THE ERINYS IRAQ OIL PROTECTION FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

Transcription

1 THE ERINYS IRAQ OIL PROTECTION FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

2 In Memory of James Wilshire and the 23 Iraqi citizens who lost their lives whilst serving with the Erinys Oil Protection Force between August 2003 and December 2004 i

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4 FOREWORD The security of oil and gas production, domestic supply and export are so obviously one of the key enablers for Iraq s reconstruction and rehabilitation. The issue of infrastructure security particularly the security of oil pipelines is critical to the rebuilding of Iraq. This reality was grasped from the beginning by Coalition governments, the US Government s proconsul in Baghdad, and by subsequent Coalition leadership. Security of domestic supply in a country practically floating on oil reserves is the litmus test for the credibility of the incumbent Iraqi administration. Failure to meet increasing domestic demand has significant short-term political implications; dissatisfaction feeds the insurgency and undermines nascent Iraqi authorities. Export of Iraq s only significant natural asset is the single means of funding the country s long-term economic growth. Failure to maximise revenues from export has serious macro-economic and longer-term political implications. Notwithstanding the clarity of purpose expressed both in Washington DC and at the highest levels of the Coalition s leadership in Baghdad, the security of Iraq s national oil infrastructure continues to present difficult challenges for those charged with realising it. The Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), an arm of the US Mission in Iraq charged with the coordination of US Congress funded reconstruction projects, recently estimated that Iraq loses $8 million in revenue per day because of sabotage on its northern oil and gas pipelines alone. Yet, after more than two years since the end of the Coalition campaign to liberate Iraq, both Coalition and Iraqi authorities seem still to be searching for a coherent mechanism - the ways and means to develop and implement a realistic and workable strategy to safeguard the nation s patrimony. This struggle has been characterised by amongst other features a series of incremental initiatives of varying size, duration and success. These not only attempted to address the rebuilding and repair of a creaking oil infrastructure, and the generation of Iraqi management capacity in the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, but also to secure strategically significant fixed sites and sections of pipeline. One of the most important of these was the contract awarded in early August 2003 by the then Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to Erinys for the creation of an oil infrastructure guard force. During the period August 2003 to December 2004, Erinys Iraq, a subsidiary organisation of Erinys International Ltd., mobilised, trained, equipped and effectively managed a 16,000 strong Iraqi guard force. This was achieved against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating security environment. The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force (or OPF as it became known) had a positive effect far beyond its contracted and mandated capabilities, or indeed its size in relation to the huge task of protecting designated static oil sites and significant stretches of pipeline. The iii

5 OPF was successfully transitioned and handed over to Iraqi Ministry of Oil control by the end of 2004, as work-in-progress. Under Erinys custodianship, and in the face of considerable political, operational and contractual challenges, the OPF stands out as a real, and still relatively little known success story which emerged from the post-conflict security domain in Iraq. The aim of this paper is to tell the story of how Erinys Iraqi and international management achieved what it did, in many cases against the odds, and to examine some of the broad operational, political and contractual factors which shaped the force, and some of the lessons that were learned along the way. The perspectives offered here are very much those of an organisation which lived and worked beyond the Coalition perimeter. This was for two reasons. First, Erinys sought to integrate itself into the mainstream of post conflict Iraqi society. Erinys senior management, almost exclusively with a British Army background, instinctively understood from the outset that for the project to be credible as an Iraqi solution, it had to be accepted by those it served (ultimately the Ministry of Oil) and employed (ordinary Iraqi citizens from all walks of life). Second, Erinys, because it was a commercial organisation, was not part of the administrative apparatus of the CPA and follow-on Coalition organisations. Written ten months after Erinys involvement in the OPF project came to an end, this document is neither intended as a detailed post-operational report nor is it an academic analysis of the problems facing Iraq. Part One seeks to explain the context into which the project was launched; Part Two sets out to bring to life some of the challenges that project management had to face; Part Three summarises the lessons that Erinys learned from its time protecting Iraq s oil infrastructure. Taken together, it is nothing more than a reflection of Erinys collective experience fulfilling a difficult mission in an extraordinary environment. The views expressed here are therefore necessarily subjective, but it is hoped that they will find a place within the growing body of commentary generated in the wake of Iraq s liberation. Major General (retired) John Holmes, DSO OBE MC Erinys, October 2005 Pipeline fire following a rocket attack on the Northern Oil Company complex in Kirkuk - November 2003 Assassins Gate in Baghdad. One of the major entrances into the former Republican Presidential complex which housed the CPA - May 2003 iv

6 IRAQI PIPELINES AND REFINERIES Dahuk IT 2A KASIK KUPRI IT 2 KM 245 HAMMANM AL ALLIT QUBBAT AL ABA DEPOT Mosul NABI YANUS DEPOT GAZLANI MUASKAR DEPOT AL WAITAIYA Arbil QAYYARAH IT 1 CHAQMAQAH DEPOT Kirkuk K 1 KIRKUK Sulaymaniyah AS SULAYMANIYAH IT 1A KM 121 K 2 West Bayji K 2 BAYJI S BAYJI TIKRIT DEPOT Tikrit T1 K 3 KM 669 AL HADITHAH Samarra KHANAQIN (DISMANTLED) Ba qubah MUSHADAH DISTRN Ar-Ramadi MUJARAH FALLUJAH DEPOT PS 4 KM 515 TAJI-NAT GAS DISTRN PT HASSAN DEPOT SADDAM INTL AFLD DISTRN PT AL ABBAS DEPOT SHAYKH BIYUTI RUSAFA DISTRN Baghdad BAGHDAD AL DOURA LATIFIYAH (KARGH) DISTRN ASRIYAH DEPOT MUDAYSIS AFLD DEPOT AR RAZZAZAH DEPOT KM 441 KM 414 MUSAYYIB GAS DISTRN Karbala' Al-Hillah Al-Kut KUT DISTRN PT An Najaf PS 3 KM 342 AD DIWANIYAH DEPOT Ad Diwaniyah Al 'Amarah AMARAH DEPOT AL AMARAH As-Samawah AS SAMAWAH PS 2 KM 168 An-Nasiriyah UWAYJAH ABU HAYYAH DEPOT QARYAT KULLIYAT DEPOT PS 1 KM 0 IPSA 1 AZ ZUBAYR DISTRN PT NW Az Zubayr IPSA 2 AL BASRAH ASH SHUAYBAH DEPOT AZ ZUBAYR IRON AND STEEL PLANT-NAT GAS DISTRN IPSA 2A Source: Task Force RIO v

7 CONTENTS i iii FOREWORD IRAQI PIPELINES AND REFINERIES PART ONE THE OIL PROTECTION FORCE IN CONTEXT 1 INTRODUCTION A CONTRACT OF ITS TIME 2 BASELINE CHALLENGES 6 SUMMARY PART TWO FROM CONCEPT TO TRANSITION 7 THE OPF VISION THE ERINYS APPROACH 8 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND DESIGN PHASE ONE: AUGUST SEPTEMBER SURVEY, PLANNING AND MOBILISATION 13 HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING 14 WHO IS ERINYS? 15 SURVEY AND PLANNING 16 RIO TO SHIELD THE BATON IS PASSED 18 SUMMARY PHASE TWO: OCTOBER DECEMBER DEPLOYMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 19 PILLARS AND POSTS 22 THE BRIDGEHEAD EXPANDS TO MEET AN INCREASING THREAT 24 EXPANDING THE FORCE 26 SUMMARY PHASE THREE: JANUARY JULY CONSOLIDATION AND GROWTH 27 LOOKING FORWARD 28 CHANGES 29 TASK FORCE SHIELD 31 CRANKING THE MOBILISATION HANDLE CONFIDENCE AND EFFECT 36 SUMMARY PHASE FOUR: AUGUST DECEMBER TRANSITION AND HAND-OVER 37 NEW GOVERNMENT AND EXTENSION AN OLD SECURITY AGENDA WITH A NEW HOPE 39 THE TRANSITION PLANNING AND CONSEQUENCE 41 HANDOVER AND ENDGAME 42 SUMMARY PART THREE CONCLUSIONS AND SOME LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 43 LOOKING BACK OUTPUT AND PERFORMANCE 44 LINKAGE AND LEVELS 45 THE CONTRIBUTION OF OUR IRAQI MANAGEMENT 46 CONCLUSION 47 APPENDIX A vi

8 ILLUSTRATIONS 9 FIGURE 1: OPF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: GRADUATED JOINT RESPONSE 10 FIGURE 2: INFORMATION SHIELD CONCEPT 11 FIGURE 3: THE OPF S PLACE IN THE SECURITY FORCE CAPABILITY SPECTRUM 12 FIGURE 4: ERINYS OPF BRIEFING SLIDES 16 FIGURE 5: TASK FORCE SHIELD S COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 17 FIGURE 6: IMPLEMENTATION SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX EXTRACT 18 FIGURE 7: SECTOR AND REGIONAL BOUNDARIES 20 FIGURE 8: RECRUITING AND VETTING CONCEPT 21 FIGURE 9: OPF TRAINING CONCEPT 26 FIGURE 10: INCREASE IN GUARD FORCE NUMBERS - DECREASE IN ATTACKS vii

9 PART ONE THE OIL PROTECTION FORCE IN CONTEXT INTRODUCTION - A CONTRACT OF ITS TIME Erinys, through an open and competitive tender process, won in August 2003 a US$39.5 million CPA 1 firm fixed price contract to raise a 6500 strong Iraqi guard force to protect 140 fixed oil sites throughout the country. It was at the time one of the largest single security contracts awarded. The intent of the contract was to establish and raise a single nationwide Iraqi guard force in the first year, and then to transition that force to full Iraqi ministerial management and operational control during the second (option) year. This aspiration remained the only constant throughout the contract, and provided the conceptual and operational underpinning for a project that changed constantly throughout its life span. In order to understand the challenges and achievements outlined in this paper, it is necessary to set these in context by examining the conditions under which the initial requirement was articulated by the CPA and which informed the design, mobilisation and development of the force. The intent of the contract was to establish and raise a single nationwide Iraqi guard force in the first year, and then to transition that force to full Iraqi ministerial management and operational control during the second (option) year. The end of the successful campaign to liberate Iraq was followed by an interregnum whose defining feature was a widespread and systematic outbreak of looting. The impact of the looting spree was well documented by the news media; Iraqi government facilities were particularly hard hit. Only a small number of major oil sites (refineries, gas oil separation plants, pumping stations, storage and distribution depots and export terminals) guarded by Coalition Forces escaped serious damage. This episode exposed two related issues which required the Coalition s immediate attention. Clearly, provision had to be made to protect critical oil infrastructure on which the future Iraq was dependent, from mobs of looters and criminal activity. There was also a concurrent need to release Coalition Force units from site guarding duties because they were required elsewhere, or were due to rotate out of the Iraqi theatre of operations. Urgency was translated by the US led CPA into action. The then seemingly more esoteric considerations of how to shape a detailed, sustainable long-term strategy for securing essential infrastructure (including oil, electricity, rail, road, and water) would be considered 1 1 The CPA grew out of and superseded the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) established in May 2003.

10 at a later time. This was neither surprising nor necessarily a bad thing. The CPA was not only trying to establish and organise itself, it was working hard to recapture the nation-building initiative lost in the immediate aftermath of the land campaign. At the same time it had to grapple with an avalanche of macroissues ranging from maintaining internal security, providing urgent humanitarian aid, re-establishing Iraqi civil authorities, management of reconstruction projects and kick-starting the Iraqi economy. The time for action was then; joining up the pieces and building on them would follow. The road bridge at Al-Fathah crossing, under which the main pipeline delivering crude oil from the northern oil fields to the Bayji refinery runs. Destroyed during the campaign to liberate Iraq - September 2003 This pragmatism was highly laudable insomuch that the drive for action did achieve real results. It was enabled by Development Fund for Iraq (or DFI) money earmarked for the re-building of Iraq, by a tremendous sense of energy and optimism which prevailed both within the CPA corridors and without, and by a then relatively benign security environment. The oil security contract therefore was very much a thing of its time. A requirement to protect oil sites was stated in the broadest of terms by hard pressed Coalition officials looking for an immediate solution to a very large and urgent problem. BASELINE CHALLENGES It was into this heady atmosphere that Erinys senior management was immersed in the initial rounds of requirement definition with CPA and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) officials. The contract s Statement of Objectives was simple enough and required 2 :..[the concept is for] the contractor to initially provide the preponderance of the security architecture and then slowly transfer that responsibility to Iraqi control over a two year timeframe. The end state is a well trained guard force and a mature security infrastructure capable of protecting the multi-billion dollar oil infrastructure. The discussions and briefings with CPA, CJTF-7 and Iraqi Ministry of Oil officials that followed exposed some of the interrelated challenges that Erinys would have to overcome. 2 Taken verbatim from IFB # DABV01-03-B-0001, the Statement of Objectives incorporated in the CPA Request for Proposal and shown at Appendix A. 2

11 Looters exiting the National Intelligence offices in Baghdad - April 2003 First, any notions that Erinys management had of a deliberate, conventional approach to the planning, implementation and management of a project of this size were quickly and unequivocally dispelled by CJTF-7, who wanted boots on the ground immediately, not least to absolve the fighting formations that had successfully prosecuted the liberation land campaign from site guarding commitments. The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) 3, other dedicated infrastructure guard forces then under consideration, and the Erinys OPF were the means by which Coalition Force assets could be released. The very tight project implementation timelines, more than any other factor, served to shape Erinys project planning and approach to implementation. Erinys therefore had effectively to switch its project management mindset from one of deliberate planning, with sequentially phased formal implementation, to a much more urgent, responsive and flexible one to ensure that the demands of the CPA and CJTF-7 could be met. This was not a straightforward process; the Company s management had considerable experience of security project management all over the world, but like so many endeavours in postconflict Iraq, this project was being prosecuted in an unprecedented set of circumstances. The second challenge was clearly establishing in the minds of the key stakeholders (CJTF-7, CPA and the Ministry of Oil) the role that the Erinys guard force was to play, what its contracted capabilities were, and where those capabilities fitted in to the overall security effort. It became clear that each stakeholder had different ideas of what a contracted guard force should do. This was exacerbated by different interpretations of what infrastructure should be the priority for protection, what the force s limit of exploitation (not just in terms of ground, but also in terms of the threat it had to be capable of defeating) was to be, and how these priorities should be adjusted and managed as the security situation developed. 3 3 The FPS consisted of hastily recruited, lightly armed guards whose principal task was to act as a first line of defence for government buildings, banks and essential infrastructure against looters and criminal activity.

12 The third baseline issue with which Erinys management had continually to wrestle related to the ownership, contractual oversight and tasking of the Erinys OPF. The CPA let the A typical Baghdad rush-hour scene in August It is illustrative of a benign threat environment contract on behalf of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil using DFI funds under CPA control. Given that Erinys was contracted to guard Ministry of Oil assets, the beneficiary (or client) was the Ministry. The Ministry s interests were represented by its shadow in the CPA: the Senior Oil Advisor s office. However, security was a CJTF-7 responsibility and the Erinys OPF was expected to integrate into the array of forces under its control. However, the Erinys OPF was initially placed under the operational supervision of Task Force RIO 4, a US Army Corps of Engineers organisation working to the CPA, and tasked with the programme management of the oil infrastructure refurbishment. The CPA s contracting office retained contractual oversight. What became apparent during the planning and early implementation phase of the project were the tensions between the principal stakeholders and especially their staffs. CJTF-7 wanted to unload site guarding commitments from its portfolio and be reassured that oil infrastructure security was being taken care of. Task Force RIO wanted security for reconstruction projects. The CPA Senior Oil Advisor s office was primarily interested in raising oil production and refinery output but had little understanding of security matters or guard forces. The Ministry of Oil, watching form the sidelines, was monitoring how the CPA was disbursing what it regarded as Iraqi funds on an imported solution, and did its best to ensure that its interests were being addressed. The diversity of stakeholder interests was exacerbated by the lack of a coherent coordinating mechanism. No system had yet been developed that was able to balance the different security needs to determine an integrated approach to prioritisation, operational tasking and the development of the contract to meet the requirements of the evolving threat 4 RIO was a mnemonic that stood for Restore Iraqi Oil. 4

13 situation. In the absence of such a unified mechanism Erinys had the difficult and time consuming task of making sense of often conflicting short-term requirements in which the strategic imperative articulated at the highest level sometimes became obscured. All of this was understandable given the embryonic stage of the new administration. Last, and importantly, the security situation had by September already begun slowly to change for the worse. We know now that the tipping point beyond which the operating environment ceased to be benign was reached in early November of This development could not have been foreseen by those in the CPA who initiated the contract and was to have serious implications for a lightly armed guard force. An OPF foot patrol on the perimeter of the Al-Dourah Refinery complex - February

14 SUMMARY By the time site surveys were being completed and the mobilisation of the project was underway, Erinys was left with a very generally stated remit from a chain of command unfamiliar with guard forces and hampered by multiple reporting lines. Many of these early challenges were symptomatic of a demanding post-conflict environment, in which the Coalition was trying to create order from chaos. The intense pressure on the CPA and CJTF-7 to set Iraq on its road to recovery allowed difficult problems, such as infrastructure security, to be initially only superficially examined. The sometimes adverse corollaries to this expediency were to remain with the OPF throughout its project life. Burning pipelines and storage depot Rumaylah Southern Iraq - August

15 PART TWO FROM CONCEPT TO TRANSITION THE OPF VISION Against the backdrop outlined in Part One, and taking into account the results of the survey teams reporting back to the planning team in Erinys Al-Mansour headquarters, project management was able to stick pretty much to its original, very simple concept articulated in its Technical Proposal. The only fundamental change was the manner in which the OPF would be mobilised. Erinys vision was to deliver a single, coherent nationwide guard force, lightly armed for self protection and the protection of sites and Iraqi oil personnel that worked on them. The force was to be based on three self-contained operating regions, which would, wherever possible be coterminous with the operational boundaries of the Coalition Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). Regional headquarters would be co-located with state oil operating companies head offices, or at important regional oil and gas infrastructure nodes. Each region was subdivided into sectors, usually based on a major oil installation such as a refinery. Site guards and mobile patrols, recruited from local communities, would operate in a system of two or three shifts per 24 hours. Erinys vision was to deliver a single, coherent nationwide guard force, lightly armed for self protection and the protection of sites and Iraqi oil personnel that worked on them. THE ERINYS APPROACH The defining feature of the CPA Statement of Objectives was the requirement to transition the OPF to Iraqi control. This determined what became acknowledged as the Erinys Approach to managing guard forces in Iraq. Most importantly, the force had to be seen as an Iraqi force distinct from Coalition Forces in order to be acceptable to the local communities straddling the oil infrastructure from which Erinys recruited its guard force manpower. The approach that Erinys developed had three linked strands: embedded international management, local recruiting of Iraqi guards, and the careful selection, training and mentoring of Iraqi guard force management personnel. 7

16 Embedded international management was essential to provide continuous, hands-on direction for the development of a coherent, task focused force made up from many tribal, religious and ethnic groupings. Erinys international management would provide a neutral component able to arbitrate over the many conflicting local pressures to which Iraqi OPF personnel were often subjected, and which were not always complementary to the task of protecting oil infrastructure. Equally, there was an obvious requirement to provide the foundations of project, training and technical guard force management expertise in an environment where none existed and a means to transfer it to Erinys Iraqi management during the project term. In recognition that Erinys custodianship of the OPF would be finite, the role of international management had to gradually adjust. During the project s first year, it would take the lead in planning and establishing the force. But as the force became established and its organisation and operational capability matured, the emphasis would switch from one of direct, dayto-day operational control to one of supporting, mentoring, advising and training Iraqi management, as well as quality control. Erinys international management would however retain overall responsibility for project OPF international management in their offices in the Central Region Headquarters at Al-Dourah Refinery - March 2004 management, and would take the lead in managing relationships with Coalition Forces essential for the success of the OPF project operating under a Coalition security umbrella. One of the most important requirements to ensure the success of the OPF beyond Erinys custodianship was the selection, recruiting and training of capable Iraqi guard force and administrative management at all levels of the OPF. Erinys identified Iraqi ex-armed forces personnel, with an understanding of English, and wherever possible, experience of working with Westerners. The ex-military dimension was regarded as important because officers who had served in the Iraqi Army, Air Force and Navy were still held in generally high regard throughout Iraqi society. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND DESIGN Erinys operational design was conventional and based on three basic components. The most visible was key point security on fixed sites provided by trained and uniformed guards. Key point security included both static guards and site mobile guards. The second 8

17 component consisted of mobile patrols with a dual function for pipeline patrols and as a sector reinforcement capability. Pipeline security would in due course be augmented by an aerial surveillance capability. The force would operate in a security environment shaped by the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), creating the conditions for a lightly armed guard force to effectively carry out its contracted remit. The operational concept is illustrated at Figure 1. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OPERATIONAL CONTROL COORDINATION/LIAISON TASKING IRAQI REACTION AGENCIES: IPS, MED, FIRE Deter / Detect CO-ORDINATE SECTOR OPERATIONS ROOM REGIONAL OPERATIONS ROOM PLANNING AND C 3 CF/IRAQI UNIT HEADQUARTERS CF FORMATION HEADQUARTERS. JOINT CO-ORDINATION CELLS SITE/MOBILE GUARD SECTOR/SITE REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY DEPLOY FOLLOW UP IRAQI REACTION AGENCIES: IPS, MED, FIRE THREAT DEPLOY REGIONAL REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY REACTION SITE/MOBILE GUARD CF/IRAQI SECURITY FORCES DEPLOY Figure 1: OPF Concept of Operations: Graduated Joint Response. Source: OPF Briefing slide The third component consisted of a comprehensive liaison and security information network encompassing Coalition and Iraqi forces, civil authorities, tribes and local communities. The concept is illustrated at Figure 2. The intent was to develop an information shield through the integration of information resources relevant to the OPF s operations, which would generate threat intelligence, in turn allowing counter-measures to be implemented within the Erinys limit of exploitation, or in support of Coalition Forces. Each sector was responsible for a set of designated fixed sites and pipelines within boundaries 5. Mobile patrol elements consisted of dedicated site quick reaction forces 9 5 OPF boundaries did not designate tactical areas of operations in the military sense. Rather, they set out areas in which the OPF had specific site and pipeline guarding responsibilities.

18 INFORMATION INPUT ANALYSIS/DISTRIBUTION OUTPUT/ACTION DEDICATED CF LOs CJTF-7 C2 ERINYS SECURITY LIASON OFFICER MINISTRY OF OIL ERINYS IRAQ BAGHDAD HEADQUARTERS COHERENT OVERALL SECURITY PICTURE PROJECT PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT AUTHORISATION FOR ADDITIONAL MEASURES DEDICATED CF LOs LOCAL CF FORMATIONS COMMUNITY LIASON OFFICER LOCAL OIL/GAS COMPANIES OTHER LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS FOCUSED DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT REINFORCEMENT WITH CF AND OTHER IRAQI AGENCY JOINT DEPLOYMENT POST INCIDENT INVESTIGATION LOCAL CF UNITS FOCUSED DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT COMMUNITY LIASON OFFICER CONTACTS LOCAL OIL/GAS COMPANIES SECTOR HEADQUARTERS SPECIFIC SITE PROTECTION MEASURES REINFORCEMENT OTHER LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES JOINT DEPLOYMENT (QRF) for larger sites, and pipeline mobile patrol teams. Operational coordination, basic training and administrative support (including equipment support, logistics, HR, finance) Figure 2: Information Shield Concept. Source: OPF Briefing slide was the responsibility of regional headquarters. Guard force operations, including continuation training, was the province of the sector and site management. Operational liaison with Coalition and Iraqi forces at the divisional and brigade combat team level was the responsibility principally of regional management, with sector management engaging at the brigade level and below. Liaison with Coalition Forces was supported by dedicated Coalition Force liaison officers acting as interlocutors between Erinys regional headquarters and Coalition divisional and brigade headquarters. 10

19 Command and control was enabled by a very simple and robust very high frequency (VHF) radio system based on a nationwide network of repeaters and base stations allowing for operational communications within each region and between sectors. Inter-regional communications would be facilitated by high frequency (HF), InMarSat and satellite telephony. Data communications was based on a VSAT 6 satellite network with terminals deployed down to sector headquarter level. Overall project control was exercised by the Project Management Team located in Erinys national Head Office in the Al-Mansour District of Baghdad, which also served as the communications management hub. The Project Management Team at Head Office had responsibility for overall planning, implementation and development of the project, operational and policy coordination, the considerable procurement, logistics, equipment support and asset management effort, as well as client relationship management. The key business, operational and administrative functions were cascaded down to sector level. Erinys planners knew from the outset that a lightly armed guard force, with limited mandated capabilities, operating in a volatile post-conflict environment, could only be fully Acronyms: IPS: Iraqi Police Service NIA: New Iraq Army ING: Iraqi National Guard ISF: Iraqi Security Forces Guard Force Para-military Force Military Force OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY Fixed Site Guards Access Control Deterring presence Mobile Guards/Patrol Teams Site QRFs Reaction & Reinforcement Mobile deterring presence Pre-emptive operations Manoeuvre/Rapid response Sustained or offensive deployment Counter-insurgency/terrorist ops Low GREEN GREEN RED Trespassing Opportunistic crime Within OPF s capabilities Within OPF s capabilities Beyond OPF s contracted legal capabilities, or operational remit Routine criminal activity ING, NIA Medium GREEN TO AMBER GREEN TO AMBER RED THREAT Organised crime Denial of MSRs Armed attack Within OPF s capabilities. May require CF/ISF General Support Within OPF s capabilities. May require CF/ISF General Support Beyond OPF s contracted legal capabilities, or operational remit NIA? CF High Insurgency AMBER TO RED RED RED Specific and sustained targeting of OPF and oil infrastructure Sustained and heavily armed attack At the margins of OPF capability. Requires CF/ISF. Close support to accomplish mission Beyond OPF s contracted legal capabilities, or operational remit NIA? CF Beyond OPF s contracted legal capabilities, or operational remit CF Figure 3: The OPF s Place in the Security Force Capability Spectrum 7. 6 Very Small Aperture Terminal Although simplistic, this diagram was used by Erinys as a conceptual tool to explain the importance of integrating the OPF into the security capability spectrum. It relates threat to capabilities able to counter it. The greater the threat, the stronger the capability required to deal with it. For example, the only forces capable of sustained offensive operations in a high threat environment (red) were Coalition Forces (CF shown in green in the bottom right-hand quadrant). Conversely, the OPF conducting site and mobile guarding operations in low to medium threat environments is operating within its capabilities (green to amber).

20 effective as an integrated part of the Coalition security apparatus, as illustrated by Figure 3. The operational concept was therefore based on graduated joint (with Coalition Forces, ISF and first responder agencies) response against threats of varying intensity, but with the OPF very much on the front line, acting as the trip wire. Joint planning and operations were facilitated by a small dedicated cadre of US and British Army liaison officers reporting to the Contracting Officer s Technical Representative, acting as a link between Coalition formations and units, and Erinys regional and sector headquarters. A succinct description of the OPF s role is shown in briefing slides at Figure 4. Erinys project management used these on many occasions in the corridors of Baghdad s Republican Palace, where the CPA and subsequent Coalition entities were headquartered. Notwithstanding the intent of the Erinys planners at the time and the OPF s design and conceptual underpinning, the benefit of hindsight allows the identification of four distinct phases of the OPF project: survey, planning and mobilisation; deployment and implementation; consolidation and expansion, and finally transition and handover to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. Each phase presented Erinys with a range of challenges, themselves a manifestation of the baseline challenges outlined in Part One. Figure 4: Erinys OPF Briefing Slides. Source: OPF Briefing to IRMO (Oil) - May

21 PHASE ONE: AUGUST SEPTEMBER 2003 SURVEY, PLANNING AND MOBILISATION OK, so when can you start? 8 Lieutenant General Sanchez, Commanding General CJTF-7 HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING August and September of 2003 was a whirlwind of concurrent activity driven by intense Coalition pressure to deploy guards onto oil infrastructure. The arrival of the Erinys advance party into the sweltering heat of a Baghdad summer on the 8 th August, contract requirement definition at the CPA, the deployment of the regional survey parties, project planning, the establishment and deployment of the Project Management Team and the expansion of the Erinys Head Office all merged into a concentrated burst of activity which touched all parts of Erinys organisation. With the support of a US Army Task Force RIO liaison officer and a succession of highly knowledgeable and enthusiastic MSC based infrastructure security liaison officers, the Erinys advance party wasted no time in validating the Technical Proposal, conceived with access to only the most rudimentary information, by conducting ground reconnaissance The Southern Region Survey Team in the open expanses of the vast Rumaylah oilfields - August 2003 of the major oil and gas nodes. This whistle-stop tour of Iraq s oil infrastructure provided greater clarity on the sheer magnitude of the task facing Erinys and the scale of the 13 8 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commanding General of CJTF-7, speaking pointedly to the Lead Project Director at their first encounter during an infrastructure security meeting in the CPA, early August, 2003.

22 recruitment, training, logistics and communications effort that would be needed to build a countrywide guard force from scratch. It also highlighted some significant difficulties. WHO IS ERINYS? It became quickly apparent that while the leadership in the CPA, CJTF-7 and the Ministry of Oil broadly understood what Erinys had been contracted to provide, news of the contract had yet to be transmitted down respective chains of command. Little direction was given to Coalition formations and state oil and gas operating companies on Erinys remit, limit of exploitation, and the support that the fledgling OPF would require to establish itself. The advance party also confirmed that the fabric of site security infrastructure was in an advanced state of dilapidation if it existed at all. Other than the major refinery complexes and storage depots, few sites had functioning barriers, illumination or habitable guard accommodation....the broad concept articulated in the Technical Proposal stood up to ground reality. For the moment, an assessment was made that the broad concept articulated in the Technical Proposal stood up to ground reality. Furthermore, the advance party s initial survey established regional and sector headquarters locations, as well as areas of responsibility based on groupings of designated oil infrastructure. The Northern Region Headquarters was initially to be co-located with Task Force RIO s office in the Northern Oil Company (NOC) complex at Kirkuk; the Central Region Headquarters was to be established in the Al-Dourah refinery complex on the southern edge of Baghdad, and the Southern Region Headquarters was to be established initially in the British logistics base at Shaiba just outside Basrah, before establishing in Basrah itself. The disposition of the regions and sectors is shown at Figure 7 on page 18. The sole pumping station that supplied water to the Kirkuk oil fields. Were it to be put out of action it would have severely curtailed the Northern Oil Company s ability to operate. Security was non-existent - September

23 SURVEY AND PLANNING The baseline was thus set for the arrival in Baghdad on 19 th August of the survey teams and the balance of the Project Management Team. Following the in-load of four-wheel drive SUVs, armed with a site list and maps provided by Task Force RIO, a validated project concept and design, and an understanding of what had to be achieved, the three regional survey teams deployed by road with a mission to conduct detailed site reconnaissance. With the surveys underway, the Project Management Team in Baghdad got to work on the detailed planning, priming the procurement, logistics, training mechanisms, and the design of the communications infrastructure. During this initial very hectic period, Erinys management was consistently working an average 20-hour day, living in very basic conditions, with temperatures reaching the high 50 degrees centigrade. Life support 9 had yet to catch up with the deployment of Erinys project management. The return of the survey teams at the beginning of September exposed myriad regional challenges. The Southern Regional survey team discovered a lacuna of suitable facilities for establishing regional and sector headquarters, as well as for training the force. The Director General of the Southern Oil Company (SOC) and the Ministry of Interior Oil Police, recently disbanded, proved less than enthusiastic over the prospect of a foreign company taking over the security of critical oil sites. In the The perimeter of the storage and distribution depot at Lathifiyah showing the dilapidated state of the sites physical defences - September 2003 North the survey team faced a lack of cooperation from the NOC illustrating very effectively the gap between Ministry of Oil intent and the preferences of powerful and strongly established senior officials of state oil and gas operating companies 10. However, this was not the case in the Central Region where the hugely experienced and dynamic Director General Dathar of the Al-Dourah refinery complex gave his full backing and support to the OPF project Military vernacular meaning: accommodation, food, water and power. 10 Non-cooperation ranged from polite disinterest to masterful inactivity, to in the case of the Bayji refinery complex outright hostility. Here, the corrupt, disbanded, but still functioning Oil Police did everything it could to prevent Erinys from conducting its surveys and subsequently its contracted tasks Director General Dathar had personally supervised the defence of the Al-Dourah refinery against mobs of looters. He stood up a guard force, erected barriers and for five days single-handedly ensured that production of his refinery was maintained.

24 RIO TO SHIELD - THE OPF BATON IS PASSED As the project plans began to take shape, the first of many changes in the contractual oversight and tasking of the Erinys OPF took place. Task Force RIO was fully focused on its reconstruction programme management mission and saw the need to disaggregate oversight and control of the oil infrastructure security function, for which it was not geared. Task Force Shield emerged as the new organisation to take on this role but its provenance was never entirely understood and seemed to be driven largely by an enterprising US Army Colonel who understood the need to set the oversight of such an important project on a more coherent footing. Task Force Shield was established initially as a component of Task Force RIO. For the first time, Erinys saw the prospect of a single point of contact and reporting chain, and a more coherent liaison and enabling capability that would accelerate the establishment of the force. Task Force Shield would act not only as the contractual and operational socket into which the Erinys OPF was to be plugged, it would enable the linkages to CJTF-7 at all levels. However, the establishment of this organisation was beset by problems from the start. Notwithstanding the briefing slide at Figure 5, Task Force Shield s position in the CJTF-7 or CPA chain of command was never clarified. The implications were far reaching and affected not only the way in which the OPF was developed and directed, but also the perception of its effectiveness in the minds of Coalition and Iraqi leadership. Figure 5: Task Force Shield s Command Relationships. Source: Commander Task Force Shield For the moment, Task Force Shield succeeded in helping to formalise in general terms how the Erinys OPF should be integrated into, and supported by MSCs. The concept of operations shown at Figure 1 was duly enshrined in a Fragmentary Order (or FragO). The Order was authorised for issue on 7 th October, 2003 after long, deliberate and constructive discussions with CJTF-7 staff. 16

25 As September drew to a close, the Project Management Team had woven the outcomes of the surveys into a Deployment Implementation Plan. At the same time, orders for vehicles, uniforms, personal equipment, radio communications equipment and the like had been placed and were being chased. International guard force management expertise began to arrive and got on with the business of familiarisation, further reconnaissance and detailed site security planning. Skeleton regional, some sector headquarters and training team staff were already deploying and establishing their operations. Concurrent activity was the theme of the hour. TIMELINE SEPTEMBER 2003 OCTOBER 2003 NOVEMBER 2003 WEEK 2 WEEK 3 WEEK 4 WEEK 5 WEEK 6 WEEK 7 WEEK 8 WEEK 9 WEEK 10 WEEK 11 WEEK 12 WEEK 13 REGIONAL ROLL-OUT AND OPERATION - NORTH ESTABLISH REGIONAL HQ (KIRKUK) 30 ESTABLISH TRAINING CAMP (KIRKUK) TRAINING TEAM OUTPUT ESTABLISH SECTOR 1 (KIRKUK NOC) INTERIM SECTOR FATAH/IT2 PST AND LPG PLANT ESTABLISH SECTOR 2 (KIRKUK LPG) ESTABLISH SECTOR 3 (BAYJI) ESTABLISH SECTOR 4 (HADITHAH) ESTABLISH SECTOR 5 (MOSUL) LOGISTICS ROLL-OUT AND OPERATION VEHICLE AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT SUPPORT FOOD ACCOMMODATION WEAPONS UNIFORMS 16 PICK-UPS, 6 PATROLS, 3 TCV 1000 AVAILABLE FOR PRIORITY ISSUE BAI HASSAN DAOUD GOSP (3) BAI HASSAN NORTH (3) BAI HASSAN SOUTH GOSP (3) KHABBAZ GOSP MODERN STORAGE IT 1 CRUDE PST / TANKS NEW STABILISATION PLANT MULLAH ABDULLA POWERPLANT IDC WAREHOUSE NORTH JAMBUR GOSP JAMBUR WATER PST SOUTH JAMBUR GOSP FROM 29 SEPTEMBER: 3 TRAINING TEAMS. 3 STAGGERED INTAKES DELIVERING 600 TRAINED MEN EACH WEEK 07 DEPLOY 08 OCTOBER TO KP S T1 CRUDE PST AND TANKS K3 CRUDE PST AND TANKS HADITHAH REFINERY 1000 AVAILABLE AT 2 WEEK INTERVALS ESTABLISHED BY 07 NOVEMBER. SECTOR STRENGTH: LPG PLANT SECURED BY SECTOR 1 UNTIL 19 OCTOBER. SECTOR STRENGTH: TAKES OVER FATAH ON 02 NOVEMBER. FULLY ESTABLISHED BE 19 NOVEMBER. SECTOR STRENGTH: 800 SECTOR STRENGTH: 400 TAKES OVER IT2 PST KP ON 02 NOVEMBER. SECTOR STRENGTH: 800 ITP METERING STATION AIN ZALAH WATER PST IT 2A CRUDE PST SFIA GOSP, WCT, PST AIN ZALAH GOSP,WCT BUTMAH MANIFOLD KASSIK REFINERY IT 2 CRUDE PST AL-QAYYARAH REFINERY KURMALAH MANIFOLD NW\AVANAH GOSP SARBALSHAKH GOSP SARULU GOSP AVANAH CRUDE PST DIBBIS WATER PST X 2 DIBBIS POWERPLANT DIBBIS WTP NGC WATER PST QUTON GOSP HANJERA GOSP AB2 BAJWAN LPG BOTTLING PLANT IDC DRILLING WAREHOUSE NOC INDUSTRIAL AREA - 14 INCLUDED SITES BAI HASSAN DAOUD GOSP (3) BAI HASSAN NORTH (3) BAI HASSAN SOUTH GOSP (3) KHABBAZ GOSP MODERN STORAGE IT 1 CRUDE PST AND TANKS NEW STABILIZATION PLANT MULLAH ABDULLAH POWERPLANT NGC LPG PLANT TAZA DISTRIBUTION STATION IDC WAREHOUSE NORTH JAMBUR GOSP JAMBUR WATER PST SOUTH JAMBUR GOSP SPECIALIST EQUIPMENT ID CARD SYSTEM 29 Figure 6: Implementation Synchronisation Matrix Extract. Source: OPF Deployment and Implementation Plan - September 2003 The conditions were thus set for the next phase; the whole project was now in motion and gathering momentum. All those involved in the enterprise knew that the only way of meeting the CPA, CJTF-7, and the Ministry of Oil s exacting timelines was to establish an immediate guard presence on the designated sites, and then to bind these isolated groups together into a coherent force with organisation, training, equipment, and communications. Erinys summarised the implementation concept as building the force from the inside out. 17

26 SUMMARY At the conclusion of the survey, planning and mobilisation phase the regional and sector boundaries had been agreed in principle. The boundaries did not designate tactical areas of operations in the military sense, but rather they set out the geographic areas in which the OPF had specific site and pipeline guarding responsibilities. NORTH MOSUL (Relocated to Q-West) KIRKUK BAYJI CENTRE BAGHDAD NAJAF SOUTH AMARAH NASIRIYAH RUMAYLAH (NORTH) BASRAH (NORTH) RUMAYLAH (SOUTH) BASRAH (SOUTH) Petroleum Refinery Petroleum Pump Station Crude Oil Pipeline Natural Gas Pipeline Petroleum Refinery under construction LPG / Natural Gas Facility Refined Fuel Pipeline LPG Pipeline Figure 7: Sector and Regional Boundaries. Source: OPF briefing slides 18

27 PHASE TWO: OCTOBER DECEMBER 2003 DEPLOYMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PILLARS AND POSTS The Deployment and Implementation Plan came out of a validated concept, adjusted through survey, and an understanding of the demands of a continually changing environment. It had therefore not only to provide Erinys Iraqi and international project management with guidance and direction, it had at same time to allow management the freedom to adapt its approach according to local conditions....building the force from the inside out The Plan s key pillars included a regional and sector management structure; a recruiting and vetting concept; a training concept, and importantly, a pay and employment policy that adhered to the requirements of CPA ordinances then being promulgated. All of these set out the fundamental building blocks of the force, but their implementation had to rely to a large extent on the ingenuity of Erinys management on the ground. The recruitment of guard personnel ran simultaneously with the establishment of administrative and operational management capability (and in some cases the buildings to house it), the in-load and distribution of equipment, the establishment of both communications and a training regime. Across Iraq, Erinys project management found, recruited and hastily installed guards at designated oil sites. Some of these guards were already in situ. Some were recruited and made up with enthusiasm what they lacked in equipment and training, which would follow. The recruiting and training aspects of deployment and implementation provide useful snapshots of how concepts and plans had to be adapted to meet local exigencies. The Erinys OPF recruiting concept is illustrated at Figure 8, which summarises Erinys approach to meeting requirements for vetting and deploying Iraqi guards recruited from three different sources. 19

28 FORMER IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUPS RECRUIT VET TRAIN DEPLOY SOURCES IDENTIFIED AND STOOD BY SOURCES ON SITE VETTING PROCESS: MEMBERSHIP OF ILLEGAL ORGANISATIONS CRIMINAL RECORD COMMUNITY STANDING FITNESS FOR ROLE CPA APPROVAL ID CARD ISSUED NOTES: VETTING TEAMS: REGIONAL COMMUNITY LOs COMMUNITY COUNCILS COMPRISING: COMMUNITY AND TRIBAL LEADERS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE INTERNAL INSPECTION PROCESS: DOCUMENTATION INSPECTION MEDICAL & FITNESS FOR TRAINING/ROLE FINGERPRINTING PHOTO INTERNAL INSPECTION TEAMS: REGIONAL COMMUNITY LOs REGIONAL AND SECTOR MANAGEMENT AND HEADQUARTER ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT GROUP PERSONNEL AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE IN-PLACE, AD HOC & INHERITED GUARD FORCES RECRUIT VET DEPLOY TRAIN SOURCES ON SITE VETTING PROCESS: AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE INTERNAL INSPECTION PROCESS: ID CARD ISSUED ON SITE, AT SECTOR OR REGIONAL TRAINING CAMPS AS APPROPRIATE AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE NEW CANDIDATES RECRUIT VET TRAIN DEPLOY RECRUITED FROM SECTOR OR SITE VICINITIES VETTING PROCESS: AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE INTERNAL INSPECTION PROCESS: AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE ID CARD ISSUED Whilst sound in theory, the time pressures and absence of acceptably objective criteria or reliable reference data made it impractical to vet inherited guards already on site before Figure 8: Recruiting and Vetting Concept. Source: OPF Deployment and Implementation Plan - September 2003 they signed an Erinys employment contract 12. Instead, Erinys devised a system to vet individuals during training using trusted local Iraqi management who achieved this timeconsuming task through local knowledge, access to often patchy police records, and in consultation with tribal and Iraqi civic leadership. This inevitably resulted in wastage of manpower under training, but the overall benefit of having vetted personnel on the force would be demonstrated in the difficult months to come. 12 Erinys made commitments to the Minister of Oil that the inherited guards would be offered the option of joining the OPF subject to passing the vetting process and training requirements. 20

29 It was a similar situation with the related matter of training. The Erinys training concept is summarised in Figure 9, which illustrates the four major training components that were needed to realise a capable guard force, fully integrated as part of the spectrum of security capabilities outlined earlier. TRAINING SYLLABUS/ACTIVITY OUTPUT INDUCTION & BASIC RECRUIT TRAINING TURNOUT, BEARING, COMPORTMENT 1 ISSUE CLOTHING & KIT INDUCTION DOCUMENTATION AND CONTRACT 7 DAYS AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR TRAINING CAMPS WEAPON HANDLING SHOOTING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A SECURITY OFFICER TRAINED GUARD POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR MANAGEMENT TRAINING CONFLICT RESOLUTION SKILLS 2 SPECIALIST AND SITE SPECIFIC TRAINING TRAINING CAMPS AND ON SITE SITE AND ROLE SPECIFIC TRAINING GUARD FORCE CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO LOCAL/SITE EXIGENCIES 3 CONTINUATION TRAINING REGIONAL AND SECTOR TRAINING CAMPS RE-QUALIFICATION (BASIC TRAINING SYLLABUS) OFFICER AND NCO TRAINING BASIC OPERATIONAL STANDARDS MAINTAINED TRAINED OFFICER AND NCO CADRES THREAT SPECIFIC TRAINING GUARD FORCE ABLE TO RESPOND TO CHANGES IN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT RUDIMENTARY JOINT TRAINING BASIC SOP DEVELOPMENT MORE INTEGRATED APPROACH TO OIL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 4 WITH LOCAL EMERGENCY AND REACTION FORCES AS APPROPRIATE/POSSIBLE WITH CF WITHIN AOR COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND REHEARSAL GREATER TRUST AND CONFIDENCE COHERENT REACTION CAPABILITY MORE EFFECTIVE GUARD FORCE TOTAL TRAINING TIME PER INDIVIDUAL LESS OFFICER/NCO CADRES AND JOINT TRAINING = 180 HRS PER ANNUM. Figure 9: OPF Training Concept. Source: OPF Deployment and Implementation Plan - September 2003 For the moment, the problem of training newly recruited Erinys guards already on site, and before the in-load and distribution of uniforms and equipment, was solved by the deployment of mobile recruiting, training and implementation teams. These were made up of the international and Iraqi management that would ultimately become regional and 21

30 sector management. The teams primary function during the early stages of this phase was to systematically establish site guard forces providing them with basic organisation, simple standard operating procedures (SOPs), rudimentary training, and pay. The issue of training facilities was gradually overcome and Erinys was able to invest in the construction of small arms ranges and refurbishment of classroom and other facilities often with the help of local Coalition Force units. Such cooperation proved especially effective in the Northern and Central Regions where US Army and US Air Force units could not have been more supportive. Centralised training facilities at regional and sector level were gradually removing the need for mobile training teams. Furthermore, a concerted effort to train the trainer meant that Iraqi guard force management on site could make a substantial contribution to continuation and site specific training. It was not until the end of December that Erinys knew it had broken the back of the training challenge. By then, training facilities were mostly fully established and working well and the supply chain was delivering the much needed equipment to the guards. THE BRIDGEHEAD EXPANDS TO MEET AN INCREASING THREAT The implementation process was in full swing by November, but the security situation in Iraq began to turn for the worse. Hitherto, Erinys international management was able to deploy by road to and between sites adopting a low-profile security posture. Such an approach was re-examined after James Wilshire, an Erinys operations manager from the Central Region, and his Iraqi translator Majid Husein Jasim were killed in an ambush south of Baghdad on 11 th November whilst returning to Al-Dourah by road. Erinys immediately reviewed its security modus operandi. Measures were taken to enforce the Company s existing force protection 13 policy Traditional Iraqi mourning banner for James Wilshire erected at the national Headquarters by our guards - November Force protection was the commonly used Coalition term for all aspects of an organisation s own security and defensive measures, both physical and procedural. 22

31 and to introduce stricter coordination of road movement. Escort strength was increased in higher risk areas, measures were taken to further harden national, regional and sector headquarter buildings, and armoured civilian vehicles were introduced to the fleet. The number of international management more than doubled from the contracted 30 to over 70 by end 2003, in no small part due to the additional force protection requirements. The deteriorating security environment and pressure to spread limited OPF resources ever wider had significant consequences on the management of the project. Most immediately, it made regional and sector management s implementation task more difficult because of the need to survey new sites and the requirement to adjust the implementation and training plans accordingly. It also meant that the OPF was becoming increasingly dispersed. November and December saw a marked increase in the number and strengths of attacks specifically targeted on crude and product pipelines in the Blast walls and barriers being delivered to the OPF national Headquarters by local US forces - November 2003 Northern and Central Regions. Already thinly spread, lightly armed Erinys OPF pipeline patrols found themselves frequently overmatched by insurgents operating in strength and armed with rocket propelled grenades. There was growing recognition in Task Force Shield that the OPF project was simply too small in scale and scope to have a major impact on securing oil and gas infrastructure in a deteriorating security environment, which the original contract did not foresee. As attacks on oil infrastructure intensified, Task Force Shield was being inundated with demands from MSCs, contractors and the Ministry of Oil for OPF manpower. Deployment requests were typically passed directly to Erinys which meant that the original list of 140 designated sites grew rapidly, as did the need to cover ever increasing stretches of pipeline. The following vignette gives a flavour of the time. 23

32 Erinys was informed by Task Force Shield that, because of the imminent rotation of MSCs, it was to take over responsibility for the security of Baghdad s government owned petrol stations. These were by then suffering serious interruptions to supply because insurgents were sabotaging product pipelines. As a result Erinys had to absorb the MSC raised and administered guards which took almost 30% of Central Region s allocated contracted manpower earmarked for pipeline patrols. It was difficult for Erinys Iraqi management to understand why the force that they were creating should be used to protect empty petrol stations from angry motorists when it could have played a more direct role protecting the pipelines that supplied them. This episode illustrated the power of immediate operational needs in this case the requirement to release MSCs from civil administration duties. EXPANDING THE FORCE Crucially, by tasking Erinys to take on more and more sites and guards, Task Force Shield committed the project to a force level that had no contractual underpinning; however, like so much in Iraq at that time the contractual aspects would catch up with realities on the ground. By the end of this phase, Erinys had responsibility for 9000 guards and over 200 fixed oil sites, but it was only contracted for 6500 guards. As sustained attacks on strategically significant pipelines in the Northern Region grew, Task Force Shield began to explore the possibility of incorporating an aerial surveillance capability to augment the pipeline patrols. This was a very positive development and an indication that the CPA and CJTF-7 had realised that more guards were not necessarily the only option for securing large, vulnerable linear targets. Funding was quickly earmarked and a contract was duly signed to make this initiative a reality 14. Erinys selected and subcontracted AirScan Inc, a Florida based company with experience of operating in support of pipeline security operations and facilities protection for the US Government. A detailed aerial surveillance concept of operations was agreed during December; Kirkuk Air Force Base was selected as the operating base, and surveillance aircraft were positioned forward ready to fly into the Iraq theatre of operations 15. It took a further four months for Erinys, with the help of Task Force Shield, the CPA and CJTF-7, to work through the difficult federal requirements to allow US civilian aircraft to fly in Iraqi airspace. AirScan C-337 surveillance aircraft parked on the apron of its hardened hangar in Kirkuk Air Force Base. The surveillance pod housing thermal imaging and low light cameras is clearly identifiable under the port wing. The aircraft had the capability to transmit real-time imagery to the Northern Regional operations room in the Kirkuk NOC 14 Introduction of the aerial surveillance capability illustrated the CPA s capacity to take action quickly when the situation demanded it. 15 The support provided by the Kirkuk Air Force Base was illustrative of the outstanding cooperation between the OPF and Coalition Forces at regional and sector levels. 24

33 By Christmas, the Erinys OPF had achieved its initial goals. The force had been deployed and contractual requirements for boots on the ground had been met and in many cases exceeded. Contracted sites were now guarded by uniformed, trained and equipped guards. Pipeline patrols were active and having a positive effect, occasionally at great cost to themselves particularly in the Northern Region where the Erinys OPF suffered a number of casualties. Regional and sector headquarters were building management capacity and beginning to function; the organisation had settled into an implementation and operational routine; the communications architecture was starting to take shape allowing greater coordination of site and sector operations; the basic training system was beginning to meet the ever growing demand for trained guards to service new sites and replace the wastage caused by the vetting process; continuation training slowly raised operational standards on sites hastily established in the previous phase; and basic common operational and administrative procedures were beginning to take hold. Importantly, strong bonds were being forged between international and Iraqi management at all levels and the OPF was beginning to make inroads on terrorist and smuggling activity, as well as corruption on oil sites. Commander Task Force Shield addressing members of the OPF who had recently completed their training and were assuming their duties for the first time - December 2003 Shift Supervisor at the main gate of the Ministry of Oil - December

34 SUMMARY The main components had been put in place in a deteriorating security environment, and the visibility and utility of the OPF was being recognised by both state oil operating companies and Coalition units. Nonetheless, there remained much to do to consolidate and expand what had been created. Figure 10: Increase in Guard Force Numbers - Decrease in Attacks. Source: Commander Task Force Shield - February 2004 Phase Two closed with a major success when, during a December night, an alert OPF guard on the perimeter of the Al-Dourah refinery complex spotted suspicious activity and alerted his supervisor. The joint OPF/Iraqi Police/Coalition Forces follow-up led to the discovery of a cache holding two tons of explosives, which were subsequently recovered along with the four individuals who were trying to access them. It was the most significant of many successes that the OPF were beginning to realise as a consequence of becoming operationally capable throughout Iraq. 26

35 PHASE THREE: JANUARY JULY 2004 CONSOLIDATION AND GROWTH LOOKING FORWARD The Erinys strategy of building the force from the inside out had succeeded in establishing a functioning framework of regional and sector operations throughout Iraq. Within each sector, site and mobile pipeline guarding tasks were being carried out under the watchful eye of international management, at this stage still very much in the vanguard of running the force. Continuation and on-the-job training steadily improved both the capability and confidence of the OPF s Iraqi management and guards. Task Force Shield Liaison Officers were by now embedded in regional headquarters and helping Erinys management to maintain good working relationships with Coalition units. NOC fire crews on an Erinys special-totask training course at Kirkuk Air Force Base - March 2004 After the initial all-consuming dash to get boots on the ground, the Project Management Team was able to re-focus on future milestones. Erinys was already considering the more detailed requirements of the transition process that would see a fully established, capable and coherent guard force being delivered to Iraqi Ministry of Oil management control by the end of the second contract year as the original Statement of Objectives envisaged. Based on the experiences of the previous five months, the Erinys Project Management Team was under no illusion that the period up to the end of the first contract year would be anything other than straightforward. The immediate task facing project management was to consolidate what had been created. Guard forces, operating under the Coalition Force security umbrella, proved themselves very effective in protecting fixed sites, but deterring insurgent attacks on vast stretches of exposed pipeline presented a whole additional range of challenges (both technical and 27

36 operational) that a lightly armed guard force deploying mobile patrols, supported by a small aerial surveillance capability, could not fully meet on its own. Two complementary force development requirements emerged during this phase: the need to extend the OPF s guarding operations, and better integrating the OPF into a security infrastructure security coordination framework in which the concept of graduated joint response would become a reality. CHANGES On the political front, the key development was the announcement of an accelerated transition of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Governing Council which was to become the Interim Iraqi Authority in July The resulting change of atmosphere within the CPA following the announcement was palpable. Hitherto, the focus was very much on taking the lead in dealing with the day-to-day problems and solving them. Almost immediately, the outward orientated drive to put Iraq back on its feet was superseded by a new focus to implement the transition to follow-on Coalition and Iraqi government entities. The deterioration of the security situation showed no signs of abating. Foreign companies, Coalition Forces and ISF were being subjected to increasing numbers of more lethal and systematic attacks, particularly on the main roads, and in the major population centres. The freedom of road movement, on which Erinys OPF management relied to manage its dispersed operations, was becoming more difficult because of the actions of what was now being labelled by the Coalition as anti-iraq forces (AIF). A civilian armoured vehicle having sustained an IED attack on the Ramadi - Baghdad road, February 2004 At the higher levels within the CPA and CJTF-7, and with the handover of power approaching, the Erinys Project Management Team was an occasional invitee to a CJTF-7 working group charged with designing a structure and mechanism that would integrate Coalition, Iraqi and contracted guards into a coherent, nationwide infrastructure security capability. 28

37 More parochially, Erinys management at all levels had to contend with the lack of continuity of key CPA, CJTF-7 personnel. Generally, the impact of such changes was directly proportional to the level at which the changes occurred. The overall effect was that tour lengths of CPA and CJTF-7 personnel rarely matched project time horizons; discussion too often reflected short-term needs, touching only briefly on the longer-term and strategic issues which should have informed the development of the OPF project to a much greater extent. Task Force Shield was the single Coalition point of contact for the Project Management Team to engage. TASK FORCE SHIELD Task Force Shield s Commander was responsible to the CPA s Contracting Officer for ensuring compliance with the stipulations of the contract. In addition to the liaison function already described, Task Force Shield was the single Coalition point of contact for the Project Management Team to engage. Task Force Shield sought in this capacity to represent the achievements of the project to date, and play an active, expert role in efforts to realise the strategic goal of securing oil infrastructure. He had by implication a vital function in bringing together the representatives of the various stakeholder organisations to ensure that OPF resources were used in the most effective, contractually compliant way. Task Force Shield s output during Phase One of the project had been constructive: it provided much needed focus in the CPA, accelerated the implementation process by enabling strong liaison links to be forged with Coalition Forces, helped the Project Management Team to negotiate many bureaucratic obstacles, and helped drive forward the deployment of an aerial surveillance capability. Senior Management visit to the Rumaylah Sector accompanied by the Task Force Shield Liason Officer (South) on secondment from the British Army. He stands adjacent to the OPF Iraqi Regional General Manager - February

38 However, because Task Force Shield straddled both the CPA and CJTF-7, high level ownership and responsibility for the project at the highest levels was at times confused. Notwithstanding this, Commander Task Force Shield s aspirations for standing up his command so that it could credibly fulfil its roles was never fully supported by the military chain of command from which he sought his manpower and staff. As a consequence Task Force Shield was not able to fully realise its intended function as originally conceived. With limited resources at its disposal Commander Task Force Shield s primary focus became the detailed management of the OPF and this exposed a fundamental difference between what Erinys and Commander Task Force Shield saw as Task Force Shield s role. At the heart of this was the perceived belief within Task Force Shield that it commanded the OPF. Erinys, as a commercial entity, could not accept this. As the employer of all Iraqi and international OPF personnel, the Company was accountable for the management of its assets and responsible for its employees and the consequences of their actions. This was not always understood by military personnel unaccustomed to working with a civilian security force. Commander Task Force Shield s extensive, Iraq-wide tours, gave him a first-hand feel for how the force was coming on, but it served to make the Task Force Shield leadership, and therefore Erinys as a contracted entity which depended on it, virtually invisible where it increasingly mattered namely with the Coalition decision makers, and the debates and forums which were attempting to decide the force s shape, role and linkages to other capabilities. Task Force Shield Liason Officer (North) conducting an inspection of the on-coming Kirkuk Sector mobile pipeline patrol shift - May

39 CRANKING THE MOBILISATION HANDLE During the closing weeks of 2003, the CPA made a commitment to increase the DFI funding for infrastructure security projects. The most pressing need was to bring contractual underpinning to the guard force levels to which Erinys had been committed. Task Force Shield had also successfully argued for the OPF to be substantially expanded. Guard numbers were to be increased from a contracted 6,500 (although force levels had already crept above the 11,000 mark by end January) to a maximum of 14,500; the vehicle strength was to be raised from the current 111 to 500, the majority of which were to be deployed on pipeline patrols. Higher force levels came with a commensurate slice of additional communications cover, and ten additional international managers bringing the contracted number to forty 16. Thus in addition to consolidating and operating a nicely maturing guard force, driving forward the in-theatre deployment of the aerial surveillance capability, engaging where possible in discussion on the OPF s future, Erinys found itself with a sizeable mobilisation task that rehearsed many of the features of the project s initial phases. Morning roll call for the on-coming day mobile patrol shift. Rumaylah - March 2004 CONFIDENCE AND EFFECT A MODEL Erinys management capacity was mostly consumed with the huge task of operating and administering a nation-wide force now numbering in excess of 11,000 guards, and growing. Whilst the planners, procurers and logisticians were busy in Erinys National Headquarters gearing up for the expansion of the force, regional and sector management continued with their drive to improve its operational capability. This entailed integrating sites with sector operations, linking sector to regional operations and binding them with common standards, procedures and communications. Training, re-training and quality control remained the principal tasks of operational management, who spent a good deal of their time travelling between sites, coordinating responses to incidents, and conducting surveys in response to new tasking orders. Efforts to implement the information shield concept were ongoing, though this proved much more difficult than originally thought; Erinys was very good at collating local information, but translating that into specific and reliable threat In practice, the number of international management committed to the project was now over 80.

40 data to guide operational planning proved anything but an exact science 17. Sector and regional managers spent much time conducting liaison and building working relationships with representatives of state oil operating companies, director-generals of various refineries and processing plants, the all-important tribal leadership, as well as Coalition Force formation and unit headquarters. Each liaison aspect presented its own challenges and Task Force Shield liaison officers soon became particularly adept at circumventing problems. Meanwhile, officials from Iraqi state oil and gas operating companies were becoming acclimatised to the presence of the OPF and its international management, and this did help ease some hitherto tense relationships. Access control at the Bayji Refinery - March 2004 The Erinys approach to tribal relations was considered by US Army Civil Affairs officers and other US civilian staff based at 1 st Infantry Division Headquarters in Tikrit as the template to apply elsewhere in Iraq. Liaison with tribal leaders deserves a special mention as it was a very important component of regional and sector management work. Tribal affiliations had been suppressed during the Saddam regime, and the power of the tribes was in abeyance. The political vacuum that followed the dismantling of the Ba athist state apparatus was very quickly and ably filled by the major tribal leaders, who in the absence of any other structures re-established themselves as the bulwark of local communities. In areas where the tribal dimension dominated the local landscape, the OPF community relations effort was synonymous with developing and maintaining excellent relationships with often powerful tribal sheikhs. The relationships between tribes and the OPF was often complex and required continual maintenance. The OPF areas of responsibility crossed the boundaries of tribes who were rarely in agreement on any issues affecting the security of oil infrastructure occupying their land. Erinys relied on the tribes consent to recruit its members as guards. In some of the more hard-line areas, Erinys had to obtain tribal assurances that international management would not be harmed. This was the case in the Bayji and Hadithah areas of the Northern Region. Over a period of eight months, Erinys international management, assisted by its 17 Erinys was clear on its remit in this difficult area. Erinys was not contracted to conduct intelligence operations per se and was therefore very careful not to associate itself directly with the Coalition intelligence gathering effort. To do so would have had adverse consequences on international managements ability to sustain the commitment of its Iraqi workforce. 32

41 Iraqi counterpart, patiently developed such good relations with key tribal sheikhs that the safe establishment of forward operating bases in areas considered by Coalition Forces as no-go was made possible. Commander Task Force Shield also understood the importance of the tribal dimension and became very seized by the idea of using tribes to support the security effort on Northern Region pipelines. He secured DFI funding to effectively outsource the hiring of tribal pipeline guard forces to tribal leaders. Tribal guards raised using this scheme were placed under the nominal control of the NOC s long-serving Deputy Director General a Kurd who was later that year assassinated outside his home in Kirkuk. The scheme to outsource pipeline security directly to tribes had some unfortunate side-effects that serve to illustrate how well intentioned initiatives sometimes worked against the goal of securing infrastructure. First, it was tantamount to paying tribes not to attack the pipeline with its obvious potential for blackmail. Second, it undermined Erinys efforts to engage the tribes in order to fulfil its mission. Last, it went against the vision for a single coherent oil security force, trained uniformed, and under a single, unified operational management that Task Force Shield was charged with overseeing. This approach was fundamentally different to that used by Erinys, which, wherever possible, sought to engage tribes as partners by employing their people as trained and uniformed Erinys OPF guards. The Erinys approach to tribal relations was considered by US Army Civil Affairs officers and other US civilian staff based at 1 st Infantry Division Headquarters in Tikrit as the template to apply elsewhere in Iraq. Meanwhile the OPF was increasingly engaged with more and more incidents. Fixed sites came under sporadic indirect fire, and attacks against pipeline patrols were commonplace. Regional and sector headquarters did not escape the onslaught. In the south, Nasiriyah Sector Headquarters suffered damage in a truck bomb attack against the Italian Coalition contingent headquarters. Fortunately, Erinys suffered no casualties. Later in the year, Erinys international sector management had to be hastily smuggled from the town in the Nasiriyah Sector Headquarter offices in the aftermath of the suicide truck bombing on the Italian occupied CPA building - the Headquarters was 50 metres from the blast boots of cars to escape death threats from the Mahdi Army militia. The Headquarters remained operationally effective under the command of a very capable Iraqi sector manager who maintained an uneasy truce with the militia, allowing guard force operations to 33

42 continue. Amarah Sector Headquarters also had on several occasions to be temporarily evacuated. In the Central Region, the Najaf Sector Headquarters was evacuated following an attempt by Shia militias to take it over, and relocated to Baghdad. In the Northern Region, the Regional Headquarters in Kirkuk suffered numerous artillery, rocket, small arms and IED attacks which claimed the lives of several Iraqi OPF guards. It was in many ways miraculous that none of the volatile refining or storage installations suffered a direct hit. Mosul Sector Headquarters, located on the edge of Mosul Dam, was attacked and had to relocate to a Coalition Force installation south of the city. Again, no casualties were sustained, but the incident demonstrated the value of Coalition Force direct support to a lightly armed guard force Commander of Task Force Shield surveying damaged pipelines at AL-Fatah Crossing during times of heightened threat. At the request of the Sector Manager, Coalition Forces provided over-watch on the headquarters. That support was re-deployed elsewhere as the upsurge of AIF activity took hold in the Sunni triangle. The night that the Coalition detachment moved off, a well armed force of insurgents attacked the Headquarters complex using rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire. The highest profile incident of that period was the defeat by OPF guards and Coalition naval forces of a boat-borne suicide bomb attack on Iraq s off-shore oil terminals south of Umm Qasr port on 24 th April. As the threat increased so too did the number of OPF successes a function of higher force levels and improving drills and organisation as the graph at Figure 10 suggests. Pipeline patrols were becoming adept at both interdicting AIF and finding improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed against pipelines - and with the help of Coalition and Iraqi explosive ordnance disposal units - neutralising increasing numbers of them. Fixed oil sites ranging from refineries to storage depots were slowly being re-claimed from the malevolent clutches of organised crime, smugglers and extortionists. Illegal tapping operations, very prevalent in the Southern Region, were being consistently intercepted leading to the arrest of smugglers and the impounding of their vehicles which were handed over to the Iraqi Police. The highest profile incident of that period was the defeat by OPF guards and Coalition naval forces of a boat-borne suicide bomb attack on Iraq s off-shore oil terminals south of Umm Qasr port on 24 th April. OPF guards, only recently deployed onto the terminals 34

43 as part of the ongoing consolidation process, caused the premature detonation of two of the three attacking boats by engaging them with small arms fire. The third boat was intercepted by Coalition naval forces, which suffered casualties in the resulting detonation. Had the off-shore terminals been damaged by the attack, Iraq s ability to export oil, already severely constrained by attacks on the northern export pipelines, would have been brought to its knees and the economic repercussions would have been severe....the Erinys approach to building and managing the force was unequivocally validated by the CPA Senior Advisor for Infrastructure Security who, in a report on infrastructure security to Ambassador Bremer, stated that the Erinys OPF was widely recognised as the model for other infrastructure security programs. The most striking demonstration of the OPF s steadfastness and growing maturity was made in April and May during a period of sustained insurgent violence across Iraq. Unlike some of the recently created Iraqi Army, National Guard and police units who suffered desertion and defections, the OPF remained loyal and continued in the execution of its mission. No oil installations were lost. The OPF s achievements during this period and the Erinys approach to building and managing the force was unequivocally validated by the CPA Senior Advisor for Infrastructure Security who, in a report on infrastructure security to Ambassador Bremer, stated that the Erinys OPF was widely recognised as the model for other infrastructure security programs. This success was widely attributed to embedded Erinys international management and its close working relationship with its Iraqi counterpart. Evening guard at the Rumaylah South Sector Headquarters 35

44 SUMMARY By the end of this phase, the OPF numbered over 14,500 guards and management deployed on over 280 sites and sections of strategically significant pipelines across Iraq. The aerial surveillance capability was operational and supporting the pipeline security effort in the Northern and Central Regions. The equipment and communications roll-out had been completed; the force was fully established. Access control in Mosul Sector Operations Centre at Erinys national Headquarters Perimeter tower at the Al-Dourah refinery complex 36

45 PHASE FOUR: AUGUST - DECEMBER 2004 TRANSITION AND HAND-OVER NEW GOVERNMENT AND EXTENSION The underlying political thrust during this phase and the principal strategic focus of the new Coalition apparatus was that of preparing Iraq for democratic elections scheduled for January Just seven months remained to generate sufficient capacity within the Iraqi civil administration to administer elections, and for Coalition Forces to come to grips with the insurgency bent on doing all it could to derail the electoral process. The arrival of MNF-I preceded that of the CPA s dissolution. Erinys Project Management, with the help of Task Force Shield, was already beginning to find its way around the new military organisation by the time the US Diplomatic Mission, led by the recently appointed Ambassador Negroponte, arrived in Iraq. The structures, procedures and personalities with which Erinys had become familiar during the preceding ten months were all in the process of changing. The CPA s Senior Oil Advisor s office was subsumed into IRMO as its Oil section. The transition of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government headed by Dr Ayad Alawi, changed the dynamics of the relationships between Coalition political and advisory entities on the one hand and Iraqi ministers and their officials on the other. Before the transition, the Coalition had executed its remit con brio. Now that was to change to sotto voce. The political imperative in advance of democratic elections can be summed up in the phrase Iraq for the Iraqis ; the Interim Iraqi authorities had to be seen to take the lead in the rebuilding of their country. The transition also gave Iraqi ministries control of DFI funds, a great proportion of which had been committed to contracts let under the auspices of the CPA. AN OLD SECURITY AGENDA WITH A NEW HOME With the first contract year rapidly coming to an end, a newly arrived and supportive Commander Task Force Shield was firmly focused on the process of negotiating terms for the contract s second option year. However, Coalition institutional understanding of the OPF project had attenuated during the transition period and, whilst MNF-I clearly saw infrastructure security as part of its broad remit, it seemed to have difficulty engaging with either project management or Task Force Shield to determine how the OPF could 37

46 best be integrated into the Coalition s evolving operational concept for securing infrastructure. Headquarters MNF-I s focus on wider security matters and Task Force Shield s unsuccessful attempts to anchor itself within MNF-I meant that the future of the OPF was left for others within the PCO and IRMO to decide. At the same time, the Ministry of Oil, now in control of DFI funds earmarked by the CPA upon exit for the continuance of the project, added its own perspectives to the mix 18. It became clear that the Minister of Oil was intent on taking greater responsibility for securing his oil infrastructure. Finally, the transfer of DFI to Iraqi ministerial control did have immediate ramifications on A recruiting poster for the Iraqi security forces. An OPF guard takes his place next to members of the new Iraqi Army, the Police Service and the Iraqi National Guard 18 Although over US$ 30 million were physically located in the bowels of the Ministry of Oil building, the Minister of Oil had to gain Ministry of Finance approval for its disbursement. 38

47 all contracts using this funding stream, the Erinys OPF project included. PCO took over the responsibility for administering the contractual aspects of the project and was to take an active part in the negotiations that were to come. However, other than through moral suasion, it had no means of getting the Ministry of Oil to commit the funds already allocated for the contract s option year. THE TRANSITION PLANNING AND CONSEQUENCES It took over five difficult weeks from the issue of the Request for Proposal for the OPF contract to be formally extended. Work on the contract renegotiations started in earnest shortly after the transition of power to the Iraqi Interim authorities at the end of June. Commander Task Force Shield, as the Contracting Officer s technical representative, was charged with drafting a Statement of Work outlining what Erinys was required to do beyond the end of the contract s first year. The General Manager of Erinys Iraq Limited at the Ministry of Oil waiting to see the Minister to deliver his regular briefings on the OPF During this process, it became clear that the full second option year of the contract would not be exercised and instead of a deliberate transition to Iraqi control, Erinys would be committed to an accelerated hand-over to be achieved by the end of that year. This was not unexpected. The political implications of a foreshortened process to hand Iraq back to Iraqi control, which had as its centrepiece democratic elections early in the following year, would inevitably reach down to the OPF project; the prospect of having a foreign security company securing the nation s principal natural resource was politically unacceptable in the new climate. The signing of the contract extension had an immediate impact on the project management organisation at all levels. In Erinys national Head Office, the Project Management Team was reconfigured into a transition team and began the process of turning Erinys Technical 39

48 Proposal into a detailed transition plan. Acting on the Minister s requests to lower the profile of the project s international management, Erinys set about reducing their number from over 80 to the contracted level of 40. Sector level international management was withdrawn and consolidated at regional headquarters as Regional Training and Liaison Teams (RTLTs). Expatriate staff that came off the project and wanted to continue working in Iraq were redeployed on to other Erinys projects after well deserved spells of leave. The reduction of the international management footprint in the sectors and regions took away the in-place neutral cover, source of technical expertise and Coalition Force liaison capability on which Erinys Iraqi OPF management still heavily relied. Although the newly formed RTLTs continued to oversee site and sector operations by conducting regular visits and coordinating regional operations, the consequences of the removal of hands-on engagement by international staff quickly manifested themselves. Iraqi OPF management became increasingly and directly exposed to corrupt elements and the volatile tribal and ethnic pressures which were particularly prevalent in the Northern Region. This served gradually to erode the OPF s impartiality and morale, and effectively ended its efforts to tackle corruption on major oil sites. Iraqi OPF management prepared to stand up to the activities of organised crime were occasionally arrested on trumpedup charges framed by elements of the Iraqi Police working in collusion with local crime gangs and corrupt site officials. As a result, Erinys lost a good few of its best Iraqi management, which it had trained and nurtured during the past year. This proved a blow to the project management s aspiration for leaving the force under trained management in good hands - once it had departed from the project. The OPF s ability to work closely alongside Coalition Force units was also affected. RTLTs, supported by Task Force Shield liaison officers, were still able to maintain links with Coalition formation headquarters, and indeed with ISF and Iraqi first-responder agencies. However, local links to Coalition units which often relied on personal relationships between unit leadership and the OPF s international management, were gradually lost. With the departure of international management from the sectors went, for all sorts of inevitable cultural and language reasons, the trust that had been slowly developed between the OPF and Coalition units. This effectively ended, at the sector and site level, the OPF s ability to plan and trigger joint responses to attacks by AIF. The concept of graduated joint response, which relied so heavily on the OPF s ability to integrate itself with other, more capable forces at the tactical level, was in danger of becoming nothing more than a colourful briefing slide 19. The OPF was, as a result of important short-term politically driven transition requirements, 19 One of the most important roles of detailed liaison was to minimise the potential for fratricide ( blue-on-blue engagements) by Coalition units against OPF. Both the Northern and Central Regions had lost OPF guards through Coalition friendly fire incidents. 40

49 being consigned to greater isolation within the security capability spectrum. Its Iraqi management and guards were not only being assailed by AIF targeting oil infrastructure, and occasionally their homes, but by corrupt officials as well as other local tribal and ethnic pressure which it was not equipped to withstand. Erinys international management did all that it could to maintain operational capability, but the task was simply too big for the RTLTs to have anything other than a delaying effect on the force s slowly declining operational effectiveness 20. HAND-OVER AND ENDGAME The transition period was a particularly difficult time for the project s Iraqi and international management. Already working flat out to manage the operation with fewer numbers, RTLTs had also to contend with the detailed and time consuming tasks of preparing for formal OPF management courses to be held on the Al-Dourah refinery complex, preparing a great number of assets for hand-over to Ministry officials, and planning their own extraction from regional bases. Graduation ceremony for an Erinys OPF first responder course, one of many held during the second year of the contract It was also an uncertain time for the Erinys Iraqi guards who were understandably concerned over their future livelihood. Their confidence in the Ministry of Oil s ability to manage the force had already been tested by delays in payroll administration caused by late invoice payments. As the hand-over date closed in, the Ministry was only able to give the most general assurances that all guards would be employed after transition. However, these were not reinforced by employment terms, salary details, or employment contracts. The The effect of international managements lower profile varied from region to region. The development of Central Region s Iraqi management was most advanced for the simple reason that there was a ready supply of highly capable Iraqis to recruit from. Consequently, international management were able to adopt a mentoring and supporting role much earlier than in the other regions.

50 lack of firm commitments affected the morale of the OPF s Iraqi senior management most of all; some resigned their posts to look for employment elsewhere; others resolved to quit after Erinys time had ended. This development concerned project management greatly as it would have a detrimental impact on the force s future. It therefore spent a great deal of time reassuring the OPF workforce that their jobs would be secure, at the same time encouraging the Ministry to set out concrete employment terms. By the last week of December, Erinys RTLTs had withdrawn back to Al-Mansour. The force was now in the hands of Erinys Iraqi management under employment until the end of the year and facing an uncertain future. The OPF, together with the assets that belonged to the Ministry under the terms of the contract, was formally handed over to the Minister of Oil at the end of the year. Erinys direct involvement in protecting Iraq s oil infrastructure ceased at midnight on 31 st December. It was the end of an era. SUMMARY The OPF Asset Register; one of the many trunk loads of databases, records and manuals presented to the Ministry of Oil on hand-over The trials and tribulations of this last phase of the project in many respects rehearsed the challenges that Erinys management overcame in the preceding phases. They were symptomatic of a long-term aspiration to place oil infrastructure security on a sound footing under Ministry of Oil management being tested against the sensitive political exigencies of the time. Erinys project management was content in the knowledge that together with its Iraqi employees, it had achieved what the original contract intended. In the end, the progress of the OPF from establishment to transition and ultimately hand-over, mirrored that of a nation also in transition and moving to take control of its own destiny. 42

51 PART THREE - CONCLUSIONS AND SOME LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE LOOKING BACK Erinys experiences on the oil security project left an indelible impression on its management. It was the first time that the Company performed a task of such avowed strategic importance on such a scale in such demanding conditions. Notwithstanding the parochial, day-today battles that were part and parcel of prosecuting the project in Iraq, Erinys management could not help but be utterly astounded at and humbled by the sheer scale, energy and unflinching commitment of the US led nation-building enterprise in Iraq. Nonetheless, Erinys also observed that the corollary to both the size and diversity 21 was great complexity. This at times caused the strategic goal of securing oil infrastructure to become obscured by factional interests - each with its own interpretation of how the goal set out with great clarity by the Coalition s leadership was to be achieved. Erinys management could not help but be utterly astounded at and humbled by the sheer scale, energy and unflinching commitment of the US led nation-building enterprise in Iraq. Erinys counts itself privileged to have played a small but significant part in the Coalition s nation-building efforts. The observations that follow are primarily focused on the main lessons that Erinys, a commercial enterprise, learned through its experiences on the oil security project. OUTPUT AND PERFORMANCE The project was often blighted by differences in interpretation of what the output should be. A mission to protect is superficially straightforward until the question is asked by the contractor: Against what level of threat? Task Force Shield was responsible for ensuring contractual compliance and had great difficulty in defining or getting consensus on what the OPF s limit of exploitation should be. Erinys senior management, brought up in the British Army traditions of operating in complex environments, and with experience of running guard forces in Africa, South America and elsewhere in the Middle East, believed that it had a more instinctive understanding of a guard force s limitations, but had great difficulty in articulating that to Task Force Shield and others. The view in Coalition and Diversity in this sense relates to both the Coalition s impressive multi-national dimension and the bewildering array of US Government civil and military organisations represented in the Coalition.

52 Ministry of Oil circles tended towards protection as an absolute: failure to prevent an attack was considered a failure of the contractor to fulfil the task that he was being paid to carry out. No consistent consideration was given to other mitigating factors such as the level of threat that a guard force had to face and the limited capabilities and powers it had at its disposal to do so. Erinys and Task Force Shield s attempts to define and enshrine an OPF concept of operations based on a graduated joint response went some way in offsetting the tendency to view protection as an absolute concept. But it was no substitute for setting out more clearly defined contract outputs, not just in terms of numbers of guards and sites to be manned, but also in terms of capability and effect. Winning agreement on outputs from a group of diverse stakeholders, each with their own requirements, was something that Erinys did not achieve. As a result, project management was often consigned to fighting rear-guard actions with Coalition staff, who expected more than a guard force was realistically able to deliver. Linked to the matter of defining output is the issue of measuring performance. Without clearly defined outputs, setting performance parameters becomes a nigh-on impossible task. The project was very adept at churning out useful data on incidents and these gave some idea of performance in terms of IEDs found, smugglers arrested and attacks defeated. Equally, Task Force Shield spend a great deal of time counting the contracted number of assets (essentially inputs) including people, vehicles, weapons, uniforms, radio equipment and the like, to ensure compliance. However, incident data and measurement of inputs only gave a partial indication of a force s performance. How, for example, should the deterrent effect of a guard force be measured? These and other difficult performance related questions were never satisfactorily addressed by Erinys and the Coalition stakeholders. The result was that no common performance criteria were used to evaluate the OPF s contribution to the infrastructure security effort and Erinys performance on the contract more objectively. This created the conditions for some ill informed and not always complimentary speculation on the OPF s effectiveness in discharging its mission. The lesson for future projects of this nature is clear: outputs and performance measures should, if at all possible, be agreed from the outset, and when conditions change, updated as required. LINKAGES AND LEVELS The project was too often bogged down in junior and middle management level battles between different parts of the Coalition apparatus. Task Force Shield was the appointed interface between Coalition interests and that of the contractor. However, it was never 44

53 able to represent the project at the appropriate decision-making level when it mattered, and instead became a victim of the factional battles that did little to help the project progress. The project cried out for strategic ownership and this was never really achieved. It is true that Erinys senior project management was able to engage Coalition decision makers when it had to, but this course of action was used very sparingly. It was reserved for instances when the very continuance of the project was under threat and tended to involve bypassing the established channels which mostly went through Task Force Shield. The resulting top level interventions often saved the day unblocking bureaucratic impasses within Coalition and Iraqi entities. Given the strategic importance of the task in which the Erinys OPF had such a visible role, it follows that project management should have had continual and direct links into the highest decision-making level. Erinys did not have dedicated resource in-country with regular, continual access to the top level of the Coalition s leadership. All too often, the OPF project alighted on the leadership s consciousness in the event of a drama that the Coalition s engine room either failed to solve, or had a hand in creating. It is conceivable therefore that the leadership tended to see the project as a sequence of problems, in a country with a sea of problems, all requiring top level attention. Erinys now understands that it was too focused on the very large demands of delivering the project; it was too pre-occupied with looking downwards when it should have placed equal importance on looking upwards. Had it done so, the many struggles which were symptomatic of the gap between the ends, and the ways and means, could perhaps have been avoided. The strategic focus would have been more easily maintained and the collective goal of securing oil infrastructure would have been more effectively realised. Moreover, the Coalition leadership would have had the benefit of a more balanced and informed view of the OPF and its many achievements. THE CONTRIBUTION OF OUR IRAQI MANAGEMENT Without the commitment, guidance and sacrifices of this impressive, trusted, dedicated, competent, and courageous cadre of Iraqi management, the OPF project would not have succeed in the way that it did. From the beginning of the project, Erinys sought out Iraqi management that was able to act as the interface between international management and Erinys Iraqi guards. The 45

54 Company was very fortunate in discovering a rich seam of management talent in the ranks of retired Iraqi Air Force pilots and middle ranking Iraqi Army officers, all of whom spoke excellent English having undergone training in the UK and US, were respected in the local community, and importantly, understood some of the expat management foibles to which all Erinys international management were occasionally prone. Erinys senior Iraqis were at the forefront of managing relations with the Iraqi authorities, Ministry of Oil officials, director generals of state oil companies and refineries. They represented the Company at the wakes of OPF guards killed, and looked out for the security and well-being of the expats. They arbitrated and settled workforce disputes and provided leadership to their Iraqi colleagues. When it was required, they gave encouragement to international management. They ensured that the considerable Home Nation dimension that touched every aspect of Erinys operations was taken care of, allowing international project management to focus on the direction of the project and the management of its relations with Coalition entities. Without the commitment, guidance and sacrifices of this impressive, trusted, dedicated, competent, and courageous cadre of Iraqi management, the OPF project would not have succeed in the way that it did. CONCLUSION Erinys was the crucible in which the creation of the OPF came together. Above all, the success of the project is testament to an eclectic mix of people who worked as a very effective team in an extraordinary time and place in history, and through sheer bloodyminded determination created something that made a difference for the better. Guards at the Erinys national Headquarters having voted in Iraq s January 2004 general election. All guards on duty that day exercised their democratic right to vote for the first time in their lives 46