An Ardor Verging on Recklessness: VII Corps in Operation Cobra. History 815. Dr. Greg Schneider. Matt Upson. August, 2008

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1 An Ardor Verging on Recklessness: VII Corps in Operation Cobra History 815 Dr. Greg Schneider Matt Upson August, 2008

2 2 This paper will examine Operation Cobra, an offensive action performed by the United States Army in France during July, The main attacking force in this operation was the U.S. Army s VII Corps, consisting of (at that time), the 1 st, 4 th, 9 th, and 30 th Infantry Divisions as well as the 2 nd and 3 rd Armored Divisions. The preparation for the attack as well as the actions of these divisions will be recounted in this paper, providing an understanding of the reasons for the success of the VII Corps in this operation: concentration of manpower and firepower, mobility of forces, as well as the flexibility and calculated risk taking of leaders in planning and execution. ORIGINS AND PLANNING Operation Cobra, or Field Order Number 6, was an offensive operation planned primarily by General Omar Bradley and Major General J. Lawton Collins, respective commanders of the U.S. First Army and the subordinate VII Corps. The operation stemmed from the Allied fear of a stabilized front. The memory of World War I and trench warfare instilled a firm desire on the part of the Allies to resist stalemate at all possible costs. 1 However, by July of 1944, their fears had become reality in the bocage, the hedgerow country of France. These irregularly shaped fields surrounded by high hedgerows wrecked havoc on the invading forces. This terrain provided natural cover, concealment, and ready-made engagement areas a patchwork quilt ideal for the defense. 2 The Germans were able to use this terrain effectively in drastically impeding American advances. The Americans, who bore the majority of hedgerow fighting, had not trained for this type of fight. Planners had been caught up in solving the problems of the D-Day landings and paid little attention to the potential problems of hedgerow combat. 3 These ubiquitous obstacles

3 3 prevented the use of a major American strength: mobility. Tanks could not run free across open fields without first penetrating a hedgerow and then climbing the berm, exposing their underbellies to fire. Therefore, advancements were slow procedures that relied heavily on small groups of infantrymen and often resulted in high casualties. The U.S. troops had been trained to use a fire and maneuver method of attack which would theoretically pin down the defenders while the GIs would advance. This did not work in the closed terrain of the bocage, where relatively few concealed German defenders could hold off large numbers of men and tanks with their superior MG42 machine gun and 88mm gun. 4 Cobra developed as the means by which to overcome the stagnant front. With the British and Canadians bogged down in the east, and favorable terrain just out of reach, it became apparent that the Americans must attempt a breakthrough of enemy forces. Bradley was very wary of the apparent stabilization: As long as the enemy confined us to the bocage of Normandy where we were forced to match him man for man, he could exact a prohibitive price for the few miserable yards we might gain. 5 He looked toward Brittany as the solution to his problems. Although Cherbourg, at the northern tip of the Cotentin peninsula, provided an entry for men and material, Bradley needed more ports in order to build up the necessary amount of force needed for a large scale assault into the French interior and on into Germany. 6 The First Army needed not only the port facilities that a breakthrough would offer, but also the space. American strength of firepower and mobility had been nullified by the closequarter, small unit fighting in the hedgerows. Sufficient space would allow the power of the U.S. forces to come into play. 7 There was simply too limited a space to effectively function. Up to 20 miles of road was required for each regiment to move and that figure assumes that the road was in usable condition. Most roads were gravel and failed easily under the strain of supporting

4 4 heavy loads. 8 Additionally, General George Patton was scheduled to gain command of the U.S. Third Army in August and maneuver room was necessary for the additional Army to become operational; a successful push toward Brittany could provide that room. Eisenhower, in a letter to the commander of Allied ground forces on the continent, British General Bernard Montgomery, reiterated the points Montgomery made regarding a breakthrough: 1. We must get the Brittany Peninsula. From an administrative point of view this is essential. 2. We do not want to get hemmed into a relatively small area. We must have space for maneuver, for administration and for airfields. This is my view exactly Time is vital. We must not only have the Brittany Peninsula we must have it quickly. So we must hit it with everything. 9 In order to reach Brittany, however, a substantial breakthrough was required. A large scale assault southward by twelve divisions in early July left the Americans with 40,000 casualties and little gains. 10 The toll on the infantryman was apparent: they suffered 90 percent of those casualties in the offensive. Nevertheless, the First Army managed to fight its way south down the Cotentin peninsula through a mixture of hedgerows and swampland and ended their offensive along the Lessay-Periers-St. Lo-Caumont line, but did not possess it in its entirety. 11 Thus, the need for space had not been met by the early July offensive. The First Army had not reached as far south as they had wanted. Forces were stuck in the swampy region known as the prairies marecageuses which limited advances to the narrow roads and few dry spots that were available. In order to gain some modicum of mobility, the line would have to be advanced to the town of Coutances, where the First Army could then wheel eastward and provide a shield for the activation of Patton s Third Army. 12

5 5 Thus, the plan for Cobra developed as a means to break through the crust of German defenses south of the base of the Cotentin peninsula, gain control of favorable terrain, and cut off any German forces that remained between the advancing VII Corps and VIII Corps to the west. The First Army plan, managed mainly by Bradley, was developed by the 13 th of July when it was approved and sent on to Collins for further revisions. The plan called for a piercing of the enemy line with great power and substantial results. 13 This would be fulfilled through the use of concentration of firepower and manpower, followed by exploitation through mobility. The VII Corps would mass north of the road between St. Lo and Periers. The terrain immediately north of the road provided a relatively narrow, if stable, jumping off point for the forces of VII Corps. 14 The operation would consist of three phases: saturation bombing of the invasion area, exploitation of breaks in the line, and finally a consolidation phase. These phases emphasized maneuver that was aimed at encircling the large force which the enemy had on his west flank and pinning it against the sea 15 The saturation bombing was meant to destroy German front-line defenses along the St. Lo-Periers road. This zone ran approximately 6000 yards along the southern edge of the road and had a depth of about 2500 yards. 16 Within this area, an unprecedented amount of concentrated ordinance would be dropped on enemy forces. The bombing would occur in four phases. The first phase consisted of 350 fighter-bombers attacking the southern edge of the St. Lo-Periers road for 20 minutes. This would be followed by one hour of bombing by 1800 heavy bombers deeper into the attack zone. After the heavy bombers completed their run, the ground attack would commence (H-Hour). This was also to signal a recommenced bombing by the 350 fighter bombers along the original strip south of the road to clear out any regrouping survivors.

6 6 Finally, 396 medium bombers were scheduled to attack the southern portion of the zone from H+30 to H+75 minutes in order to clear a path for the oncoming ground forces. 17 The second, or exploitation, phase of the operation was the responsibility of Collins and his VII Corps. The plan called for two infantry divisions to march forward to the towns of Marigny and St. Gilles and then fan outwards so as to block off the flanks of the breakthrough area followed by the exploitative force of two armored divisions and one motorized infantry division. 18 The exploitation forces would attack through the hole, rushing south and southwest in order to capture the town of Coutances, as well as various river crossings and roads in order to prevent any successful German counter-attack. The initial plans assigned the 9 th, 30 th, and 1 st Infantry Divisions as well as the 2 nd and 3 rd Armored Divisions to VII Corps, creating a substantially larger corps than existed elsewhere on the front. Collins soon requested an additional infantry division and was assigned the 1 st Infantry Division as well. This enabled, at the risk of losing operational control, the capability to strike at a relatively narrow point with a massive amount of force. Approximately 70,000 men would be attacking on a 5 mile front. 19 The consolidation phase required that the VIII Corps to the west and the XIX and V Corps to the east put substantial pressure on their fronts throughout the operation in order to prevent any German reinforcements relocating to the VII Corps front. After the initial exploitation occurred, the other corps were to increase this pressure, forcing [the enemy] to withdraw and exploiting every advantage gained from his state of disorganization. 20 Now that the First Army plan was in place, Collins was left to form the VII Corps operation plan. He decided to assign the 1 st Infantry Division the primary task of the operation. Major General Clarence Huebner would lead his completely motorized division southwest to

7 7 Coutances. Combat Command B of the 3 rd Armored Division would supplement the 1 st Infantry Division with armor. The bulk of the 3 rd Armored would swing south of the city and assist the 1 st Division in pinning German troops in a closing pocket. 21 The 2 nd Armored Division, commanded by Major General Edward H. Brooks, was assigned to cover the 1 st Infantry and 3 rd Armored Divisions movement by moving southeast and seizing LeMesnil Herman. Combat Command B of the 2 nd Armored was given flexibility in its mission. They were to push southwest, below the 1 st Infantry Division and the 3 rd Armored Division, and be ready to either capture towns along the Brehal-Hambye road to stop reinforcements, move north to Coutances in support of the attack there, or return to their parent unit (2 nd Armored) as support. 22 The plans were in place and the troops were set to surge forward. On July 24, Eisenhower sent Bradley a cable exhorting him to pursue every advantage with an ardor verging on recklessness. 23 Hopefully, the massive airstrike followed by the attack of an oversized corps along a narrow front would allow such success. An examination of the saturation bombing and the exploitation phase will establish the value of concentration of power and use of mobility. The effective usage of such tactics altered the nature of Cobra and permitted a vastly more ambitious operation of breakout rather than merely a consolidation of acquired maneuver territory. THE BOMBING PHASE Bradley had chosen to launch the offensive from the long, straight St. Lo-Periers road primarily because it offered a readily visible landmark for the bombers. He planned to have the bombers fly parallel to this road, thereby minimizing any chance for accidental friendly or

8 8 short bombings that could result from a perpendicular approach. 24 Having learned from the shortcomings of previous Allied attempts to precede a ground assault with bombing, Bradley wanted to put the assault divisions as close to the bombing line as possible. This action, he hoped, would preempt any attempt by the Germans to reorganize after the air strikes. He wanted to keep the front lines only 800 yards north of the bomb line, but compromised with air planners on a margin of 1,200 yards. Still, the close proximity of the troops to the bombing area made Bradley s desire for a parallel run imperative in his mind. 25 The bomb runs would be supplemented by artillery strikes as well. First Army transferred 21 artillery battalions over to VII Corps prior to the start of the attack. There would be over 1,000 guns available to Collins as the operation began but were not used heavily due to a shortage of ammunition. Accordingly, the air strikes were meant to account for most of the destruction with over 3,300 tons of ordinance being dropped by heavy bombers, along with lesser amounts from the medium and fighter-bombers, including napalm. 26 H-Hour was set for 1:00 P.M. on July 24, but overcast skies forced postponement. However, some planes that had already taken off did not receive the recall notice. There had been no contingency for emergency communication and some planes dropped their payload. Not all of the bombs struck their targets; the 30 th Infantry Division had 25 killed and 131 wounded. 27 Bradley was understandably upset, but became furious when he discovered that the planes did not attack on a route parallel to the road. If they re to come on a perpendicular course he complained, we re taking a helluva chance much more than I want to take with only a mile between my front lines and the target. 28 Air planners explained that if the planes attacked parallel to the road, following the narrow axis of the bombing carpet, the attack would

9 9 be stretched out and take much longer. The attack could not proceed the next day if Bradley wished to change the plan. He decided to go ahead with the existing plan, fearing that the Germans had already been warned of an impending attack. Collins, in preparation for the assault, had moved his forces back from the St. Lo-Periers road to their agreed upon safety zone for the bombing. Once word reached Collins that the air bombardment was postponed, he had to make a decision regarding the placement of his troops. Since the bombing was not to occur until weather cleared, the temporary withdrawal of the frontline left a vacuum into which German forces could flow, negating the tactical benefits of holding the road. Collins still remained unaware of whether or not the ground attack would continue as planned without the bombardment. He reasoned that he should make an initial limited attack to reinvest the roadway and then decide whether to continue the attack as planned or simply consolidate the previously held territory. The ground attack was postponed as well and Collins successfully regained the area previously held around the road, although the front divisions struggled with not only the confusion of the short bombings, but aroused German forces as well. 29 The next day, July 25, brought clearer skies. Bradley joined Collins at his command post in anticipation of the bombing runs. Once again, tragedy struck. High clouds forced bombers to lower their altitude, making the planes more vulnerable to antiaircraft fire and therefore decreasing the reliability and accuracy of the bombing. The smoke and dust kicked up by the initial bombings was blown north across the front lines of American troops. The bombers, whose view of the road was obscured, began to use the smokeline as their landmark. 30 Famed journalist, Ernie Pyle, was with the 4 th Infantry Division, on the front lines. He described the terror as the bombs crept northward:

10 10 An indescribable kind of panic comes over you at such times. We stood tensed in muscle and frozen in intellect, watching each flight approach and pass over us And then all of an instant the universe became filled with a gigantic rattling as of huge, dry seeds in a mammoth dry gourd It was bombs by the hundred, hurtling down through the air above us. 31 The 30 th Infantry Division was hit again, this time with worse results. Wounded men in the division numbered 374. Sixty-one were killed. VII Corps front line troops were hit hard: 601 total casualties resulted from the short bombing. To add insult to injury, Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, who had previously commanded Army Ground Forces in the U.S., was killed when he joined the frontlines to see how his troops performed. Needless to say, the short bombings proved to be demoralizing to all units, but especially those that took direct hits. A battalion command group was decimated and assault companies were disabled. The hard hit 30 th Infantry Division had 164 cases of combat exhaustion. 32 Despite the short bombings, there were heavy casualties on the German side. The enemy forces south of the road, primarily the Panzer Lehr division, were struck a heavy blow. The previously postponed bombings and hasty reconsolidation attacks on the 24 th had the effect of placating the Germans. Fritz Bayerlein, commander of the Lehr Division believed that his men had successfully held up a major assault by the Americans. Expecting an attack across the road the next day, Bayerlein moved reinforced troops directly into the saturation bombing zone, unintentionally creating a dire situation for his men. 33 The true power of the full bombing on the 25 th took the Germans by surprise. The bombs turned landscape into a crater-filled graveyard for men and vehicles. One-third of the total frontline defenses, or approximately 1,000 men, were casualties of the bombing. Few tanks remained operational and battalion command posts were destroyed; the German capability for

11 11 organized resistance was vastly diminished. The commander in-chief of the German Army in the west recognized that the front has burst. 34 BREAKTHROUGH With a sizable hole in the German lines, it was now up to the VII Corps to penetrate and then exploit the opening. The nature of the attack depended on quickness, so that the line could be overrun and held open before reinforcements arrived to counterattack. Therefore, the initial attack by the three frontline infantry divisions involved quick strikes toward targeted objectives such as crossroads and high ground. Each unit was to advance to these objectives as quickly as possible without regard to keeping in line with adjacent units. Even enemies were to be bypassed if they could not be easily overcome. Strongpoints would be dealt with later, after initial objectives were held. Speed was the goal. To quicken their movement, units had engineers repair road damage and clear obstacles. They carried extra food and held POWs to keep roads clear of unnecessary traffic to and from the advancing line. Additionally, a device called a Rhino had been installed on many of the tanks engaged in the breakthrough. It consisted of prongs that would dig into a hedgerow, allowing a tank to remain engaged with the berm and push through, rather than up and over. This device, made from steel salvaged from German beach obstacles, was welded to the front of tanks and allowed increased safety and mobility for tanks and supporting units. 35 The 9 th, 4 th, and 30 th Infantry Divisions were to attack through this breach; the 9 th on the west flank, the 4 th in the center and the 30 th on the east. The 1 st Infantry Division (Motorized) and the 2 nd and 3 rd Armored were to wait in the rear until Collins deemed the breach secure and ready to be exploited. Most units moved out on time at 11:00 AM despite the confusion the

12 12 short bombings had caused. The 47 th Infantry Regiment had sustained many casualties, including and took an hour to regroup before they entered the fight. 36 The 9 th Division, under General Eddy, was assigned the burden of capturing three key objectives during the assault. The first was the main road running south from the St. Lo-Periers highway toward Marigny. This road would serve as the conduit along which the mobile forces would push south. The other two objectives were both ridges. One overlooked the north-south road objective and would be necessary to control in order to use the road without fear of ambush. The other ridge was beyond Marigny and controlled the approaches from all directions: any way U.S. VII Corps wanted to go, Marigny was the way out of the bocage or a decisive roadblock. 37 The division attacked toward Marigny, which was over 2 ½ miles south of the St. Lo- Periers road, but encountered some remaining resistance that proved to be quite strong. Most units did not reach their objectives; a few were held back despite lack of enemy contact. Eddy acted very cautiously and prevented the successful completion of a quick assault. Collins stated that this caution was very unlike Eddy, although Bradley stated that he liked to count his steps carefully before he took them. Regardless of Eddy s operational caution, his actions illustrated the American surprise that anyone could survive the carpet bombing to fight so tenaciously. It seemed that German units were either decimated by the air strikes or were nearly completely unfazed. 38 Historian Russell F. Weigley describes the disappointment of the troops: So much had the generals depended on and expected from the carpet bombing, and so much had the generals expectations filtered down to the troops who watched the thousands of friendly planes stream over them and felt the earth shake, that anything less than complete pulverization of the enemy in the target area was sure to aggravate the fog of dejection. And though the first advancing troops found disabled German vehicles, shattered corpses, and stunned and disoriented survivors everywhere in the bombing

13 13 carpet, they also found the veterans of... [the] Panzer Lehr Division doing business at the same old stand with the same old merchandise dug in tanks and infantry. 39 Despite the pessimism that had set in and the fact that the 9th Division did not reach Marigny, the Americans did not realize how badly the Germans had been hurt by the initial carpet bombings and continued advancing airstrikes: It had been possible to prevent the [American s] strategic breakthrough on the first day of the battle [the abortive bombings and attacks of July 24], but unreasonably high losses were suffered through bombing attacks and artillery fire, and the already weak reserves had been practically annihilated. 40 Still, the assault troops would face unpredicted and sporadic resistance. This made for uneven progress all along the line of advancement. In the middle of the front line, the 4 th Division utilized only one regiment in the assault: the aggressive 8 th Infantry. Despite some disruption due to the friendly bombing, the 8 th was able to attack rapidly thanks to terrain conducive to the offense. Their main objective was to hold the center, permitting the two outside divisions, the 30 th and the 9 th, to open up and hold the breach. Additionally, the division would not advance too far south, permitting them to serve as a shield for any remaining German forces to the north that might regroup and counterattack: even minor counterattacks from inside the breakthrough could be more than a nuisance; they might slow the tempo of the attack and prove the death of Cobra. 41 With the assistance of Sherman Tanks the regiment was able to advance to the town of la Chapelle-en-Juger before halting. Though not quite reaching their objective, they had pushed far enough to permit and open center for the mobile forces to shoot through. The division s success was due in part to the confusion the carpet bombing had wrought on the German defenses. The enemy was uncoordinated and separated into small, isolated units. The concentrated power of

14 14 the bombings created conditions conducive to quick forward movement, even for an infantry division. James Carafano has recently commended the initiative of the 4 th Division s units: Small, unsupported, and unrehearsed, but aggressive groups of U.S. soldiers could, given the right tactical conditions, win a battle among the hedgerows. Without the threat of serious counterattacks, the Americans moved swiftly and fearlessly, bypassing the enemy where they could and risking exposed flanks, keeping the tempo of the attack as rapid as possible. 42 General Leland Hollywood Hobbs and his 30 th Division were the final component of effort to hold open the breach and allow mobile forces to pour through. The division held the eastern flank of the breach and was assigned three main objectives. The first was to gain high ground near the village of Hebecrevon in order to control the flank of the opening. Next, the division was to clear a route for the 2 nd Armored Division s mobile assault by driving past St. Gilles and securing roadways vital to a rapid exploitation. Finally, in order to prevent any German counterattacks across the Vire River from the east, the division was to capture and hold the bridge there. These objectives were difficult to take; the terrain lacked roads and contained many hedgerows. German artillery covered the attack ground from the heights near Hebecrevon and would make advance difficult if any observers remained after the carpet bombing. Most importantly, accurate locations of enemy defenses were not ascertained prior to the attack. Each one of these problems proved to be a thorn in the side of the 119 th Regiment. They made little initial progress, but fought on into the night and gained the high ground. The limited, but vital success of the division was due to ability of regiment and battalion commanders [who] exploited the advantage of the bombings by concentrating on maintaining a high tempo for their attacks and breaching the enemy defenses before the Germans could reorganize and counterattack. Maintaining the tempo of the attack was the key to winning the day. 43

15 15 EXPLOITATION The Germans were resisting fiercely where they still retained some unit cohesiveness. None of the three initial assault divisions had accomplished all of their objectives. Marigny and la Chapelle-en-Juger had not been captured, nor was the St. Gilles road completely held. However, the resistance that the divisions had already faced had nearly exhausted the capabilities of the German forces to fight back. The Americans were not aware of this fact, but General Collins and his subordinates noted the lack of coordination in the German reaction, particularly their failure to launch prompt counterattacks [a common German tactic]. Collins sensed that their communications and command structure had been damaged more than our troops realized. 44 Collins therefore decided to commit two of his three mobile divisions. The morning of July 26 brought the attack of the 1 st Division (with the attached combat command B of the 3 rd Armored) along with the 2 nd Armored Division. The bulk of the 3 rd Armored would remain in reserve for the time being. With Marigny still unclaimed, the 1 st Division would assume responsibility for its capture. The infantry divisions were to remain committed to allowing open paths for the mobile forces to pass through. 45 The 1 st Division was now tasked with completing the 9 th Division s efforts to capture Marigny. The division was potentially the most mobile and combat effective unit in the operation. Supplemented with six times the tanks of a regular infantry division, the Big Red One was ready to speed to its objectives. 46 However, the 1 st Division came up against Panzers north of Marigny and did not take the town that night. The next morning, it was discovered that the Germans had retreated to a hilltop

16 16 during the night and were capable of heavily bombarding the Americans. Despite this, the town was secured and combat command B was able to shoot southwest toward Coutances with the only resistance coming from retreating Germans wandering into the American lines. For the first time, true utilization of mobility came into play: This virtual road march was war such as the American army was designed for, especially the American armored divisions. Appealing also to the passion for moving on that is so much a part of the American character and heritage, it brought out the best in the troops, their energy and mechanical resourcefulness. 47 West of the VII Corps, the VIII Corps was advancing south, putting pressure on the Germans in an effort to pin them against the encircling maneuver the VII Corps was attempting in its efforts to gain Coutances. However, the Germans, instead of putting up a static defense, retreated at full speed, making encirclement difficult if not impossible. This was illustrated when the two corps met in Coutances with minimal POW gains. The unexpected withdrawal of Germans made for a welcome opportunity for Bradley. He altered plans and issued orders to push south instead of west to the coast. By opening the gap even further and extending forces deeper into the breach there would be a real possibility of outflanking the whole German Seventh Army in Normandy. 48 Despite the alterations to the plan, General Collins decided that the 3 rd Armored division should be committed as planned. It was to make a wide hook toward Coutances in an effort to create an outer ring that would capture retreating forces as well as lessen pressure on the 1 st Division. This effort proved to be the least successful and perhaps unnecessary of all Cobra missions. The terrain through which they attacked was conducive to the defense. A consolidated mixed division of SS Panzer forces had set up a new line to defend the retreat of the remaining forces southward. By remaining committed to the original plan of envelopment,

17 17 Collins unnecessarily sent a highly mobile force into a frontal assault that would demand precious time and manpower. The critical timing for an effort to surround significant numbers of Germans around Coutances had passed. General Bradley s new orders reflected that fact. 49 On August 1 st, Collins requested the relief of the 3 rd Armored Commander, General Leroy Watson. Collins argued that Watson failed to demonstrate the leadership and control required for the command of an armored division. 50 Citing Watson s lack of mobility and poor efforts to control advances, Collins absolved himself of the responsibility of committing a mobile division to a defunct objective. Although Collins recalls receiving somewhat conflicting orders to continue present operation to isolate enemy forces at Coutances and at the same time continue to push rapidly to the south 51 it seems that the logical choice would have been the utilization of 3 rd Armored to the push south, given the commitment of VIII Corps and the 1 st Division to Coutances. More than any other unit, the 2 nd Armored Division under General Edward Brooks exemplified the effects that mobility could have in an offensive drive. The division was tasked with forming the outermost ring of forces protecting the drive to Coutences. Two combat command groups would shoot southward, capturing a line of towns and setting up the southern boundary of the intended exploitation from Cerences in the west to Tessy-sur-Vire in the east. The division had the advantage of driving through the most thoroughly saturated area of the initial carpet bombing. The damage wrought there promoted an unexpected boon: In driving south and west the division cut the German Seventh Army in half, exposing the flanks of two corps to exploitation. 52

18 18 The defensive line that was intended to protect the envelopment from counterattack soon ended up as the best possible chance to complete that envelopment with any real gains. With the failure of the 1 st Infantry and 3 rd Armored to cut off retreating forces, the 2 nd Armored became the de facto envelopment force. The division was reinforced with an additional combat command and a battalion from the 4 th Infantry Division in order to effectively face both the retreating Germans and any possible counterattacks. 53 July 28 and 29 brought significant counterattacks against the spread out forces of the 2 nd Armored. The Americans overcame everything thrown at them by elements of the LXXXIV Corps and II Parachute Corps thanks to superb artillery and close air support. The combination of mobility and power were effectively implemented by the 2 nd Armored Division. German units were forced out of cover by the mobility of American forces. Once exposed, artillery and air power could effectively eliminate opposition while the mobile force carried on. These tactics allowed the 2 nd Armored to kill or capture over 5,000 Germans with only 400 casualties. The 2 nd Armored pushed nearly to the coast, leaving an alley for the pursuit of the Germans out into not just Brittany, but the interior of France. CONCLUSION The success of Cobra, although different than initially planned, surpassed anything the American forces anticipated. In the following days, additional forces would take advantage of the exploited gap in German lines and push down the coast to Avranches, the entryway to Brittany and its ports. The path to Brittany was open, but more importantly, the space for effective operational maneuver had been acquired. On August 1, Patton s Third Army became

19 19 operational and was able to push east along with the First Army in a nearly successful attempt to surround the German Seventh Army. From July 25 to August 1, the VII Corps pushed 40 to 50 kilometers south of an area that had previously restrained American forces to hard fought gains of minimal value. Although the cost of success was still high (17,267 casualties 54 ), the gains were phenomenal. None of this would have been possible without the breakthrough that Cobra provided. Since landing in Normandy on June 6, the Allies had fought a tenacious defender in the hedgerows for very few gains of strategic significance. Cobra was successful because it utilized existing American strengths (concentration of firepower and manpower) to enable their potential strength (mobility). The carpet bombing brought destruction and confusion to the German forces opposite VII Corps. Despite leaving sporadic, but fierce pockets of resistance, the bombing effectively disabled communication lines on the German front. The concentration of firepower was then expanded upon by the concentration of manpower. By quickly sending three divisions across the line of departure along a narrow front, Generals Bradley and Collins capitalized on the confusion and damage done to the German lines. This concentration of manpower then allowed for the implementation of mobility by motorized and armored divisions. Even though the infantry divisions had not completely attained their objectives, Collins recognized that the concentration of force he wielded was sufficient for putting his mobile units into play. This heretofore unutilized strength allowed for relatively rapid, in-depth penetration of German lines and flexibility that regular infantry units could not muster.

20 20 Leadership flexibility also played a key role in the success of the operation. Bradley and Collins worked together to create an overall plan that could be altered without risk of losing integrity. This operational flexibility was exercised when Collins, recognizing a lack of coherent enemy organization, committed his mobile divisions earlier than expected. Bradley also illustrated this flexibility when he ordered units to push south in order to capitalize on unexpected withdrawals by the enemy. The concentration of power, supplemented by the strength of American mobility allowed for the success of Operation Cobra. The flexibility of the plan and the commanders allowed for the adaptation of tactics in order to follow up on opportunities presented during the battle. Mistakes such as the short bombings and the failure of various units to attain objectives became less threatening to the operation thanks to the expanded options that concentration of power, mobility, and flexibility offered.

21 21 Endnotes 1 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower s Lieutenants (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), Mansoor, Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1999), Weigley, James J. Carafano, After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed. Stephen Ambrose, assoc. ed., et al., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years (5 vols., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), III, Carafano, Blumenson, Weigley, U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, October, 1943 to July, 1944, U.S. Army, First Army Headquarters: Records, , Box 2, Folder 13, Section IV, F., 1, b. pg.1. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 14 U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, Section IV, F., 1, b. pg U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, Section IV, F., 1, b. pg U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, Section IV, F., 1, b. pg U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, Section IV, F., 1, b. pg U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, Section IV, F., 1, b. pg Carafano, U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, Section IV, F., 1, b. pg J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: An Autobiography (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), Collins, Chandler, Bradley, Weigley, Weigley, Weigley, Bradley, Blumenson, Blumenson, James Tobin, Ernie Pyle s War: America s Eyewitness to World War II (New York: Free Press, 2006), Collins, Blumenson, Blumenson, Blumenson, 241; Collins, History of VII Corps, U.S. Army, Covering Operations in Normandy, France, from 1 31 July, 1944, section III, page 28. J. Lawton Collins Papers, Box 5, History of VII Corps, July, 1944 Folder. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 37 Carafano, Blumenson, ; Collins, 242, Bradley, Weigley, 154.

22 22 40 Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, The American Breakthrough, in Fighting the Breakout: The German Army in Normandy from Cobra to the Falaise Gap, ed. David C. Isby (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), Carafano, Carafano, Carafano, Blumenson, 246; Collins, Collins, Carafano, Weigley, Carafano, Carafano, J. Lawton Collins, Letter recommending relief of Maj. General Watson of command of 3 rd Armored Division, 1 August, J. Lawton Collins Papers, Box 3, 201 Personal Letter File, 1944 (3). Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 51 Collins, Blumenson, 264; Carafano, Collins, , 54 History of VII Corps, page 40.

23 23 Bibliography Books Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier s Story. New York: Modern Library, Carafano, James Jay. After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., and Stephen Ambrose, eds. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years. Vol. III. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, Collins, J. Lawton. Lightning Joe: An Autobiography. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, Doubler, Michael D. Closing with the Enemy. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, Freiherr von Gersdorff, Rudolf-Christoph. The American Breakthrough. In Fighting the Breakout: The German Army in Normandy from Cobra to the Falaise Gap, edited by David C. Irby. London: Greenhill Books, Mansoor, Peter R. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, Tobin, James. Ernie Pyle s War: America s Eyewitness to World War II. New York: Free Press, Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower s Lieutenants. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, Documents Collins, J. Lawton. Letter recommending relief of Maj. General Watson of command of 3 rd Armored Division, 1 August, J. Lawton Collins Papers, Box 3, 201 Personal Letter File, 1944 (3). Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. History of VII Corps, U.S. Army, Covering Operations in Normandy, France, from 1 31 July, 1944, section III, page 28. J. Lawton Collins Papers, Box 5, History of VII Corps, July, 1944 Folder. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

24 U.S. First Army Summary of Operations, October, 1943 to July, 1944, U.S. Army, First Army Headquarters: Records, , Box 2, Folder 13. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 24