HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE 1st CANADIAN PARACHUTE BATTALION

Transcription

1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE 1st CANADIAN PARACHUTE BATTALION PART 3 By Ken Joyce Edited by Roy Akins (G) "INVASION!" June Since 1942, concrete preparations for invasion had been in the works by the British and their Allies. The Special Operations Executive (SOE) in conjunction with the French Resistance (FFI) were tasked to wage a limited underground war against the Germans and to disrupt their movements and communications. The Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ) inserted by parachute Allied paramilitaries dubbed Jedburgh teams to openly fight with resistance forces. In a similar role, men of the British and French Special Air Service were parachuted in with their heavily armed jeeps to operate from resistance strongholds to harass the enemy. Britain's Intelligence services had also inserted agents to gather intelligence and to maintain escape and evasion routes throughout occupied territory. They also worked out several imaginative deception plans and exercises under code names such as FORTITUDE, BODYGUARD and HARLEQUIN. They utilized agents and double-agents as well as true and false radio transmissions to keep the enemy guessing as to where an all-out invasion would occur; the goal being to keep large numbers of German troops deployed everywhere except in the Normandy area. A direct example of this deception work was a plan dubbed FORTITUDE SOUTH. The Combined Chiefs placed US General George C. Patton in charge of a mythical First Army Group based in south-eastern England with an imaginary mission to assault Hitler s Fortress Europe at the Pas-de-Calais. A schedule of bombing and strafing was also maintained prior to and during the invasion. This was done in conjunction with special operations to knock out enemy communications and infrastructure. Extensive bombing also took place at other locations so that the enemy would think that these raids were nothing more than regular bomb runs. It was intended that these bombers provide cover for troop transport aircraft which would drop and land the airborne and special force personnel. Incredibly the Allied bombers were able to completely destroy the extensive network of German radar facilities preventing them from determining exactly what was heading their way either by air or sea. The entire OVERLORD operation involved landing airborne troops to either side of the main amphibious landings. On the extreme western flank of the Allied landing, the US 101 st and 82 nd Airborne Divisions dropped north of the River Douve between Carentan and Montebourg in the Cotentin Peninsula. Directly east of their drop zones around St. Mere Eglise was the landing beach UTAH of the US VII Corps and further east and just north of St. Laurent was the landing beach OMAHA of the US V Corps. The US paratroopers were assigned to capture vital transportation junctures (exits to causeways leading behind UTAH beach), block reinforcements moving against UTAH and capture crossings over the River Merderet in order to seal off the Cherbourg Peninsula. Their main objective was to capture the town of Carentan which was the

2 key to establishing a link-up with the units of the US First Army arriving ashore at UTAH and OMAHA. On the extreme eastern flank of the Allied landings the British 6 th Airborne Division was assigned to drop east of the landings by British Second Army to hold their left flank against enemy counterattack between the River Orne and the flooded areas which surrounded the River Dives north of the town of Troarn. The 1 st Special Service Brigade and elements of the 3 rd Infantry Division were then assigned to drive forward from the beaches to relieve the beleaguered paratroops. At the far western edge of British Second Army s landings at GOLD beach, the British XXX Corps landed its forces just northeast of Bayeux beginning at the seaside town of Arromanches. The British I Corps landed further east at JUNO and SWORD. Units of the Canadian II Corps, the 3 rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2 nd Canadian Armoured Brigade landed at JUNO from Graye-sur-Mer to St. Aubin-sur-Mer. Further east the 3 rd British Infantry Division, the British Special Service Brigade and French Commandos landed at SWORD from Langrune-sue-Mer to Ouistreham ending at the Canal de Caen a la Mer. It was the task of the Canadian II Corps troops to link up with the British pushing inland from GOLD while protecting the right flank of the British moving inland to capture Caen from SWORD. Part of the Canadians task of securing British 3 rd Infantry Divisions right flank was to move on and capture Carpiquet airfield to the northwest of Caen. The British 6 th Airborne Division was given the vital task of capturing key bridges over the Canal de Caen a la Mer and the River Orne. After blowing up bridges and assaulting enemy defences in the area, the airborne troops were to dig in along a high ridge line running parallel to the eastern bank of the River Orne. There they would hold the invasion s left flank against counterattack. After the 6 th AD prepared to drop on the night of 4 June, bad weather resulted in a postponement. Major General Richard N. Gale had distributed this special order of the day for the men of the 6 th AD about to make history, All reports I have had from civil and military sources reflect greatest credit to all ranks for their loyal and rigid security. This is good. My final words to you are to see to it that what you gain by stealth you hold with guts. In the words of a great Captain, Pray to God and keep your powder dry. God bless you, Go to it. The following evening the weather forecast for the landings was deemed acceptable enough to proceed. This was a gamble and it was soon discovered by the airborne troops and amphibious forces that the weather was a significant factor in the outcome of their assignments. On 5 June 1944, Operation NEPTUNE, the assault phase of Operation OVERLORD was finally to go ahead. However despite the extensive preparations and the intense training, General Eisenhower and his staff were fully aware that the operation could fail. Churchill himself argued that plans drawn up in 1942 to invade Norway should continue to be prepared should OVERLORD flop. What worried Eisenhower the most was the success or failure of the airborne landings. With only very grim statistics to work with, their success was vital if the amphibious landings were to succeed. This was no more evident than on the invasion s left flank (from England). With enemy armoured reserves nearby, it was the British 6 th AD along with the 1 st CPB that were directly responsible for blocking any serious attempt by the enemy to immediately drive on and destroy the beachhead.

3 With this foreboding at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the 1 st CPB and the other elements of 6th AD travel under the cover of darkness to their respective airfields. As C Company arrived at Harwell Field, British Albemarle aircraft of the 46 Group RAF were ready to except their Canadian cargo. The remainder of the Battalion headed off to Down Ampney Airfield. There, the paratroopers boarded C-47 aircraft manned by air crews of 38 Group RAF. This group also towed three Airspeed Horsa AS51 gliders which contained three of the Battalions jeeps and trailers with ammunition, signal equipment and supplies. The advance group left at 2230 hours followed by the main group at 2300 hours. Utilizing the proven assault capability of the glider, a British glider assault group consisting of six Airspeed Horsa AS51 gliders piloted by 12 glider pilots transported Major R.J. Howard s small force of men from the 2 nd Bn, O&BLI and the RE to seize intact the bridges over the River Orne (3 Gliders) and the adjacent Canal de Caen a la Mer (3 Gliders). Shortly after midnight they made their coup de main attack and successfully capture the crossings. To help prevent the enemy from making efforts to destroy or recapture the bridges, the 7 th PB also landed just east of the Orne bridge south-southwest of Le Plein to take up positions around Benouville and Ranville. Later at 0100hrs, the remainder of the 5 th Para Bde, the 12 th and 13 th PBs landed, reinforcing those defending the bridges and taking up positions to the south at Le Bas de Ranville and Ranville le Mariquet. On the evening of 6 June, the 6 th Air Ldg Bde arrived at a landing zone just east of the 5 th PB drop zone and took up positions further south and just northwest of the 8 th PB drop zone at Longueval, St. Honorine and Escoville. The airborne troops were to hold onto their objectives at any cost until reinforced by the 1 st Special Service Brigade (1 st SSBde ). Utilizing lessons learned at Sicily and the successful use of radio transmitters to guide troop transports at Salerno, C Company of 1 st CPB under Major Murray MacLeod dropped with a section of the British 22 nd Independent Parachute Company (Pathfinders). This occurred an hour before the rest of the 1 st CPB and Lieutenant-Colonel Terence Otway s 9 th PB in order to mark and secure their dropping zones. While the pathfinders went about their business marking the drop zone, C Company was tasked to clear out the enemy garrison at Varaville, destroy its radio transmission station and neutralize an enemy gun emplacement east of the town. They were then assigned to destroy the bridge over the Divette stream. Once this was accomplished they were to move to the Battalion rendezvous at Les Mesnil. No small task for a single Company of paratroops especially if that Company did not arrive to its objective intact. Once the rest of the 3 rd Brigade had landed, the 9 th PB was assigned to neutralize the coastal battery South of Franceville at Merville. This vital task prevented the Merville battery from firing on the British 3 rd Infantry Division and Commandos scheduled to land on SWORD beach. Under the Command of Major Don Wilkens, A Company 1 st CPB was to assist 9 th PB s attack on the Merville battery by protecting their left flank. It was estimated that the 75mm gun was surrounded by machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, barbed wire, minefields and trench lines manned by about Germans. The attack was intended to involve the landing of three Airspeed Horsa AS51 Gliders with members of the 9 th PB and REs equipped to destroy the gun. However the three gliders landed dispersed. Despite this temporary setback, those that did make it to the rendezvous were joined by others from 9 th PB and successfully neutralized the gun. Once this was completed, both 9 th PB and A Company were assigned to seize the high ground at Le Plein.

4 From there A Company was assigned to leave 9 th PB and capture and consolidate the ground around the Les Mesnil crossroads. Once Lord Lovat s 1 st SSBde linked up with 9 th PB at Le Plein, they were to move to occupy the high ground around the Chateau St. Come on the left flank of the Canadians. After landing, B Company 1 st CPB under Major Clayton Fuller had two hours to destroy the bridge over the River Dives at Robehomme. They were then to defend the ground around this objective until given the order to move to the Battalion concentration area at Les Mesnil where both 3 rd Para Bde and Battalion HQ were positioned. The British 8 th PB was to land due East of Caen between the towns of Cuverville and Toufreville. From there they were to move to destroy the road bridge at Troarn (accomplished 0520hrs) and the road and rail bridges at Bures. Then they were assigned to take up the most difficult positions of the Division on the extreme southern end of the ridge line. Glider-borne reinforcements for the British 7 th PB were also brought in and landed just north of the captured bridge over the Canal de Caen a la Mer at Le Port. The main force of airborne troops began landing around hrs on 6 June. With their radar and communications network a shambles, it took the Germans some time to figure out exactly what was going on. To add to the confusion, the Allies had dropped masses of dummy paratroopers to the east of the River Dives north of Lisieux. In the 3 rd Para Bde Operational Order No. 1 for NEPTUNE-BIGGOT it is stated, Deception. Dummy paratps, delay battle noise simulators, flares and other issue-confusers will be dropped to the SW of Caen and on high ground EAST of R. Dives from P minus 4hrs to P minus 4hrs 25mins. i First word of the actual para-drop reached the German Command shortly after 0130hrs when the 711 th Infantry Division stated that they were engaging enemy paratroops on their left flank (the 9 th PB). Additionally, the 21 st Panzer Division was reporting paratroops touching down in the area of Troarn east of Caen (the 8 th PB). Shortly after, Naval Group West notified Field Marshall von Rundstedt s HQ that para landings were also occurring in the area just south of coastal defences manned by the 716 th Infantry Division (1 st CPB). The LXXXIV Army Corps was then ordered to be on high alert. Although the Germans now knew that something was up, Commanders still debated whether this was an invasion, a mere parachute raid or a ruse to draw their attention away from a future main landing elsewhere, possibly at Pas-de-Calais. Although Hitler himself thought that Normandy was a more likely place for invasion due to the vicinity of the port of Cherbourg, his Commanders did not agree. Then at 0215hrs. Major General Max Pemsel, Chief of Staff, Seventh Army notified Major General Hans Speidel at Army Group B HQ that the 91 st Air Landing Division on the Cotentin Peninsula was also engaging US paratroops, of which many had been captured. Finally a few minutes after this news was received, the Germans learned that an invasion force was approaching the Normandy coast. Even with this news the Germans did not put the Seventh and Fifteenth Army on alert until 0410hrs. Additionally they could not move their forces in a concentrated strike due to the fact that the 1 st SS Panzer Division, 12 th SS Panzer Division, 17 th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the Panzer Lehr Division were in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) reserve. Only Hitler could clear these formations to move on the

5 beachhead. At 0420 General Speidel requested that 21 st Panzer Division move from their positions just northwest of Falaise to attack the Airborne troops east of the Orne. Before permission to attack in force was granted, Speidel had elements of the 21 st Panzer begin to move against the airborne east of the Orne. This was the only readily available formation under Army Group B that could be immediately moved into the area. At 0445hrs Field Marshall von Rundstedt attempted to get Hitler to clear the OKW reserves. In part due to deception tactics, the widely dispersed airborne drop and Allied bombing up and down the coast, it was not until hrs on 6 June that the Germans finally realised where the Allied Schwerpunkt, or main point of attack was taking place. Although the 21 st Panzer Division had been ordered by General Richter to prepare to destroy the airborne bridgehead, the realization that the Allies were now landing strong amphibious forces along the Normandy coast immediately necessitated a division of tasks for the 21 st Panzer Division. Now General Marcks of LXXXIV Corps ordered the 4 th Company of the 22 nd Panzer Regiment at roughly 0800hrs to join Oberstleutnant Freiherr Hans von Luck s 125 th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Battle Group Luck) along with other support units to tackle the airborne troops from the south. The rest of the 21 st Panzer Division attacked west of the canal and attempted to split the forces of the British I Corps. After Hitler had finally released his reserves, the 12 th SS Panzer Division (Hitlerjugend) was initially directed to move against the airborne bridgehead. However in another stroke of luck for the airborne, once the main focus of the Allied attack had become clear, the division was diverted to take up positions around Caen. Field Marshall von Rundstedt wanted to concentrate his armoured forces, which was also to include the Panzer Lehr Division, to make a co-ordinated attack to destroy the Allied forces landing by sea. However before this could be achieved, these formations had to be moved into their planned areas of concentration for the counterattack. This took some time and also inadvertently saved much of the airborne bridgehead. In order to move the 12 th SS the shortest distance from Lisieux to Caen, it was originally planned that they travel directly through the southern positions of 6 th AD. In an unusual decision, the German high command ordered Brigadefuhrer Fritz Witt to move his Hitler Jugend Division southwest and then northwest to Caen. This move undoubtedly saved the airborne troops from disaster. During the initial drop of the 22 nd Independent Parachute Company (Pathfinders) things immediately went wrong when many of their men and equipment were dropped a significant distance from their drop zones. To add to the dilemma, many lost their Eureka Beacons during the drop or they were rendered inoperable. The men of C Company also found themselves in trouble when their Albemarle aircraft, flying in bad weather, encountered flak after crossing the coast into France. The dispersion of the aircraft and high wind meant that some sticks were dropped ten miles from their intended drop zone. The men of C Company had jumped at roughly on 6 June. The main force had left Down Ampney at 2330hrs 5 June. During the flight Brigadier Hill recalled some of his thoughts reflecting on the time spent leading up to that momentous moment, One s task was temporarily done; there was a sense of almost peace. Fourteen months of intense training was now a page out of the past, and one s plans inexorably in motion. I knew they would go wrong; I had told all my chaps to

6 expect that, and to go anyway to the rendezvous. I also realized that we were embarking on a momentous event, and that the number of men in the Brigade who had any previous experience of fighting could have been counted on the fingers of one hand. That gave me no cause for worry. Each Battalion had a personality of its own, moulded by the stock from which it was raised and the characteristics of the leaders within it. With one Canadian and two British battalions, the Brigade combined the vitality, élan and dash of the New World with the discipline, doggedness and staying power of the old. As the planes of the main body arrived over the drop zone at roughly 0100hrs, approximately a half hour after C Company s jump, things already began to go wrong. Again due to the bad weather, flak and the obstruction of landmarks from the smoke of the bombing, the men of HQ and A and B Companies of 1 st CPB were widely dispersed over a 40-mile radius of their drop zone. As for the rest of 6 th AD, Brigadier Hill for one had noted that the green light to jump in his aircraft had flashed as they crossed over the seaside town of Cabourg, I was approaching a vast sheet of water. There was just time to loosen the harness for a water landing, then bang into four feet of it I went. We had been dropped into the valley of the Dives, flooded by the Germans as a defensive measure, and well to the north of our objective. ii To further add to the problems on D-Day, bombers assigned to attack various targets in and around the drop and landing zones also took a bloody toll. Due to the scattering of the paratroops all over the place, disasters occurred when prearranged bombing runs released their loads onto paratroops either struggling to reach their rendezvous points or accidentally onto those actually on their drop zones. In Brigadier Hill s case, he was wounded while forty of his men, including their Royal Navy Forward Observers, were killed. Major MacLeod and his runner, both of C Company 1 st CPB, were at the northern edge of their drop zone when Lancasters, whose bombs were intended for the Merville battery, began to explode all around them. Elsewhere Brit and Canadian alike were hung up in trees, landed in flooded areas or right on top of German positions. Also many men carrying the Battalion s vital support weapons failed to arrive either in person or with their weapons. This included radios, Vickers Machine Guns, PIATs and Mortars. These weapons, along with the future landing of the Brigade s anti-tank weapons, were all that stood between the lightly armed paratroops and German armour lurking in the area. The loss of most of the Battalion s heavy equipment was blamed on the canvas bags the men were issued to carry them being in a broken-down state. The Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment (AFEE) had attempted to devise methods where the soldiers weapons and equipment could be carried on the person during the jump. This prevented being separated from weapons etc. that had previously been dropped in separate parachute containers. While this was a wise move, problems with the tested Leg Kit Bags occurred. These bags and weapons valises were designed so that shortly before the paratrooper hit the ground (roughly 25 feet) they

7 released, utilizing a quick release mechanism, the bag or valise which was attached to the parachute harness. The dropping of this equipment before landing allowed the paratrooper to properly go through his landing drill without being jarred by the bag or valise. The heavy weight of the weapon or bag was also intended to be used as an anchor which when dropped to the ground tethered the paratrooper and lessened the impact. While this equipment was tested under different conditions, several factors during the actual jump caused significant problems. While the paratrooper was to firmly grasp this equipment while exiting the aircraft, many were forced to release the bag due to aircrew flying at speeds in excess of what was considered ideal through high winds and bad weather. This created a greater prop blast for those jumping from C-47 aircraft which resulted in kit bags being inadvertently released and torn, the contents being lost to the night. In addition to their heavy weapons, the 1 st CPB medical officer Captain C.N. Brebner was hung up in a tree near the Chateau at Varaville. Upon releasing himself from his exposed position in the dark, he misjudged the 40' distance to the ground and broke his pelvis and wrist in the fall. After his batman, Private Bill Adams located him, Brebner ordered him to take his medical supplies to their rendezvous. After Adams left, the Doc realized that Adams had not given him anything for the pain that soon engulfed him. After struggling unsuccessfully with his morphine syrette he was not found until the next morning by Captain Nelson s men of the 224 th Parachute Field Ambulance. After finally being injected with the pain killer he was moved on top of a garden frame near to the vicinity of the Chateau de Varaville where the field ambulance was investigating setting up shop. Unfortunately for all, a German patrol captured Brebner and later Nelson who was making a recce of the Chateau. iii Also during the drop, the Battalion Padre, Captain G.A. Harris did not survive the jump when his parachute failed to open. Unlike the rest of those dropping that day with the 1 st CPB, 6 June was the second time into action for the Canadian Film and Photo Unit photographer Sergeant D.A. Reynolds. 1 After previously being deployed to France in 1940, he now jumped with a stick of the 1 st CPB at the extremity of the widely dispersed drop. With the drop taking place at night, he had to wait until the next day to begin shooting pictures. However his immediate concern was not taking pictures but to work his way with the rest of his stick to their rendezvous. After linking up with the rest of the Battalion, Reynolds only had his still camera to take pictures. The remainder of his equipment, including his cine camera, had been brought in by glider and was still with the crashed glider behind enemy lines. After taking some of the only pictures of the Battalion situated around Les Mesnil, on 14 June he was wounded in the right arm by shrapnel and was returned to the UK. iv Despite all the setbacks, those that made it to their rendezvous points were determined to carry out their orders. The high state of training and their resolve enabled the paratroopers to proceed to their objectives and accomplish what they were assigned to do. Others who were having bad luck reaching their objectives also did their part to harass the enemy and cause as much confusion as possible. Although this was not a specific task for members of the Brigade, the 1 Reynolds was to be accompanied by Sergeant E.R. Bonter however Bonter was not able to accompany the Battalion to Normandy due to a medical problem encountered with his vision.

8 experiences of past airborne operations meant that it was guaranteed that many would fight alone or as small bands until they could work their way to their rendezvous point. As recorded earlier, during the initial phase of the drop these men bought the Allies precious time while the Germans tried to figure out exactly what was happening. The early morning of the 6 th also found men of A Company badly scattered however some managed to team up with members of C Company preparing to attack Varaville. After reaching his rendezvous point, Lieutenant J.A. Clancy was only able to gather up a handful of men. He then decided to mount a recce into nearby Gonneville-sur-Merville. After no contact with the enemy was made, he returned to the rendezvous point and gathered up an additional 21 personnel. They then proceeded off to cover the left flank of the 9 th PB now engaging the coastal battery. After this action they formed part of the rearguard of the 9 th PB s move to Le Plein. Once this task was complete, at 1530hrs they began to make their way to the 1 st CPB rendezvous. Clancy noted that on their arrival at the crossroads, most of his dispersed Company had managed to work their way to the Battalion positions. Meanwhile, the men of B Company landed dispersed northeast of the drop zone in flooded and marshy areas in the vicinity of Robehomme. In the northeast, the enemy had already been alerted by the drops of the dummy parachutists and many of the positions of the 711 th Infantry Division were scanning the skies and sending out patrols. Many of the men of B Company came to grief against this alerted enemy. The Battalion s HQ Company did not fare as bad as the other Companies, with their men either landing on or near the drop zone or Battalion rendezvous point. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradbrooke, Major Nicklin, the Battalion s Signal Officer and Intelligence Officer found the rendezvous point without difficulty. Along the way they teamed up with stragglers from both the 8 th and 9 th PBs. Luckily for 1 st CPB, after one of the Gliders had gone off course, the anti-tank detachment of the Ox and Bucks that was on board showed up at the 1 st CPB rendezvous point complete with their 6-pounder anti-tank gun. After the arrival of Bradbrooke, those that had gathered at the Battalion rendezvous moved off to the Les Mesnil crossroads. While en route, they encountered enemy sniper fire but managed to reach the cross roads at 1100hrs. There they immediately set up Bn. HQ. As men began to arrive at the Battalion rendezvous point, those in B Company who did not drown in the flooded areas or were killed by enemy anti-aircraft fire or patrols set off to accomplish their assigned tasks. As with many others falling from the sky that morning, they had also lost a large proportion of their equipment. After touching down on terra firma, Lieutenant Norm Toseland of 5 Platoon met up with more fortunate personnel of his Company and they began to make their way to their objective. They stopped a French girl on a bicycle to ask her where the Robehomme bridge was located. The brave girl led the paratroops to the bridge where Toseland s group met up with more stragglers from 1 st CPB as well as the 8 thpb, 9 th PB and RE. The original plan was to wait for the arrival of the demolition crew that had been assigned to blow the bridge however they did not arrive on time. Toseland then improvised and utilized what explosives they already had with them. However this attempt did not completely destroy the bridge so his group, now reinforced by further stragglers from various units, dug in and prepared to defend the bridge until the demolitions team arrived. Fortunately, the team did arrive and the bridge was blown at roughly 0600hrs. The men of B Company then met up with a German patrol however the enemy was contained on a bit of high ground on the opposite side of the river.

9 B Company then left a small force to defend the bridge and proceeded into the town of Robehomme. The town was situated on high ground which overlooked the surrounding flooded terrain. They utilized the town s church spire to observe the entire area and keep an eye out for the enemy. At Varaville, a scant number of men from C Company under Major H.M. MacLeod attempted to destroy their objectives in and around Varaville. This involved destroying an enemy gun emplacement and bunkers protecting the main road juncture. However it was originally planned that these men have heavy machine guns, 3" mortars and Bangalore torpedoes. Instead, MacLeod s band of men had but a single PIAT and an assortment of small arms. In order to get close enough to the enemy positions, he occupied the gate house of the Chateau at Varaville. This position overlooked a Germans defensive trench line fixed with machine guns and bunkers at either end. Hidden behind the trench line was a 75mm gun. The only weapon available to MacLeod s men that could tackle this formidable defensive position was their PIAT. After the first shot at the enemy 75mm gun had failed, the Germans zeroed in on the PIAT gunner, Corporal Oikle. The resulting explosion killed Oikle, Lieutenant Walker and mortally wounded Major MacLeod. With their Commanding Officer severely wounded and their PIAT destroyed, Lieutenant J.P. Hanson carried on with the task at hand. He now planned to utilize a newly acquired light machine gun and a 2" mortar to take care of the enemy. In an interesting turn of events, at 0830hrs the Germans came forward with a white flag. They had no medical personnel or facilities within their positions. Hanson agreed to allow them to evacuate their wounded to the paratroopers aid station down the road. In spite of the compassion of the Canadian officer, he and the enemy soldiers evacuating their wounded were betrayed as a German machine gun opened up. The enemy wounded being transported in a push cart were killed while the Germans pushing the cart fled. After an exchange of fire, the paratroops heard a loud explosion. This signalled the destruction of the bridge at Varaville. The paratroops then let out a celebratory yell as they knew the destruction of the bridge meant that enemy armour approaching from the east could not advance on the town. After the incident with the evacuation of the enemy wounded, at 1000hrs Corporal Dan Hartigan would make use of the 2" mortar and crawl along a drainage ditch to a position where he could fire the mortar at close range into the enemy defences. In what can only be stated as remarkable marksmanship, he placed the base of the mortar against the side of a tree and fired several high explosive and smoke rounds into the German trench line. After this brilliant action by Hartigan, the remaining 43 German troops surrendered. Shortly after, British Commandos arrived from the beachhead to relieve men of C Company around Varaville. They now made their way to the Battalion positions at Les Mesnil. By the early afternoon of 6 June, the survivors of A, C and HQ Companies had made their way toward the Le Mesnil crossroads. All the Battalion objectives had been met. Upon arrival at Les Mesnil, each company was directed to its area within the Battalion s defensive line. After occupying Robehomme, B Company was ordered to move to Les Mesnil on the evening of 7 June. 2 After the initial objectives on D-Day had been achieved and the bridges were blown, the 2 During their move they destroyed an enemy road block and several enemy vehicles. They did not reach the brickworks at Les Mesnil until 0330hrs on the 8 th.

10 3 rd Para Bde front line was moved back towards a ridge line that ran from Le Plein in the north to the southern edge of the Bois de (forest of) Bures in the south. The 9 th PB positioned themselves from Le Plein in the south to 1 st CPB positions centred at the Les Mesnil crossroads while 8 th PB would establish themselves further south towards Troarn. As 3 rd Para Bde dug in, Battle Group Luck was preparing to strike. However as the Germans moved into position, the 6 th Air Ldg Bde began to land and bring in badly needed heavy weapons, notably anti-tank guns. Although some of the Gliders were shot down by Battle Group Luck s 20mm flak guns, the Airborne bridgehead was now supplied with the weapons it required to have a chance at holding on. Up until the 7 th, the enemy had not made any significant attempt to destroy the airborne bridgehead. This mistake not only resulted in the supplying of the airborne with heavy weapons but it also allowed time for further reinforcements, in the form of the 51 st Highland Division, to be brought forward from the beachhead to the airborne positions. The expansion of the airborne bridgehead was now intended to outflank Caen by providing the British with an attack directly south from the positions of the British 3 rd Infantry Division west of the Orne as well as an approach from the airborne positions located east of the Orne. Now a more prepared and organized Battle Group Luck made another attempt to stop this expansion. After little in the form of mortars or anti-tank artillery had come from the airborne bridgehead, a rather cocky enemy turned its armour with limited Infantry support to smash the airborne perimeter. The airborne however had a surprise for the attacking Germans. The reinforced airborne, now with their heavy weapons, ultimately took a high toll on the enemy infantry and tanks. On 8 June elements of the 857 th and 858 th Grenadier Regiment of the 346 th Infantry Division, Battle Group Luck (originally brought in from around Le Havre) counterattacked 1 st CPB positions with the assistance of self-propelled guns. However, unbeknownst to the Germans, shortly before this engagement the 1 st CPB was re-supplied with 3" mortars and PIATs. The mortars and PIATs were put to good use to repel the enemy infantry and armour. After suffering heavy casualties the Germans withdrew as B company charged with the bayonet. The withdrawing enemy would hold up in a fortified farmhouse 200 yards down the road. At 0900hrs the next morning, B Company attacked the farmhouse and seized it. While they were consolidating the immediate area, they also sent out a flanking force east along the road to Bavent. It was soon learned that the enemy was concentrating armour and infantry nearby. With their ranks thinned during the assault, it was determined best to withdraw. The Germans then counterattacked to take the farmhouse. However the paratroops withdrawing from the farmhouse, along with their withdrawing flanking force, caught the attacking enemy in a precarious situation as the flanking force opened fire. After killing 50 of the enemy, their overwhelming strength, supported by tanks and artillery, precipitated the paratroops move back to their line along the height of the ridge. 3 After a failed attempt to break through the left flank of the Battalion s defences at Les Mesnil the enemy was content with utilizing their mortars and snipers. The Battalion then sent out patrols to eradicate the sniper threat from the trees and hedgerows. Although the airborne troops had successfully repelled the enemy Battle Group, the 3 This defensive line not only used the height of the ridge but also the cover of tree lines to the southeast of the crossroad in the forest of Bavent (Bois De Bavent) and the forest north of Troarn (Bois De Bures).

11 Germans continued to feel out the airborne line and utilize their mortars and artillery on an ever increasing scale to try and demoralize the airborne defenders. Further west of the Orne, the enemy now concentrated on splitting the invasion forces in the British and Canadian sectors. It now became even more imperative that the airborne and its 1 st CPB hold their ground. With the bulk of the enemy s armour now converging onto the eastern flank of the beachhead, the paratroops had a long and exhausting fight ahead of them to keep the enemy from exploiting the beachhead s far left flank. While always being on their guard against further enemy counterattacks, the Battalion now sent out patrols to gather intelligence, ambush enemy patrols, flush out snipers and simply to harry the enemy. On 9 June two successful patrols were mounted to the town of Bavent. This was meant to keep the enemy on their toes and to gather information on their positions. That night a group from C Company and 14 Engineers pushed through the town and rigged demolition charges and booby traps in houses utilized by the enemy. In an attempt to get back at the enemy mortars that constantly bombed their positions, the paratroops raided an enemy mortar position with attached Engineers who set charges on the enemy weapons. These operations were a boost to the moral and confidence of the men and helped to keep up a steady tempo of offensive operations. However, with the far eastern flank of the bridgehead becoming more and more important to the enemy, they finally mustered up enough forces to make a concerted effort to break through the airborne line. On the 10 th, elements of the 346 th Infantry Division supported by armour from Battle Group Luck attacked through Breville in the direction of Ranville. They succeeded in driving a wedge between the positions of 3 rd Para Bde and the 1 st SSBde further north. Additionally, a short distance to the south, elements of the same enemy units attacked with armour support into the 6 th Air Ldg Bde s landing zone just northwest of the 1 st CPB positions at the crossroads. This effort by the enemy was quelled by artillery from the British and Canadian sectors west of the Orne. Under constant Allied artillery fire, the enemy made two more desperate attempts to break through airborne line but failed. Although they did not succeed, the enemy continued to hold open a significant gap in the airborne line. It was then decided by General Gale to close the gap left by the enemy at Breville. He placed the 5 th Battalion, Black Watch (5 th BW) of the British 51 st Division under 3 rd Para Bde for the operation. On 11 June they attacked through 9 th PB positions and encountered stiff enemy resistance. Brigadier Hill then ordered his force to take up defensive positions around the 9 th PB. There they were the recipients of devastating German artillery fire. This deadly fire erupted again at noon the following day. At 0300hrs the enemy attacked the 9 th PB and Black Watch positions with tanks and SP guns while a Battalion of Infantry with SP guns attacked the northern portion of 1 st CPB s line. The whole northern portion of the airborne line now quickly came into jeopardy. Lieutenant- Colonel Otway s Battalion and the Black Watch were now being subject to close range tank fire and infantry attacks. Otway communicated to Brigadier Hill that if help did not arrive soon, the line could be split. Hill then contacted Bradbrooke whose own defences were being attacked. Although stretched well thin, Bradbrooke scraped up whatever men he could and sent them along to assist Otway s beleaguered forces. The Germans had managed to work their way forward and occupied the Chateau St. Come. However with the arrival of elements of C

12 Company and HQ Company of the 1 st CPB a cheer went up from the positions of the Black Watch. Although only 40 Canadians had arrived, this gave the Highlanders the boost they needed to hold their present positions. After a counterattack was made under the leadership of Brigadier Hill it did not dislodge the enemy who continued to prod forward. To stop the enemy once and for all, Hill called for the heavy guns off shore in the Channel to deal with this persistent enemy force. The ensuing barrage was effective and permitted Major Hanson and his Canadians to recapture the Chateau. While the situation was stabilizing further south, General Gale was now concerned about the gap made in his line at Breville. He ordered his reserves, the 12 th PB and a Company of the 12 th DR to recapture Breville. Although a vicious battle was fought with significant casualties to both sides, Breville was recaptured and the line restored. The Canadians that were still operating with the 9 th PB and 5 th BW completed their mission by clearing the enemy from around the Chateau. After smoking out snipers in the area, the men of C Company and HQ Company returned to the 1 st CPB positions. A final attempt by the enemy was made to break through the Battalion s line on 16 June. After an artillery and mortar barrage, Battle Group Luck, using infantry and tanks, attacked the positions of A Company. Although the 1 st CPB held their line utilizing PIAT to engage the enemy tanks, they suffered high casualties before the enemy attack was beaten off. After almost eleven days of straight action, the 3 rd Para Bde was relieved by the 5 th Para Bde on the 17 th. They moved to Ranville for a few days before moving to a rest area along the coast near the mouth of the Orne. There the men enjoyed a long overdue rest. They were permitted to tour the landing beaches where the enormity of the operation and their vital role was made ever more clear to them. (H) The Breakout from Falaise and the Pursuit to the R. Seine While many thought they would be quickly returned to the UK, on 25 June they were assigned to continue in their infantry role holding the eastern flank of the Allied advance. They now occupied positions of the 13 th PB around the Les Mesnil crossroads and continued patrolling until Montgomery s plans had come full circle. Initially Monty wanted to attack Caen from both sides of the Orne however he later opted to make it in a single thrust from the western side. It was planned that Caen be the hinge to close the door on what now constituted elements of both German Army Groups B and G in France as well as additional forces brought in from the east. This ominous part of the plan was succeeding beyond expectations as high grade German Divisions were being fed into the battle around Caen. Although General Dempsey s Second Army suffered the brunt of the German juggernaut, it gave the Americans precious time to take Cherbourg and prepare Patton s secretive Third Army for an ultimate breakout to encircle the enemy. However the sheer strength of the enemy facing British Second Army meant that their part in the closing of the Allied front line southeast of Caen would be a cataclysmic battle of attrition. While Dempsey pressed down from Caen to Falaise, Patton pressed north from the vicinity of Alencon to Argentan to meet up with British, Polish and Canadians to effectively close the encirclement. While the Americans did not face a significant enemy until they closed within range of the fighting south of Caen, the enemy knew what was being attempted and applied significant pressure on both the US and British pincers so that their encircled forces could escape.

13 East of the Orne the enemy now established the LXXXVI Corps. Beginning on 25 June this Corps was made up of General Reichert s 771 st Infantry Division, General Diestel s 346 th Infantry Division, the 16 th Luftwaffe Field Division and Battle Group Luck. This Corps was assigned to operate between the Seine and the Orne. While the airborne front line saw very little of the type of fighting taking place around Caen, they still had this formidable enemy Corps to deal with. This meant that their job to hold the eastern flank was none the less important. Any threat from the east could serious hamper Monty s plans. Relentless in their task and facing a far superior equipped enemy, the 1 st CPB continued to mount patrols and harass the enemy along their front line. After another exhausting experience in the front line, on 4 July they were relived and proceeded to the 6 th AD rest area. There they heard of the capture of Caen on the 9 th and the capture of St. Lo by Patton s Third Army on the 18 th.

14 After being captured shortly after the drop on 6 June, the Battalion s MO Captain Brebner was liberated after the fall of Caen. The Battalion learned of his own liberation during their rest period. It was also during this time that the Battalion received its first large number of reinforcements, coming from regular infantry battalions such as the SD&G Highlanders and Canadian Scottish. 4 On 21 July the Battalion moved once again back into the front line along the Les Mesnil-Troarn road fronting the western edge of the Bois de Bavent. After operating under continuous mortar and shell fire in miserable wet weather they were again relived from the line on the 27 th. 5 Yet again, at the beginning of August they returned to the line and continue in the same old routine of withstanding enemy barrages and mounting patrols. However by the 16 th, little enemy activity was registered in the Bois de Bavent. They also received word that Montgomery s encirclement of the enemy was about to take place after Falaise had just fallen. They were now told to be ready on the 17 th for a concentrated Allied breakout. The British 6 th AD s role in this breakout was to advance their line to positions in a south-easterly direction from Cabourg to Bures in Operation PADDLE. The 8 th and 9 th PBs were assigned to seize Bures while 1 st CPB moved through and eradicated any enemy in the Bois de Bavent. With the enemy having withdrawn from the wood, the 1 st CPB along with the rest of 3 rd Para Bde crossed the River Dives and advanced three miles to Plain Lugan. On 18 August Operation PADDLE II was conducted by the Battalion in order to seize the bridges over the St. Samson-Dives-Sur-Mer- Canal. The Battalion captured four railway bridges relatively intact and in the process also reduced two fortified enemy positions taking 150 prisoners. The action to capture the bridges saw the awarding of the Military Medal to Sergeant G.W. Green and the Military Cross to Captain J.A. Clancy. This achievement by the 1 st CPB cleared the way for an advance to the town of Dozulé. With the successes also came the losses. Several members of the Battalion were killed or wounded from August. One of those listed as killed was Private J.L. Benoit. 6 By 20 August General Montgomery s plan to trap the Germans between the advance of the US in the south and British, Canadian and Polish forces in the north was now realized. The enemy now sought to withdraw rapidly across the natural barrier of the River Seine. The Americans and French then liberated Paris as the British, Canadian and Polish forces raced to cross the Seine to continue the pursuit of the enemy and begin the Liberation of the Channel Ports starting with Le Havre. This meant that the main advance of the 21 st AGp was in an easterly and north-easterly direction. The area now being covered by the British 6 th AD soon intersected with advancing 4 A small number of Battalion reinforcements were sent from the UK by sea shortly after the initial landings while others were withheld in the UK and sent later. A small number from 1CPTC were also transferred to the Battalion as seaborne reinforcements. 5 On 23 July the Battalion came under the Command of Canadian First Army. 6 Interestingly, Pte. Jacques L. Benoit did not arrive in the UK with the 1 st CPB and was sent over earlier where he was placed on strength of the 5 th Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Unit. It is not known exactly how he was introduced to the British Secret Intelligence Service however being a French Canadian he was attached to the War Office for possible service with SIS or SOE on 22 February It is reported by CMHQ that although he wore an officer s uniform. under the War Office he was not commissioned. During his preliminary assessment, Benoit got involved in some kind of unspecified financial difficulty which resulted in his loan to the War Office being terminated. Benoit was then put back into the reinforcement pool where he enlisted in the 1 st CPB. He qualified as a parachutist on 4 February 1944 at Ringway.

15 forces moving directly northeast to Le Havre. After the assault on the bridges, Dozulé was secured by the 5 th Para Bde and Special Service Commandos. The 1 st CPB then took the lead in the advance on Annebault. While the 8 th PB was given the task of clearing the town on the 21 st, the 1 st CPB pressed on to attack La Vallée Tantot. However after enduring heavy shelling and mortaring, the men of the 1 st CPB noted that the enemy was now withdrawing faster than the Brigade could advance. After the Battalion moved to La Haie Tondue, the Brigade was given a two day rest. The 5 th Para Bde then continued on to Pont L Eveque. During the two day rest period the Battalion learned that Bradbrooke had been reassigned and was returning to the UK. 7 Major G.F. Eadie was then placed in temporary Command of the unit. By the 25 th the Battalion had travelled as far east as Beuzeville before it encountered any serious enemy opposition. This was dealt with by the 8 th and 9 th PBs. Then came the move to Mon Mauger where it was discovered that the enemy had fled. The Battalion then consolidated the ground around the town and on 2 September received reinforcements from the Battalion s Training Company in England. This consisted of five officers, including the Battalion s new Padre, Capt. Doug Candy and 85 ORs. The Battalion settled in at Mon Mauger for the next week until word was received that they were being sent back to England. They arrived back at Carter Barracks in Bulford on 7 September and then proceeded on a two week leave. During the fighting from 6 June thru to September the 1 st CPB had sustained very heavy losses. Of the 618 who participated in the Normandy Campaign, only 251 returned to Bulford. 8 One of those wounded was the Battalion s 2i/c Major J.A. Nicklin. He sustained wounds after stepping on an anti-personnel mine. After recovering in England he replaced Bradbrooke as the Battalion s Commanding Officer and was promoted on 8 September1944 to Lieutenant-Colonel. Major G.F. Eadie was now Nicklin s 2i/c. (I) The Ardennes and the push to the R. Maas During the men's well deserved rest, they heard of Montgomery s attempt to outflank the Siegfried line. As the Allies now continued to drive on into Belgium, their supply line became stretched to its limit. The bulk of the supplies needed to keep pushing eastward towards Germany were still being off loaded in Normandy. While the Canadian and Polish forces had successfully pushed the enemy out of the Channel ports in France and Belgium and the British had taken the Port of Antwerp, there was still the matter of clearing the Scheldt. Until this could be achieved, the Port of Antwerp could not be utilized. The resulting lack of resources available meant that 7 After the death of Major Proctor, Bradbrooke had basically raised the 1 st CPB from scratch. His performance as its Commanding Officer from October 1942 was exemplary. Originally, due to the back seat the Battalion took in relation to the 1 st SSF, he had to fight hard to get NDHQ to move on several issues regarding the recruitment, training, equipping and the general well-being of his paratroopers. He was already burned out before dropping into Normandy. Initially he performed well on the battlefield however the stress involved soon required that he be removed from command. Regardless his important role as one of Canada s fathers of the Airborne should not be diminished. 8 The Battalion s losses during the Normandy Campaign totalled, Officers: 5 killed, 16 wounded and 3 captured. Other ranks: 66 killed 184 wounded, 10 missing and 83 captured. The unit s total losses added up to 24 Officers and 343 ORs. LAC, RG24, Vol.6919, Report No. 17, Historical Section CMHQ, The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion in the Low Countries and in Germany, Final Operations, 2 January - 18 February and 24 March -5 May 1945.