APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR WARHEAD COUNTING

Transcription

1 APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR WARHEAD COUNTING Alexander Glaser Princeton University PVTS-SGS Workshop on Verification Technologies Beijing, June 15 16, 2015 Paul Shambroom Revision 0

2 BACKGROUND VERIFICATION CHALLENGES OF DEEP(ER) REDUCTIONS

3 KEY VERIFICATION CHALLENGES OF TREATIES THAT LIMIT TOTAL NUMBER OF WEAPONS CORRECTNESS OF DECLARATIONS Warhead Counting Verify that numerical limit of declared items is not exceeded Warhead Authentication Verify authenticity of warheads prior to dismantlement COMPLETENESS OF DECLARATIONS Most promising may be techniques to verify completeness of fissile material declarations; nuclear forensic analysis can be used to estimate historic fissile material production ( nuclear archaeology ) Source: U.S. Department of Energy (top) and U.S. Department of Defense, (bottom) 3

4 WARHEAD COUNTING

5 TAGGING TRANSFORMING A NUMERICAL LIMIT INTO A BAN ON UNTAGGED ITEMS Source: Steve Fetter and Thomas Garwin, Using Tags to Monitor Numerical Limits in Arms Control Agreements in Barry M. Blechman, ed., Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict, Washington, DC, 1989, pp

6 TAGGING TRANSFORMING A NUMERICAL LIMIT INTO A BAN ON UNTAGGED ITEMS Source: Steve Fetter and Thomas Garwin, Using Tags to Monitor Numerical Limits in Arms Control Agreements in Barry M. Blechman, ed., Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict, Washington, DC, 1989, pp

7 WARHEAD COUNTING OPTIONS 1 WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF NON-INTRUSIVENESS AND ROBUSTNESS Serial number on warhead Non-intrusiveness Robustness A. Glaser, Information Security in Nuclear Warhead Verification, Vienna, December 12,

8 WARHEAD COUNTING OPTIONS 1 WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF NON-INTRUSIVENESS AND ROBUSTNESS 2 Serial number on warhead Unique ID on warhead UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS (e.g. Reflective Particle Tags) Non-intrusiveness Robustness Non-intrusiveness Robustness Reflective particle tag concept: A. Gonzales, Reflective Particle Tag for Arms Control and Safeguards Authentication, Sandia National Laboratories, 2004 A. Glaser, Information Security in Nuclear Warhead Verification, Vienna, December 12,

9 WARHEAD COUNTING OPTIONS 1 WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF NON-INTRUSIVENESS AND ROBUSTNESS 2 3 Serial number on warhead Unique ID on warhead UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS (e.g. Reflective Particle Tags) Simple Buddy Tag Non-intrusiveness Non-intrusiveness Non-intrusiveness Robustness Robustness Robustness Reflective particle tag concept: A. Gonzales, Reflective Particle Tag for Arms Control and Safeguards Authentication, Sandia National Laboratories, 2004 Buddy tag concept: S. E. Jordan, Buddy Tag s Motion Sensing and Analysis Subsystem, Sandia National Laboratories, 1991 A. Glaser, Information Security in Nuclear Warhead Verification, Vienna, December 12,

10 WARHEAD COUNTING OPTIONS 1 WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF NON-INTRUSIVENESS AND ROBUSTNESS Serial number on warhead Unique ID on warhead UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS (e.g. Reflective Particle Tags) Simple Buddy Tag Buddy Tag with serial number Non-intrusiveness Non-intrusiveness Non-intrusiveness Non-intrusiveness Robustness Robustness Robustness Robustness Reflective particle tag concept: A. Gonzales, Reflective Particle Tag for Arms Control and Safeguards Authentication, Sandia National Laboratories, 2004 Buddy tag concept: S. E. Jordan, Buddy Tag s Motion Sensing and Analysis Subsystem, Sandia National Laboratories, 1991 A. Glaser, Information Security in Nuclear Warhead Verification, Vienna, December 12,

11 EXAMPLE BUDDY TAG CONCEPT

12 OPTION FOR A MINIMALLY INTRUSIVE ONSITE INSPECTION USING BUDDY TAGS WITHOUT DIRECT ACCESS TO TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEMS Buddy Tags Area off limits for inspectors Area accessible to inspectors Hypothetical nuclear warhead storage facility A. Glaser, Information Security in Nuclear Warhead Verification, Vienna, December 12,

13 SCENARIO 1 ( DISHONEST HOST )

14 SCENARIO 1 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B 10

15 SCENARIO 1 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B In reality, there are 60 warheads 10

16 SCENARIO 1 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B 11

17 SCENARIO 1 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B INSPECTION 11

18 SCENARIO 1 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B INSPECTION 11

19 SCENARIO 2 ( HONEST HOST )

20 SCENARIO 2 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B 13

21 SCENARIO 2 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B Some items are moved to a previously unknown third site (perhaps for maintenance) 14

22 SCENARIO 2 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B Some items are moved to a previously unknown third site (perhaps for maintenance) Without buddy tags, the presence of these items may be considered suspect 14

23 SCENARIO 2 PARTY HAS DECLARED 50 WARHEADS; THEY ARE STORED AT TWO (DECLARED) SITES SITE A SITE B Some items are moved to a previously unknown third site (perhaps for maintenance) Without buddy tags, the presence of these items may be considered suspect 14