Northern California. Geographic Area Coordination Center

Transcription

1 2008 Northern California June Fire Siege Operational Support: Strategic Planning June 22 to July 10, 2008 (Version 1.0) Northern California Geographic Area Coordination Center

2 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Table Of Contents Executive Summary... 4 Introduction... 5 Leader s Intent... 5 Letter of Expectations - NorCal MAC to NIMO Boise IMT... 5 Letter of Expectations NIMO Boise IMT to City of Phoenix AHIMT... 7 Organizational Support Structure... 8 Conference Call / Meeting Schedule... 9 Situation Assessment Historical Perspective and Fire Behavior Assessment Priorities Theater of Operations Theater of Operations End State Theater of Operations Concepts Theater of Operations Implementation Plan Option 1 Two Zones Option 2 Three Zones Resources and Preparedness Force Multiplier Protocols to Initiate Resource Reallocation Coordination Plan Resources Reallocation Resource Reallocation Strategy Resource Reallocation Coordination Plan Protocols to Initiate Resource Reallocation Coordination Plan Building Capability and Capacity through Non-Traditional Sources NorCal MAC Group Rest and Recuperation Federal Disaster Assistance and ESF4 Firefighting Support Direct Federal Assistance Emergency Support Function #4 Firefighting Involvement in Wildfires ESF4 Resource Tracking Emergency Declaration State of California Emergency Declaration Request Presidential Emergency Declaration Safety Leadership / Human Factors Developing the Human Factor - On the Job Education, a Proposal Sample Human Factors Message Rapid Team Building Aviation...41 Aviation Command and Control Helitanker Initial Attack Protocols Planning and Coordination Incident Data Collection Fire Information California June Fire Siege Report Page 2 of 56

3 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Accountable Cost Management Key Decision Log Fire Suppression Rehab Strategy Appendices Page 3 of 56

4 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Executive Summary The National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) Boise Incident Management Team (IMT) was asked to develop concepts, review processes and assist Northern California Operations (North Ops) and the NorCal Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group with providing support and coordination to the incidents in northern California. Included within the attached report are the project documents that support the following recommendations; Establish a Theater or Zone of Operations management organization concept to the extent possible. Establish and staff an aviation operations officer to handle the allocation and reallocation of critical air resources from the GACC level. Implement the resource allocation / reallocation and Force Multiplier strategies. Implement the Fire Suppression Rehabilitation Strategy. Continue to use the Key Decision Log to capture critical decisions, recommendations and thoughts. Develop, in consultation with the Line Officer Team in R-5, and implement a mop-up strategy to ensure the incidents are not being required to implement mop up standards that would engage fire suppression resources needed at other incidents. Continue to utilize the ESF4 Lead, Cal-Fire, Phoenix Fire Department AHIMT and FEMA personnel to support and coordinate the ordering, in processing and support of the ESF4 resources. After the fire season ends, establish an interagency task force to review and update, based on lessons learned, the established processes and procedures that were enacted. Page 4 of 56

5 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Introduction The purpose of this Strategic Planning document is to provide guidance and recommendations to assist with: Efficient and effective allocation of scare or limited resources Providing timely and accurate incident intelligence for geographic area planning Providing timely and accurate incident intelligence for the media and public Documenting decisions for proper financial management and responsibility Leader s Intent Letter of Expectations - NorCal MAC to NIMO Boise IMT The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) Assistant Director, Northern California Coordination Center and California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) Assistant Regional Chief, Operations provided a Letter of Expectations to the National Incident Management Team (NIMO) Boise Incident Management Team (IMT). Objective: Provide planning process and organizational support to MACS. Organize intelligence to facilitate discussion of factors and setting of priorities during MACS sessions. Increase situational awareness through the use of new tools. Facilitate Conference Calls Nor Cal MACS meetings Provide relevant intelligence for incident priority decision making Prioritize and incorporate technology and new tools into decision making process Promote a Forward Looking strategy process Objective: Provide operational support, including air assets, gather intelligence and assist in the decision making process for North Ops including long range and strategic outlooks and MACS group support. Provide operational aviation support and intelligence gathering Operations/Safety Fire and Aviation Safety Team (FAST) support Objective: Provide finance processes and organizational support to MACS. Provide financial assistance to the North Ops support operations. Capture key decisions made in support of North Ops, the incidents and the units. Consolidate Long Term high cost potential fires received from Agency Administrators. Capture key decisions made in support of North Ops, the incidents and the units. Provide financial and administrative assistance to North Ops support operations. Page 5 of 56

6 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Objective: Provide safety assistance and organizational support to the regional fire safety officer and MACS. Organize safety and risk management issues to facilitate identification and mitigation of safety and risk management issues. Develop and prepare a Medical Plan (ICS-206) for Northern Operations Base Participate in or help prepare briefing for incoming resources to insure they are briefed before leaving North Ops. Safety/Logistics on site (Incidents) visits, intelligence gathering. Coordinate with Regional Safety Manager (Peter Tolosano) with site visits to identify trends in accidents/illnesses, etc. Participate in Safety/Logistics and other Conference Calls as required. Prepare and define protocols/procedures documents for serious injury, accidents, fatalities and deployments in conjunction with North Operations. o Define Critical Incident Stress Debriefing protocols, procedures, contacts, etc. Objective: Provide intelligence to North Ops dealing with logistical trends or problems experienced by the fires in Northern California beginning June Coordinate with Regional Safety Manager, North Ops Logistical Coordinator, and Logistical Contracting Specialist for logistical or medical related trends determined by incident visits. Monitor the ordering process information from various incidents to see if there are trends that could result in shortages, large backhaul requirements or UTF trends. Evaluate IMT s accountable property procedures and security of resources as part of site visit. Assist with in-processing of Emergency Support Function #4 Firefighting (ESF4) resources. Objective: Provide organizational guidance to have a coordinated and integrated public information function across jurisdictions. Ensure consistent and accurate fire information is coordinated with agency partners and fire incidents and disseminated in a timely manner. Provide oversight to ensure national fire management policy and programs are accurately portrayed in information updates and briefs. Engage agency partners to assure public understanding of the immediate and long-term impacts and benefits of wildland fires. Objective: Provide a contingency planning framework for possible circumstances including, but not limited to, FEMA involvement following a Federal disaster declaration; VIP visits; a weather event; serious accident involving a firefighter or other resources; a long term sustainability of coordination and support. FEMA Mission Assignment assistance Significant event support (Incident within an incident) Suppression resource demobilization, rehab, rotations, etc. Long term strategy development Page 6 of 56

7 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Increased fire activity strategy Letter of Expectations NIMO Boise IMT to City of Phoenix AHIMT To provide for a more manageable span of control for the processing of ESF4 resources, a Type 3 All Hazard Incident Management Team (AHIMT) was ordered. The order was placed under the Action Request form to provide support to the ESF4 mission. By using the Phoenix AHIMT a short wildland team did not have to be ordered. The Phoenix AHIMT worked under the National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) Boise Incident Management Team (IMT) and was given the following Letter of Expectations. 1. The Phoenix AHIMT (PIMT) is expected to manage the Base Camp (base) for the induction of resources ordered to support the FEMA Mission Assignment (MA) tasking ESF4 to supply resources to the state of California and the local fire organizations in the effected counties. 2. The PIMT will be responsible to manage the base in an efficient and effective manner following ICS organizations and established policies and procedures. 3. The PIMT will assist the North Ops logistical with managing and/or support other logistical functions at the base. 4. The base will need to have limited human comfort facilities and supplies. 5. All Finance agreements or purchases will be done by the BOI NIMO FSC, Liz Kinney, the assigned buying team or a member of the North Ops logistics team unless approved prior to purchase of any supplies. 6. The PIMT will coordinate with Tom Johnston, BOI NIMO SOFR, on the development of health and safety plan for the base. 7. The PIMT will develop a schedule for after hour coverage of the base in the event a resource arrives after the established hours. 8. The NIMO-BOI will be available to assist as needed. A contact list will be provided. 9. The PIMT and the BOI NIMO teams will look for and take advantage of training opportunities where and when possible. The PIMT will develop a list of desired functional training needs that may be facilitated by the BOI NIMO. 10. The PIMT will report directly to Steve Gage, Incident Commander, Boise NIMO or his designated representative. Page 7 of 56

8 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Organizational Support Structure Page 8 of 56

9 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Conference Call / Meeting Schedule North Operations Coordination Center Time of Call Type of Conference Call or Meeting Phone Number or Location Pass Code 0730 Incident Commander s (888) # Conference Call (1) 0830 Incident/Region Safety Conference Call (888) # 0830 Incident/Region Logs Conference Call (866) # 0830 National Coordinators (866) # Conference Call (NICC) 0900 Northern MAC Group Operations Center N/A (Prioritization Meeting) 1030 Predictive Services Meeting Operations Center N/A (Intelligence/Weather) 1100 Incident/Region Finance (888) # Conference Call 1300 Incident PIO Conference Call (916) N/A 1300 North/South Operations Conference Call (877) (South Operations Bridge) # 1400 Logistics Meeting (Base) Simulation Room #3 N/A 1700 CAL-MAC Conference Call (877) # (South Operations Bridge) 1730 California Aviation Conference Call (877) # 1800 National /Regional Conference Call (888) # Other Phone Numbers: North Operation Bridge (877) L - Pass Code # and P - Pass Code #) NMAC (866) (P- Pass Code ) (1) Refer to Incident Commander Conference Call (Appendix 1). Page 9 of 56

10 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Situation Assessment Refer to the National Significant Fire Potential, July 6, 2008 (Appendix 2). Refer to the 2008 Northern California Fire Season Outlook, July through October 2008, issued 6/25/08 (Appendix 3). Historical Perspective and Fire Behavior Assessment R-5 Fire Behavior Branch Protocol Coordination Interpretation (Strategic) Fire Modeling Interpretation (Strategic & Tactical) GACC Coordination Modeling Interpretation (Strategic) Fire Modeling Interpretation (Strategic & Tactical) Fire Modeling Interpretation (Strategic & Tactical) Flow paths and tasks for successful transfer of fire behavior information during periods of high activity. Page 10 of 56

11 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Tools ICS-209 Provider -Intel Group Life Threat Real Property Threatened High Damage Potential Incident Complexity Containment Potential Decision Tools FSPro Fire Spread Probability RAVAR/RIVET Structures and assets at risk Fire Behavior Farsite/FlamMap 7-day significant fire potential Fire behavior forecast Fire weather forecast Provider Fire Teams, Fire Behavior Branch, GACC Predictive Services Provider - Fire Teams, Predictive Services Refer to the Northern California Fire Behavior Assessment, ONC Support 2008 (Appendix 4). Page 11 of 56

12 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Priorities Refer to Firescope California MACS Procedures Guide, MACS 410-1, July 12, 2006 (Appendix 5). Refer to Northern California Multi-Agency Coordination Group (NorCal MAC) Operations Guide, Northern California Wildfire Coordinating Group, July 2006 (Appendix 6). Life threatening situations (firefighter or public safety) Evacuations currently taking place Advisory evacuations Evacuation plans in place Road, highway, or freeway closures Real Property Threatened Number of structures, commercial and/or residences Number of subdivisions Name communities and number of populace High Damage Potential Long term or short term damage potential Plausible impacts on community Historical significant cultural resources Natural resources, such as crops, grazing, timber, watershed Major power lines, energy sources Incident Complexity Multi-jurisdictional Fuel type, size and growth potential Political situations Severity, extreme fire behavior and fuels conditions Refer to Extended Term Incident Prioritization, July 6, 2008 (Appendix 7). Refer to Long Term Incident Priorities, July 6, 2008 (Appendix 8). Page 12 of 56

13 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Theater of Operations Theater of Operations End State The goal of the theater of operations is to have in place the coordination, command and control organizations providing a strategic management framework. The framework will include direction from line officers of all the agencies involved; an unified area command authority for each theater; strategies developed based on a priority system utilizing the same criteria for comparisons of fires or complexes; plans for allocations and reallocations of resources within a theater and between theaters; a plan for sustainability of resources and the ability to maintain the appropriate management organization. To achieve the desired end state the following key items will need to be completed: Designate the theaters by geographical features. Establish and staff Unified Area Command Authorities, one for each theater. Obtain a unified delegation of authority and/or a letter of expectations from the agency line officers within each of theater. Establish strategies, based on agreed upon criteria, for each theater. Prioritize incidents or complexes within each theater. Develop and implement plans for allocation and reallocation of resources. Develop and implement plans to ensure sustainability of resources, appropriate management organizations, and support systems within each theater. The Northern California MAC Group will need to provide; Prioritization of the theaters based on agreed upon criteria. GACC level strategies for the allocation and/or reallocation of critical resources. Develop and implement plans to ensure sustainability of resources, the appropriate coordination organizations, and support systems within each theater. Theater of Operations Concepts The current fire situation in Northern California is unprecedented. The magnitude of the fire situations encompasses the significance of the elements of time and space. On average, the season ending event is October 31st for Northern California. A Gubernatorial Disaster Declarations has been made in many counties and the process may move toward a Federal declaration. Many questions arise from the historic impact to the landscape: When does the attempt to manage complexity become chaos? When and to what magnitude will the crises occur? Page 13 of 56

14 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning In more recent times we have recognized some fires will continue until a season ending event occurs and managed appropriately. The earlier we recognize those types of fires, the earlier we can plan into the future and be organized and prepared. The following is a conceptual approach to Theater of Operations. Our more historic approach to incident management needs to evolve beyond what we may be accustomed to and organized for. This will include a unified strategic approach in our thinking that must include: Incident complexity evaluation Fire progression Values at Risk Resistance to control Logistical support Engagement principle of maneuver Long term strategic planning Consistent and valid approach to identifying risks Focused, agile, and fast operational element Unity of efforts across agency, jurisdictional and incident boundaries are imperative. This should include a more modified approach to unified command. The concept of unified command and control is essential for success Centralized command vs. decentralized command needs to be addressed. Non traditional organizations will need to be developed It is important that all involved understand the current and future situation. It is even more important that all participants be open to creative and clever ideas to meet the unified and long term mission. Theater Concept of Strategic Planning: The objective of strategic planning lays the foundation for long-term success. Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about. This process should provide improved situational awareness which improves decision making. Since decision making is central to command and control, planning can contribute to effective anticipatory decision making. Thus strategic planning is a means to move from the current state to a more desirable state. Planning helps the decision makers at all levels in both formulating their intent and communicating that intent to their subordinates. Theater Concept of Organization: Theater level organizing takes in to account all the ICS command and functional areas with the objective of moving to a more strategic plane. The intent would be for Incident/Area Commanders, Plans, Safety, Information, Logistics, Finance, and Operations to move from the more tactical and operational levels of organizing to a more strategic organization for mission success. Defining the mission is the initial step in developing the appropriate organization. How this organization successfully integrates into the coordination system and the incident management teams is an important aspect. The litmus test for this methodology of organizing is that all players have a working knowledge and understanding of roles and Page 14 of 56

15 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning responsibilities of the strategic organizations. The appropriate organization leads to being organized which leads to capability and capacity. Unity of efforts across agency, jurisdictional and incident boundaries are imperative. This requires a modified approach to unified command, and the ability for agency administrators to uniformly act across jurisdictional boundaries. Creating and Exploiting Opportunities: We must be prepared to react and exploit opportunities as they arise. Personnel being at a heightened level of situational awareness will be able to recognize those weak signals of opportunity. If the organization is structured appropriately, they will be able to attack and exploit that opportunity. Human Factors: Through the scope of this complex mission we need to be reminded of the aspect of Human Factors. These factors create both the positive and also the negative affects on what and how we do. Incident management is shaped by human factors which include decision making, stress, complexities, fatigue, etc. It is a consideration to be included with your behaviors and those around you. Human factors influence decision making. Theater of Operations Implementation Plan End State: Interagency Area/Zone Command teams provided the appropriate command climate for safe, efficient, and effective mission success. Purpose: The Interagency Area/Zone Command teams would implement the appropriate management actions, prioritization, and coordination between the incidents within the zone. This concept would reduce the span of control within Northern Operations of California. These teams will have the responsibility and authority to take emerging incidents, regardless of jurisdiction. Task: Organize teams for management of zones within an interagency theater. Implementation the Theater of Operation Zone concept will require a coordinated effort from all of the jurisdictional agencies. To implement the zones, the following tasks will need to be outlined in an interagency agreement or MOU and delegation of authority: Determine all partners to be included in the development of a mega unified delegation authorities. Determine Zone Jurisdictional boundaries. (Two zone and three zone models have been developed.) Determine Zone organization and agency structure Determine the communication procedures, chain of command, and line of authority Determine a prioritization process involving Nor Cal MACS, Zones, and individual fires. Page 15 of 56

16 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Determine resource allocation and reallocation criteria and resource sharing guidelines. Determine long range prediction tools, base line information, and organization that will be implemented for all zones. Determine criteria for disbanding a zone Determine criteria for an agency to withdraw from zone involvement. Determine historical documentation for the duration of the incidents. Develop a theater concept communication plans for agency personnel and the public. When the above items are determined clear direction in the following areas will be outlined in the delegation. 1. Clear and precise management expectations from the regional/state level. 2. Objectives that is specific, Measurable, Attainable and Relevant. 3. All agency specific policies will need to be outlined so that they are understood by all. An overarching suppression strategy with guiding principles that will include a wide spectrum of suppression management options is being developed. Option 1 Two Zones Zone 1 CAL FIRE Units Del Norte/Humbolt Siskiyou Shasta/Trinity Lassen /Modoc National Forest Six Rivers Klamath Shasta Trinity Mendocino Lassen Modoc Zone 2 CAL FIRE Units Tehama/Glen Mendocino Colusa Sonoma/Lake/Napa Nevada/Yuba/Placer National Forest Mendocino Plumas Tahoe Lake Tahoe Basin Mgmt. Unit Lassen (Partial) Page 16 of 56

17 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Option 2 Three Zones Zone 1 CAL FIRE Units Del Norte/Humbolt Siskiyou Shasta/Trinity National Forest Six Rivers Klamath Shasta Trinity Mendocino Zone 2 CAL FIRE Units Tehama/Glen Mendocino Colusa Sonoma/Lake/Napa National Forest Mendocino (Partial) Zone 3 CAL FIRE Units Lassen/Modoc Butte Nevada/Yuba/Placer National Forest Modoc Lassen Plumas Tahoe Lake Tahoe Basin Mgmt. Unit Page 17 of 56

18 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Resources and Preparedness Force Multiplier The purpose is to provide increased capabilities for special and or specific missions to gain success and meet objectives within the Northern Operations Zone of influence. The intent of this plan is to organize mobile suppression units with overhead (Task Force) that can effectively and efficiently manage special operations in a short time, 1 to 4 days. A requesting unit will identify these special needs and request a Task Force for a planned need. The Task Force will generally be staffed with: 1-DIVS 1-TFLD (Chief of Party) 2-IHC 2-Type 2IA Task Forces can be modified to fit the mission adding a Structure Protection Specialist, Safety Officer, Firing Boss, and reduced numbers of crews or personnel are some examples. Examples of the assignments: 1. Complex burnout out operations 2. Key and decisive line location and or construction 3. Any other operation that would expedite timely containment 4. Supplement to initial attack efforts The general operating principles are for incidents to pre-identify special operations, and make a formal request for a Task Force following established protocols. Protocols to Initiate Resource Reallocation Coordination Plan 1. IMT, Forest or Unit makes request through NorCal Coordination Center with Task Force request. 2. NorCal Coordination Center receives request. 3. Federal Duty Chief and/or CALFIRE Duty Chief: a. Evaluate request: 1) Firefighter and Public Safety 2) Critical point protection operations 3) Protection of critical infrastructure 4) Provide for timely incident containment b. Evaluate current situation with other fires and complexes c. Decision/prioritization is made by MACS group d. Decision is communicated to NorCal Coordination Center Page 18 of 56

19 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning 1) If approved, source of reallocated resources will be identified 4. Nor Cal Coordination Center will initiate follow-up actions a. Approval 1) Coordinate reassignment request with forests/units/complexes 2) Communicate approval to requesting unit with identified resources and ETAs b. Disapproval 3) Communicate disapproval to requesting unit 5. Ordering Process Resources Reallocation Resource Reallocation Strategy Reallocation decision protocols are built along the daily planning cycle. 1. The local agency administrator defines the incident objectives documented in the WFSA and in the delegation of authority. 2. Based on these objectives the IC develops a strategy and associated tactics which in turn defines the resources needed. 3. The NO-OPS Operations Managers will ensure that no or limited resources are available within the national system before recommending resource reallocation. 4. The priority of an incident, as determined by NO-OPS MAC may not always equate to the mission priority this rationale will be documented. 5. The NO-OPS MAC Coordinator when evaluating the rationale for a reallocation may decide that a critical need will not be met by a reallocation action. 6. NO-OPS MAC Coordinator in conjunction with the NO-OPSC Operations Manager will identify incidents as possible candidates from which to acquire critical resources. 7. If the decision is to negotiate for resources, the NO-OPS MAC coordinator will communicate with the area command or incident management team. 8. Any decision to reallocate resources will be documented within the MAC decision, document and shared with the appropriate stakeholders. 9. If an incident management team is going to be asked or directed to give up resources, every effort should be made to give the IC sufficient time to modify strategies. 10. If the situation warrants, there may be times when there will be no negotiations and a command decision will be made to move a resource. 11. In the event of a command decision with no negotiations, the NO-OPS MAC will conduct an After Action Review (AAR) to evaluate resource timing and the effects on incident planning and execution and to document the measure of success. Page 19 of 56

20 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Guidelines and Considerations General Guidelines: These guidelines are designed to be flexible in order to meet the needs. The following will direct the business process of resource reallocation. Be responsive in resolving vital needs to meet critical objectives. Acknowledge that multi-jurisdictional cooperation is essential to success. Consider the potential impacts that resource reallocations may have on meeting incident objectives and aim for a balance between risks and opportunities consistent with wildland fire policy. Risk is easy conceptually, but hard in reality. Encourage creativity when having to deal with less than ideal conditions. Encourage a mindful, thoughtful decision process to evaluate recommendations. Foster responsible communications among key stakeholders Considerations Associated with Resource Reallocation Decisions: Resource reallocation is a complex equation with numerous variables to be considered. Are the incident objectives in line with the availability of resources? What are the chances for success given the defined objectives, strategy and tactics and available resources? How does the fire environment affect the chances for success? How does resource reallocation affect the chances for success? Objectives, Values and Decisions Considerations Are the objectives for the incident quantified and measurable? Are the objectives built to protect values? Are the values described and given relative weights? Are the objectives realistic and achievable given the larger situation, including amount and type of resources available? Has expert opinion (agency administrator and/or resource advisors in addition to Planning Section Chiefs (PSCs) been used to evaluate WFSA and IAP objectives? Is progress in meeting the objectives being measured over time? Are objectives are being monitored and adjusted as the situation changes over time and space as evidenced in planning documents and narrative descriptions? Are objectives readjusted as values are protected or impacts are mitigated? Is there a documentation process in place regarding evaluation of the listed considerations? Is there documentation to identify where resources can be made available? Are decisions being made on a sound defensible foundation based on: Situation (multiple incidents, interagency, timing, etc.) Objectives (unit management plans, life, structures,) Available resources Risks (success-failure scenarios) Predictions (weather, landscape, Page 20 of 56

21 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Costs (consequences, social, political, etc.) Assumptions Options (reality) Professional judgment (expert opinion) Politics Is the WFSA in place to document the strategic management decision? Is the time frame of the when the critical values will be immediately threatened? Have communications among MAC, responsible AA s, and IMT s regarding critical values and specific objectives been sufficient? Economics, External Influences, Socio-Political Considerations What are the issues associated with cumulative smoke effects? What are the estimated costs? What are the social-economic values to be considered? What are the social-political issues to be addressed? What are the costs of rehabilitation? Fire Environment Considerations What is the current/predicted fire environment? Including the following: Weather Fire Regime/Condition Class Fuel Natural Barriers Fire behavior/intensity Time of year: early, mid, late Fire Stage: IA, Extended, Large, Mega Climate change Fire history What is the current and predicted national and geographic fire situation regarding: Preparedness Levels Number of fires IMT/resource commitment Critical needs What is the probability for success? Are resources matched to the fire environment and to the work that needs to be done? Specifically how much and what kind of work needs to be done by what critical resource? What is the seasonal/historical ERC track for the incident? How does short-term weather forecast affect the probability of success given additional resources? How does the fuel type affect the probability of success given additional resources? Page 21 of 56

22 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Resource Availability / Capability Considerations Is the resource engaged in rehab work on the incident? Will the resource achieve objectives or reduce costs? Is the resources identified as a critical resource on the ICS-209? What is the current & predicted national / regional situation related to this resource? Is the proposed resource a shared or local resource? Is the resource part of a ready reserve? What is the mobility factor of this resource (e.g. what is the time necessary to move this resource 100 miles, 300 miles, etc.)? Is the resource currently assigned to low priority work (e.g. structural specialist on a wilderness fire, etc.)? What is the total availability of resources locally, statewide, regionally, nationally? Will the addition of this resource to the requesting incident make a difference? Where is the Preparedness Level headed? Where is the resource related to work / rest? Is the needed resource available (e.g. a crew spiked in the wilderness 2 days from a mobilization site, etc.)? What is the length of time the resource is needed on the proposed assignment? Does the timing work out between the incident giving up the resource and the incident destination for the resource? Is there the necessary supervision in place or is it needed and also in tight supply? Will the resource be available after the objective is met? Resource Reallocation Coordination Plan This purpose of this plan is to provide sufficient resources for immediate need situations of high risk within North Operations Zone of influence. The intent of this plan is to effectively and efficiently manage these situations to meet the Nor Cal Macs group priorities. The general operating principles are to pre-identify incident assigned resources that would be made available for immediate need response. Protocols to Initiate Resource Reallocation Coordination Plan 1. Forest or Unit makes request through NorCal Coordination Center with immediate need resource request such as: a. New start on a forest or unit b. Request is initiated from an incident that has a critical/immediate need 2. NorCal Coordination Center receives request: a. Federal Duty Chief decides and/or Page 22 of 56

23 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning b. CALFIRE Duty Chief decides 3. Duty Chief enters into evaluations process a. Evaluate request: 1) Critical point protection or critical area of containment- (example: line construction, burn out, requiring less than a division level of mixed resources for less than a 72 hour commitment) 2) Protection of critical infrastructure- If ignored would result in unacceptable human and/or community economic impacts and life threats 3) Timely incident containment less than 72 hours. b. Evaluate current situation with other fires and complexes c. Decision/prioritization is made by MACS group d. Decision is communicated to NorCal Coordination Center 1) If approved, source of reallocated resources will be identified 4. Nor Cal Coordination Center will initiate follow-up actions a) Approval 1) Coordinate reassignment request with other forests/units/complexes 2) Communicate approval to requesting unit with identified resources & ETAs b) Disapproval 3) Communicate disapproval to requesting unit Page 23 of 56

24 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Factors Used to Determine Incident Priorities Life threatening situations (firefighter or public safety) Evacuations currently taking place Evacuation plans in place Advisory evacuations Road, highway, or freeway closures Real Property Threatened Number of structures, commercial and/or residences Number of subdivisions Name communities and number of populace High Damage Potential Immediate damage Plausible impacts on community Major power lines, energy sources Incident Complexity Multi-jurisdictional Fuel type, size and growth potential Political situations Severity, extreme fire behavior and fuels conditions potential Historical significant cultural resources Long term damage potential Natural resources, such as crops, grazing, timber, watershed Description of Situation Approved Disapproved Documentation of Decision 1. Critical point protection or critical area of containment- (Example: line construction, burn out, requiring less than a division level of mixed resources for less than a 72 hour commitment) 2. Protection of critical infrastructure- If ignored would result in unacceptable human and/or community economic impacts and life threats 3. Timely incident containment less than 72 hours. Page 24 of 56

25 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Rate Factors Used to Determine Incident Ranking. Assign ratings of 1-5 to each factor. EXTREME - Rating of 5 indicates immediate threat, need or greatest, potential or complexity. VERY HIGH - Rating of 4 indicates time-delayed threat or need of 24 hours or high potential or complexity. HIGH - Rating of 3 indicates time-delayed threat or need of 72 hours or moderate complexity with the potential to change to a higher complexity. MEDIUM - Rating of 2 indicates potential of threat or need exist with no time frame identified, or a moderate complexity with little potential for change. LOW - Rating of 1 indicates unlikely potential of threat, need or low complexity. Building Capability and Capacity through Non-Traditional Sources Situation: National commitment of resources has started early and will continue at a pace never seen in the past. The Northern California situation will be a 5 month siege with no lulls. The outstanding need for logistics, finance planning and EOC support personnel are and will exceed the availability of our traditional sources. Opportunities: Thousands of federal, state employees have been trained in ICS as per the outstanding presidential directive. This supply of untapped resources is available and should be used. The value of non traditional personnel participating in the wild fire situation is two fold. 1. Support positions on long duration incidents will be staffed easing up the requirements of our traditional sources. 2. The sending organizations will benefit from the ICS experience and incident management knowledge gained. Options: A presidential disaster declaration opens up many options for requesting and deploying resources. The Coast Guard Incident Management Assistance Teams, IMATS, are available as well as many CG individuals throughout the country. As with Katrina volunteers can be requested from all govt. agencies. FEMA reserves can be used. Emergency contracts can be issued to fill immediate needs. Page 25 of 56

26 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Mechanics When mobilizing other agency personnel, as with mobilizing the military for fire operations, an organized well planned mobilization is a must. This process would start with implementing existing agreements and entering into new agreements with departments and agencies. Individuals would volunteer for a 30 day assignment and would be given an orientation and organizational overview at a given training location. 100 to 150 individuals would not be difficult to run through orientation at any one time. Assignment Each individual would be given an order and request number and travel authorization would be issued. Applicants would be given a 24 hour fire orientation and then a day of functional area training. PPE would be issued as needed. After orientation and training the applicants would be assigned to an incident according to position needs submitted by the incidents. All personnel would then be picked up by the incident and transported to the work site. 21 days will be the normal time on scene. NorCal MAC Group Rest and Recuperation Issue: Based on the sheer number of incidents in the Northern CA Operations area we find that current staffing levels cannot be maintained. Out of state resources are reaching assignment limits and must be released to home or rested. Due to the onset of fire season in other Geographic Areas resources released to home will probably not return in the same capacity that was originally ordered for this unprecedented event. Other options must be explored. Extensions, R&R and releasing of crews, are presently in progress at all incidents. Prior to extending incident personnel, health, readiness, and capability must be considered. The health and safety of incident personnel and resources will not be compromised under any circumstance. Options: Many of the crews working on the Northern CA fires are contract resources brought in to augment our own forces, from the Pacific NW. In accordance with their contracts these crews must be rested 2 days with pay before working a second 14 day assignment. IC s and Planning Ops should immediately open a dialog with the crew bosses and present an offer of two eight hour days of paid R&R, in camp, to determine if the crew can work a second 14 day assignment. If the crew elects to leave camp to seek lodging and meals away from camp the crew should be released to home. In camp R&R does not preclude the crew from sleeping in, resting, leaving camp during the day to visit local stores, laundry facilities or using local recreation areas. They are expected Page 26 of 56

27 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning to be present at the morning briefing following the second day off. Please document to insure the crews understand these conditions. Extension: From Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations 2008; Chapter 07 Pg Assignments may be extended when: Life and property are imminently threatened, Suppression objectives are close to being met, A military battalion is assigned, Replacement resources are unavailable, or have not yet arrived. Upon completion of the standard 14 day assignment, an extension of up to an additional 14 days may be allowed (for a total of up to 30 days, inclusive of mandatory days off, and exclusive of travel). Regardless of extension duration, two mandatory days off will be provided prior to the 22 nd day of the assignment. Extension forms may be found at: Additional Notes: 1. A Database should be developed and designed to track crew assignments including R&R. Crews accepting R&R and a second 14 day assignment need to be reported to the coordinator on Duty at North Ops so that this information can be shared with the NMAC and the providing GACC 2. Agency crews have a formal extension process and signature form which must be submitted in advance of any extension through normal channels. 3. Equipment such as Mobile Sleeper Units (42 beds/unit) are available under contract that can locate near or at incidents. 4. Secure storage of vehicles and equipment has to be designed for personnel that are being transported home (R&R) by air and returning to incident. Page 27 of 56

28 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Federal Disaster Assistance and ESF4 Firefighting Support Direct Federal Assistance Those are specific terms in the Stafford Act on the types of assistance that the President can direct Federal agencies to do upon declaration of an emergency. The specific type of assistance being requested by the Governor must be included in the request for a declaration. Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) - goods and services provided to the affected State and local jurisdictions when they lack the resources to provide specific types of disaster assistance, either because of the specialized nature of the assistance, or because of resource shortfalls. The State has the legal responsibility to provide vital goods and services to its citizens, but asks the Federal Government to meet needs until the State can do or contract for the work. Emergency protective measures - performing on public or private lands or waters any work or services essential to saving lives and protecting and preserving property or public health and safety, including-- Debris removal; Search and rescue, emergency medical care, emergency mass care, emergency shelter, and provision of food, water, medicine, and other essential needs, including movement of supplies or persons; Clearance of roads and construction of temporary bridges necessary to the performance of emergency tasks and essential community services; Provision of temporary facilities for schools and other essential community services; Demolition of unsafe structures which endanger the public; Warning of further risks and hazards; Dissemination of public information and assistance regarding health and safety measures; Provision of technical advice to State and local governments on disaster management and control; and Reduction of immediate threats to life, property, and/or public health and safety. Page 28 of 56

29 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Since "firefighting" isn't listed as an "emergency protective measure", it is specified in the Governor's request for a presidential declaration of emergency. Emergency Support Function #4 Firefighting Involvement in Wildfires Based on the lessons learned from the October 2007 Seige, the following actions were recommended and implemented. Clearly define who is filling which ESF4 staff positions (lead, support, Regional Emergency Operations person) and what their roles are. 1. RRCC/JFO place ESF4 s at the GACC, state EOC (also tied in with Cal-MAC) 2. Develop phone list and organization chart for each location. Share with all other locations. GACC needs to know the reporting order under wildfire declared disasters. 3. Develop a master phone and contact list and ensure it is shared widely. Establish financial support system for ESF4. 1. Think about what you really need a finance person to do there is a huge shortage of qualified FSCs. 2. ESF4 assigns a position to the GACC to compile and track Mission Assignment (MA) related costs. This could be a cost unit leader type. Ensure F-Codes are assigned and tracked. Ensure that obligations are tracked and accomplished. 3. Ensure that ASC is in the loop early. ESF4 assign person to the GACC to gather intelligence and answer inquiries from the FEMA HQ, NRCC, JFO, RRCC, NRCC and NICC. ESF4 should have the availability of workspace and desk at each GACC, complete with phone, etc. Must have access to GACC intelligence unit. Develop one method that is used by all to track MA funded resources in ROSS. Need to confirm with ESF4 before killing any order. Use one source for information! Once a process is set up we need everyone to use it. If any question occurs contact the lead ESF4 person or Dale Dague or Gordy Sachs before committing to anything. ESF4 Resource Tracking Page 29 of 56

30 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning After an Action Request Form (ARF) is approved, resources are ordered on a Forest Service ESF4 resource order. Resources are to report directly to the 84 Camp located in Redding, CA. Once at 84 Camp, they check-in (two forms to fill out), vehicles are inspected and a safety briefing given. If the vehicles pass inspection, they are then re-assigned to one of three CAL FIRE incidents, BTU (Butte) Lightning Complex, SHU (Shasta) Lightning Complex, or MEU (Mendocino) Lightning Complex. A file folder is created by the COST (Cost Unit Leader) at the 84 Base that contains the following document: The original Forest Service ESF4 resource order The CAL FIRE resource order that the resource has been reassigned to The 2 check-in forms A copy of the resource contract (just the front page and the rates) Completed vehicle inspection form Resources are checked in using the I-Suite database. If a contract resource, the actual rate is input to replace the default amount. The Cost Unit Leader at 84 Camp will accrue all costs associated with the ESF4 tasking on a daily basis. The ESF4 resources are officially reassigned in ROSS to a CAL FIRE incident by CA FIRE. The CAL FIRE resource order must contain the F code in the upper right hand corner in the Financial Block. This new resource assignment is communicated by FAX/Telephone from CAL FIRE, located at North Ops and Cost Unit Leader located at the 84 Camp. It could take an hour or so to get the re-assignment, because until the resource passes the vehicle inspection, the process is not initiated. Once the processing is complete, including passing the vehicle and equipment inspection, the resource is directed to the assigned incident. The resource is now an ESF4 resource assigned to a CAL FIRE incident. The resource checks in as normal at the CAL FIRE incident and accepts assignments only on State or State protected lands. ESF4 resources are not to be assigned to protect Federal lands. Federal Time Unit Leader at the incident enters the ESF4 resource into the I-Suite database and will produce the appropriate pay document at the end of the resource s assignment. Once the resource is released from the incident, Federal Time Unit Leader will contact Cost Unit Leader at 84 Base with the resource release information. Cost Unit Leader will then release the resource from I-suite. Accruals are the responsibility of Page 30 of 56

31 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning the Cost Unit Leader at 84 Camp. Pay documents are the responsibility of the incident federal Time Unit Leader. Original pay documents are sent according to Forest Service policy, to the Albuquerque Service Center (ASC), with copies going to the contractor and into the finance package. ESF4 resources do not have to return to 84 Camp before returning to their home unit. It is critical that the 84 Camp Cost Unit Leader is notified of ESF4 resource releases. Once ESF4 resources have been released, the original pay documents are sent directly from the incident to ASC Incident Finance, the 84 Camp Cost Unit Leader, closes out the resource in I-Suite and sends the resource folder to ASC Incident Finance as backup documentation for FEMA reimbursement. Contact List: 84 Base Camp Dave Carter FSC Dave Burley COST (Phone # will transition to new COST Maurica Owen Buying Team Leader Red Lion FAX Maurica s team probably won t be replaces, time out 7/13(?) BTU Complex Todd Shymanski FSC CAL FIRE Teresa Reniff TIME BTU Complex (call Todd) SHU Complex Roger Raines FSC CAL FIRE Eric Cleveland FSC- CAL FIRE Evelyn Hart TIME SHU Complex MEU Complex Rich Boehn FSC CAL FIRE No Federal TIME CAL FIRE Redding Chris Starnes ESF4 CAL FIRE Erick Puckett ESF4 CAL FIRE Page 31 of 56

32 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Emergency Declaration State of California Emergency Declaration Request Page 32 of 56

33 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Page 33 of 56

34 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Page 34 of 56

35 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Presidential Emergency Declaration DECLARED JUNE 28, 2008 SUMMARY In the event of an emergency declaration, the following information applies: STATE: NUMBER: INCIDENT: INCIDENT PERIOD: California FEMA-3287-EM Wildfires June 20, 2008, and continuing DATE REQUESTED BY GOVERNOR: June 26, 2008 FEDERAL COORDINATING OFFICER: Michael J. Hall National FCO Program DESIGNATIONS AND TYPES OF ASSISTANCE: The Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is authorized to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures, authorized under Title V of the Stafford Act, to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in the designated areas with respect to (uncontained) fires existing at this time. Specifically, FEMA is authorized to provide emergency protective measures (Category B), limited to direct Federal assistance, under the Public Assistance program at 75 percent Federal funding. This assistance is for the counties of Butte, Mendocino, Monterey, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Shasta, and Trinity. OTHER: Additional designations may be made at a later date after further evaluation. Note: This is an emergency declaration. Plumas, Kern, Monterey, Santa Barbara counties have since been added to the Presidential Emergency Declaration. Page 35 of 56

36 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Safety The safety organization is providing strategic and tactical support to the Northern Operations Service Center. Base Camp and Incoming Resources Establish information board for Safety Messages, Advisories, Alerts, Hazard/Risk Analyses (215a), and Medical Plan (ICS-206.) Coordination with Regional Fire Operations Safety Officer on subject material(s). Information is for personnel at North Ops, North Ops support personnel and briefing information for incoming resources. Develop information and brief all incoming resources: Human factors (expectations-briefing, fatigue, assignment duration, etc.), overall situation, fatigue, dehydration, accident/injury update, update on weather, fuels/fire behavior and general hazards/risks and associated risks. 84 Base and incoming ESF4 Resources Prepare, develop, establish and coordinate information board for Safety Messages, advisories, alerts, Hazard/Risk Analyses (215a), and Medical Plan (ICS-206.). Mentor, train and work with T3 Organization Safety Officer (Frank Salomon). Review the Security Plan, Transportation Plan(s) and Base Camp for hazard/risk and mitigations. Notable: Building capability and capacity with non traditional partners, T3 organization (All Hazard Phoenix Team), mentoring a PIO into the Safety Program and Police/Paramedic into Ground Support and Security Manager. Evaluation and monitoring of incoming resources: as to fitness condition (2-1, work/rest), arrival time and determination of reassignment time (whether they can be released for assignment or temporarily held). Develop, prepare and distribute Safety, Alert, Lessons Learned information to the Regional Office for IMT, Complex and Area Command dissemination. Participate in Safety Officer Conference Call and emphasis noteworthy topics, such as: information needed for good briefings Zanfel justification and treatment fatigue mitigations, smoke, visibility and inhibition of aviation and fire location span of control un-staffed, new, merging fire awareness dehydration-do not get behind Personal hygiene, prevent staph infections of blisters Tabulate 209 summary information, I/C and Safety/Logistic Conference Call information to Regional Safety Officer. Page 36 of 56

37 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Conduct Complex/Incident Reviews on Complexes for Regional Offices. Serve as a conduit between IMT Safety Officers, North Operations and the Regional Office and Visa Versa. Page 37 of 56

38 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Leadership / Human Factors The Forest Service committed to developing a leadership curriculum in This has resulted in approximately 12,000 employees attending the L380 Fireline Leadership and L381 Incident Leadership course. In addition, thousands of employees involved with fire management at the entry levels have attended L180 and L280. The unprecedented fire activity in California has mobilized thousand of firefighters and support personnel from though out the nation. This commitment will continue through the summer. At the current time we have set a basic foundation to enhance our leadership and human factor efforts. The following is in place: Human Factor messages sent daily to incidents and posted on multiple web and information sites. Human Factor messages sent directly to the incidents to be posted at bases and camps. Leaders have been empowered to follow basic human factor fundamentals We are starting to practice what we preach. Current opportunities Opportunities to enhance the current effort are as follows: Opportunity to contact and influence the behavior of thousands of firefighters. Opportunity to influence thousands of support personnel. Opportunity to influence dozens of federal, state and local agencies Opportunity for leaders, at all levels, to create a climate that will enhance safety for the long haul. Opportunity to directly impact the national fire management climate. The Next Step To seize the moment the following action items should be considered: Distribute NWCG leadership publications to all individuals arriving at incidents. Develop Incident Management Team Leadership lessons learned. Develop a vehicle to distribute this information. Provide face to briefings of the leadership effort to line officers and staff. This will get everyone on a common platform. Provide human factor briefings to other federal, state and local agencies that are participating in the national fire effort. Introduce the fire leadership curriculum and publications to all agencies. Provide media briefing to the leadership effort and why understanding the human factor is so important in fire management. As with the Incident Command System, a common terminology and language will provide a vehicle to influence interagency relationships and decision when it comes to the human factor. Understanding the Human Factor will save lives. Page 38 of 56

39 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Developing the Human Factor - On the Job Education, a Proposal The End State, What Right Would Look Like A national level fire workforce comprised of all facets of federal, state and local governments that recognize the value of duty, respect and integrity. A firefighting workforce that understands the factors of human behavior not just fire behavior and the impacts human factors have on performance and safety. The Purpose of this program would be the following: To bring together all the players at the federal, state and local government in understanding the impacts of human factors on morale and safety. To create a climate where all agency and private individuals practice duty, respect and integrity. To demonstrate the value of duty, respect and integrity during high risk activities. To share with the rest of the nation the human factor and leadership lessons learned by the federal wild fire agencies. The Tasks Bring together a team of Human Factor Specialist to produce HF and leadership messages to incidents. Put together the appropriate package of HF information which can be given to an individual upon arriving at an incident. Present to high levels of federal, state and local governments a briefing on the impacts of human factors. Prepare a media briefing package and present this package to the national and local media. Prepare educational opportunities to insure that all levels of management can walk the talk, understand the impacts that ignoring the human factor will have on performance, moral and safety. Sample Human Factors Message Rapid Team Building Building teams will be a major challenge during this long fire season. We must also realize that all groups of people will not become teams. The dynamics required to build a team will not always be there. Rapid team building relies on several essential fundamentals. 1. During high-risk, high tempo incidents first impressions will play a huge roll in communicating and building trust. Beware of negative first impressions! Most of the time first impressions are accurate but they can betray you. Circumstances, fatigue, temporary situations can lead to an inaccurate impression. Page 39 of 56

40 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning 2. The five communication responsibilities should be your foundation in building a team. Communications is critical in high risk activities and failure to communicate can create drastic consequences. 3. When a group of people communicate the trust will develop. Trust can be difficult to build yet can erode quickly. Solid trust is a must before you can expect commitment. 4. Commitment is the next step in rapid team building. Fire professionals all have a certain level of commitment but building team commitment can be difficult do to lack of clear intent or being involved in a reactive team verses one that has a clear purpose and a determined end state. A team that demonstrates the value of delegation and the sharing of success can build deep commitment rapidly. 5. Communication, trust and commitment will lead to accountability which is what firms up safe professional firefighting. Knowing someone is watching your back and not afraid to speak up if things are not right is a comfort in any high risk activity. 6. When rapid teambuilding is successful team results will be apparent and the ability to accomplish challenging tasks will demonstrate a team that does the right way not just the easy way. Page 40 of 56

41 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Aviation Aviation Command and Control Introduction Limited aircraft available for interagency initial attack and large fire support require centralized command at the area or theater level with decentralized tactical control. A single command and control model is required. This model involves trust that resources will be available to participating agencies and incidents and that resources are assigned to areas of greatest risk and/or highest probability of success. This model must have clear line of command with delegated authority of all aerial resources at the appropriate level. Objectives Optimize Overall Aviation Capability. Maintain high initial attack success rate. Maximize operational flexibility and mobility. Apply effective management controls to suppression costs. Ensure that aviation assets are assigned to areas of greatest risk and/or highest probability of success. Contribute to meeting interagency partner needs. Command and Control of Aerial Fire Fighting Resources To implement this command and control model it is essential that all wildland fire participants accept and adopt the following Tenets: Single Cohesive Line of Command- Coordinating Group to Operations to Aviation. Each level must understand the strategic situation where priorities must determine resource assignment Aerial Resources are prepared for mobilization. Aerial Resources are supported administratively and logistically for short and long term deployment. Robust aircraft intelligence and utilization reporting. Utilization of predictive services to determine base assignments on a daily basis. Large airtankers and National Initial Attack helicopters are national resources and may be reassigned for initial attack outside the geographic area by NICC. NorCal Coordinating Group NorCal MAC is the authority for directing and controlling firefighting resource allocations to ensure priority objectives are met, with full authority to take appropriate actions within NorCal Area to implement their decisions. This authorization specifically provides the authority to manage resource prioritization and allocation between units/zones and establish theater commands. Page 41 of 56

42 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Geographic Aviation Coordinator (GAC) The GAC works directly for NorCal MAC. The GAC is the single point of authority as delegated by the GMAC group. This position is activated at Geographic PL 3. The GAC is responsible for the following: Make recommendations regarding aerial assets when GMAC establishes priorities. Communicates allocation and reallocation strategies to the incidents and or units in NorCal. With oversight from the NorCal MAC recommend aviation theater operations areas. Establish aircraft allocation and reallocation for of all Federal, State and Local aircraft for both Initial Attack and Large Fire support based on priorities established by GMAC and NMAC. The GAC is authorized to establish and dissolve Aerial Task Force s in support of initial attack or large fire support. Track aircraft use and establish a report. Inform NorCal MAC of the capabilities and limitations of the aerial assets assigned to the geographic area based on current and expected fire load. Maintain the unity of command through clear lines of authority to area/theater aviation coordinators. The GAC will manage the resources under a total mobility concept, which emphasizes positioning resources in areas with the greatest fire potential and the greatest probability of success based on Predictive Services information and NorCal MAC priorities. Total Mobility Maximizes effective pre-positioning to areas of greatest risk and/or highest probability of success. Maximizes appropriate resource commitment in numbers and type validating daily and reallocated as necessary. Enhances cost controls Limits uncoordinated acquisition of resources. Command Control Process 1. NorCal Mac sets aviation priorities with GAC. 2. GAC coordinates with Predictive services on potential clean air for overnight basing. 3. CALFIRE and R5 Aviation in coordination with GAC develop base (incident aviation bases, fixed bases and ATBs) assignments. 4. At 1800 each day aircraft are assigned overnight bases based on weather and priorities. 5. Aircraft work priority initial attack fires and/ or large incidents. Orders are processed through normal dispatch procedures. Will need to determine which orders can be shared resources without ordering through ROSS. Page 42 of 56

43 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Helitanker Initial Attack Protocols Initial attack of new fires is the priority for the geographic area. These protocols will facilitate rapid helitanker response to these emerging fires. Protocols will apply to all helitankers (helicopters with a fixed tank) in the Northern California Geographic Area, including helitankers assigned to incidents. The closest available helitanker will be mobilized by ONCC. Orders will not be processed through ROSS to facilitate immediate response. Helitankers will remain on their original request number (A#) assigned to the incident/ unit. Flight hours will be charged to the actual initial attack fire payment code in the appropriate payment document/system. Helitankers will be released from the initial attack at the end of the flight day and may be reordered for the next day. If the incident will not be contained during the first operational period (24 hours), the helitanker will be released back to the originating incident/unit. Divert Policy: An Incident Commander may request a "no divert" due to imminent threat to life and property. ONCC will re-evaluate the no divert every hour. Ordering Unit: Ensure aerial supervision is over the incident during the helitanker operations. Ground resources are on the incident. ONCC will: Locate the closest available helitanker to complete the mission. Receive the flight plan from the ordering incident/unit and relay the limitations of the potential helitanker assignment. Coordinate with the sending unit on the return of the helitanker. Page 43 of 56

44 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Planning and Coordination Incident Data Collection Issue: In order for NorCal MAC to assist with achieving incident specific, MAC needs to understand and share the strategic vision for the incident or complex. Information relayed through the Incident Status Summary (ICS-209), lacks the level of information and clarity needed to allocate, reallocate or provide short-term resource needs. NorCal MAC needs adequate information to differentiate between critical short-term needs to mitigate risks and protect values (e.g. need a taskforce of 1 DIVS, 1 TFLD, 2 IHC, 2 T2IA crews for 1-4 shifts for a complex burnout operation) and longer-term needs for achieving the containment objective. In some instances information about critical short-term needs is shared during the morning IC conference call, but is not captured on the ICS-209. Expectations: ICS 209, Block 42: Continue to list fires in priority order with acres, % contained and containment date; this list should match the priorities displayed in the IAP (ICS-202). ICS-209, Block 38: List airtanker needs, by priority locations and/or tasks (e.g. 1 airtanker Division D). ICS-209, Block 38: IMTs should communicate short-term needs for high probability of success critical missions in the ICS-209 with adequate reaction time for NorCal MAC to consider, approve and initiate action to Page 44 of 56

45 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Fire Information 2008 California June Fire Siege Report An interagency effort has begun to prepare a factual overview/summary of lightning activity, emergency response efforts and related events that led up to the California statewide June fire siege of Unified Command: Monitor Branch efforts, assist in locating data sources, provide guidance on document format. Planning/Operations Section: Each of the groups in the Ops Section will collect data relative to their unit over the time period covered by the 2008 CNR Fire Siege Report. Research Group: Assemble fire statistics primarily from CFIRS and Sit Reports. Collect Lightning GIS data layers of fire perimeters, Assemble seasonal climate, drought, forecasts, actual weather data, NFDRS indexes and fuel moistures. Identify pre-positioning actions for federal, state, local fire agencies, backfill; resource commitment/drawdown, demobilization primarily from ROSS and ICS-209 data. Identify community preparedness: evacuations, damage and loss, injuries and fatalities, impact on businesses, loss of power & water; impact on transportation systems; human health impacts; defensible space preparations and effectiveness; pre-fire WUI and wildland fuels treatment, fire hazard severity mapping, changes in building and fire codes, changes and enforcement of laws and local ordinances (clearance, weed abatement, etc.). Identify the development, acquisition, and use of new technology, such as Predator, Global Hawk, U2, associated GIS mapping, FS Pro, fire behavior prediction, fire weather prediction, air quality esp. smoke etc. Writing Group: Develop the report design and layout. Draft the report from the material assembled by the research group. Edit the report for grammar, consistency and completeness. Conduct external review sessions with California fire officials and agency administrators. Logistics Section: Secure a work location, provide telephones, office supplies, printers, Internet access, and IT support Finance Section: Track expenditures and, insure payment of invoices and proper routing of payment documents. Page 45 of 56

46 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Accountable Cost Management Key Decision Log Although the Accountable Cost Management (ACM) Strategy has not been formally introduced in the U.S. Forest Service Pacific Southwest Region (R5), many of the key personnel at Northern Operations Geographical Area Coordination Center were very aware of the concepts of the basic tenants. Many of the concepts of ACM were presented in a strategic approach and well accepted. The ACM Key Decision Log within ACM was modified to make it more useable throughout the support and coordination systems as well as within the command and control systems. The KDL provides: A real-time documentation package Captures key business decisions (what and why), and Key business interactions (how). Key Decision Log Northern California 2008 Key Decision Alternatives Considered Rationale for Decision Cost Implications Key Decision: Those strategic and tactical decisions that influence the allocation of resources to the complexes and/or fires. Alternatives Considered: Briefly summarize the alternatives considered to the decision made. Rationale: Document the rationale for why the decision is considered to be the most effective. Page 46 of 56

47 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Fire Suppression Rehab Strategy Issue: With the large scale impact of fires on the landscape, the task of completing fire suppression rehabilitation activities in a timely manner using traditional methods and means may not be possible. The availability of fire trained crews and heavy equipment will be limited in many areas for an extended time. Recommendation: Charter an interagency task force to develop strategies, new methods of filling the resource needs and recommended processes to address the fire suppression rehabilitation issues. There maybe a need to develop plans that include theaters of operations and nontraditional resources to meet the tactical needs. Some of the types of resources may include; Landscape professionals and their crews and equipment Hiring smaller size dozers or excavators Using CCC non-fire crews to water bar fire suppression hand lines Hiring labor crews from local communities to do manual labor of spreading straw or the hand work on dozer lines and/or hand lines Each of the agencies represented at the North Ops MAC would provide a representative to the task force. There may be a need to involve others as the project evolves. The Boise NIMO team could provide the coordination of the task force with the other activities of the MAC Group. Page 47 of 56

48 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Appendices Appendix 1 Incident Commander Conference Call Agenda Appendix 2 - National Significant Fire Potential, July 6, 2008 Appendix Northern CA Fire Season Outlook, June 25, 2008 Appendix 4 - Northern CA Fire Behavior Assessment, ONC Support 2008 Appendix 5 - Firescope CA MACS Procedures Guide, July 12, 2006 Appendix 6 - Northern California MAC Operations Guide, July 2006 Appendix 7 - Extended Term Incident Prioritization, July 6, 2008 Appendix 8 - Long Term Incident Priorities, July 6, 2008 Page 48 of 56

49 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Appendix 1 - Incident Commander 0730 Daily Conference Call Dial in: Pass code: Host: Guest: House keeping Reminders; Cell phones, muting and side bar Short and concise reports Weather Briefing from No-Ops WFDSS - Larry Hood IC Reports (by order on sit report or ICS 209 summary) Acreage, % contained and estimated complex containment date Significant events Evacuations and/or closures What is threatened in the next 24 hours Critical needs including air tankers Social / political issues Critical infrastructures threatened Priority fires and estimated containment dates Important Messages to be shared to all I/Cs Report any Additional Information from Units, Parks and Forest Six Rivers NF Whiskeytown NP MEU Plumas NF Mendocino NF Tahoe NF Klamath NF El Dorado NF Lassen NF OES Region 2 BLM Susanville OES Region 4 Shasta Trinity NF Roundtable from Northern CA MAC Group USFS Cal-Fire DOI CA-OES Close Out

50 Appendix 2 National Significant Fire Potential Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning

51 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Appendix Northern CA Fire Season Outlook

52 2008 California Fire Season Outlook For July through October 2008 (issued 6/25/08) 1

53 North Ops Concerns and Implications for Management NOPS currently in a worsening drought, due to the driest spring on record in many areas 1000-hr dead fuel moistures are below to much-below normal for late June, especially below 4000 elevation We have high to record-setting ERC values; biggest anomalies at low to mid elevations Measured live woody fuel moistures are peaking at lower levels than average. As the season progresses, these fuels will fall into the critical range earlier than normal. Live woody vegetation is putting on less new growth in response to less available soil moisture. A longer than average fire season can be expected, due primarily to the early onset at lower elevations associated with the curing of annual grasses by mid May. A major widespread dry lightning event occurred June This event alone will produce weeks to months of suppression efforts in the areas hit hardest. Other events this summer, should they occur, will exacerbate an already above normal season. Springtime was fairly windy, and due to the early fuel drying this made late May and June foehn events at low elevations more critical than usual. Any gradient wind events lingering into early summer will do the same. I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This Assessment is an update from, and expands upon, the preliminary outlook produced in late April It should be considered the primary assessment of expected fire season severity for the remainder of the Northern California fire season. It will only be updated again if necessary. The Assessment is produced by subject matter experts in fire weather meteorology, climate, fuels, fire danger and GIS technology. It is based on past developments, current conditions, recent trends, and present predictions for the next four months (July through October). Objectives of this Assessment are to: Provide a prognosis for the core of the 2008 wildland fire season in northern California, based on fuel conditions and available weather and climate forecasts. Highlight the key concerns and implications for management (see bullets above). Point out factors and conditions that could have direct bearing on firefighter safety. Provide supporting documentation regarding weather and fuels information. This contents of this Assessment are consistent with that of a California Fuels and Fire Behavior Advisory issued just prior. This document is available as a link from the North Ops Outlook web page, as will be the region-wide document after combination with South Ops. In addition to Seasonal Assessments such as this one, the GACC Predictive Service Units at Riverside and Redding issue detailed Monthly Outlooks of fire weather and fire danger. II. REVIEW OF NORTH OPS 2008 FIRE SEASON TO DATE: The fire season got off to an early and active start at elevations below This has been most evident to date in the above-average acreage burned in the Sacramento Valley / Foothills PSA, in the Bay Area PSA, and in portions of the Mid Coast to Mendocino PSA. Most of the large fires prior to the June lightning bust, occurred during foehn wind events (i.e. those with dry North to NE winds directed downslope). We have seen several of these foehn wind events reach the moderate or stronger wind speed category. Also, the 2008 spring season has in general been a 2

54 breezy one across much of northern CA, not just the lower elevations. This has been mainly due to being in the proximity of a West to NW jet stream stretching from the north Pacific to the central Great Basin, a path which crosses the northern quarter of CA. After a dry late-february to April period, it was expected that May would receive closer to normal precipitation, but this did not occur in a significant portion of northern CA. What had been a promising mountain snow pack through early February quickly became a dwindling one by the start of June. This was primarily due to the lowest March through May total precipitation since record-keeping began, in many north state locations. The late winter to spring dryness, in addition to causing early curing of low elevation annual grasses, also led to generally lower than normal peak values in springtime live fuel moistures, another contributing factor to the early and active fire season at lower elevations. With the extended dry period this spring, 1000 hr fuels were consumed during early season prescribed burning. Some planned ignitions were canceled due to overly dry conditions at the lower elevations. Wildland fires at lower elevations have exhibited fuel driven runs even in the absence of alignment with wind and/or topography. Potential for large fires will continue in lower elevations, but will also progress into higher elevations during July. Except in the counties bordering Oregon, where the winter was wet, our large dead fuel moistures below 5000 feet are currently below or much below normal for the date. Energy Release Component (ERC) values are ranging from above normal to record highs for the date (see Figure 1). As always, it is recognized that even a single significant lightning episode can quickly cause any fire season to become critical. Such an event this year would most likely put us into a 90 th percentile type of season. Figure 1, Energy Release Component for Sacramento Valley PSA 3

55 III. Present (late-june) weather, and the July through October NOPS Weather Forecast: As stated above, North Ops heads into the core of fire season 2008 having had unprecedented dryness for March through mid-june. Figure 2 shows that California has been, by far, the driest portion of the country compared to normal this spring. The Redding March to May 2008 precipitation total of just 1.08 was only about half as much as in the next driest year seen in 100+ years of rainfall records. Figure 3 shows the latest Drought Monitor map, which depicts much-increased California drought coverage compared to just 3-4 months ago. The same storm track that kept much of the Pacific NW wetter than normal this spring, produced an above-normal frequency of drier West to North wind events to areas just south of it, i.e. across northern CA. The La Nina event (cold Pacific ocean water) of this past winter continues to steadily decline. NOTE - The magnitude and scope of the major dry lightning event of June was not foreseen by meteorologists. Most events under southwesterly upper flow have only minimal North Ops lightning, with the counties bordering Oregon an occasional exception. Weather maps didn t reveal the typical precursors for a major event in this case, and did not indicate the level of instability that would occur. However, the resulting 950+ wildland fires will now be a major player in what appears to be a very busy and possibly lengthy fire season across northern CA. Figure 2, March to May 2008 Percent of Normal Precipitation 4

56 Figure 3, Drought Monitor map Temperature forecast guidance from the Climate Prediction Center of NOAA, for both July to September and August to October, is shown in Figure 4. The thinking here is that overall, northern CA will probably average a little warmer than indicated by this CPC guidance, at least for the inland areas. [Note: Even if July and/or August do end up having slightly below normal temperatures, in our hot summertime climate those are still temperatures supporting higher, not lower, fire potential. For example, from July 13 to Aug. 7 th, daily maximum temps of 98º F in Redding would technically be below normal ]. Figure 4: NOAA / CPC Temperature anomaly forecasts 5

57 Figure 5 shows Precipitation forecast guidance from the CPC, for July to September and August to October. See Table 1 for representative NOPS summer normals. Table 2 shows this Assessment s temperature and precipitation anomaly forecasts for North Ops, July - October. Figure 5: NOAA / CPC Precipitation anomaly forecasts July Normals August Normals Sept Normals October Normals LOCATION Precip Max Precip Max Precip Max Precip Max Temps Temps Temps Temps Yreka.44 91º.56 90º.62 82º º Eureka.16 63º.38 64º.86 64º º Susanville.25 89º.16 88º.38 80º º Redding.05 99º.22 97º.48 90º º Ukiah.04 93º.09 92º.43 87º º Sacramento.05 93º.07 92º.37 87º º Quincy.18 91º.30 90º.72 84º º Livermore.02 90º.05 89º.16 86º.71 78º MONTH in 2008 July August September Table 1, Representative NOPS normals TEMPERATURE Departures from Normal (DFN) -1.5 to + 1.0º F to +1.5º F +0.5 to +2.0º F PRECIPITATION Percent-of-Normal (PON) For the 3 months as a whole, varying from 40% to 95% around North Ops October to +1.5º F % Table 2, NOPS Predictions for 2008 Forecaster Confidence for above = Temperatures 55%, Precipitation 60% 6

58 An early June conference call among southwest U.S. monsoon experts called for a most likely scenario of a normal location for the primary summer monsoon moisture influx this year. There was thought that timing-wise, the monsoon might start a little earlier than average, perhaps in late June. If the monsoon does track in the most-typical location, then northern CA will see variations during July and August ranging from periods with near-zero monsoon moisture, to several 1-4 day periods in which the eastern half of NOPS is under the western flank or fringes of the monsoon stream moving NW or North. Our most widespread and/or critical lightning events often occur in late July or August, and we have no reason to deviate from that in this 2008 forecast. Regarding wind patterns, the early part of July might continue a little breezier than average, perhaps with one final near-moderate foehn wind event. Otherwise we expect fairly normal winds through the months of July and August, favoring local terrain driven breezes in the warm to hot interior, and sea breezes west of the coast range crest and through the Sacramento Delta. When significant foehn events begin to return in September or early October (as is typical) we can expect lower elevation PSAs to have a secondary maximum in potential for wind driven large fires. Fuels Discussion: The season started early this year, with the dry conditions causing annual grasses to cure earlier than normal at the lower elevations. The NDVI greenness imagery from satellite data portrays this well: an image from this spring is shown in Figure 6. As can be seen in this Departure-from-Average image, the yellow to orange colors in the Sacramento Valley down through the Mid Coast and Bay area, indicate lower than normal plant greenness in these areas. Figure 6: NDVI Greeness Departure from Average 7

59 Measured live woody fuels are indicating a trend towards lower peak live moisture values as the plants go through the green-up process this season. As these plants peak at lower values, they will fall to critical moisture values earlier in the year than normal. The woody plant species are not putting on the normal amount of new growth. With a lack of lush new growth in the live vegetation to retard fire behavior, these fuels should contribute to fire spread due to the change in live to dead fuel ratios. We expect this trend to extend from the lower elevations where it has already been observed, to the higher elevations as we move into July. Observed fire behavior includes consumption of 1000 and 100 hour fuels, fuel driven spread, active night time burning, spotting well ahead of the main fire, and group torching. North Ops Assessment team members: John Snook Fire Weather Meteorologist and Predictive Services Program Mgr, Redding, North Ops, USDA Forest Service Mark Steele Intelligence Officer, USDA Forest Service, Northern California Geographic Area Coordination Center Marva Willey Intelligence Coordinator, USDA Forest Service, Northern California Geographic Area Coordination Center Mike Lococo Intelligence Officer, USDA Forest Service, Northern California Geographic Area Coordination Center Ralph Martinez GIS Coordinator, USDA Forest Service, Plumas National Forest. 8

60 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Appendix 4 - Northern CA Fire Behavior Assessment, ONC Support 2008

61 Northern California Fire Behavior Assessment ONC Support 2008 Prepared July 6,

62 Introduction On June 21st wide spread lightning started hundreds of fires in northern California. The magnitude of ignitions outpaced initial attack capabilities of firefighting resources. Accessible fires with low resistance to suppression were easily contained while unstaffed fires in remote and difficult terrain burned freely for several days. The focus of this analysis is to look ahead into the emerging 2008 fire season and identify synoptic fire behavior issues. This information will be used by fire managers to identify broad scale values at risk and assist in resource allocation associated with temporal and spatial changes in fire behavior. Objectives Provide a landscape assessment of fire behavior over the remainder of the fire season. Evaluate the potential weather scenarios that effect fire spread. Identify the relative changes in fire behavior utilizing seasonal synoptic changes in weather. Evaluate potential growth on fires that receive minimal staffing, or have high resistance to suppression. Identify temporal changes in the fire environment and how fire behavior changes as the season progresses, fuels cure and moisture decreases. Provide links to existing intelligence pertaining to fire weather and fire danger for northern California. Synoptic Weather and Fire Behavior The analysis was conducted in the context of northern California Predictive Service Areas (PSA). There are eight predictive service areas in northern California, each representing different weather and fire behavior trends (Figure 1). Most of the factors important in determining the potential for large fire growth are weather and fuels-related. The Predictive Services Group collects and analyzes information by Predictive Service Area producing many products that are useful for examining weather, climate, fire danger, and fire growth potential over the various PSAs. Table 1 describes the general characteristics of each PSA and the groups of fires burning in each. Figure 1. Northern California Predictive Service Areas 2

63 Table 1. Predictive Service Area characteristics and current fires Predictive Service Area Bioregion Vegetation/Fuels Fires North Coast North Coast Coastal scrub, chaparral, grass, oak woodland, Redwood, coastal pine and spruce Mid Coast to Mendocino North Coast Mid-Coast chaparral, coastal scrub, grass, oak woodland, Redwood, coastal pine and spruce Inland Valleys/Mountains chaparral, grass, oak woodland, Redwood, mixed conifer Bay Area Central Coast Coastal scrub, chaparral, grass, oak woodland, Redwood, coastal pine, eucalyptus Northwestern Mountains Sacramento Valley/Foothills Northeastern California Klamath Mountains Chaparral, grass, oak woodland, mixed conifer MEU Lightning MEU Lightning, Soda, Yolla Bolly Ukonom, Siskiyou, Alps, Iron, Lime, Mad, Hell s ½, Whiskeytown, SHU Lightning Central Valley Chaparral, grass, oak woodland SHU Lightning Southern Cascades Grass, Pinyon, Western Juniper, Sage, Jeffery Pine, Mixed conifer Northern Sierra Sierra Nevada Chaparral, grass, oak woodland, mixed conifer, true fir East Side North Eastern Plateau Grass, Pinyon, Western Juniper, Sage, Jeffery Pine Cub, Canyon, American, Yuba, BTU Lightning, Corral Weather patterns and associated fire behavior are summarized below by Predictive Service Area (PSA). North Coast & Bay Area Critical fire weather is generated by: Pacific High (Post frontal) and the Great Basin High pressure systems which produce warm, dry east winds which displace the marine air mass off the coast. Subtropical High aloft which produces abnormally high temperatures and low relative humidity. Fire behavior implications: Absence of marine layer dries fuels and creates periods of high fire danger. When in concert with wind and complex terrain rapid fire growth with frequent spotting occurs. Example: 1991 Tunnel Fire, 2008 Summit Fire. 3

64 Mid Coast to Mendocino Critical fire weather is generated by: Pacific High (Post frontal) and the Great Basin High pressure systems which produce warm, dry east winds which displace the marine air mass off the coast. Subtropical High aloft which produces abnormally high temperatures and low relative humidity. Localized effect of deep marine layer spilling over the crest of the Mendocino Mountains and thermal low that is created by heating in the Central Valley. This condition occurs on the east side of the PSA. Example: 1953 Rattlesnake Fire Fire behavior implications: Localized effect described above causes strong down-slope wind which changes the direction and speed of fire spread. Northwestern Mountains Critical fire weather is generated by: Post-frontal conditions occur when high pressure following the passage of a cold front causes strong winds from the north and northeast Example: 1999 Megram and Jones Fires Pre-frontal conditions occur when strong, southwesterly or westerly winds are generated by the dry, southern tail of a rapidly moving cold front. Example: 2001 Oregon Fire Subtropical High conditions occur when the region is under the influence of descending air from high pressure that causes temperatures to rise and humidity to drop. Example: 1987 Hayfork Fires, 2006 Bar Complex Fires Fire behavior implications: Rollout and spotting in complex topography are key factors to fire spread. Topography also creates persistent inversions, limiting visual observation of fire behavior by ground personnel and aircraft reducing situational awareness. Northeastern California & Eastside Southern Cascades Critical fire weather is generated by: Post-frontal conditions occur when high pressure following the passage of a cold front causes strong winds from the north and northeast Example: 2002 Cone Fire Pre-frontal conditions occur when strong, southwesterly or westerly winds are generated by the dry, southern tail of a rapidly moving cold front. Example: 1987 Lost Creek Fire, Hat Creek Valley, 1992 Fountain Fire Subtropical High conditions occur when the region is under the influence of descending air from high pressure that causes temperatures to rise and humidity to drop. Fire behavior implications: With Subtropical High conditions, fires are affected mainly by local fuel conditions, diurnal wind flow, and topography. In areas with steep elevation gradients, shifting diurnal winds cause fires to continually change directions. 4

65 Northeast Plateau Critical fire weather is generated by: Pre-frontal winds from the south and southwest which can surface strongly on the east side of the lee side of the Cascade Range and Sierra Nevada. Downward moving air masses lose elevation, gain temperature and lose relative humidity. Lightning with low precipitation is most common in July and August, but can occur in June and September. Moist Monsoon pattern is rare on the Northeast Plateau, however if it does occur many wildfires can be ignited during this pattern. Accompanying precipitation limits fire ignition and spread. Strong subsidence/low relative humidity can increase fire potential even in the absence of wind; poor nighttime relative humidity recovery is also a primary factor. This condition is most common in August and September. Fire behavior implications: Pinyon Pine, Juniper and sage brush fuels exhibit rapid rates of spread with torching, crowning, and long-range spotting, especially when influenced by low relative humidity and wind. Fire whirls are a common fire behavior feature in this area. Example: 2007 Fletcher Fire, Modoc NF Northern Sierra Critical fire weather is generated by: Post-frontal conditions occur when high pressure following the passage of a cold front causes strong winds from the north and northeast. Great Basin High condition creates strong pressure gradients and easterly and northeasterly winds across the Sierra. Example: 2007 Wheeler Fire Subtropical High condition displaces westerly winds to the north and stagnate air blocks moist air from the Gulf of Mexico bringing high temperatures and low relative humidity. Meridional Ridge with a southwest flow allows marine air to penetrate costal and inland areas. Above the marine layer in the Sierra Nevada, temperatures are higher and relative humidity is lower as short wave troughs and dry frontal systems pass over the area. Fire behavior implications: Low humidity accompanied by high wind allows fires to spread rapidly through timber, transitioning form torching to active crown fire with long-range spotting. Sacramento Valley/Foothills Critical fire weather is generated by: Winds created by the Great Basin High and Pacific Low trough come from the north and with considerable strength. Thermal belts are created above the dense pool of cool air that settles in the valley. Fires burn freely above this layer in dry fuels, lower relative humidity and warmer temperatures. Example: 1976 Skinner Mill Fire Fire behavior implications: Fires are wind-driven, with rapid rates of spread in dry, flashy fuels. 5

66 Table 2. Historical Fires of Interest, Northern California Fire Year Location Acres PSA Notes Megram August 23, 1999 Six River NF 124,898 Northwest Mountains Hog August 10, 1977 Klamath NF 46,530 Northwest Mountains Trough August 8, 2004 Mendocino NF 25,000 Mid Coast to Mendocino Canoe September 3, 2004 Humboldt Redwoods SP Rattlesnake July 9, 1953 Mendocino NF 1,300 Mid Coast to Mendocino Vision October 3, 1995 Point Reyes NP Blow-down timber, wind driven run in the fall, 70+ days to contain 24 days to contain Chaparral and timber 13,744 North Coast Coast Redwood 30+ days to contain 12,000 Mid Coast to Mendocino Crank August 30, 1987 Modoc NF 4076 Northeastern California Chaparral, localized wind, fatality fire Bishop Pine/Doug fir Coastal Sage, wind driven Timber, T-storm winds, shelter deployment Star August 25, 2001 Tahoe NF 16,600 Northern Sierra Timber, 18 days to contain Moonlight September 3, 2007 Tunnel October 20, 1991 Plumas NF 65,000 Northern Sierra Timber, plume dominated & wind driven 22 days to contain Oakland Hills 1,520 Bay Area Interface, wind driven, fatality fire Skinner Mill June 27, 1976 Mendocino NF 89,130 Sacramento Valley/Foothills Wind driven Fire Behavior Analysis Tools used in this analysis include FlamMap (ver ), weather and fire analysis in Fire Family Plus (ver ), Rare Event Risk Assessment Process (RERAP, ver 7.03), and Fire Spread Probability (FSPro, Beta version 2008). Other data sources used for the analysis include the U.S. Drought Monitor, the National Climatic Data Center, Western Regional Climate Center, and data from Northern California Geographic Area Coordination Center Predictive Services. The best available information was applied to the models used in this analysis. Fire behavior prediction tools are based on modeled fuels and weather assumptions which may not represent the actual conditions. Actual weather and wind can differ significantly from modeled inputs based on forecasts or scenarios. The FlamMap tool assumes constant wind conditions across the landscape and does not account for spotting, rollout, or suppression actions. FSPro uses climatological probabilities based on historical data that may not adequately capture occurrence of extreme burning conditions. General Fire behavior characteristics were modeled under three conditions inversions, large fire growth, and extreme. Adjustments were made to fuel moisture and wind speed inputs to represent the varying burning conditions. The landscapes used for modeling are intended to be samples of areas that might represent a particular PSA. Three PSAs were modeled Northwestern Mountains, Mid Coast to Mendocino and Northern Sierra. These PSAs all contain incidents that 6

67 have the potential to be long duration and differ in fuel characteristics, topography and climate enough to warrant comparison analysis. A comparison of fire characteristics for each of the burning conditions indicates the following: Flame lengths tend to remain 4 feet or less over percent of the area during inversion type conditions. Rate of spread remains less than 10 chains per hour in a large percentage of the area except during extreme type conditions. Crown fire activity largely remains in the surface or passive category except during extreme type conditions. Comparisons of PSAs for the modeled fire characteristics indicate: The Northern Mountain PSA has a larger percentage of the area with flame lengths greater than 12 feet. There is little difference between PSAs in the distribution of rate of spread. There is a higher percentage of active crown potential in the Northwestern Mountain PSA. 7

68 Figure 2 Northern Sierra Northern Sierra Northern Sierra 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Flame Length (feet) Inversion Growth Extreme 60% 40% 20% 0% Rate of Spread (chains/hour) Inversion Growth Extreme 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Inversion Growth Extreme Crown Fire Activity Surface Passive Active Northwest Mountains Northwest Mountains Northwest Mountains 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Flame Length (feet) Inversion Growth Extreme 60% 40% 20% 0% Rate of Spread (chains/hour) Inversion Growth Extreme 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Inversion Growth Extreme Crown Fire Activity Surface Passive Active Mid-Coast to Mendocino Mid-Coast to Mendocino Mid-Coast to Mendocino 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Flame Length (feet) Inversion Growth Extreme 60% 40% 20% 0% Rate of Spread (chains/hour) Inversion Growth Extreme 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Inversion Growth Extreme Crown Fire Activity Surface Passive Active 8

69 Outlook by Time Period Weather, Fire Danger, and Fire Behavior 7 Day Outlook Weather High pressure will build overhead late this weekend and produce very dry and hot weather through midweek. During this time overnight winds will be north/northeasterly from the west slopes of the Sierra to the coastal mountains with locally gusty conditions, which will limit RH recovery, but this pattern will not be widespread. Instead, these winds and their drying effect will occur in the usual wind-prone areas. There is a potential for a monsoonal surge of moisture moving over the interior later in the period. Fire Danger Live fuels are currently acting as a heat sink at high elevations, while at lower elevations herbaceous are cured. Below normal amount of new growth, which acts to retard fire behavior, is resulting in a greater contribution to fire spread due to the change in live to dead fuel ratios. Both live and dead fuels are ahead of their typical dryness time frames by one to two months, and in some cases fuels are record-setting dry. Departure from Average Greenness map below graphically illustrates the drier than normal condition of the fuels throughout most of the northern California area indicated by the yellow and brown colors. Figure 3. Mid Coast, Sacramento Valley/Foothills, and Northwestern Mountains PSAs are most significantly departed from normal greenness. ERCs for all northern California Predictive Service Areas (PSA) are still on an upward trend. Energy Release Component (ERC) values are ranging from above normal to record highs for the date, with most PSAs at or approaching the 90 th percentile for the season. The North Sierra PSA set new highs for ERC in May and is now at the 9

70 maximum for this date, approaching the 97 th percentile for the season. The biggest anomalies are at low to mid elevations. Figure 4. Seasonal ERC graph for North Sierra PSA shows maximum and average values compared to 2007 and 2008 to date. Fire Behavior The current 7-Day Significant Fire Potential chart (July 4) shows at least a 20% probability for large fire growth next week due to hot and dry conditions over all northern California PSAs except the North Coast. Live fuels are currently acting as a heat sink at higher elevations. Herbaceous fuels at lower elevations are cured, resulting in rapid rates of spread hour fuels are contributing to fire spread in all PSAs Low to mid- elevations currently have highest probabilities of significant fire spread over 7 days, especially in the southern part of Mid Coast PSA (FSPro 7-day runs). Short-range spotting is expected when inversion lifts. The North Sierra and Sacramento Valley/Foothills PSAs have a high potential for large fire growth and intense fire due to record high ERC and low fuel moistures. 30 Day Outlook Weather Little or no precipitation is forecasted for July. Temperatures for July are expected to be near normal to slightly above normal. July averages six days in which temperatures in the Redding area are 100 degrees. Northeast wind events are not typical between July 4 and Labor Day. There are nine to twelve days of possible thunderstorm events (mostly dry) expected for the month of July; more than last year. Smoke may affect the weather. 10

71 Fire Danger Expect currently green brush and forbs at higher elevations to cure early and contribute to fire activity by mid-july. ERC is rising and is expected to continue upward hr fuels are drying and are expected to continue this trend. Live woody fuels will fall to critical moisture values earlier in the year than normal. Fire Behavior Expect increased fire intensities and spread rates in all PSAs as ERC rises. There is an % probability that fires in close proximity would grow together without suppression actions (FSPro 30-day runs). Fires close to the west side of the valley are more likely to have fire spread influenced by localized wind events. Smoky conditions can cause cooler temperatures, moderating fire behavior. However limited visibility may also obscure hot spots Seasonal Outlook Weather The Drought Monitor forecast shows the drought persisting or worsening over the season. Extended-range forecasts show little rainfall across California and the state is unlikely to experience significant improvement during the ongoing dry season. Local, terrain driven winds typically predominate during August with a reduced potential for strong pressure gradient winds. August is typically as warm or warmer than the month of July. The potential for wind events associated with frontal passages increases later in the season. The effects of smoke may have more of an effect on the weather as the season progresses. The Climate Prediction Center (CPC) outlook shows some probability of below normal temperatures for coastal areas from August through October and above normal temperatures for the North Sierra PSA. The CPC outlook shows some probability of below normal precipitation over most of northern California. Fire Danger On average throughout northern California, ERC peaks by mid-august then starts trending downward. Historic maximum ERC values in all PSAs have exceeded the 97 th percentile as late as mid-october. Shorter day length and diminishing sun angle results in cooler temperature and higher humidity, which should begin to lower the potential for large fire growth in September and October. Analysis of fire and weather records over the past 20 years for each PSA using Fire Family Plus (ver ) indicates that few large fires (>300 acres) occur below the 70 th percentile ERC, especially toward the end of the fire season. ERC was used as the criteria for season-ending events in the table below. 11

72 Using precipitation events for season-end criteria yields later dates for 80 and 90% probability in the Northwestern Mountains (Cecilville and Orleans data) Table 3. Probability of season end using ERC falling below 70 th percentile with no recovery. Predictive Service Area 80% probability 90% probability Mid Coast to Mendocino Oct. 24 Nov. 1 Northwestern Mountains - ERC Oct. 22 Nov. 1 Northwestern Mountains precip Nov.13 Nov. 17 Sacramento Valley/Foothills Oct. 28 Nov. 4 Northeast California Oct. 20 Oct. 27 Northern Sierra Nov. 3 Nov. 9 Fire Behavior The Northern California Seasonal Outlook projects above normal potential for large fires over much of the geographic area between July and October due to record low precipitation to date and early drying of live fuels. Figure 5. Above normal large fire potential indicated by red areas Foehn wind events in September and October will increase the potential for large, winddriven fires in the lower elevation PSAs. Continuing drought conditions will allow for high probability of ignition, increased fire intensity, and significant crowning and spotting potential. General Management Implications Due to the early establishment of large fires in numerous locations across northern California, the opportunity for even larger growth is compounded. Effectiveness of fire suppression resources will be hampered by smoke concentrations at both the local and larger area, especially in the Klamath and Yolla Bolly Mountains, and 12

73 the Trinity Alps. This may limit aerial support and impact situational awareness due to reduced visibility, as well as increase the potential for fatigue and decision-making errors. Fuel conditions will continue to contribute to high probability of ignition and large fire growth potential in the low and mid elevations. The unusually early drying of fuels at the higher elevations will soon have the same effect there. Increased fire intensities, rapid spread rates, and high spotting potential in extremely dry fuels will reduce the probability of successful initial suppression actions. The potential for large fire growth is expected to continue or increase for at least the next two to three months as drought conditions persist or worsen. Numerous potentially long-duration fires are currently positioned in areas that have historically experienced rapid fire growth events triggered by conditions which developed later in the summer or fall. Links and References Northern California Daily Weather Outlook 7-day Significant Fire Potential Monthly Outlooks Seasonal Assessments Northern CA Smoke Transport and Stability Outlook Energy Release Component by Predictive Service Areas Sugihara, Neil G., van Wagtendonk, Jan W., Shaffer, Kevin E., Fites-Kaufman, JoAnn and Thode, Andrea E Fire in California Ecosystems. University of California Press. 596 pgs. Preparers: Sid Beckman CA- Fire Use Management Team, Incident Commander/Fire Behavior Analyst Gary Cones Long Term Analyst Jan Rea Long Term Analyst Contributors: John Snook Chuck McHugh Rick Connell Larry Hood Berni Bahro 13

74 Northern CA Operational Support: Strategic Planning Appendix 5 - Firescope CA MACS Procedures Guide

75 MACS PROCEDURES GUIDE MACS Multi-Agency Coordination System Publication July 12, 2006

76 July 2006 MACS NOTICE This Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS) Procedures Guide is intended for use by emergency service providers in California. The content of this guide supplement existing agency, state or federal directives and guidelines currently in use and complies with the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), the National Incident Management System (NIMS) that has incorporated the FIRESCOPE Incident Command System (ICS). This guide describes the MACS Information Management System, Modes of Operation, Preparedness Levels and the process and procedures by which the Multi-Agency Coordination System will function in California on all hazard incidents that require the use of multi-agency or multi-department resources on single or multi-jurisdiction incidents. This guide incorporates procedures agreed to by FIRESCOPE and the California Wildfire Coordinating Group (CWCG) that link the various MAC Groups in California. These include local MAC Groups, Region MAC Groups, Geographic MAC Groups, the California MAC Group (CALMAC), and finally to the National MAC Group. These links are especially important in providing incident information to request and allocate limited resources to incidents within and outside the State of California. Access to the information described in this document is through the FIRESCOPE Website ( or Fire agencies with response capability must obtain a password to fully access the system. For additional information contact the Governor s Office of Emergency Services (OES), Fire and Rescue Branch, FIRESCOPE Program in Riverside at (951) i

77 July 2006 MACS CONTENTS INTRODUCTION... 1 Local Level and Operational Area MACS... 1 Regional Level MACS... 2 Geographic Area MACS... 2 California Multi-Agency Coordination (CALMAC)... 3 CALMAC Role... 3 CALMAC Authority... 4 CALMAC Responsibilities... 4 CALMAC Representatives... 4 National Multi-Agency Coordination Group (NMAC)... 5 MODES OF OPERATION AND CWCG PREPAREDNESS LEVELS... 5 FIRESCOPE MACS Modes of Operation... 5 California Wildfire Coordinating Group Preparedness Levels... 6 Preparedness Level (PL) Description... 8 CALMAC MEETINGS... 9 Conference Calls... 9 In-Person Meetings MACS REPORTS Reports Criteria Resource Status, Drawdown CALMAC PRIORITY SETTING PROCEDURES Incident Priority Rating Matrix APPENDIX A: CALMAC Conference Call Format and Roll Call...A-1 APPENDIX B: CALMAC Briefing Report Format...B-1 APPENDIX C: CALMAC Position Duties and Responsibilities... C-1 ii

78 July 2006 MACS INTRODUCTION The Multi-Agency Coordination System or MACS is a part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS), as well as the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). It is also an integral part of the MACS process, essential to integrating and coordinating multiagency emergency response and management. The function of multi-agency coordination is effective when it takes place in a preplanned and organized Multi-Agency Coordination System. While ad-hoc arrangements among agencies can be made to work, it is more effective to establish MACS procedures in advance. A formal MACS consists of a Multi-Agency Coordination Group, (MAC Group) consisting of jurisdictional/agency representatives. MACS also consists of facilities, equipment, procedures, information systems, and internal and external communication systems integrated into a common operating system that ensures effective interagency and interjurisdictional coordination. The MACS components, California Mobilization Guide, California FIRESCOPE Field Operations Guide, FIRESCOPE Radio Frequency Guide, MACS Resource Designation System, etc., are available on the FIRESCOPE website ( or and through the FIRESCOPE Document Control Unit at the Southern Geographic Coordination Center at 2524 Mulberry Street in Riverside, California This guide will focus on the California MAC Group function, purpose and procedures. It is extremely important that MAC Group members have full authority from their respective agencies to commit resources, including equipment and personnel and fully represent their agency or department in MAC Group decisions. The function of the MAC Group is to provide a basis for local area, operational area, Regional area or statewide interagency coordination involving: Establishing priorities for response Allocating critical resources based on established priorities Communication systems integration Information coordination Intergovernmental decision coordination Development of geographic strategies and contingency plans Local Level and Operational Area MACS Multi-agency coordination is an essential element in support of jurisdictional Emergency Operations Centers (EOC). The local or operational area MAC Group provides jurisdictional or area-wide direction and/or policy. The MAC Group also identifies priorities for response and allocation of resource use based on the established priorities. MAC Group intelligence gathering and information exchange activities are usually accomplished through the information systems established by the EOC, such as the use of the MACS 404 or ICS-209. The MAC Group usually meets prior to each operational period. After analyzing current situational information establishes priorities and disseminates this information to the EOC for 1

79 July 2006 MACS implementation in operational plans. In more complex emergencies the MAC Group may choose to establish support positions that work for a MAC Group Coordinator under the direction of a MAC Group chairperson. The complexity of the situation and preplanned procedures should identify organizational structure, meeting locations and meeting frequency. Procedural guides or mobilization guides should establish and describe MAC Group activation procedures and identify required informational needs and decision requirements for the specific jurisdictional area(s) involved. More detailed MACS information can be found in the NWCG I-401 Multiagency Coordination curriculum and in the SEMS. Regional Level MACS Multi-Agency Coordination may also be achieved by bringing together representatives from various political levels such as county governments and functional agencies to coordinate in an interjurisdictional Regional MAC Group. This level of coordination of emergency activities is increasing due to complexity of incidents within regions and broader legal authorities within cities, counties, water districts, fire protection districts etc. In areas where occurrence of complex incidents is more commonplace it may be beneficial to formally establish MAC Groups within applicable OES Regions. Should Regional MAC Groups be establish, formal operating procedures should be developed and shared with the Geographic Area MAC Group and any affected local MAC Groups. Geographic Area MACS From a historical and informational standpoint, Geographic Area MAC Groups were established for the primary purpose of coordinating wildfire response and suppression activities among multiple regions and agencies in Southern California. FIRESCOPE initially established MACS in Southern California in the late 1970 s. In 1987, a MAC Group was formally established in Northern California representing the Northern Geographic Area. Each MAC Group has been activated numerous times since they were established. Currently the Geographic Area MAC Groups are established to ensure: Scarce or limited resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. Participating agencies that provide resources do not impair their ability to carry out their own mission. Timely and accurate incident intelligence and information made available for the media and the public. Decisions are documented and tracked so that proper financial management can occur and financial responsibility is determined. Develop contingency plans and trigger points for implementation. The operation guides for the Northern California Geographic MACS Group, (NORCAL MACS) and Southern California Geographic MAC Group, (SOCAL MACS) are available on request. 2

80 July 2006 MACS California Multi-Agency Coordination (CALMAC) During periods of significant emergency activity that require high levels of emergency resources statewide it may become necessary to activate a statewide MACS, herein referred to as CALMAC. The purpose of CALMAC is to prioritize incidents and manage resource allocation on a statewide basis. CALMAC should be activated when a Geographic Area exceeds its ability to meet resource needs and must rely on resource commitments from other Geographic Areas. When this occurs for extended periods, it can adversely impact statewide response capability. During periods of statewide resource drawdown, even though only one Geographic Area may be experiencing multiple incidents, it may be necessary to activate CALMAC. When this kind of resource commitment and utilization occurs, it requires close coordination to assure that: Scarce resources are allocated effectively and efficiently. Participating agencies providing resources also maintain their ability to carry out their missions. Timely and accurate incident intelligence and information are available for statewide planning, media communication and public service. Decisions are documented and tracked so proper financial management occurs and financial responsibility is determined. Development of geographic strategies and contingency plans. CALMAC Role It is important to understand the CALMAC organization and its relationship to member agencies (the two Geographic Area MAC Groups and the National MAC (NMAC) Group). The following organizational structure displays the Federal, State, County and local agencies during a FIRESCOPE MODE 3 and 4 or a National Preparedness Level 4 and 5. State Operations Center NMAC Liaison CALMAC Liaison Officer CALMAC Group CALMAC Information Officer Southern MAC Group Northern MAC Group CDF, Contract Counties BLM USFS BIA CDF NPS FWS OES 3

81 July 2006 MACS CALMAC Acts as the Statewide Authority to: Evaluate incident situation status reports and organizational resource status reports, as provided by the Northern and Southern California MAC Groups. Provide oversight for Geographic Area allocation of scarce and/or limited resources based on established priorities. Develop statewide incident priorities and strategies to submit to NMAC for coordination and inclusion in national incident priorities. CALMAC Responsibilities Include: Gather and maintain statewide situation status information. Enhance state and federal disaster assistance efforts. Enhance political interfaces. Review need for participation of other agencies in CALMAC Provide necessary liaison with out-of-state/region facilities or agencies as appropriate. Recommend improvements to CALMAC operations. Liaison with NMAC and/or the National Interagency Coordination Center, (NICC) as required. The CALMAC Group is normally activated when emergency incidents significantly impact or involve agencies within the six OES Mutual Aid Regions, four California CDF Regions, and the two Federal Geographic Areas. California Wildfire Coordinating Group (CWCG), or their designees are brought together as CALMAC. CALMAC is briefed on the statewide situation and then begins the decision-making process regarding the sharing and use of scarce or limited resources statewide. This may occur in a face-to-face meeting or via a conference call as determined by consensus. CALMAC members are generally upper level management or executive personnel from agencies with jurisdictional responsibility, or agencies that are heavily supporting the effort or are being significantly impacted by the shortage of local resources. Agency representatives should have full delegated authority to represent their agency to: Assist and advise on prioritizing incidents Establish resource allocation priorities Commit to expenditure of emergency funds CALMAC Will Include Representatives From the Following Agencies: 1. California Dept. of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) 2. USDA Forest Service (USFS) 3. Bureau of Land Management, DOI (BLM) 4. National Park Service, DOI (NPS) 5. Bureau of Indian Affairs, DOI (BIA) 6. Fish & Wildlife Service, DOI (FWS) 7. Governor s Office of Emergency Services, Fire and Rescue Branch (representing local government fire departments) (OES) 8. CDF, Contract Counties Representative 9. California National Guard Representative (if activated) 10. Active Military Liaison Representative (if activated) 4

82 July 2006 MACS Other organizations may be invited to participate if the CALMAC member agencies feel that their participation would improve the resource allocation and incident prioritization process. National Multi-Agency Coordinating Group (NMAC) The NMAC consists of one representative from the following agencies: 1. National Association of State Foresters (NASF) 2. USDA Forest Service (USFS) 3. National Park Service (NPS) 4. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 5. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 6. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 7. Federal Emergency Management Agency United States Fire Administration (FEMA- USFA). They have been delegated by their respective agency directors to manage wildland fire operations on a national scope when fire management resource shortages are probable. The delegated authorities include: Provide oversight of general business practices between NMAC and the Geographic Area Multi-Agency Coordination (GMAC) Groups. Establish priorities among Geographic Areas. Direct, control, and allocate resources among or between Geographic Areas to meet NMAC priorities. Implement decisions of the NMAC. MODES OF OPERATION AND CWCG PREPAREDNESS LEVELS California is currently using both FIRESCOPE MACS Modes and the CWCG Preparedness Levels. Both systems have their place in establishing levels of operational readiness depending on the magnitude of the emergency. Both CWCG Preparedness Levels and MACS Modes were designed in response to managing resource commitment during periods of high demand due to multiple emergencies. Although either system could be used alone, both systems are used collaboratively as each have their advantages when considering the variety and complexity of emergencies that tend to occur in California. More detailed information and comparisons of each system are provided below. FIRESCOPE MACS Modes of Operation FIRESCOPE modes are more operationally focused and tend to consider other all risk incidents that may impact the availability of emergency response resources. There are four operating modes. The four modes of operations are reflective of overall regional emergency activities, specific incident activity, resource commitment, and predicted weather patterns that may result in continued or increased resource commitments. The following are examples of conditions resulting in various mode levels: 5

83 July 2006 MACS Mode 1 is a non-critical situation typical of a non-fire season or early fire season situation. Mode 2 reflects a normal fire season situation with no significant resource impacts. Mode 3 reflects a serious situation and may require Northern and Southern MAC Groups to participate in MACS activities to include providing incident resource information and Mode 3 conference calls. Mode 4 reflects a total Geographic Area commitment or statewide effort requiring MACS activities at both Geographic Areas and may also require CALMAC activation. CALMAC Statewide coordination may require a face-to-face meeting in Sacramento; however, this is usually determined by group consensus. Conference calls are also effective and are often used, especially for short duration events. California Wildfire Coordinating Group Preparedness Levels National Preparedness Levels were established by the National Wildland Fire Coordinating Group. The California Wildfire Coordinating Group, (CWCG) has accepted the National Preparedness Levels (with minor modifications) for use in California. The CWCG Preparedness Levels are described in more detail in the California Mobilization Guide, Section Preparedness Levels are similar to the MACS Modes in that they are based on a combination of incident activity, resource commitment, and predicted weather. However, the Preparedness Levels differ from the MACS Modes because they take into consideration the full range of wildland fire activities, such as prescribed fire and fire use. This ensures that fire protection responsibility and prescribed fire or fire use does not exceed the state s wildland fire response capabilities and are coordinated with the state and national wildland fire activities. Preparedness Levels are determined by situational criteria that determine specific actions and the responsible party. The Preparedness Levels can restrict prescribed fire and/or fire use in order to ensure that adequate resources are available for emergency response. There are five distinct levels. Each level is described below beginning with Level 1, comparable to FIRESCOPE Mode 1 and ending with Level 5 that is comparable to Mode 4. 6

84 July 2006 MACS MACS MODES of OPERATION Mode 1 Reflects a non-critical statewide situation. In general, there are no major or multiple incidents that would require extended use of Multi-Agency resources. This mode reflects a typical non-fire season operation for wildland fire agencies. Mode 2 Reflects normal fire season operations. While isolated major incidents may occur, there is no significant impact on regional or statewide resources. Mode 3 Reflects a serious situation or the potential for a serious situation. A serious situation could be a high potential incident that involves the use of resources from multiple agencies. Generally, a Mode 3 would exist when one to three such incidents were occurring simultaneously, or when the potential for a regional or statewide emergency situation exists. Severe winter weather conditions, a forecast for Santa Ana winds, or a tsunami warning could be sufficient to initiate a Mode 3. The major commitment of fire suppression resources in region to an outof-region incident would warrant a Mode 3. CWCG PREPAREDNESS LEVEL Level 1 Few or no class A, B, and C wildland fires. Minimal or no commitment of interagency resources to suppression activities. Current and short-range predictions for low to moderate fire danger. Local units implementing prescribed fire operations with sufficient contingency resources available. Agencies above drawdown levels and requests for personnel and resources outside of the local area are not occurring. Level 2 Numerous class A, B, and C wildland fires. Local commitment of interagency resources for initial attack, fuels projects and wildland fire used for resource benefit. Current and short-term weather predictions for moderate fire danger. Local units implementing prescribed fire operations with sufficient contingency resources available. Agencies above drawdown levels and requests for personnel and resources outside of the local area are of minimal to low impact. Level 3 High potential for Class D and larger fires to occur with several active Class A, B, and C fires. Mobilization of agency and interagency resources within the Geographic Area/Region, but minimal mobilization between or outside of Geographic Area/Regions. Current and short-term forecasted fire danger is moving from medium to high or very high. Local units implementing prescribed fire operations starting to compete for interagency contingency resources. Agencies still above drawdown levels for suppression resource, but starting to have difficulty maintaining sufficient resources to meet initial attack responsibilities, project fire support, and fuel projects/prescribed fire requirements without prioritizing or using non-local support. Some critical resource needs are starting to be identified. Mode 4 Level 4 Signifies the existence of a total regional or Continuing initial attack activity and Class D or larger fires are common in statewide area effort where resource use one or both Geographic Area/Regions. Resource ordering and mobilization priorities require a concerted multi-agency of personnel is occurring between Geographic/Regions. Current and shortterm weather forecasts are for high to very high fire danger. The long- coordination effort. A statewide MAC operation may be established in Sacramento, while the range forecast for the next week indicates continued high fire danger. Local Regional MAC Operations would be activated units may implement new fuel/wildland fire use/prescribed fire projects, but in Riverside (South Operations) and/or in operational and contingency resources must be provided by the agency or Redding (North Operations). Agency by local arrangements. Actual and long-range fire weather forecasts predict representatives, by either conference call or in high to very high fire danger. Significant potential exists for moving into person at the coordination center, should be extreme fire danger for most of the Geographic Area/Region. Personnel authorized to speak and commit resources for and resources at minimum drawdown levels, especially for initial attack. their agency Fuels projects and prescribed fires can only be implemented with agency contingency resources or special arrangements within the local units. Mobilization and resource orders are occurring for suppression assignments within the Geographic Area/Region and between Geographic Areas/Regions. Ref: MACS (April 5, 2000) Level 5 CALMAC is fully activated. Agencies are below drawdown levels. Class D and larger fires are common in the North GACC/Region. North GACC/Region cannot fill many outstanding resource requests and are sending these orders to NICC. Use of local government resources is common. Reassignment of personnel and resources between incidents is common. Current and short-range weather forecasts predict very high to extreme fire danger. Long-range forecasts for the next week for North GACC/Region indicates continued very high to extreme fire danger. Activation of National Guard or military personnel and resources is being considered or has been done. Orders for California resources are causing the state to drop below agency drawdown levels. State and Local government personnel are being used to fill in-state and out-of-state resource orders. Actual and long-range fire danger predictions are for very high or extreme. Personnel and resources are at or below agency minimum drawdown levels. Ref: CAL MOB Guide CDF 8100 Procedure No