INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Exchange Taos, New Mexico

Transcription

1 Throwing Down the G Gauntlet tl t to t the th Next N t Generation of Nuclear Stewards: The Enduring Nuclear Legacy The 21st Century has brought many challenges in the nuclear world: INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Exchange M May 17, Taos, New Mexico TM Jack Jekowski The global spread of terrorism with entities wanting to secure weapons of mass destruction to achieve their goals, including nuclear materials The proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies Closing of the nuclear fuel cycle and the challenges associated with the disposition of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors The legacy of high-level nuclear waste left from the buildup of nuclear stockpiles during the Cold War The continuing repercussions of the Fukushima nuclear accident It is up to the new generation to accept these challenges to ensure the future safety and security of the world

2 TM TM TM TM TM TM TM TM TM The Transformation of the Nuclear Enterprise A ninth year of examining the future of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise and the world, looking into the second decade of the new Millennium Complex Transformation and the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise The Proposed Restructuring of the Nation s Nuclear Weapons Complex past, present and future? Complex Transformation Creating the National Security Enterprise The Proposed Restructuring of the Nation s Nuclear Weapons Complex past, present and future? INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Meeting May 21, 2009 Taos, New Mexico Jack Jekowski Complex Transformation The Nuclear Spring Strategic Implications of Current Events and U.S. Nuclear Policy on the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise, the Stockpile and Deterrence INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Meeting May 15, 2008 Taos, New Mexico INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Meeting May 20, 2010 Taos, New Mexico The Road to Complex 2030 A look back, one year later, on the proposed restructuring of the Nation s Nuclear Weapons Complex Jack Jekowski The NNSA Landscape: A Year of Change Ahead Jack Jekowski The Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force Report (NWCITF) Historical Perspectives and Future Implications INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Meeting May 18, 2006 Taos, New Mexico Jack Jekowski INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Meeting May 17, 2007 Taos, New Mexico Jack Jekowski INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Exchange May 16, 2013 Taos, New Mexico Jack Jekowski 2012 brought many challenges to the NNSA: the Y-12 Security Incident; problems at Los Alamos with a new security perimeter intrusion system; projected multi-$b cost overruns for the B-61 LEP, the Uranium Processing Facility in Oak Ridge, the MOX facility in Savannah River, and the CMRR facility in Los Alamos; problems with achieving ignition goals at the LLNL National Ignition Facility; and difficulties in the award of the new consolidated Y-12/Pantex M&O contract. These issues have once again focused Congressional, GAO and IG attention on the NNSA, and has resulted in Legislation to look once again at the original construct that separated NNSA from DOE. This presentation will explore the complex current landscape of NNSA, the establishment and expansion of the role of the new NA- 00 organization (Infrastructure & Operations), and what the future may hold for the organization as we head into FY14 and beyond. Throwing Down the Gauntlet to the Next Generation of Nuclear Stewards: The Enduring Nuclear Legacy INMM SW Chapter Annual Technical Exchange May 17, 2014 Taos, New Mexico Jack Jekowski The 21 st Century has brought many challenges in the nuclear world: The global spread of terrorism with entities wanting to secure weapons of mass destruction to achieve their goals, including nuclear materials The proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies Closing of the nuclear fuel cycle and the challenges associated with the disposition of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors The legacy of high-level nuclear waste left from the buildup of nuclear stockpiles during the Cold War The continuing repercussions of the Fukushima nuclear accident It is up to the new generation to accept these challenges to ensure the future safety and security of the world Weathering the Perfect Storm: Implications of 2012 events on the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) ANS Trinity Section and INMM SW Chapter Joint Dinner Meeting November 2, 2012 Santa Fe, New Mexico Jack Jekowski 2

3 The New Era The Prague Speech April 5, 2009 the morning after a DPRK ballistic missile launch In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. g, g y y Reaffirms the Administration goal of a world without nuclear weapons Reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy Negotiate a new, verifiable Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia by the end of the year [when the existing one ends] X Pursuit of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). X Pursuit of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). See for background information Strengthening th the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT - next conference scheduled d?? for 2010] Strengthening international inspections [IAEA] New framework for civil nuclear cooperation including an international fuel bank Consequences for countries breaking the rules Secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years - establish the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as durable international institutions 3

4 The New Era Positives and Negatives Positives Significant accomplishments in securing and reducing nuclear material world wide U.N. Security Resolution 1887 Nobel Peace Prize QDR, NPR and National Security Strategy New START treaty signed Nuclear Security Summits, 2010, 2012 and 2014 NPT Summit 2010 Recognition of Global Zero initiative Diplomatic resolution to Iranian nuclear situation? Negatives Iranian nuclear situation still unresolved North Korea continues down path toward deployable nuclear weapons Russia, China and Pakistan upgrading their nuclear stockpiles Growing concern over effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella Congressional response to Crimea Situation (New START) Growing tensions in the East and South China Seas Declining relationship with Russia Unrest in many third-world countries: follow-on to Arab Spring Budget deficit and continued global economic problems Snowden NSA leaks 4

5 NPR Implementation Study Madeline Creedon, Asst. Sec. of Defense, Global Strategic Affairs, Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 17, 2013: the administration has been conducting an NPR implementation study to review our nuclear deterrence requirements and operational plans to ensure e they address today s threats The e implementation e study focuses on the five key strategic objectives established in the Nuclear Posture Review : Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. The Brandenburg Gate Speech, June 19, 2013 The President announces plans to further reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons Released with new Nuclear Employment Strategy that clarifies the implementation of the NPR, and sets the stage for a 3+2 strategy Proposal not well-received by Russia 5

6 National Policy Strategic Linkages Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. pursuing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at the lowest levels consistent with U.S. and allied interests as we pursue the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons. Four enduring national interests: Security of the U.S., allies and partners Prosperity both in the U.S. and abroad Values and respect at home and abroad International Order that promotes peace, security and opportunities The QDR embodies and builds on the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance priorities, preparing for the future by rebalancing our defense efforts in a period of fiscal constraint.emphasizing three pillars:: Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to mitigate the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. Build security globally, to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges. Project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.. The U.S. will: Pursue the goal of a world without Nuclear weapons Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Present a clear choice to Iran and North Korea Secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and material Support peaceful nuclear energy Counter biological threats Until such time as the Administration s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners. Joint Tri-Lab Director statement on Nuclear Posture Review: NPR Policy Framework: We believe that the approach Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; outlined in the NPR, which Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons; excludes further nuclear testing Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced and includes the consideration of nuclear force levels; the full range of life extension Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. options (refurbishment of existing allies and partners; and warheads, reuse of nuclear Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. components from different warheads and replacement of Our Armed Forces will always be nuclear components based on a cornerstone of our security, but previously tested designs), they must be complemented. Our provides the necessary technical security also depends on flexibility to manage the nuclear diplomats who can act in every stockpile into the future with an corner of the world acceptable level of risk. It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy. U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending form the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. With this QTR, we bind together multiple energy technologies, as well as multiple DOE energy technology programs, in the common purpose of solving our energy challenges. In addition, the QTR provides a multi-year framework for our planning. Energy investments are multi-year, multi-decade investments. Given this time horizon, we need to take a longer view. 6

7 The Nuclear Security Project Ten Steps Work with leaders of countries with nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise; Discard Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons for U.S. and Russian forces to reduce the danger of accidental, mistaken or unauthorized launch; Substantially reduce nuclear forces in all countries that possess them; Eliminate short-range battlefield nuclear weapons designed to be forward deployed; Adopt a process to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into effect; Secure all nuclear weapons and materials globally to the highest possible standards; Develop a new international system to manage the risks associated with producing fuel for nuclear power; Halt the production globally of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes; phase out the use of HEU in civil commerce and remove weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and render it safe; Redouble efforts to resolve regional conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers; and Strengthen verification and enforcement capabilities. 7

8 Taking the Long View Questions Challenges to the INMM membership: How will the world deal with the untenable situations in Iran and DPRK? What happens if other nation-states similarly pursue nuclear weapons? How are other nations responding to President Obama s global nuclear initiatives what impact will those responses have on the INMM? What will be the world-wide response to the first terrorist nuclear event (either nuclear or dispersal)? Can nuclear forensics provide the deterrence needed to prevent terrorist attacks? Will unilateral reductions in the U.S. stockpile influence the decision of other Nuclear Weapons States to further reduce their own stockpiles? What is the evolving role of the United Nations and IAEA in the new International Order proposed by President Barack Obama? What scientific, technological and policy innovations can INMM promote to make the world a safer place? Should INMM have an interactive web presence (social network)? How will the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant accident impact the future of the Nuclear Renaissance? 8 8

9 The Nuclear Challenges of the 21 st Century Keeping nuclear materials around the globe secure and out of the hands of entities wishing to have access to them for nefarious purposes Controlling the spread of dual-use nuclear technologies, especially uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing Completing the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle with the safe and secure handling and disposition of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors The legacy of high-level nuclear waste left from the buildup of nuclear stockpiles during the Cold War Developing nuclear power that is proliferation-resistant resistant and accepted by the general public as safe, economically viable and environmentally friendly It is up to the new generation to accept these challenges to ensure the future safety and security of the world 9

10 Putting the World in the Context of INMM An international professional organization focused on the management of nuclear materials worldwide and the advancement of nuclear scientific knowledge, technical skills, and professional standards for more than 55 years 10

11 Putting the World in the Context of INMM 11

12 Putting the World in the Context of INMM Keeping nuclear materials around the globe secure and out of the hands of entities wishing to have access to them for nefarious purposes Controlling the spread of dual-use nuclear technologies, especially uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing Completing the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle with the safe and secure handling and disposition of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors The legacy of high-level nuclear waste left from the buildup of nuclear stockpiles during the Cold War Developing nuclear power that is proliferation-resistant resistant and accepted by the general public as safe, economically viable and environmentally friendly 12

13 The Legacy Challenges Keeping nuclear materials around the globe secure and out of the hands of entities wishing to have access to them for nefarious purposes Global cooperation for the reduction and safeguarding of nuclear materials Technologies to enhance detection and protection National Technical Means to verify treaty compliance and identify clandestine activities Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Nuclear Forensics Containment of rogue states intent on building nuclear weapons Use of social media to create a world-wide network of observers and reporters Diplomatic and societal changes to reduce conflicts and their causes, including climate change impacts, poverty, disease, hunger and water Workforce development next generation of Nuclear Stewards 13

14 The Legacy Challenges Controlling the spread of dual-use nuclear technologies, especially uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing Containing emerging nuclear states through international efforts Control of exports associated with nuclear technologies Cybersecurity Technologies to enhance detection and protection National Technical Means to verify treaty compliance and identify clandestine activities Strengthening role of Nuclear Suppliers Group International Fuel Bank Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Use of social media to create a world-wide network of observers and reporters Workforce development next generation of Nuclear Stewards 14

15 The Legacy Challenges Completing the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle with the safe and secure handling and disposition of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors Not-in-my-backyard societal issues and public education Long-term secure storage solutions with both scientific and public acceptance Technology developments breeder reactors Small Modular Reactors International Fuel Bank Use of social media to create an informed and supportive public Workforce development next generation of Nuclear Stewards 15

16 The Legacy Challenges The legacy of high-level nuclear waste left from the buildup of nuclear stockpiles during the Cold War Long-term secure storage Yucca Mountain resolution Quick solution to WIPP issues Hanford Tank Farm Waste Treatment Plant Project resolution 53 million gallons Public perceptions and education Savannah River MOX technologies Use of social media to create an informed and supportive public Workforce development next generation of Nuclear Stewards 16

17 The Legacy Challenges Developing nuclear power that is proliferation-resistant and accepted by the general public as safe, economically viable and environmentally friendly Enhanced risk management assessments for nuclear reactors Enhanced security for Spent Fuel ponds Redundant Power Systems for cooling Catastrophic event scenarios Next generation safe reactors Public perceptions and education Use of social media to achieve and informed and supportive Public Workforce development next generation of Nuclear Stewards 17

18 INMM Efforts to Throw Down the Gauntlet Strengthen student and university engagement since 1998 Broaden International membership participation (with the help of the Department of State s Partnership in Nuclear Security initiative) Creation of enhanced organizational structure Examine broader strategic role for the Institute in standards and collaborations Taking the Long View Promote the important continuing role for the Institute 18

19 The Challenges Closer to Home Administration focus on reducing the reliance on the nuclear stockpile Unresolved issues with geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel General public fear of things nuclear and misinformation by public media Lack of a long-range strategy and support for the Nuclear Security Enterprise Shrinking pool of expertise, lack of mentorships with aging workforce Long-term budget deficit it issues Global unrest and economic issues Election-cycle driven policy making 19

20 y g DOE Today (with NNSA) The only constant is change - Heraclitus of Ephesus Associate Deputy Secretary Bruce Held* Chair, Security Committee Secretary Moniz reorganized the Department in July of 2013 with the creation of a new Under Secretary position for Management & Performance Beth Robinson (NASA) was nominated for the position New NNSA Management Team General Frank Klotz and Madelyn Creedon Klotz was confirmed on April 8 th and sworn in on April 17 th as the new Administrator. Ms. Creedon was confirmed on July 23 rd, and sworn in on August 7 th. Dr. Franklin Lynn M. Orr, Jr. nominated to Under Secretary for Science & Energy Mike Lempke Named Acting Chief Security Officer for NNSA* * Member of the new DOE Security Committee Dennis Miotla is Chief Security Officer for Science & Energy as well as COO and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for NE* Brig. Gen. Jimmy McMillian is Chief Security Officer for M&P in addition to his role as Director for S&S and Emergency Management within office of EM* Still under development. Matt Moury will be Acting Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety and Security, supported by Steve Kirchhoff, Director of the HSS Office of Resource Management. These are functions previously in HSS Renamed Office of Independent Enterprise Assessments (IEA) to be headed by Glenn Podonsky 20

21 Commission to Review DOE Labs S. 1245, FY14 Consolidated Appropriations Act: Commission to Review the Effectiveness of the Energy Department s National Laboratories The Commission shall address whether the 12 Department of Energy s national laboratories: (A) are properly aligned with the Department s strategic priorities; (B) have clear, well understood, d and properly balanced missions i that t are not unnecessarily redundant and duplicative; (C) have unique capabilities that have sufficiently evolved to meet current and future energy and national security challenges; (D) are appropriately sized to meet the Department s energy and national security missions; and E) are appropriately supporting other Federal agencies and the extent to which it benefits DOE missions. The Commission shall also determine whether there are opportunities to more effectively and efficiently use the capabilities of the national laboratories, including consolidation and realignment, reducing overhead costs, reevaluating governance models using industrial and academic bench marks for comparison, and assessing the impact of DOE s oversight and management approach. In its evaluation, the Commission i should also consider the cost and effectiveness of using other research, development, and technology centers and universities as an alternative to meeting DOE s energy and national security goals. 21

22 Commission to Review DOE Labs Co-chairs: Jared Cohon, President Emeritus and Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Carnegie Mellon University T.J. Glauthier. Cohon, formally the Deputy Secretary and Chief Operating Officer of the Energy Department and currently President of TJG Energy Associates, LLC, an energy consulting form. Membership: Norman Augustine, Chairman of the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, NASA and Former Chairman, Lockheed Martin Wanda Austin, President and CEO, The Aerospace Corporation Charles Elachi, Director of Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA Paul Fleury, Frederick W. Beinecke Professor of Engineering and Applied Physics, Yale University Susan Hockfield, Professor of Neuroscience and President Emerita, MIT Richard Meserve, President, Carnegie Institution for Science and Chair of the Environmental Stewardship Subcommittee of Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) Cherry Murray, Dean, Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS) Two part study with first report due February 1,

23 y g NNSA Today The only constant is change - Heraclitus of Ephesus Under Secretary for Nuclear Security & Administrator, NNSA Lt Gen Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret) Principal Deputy Administrator: Madelyn R. Creedon Office of Science and Policy Dimitri Kusnezov Associate Principal Deputy Administrator William White (Acting) Chief of Staff Janis Greene Office of Civil Rights Debra Parrish NA-1 With the recent confirmation of the NNSA Administrator and his Principal Deputy Administrator, NNSA is now prepared to implement functional and strategic changes to address concerns by Congress. Deputy Admin. for Defense Programs Donald L. Cook Deputy Admin. for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Anne M. Harrington Deputy Admin. for Naval Reactors Admiral John M. Richardson, USN Associate Admin. for External Affairs Clarence Bishop Office of General Counsel Bruce Diamond Associate Admin. for Acquisition & Project Management Robert B. Raines NA-10 NA- 20 NA-30 NA-EA NA-GC NA-APM Assoc. Admin. for Emergency Operations Assoc. Admin. for Def. Nuclear Security & Chief, Defense Nuclear Security Assoc. Admin. & Dep. Under Sec. for Counterterrorism & Counterproliferation Assoc. Admin. for Infrastructure & Operations Assoc. Admin. for Management & Budget Assoc. Admin. for Information Mgmt. & CIO Assoc. Admin. for Safety & Health & Chief, Defense Nuclear Safety Robert Nassif Joseph J. Krol Douglas Dearolph Steven Aoki James McConnell Wayne Jones (Acting) Don Nichols (Acting) (Acting) (Acting) NA-40 NA-70 NA-80 NA-00 NA-MB NA-IM NA-SH Kansas City Field Office Mark Holecek Livermore Field Office Nicole Nelson-Jean (Acting) Los Alamos Field Office Kim Davis Lebak Nevada Field Office Steven Lawrence NNSA Production Office Steven C. Erhart Sandia Field Office Geoffrey Beausoleil Savannah River Field Office David Alldridge (Acting) August

24 Congressional Advisory Panel on NNSA Section 3166, FY13 Defense Authorization Act: There is established a congressional advisory panel to be known as the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise The purpose of the advisory panel is to examine options and make recommendations for revising the governance structure, mission, and management of the nuclear security enterprise. Membership: Gen. Richard Mies (co-chair) Norm Augustine (co-chair) Rep. Heather Wilson Dr. Michael Anastasio* Rep. Ellen Tauscher Rep. John Spratt Rep. David Hobson Adm. Kirkland Donald Frank Miller William Schneider T.J. Glauthier Gregory Jaczko Panel start delayed due to Sequestration 180 Day Report due after start Final Report was originally due February 1,

25 Congressional Advisory Panel Status Preliminary Congressional Hearings held March 26, 2014 "Unfortunately, the unmistakable conclusion of our fact-findingfinding is that, as implemented, the NNSA experiment" involving creation of a semi-autonomous organization has failed. Norm Augustine, Co-Chair Systemic disorders Identified: Loss of Sustained National Leadership Focus. The fundamental underlying cause of this erosion has been a lack of attention to nuclear weapon issues by senior leadership-both civilian and military - across both past and present Administrations and Congresses. A Flawed DOE/NNSA Governance Model. Second, the current NNSA governance model is fundamentally flawed. NNSA has not established effective leadership, policy, culture or integrated decision-making. Indeed, the design and implementation of NNSA has led to redundancies, confused authorities, and weakened accountability. Sound Management Principles are Lacking. Both DOE and NNSA lack clearly defined and disciplined exercise of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability aligned to NNSA's mission deliverables. Too many people can stop mission essential work for a host of reasons and those who are responsible for getting the work done often find their decisions ignored or overturned. Dysfunctional M&O Relationship. The trusted partnership that historically existed between the laboratories and DOE/NNSA headquarters has eroded over the past two decades to an arm's length, customer-to-contractor adversarial relationship Uneven Collaboration with Customers. There is no affordable, executable joint DOD-DOE vision, plan, or program for the future of nuclear weapons capabilities. This is, at once, a cultural and communications divide. Final Report was expected in June, 2014, but has been delayed d Bold Recommendations requested by Congress Archived video: Testimony: 25

26 Paul Robinson on the Future of the Complex* Personally, and after many years of believing that it was important to keep the nuclear weapons design, development, and production separate from the Defense Department, I have now reached the point that I believe it is worth considering removing the weapons responsibilities from DOE and placing it as a new agency within the DoD. The presence of a uniformed military could provide a continuity that has been lacking as different administrations came and went. The nation s nuclear deterrent has only suffered from these short-term upheavals in what must be a long-term commitment. *Response to questions of House Arms Services Committee, Summer,

27 Which Landscape Does the Future Hold? Taking the Long View in a Time of Great Uncertainty t Throwing Down the Gauntlet to the Next Generation of Nuclear Stewards: The Enduring Nuclear Legacy A discontinuity event? Path Toward World Peace? Today Possible Discontinuity Events: Israeli attack on Iran nuclear facilities Iranian nuclear test DPRK and South Korea conflict Destabilization of Pakistani government India/Pakistan conflict Rise of new nuclear powers Middle East war Conflict in the South Asia Sea Terrorism on U.S. soil Non-state use of WMD Fukishima events The Next Generation of Nuclear Stewards Status Quo? Path Toward Global Conflict? 27

28 Five minutes is too close Throwing Down the Gauntlet to the Next Generation of Nuclear Stewards: Nuclear Stewards: The Enduring Nuclear Legacy TM Past, Present and Future? 2014 It is still five minutes to midnight. Since the end of World War II, the Bulletin has focused on the interface between scientific discovery and self-governance. Humanity has been sorely tested during its attempts to control the implements of nuclear warfare. The difficulties of managing dangerous technology are perhaps even more challenging when the threat is not the fierce immediacy of atomic explosion, but slow, creeping dangers like rising carbon-dioxide levels or increased access to dual-use use science. In 2013, the world saw new evidence of a dangerous but familiar trend: Technology outpaced humanity s capacity to understand or control it, even as many citizens continued for a wide variety of reasons to lose faith in the institutions upon which they must rely to make scientific innovation work for rather than against them. This is a trend that must be reversed if society is to gain control over the science it produces. Technological changes are outpacing humanity s ability to manage them in ways that ensure our safety and security. As always, new technologies hold the promise of doing great good, supplying new sources of clean energy, curing disease, and otherwise enhancing our lives. From experience, however, we also know that new technologies can be used to diminish humanity and destroy societies. We can manage our technology, or become victims of it. The choice is ours, and the Clock is ticking.. These are historic i times we need to use all of our collective knowledge, wisdom, and imagination, to ensure that there is no question mark at the end of the road our national security hangs in the balance For electronic copies of this presentation Jack Jekowski: jpjekowski@aol.com; visit ITP s website: ( and click under What s New 28