia aong the Anzio-Abano Road, and in the south by the viages of Cisterna and Littoria, a provincia capita, and the Mussoini Cana. The operations at Anzio were to be supported by a genera 15th Army Group offensive. One week before the Anzio assaut, the Fifth Army, consisting of the U.S. II Corps, the British 10 Corps, and the French Expeditionary Corps, woud aunch a massive offensive on the Gustav Line, cross the Garigiano and Rapido Rivers, strike the German Tenth Army under Lt. Gen. Heinrich von Vietinghoff in the area of Cassino, breach the enemy ine there, push up the Liri vaey, and ink up with the forces at Anzio for the drive on Rome. Meanwhie, Aied, British, and Commonweath forces of the Eighth Army were ordered to break through on the Adriatic front or at east tie down German forces to prevent their transfer to the Anzio area. Genera Cark designated Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, U.S. Army, commander of the Fifth Army s VI Corps, to ead the invasion and gave him two missions. First, Lucas was to divert enemy strength from the south and, in anticipation of a swift and vioent enemy reaction, to prepare defensive positions. The vague second portion of his orders directed him to move toward the Aban His and points east for the ink-up with the remainder of the Fifth Army on D-day pus 7. In what became a source of continued controversy, neither American interpreted these orders as specificay charging VI Corps with the immediate capture of the Aban His. That attitude refected Cark s and Lucas skepticism regarding the argey British pan and the feasibiity of the overa Anzio operation. Cark in particuar had been enthusiastic about the Anzio pan in its eary stages, but he became increasingy pessimistic after earning that ony two divisions were avaiabe for the operation. Both men expected that the assaut troops woud have to fight their way ashore against fierce resistance. They strongy doubted whether the sma force coud survive even the initia German counterattacks anticipated on D-day, et aone estabish a viabe beachhead. The notion that these troops coud aso take and hod the Aban His soon after anding, as impied by the British, seemed overy optimistic. Under the circumstances Cark wanted to remain fexibe, and he 6

7 encouraged Lucas to do the same, eaving the decision about how far and how fast to advance to the VI Corps commander. By the time the pans for Operation SHINGLE were finaized on 8 January, with D-day schedued for 22 January 1944, the anding had evoved from a sma, subsidiary attack into a major offensive operation behind enemy ines. For the initia assaut Cark seected a combined Ango-American force then gathering in Napes. Since the Aies wanted to and the argest possibe contingent that avaiabe amphibious assaut shipping aowed, the invasion force consisted of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division; the British 1st Infantry Division and 46th Roya Tank Regiment; the U.S. 751st Tank Battaion, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne Division, and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battaion; two British Commando battaions; and three battaions of U.S. Army Rangers. The U.S. 45th Infantry Division and Combat Command A (CCA), a regimenta-size unit of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, were directed to and as reinforcements once the beachhead was estabished. The XII Tactica Air Command, the British Desert Air Force, the Coasta Air Force, and the Tactica Bomber Force, units which were supporting Aied operations throughout the entire Mediterranean theater, were directed to conduct major air assauts in support of the Anzio andings. The approximatey 2,600 avaiabe Aied aircraft were to gain air superiority over the beach, provide cose air support for the invading forces, and destroy enemy airfieds and hinder communications. The 64th Fighter Wing was charged with protecting the batte area during the actua andings from some 2,000 German aircraft beieved to be stationed in Itay and the Bakans. To move, protect, and assist the assaut forces, the Aies assembed a nava fotia comprising vesses from six nations. Task Force 81, commanded by U.S. Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry, contained over 250 combat-oaded vesses and amphibious assaut craft of a sizes and descriptions. Admira Lowry aso commanded the 74 vesses of Task Force X-Ray, assigned to see American forces safey ashore and to support their beachhead operations, whie Admira Thomas H. Troubridge, Roya Navy, commanded the 52 ships of Task Force Peter, which was to carry, and, and support the British contingents. To obtain surprise, the Aies decided to dispense with a ong preiminary nava bombardment, panning instead on a short and intense ten-minute barrage by two British assaut vesses equipped with 1,500 5-inch rockets. As a diversion- 7

8 The Anzio-Nettuno area. (Nationa Archives) ary move, other nava units were ordered to she the coasta town of Civitavecchia, forty mies to the north. The Aies aunched their offensive in the south on 12 January 1944, with the French Expeditionary Corps assauting Cassino and the British 10 Corps attempting to expoit previous gains on the Garigiano River. Neither attack succeeded in breaking through the Gustav Line, athough imited progress was made. One week ater, on 20 January, the U.S. II Corps attacked in the center of the Fifth Army front, attempting to cross the Rapido River. After two days of bitter fighting and heavy osses, the II Corps 36th Infantry Division was forced to break off its attack. The assaut on the Gustav Line, the ynch-pin of the Aied pan of which Anzio was a part, had bogged down. In the meantime, farther south, the eaborate air and sea precautions taken to mask and protect the Anzio anding force were competed. The armada set sai from Napes on 21 January. Operations The Anzio invasion began at 0200 on 22 January 1944 and achieved, Genera Lucas recaed, one of the most compete surprises in history. The Germans had aready sent their regiona re- 8

9 serves south to counter the Aied attacks on the Garigiano on 18 January, eaving one nine-mie stretch of beach at Anzio defended by a singe company. The first Aied waves anded unopposed and moved rapidy inand. On the southern fank of the beachhead the 3d Division quicky seized its initia objectives, brushing aside a few dazed patros, whie unopposed British units achieved equa success in the center and north. Simutaneousy, Rangers occupied Anzio, and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battaion seized Nettuno. A VI Corps objectives were taken by noon as the Aied air forces competed 1,200 sorties against targets in and around the beachhead. On the beach itsef, the U.S. 36th Engineer Combat Regiment budozed exits, aid corduroy roads, ceared mines, and readied the port of Anzio to receive its first anding ship, tank (LST), an amphibious assaut and suppy ship, by the afternoon of D-day. By midnight over 36,000 men and 3,200 vehices, 90 percent of the invasion force, were ashore with casuaties of 13 kied, 97 wounded, and 44 missing. During D-day Aied troops captured 227 German defenders. Aied units continued to push inand over the next few days to a depth of seven mies against scattered but increasing German resistance. In the center of the beachhead, on 24 January, the British 1st Division began to move up the Anzio-Abano Road toward Campoeone and, with hep from the 179th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division, captured the town of Apriia, known as the Factory because of its custer of brick buidings, on 25 January. Within three days the continuing Ango-American drive pushed the Germans a further 1.5 mies north of the Factory, created a huge buge in enemy ines, but faied to break out of the beachhead. Probes by the 3d Division toward Cisterna and by the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment toward Littoria on January made some progress but were aso hated short of their goas by stubborn resistance. Renewed attacks on the next day brought the Americans within three mies of Cisterna and two mies beyond the west branch of the Mussoini Cana. But the 3d Division commander, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., on orders of the corps commander, caed a hat to the offensive, a pause that ater engthened into a genera consoidation and reorganization of beachhead forces between 26 and 29 January. Meanwhie, the Aied troop and materie buidup had proceeded at a breakneck pace. Despite continuous German artiery and air harassment, a constant fact of ife throughout the campaign, 9

10 Incastro THE LANDING 22 January 1944 River Initia Beachhead Line Campoeone ELEVATION IN METERS Veetri Cori and Above 0 Ardea Mies Moetta River 4 Apriia (the Factory) HIGHWAY 7 Cisterna Padigione 1st Inf Nettuno ANZIO Rangers 3d Inf (1st, 3d, 4th) Conca Mussoini Cana Borgo Grappa Littoria the Aies off-oaded twenty-one cargo ships and anded 6,350 tons of materie on 29 January aone, and on 1 February the port of Anzio went into fu operation. Improving air defenses downed ninety-seven attacking Luftwaffe aircraft prior to 1 February, but the Germans did succeed in sinking one destroyer and a hospita ship, as we as destroying significant stocks of suppies pied on the crowded beaches. Mindfu of the need for reinforcements, Lucas ordered ashore the rest of the 45th Infantry Division and remaining portions of the 1st Armored Division aotted to the Anzio operation, raising the tota number of Aied sodiers in the beachhead to 61,

11 Preoaded suppy trucks and DUKWs at Napes. Archives) (Nationa The Germans had not been ide during the week after the Anzio anding. The German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) in Berin was surprised at the ocation of the anding and the efficiency with which it was carried out. Athough they had considered such an attack probabe for some time and had made preiminary pans for meeting it, Kessering and his oca commanders were poweress to repe the invasion immediatey because of the ack of adequate reserves. Nevertheess, German reaction to the Anzio anding was swift and utimatey woud prove far more powerfu than anything the Aies had anticipated. Upon receiving word of the andings, Kessering immediatey dispatched eements of the 4th Parachute and Hermann Goering Divisions south from the Rome area to defend the roads eading north from the Aban His. Within the next twenty-four hours Hiter dispatched other units to Itay from Yugosavia, France, and Germany to reinforce eements of the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 71st Infantry Divisions that were aready moving into the Anzio area. By the end of D-day, thousands of German troops were converging on Anzio, despite deays caused by Aied air attacks. 11

12 Men and equipment move ashore south of Anzio on D- day. (Nationa Archives) OKW, Kessering, and Brig. Gen. Siegfried Westpha, Kessering s chief of staff, were astonished that the Anzio forces had not expoited their unopposed anding with an immediate thrust into the virtuay undefended Aban His on January. As Westpha ater recounted, there were no significant German units between Anzio and Rome, and he specuated that an imaginative, bod strike by enterprising forces coud easiy have penetrated into the interior or sped straight up Highways 6 and 7 to Rome. Instead, Westpha recaed, the enemy forces ost time and hesitated. As the Germans ater discovered, Genera Lucas was neither bod nor imaginative, and he erred repeatedy on the side of caution, to the increasing chagrin of both Aexander and Cark. By 24 January Kessering, confident that he had gathered sufficient forces to contain the beachhead, transferred the Fourteenth Army headquarters under Genera Eberhard von Mackensen from Verona in northern Itay to Anzio. Mackensen soon controed eements of 8 divisions, totaing 40,000 troops, with 5 more divisions on the way. Seeking to prevent a permanent Aied foothod at Anzio, Kessering ordered a counterattack for 28 January, but Mackensen requested and received a postponement unti 1 February to await further reinforcements, especiay armored units that were being hed up by Aied air attacks. Two days before the schedued offensive, the Fourteenth Army numbered about 70,000 12

13 River Veetri Incastro Campoeone Cori HIGHWAY 7 Ardea Moetta River Apriia (the Factory) 1st Inf Br Padigione XX 3d Inf Cisterna ANZIO Nettuno 45th Inf Conca XX Mussoini Cana Littoria EXPANDING THE BEACHHEAD 1 February 1944 Front Line, Morning Front Line, Evening ELEVATION IN METERS and Above Borgo Grappa 0 Mies 4 combat troops, most aready depoyed in forward staging areas, with severa thousand more on the way. Racing against the expected German counterattack, both the Fifth and Eighth Armies prepared to renew their staed offensives in the south. Lucas meanwhie panned a two-pronged attack for 30 January. Whie one force cut Highway 7 at Cisterna before moving east into the Aban His, a second was to advance northeast up the Abano Road, break through the Campoeone saient, and expoit the gap by moving to the west and southwest. A quick ink-up with Fifth Army forces in the south was beieved 13

14 Isoa Bea and Cisterna. (Nationa Archives) sti possibe even though German resistance a aong the perimeter of the beachhead was becoming stronger. The 3d Division and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battaions under Co. Wiiam O. Darby were responsibe for the initia attack on Cisterna. The 1st and 3d Rangers were to spearhead the assaut by infitrating the German ines and seizing and hoding Cisterna unti the 4th Rangers and 15th Infantry, 3d Division, arrived via the Conca-Cisterna Road. Meanwhie, at 0200, 30 January, the 7th Infantry, 3d Division, was to push on the eft to a point above Cisterna and cut Highway 7, whie the 15th Infantry passed to the right of Cisterna and cut the highway south of town. As a diversion the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment woud attack aong the Mussoini Cana. Unknown to the Americans, their assaut was aimed directy at the center of the area where thirty-six enemy battaions were massing for their 1 February counterattack. The Rangers moved out at 0130 to the right of the Conca-Cisterna Road and by dawn were within 800 yards of Cisterna. But German sodiers of the 715th Motorized Infantry Division discovered the ighty armed Ranger force during the night and sprang a devastating ambush at first ight. Heavy fighting broke out and the Rangers were pinned down quicky by an enemy superior in arms 14

15 and numbers. Efforts by the 4th Rangers and 15th Infantry to rescue the beeaguered units faied, and by noon armored units of the Hermann Goering Division had forced the Rangers into the open. The Americans had ony grenades and bazookas for antitank weapons, and as they attempted a fighting withdrawa in sma and scattered groups they were cut down merciessy. Of the 767 men in the two battaions, ony 6 eventuay returned to Aied ines. In spite of the disaster that befe the Rangers, the 7th and 15th Infantry regiments continued their attacks toward Cisterna, one sodier recaing that the defenders cung stubborny to their entrenched positions whie aunching ocay heavy counterattacks. Sgt. Truman O. Oson, a ight machine gunner with Company B, 7th Infantry, took part in one sixteen-hour assaut on entrenched enemy positions in which one-third of his company became casuaties. Having seized a toehod, the survivors dug in whie Sergeant Oson and his crew took their one avaiabe machine gun and paced it forward of the ine to bear the brunt of an expected enemy counterattack. Athough he had been firing without respite a day, Oson stuck grimy to his post throughout the night whie his gun crew was kied, one by one, by accurate and overwheming enemy fire. Weary from over twenty-four hours of continuous batte and suffering from an arm wound, Oson manned his gun aone, meeting the fu force of a 200-man enemy dawn assaut supported by mortars and machine guns. After thirty minutes of fighting, Oson was severey wounded, but he refused evacuation. For an hour and a haf after receiving a second and subsequenty fata wound, he continued to fire his machine gun, kiing at east twenty of the enemy, wounding many more, and utimatey forcing the attackers to withdraw. For his actions Sergeant Oson was posthumousy awarded the Meda of Honor. Whie some progress was made by 3d Division units in the face of noticeaby stronger enemy resistance, by nightfa on 31 January the Americans were sti one mie from the viage, batting stubborny forward but unabe to break through. On the foowing day fighting was equay inconcusive, and by noon it had become obvious, after three days of costy attacks and counterattacks, that the Americans coud not capture Cisterna, sti 1,500 yards away. Heeding inteigence reports deivered on 2 February, which indicated the arriva of new German units in the Anzio area and an imminent enemy counterattack, Truscott, on the orders of Cark and Lucas, again tod his command to dig in. 15

16 The other prong of the Aied attack aunched by the British 1st Division and CCA, 1st Armored Division, toward Campoeone and the Aban His initiay fared itte better. Rain-soaked terrain, fierce enemy fire, and ubiquitous minefieds sowed CCA s advance, and by nightfa on 30 January the unit was sti strugging to reach its ine of departure. The British succeeded in advancing two mies the first day, but they aso faied to breach the German defenses. Genera Lucas changed pans for the second day of the attack and ordered the British to breach the enemy ine aong the Abano Road at Campoeone for expoitation by CCA. During the next two days the Aies reached Campoeone, penetrated the German main ine, and opened a two-mie-wide gap. But the exhausted Aied troops were unabe to expoit their success, and the drive ground to a hat. The faiure of the Aied breakout attempt, stymied by stiff resistance, convinced Aexander, Cark, and Lucas that an enemy counterattack must be in the offing. Reinforcements were rushed to Anzio, incuding 1,800 men of the American-Canadian 1st Specia Service Force, eements of the British 56th Division, and additiona antiaircraft and artiery units, raising the tota number of Aied sodiers in the beachhead to 100,000. Despite these additions, the Fourteenth Army outnumbered the Aies at Anzio by 4 February. But the German force was a hodgepodge of rapidy thrown together units. A were criticay short of ammunition, training, quaified eaders, and reserves. Aied air attacks had disrupted communications, hampered troop and suppy movements, and caused morae probems. From the outset Mackensen had doubted the avaiabe force coud eiminate the Anzio beachhead, but he prepared a forcefu counterattack nonetheess. The 4th Parachute and 65th infantry Divisions of the I Parachute Corps were to pinch off the Campoeone saient and recapture the Factory at Apriia. The same units woud then break through to the sea aong the Abano Road. Esewhere the LXXVI Panzer Corps, consisting of the 3d Panzer Grenadier, 715th Motorized Infantry, 71st Infantry, Hermann Goering, and 26th Panzer Divisions woud attack south of Cisterna aong the Mussoini Cana and attempt to breach the Aied perimeter and advance on Nettuno and Anzio. The counterattack opened with an artiery barrage on 3 4 February, foowed by armored and infantry assauts which smashed into the partiay prepared British 1st Division defenses in 16

17 The Factory. (Nationa Archives) the Campoeone saient. The British hed, despite suffering 1,400 casuaties, but their dangerousy exposed position prompted Lucas to order their withdrawa to one mie north of the Factory and Carroceto on the night of 4 5 February, a retreat of about 2.5 mies. Athough the saient was eiminated, the Germans faied to break the Aied ine or retake the Factory. The unduating and soggy Abano Road area was just as inhospitabe to German armor and infantry as it had been to Aied forces the week before. However, the critica situation the Germans created in the Aied center convinced Lucas to form a beachhead defense ine running from the Moetta River in the north, through the fieds of the centra sector, to the Mussoini Cana in the south. He issued orders to a Aied troops that this was the fina ine of resistance to be hed at a costs the shaow beachhead precuded any further retreat. The Germans renewed their attacks on 7 February in the weakened British 1st Division sector and, in two days of bitter fighting, pushed the British troops from the Factory and Carroceto. Athough battered and exhausted, they managed to maintain a coherent ine and were reinforced on 10 February by the 1st Armored Regiment, CCA, 1st Armored Division (itsef at 50 percent strength), the 509th Parachute Infantry Battaion, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 179th and 157th regiments of 17

18 the U.S. 45th Infantry Division. Ordered to counterattack and retake Apriia on 11 February, the 179th Infantry and 191st Tank Battaion began a two-pronged attack seeking to outfank the Germans hoding the Factory. In two days of costy, hand-to-hand fighting, the Americans faied to retake the ost ground, but inficted heavy osses on the enemy. Lucas sti expected further attacks in the weakened centra sector and removed the British 1st Division from the ine, repacing it with the British 56th and U.S. 45th Infantry Divisions. As an added precaution, VI Corps artiery was strengthened and Aied tactica air attacks were stepped up. Spurred by the eimination of the Campoeone saient, the Germans continued their counterattack on 16 February by moving down the Anzio-Abano Road on a four-mie front. The brunt of the assaut hit the 45th Division sectors hed by the 157th and 179th Infantry regiments. The initia attacks by the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 715th Motorized Infantry Divisions were beaten back with heavy osses, aowing ony minor penetrations, whie the 180th Infantry rebuffed ighter attacks. Just before midnight, however, enemy persistence paid off. A gap was created between the 179th and 157th Infantry, which was prompty expoited by three German regiments supported by sixty tanks. By dawn the Germans had driven a two-by-one-mie wedge in the center of the 45th Division and were poised to break the Aied ine, threatening the entire beachhead. Compounding the aready critica situation, the 179th Infantry attempted to withdraw in fu view of the enemy the foowing afternoon and suffered heavy casuaties. A through February the Aies scrambed to pug the gap with hastiy redepoyed 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, nava gunfire, and units of the 1st Armored Division. The XII Tactica Air Command few 730 ground support sorties and ater caimed that the tota weight of bombs dropped and the number of bombers empoyed was the greatest ever aotted up to that date in direct support of ground forces. The Germans aunched a more intense assaut against the 45th Division at dawn on 18 February and destroyed one battaion of the 179th Infantry before pushing the remainder of the unit back a haf mie farther to Lucas fina defensive ine by midmorning. Fearing that the 179th Infantry was in danger of giving way, Lucas ordered Co. Wiiam O. Darby to take command of the unit and aow no further retreat. The regiment hed, ater counting 500 dead Germans in front of its positions. Esewhere, the 180th and 157th regiments aso hed their positions in spite of heavy osses 18

19 River Veetri Incastro Campoeone Cori Ardea Moetta River 56th Inf Br XX 1st Inf Br XX LXXVI Panzer Corps Apriia (the Factory) 45th Inf Padigione XX 3d Inf HIGHWAY 7 Cisterna ANZIO Nettuno Conca Mussoini Cana Littoria HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD 28 February 3 March 1944 Front Line German Attacks ELEVATION IN METERS and Above Borgo Grappa 0 Mies 4 during three days of German attacks. By midday, Aied air and artiery superiority had turned the tide. When the Germans aunched a fina afternoon assaut against the 180th and 179th regiments, it was hated by air strikes and massed mortar, machine gun, artiery, and tank fire. Subsequent enemy attacks on 19 and 20 February were noticeaby weaker and were broken up by the same combination of Aied arms before ground contact was made The crisis had passed, and whie harassing attacks continued unti 22 February, VI Corps went over to the offensive ocay and succeeded in retaking some ost ground. 19

20 The Germans coud i afford the oss of the 5,389 men kied, wounded, and missing during their five-day counterattack. Enemy troop morae pummeted, and many units ost their offensive capabiity. The 65th Infantry Division s combat strength had dropped to 673 effectives by 23 February, and one regiment of the 715th Motorized Infantry Division numbered fewer than 185 men. Aied casuaties numbered some 3,496 kied, wounded, or missing in addition to 1,637 nonbatte casuaties from trench foot, exposure, and combat exhaustion. Aied commanders at Anzio often caimed that osses woud have been ower if sodiers were periodicay rotated away from the ines, but repacements simpy were not avaiabe. A 96,401 Aied sodiers were required to hod the 35-mie perimeter against an estimated ten German divisions in the Fourteenth Army, totaing 120,000 men by 12 February. Despite the fact that their drive to eiminate the Anzio beachhead with an attack down the Abano Road had faied, the Germans resumed the offensive on 29 February. This time their main effort was directed against the U.S. 3d Division hoding the Cisterna sector of the Aied beachhead. The LXXVI Panzer Corps, consisting of the 114th Light Infantry, 362d Infantry, 26th Panzer, and Hermann Goering Divisions began a drive to breach the outer beachhead defenses from Carano to Isoa Bea, which, if successfu, woud be expoited by the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division a the way to Nettuno and Anzio. The Americans, however, had anticipated this move. Genera Truscott, who had repaced Lucas as VI Corps commander on 23 February, had reinforced the ine with additiona artiery. Further, he made certain that each unit had at east one battaion in reserve with additiona reinforcements avaiabe at the corps eve. At midnight, 28 February, German artiery signaed the commencement of the new attack. But VI Corps and 3d Division artiery responded in mass, returning twenty shes for each one fired by the Germans, expending 66,000 rounds on 29 February aone. When the enemy infantry advanced at dawn at a haf-dozen points aong the 3d Division front, ony one attack made any progress, penetrating 800 yards northeast of Carano before being hated with heavy osses. The other attacks fared ess we amid a hai of American artiery and mortar fire. Attacking on too broad a front, the Germans acked the overwheming strength needed to break through anywhere, and by the end of the day they had barey dented the American ine. Over the next severa days, the we-en- 20

21 trenched Americans, supported by cosey coordinated artiery, armor, and air support, shattered subsequent German attacks. Even though the 7th and 15th Infantry regiments and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battaion often were hard pressed and suffered heavy osses between 1 and 4 March at the hands of the 715th and the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions, a three units hed their positions and beat back successive enemy assauts. The Germans continued to seek a breakthrough, but their efforts graduay weakened. Mackensen reaized that the Fourteenth Army had spent itsef in a costy and futie offensive after a ast German assaut faied on 4 March. The fina five-day German counterattack cost 3,500 men kied, wounded, and missing, pus thirty tanks destroyed. It had faied to eiminate the beachhead, and 3d Division counterattacks quicky recaimed a territory. From then, the Germans went over to the defensive, ceary incapabe of mounting any further serious offensive action. After six weeks of continuous bombing, sheing, and fighting, the men of the VI Corps were as exhausted as their German adversaries. Foowing the coapse of the fina enemy drive on 4 March, a three-month u began. During this time both armies imited their operations to defending the positions they hed at the beginning of March, whie they conducted imited counterattacks and raids and marked time unti the renewa of offensive operations on the southern front. Athough the reinforced Fourteenth Army, totaing 135,698 troops by 15 March, considered another offensive, pans were sheved in eary Apri in favor of conserving troop strength to counter an expected Aied spring offensive. The VI Corps spent this time reorganizing and regrouping as we. The British 56th Division was reieved by the British 5th Division whie Commando, Ranger, and parachute units were sent to Engand to begin preparations for OVERLORD. The U.S. 34th Infantry Division took up positions before Cisterna on 28 March, repacing the 3d Division, which had seen sixty-seven days of continuous front-ine action and now reverted to corps reserve. Over 14,000 repacements arrived to fi other depeted Aied units, bringing VI Corps to its fu combat strength of 90,000 men in six divisions. In preparation for its roe in the spring offensive, VI Corps received Combat Command B (CCB) of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, giving the beachhead forces a compete armored division. 21

22 ROME THE BREAKTHROUGH May 1944 Route of Aied Advance Front Line, Date ELEVATION IN METERS and Above 0 4 Frascati Mies HIGHWAY 7 Abano Vamontone Incastro 25 May River Ardea Moetta 5th Inf Apriia (the Factory) River Campoeone 26 May 1st Inf Br Genzano Veetri 45th Inf Padigione 34th Inf HIGHWAY 7 CCA CCB 3d Inf 1st SSF Cisterna Cana Cori Conca Nettuno TF Brett Mussoini Littoria ANZIO Contact with II Corps 25 May Borgo Grappa

23 On 22 May the entire U.S. 36th Infantry Division anded, bringing the tota number of Aied troops at Anzio to seven fu divisions. During March, a of Apri, and the first part of May 1944, recaed one veteran, the Anzio beachhead resembed the Western Front during Word War I. The vast majority of Aied casuaties during this period were from air and artiery attacks, incuding fire from Anzio Annie, a 280-mm. German raiway gun which fired from the Aban His. During March, shrapne caused 83 percent of a 3d Division casuaties, and other units experienced simiar rates. The Anzio beachhead became a honeycomb of wet and muddy trenches, foxhoes, and dugouts. Yet the Aied troops made the best of a bad situation, and one sodier recaed that during these months the fighting was ight and iving was eisurey. Suppy probems at Anzio, originay one of the main concerns of Aied panners, never reached a crisis stage. Beginning on 28 January, six LSTs eft Napes daiy for Anzio, each carrying 1,500 tons of cargo distributed among fifty combat-oaded trucks. Driving off the ships at Anzio, the trucks moved directy to front-ine positions with ammunition, fue, and rations and were repaced on the LSTs by the fifty empty trucks that had made the voyage the previous day. In addition to LSTs, fifteen smaer vesses arrived each week, and every ten days four massive Liberty ships deivered heavier equipment. Between 22 January and 1 June over 531,511 ong tons of suppies were unoaded at Anzio, a daiy average of 3,920 tons. On the night of May, the Fifth and Eighth Armies aunched their ong-awaited spring offensive against the Gustav Line. Stymied in attempts to break through at Cassino in February, March, and Apri, the Aies initiay encountered itte success in their new drive. Nonetheess, the Germans abandoned Monte Cassino after a week of heavy fighting by Poish forces, and the French Expeditionary Corps and U.S. II Corps succeeded in breaking the Gustav Line by 15 May. The II Corps continued its drive north toward Terracina, which fe on May, and raced toward the Anzio beachhead against rapidy crumbing German resistance as enemy troops began withdrawing northeast toward Rome. On 5 May Genera Cark gave Genera Truscott orders for a new Aied offensive code-named BUFFALO. The VI Corps was to break out of the beachhead on the Cisterna front at Cori, at the base of the Lepini Mountains, and at Veetri near the base of the Aban His. Once the breakout occurred, the Anzio units were to 23

24 Patro moving through Cisterna. (Nationa Archives) drive east through the Veetri Gap to Vamontone, cut Highway 6, the main German route of retreat, and trap the buk of the enemy forces withdrawing north through the Liri vaey. The basic operationa concept had been dictated to Cark by Aexander, who was acting on Churchi s desire to destroy the entire Tenth Army south of Rome at Vamontone. Cark, however, had itte faith in the feasibiity of the pan. Furthermore, he beieved that most of the recognition for Aied gains thus far obtained in Itay had been attributed unjusty to British forces, and he wanted the Fifth Army to have the singuar honor of iberating Rome. He therefore informed Truscott that the VI Corps was to be prepared at any moment during the breakout to swing north for a rapid advance on the Itaian capita, especiay if stiff enemy resistance was encountered on the route to Vamontone or if the British advance up the Liri vaey was sower than panned. The U.S. 1st Armored Division was to make the initia assaut out of the beachhead, supported by the 3d Division and 1st Specia Service Force. The 45th Division was to move beyond Carano on the eft as far as the Campoeone-Cisterna rairoad, whie the 36th Infantry Division expoited the expected breakthrough. 24

25 At 0545, 23 May, a 45-minute Aied artiery barrage opened on the Cisterna front, foowed by armor and infantry attacks aong the entire ine from Carano to the Mussoini Cana. Athough resistance was very stiff, by evening the 1st Specia Service Force and 1st Armored Division had breached the enemy main ine of resistance, whie the XII Tactica Air Command competed the ast of 722 sorties. The foowing day VI Corps forces cut Highway 7 above Cisterna and encirced the town, the scene of continued heavy fighting by desperate enemy forces. The town finay fe on 25 May at the cost of 476 Americans kied, 2,321 wounded, and 75 missing. Earier on 25 May, at 0730, troops of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, 85th Infantry Division, U.S. II Corps, racing north from Terracina across the Pontine Marshes, met sodiers of the 1st Battaion, 36th Engineer Combat Regiment, from the Anzio beachhead, effecting the ong-panned and onger-awaited ink-up between Fifth Army forces. With the physica juncture of the II and VI Corps, the beachhead ceased to exist and the formery isoated sodiers became the eft fank of the Fifth Army. Cark personay greeted the II Corps troops three hours ater. Meanwhie, the breakout west was proving costy to the VI Corps. The 1st Armored Division ost 100 armored vehices in the first day aone, whie the entire corps took over 4,000 casuaties in the first five days of the offensive. Aied troops, however, counted 4,838 enemy prisoners, incuding 1,000 in Cisterna, and destroyed or damaged 2,700 enemy vehices. On the same day that the Fifth Army front merged with the Anzio beachhead, Genera Cark aso spit Truscott s forces into two parts, sending the 3d Division, the 1st Specia Service Force, and eements of the 1st Armored Division toward Vamontone. This thrust, however, proved insufficient, and most of the Tenth Army escaped north to fight again. In the meantime the 45th and 34th Infantry Divisions, aong with the rest of the Fifth Army, joined in the hot pursuit of German forces faing back on Rome, a scarce thirty mies distant. Americans iberated the Itaian capita on 4 June Anaysis During the four months of the Anzio Campaign the Aied VI Corps suffered over 29,200 combat casuaties (4,400 kied, 18,000 wounded, 6,800 prisoners or missing) and 37,000 noncombat casuaties. Two-thirds of these osses, amounting to 17 percent of VI Corps 25

26 Anzio Harbor Under German Bombardment by Edward A. Reep. (Army Art Coection) effective strength, were inficted between the initia andings and the end of the German counteroffensive on 4 March. Of the combat casuaties, 16,200 were Americans (2,800 kied, 11,000 wounded, 2,400 prisoners or missing) as were 26,000 of the Aied noncombat casuaties. German combat osses, suffered whoy by the Fourteenth Army, were estimated at 27,500 (5,500 kied, 17,500 wounded, and 4,500 prisoners or missing) figures very simiar to Aied osses. The Anzio Campaign continues to be controversia, just as it was during its panning and impementation stages. The operation ceary faied in its immediate objectives of outfanking the Gustav Line, restoring mobiity to the Itaian campaign, and speeding the capture of Rome. Aied forces were quicky pinned down and contained within a sma beachhead, and they were effectivey rendered incapabe of conducting any sort of major offensive action for four months pending the advance of Fifth Army forces to the south. Anzio faied to be the panacea the Aies sought. As Genera Lucas repeatedy stated before the anding, which he aways considered a gambe, the patry aotments of men and suppies were not commensurate with the high goas sought by British panners. He steadfasty maintained that under the circumstances the sma Anzio 26

27 force accompished a that coud have been reaisticay expected. Lucas critics charge, however, that a more aggressive and imaginative commander, such as a Patton or Truscott, coud have obtained the desired goas by an immediate, bod offensive from the beachhead. Lucas was overy cautious, spent vauabe time digging in, and aowed the Germans to prepare countermeasures to ensure that an operation conceived as a daring Aied offensive behind enemy ines became a ong, costy campaign of attrition. Yet the campaign did accompish severa goas. The presence of a significant Aied force behind the German main ine of resistance, uncomfortaby cose to Rome, represented a constant threat. The Germans coud not ignore Anzio and were forced into a response, thereby surrendering the initiative in Itay to the Aies. The 135,000 troops of the Fourteenth Army surrounding Anzio coud not be moved esewhere, nor coud they be used to make the aready formidabe Gustav Line virtuay impregnabe. The Anzio beachhead thus guaranteed that the aready steady drain of scarce German troop reserves, equipment, and materie woud continue unabated, utimatey enabing the 15th Army Group to break through in the south. But the success was costy. 27

28 Further Readings For additiona reading see Wiiam L. Aen, Anzio: Edge of Disaster (1978); Fred Sheehan, Anzio: Epic of Bravery (1964); and Martin Bumenson, Anzio: The Gambe That Faied (1963). For a British perspective, see Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio (1961). The officia U.S. Army histories, which incude Martin Bumenson, Saerno to Cassino (1969); Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Cassino to the Aps (1977); and the War Department Historica Division, Anzio Beachhead, 22 January 25 May 1944 (1948), remain the most comprehensive histories avaiabe on the overa operationa and tactica aspects of the Anzio Campaign. CMH Pub Cover: Men come ashore from LCIs at Anzio on D-day. (Nationa Archives) PIN :