D-DAY 25 YEARS ON. The Battle of Binh Ba Arthur Burke

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1 D-DAY 25 YEARS ON The Battle of Binh Ba Arur Burke Twenty-five years after e Allied laing at Normay on 6 June 1944, anoer military force also crossed a start line a advanced into history at e small rubber plantation village of Binh Ba in Sou Vietnam. The peaceful morning air of Phuoc Tuy Province in Sou Vietnam was shattered at 7.20 am by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) striking e turret of an Australian Centurion tank as it entered e village of Binh Ba, some six kilometres nor of e Australian base at Nui Dat. Forty-eight hours later, e vicious Battle of Binh Ba concluded leaving one Australian dead a 10 woued, but at least 107 enemy killed, six woued a 29 detained for furer investigation. This battle on 6 June 1969 was an ueniable success for e Australians a ranks as one of e major military victories of at force during e Vietnam War. The question has often been asked, <Was is an ambush or an accident?' Was e RPG fired by a nervous young local Viet Cong (VC) guerilla or a trigger-happy Nor st rd Vietnamese Regular, or was is a deliberate attempt by 1 Battalion of 33 Nor Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment to entice two Australian armoured vehicles into a trap which would draw resources away from e 6 Battalion Royal Australian Regimental (6 RAR) Group which was exerting pressure on e enemy from furer nor? This article tells e story of at modern D-Day battle a leaves e reader to make a decision. The 6 Battalion had not long been in country a was still uergoing its warm-up or nursery operation which had commenced towards e e of May in an area some 17 km nor of Nui Dat. Their supposedly raer benign patrolling souwards had, however, inadvertently began to encroach upon e cross-country movement of an NVA battalion which was temporarily laying up in e former French rubber plantation village of Binh Ba. There is no doubt at it felt reatened by e hammer a anvil effect of 6 RAR pushing sou towards e defeed Nui Dat base. The RPG which hit e replacement tank being accompanied to 6 RAR by an armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) seriously woued e loader/operator a prevented e turret from traversing. The crew commaer opened fire wi a.30 calibre machine gun a was supported by e fire from two similar weapons on e ARV. The tank continued nor to a nearby friely village post whilst e recovery vehicle widrew sou to Nui Dat. The tank's arrival alerted e Vietnamese Regional Force (RF) Company who prepared to react against an enemy of (at at time) unknown streng. In parallel, e tank<s contact st report sent by radio to e 1 Australian Task Force (1 ATF) base a a request for assistance from e Vietnamese District Chief resulted in e task force's ready reaction force based on D Company 5 RAR being mobilised at about 9 am. Paul Stevens, a young lieutenant artillery forward observer from 105 Field Battery was attached to D Company at at time. He recalls, <We were ordered to move to Binh Ba, join up wi a tank troop, liaise wi e [Vietnamese] Sector Commaer, a, when given e go ahead, push e VC out of e village.' The group deployed in armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as reports from e RF company en being engaged by heavy fire in e nor escalated e original estimates of an irregular enemy force of a couple

2 - 2 - of platoons. On arrival at Binh Ba, Stevens saw Vietnamese villagers being evacuated an obvious prelude to approval being given for e Australians' assault a mused at is could be a possible escape route for some Viet Cong. At am, e waiting force in e east came uer heavy RPG fire a e District Chief immediately told D Company commaer, Major Murray Blake to <do what you have to do'. The import of is decision was not uerrated because e inevitable collateral damage especially from e tanks' 83.4 mm main armament to homes in e village would be substantial. The reaction force advanced, 2 Lieutenant Brian Sullivan's composite four tank-troop leading a Captain Ray De Vere's APCs ferrying D Company followed. Some 600 m sou of e village a machine gun fired near a flanking tank. In reply, four shotgun-type 83.4 mm cannister a 1000 tank machine gun rous silenced is opposition. The tanks halted about 300 m from e nearest houses a e infantry dismounted a spread out between e APCs. Desultory enemy RPG fire aimed at e tanks began, but e RPG gunners were shooting beyo effective range. The tanks returned fire, but an RPG en fired from e next house. It was not until e tank commaers began noting e house from which fire emanated, pausing, en firing at e next house at RPG fire decreased. The village of Binh Ba was about 200 m nor to sou a 500 m east to west. It was constructed in a grid divided by four roads/tracks running east to west. The buildings were constructed of concrete walls, tiled roofs a contained wooden doors a shuttered wiows. De Vere ordered elements of his force to each block of houses, one tank wi APCs in support leading every group. A mopping-up force of APCs carrying infantrymen brought up e rear. Up above, a light fire support team of RAAF Bushrangers (two Iroquois helicopters equipped wi mini-guns, machine guns a rockets) engaged enemy who tried to escape from e village. The next two hours were a mixture of cameo memories for all concerned. Tank troop commaer Brian Sullivan vividly describes two tank rous hitting a house simultaneously wi such force from eir explosion at e roof lifted, e walls crumbled a it was possible to see clearly rough e intervening space before e roof crashed down to grou level. Sullivan soon realised at if tank gun rous were directed at e wooden doors of houses, e 20-pou rous exploded inside, blowing out e shutters but containing most of e shrapnel wiin e building a reducing overall external destruction. This meod dealt very effectively wi enemy inside a house. The resistance was far stiffer an could have been possible for two platoons of VC a e determination to engage tanks reflected a strong NVA component. A United States< Air Force Forward Air Controller (<Jade 5') offered his services but De Vere declined a himself directed helicopter gunships< rocket fire to effect upon a group of troublesome houses. A significant number of enemy escaping sou-west were reported from a Souix helicopter flown by 2 Lieutenant Peter Rogers a carrying 5 RAR's intelligence officer, Captain Mike Battle. Tank commaer 2 Lieutenant Dave Ritchie saw an opportunity a wi anoer tank gave chase. The seco tank sustained heavy RPG fire a was disabled. Its woued crew had to be evacuated a e vehicle temporarily abaoned.

3 - 3 - By 1.30 pm, crewman on ree of e four tanks had been woued, tank ammunition had been expeed a relief by Sergeant Jock Browning's troop was welcomed. Major Blake's infantry force dismounted, reformed on e western e of e village a at 2 pm swept rough again using similar tactics to e morning's. It was now obvious at each house had a bunker below in which enemy had escaped detection during e initial sweep. After each tank/apc had fired into a building, e infantry entered a ha-toha fighting increased in tempo. Paul Stevens fou himself wiout any artillery tasks because of e close fighting a describes how e comma vehicle had collected a platoon commaer who had been woued when he came face to face wi a VC on entering a house. The officer had en survived a grenade blast before dispatching e enemy wi a shot from his rifle. The courage a leadership of junior ranks was superb. Of e 21 rifle sections involved, twelve were commaed by private soldiers. Two platoons were led by sergeants a one by a corporal. By last light, e assault force had completed is seco sweep a were exhausted. Major Rein Harring's B Company 5 RAR had moved into a blocking position sou of e village during e day a e battalion's commaing officer, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan had been in a forward tactical headquarters at a village just to e nor of Binh Ba since noon. Attention now focussed on e gun e of 105 Field Battery in Nui Dat which began receiving incoming rockets at about 7.30 pm. Gun Position Officer, Lieutenant Arur Burke recorded e nearest laing some 60 m from one field gun a anoer 100 m from e ammunition dump. The mortar locating radars obtained a fix on e enemy's firing point a e gunners manned eir guns in retaliation. The enemy ceased firing but as e battery began to clean up after an hour's firing, B Company 5 RAR reported a contact a e guns opened up in support. That evening a huge harassing a interdiction target list was haed down to e 105 which kept e gunners busy all night. At 6 am next morning, 7 June, B Company to e sou of Binh Ba engaged an enemy force of company streng after first mistaking em for friely Vietnamese soldiers at first bo sides waved to each oer! As D Company now prepared to sweep rough Binh Ba village in a final clean-up, some 80 enemy were observed in a rubber factory at Duc Trung,, 1000 m nor. A Vietnamese reaction force assisted by elements of 5 RAR were tasked but e enemy slipped out of e noose. D Company began its sweep from e west. The gruelling tasks of bringing out e dead a searching em for documents, accepting e surreer of woued enemy, relieving hiding civilians, a stockpiling captured weapons a ammunition made for a slow a distasteful process. The macabre scene of e day was e enemy dead in e village square, layed out uer e District Chief's orders for a salutary warning to villagers not to harbour enemy. One bright spot in is day were papers which identified e enemy as a battalion of NVA regulars who had been trying to sneak across Phuoc Tuy Province to a sanctuary in its noreast. D Company was not surprised at ey had been regulars, but were very relieved at e outcome of e battle. About 1 pm, heavy firing broke out arou Duc Trung village to e nor a e District Chief reported at e RF platoon had been overrun by about 100 enemy. Artillery fire was brought down amongst e widrawing enemy on e norern edge of e hamlet whilst helicopter gunships assisted in containing em till B Company 5 RAR wi four tanks arrived wiin 20 minutes. The souern part of Duc Trung was en

4 - 4 - secured, but e enemy was so intermingled wi e civilians in e nor at it was agreed RF troops should couct e sweep of at area. Artillery a Bushrangers continued to harass e widrawing enemy. Arur Burke at e gun e of 105 Battery wrote, <we've fired more rous in e last 48 hours an e first 20 days of last mon 2000 rous.' B Company blocked norwest of Duc Trung at night. D Company completed its clearance of Binh Ba at 5.15 pm a went into a night blocking position in e rubber to e sou-west of e village. Despite expectations of an NVA return, e night was mercifully peaceful. Paul Stevens described it as <deliciously cool, a e lanes of [rubber] trees stretched as far as e eye could see. From e outside, even e village looked peaceful.' The Battle of Binh Ba or by its military name, Operation HAMMER concluded at 8 am on 8 June after a final sweep of e village. An hour later, Australian Civil Affairs personnel arrived to guide a assist e resettlement of e villagers. Task Force Commaer Brigadier Say Pearson a Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan spoke wi e weary but proud troops prior to eir return to base. The words of a presentation at e Royal Australian Infantry Corps Conference in 1981 aptly summarise is operation. The contact at Binh Ba was characterised by vicious ha to ha fighting of an intensity rarely equalled during our period in Vietnam. The close support of e tanks was vital in allowing infantry to enter a clear houses. Engagements were at close quarters requiring high volume, shortrange fire... Binh Ba was a magnificent example of close cooperation between infantry a tanks against a determined, dug-in enemy. In is vicious battle, a large enemy force was defeated by rapid reaction, skill, courage a firepower. The Battle of Binh Ba is well credited in e 5 RAR book, The Year of e Tigers as <one of e major military victories of e Australian Force in Vietnam'. However, wheer it was triggered as an ambush or by accident remains a mystery. Colonel Arur Burke, a keen military historian is currently e Colonel Commaant of e Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery in Queensla. This article amalgamates e bibliography wi his a Major General Paul Stevens' personal diaries from 1969 when ey were fellow subalterns in 105 Field Battery RAA in Vietnam. It should be noted at, whilst not specifically for Binh Ba, but including eir actions at at time, e following received awards: Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan Distinguished Service Order, Major Murray Blake a Captain Ray De Vere a 2 Lieutenant Brian Sullivan Military Cross, 2 Lieutenant Peter Rogers - Distinguished Flying Cross, Sergeant Brian Loon Distinguished Couct Medal, a Corporal Peter Strudwick - Military Medal. The auor is iebted to Paul Stevens, Ray De Vere a Bruce Cameron for eir constructive editorial comments on drafts of is article. Battle, Capt M.R. Ed, The Year of e Tigers, 5 Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment, Sydney, <Heritage The Battle at Binh Ba Operation HAMMER Sou Vietnam 6-8 June 1969', <Ironsides The Magazine of e Royal Australian Armoured Corps<, Combat Arms, No , Phoenix Defence Publications, Canberra, pp 3 10.

5 The Battle of Binh Ba Two views of e gun position after e battle (Ian Rudd photos) Binh-Ba after 3c.jpg Binh-Ba after 4c.jpg 1 of 1