NATO UNCLASSIFIED THE COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CJOS/COE) STUDY (2009) FOR MARITIME UNMANNED SYSTEMS (MUS) IN NATO

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1 THE COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CJOS/COE) STUDY (2009) FOR MARITIME UNMANNED SYSTEMS (MUS) IN NATO 8 December 2009

2 TABLE of CONTENTS Executive Summary...3 Introduction...5 Aim...6 Definition of Maritime Unmanned Systems Overview of the Changing Geostrategic Environment...7 NATO s Three Current Core Missions...8 Capability Shortfalls in the Current Maritime Operating Environment...11 Future Additional Maritime Missions and Associated Capability Requirements...13 Current MUS Capabilities...16 Capabilities of Currently Fielded & Developed MUS Way Ahead for MUS Development in Support of Emerging Missions...30 Maritime Capability Shortfalls-Options for MUS to fill current and predicted capability gaps...31 Impact of Ongoing Studies/Research on Future MUS Capabilities...33 Improving Coordination through Better Interoperability and Integration Way Ahead-Achieving MUS Goals and Vision...43 Conclusions...44 Annex A: References...45 Annex B: Acronyms and Definitions...46 Annex C: Lessons from Real-World MUS employments

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY There is currently an evolution in technology creating entirely new capabilities that allow unmanned systems to conduct missions saving lives, avoiding human risk, and potentially reducing operating costs. Industry, academia, and the private sector are using the rapid advancement in technology to shape the future of national unmanned systems procurement processes. Industry in many areas is significantly ahead of military requirements definition. NATO Allies urgently need to redress this by jumping ahead and rapidly defining, as a minimum, the collective requirements for unmanned systems which will underpin Alliance enabling capabilities between now and NATO does not currently have a road map that allows for the establishment of these requirements, nor for defining more clearly the acquisition priorities which would allow Allies to fully harness the evolution in unmanned systems. As these capabilities continue to evolve and as unmanned systems more decisively shape the battlefield for operational commanders, it becomes an imperative for NATO to develop a proper road map to transform organizations and processes to fully, economically, and effectively harness the potential offered by such unmanned systems. This imperative is not driven solely by technological opportunities or the conventional requirements definition process: rather, it is increasingly affected by the political challenges which NATO Allies are likely to face over the next 10 years at least. After recent difficult experiences in Afghanistan, Allies democratic populations may be increasingly unwilling to support future deployments of their soldiers, sailors, and airmen on security tasks which may not be seen as existential and where casualties will continue to occur. There will be an increasing popular demand for lower risk options which will bring the focus even more sharply onto unmanned systems, particularly where they are capable of achieving comparable effects. NATO s Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Towards 2030 points to broad insights that include the evolving nature and blurring of the threat to the Alliance and a need to respond to this threat outside NATO s traditional areas of engagement. Advanced technology will enable adversaries to threaten Alliance vulnerabilities in new ways. This reality highlights the need to review policy, organization, operational concepts, and capabilities to shape the future force and command structure of NATO. Much of the non-traditional areas of engagement will include the maritime environment such as the enduring need to conduct sustained Maritime Security Operations inside the Euro-Atlantic area, as well as expeditionary MSO including Critical Infrastructure Protection at Strategic Distance, and the special challenges that sustained operations within the Arctic region will pose during the next 20 years. The use of maritime unmanned systems will undoubtedly attract increased emphasis and will create a further requirement for improved coordination, more efficient command and control, and streamlined training arrangements. To date, most of the important developments in unmanned systems have been within the realm of unmanned air systems supporting operations over the ground. With the ever-growing threats and challenges being presented to the Alliance within the maritime environment and as highlighted by the current draft NATO MSO Concept, the Alliance will need a capability that will allow for rapid response to time sensitive MSO challenges in all maritime regions of interest to Allies. It will also increasingly need long dwell time Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) support to Joint Expeditionary Operations where Alliance forces require assured access to countries of strategic concern. MUS capabilities may enhance MSA and MSO efforts with improved endurance, speed of 3

4 command, reduction of risks to human life, mitigation of the numerical reduction in manned platforms, and underpin a reduction in deployment and operating costs. This paper concludes that NATO should give the highest priority to collective acquisition of two critical enabling Maritime Unmanned Systems capabilities: mine countermeasures and long endurance, high capacity ship-launched ISR vehicles. The mine countermeasures capability is critically important in assuring Joint Force access under denial conditions. The ISR platforms will be a key enabler for improved MSA in support of the enduring MSO mission inside the Euro-Atlantic area, as well as providing critical support to MSO at strategic distance, allowing early indicators and warnings of developing instability and a preventive posture to be adopted. They will also play a key role in enabling the Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations during intervention and stabilisation operations. Such platforms might also usefully act as relay platforms for a range of beyond Line of Sight Communication systems in the maritime environment which are currently one of NATO s most critical capability shortfalls. The paper also concludes that the greatest cost-effectiveness will probably be achieved by agreeing to a set of common platforms and command and control systems for such vehicles, while leaving individual Allies to procure onboard sensors and other payloads according to national requirements. To date, surface and subsurface MUS capabilities have received less research and development emphasis than MUS air capabilities. There is also less data available from which to conduct comparisons of operational effectiveness between manned and unmanned platforms. However, such surface and subsurface capabilities should compliment existing and emerging MUS air systems to ensure that NATO can effectively counter the wide range of emerging threats in the maritime environment. During the next 10 years, NATO Allies will need to continue to transform and find solutions for operational shortfalls under unprecedented funding constraints. It will be vital that they focus their military acquisition organizations and defence research agencies on delivering the most cost-effective balance of investment into manned and unmanned platforms and systems, which must nevertheless meet the current and expected needs of operational commanders. The development and acquisition of MUS and related technology must be made a mainstream element in the near future force generation process where they offer the potential to overcome existing and projected critical capability shortfalls. The importance of procuring common platforms and their core command and control systems wherever possible cannot be overstated: it will yield enormous collective benefits in reduced training burdens, reducing supply chain diversity and improving availability, as well as offering a cost-effective procurement path by exploiting the benefits of scale. NATO should improve the effectiveness of MUS through integration and Joint collaboration, fostering the development of policies, standards, and procedures that enable safe and timely operations and the effective integration of manned and unmanned systems. 4

5 INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND 1. Most current military operations will be planned and executed in extremely challenging environments, potentially against enemies who operate unconventionally, who use the surrounding populations for cover and who employ conventional, irregular, terrorist and even criminal tactics to achieve their objectives. As discussed in References P and Q, wars of survival for NATO Allies are less likely over the next 10 years than frequent low-intensity operations to stabilise volatile regions and counter non-state adversaries. While lower intensity operations are important to safeguard Allies interests and maintain security in the increasingly globalised world, they are nonetheless seen by many as discretionary because they do not involve an overt and immediate existential threat. This perception makes it difficult to generate support for remote operations, especially when combined with the growing national/political aversion to casualties and constant pressure to contain costs. Thus, a compelling case is made for the more regular use of unmanned systems in support of military operations. 2. Unmanned Systems are currently being used in support of NATO and coalition operations in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and Mediterranean and are offering newer and more comprehensive capabilities to collect information and enhance Alliance security while reducing risk to human life. Allied Command Transformation (ACT), in accordance with its charter, is undertaking work to coordinate the integration of contributing Nations current and future Unmanned Systems capabilities into the battlespace, with the aim of achieving greater interoperability. Improved interoperability, as primarily related to system control, communication, and data/link, will offer significant improvements in force effectiveness. 3. Unlike the developments in Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV), which have been widely debated and highlighted in the general media, there is generally very limited information available regarding other Unmanned Vehicles designed to meet surface and subsurface requirements at sea. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) recently recognized a capability gap in NATO Joint Air Power doctrine and reviewed options to improve the guidance available to NATO on the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Systems (UAV/S). This led to delivery of the JAPCC authored Flight Plan for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in NATO 1, which provided a comprehensive view of how these capabilities could be further integrated between the Member-Nations, as well as their current development of a UAV Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Similar studies were then envisioned in both the maritime and the ground domains, in the hope of achieving a comprehensive roadmap for Unmanned Systems throughout NATO. At the request of ACT, the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) has initiated and led this study into the contribution that Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) might make to meet future maritime capability requirements. Contributors to this study have included the NURC, JAPCC, and a wide range of national subject matter experts. 1 JAPCC Flight Plan for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in NATO dated 10 March

6 AIM 4. This study will provide an overview of the core principles which, if taken into account by NATO and the individual Allies, would allow the most cost-effective development of Maritime Unmanned Systems capabilities in support of the Alliance s current strategic missions and potential future missions. 5. The objectives in support of this aim are to: SCOPE a. Provide an overview of the emerging geo-strategic environment in which NATO will have to operate during the next 20 years; b. Identify NATO s current missions, the maritime support required for those missions and capability shortfalls in the maritime environment which need to be addressed; c. Identify potential future additional maritime missions and the capabilities required to support them; d. Articulate an up-to-date comprehensive description of MUS capabilities, including assessment of the technologies available and the missions that such capabilities might support; e. Highlight those areas in which the requirement for greater use of MUS looks most compelling; f. Advocate improved focus on this capability area and consideration of additional coordination steps leading to increased standardisation and improved interoperability. 6. This Study will address unmanned systems designed for use in the maritime environment, focused primarily on those used on the sea surface and under the surface. Unmanned ground systems used occasionally by maritime forces will be covered by a further planned Unmanned Ground Systems study. The MUS Study will specifically not focus on Maritime Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and their associated technology, as most are addressed in the JAPCC Flight Plan. However, they will be included where relevant to the wider capability roadmap proposals. The analysis of future missions for NATO maritime forces is based in part on the work already conducted by CJOS COE to produce the NATO MSO Concept paper and its ongoing extensive contribution to the new Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS). DEFINITION OF MARITIME UNMANNED SYSTEMS 7. An unmanned system operating in the maritime environment (air, surface, subsurface) whose primary component is at least one unmanned vehicle. Unmanned vehicle is a powered vehicle that does not carry a human operator, can be operated autonomously or remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise 6

7 missiles, artillery projectiles, torpedoes, remotely operated vehicles (ROV s), mines, satellites, and unattended sensors (with no form of propulsion) are not considered unmanned vehicles. OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGING GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 8. The evolving international situation of the 21 st century is shaped by the complex interdependence between states and organisations, the increasing importance of global commerce and a greater awareness of threats from non-state actors. The risk of an existential war against the NATO Alliance is currently assessed to be low 2, but with the prospect of steadily heightened tensions emerging during the next 20 years, created by increasing competition for vital natural resources. This new strategic context has driven a substantial re-evaluation of the roles of NATO s military forces in supporting the Alliance s strategic objectives and 3 core missions over the next two decades. 9. Collective defence remains the cornerstone of NATO and its military forces must remain ready and capable of contributing to deterrence and intervention operations in this rapidly changing threat environment. Ensuring the collective security of Allies interests beyond territorial defence, while providing NATO s political and military leaders with effective options for managing risks, is driving the development of new strategies which will include expanded roles, transformed approaches and a range of new capabilities. 10. The new Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) is currently likely to highlight the need for NATO to focus more on preventing conflict by early forward engagement, including capacity building, and on a potential new role for NATO forces in supporting the maintenance of maritime security which is critical to the peaceful operation of the global economy and to Alliance stability, security and wellbeing. The AMS will also highlight the importance of forward presence without a large ground footprint and identify the continuing need for assured access from the sea for Joint forces, a requirement which has become increasingly challenging to achieve as fewer nations are prepared to offer Allies Access, Basing and Overflight (ABO) rights in their territory. These two major factors will undoubtedly shape new approaches to some maritime missions and provide the foundation for the new Maritime Security Operations (MSO) mission proposed in the draft MSO Concept paper Allies will also be challenged increasingly frequently in the future by sophisticated adversaries who will employ anti-networking strategies to restrict western decision-superiority in the battle-space. Meanwhile, the unprecedented economic pressures caused by the current financial crisis will make it harder to resource the wider range of commitments which NATO needs to undertake. This is already being seen in the significant reduction in the numbers of maritime platforms being procured by Allies. This will be exacerbated by the need to remain committed in Afghanistan, at least in the short term, and by the likelihood that Allies will face some form of persistent conflict for the foreseeable future, either from foreign fighters trying to kill western troops or from sophisticated adversaries employing hybrid tactics to achieve asymmetric advantage over conventionally superior forces. 12. The effects of these changes will be significant in several areas. Firstly, there will be an increased demand for persistent ISR inside the Euro-Atlantic area in support of better Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) which will create a requirement for a range of persistent collection 2 MC 161-NATO Strategic Intelligence Estimate (NSIE) 3 Alliance Maritime Security Operations (MSO) Concept paper 4 September

8 sensors and rapid analysis capabilities, followed by over the horizon dissemination to ships, aircraft and submarines operating in the local area. Secondly, as the focus shifts towards proactive projection of influence from the sea to prevent crises developing, and in support of MSO at strategic distance, there will be an increasing demand for persistent ISR deployed from organic assets within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) when ABO has been denied. Thirdly, the requirement to maintain forward presence and to support dispersed forces in diverse and sometimes contested geographic locations within a large region, with a very limited number of manned platforms available, will focus acquisition effort onto less costly but equally effective unmanned options. It will also highlight the emerging requirement for effective maritime Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) to provide force protection against increasingly agile hybrid enemies with access to ever more sophisticated coastal defence and ballistic missiles. Fourthly, the rapid shrinkage of the Arctic ice cap will open up the Arctic Ocean to merchant traffic, initially only during the late summer months, but eventually all year round. This will create a further demand for new capabilities for maritime operations in marginal and pack ice conditions, should the predicted competition for access to the resources known to lie under the ocean become a potential source of conflict. 13. Before identifying the new capabilities which may be required to support such evolving missions, it is necessary to identify the current missions undertaken, the capabilities required to support those missions and then to focus onto the known capability shortfalls. NATO s THREE CURRENT CORE MISSIONS 14. According to the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (APP-6), Mission is a clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy which translates the Strategic Concept into detailed instructions necessary for military planning and activities, describes the three basic NATO missions as: a. Article 5 Collective Defence, b. Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, and c. Consultation and Cooperation NATO S MARITIME OPERATIONS, TASKS AND MISSIONS 15. The mission of the NATO Response Force (NRF) has recently been rationalised 4 as follows: To provide a rapid demonstration of force and the early establishment of a NATO military presence in support of an Article 5 or Crisis Response Operation. 16. Article 5 Collective Defence creates a requirement for a very wide range of maritime capabilities ranging from the submarine-borne strategic nuclear deterrent, as the ultimate guarantor of nuclear power stand-off, through to the more conventional Maritime Operations highlighted in Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01 (B) and divided into the following capability-based sections: 4 SACEUR SH/DFCG/IRW/ dated 2 Jul 09 Implementation of a Revised NATO response Force (NRF). 8

9 a. Anti-Air Warfare; b. Anti-Surface Warfare; c. Anti-Submarine Warfare; d. Submarine Warfare; e. Mine Warfare; f. Amphibious Warfare; g. Info Ops; h. Strike Warfare; i. Naval Control of Shipping; j. Maritime Interdiction Operations; k. Sustaining Operations Afloat and Ashore. Such Maritime Operations include any actions performed by forces above and under the sea to gain, or exploit, command of the sea, establish sea control or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea. While they are primarily focused on delivering assured access to Joint forces from the sea wherever required, they are also are conducted during lower intensity peacetime operations such as presence, surveillance, and humanitarian operations. 17. Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO) publication AJP-3.4 lists Non-Article 5 Crisis Response operations and tasks as: a. Peace Support Operations; b. Support of Humanitarian Operations; c. Support of Disaster Relief; d. Search and Rescue; e. Support to Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations; f. Extraction Operations; g. Military Aid/Support to Civil Authorities; h. Enforcement of Sanctions and Embargoes. 9

10 These Operations create similar demands to the Article 5 requirement, although the focus is generally on the lower intensity actions. CRO require significantly more interaction with civilian agencies and non-military authorities ashore and will rarely involve operating in a fully contested environment. 18. The requirement to defend against potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks from the sea, possibly using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has led to the inclusion of a further CRO mission group. The NATO Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism chooses to use the term military options to describe the four types of operations against terrorism within this group: a. Anti-Terrorism; b. Consequence Management; c. Counter-Terrorism; d. Military Co-operation. 19. As is evident from this listing of NATO missions, fulfillment of all of the above NATO maritime operations will require capabilities across the warfare spectrum to assure access and control in the maritime environment. All will be underpinned by MSA and effective C4I common enabling capabilities, some of which may be most effectively provided through use of maritime unmanned systems. 20. Thus it can be seen that there is not a single NATO publication which specifically provides a NATO Maritime Missions List. However, the NATO Task List (BI-SC Directive 80-90) may serve the same purpose. Designed as a menu of capabilities, including mission-derived tasks, the NTL provides common terms of reference for exercises, operations and determination of required capabilities. 21. The NTL explains the relations between task, mission and operation as follows: An operation is a military action that supports a mission and consists of tasks, which are generated from Mission Analysis. The mission establishes the requirement to perform tasks and provides the context for each task performance including conditions under which a task must be performed. 22. The NTL also supports the operational planning process by providing a common language and reference system for identification of tasks in the mission statement, concept of operations and subordinate tasking. The NTL is a key element of requirements-based mission-to-task Joint and Combined training system. In this respect, the NTL can be used to determine which maritime missions and tasks may be supported by MUS. This paper uses knowledge of the strategic objectives of the Alliance, the 3 core missions and 4 th putative mission in support of maritime security and the maritime missions derived from the NTL as the basis for its assessment of the areas in which unmanned systems may offer the greatest benefits. 10

11 CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS IN THE CURRENT MARITIME OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 23. NATO s current ability to support the 3 core missions highlighted above is routinely assessed and the list of capability shortfalls which this assessment identifies is published in the Bi-SC Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCR) Study The LTCR provides the Nations with guidance from a military perspective on high priority future capability shortfalls for which research and technology effort would be required to develop solutions. The term capability shortfall can refer to either a lack of quality or quantity. Appropriate solutions for the Alliance will be developed through collaborative efforts involving the Research Technology Organization, Armaments Groups, other NATO entities and the Nations. The current LTCR looks forward beyond the medium-term Defence Planning horizon and covers capability requirements out to Potential solutions are identified from several requirements-generating activities including the Defence Requirements Review (DRR) 07, ongoing operations/lessons learned and through analysis of the future security environment. 25. There are 38 capability shortfalls listed in this study. There are 6 capability shortfall areas in which the LTCR identifies the potential for resolution using Unmanned Systems (alongside other systems and technologies). These are examined below. BEYOND LINE OF SIGHT (BLOS) COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY 26. Effective ISR and C2 at all levels rely on continuous, flexible communications. The conduct of expeditionary operations assumes deployment of forces at considerable distances from higher level command and control. Currently, user capacity and bandwidth demands for reliable and secure communications have increased use of radio frequencies propagating on line of sight. Future deployed operations may well require NATO forces to communicate over much longer distances and difficult terrain, thus exposing the limitations of such line-of-sight communications. Highly flexible BLOS communications are essential for future NATO combat forces and systems to operate effectively at extended range and in disaggregated postures. Secure, robust, reliable and affordable means of augmenting available capacity are therefore essential to enable the Alliance to meet future security challenges. Long endurance UAV and USV technology (fixed wing and surface platforms, airships), capable of enhanced beyond line-of-sight communications, offer one of the possible solutions that can fill the BLOS communications capability gap. For instance, maritime platforms can provide high frequency (HF) and satellite communications (SATCOM) bridges into the battlespace for air and ground landing forces. COUNTER NAVAL MINES CAPABILITY 27. Sea mines provide an inexpensive means of achieving sea denial and, in combination with shore-based surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, gaining sea control. Mines and any damaged ships caused by their detonation are an effective tool for disrupting maritime access, blocking harbours and waterways, and preventing the movement of commercial and military traffic. Modern sea mines are increasingly hard to detect and are able to discriminate between targets and sweeps, which 5 Bi Strategic Command Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCR) Study dated 23 October

12 reduces the efficiency of current mine countermeasures. Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) are capable of countering static underwater threats, to include the detection and disposal of all types of naval mines in virtually any water environment. Such vehicles are one of the possible solutions that can fill the Counter Naval Mines capability gap. INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) COLLECTION CAPABILITY 28. Despite significant recent advances in technology, the timely collection of imagery, data, information and intelligence needed by operational commanders remains a challenge. Moreover, NATO s ability to integrate information flows, uses and sources is further complicated by the requirement for future operations to employ a comprehensive approach. Alliance ISR must support the creation of various tactical and recognized pictures and ultimately the Common Operational Picture needed by end-users. Failure to meet such challenges will critically undermine the Alliance s ability to assure Information and Decision Superiority. The provision of high quality ISR is a critical common enabling function in support of all the Maritime Operations listed above. 29. Unmanned Air, Surface, and Underwater Vehicles capable of collecting the imagery data, information and intelligence on opponents/neutrals and the environment in a timely manner,will be part of the solution of fulfilling the overall information requirement for deployed forces. Unmanned vehicles provide substantial improvements over manned ISR platforms with longer endurance and the ability to operate more covertly. SUPPORT TO INSERTION, EXTRACTION AND RESUPPLY OF SPECIAL FORCES 30. Forces deployed into theatre are susceptible to detection from multiple means. Forces which are located remote to the main force, but are reliant upon re-supply from the main force, need to be resupplied at regular intervals. When required, sufficient supplies must be covertly, reliably and accurately delivered to forces which are located away from the main force and not self sufficient. Use of unmanned systems (air drop by UAV/delivery by unmanned underwater systems) for resupply can be used to reduce the risk of compromising Special Forces covert operations. 31. Although the following areas have not been identified as potential capability gaps to be filled by MUS in the LTCR Study, MUS would provide very beneficial and logical enabling capabilities for these operational requirements: COUNTER CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) 32. Most CBRN detection is done through close range sample collection; a method that is potentially harmful to human collectors. SACT, in concert with several national research institutions, has successfully demonstrated that current technology will support the stand-off detection of containerized and at least partially shielded radiological and nuclear material. These emerging capabilities might be integrated with unmanned air or surface platforms. While such stand-off detection for containerized biological and chemical agents is not yet technologically feasible, unmanned systems may yet provide the capability to detect, classify and quantify the full spectrum of 12

13 CBRN agents at appropriate stand-off distances. Advanced detection of CBRN agents enables planning for an appropriate response (counter-strike or humanitarian). PRECISION ENGAGEMENT 33. In the future battle space, the threat systems will be increasingly mobile, difficult to detect, and lethal. Failure to rapidly detect, identify, assess, track and accurately engage time critical targets, including systems with WMD warheads, will heighten the risk to NATO s military forces. Adversaries may attack unarmed civilians as readily as military forces. Moreover, the possible involvement of WMD creates a particularly difficult challenge for effective targeting and precise engagement. Here, unmanned systems are particularly important as they allow ISR with reduced risk and eliminate the likelihood of the friendly attacker being contaminated during the engagement. FUTURE ADDITIONAL MARITIME MISSIONS AND ASSOCIATED CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 34. The capability shortfalls highlighted in the LTCR are largely focused on the current perception of force requirements. The additional missions highlighted in para 12 above create a requirement for at least the following expanded or new capabilities: a. Persistent wide-area ISR collection capabilities inside the Euro-Atlantic area against non-military targets; b. Persistent automatic analysis and anomaly detection capabilities networked with the ISR collection sensors to provide enduring alert to potential threatening activity at sea inside the Euro-Atlantic area; c. Rapid dissemination of MSA information to Quick Response Forces and agencies tasked to interdict threatening or illicit activities at sea inside the Euro-Atlantic area; d. Persistent wide-area ISR collection capabilities which can be deployed from aircraft carriers or from Allied territory to support contingency MSO at strategic distance; e. Persistent automatic analysis and anomaly detection capabilities networked with the deployable ISR collection sensors to provide rapid alerts of potentially threatening activity at sea within the Joint Operations Area / Area of Intelligence Interest; f. Craft capable of operating within the Marginal Ice Zone and under deep pack ice; g. Craft equipped with navigation systems, sensors and weapons systems which will remain effective at the high latitudes experienced in the High North. 35. The potential for MUS to provide solutions to some of these additional capability requirements is reviewed below, both within the US perspective, reflected in the US DoD Unmanned Systems Roadmap, and within the context of the emerging technologies which should enable solutions to be developed. 13

14 US PERSPECTIVE ON UNMANNED SYSTEMS CAPABILITY ROADMAP 36. The U.S. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmaps FY ; DOD Unmanned Systems Roadmap (Reference A), provide useful information regarding which maritime tasks can be supported by MUS today and in the future. These roadmaps highlight the most urgent mission requirements and those mission areas that are currently being supported by various unmanned systems. The U.S. DOD Unmanned Systems roadmaps overarching aim is to guide military departments and defence agencies toward logical and systemic migration of thought and resources for this new class of military tools. They point out that MUS are performing many dull, dirty and dangerous jobs on the battlefield and around the world. Reviews of existing and draft capability documents reveal a wide range of requirements and capabilities being filled or developed. Parameters to consider for MUS capability requirements include the following: a. Typical warfighting specifications (endurance, payload capability, detection avoidance, operational radius/area coverage and operating parameters such as depth, altitude and speed); b. Material requirements (size, weight, reliability, and availability); c. Interoperability and open architecture, and d. Requirements specific to MUS (level of autonomy, obstacle avoidance and fail-safe systems). USER PRIORITIES ACROSS COMBATANT COMMANDERS AND MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 37. As discussed in Reference A, each US Combatant Commander and Military Department provides inputs based on operational lessons learned in an effort to more effectively counter current and projected adversaries capabilities. These lessons learned often include hard-earned insights based on casualties or loss of expensive and critical military material. They directly impact the determination of US DOD unmanned mission needs. The priority lists below represent the US Combatant Commanders and Military Departments needs for MUS and demonstrate the growing role of unmanned systems in meeting critical operational capabilities: a. ISR; b. Inspection/Identification; c. MCM; d. Payload Delivery; e. CBRNE Reconnaissance; f. Covert Sensor Insertion - an operation that is planned and executed to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by the sensor. A covert operation differs from a 14

15 clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of sponsor identity rather than on concealment of the operation. g. Littoral Surface Warfare; h. Special Operations Forces re-supply; i. Strike and Time Critical Strike missions; j. CN3 (Communication/Navigation Network Node); k. Open Ocean ASW; l. Information Operations; m. Digital Mapping; n. Oceanography; o. Decoy/Pathfinder (1) Decoy - An imitation in any shape of a person or an object or phenomenon that is intended to deceive enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation. (2) Pathfinder - A radar device used for navigating or homing to an objective when visibility precludes accurate visual navigation. p. Bottom Topography. US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE (DOD) PRIORITIES 38. Per Reference A, the priorities summarized below represent a relevant list of priorities for how MUS can fill gaps or improve capability. The US approach does not intend that the priorities are focused on the top four mission areas, thus downgrading the importance of lower priority items to manned or existing systems. Some of these missions can be supported by the current state-of-the-art unmanned technology where the capabilities of current or near term assets are sufficient and the risk to war fighters is relatively low. Other mission areas, however, are in urgent need of additional capability. Current MUS capabilities must evolve into future acquisition and operational vision. In fact, there are likely missions and MUS solutions that will emerge in the coming years that do not exist today. The following priorities represent a contributing nation s most pressing needs from direct operational lessons learned which can be used as an extremely accurate and relevant case study for potential Alliance requirements. 39. Reconnaissance and Surveillance: this remains the number one priority for MUS. While the demand for full-motion video (FMV) remains high, there is an increasing demand for wide-area search 15

16 and multi-int capability. Processing, exploitation, and dissemination remain some key areas highlighting the need for interoperability. 40. Target Identification and Designation: the ability to positively identify and precisely locate military targets in real-time is a current shortfall. Reducing latency and increasing precision for GPSguided weapons is required. 41. Counter Mine Warfare: counter mine warfare may be the mission area most suitable for MUS. A significant amount of effort is already being expended to improve the capability to find, tag and destroy sea mines. MUS are a natural fit for this challenging mission. 42. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) Reconnaissance: the ultimate dirty mission, CBRNE reconnaissance may be the single most important element of NATO s collective defense mission. The consequences of a successful nuclear, chemical or biological attack on the territory of NATO countries, or against deployed forces would potentially be extremely serious. The ability to find and clean chemical and biological agents and to survey the extent of affected areas is a crucial effort. CURRENT MUS CAPABILITIES MUS CONCEPTS & REQUIREMENTS 43. There is no current overarching holistic concept or doctrine for MUS capabilities in NATO. As discussed and developed in References B through E, some contributing nations place great emphasis and devote significant resources to the study and development of unmanned technologies. The current progress and lessons learned of these Nations form the foundation of future Alliance work, and have been used to develop the assessment below. CAPABILITY DETERMINANTS FOR THE USE OF MUS IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT 44. Unmanned vehicles will become critical components of future naval forces. An overriding advantage of unmanned systems is their effective and low cost alternative to risking human life. Additional key determinants for using MUS in the maritime environment include: a. Improvement of Warfighting Capabilities: (1) improved performance, agility, sustainability and reliability; (2) elimination of limiting human factors including scope for human error; (3) improved flexibility; (4) accommodate a variety of payloads; (5) able to operate effectively even when satellite navigation aids are unavailable (denial of service); 16

17 (6) ability to operate in contaminated environments; (7) ability to operate in provocative role/drawing fire and potential Kamikaze employment. b. Capability of operating 24/7 in support of: (1) persistent surveillance; (2) continuous deterrence. c. Accelerating the Speed of Command : (1) aversion to risk and human casualties; (2) absence of potential hostages; (3) deniability of operations; (4) option to operate covertly (or near covertly); (5) ability to deploy sensors remotely (including under-ice). d. Reducing Risks to Human Life: (1) keep personnel out of harms way. e. Mitigating the Decline in Ship Numbers: (1) multiple vehicles can be controlled by one operator. f. Mitigating Future Manpower Shortfalls: (1) reduced crew fatigue. g. More cost-effective / Economic Reasoning: (1) lowering manpower and training costs; (2) lowering costs of overall logistic infrastructure; (3) removing the need for significant life support and protective features; (4) reducing physical requirements for operators; (5) allowing automation of mundane/repetitive operations. 17

18 CAPABILITIES OF CURRENTLY FIELDED & DEVELOPED MUS MARITIME UAV 45. Specific UAV platform capability is discussed in detail in the JAPCC FLIGHT PLAN, (See Reference F). UAV platforms currently provide critical ISR, C2, and precision engagement in the maritime environment. UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES (USV) USV PRIORITY MISSIONS 46. The priority missions for USV currently include: a. Mine Countermeasures (MCM): USVs, along with Underwater Unmanned Vehicles (UUVs), will have an important role in the conduct of MCM as they are particularly well suited for the dirty - dull dangerous tasks that MCM entails. They provide persistence, which permits significant mine hunting and sweeping coverage at lower cost by multiplying the effectiveness of supporting or dedicated platforms. Additionally, they provide the potential for supporting an MCM capability on platforms not traditionally assigned a mine warfare mission. b. The introduction of USV-based MCM systems will provide a Joint Force Commander (JFC) with the capability to conduct persistent organic mine countermeasure operations ranging from intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) to first response MCM, enabling Joint operations to be conducted ahead of power projection forces, at safe standoff ranges. These MCM operations will open transit lanes for Joint Forcible Entry Operations, clear operating areas for naval forces, and enable protection for amphibious forces, again while keeping manned forces out of harm's way. c. In addition to providing safe-standoff, the force multiplication attendant on the use of USVs in MCM can also reduce the timelines associated with providing safe passage through potentially mined waters. Through the application of USV-based MCM systems (e. g., the US Littoral Combat Ship MCM mission package), the timeline for access to the contested littoral will be reduced and a broader range of options will be available to the JFC. The concept is to gather as much information as possible, as early as possible, in order to minimize the magnitude of follow-on MCM operations required. Knowledge of the environment in the intended operational areas along with intelligence on the adversary s capabilities focuses efforts on plausible threats and likely threat areas--in the ideal case, mined areas can be avoided entirely. Even minor successes with interdiction or avoidance of the threat before engagement will yield orders of magnitude savings in the operational timeline. d. The development of a completely independent, fully autonomous, long-term USV MCM capability with large area search, autonomous target identification (ID), and fully autonomous neutralization is not considered to be feasible in the immediate future. Even short of this ideal capability, however, there are several MCM capabilities that USVs can provide as significant complements to existing MCM forces, which will only become more useful as the enabling technologies mature. The ultimate goal may be a fully autonomous USV MCM capability to 18

19 enable the Naval Force to achieve in-stride or near in-stride access to any of the world s littorals, regardless of the mine threat. e. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): USVs offer significant force multiplication for ASW operations in that they can perform the ASW mission at some level of autonomy. This provides a layer of ASW defence-in-depth for the manned surface group, while freeing the manned combatants for other duties, as well as reducing risk to the manned platforms that would otherwise have been conducting the ASW mission themselves. f. In all cases, USVs can serve as off board sensors or sources, extending the range of detection and effect without increasing risk. The manned host platform can serve as the mother ship for a fleet of vehicles, providing the decision-making capabilities while remaining out of harm s way. g. By establishing stand-off submarine surveillance barriers without escalating the level of conflict or placing manned vehicles at risk, USVs can greatly enhance the ability of a Task Force Commander (CTF) to achieve and maintain access, independent of the state of hostilities. h. In addition to using third-party sensors and cueing assets, or using platform sonars as sources for multi-static prosecution, the USV may also be tasked to plant its own supporting sensor field (e. g., sonobuoys). i. As in Maritime Shield situations, USVs may use third-party sensors and cueing assets in addition to their own organic sensors. j. Depending on the stage of conflict and the implementation of appropriate concept of operations (CONOPs) and Rules of Engagement (ROE), variations of USV employment include: (1) employment of non-lethal weaponry; (2) employment of lethal weaponry; (3) accumulation of intelligence information on threat submarines; (4) provision of diversionary manoeuvres and behaviours. At a minimum, the USV ASW forces can provide a deterrent or distracting effect against threat submarine aggressors. The development of a completely independent, fully autonomous, long-term USV tracking capability with wide- area ASW search capability is not considered to be feasible in the immediate future. k. Maritime Security Operations (MSO): while NATO does not yet have formal policies and doctrine in place for MSO, there will be significant scope for MUS to support the military contribution to the maintenance of maritime security. This will start with providing persistent ISR and surveillance capacity in support of the protection of ports, harbours and important 19

20 waterways, where the continuous and monotonous nature of the patrolling task is not wellsuited for manned platforms. USVs offer an attractive solution in situations where access by manned platforms is problematic, either due to access denial challenges or due to the physical nature of the operating area eg very shallow water. Under such circumstances, the USVs act as a force multiplier in adding additional eyes and ears to the Fleet. l. USVs may in the future also be capable of additional more extensive ISR missions, although their semi-covert nature limits their potential in this regard. Their ability to approach very close to potential threat platforms, without any risk to a human crew, makes them attractive for Measurement and Signature Intelligence collection, particularly against platforms suspected of carrying nuclear materials. Their low height of eye limits their ability to become more effective SIGINT collection vehicles. m. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) Support: MIO is traditionally defined as activities by naval forces to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy s military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Pre-emptive protective measures can protect not only maritime assets, but also ground forces by disruption of sea-based lines of supply to the enemy. For MIO in this context, mission emphasis is on vessel boarding, search, and seizure capabilities. MIO is by definition a manned mission. The MIO role of USVs is to enhance situational awareness in support of the manned mission. In general, this MIO effort would require a small USV system that would support a boarding party by investigating the threat vessel at the waterline and below. Potential support payloads for this role include ISR, EO/IR, CBRNE, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) detectors, Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), UUVs, and UAVs. n. The following example scenario should provide a flavour of USV MIO support missions. It is not intended to be prescriptive or limiting, since each MIO situation is likely to have its own unique characteristics and requirements: (1) The USV will provide ISR support to a manned Rigid-Inflatable Boat (RIB) performing MIO. The USV will support the MIO mission by providing a capability to detect a threat through a variety of devices and sensors to enhance situation awareness. Examples: (A) USV approaches a potentially hostile ship ahead of the manned RIB to help guage reaction ("draw fire"); (B) USV approaches and monitors the far side of an interdicted vessel from the manned MIO boat, to check for cargo jettisoning, fleeing personnel, etc. (C) USV uses sensors (ROV/UUV) to check for below-waterline oddities such as trapdoors, moon pools, or hidden cargo compartments and "drop tanks". (D) USV uses special sensors to search for unusual phenomena (e. g., CBNRE traces, and large numbers of personnel in "cargo" holds). 20

21 In these ways using a USV may reduce the need for manning in support of MIO, and should improve the operation's effectiveness. In conjunction with the USV, launching and recovering an UAV could provide additional monitoring of suspicious objects or behaviours during the MIO mission, similar to that noted above, except from an aerial perspective. o. The MIO USV should be small to facilitate handling and carrying from the "mother" MIO RIB. The size of the current demonstration MIO USV is approximately 5m. A 3m USV to support the MIO mission would be sufficient. The sea state limitations of a 5m craft compared to a 3m are insignificant, while the advantages of the 3m in ease of handling from a manned MIO craft (likely an 11m RIB) are considerable. Fuel load and endurance are not issues for this mission, as the USV will be operated in relatively close proximity to the mother craft, and for relatively short periods of time. p. The MIO USV will be equipped with the basic ISR suite including camera and radio. In addition, the USV should be able to accommodate a variety of sensors including CBNRE and WMD sensors. In this case, payload modularity will greatly facilitate this mission becoming not just a reality, but an effective and useful one. Critical technology and engineering issues pertaining to the MIO USV mission capability stem from the requirements for vehicle stability and failsafe vehicle behaviours. At least initially, the requirement for long time on station and significant autonomy is considered to be minimal, since the MIO Support mission will be operated in close proximity to a manned MIO craft. This situation may change as mission experience is gained and autonomy technologies advance. Reliable communications capability is required, even in the initial implementations, to ensure that the MIO crew is able to make effective use of its USV "assistant", as well as learning of its activities and their results in real time. The challenge for the MIO support USV will be the height of eye issue for both observation and communication. An enhanced surveillance and communications relay capability may be achieved by working in conjunction with an UAV, and normally inaccessible underwater observations may be facilitated by the use of an ROV or UUV. Launch and retrieval issues of a 3m from an 11m RIB may include mechanical interactions between launch/retrieve system and vehicle and fluid interaction between launch/retrieve system and vehicle. Autonomy issues need to be addressed. Threat recognition and determining the means for object avoidance must be considered. Continued enhancements will be required as the threat evolves. q. Riverine Operations: USV are ideally suited for riverine operations where their speed and manoeuvrability enable them to patrol amongst the commercial traffic without concerns for depth of water. Fitted with high resolution, long range optical recording equipment, they are able to play a vital part in the collection of evidence against illicit smugglers and other criminals, effective prosecution of whom will only be possible with strong evidence on which to convict them. r. USVs are able to place leave-behind surface and sub-surface sensors very accurately within an area inaccessible to conventional surface platforms. Underwater unmanned vehicles are less resilient in this regard, as they have more challenges in navigating accurately and remaining covert. 21

22 s. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW): The USV surface warfare capability potentially extends to the engagement of more difficult threats in relatively open ocean, as well as in the littorals. USV offer a less vulnerable target reporting method than the traditional MPA in direct support (Bluewhale etc). In such a role, USV contribute to MSA and offer a means by which to achieve positive identification of a non-emitting target without risking a manned surface platform. USVs developed for these roles tend to be larger, with a higher maximum speed and additional firepower. t. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Support: USVs are capable of supporting some SOF missions but will require some additional unique capabilities, such as more discrete communications systems and Low Probability of Intercept Sensors. They will also provide very basic but responsive and flexible infiltration and re-supply options which would otherwise be more hazardous for manned platforms or aircraft. The USVs with the lowest observable signature will have more potential to support SOF operations effectively than the more overt platforms. u. Electronic Warfare (EW): Small USVs will always lack the height of eye to achieve long range effects, and the power density to achieve high power electronic effects. Nonetheless, they offer an excellent platform from which to mount local OPDEC missions and for jamming enemy communications and local area networks as well as radars in the littoral area, where the sea state has less effect on antenna stability and where they are likely to be operating against a relatively unsophisticated enemy Order of Battle (ORBAT). The larger USVs will offer correspondingly greater capacity to achieve Over-the-Horizon (OTH) effects and higher power output for longer period. USV CRAFT TYPES 47. There are 4 principal types of USV and a number of different alternatives under development. a. Semi-submersible (SS) Craft: Operating with most of its volume below the surface, the semi-submersible design exhibits lower drag and platform motion than conventional hull designs. When wave-making drag is eliminated, the total craft drag is significantly reduced, thus allowing for a larger percentage of the craft s power to be available for other purposes, such as towing or powering payloads. Power required for propulsion, in general, is a function of speed (squared?) cubed. Due to the relationship of form drag to power required, speeds are limited to around 25 knots for a 7m SS. Being speed limited, the semi-submersible can be fitted with highly efficient (low speed, large diameter) propulsion systems, making them competitive with other craft designs. Nominally a 7m SS is comparable to an 11m planing hull in terms of towing capability. Operating below the surface, the SS is less affected by sea state, giving it a larger operational weather window. Sea-state related motions are reduced which is useful for sensor and payload stabilization, such as MCM high-resolution sonars and directional antennas. This hull form is also more conducive to deployment and retrieval of a variety of payloads. With payloads carried on conventional hulls, the difficulty arises in raising the payload off the USV deck, over the side and through the air/sea interface. None of the above needs to occur when a SS carries its payload beneath the interface. With the majority of the hull under water, 22

23 the SS has reduced radar and visual signatures and is therefore more effective in supporting missions requiring stealth. The SS is somewhat more costly than conventional hull designs due to the increased complexity of its systems and its uniqueness. b. Conventional Planing Hull Craft : Conventional planing hulls come in a variety of shapes, the most common types being the V-Hull, Modified V, and M-Hulls. The familiar RIB is a subset of the V-Hull hull type. The V-hull provides an excellent blend of performance with a broad speed range including a top speed exceeding 20 knots, depending on craft shape and loading. This hull is very competitive with other hull types in terms of transport efficiency (speed, payload, and range). While this hull type is very capable of towing, the hull drag is sensitive to load distribution (longitudinal centre of gravity (LCG)), tow point and trim angle. As a result, it may be less efficient than other craft types in this size range, especially at speeds less than 25 knots. These craft offer high payload fraction (i.e., percentage of payload weight to loaded craft weight) and can be of low complexity. At low speeds these craft may be less stable in a seaway and tend to roll when at rest, while at high speeds they may pound (slam) and are somewhat inefficient at transitional speeds. At normal operating speeds, they are likely to exhibit more motion than other hull types. These conventional planning hull types tend to be lower in cost as a result of commonality with commercial craft and the resulting manufacturing economies of scale. c. Semi-planing Hull Craft: The semi-planing hull provides lower drag and higher seastate capability than the conventional V-Hull and its variants when operated at moderate speeds. It also exhibits lower sea state sensitivity and provides a more stable sensor platform for a given size at approximately the same cost. This hull type is capable of speeds up to 30 knots, can be highly efficient across a broad range of speeds, and can also perform towing. This hull form typically has a lower payload fraction than conventional planing hulls for a given waterline length and tends to be more slender with higher length-to-beam ratios. d. Hydrofoils: The hydrofoil craft provides the lowest drag and best sea-keeping of all hull forms and provides a very stable platform at speed in moderate sea states. It is capable of speeds well in excess of 40 knots. Generally, it is not suited to towing due to the conflict of optimizing the propulsion to achieve high-speed operation versus the low-speed/highthrust operations required for efficient towing. Due to the complexity of design, this hull type is more costly than the planing hull craft. The necessity of retracting or folding the foils for launch and recovery can be problematic. e. Other Craft types: There is a myriad of other conventional and non-conventional craft types which are not further addressed. They include; sailboats, pure displacement, other lifting bodies, Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH), wave piercing, and multi-hulls. In general, these craft type are well suited to particular niche requirements and are not of generalpurpose design, with costs that can vary between the vehicle being expendable and its being a capital asset. Aside from the pure displacement craft, they tend to have lower accommodation of large weight-fraction changes in either payload or fuel load, which makes them unsuited to extended operations or deployment of heavy sensors. It is for these reasons that these craft types were not considered candidates for standard, common USV needs. 23

24 UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHICLES (UUV) 48. The use of unmanned vehicles is a force multiplier and risk reduction agent for navies of the future and postulates a host of specific missions for which UUVs are uniquely qualified. The longterm UUV vision is to have the capability covertly to: a. deploy or retrieve devices; b. gather, transmit, or act on all types of information, and c. engage bottom, volume, surface, air or land targets. 49. While their inherent covert characteristics make them more clearly suited for some applications than others, UUVs can offer capabilities in each of these areas, particularly in preparation of the battlespace in the face of area denial threats that may present undue risks to manned systems. The many possibilities for UUVs to contribute to naval needs derive from their generic operational advantages, which include: a. Low Profile: UUVs operate fully submerged with potentially low acoustic and electromagnetic signatures. They maintain a low profile when surfaced to extend antennae. The possible intent for follow-on manned operations in a route or area is not revealed and the element of surprise is preserved. UUVs have less risk of entanglement with underwater or floating obstructions than towed or hard-tethered systems (Remotely Operated Vehicles - ROVs). b. Autonomy: The ability to operate independently for extended periods creates a force multiplier that allows manned systems to extend their reach and focus on more complex tasks. Costs may be reduced when sensors or weapons are operated from the smaller infrastructure of a UUV rather than entirely from manned platforms. c. Persistence: UUVs can remain on station in the face of weather that would abort the operations of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or USV, simply by submerging to a less turbulent depth. Violent weather may preclude near-surface operations, but UUVs can wait out the storm at depth, precluding a lengthy transit when conditions improve. Likewise, UUVs that lose power (accidentally or intentionally in a loiter mode) can settle stably onto the bottom, unlike UAVs and USVs that are at the mercy of the elements as soon as they lose propulsion. d. Deployability: By virtue of their potentially smaller size, UUVs can provide a capability organic to the strike group. They can also be designed as flyaway packages or be prepositioned in forward areas. Their launch can be adapted to a variety of platforms including ships, submarines, aircraft, and shore facilities. The UUV recovery craft need not be the same as the launch craft. Recovery may be delayed or dismissed entirely for low-cost expendable systems. Multiple UUVs can be deployed simultaneously from one platform. e. Environmental Adaptability: UUVs can operate in all water depths, in foul weather and seas, under tropical or Arctic conditions, and around the clock. Their ability to operate in the 24

25 medium gives them unique sensor advantages over similar towed or surface operated sensors. No other sensor platform apart from a nuclear submarine can operate under the Arctic ice cap with a comparable level of risk. f. Risk Reduction: Their unmanned nature lessens or eliminates risk to personnel from the environment, the enemy, and the unforgiving sea. They also offer a more deniable platform from which to gather intelligence and covertly penetrate minefields or lay minefields. In keeping with other types of MUS, UUVs should be used in applications where they increase performance, lower cost, enable missions that cannot be performed by manned systems, or reduce the risk to manned systems. The characteristics of UUVs that may facilitate meeting these principles include their ability to put sensors in an optimal position in both vertical and horizontal dimensions, autonomy, endurance, exceptionally low-observability, expendability, and standoff or reach from the launch platform. UUV PRIORITY MISSIONS 50. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR): Persistent covert maritime ISR is a critical requirement for all forms of Joint warfare from the sea and in providing strategic Indicators and Warnings of force build-up which cannot be gained from other overt sensors. ISR is important not only for the traditional purpose of intelligence collection, but also as a precursor and enabler for other missions, such as MCM and ASW. The ISR mission area encompasses collection and delivery of many types of data: intelligence collection of all types, target detection and localization, and mapping (e.g. IPB and Oceanography). 51. UUVs are uniquely suited for information collection due to their ability to operate at long standoff distances, operate in shallow water areas, operate autonomously, and provide a level of clandestine capability not available with other systems. UUVs extend the reach of their host platforms into inaccessible or contested areas. UUVs also act as a force multiplier by increasing the number of sensors in the battlespace. There are many applications, particularly of a military nature, where UUVs would be the preferred means of persistently and clandestinely gathering desired information. UUVs can operate in otherwise denied areas, and provide information without undue risk to personnel or high value assets. 52. While the practicalities of reporting the intelligence collected place some limitations on the near-real time operation of UUVs, the platforms themselves are capable of conducting many extremely high value strategic (long term), operational (persistent theatre-wide) and tactical (short-term focused) ISR missions, including: a. Covert acoustic intelligence (ACINT) and MASINT collection against potential enemy submarines, and surface warships and auxiliaries, and against commercial shipping traffic; b. Covert oceanographic mapping of potential enemies waters to provide better local knowledge of the water depth and currents etc in the event of combat in that area; 25

26 c. Covert monitoring of seabed activities to establish the scope of minefields and sensor fields and to identify the positioning of undersea cables etc d. Covert monitoring of potential enemy surface, air and sub-surface weapons firings to establish full assessment of their capabilities. 53. Mine Countermeasures (MCM): The full range of MCM mission types can be brought to bear to meet the requirements against the myriad mine threat types and operational environments. These include: a. Reconnaissance Detection, classification, identification and localization; b. Sweeping Mechanical and influence; c. Clearance Neutralization and breaching; d. Protection Spoofing and jamming. Additionally, other mission areas contribute to MCM operations. For example, IPB can be accomplished with a variety of ISR assets. These assets can indicate if mine stockpiles have been accessed, mines moved, minelayers loaded, or mining operations undertaken, thereby allowing actions against these threats prior to their deployment. UUVs can gather oceanographic data long before hostile operations to provide data on winds, bathymetry, water visibility, currents, waves, bottom geophysical parameters, kelp concentrations, sand bars, etc. to determine mineable areas. Previous bottom surveys can be compared to current ones to determine changes in mine-like contacts. 54. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): While UUVs offer significant force multiplication for some ASW operations, their limited mobility and the lesser need for stealth make them less ideal candidates in some other cases. In all cases, UUVs can serve as offboard sensors or sources, extending the range of detection without increasing risk. The host platform can serve as the mother ship for a fleet of vehicles, providing the decision-making capabilities while remaining out of harm s way. By establishing submarine surveillance points without escalating the level of conflict, UUVs can greatly enhance the ability of the Task Force Commander to achieve and maintain access, independent of the state of hostilities. In addition to using existing or pre-positioned sensor fields and cueing assets, the UUV may also be tasked to plant its own field (a sub-mission which falls under the category of Payload Delivery). 55. Inspection / Identification (ID): Among the many requirements emerging from Maritime Security Operations (MSO) and Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection (AT/FP) is the need to efficiently inspect ship hulls and piers for foreign objects. Currently, hull and pier inspection is generally the responsibility of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Diver teams, and it is both time and manpower intensive. Additional assets beyond the available EOD Diver teams are needed to effectively meet these additional requirements for inspection. The typical targets in a hull or pier search would be unexploded ordnance, such as limpet mines or special attack charges. Critical components of the ship such as shafts, intakes and discharges must be secured before a diver can begin his search. Preparing a ship for divers may take several hours, and it requires coordination, as some damage control systems may have to remain on-line. Searching for ordnance that is typically time-fused is particularly 26

27 hazardous to divers. Use of an unmanned vehicle can reduce the risk to EOD technicians and divers by providing precise location of suspicious objects, while relieving the divers of the tedious search process in cluttered environments. 56. Oceanography: As missions move at a more demanding pace, environmental intelligence is critical in determining when and where operations are most likely to be successful. Environmental information is now demanded on the order of minutes to hours and not days to weeks. Knowledge of the operating environment is of key importance for both strategic and tactical operations. UUVs are well suited for many ocean survey tasks. Conventional oceanographic data collection is largely dependent on hull mounted or towed systems that require extensive surface ship support and suffer limitations imposed by tow cables. In applications such as acoustic and optical imaging, data quality is significantly enhanced when sensors are decoupled from motion of a towing platform. UUVs permit characterization of significantly greater areas at less cost by multiplying the effectiveness of existing platforms. UUVs can perform oceanographic reconnaissance in near-shore shallow water areas while their host ships remain at a safe standoff range. UUV technology provides the opportunity to acquire affordable, near real-time data at required temporal and spatial sampling densities. Data gathered by UUVs will be integrated with conventional survey data and models to provide joint warfighters with critical knowledge of the undersea battlespace. UUVs can autonomously collect information for later delivery and analysis for battlespace preparation or for direct transmission and real-time input into Tactical Decision Aids (TDAs). Oceanography missions for UUV operations include: a. Bottom Mapping; b. Bathymetric surveys; c. Acoustic imagery; d. Optical imagery; e. Sub-bottom profiling; f. Water column characterization which would include: (1) Ocean current profiling (with tides); (2) Temperature and salinity profiling; (3) Water opacity / clarity assessment; (4) Bioluminescence prevalence and impact; (5) Detection and tracking of CBRN trace materials moving through the water column on the current. 57. Communications / Navigation Network Node (CN3): UUVs can serve as critical communication and navigation links between various platforms at sea, on shore, even into the air and 27

28 space realms. As with the other missions, they can be operated from a variety of platforms, at long standoff distances, and for extended periods of time. A small vehicle can function as an information conduit between a subsea platform and an array, or it can clandestinely come to the surface and provide a discreet antenna. As an aid to navigation, UUVs can serve as stand-by buoys, positioning themselves at designated locations and popping to the surface to provide visual or other references for military manoeuvres or other operations. UUVs can also provide the link between subsurface platforms and Global Positioning System (GPS) or other navigation systems, without exposing the platform to unnecessary risk. Prepositioned beacons could be placed to provide navigational references in circumstances where conventional means are not available or desirable for use. This makes them attractive for a variety of communication and navigation functions including the following: a. Communication: (1) Phone booths : underwater network nodes for data transmission; (2) Underwater connectors (e.g., Flying Plug ); (3) Low aspect deployed antennas (Satellite communications (SATCOM), GPS). b. Navigation: (1) Deployment of transponders or mobile transponders; (2) Inverted GPS capability (antenna to surface); (3) On-demand channel lane markers (to support Amphibious Assault). c. Payload Delivery: Large UUVs can facilitate logistics by providing clandestine supply and support without exposing high-value platforms. Potential payloads include: (1) Supplies to preposition for Special Operations Force (SOF) or EOD missions. (2) Cargo as a follow-on behind SOF Delivery Vehicles (SDVs); (3) Sensors or vehicles deployed in support of ISR, ASW, Mine Warfare (MIW); (4) Oceanography, CN3 or Time Critical Strike (TCS); (5) MCM neutralization devices; (6) Weapons to deploy or preposition. d. Information Operations (IO): Analysis identified two IO roles well suited to UUVs: first, as a platform to jam or inject false data into enemy communications or computer networks, and second, as submarine decoys. The small size and stealth inherent in UUVs would enable them to operate in coastal areas difficult or impossible for other platforms, where 28

29 they could carry antennas and transmitters into locations that support electronic attack. The degree of difficulty increases as the capability moves from jamming to denial of services to injection of false data. Submarine decoys and ASW training targets have existed for decades. These simple vehicles could be effectively used in an IO role to convince an enemy that submarines are operating in an area where they, in fact, are not. Today s capabilities could improve on this old technology by extending the range, duration and autonomy of the vehicles to provide an improved deception capability. This capability could be used to impede enemy maritime operations out of fear of attack by a non-existent or minimal submarine threat. In addition, they would enhance the safety of friendly submarines by causing the enemy to dilute its ASW forces into areas where friendly submarines are not operating. e. Time Critical Strike (TCS): Warfighters need the ability to strike time critical targets at precisely the right moment in battle. UUVs can perform some of the necessary functions for TCS, for example, clandestine weapon delivery or remote launch. Stealth and long-standoff distance and duration allow a UUV to be an effective weapon platform or weapon cache delivery vehicle for TCS missions. Launching a weapon from a UUV or from an emplaced cache allows a launch point closer to the target resulting in reduced fuel weight requirements and quicker response time for prosecution. It also moves the flaming datum away from high value platforms so that their positions are not exposed. The autonomous weapon or weapon launch option is controversial; however weapon launch from an unmanned vehicle has been accomplished in wartime conditions, specifically from the Predator UAV. Man-in-the-loop control of weapon launch will be required for the foreseeable future. 58. There are currently 4 different types of UUV in development: a. Man-Portable b. Light Weight Vehicle (LWV) c. Heavy Weight Vehicle (HWV) d. Large Class 59. Man Portable UUVs: These vehicles are generally characterized with a 15 to 50 kilogram displacement and endurance of hours. There is no specific hull shape for this class. This class of UUV is capable of detecting and localizing threat objects on the sea floor of harbours and open areas and will support MCM operations to 300 feet. These systems are deployed from multiple platforms and shore and contain dual frequency side-scan sonar, GPS, INS, low light CCD cameras, and enhanced acoustic communications. An example within NATO s Naval Undersea Research Centre (NURC), is the successful use of the REMUS Man Portable UUV to perform surveys in ports and littoral areas. Two REMUS units were deployed by a NURC team and successfully detected four World War II Russian mines in Tallinn Bay, Estonia, during the Open Spirit 06 Exercise. Other examples of currently fielded Man Portable UUV s as described in Reference (A) are the Bottom UUV Localization System (BULS) which is part of a toolbox approach to equipping EOD forces. It will be capable of detecting and localizing threat objects on the seafloor of harbors and open areas and will support MCM operations from 10 to 300 feet. The system is small (two-person portable) with a low unit cost, so that inadvertent loss is not mission-catastrophic. It will be deployable via multiple platforms and from shore. 29

30 60. Light Weight Vehicle UUV: This class of UUV s is characterized with nominal inch diameter vehicles and displaces about 250 kilograms. This class payload increases six to 12-fold over the manportable class and the endurance is doubled. This class is used for MCM to detect buried mines and identify targets using high resolution imagery. These systems are recoverable with up to 12 hours endurance and an operating depth of 300 feet. 61. Heavy Weight Vehicle UUV: This class has a 21 inch diameter and displaces about 1.5 tons while providing another factor-of-two improvement in capability. This class includes submarine compatible vehicles with operating depths down to 1000 feet and up to 24 hours endurance. This class of UUV is primarily used for minehunting and IPB. A heavy weight sized vehicle is necessary to house the full sensor complement and attain the required endurance. This class increases the survey footprint as well as allowing clandestine military surveys. Examples of this class of UUV s as described in more detail in Reference (A), include the Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicles (BPAUVs) which have been employed in Office of Naval Research (ONR) Science and Technology experiments since The BPAUV provides mine hunting and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) capability. Also, the Littoral Battlespace Sensing Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (LBS-AUV) is the acquisition Program of Record (POR) intended to increase the survey footprint of the T-AGS 60 Multi-Mission Survey Ship, as well as allow clandestine military surveys to be conducted at a greater standoff range, thereby decreasing the risk to the ship and crew. 62. Large UUVs: The large class of UUV s will be approximately 10 tons displacement and compatible with both surface ship and submarine use. Large vehicles with diameters of 36 to 72 inches are being developed for use in persistent ISR, ASW, long- range oceanography, mine warfare, special operations, EOD, and time-critical strike operations. WAY AHEAD FOR MUS DEVELOPMENT IN SUPPORT OF EMERGING MISSIONS 63. A critical success factor in the integration of MUS into maritime operations will be the ability to efficiently launch and recover, handle data, coordinate communications, command and control between multiple vehicles and provide information to decision makers in real time. 64. The integration of MUS into deploying Mother Ships will also be a critical enabling capability development, which would be significantly easier in the NATO context for the maritime Allies if the platforms adopted were common in each environment, even if the payloads are different. Most existing surface vessels are not configured to handle or stow unmanned vehicles. Future manned maritime platforms may need to utilize containerized mission modules to allow a variety of unmanned vehicles to be utilized, ideally based on common platforms and C2 systems. 30

31 MARITIME CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS OPTIONS FOR MUS TO FILL CURRENT AND PREDICTED CAPABILITY GAPS 65. Tasks which are dull, dirty, monotonously repetitive and dangerous for humans are attractive candidates for execution in future by MUS in support of the existing and potential new NATO Maritime Operations areas. Unmanned systems generally offer the potential to automate repetitive tasks which humans tend to perform less well over time. Replacement of human operators with computerised machines also ensures a consistent reaction /response when preset criteria for action are identified. The use of MUS under such circumstances allows human operators to focus on the cognitive challenges associated with anomaly detection and on the decision-making process exclusively without having to integrate the collection and analysis elements as well. This allows better crew operating cycles and minimises human exposure to risk. 66. The potential for MUS to fill capability gaps in the 6 LTCR existing shortfall areas was already briefly highlighted in paras above. The more detailed examination of current and emerging capabilities for USV and UUV has identified clear areas where further investment will lead to the most cost-effective completion of the highest priority Maritime Operations using a balance of unmanned and manned systems. These are: a. Counter Naval Mines Capability: both USV and UUV offer enormous potential advantages over manned surface platforms in combating naval mines. Most of the technology required already exists, but the means of deploying the systems required are currently limited and the knowledge of how to exploit the information provided is limited to a small number of Allies who have developed their own autonomous national capabilities. Assured access from the sea for Joint Forces in future will increasingly depend on confidence that the approaches to the beachhead or holding area offshore from which to launch Ship-to-Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) Missions are free from mines. Thus, this capability is one that NATO as a collective alliance, with common strategic objectives in support of collective defence, must treat as a common enabling capability akin to AWACS for air surveillance and C2. b. ISR Collection Capability: both USV and UUV offer significant advantages in addressing ISR collection capability shortfalls. By virtue of their covert operation, UUV offer better chances of high fidelity ISR because the enemy will not know that eh is being observed and will therefore act normally, rather than assuming that he is being observed when an USV is known to be in the vicinity, whereupon he will not make sensitive transmissions etc to compromise his operations. However, USV offer high utility at the tactical level using their immediate connectivity to provide near-real time feedback and by being able to manoeuvre rapidly close to less sophisticated enemies before they can be neutralised. In the context of ISR capabilities, there is a compelling case for including UAV which can be deployed in the maritime environment from seagoing platforms. These form a critical component of any maritime ISR collection plan and would ideally have a similar C2 architecture to the USV and UUVs. MSO at strategic distance and all types of Maritime Operations in support of the Joint Force require high fidelity ISR from the air, sea surface and from below the surface. These capabilities are also common enablers for collective use and should be procured with their common use in mind. 31

32 c. Support to Insertion, Extraction and Resupply of Special Forces: USVs offer quick reaction support in a semi-permissive environment but will often compromise the presence of Special Forces by virtue of their overt nature. UUVs are less agile because they operate in a less accessible medium, but offer covert benefits which make it much less likely that a Special Forces mission will be compromised. Both have the potential to minimise the risks to conventional forces supporting SF by being able to operate in contested areas with a high probability of mission survival for UUVs and a moderate probability for USVs. Such is the specialist nature of SF operations that the utility of MUS in general will be very closely related to the type of mission support required. There is no doubt that the UUV can provide vital preinsertion intelligence for SF ahead of them arriving covertly into a JOA, such as: (1) Enemy patrol patterns; (2) Existence of enemy defensive barriers, minefields, underwater obstructions, underwater sensors and underwater cables; (3) Latest environmental data including bathymetry etc for proposed insertion sites; (4) Electronic ORBAT close inshore in the vicinity of the proposed insertion sites; While high priority should undoubtedly be given to support for SF using MUS, these will probably remain a primarily national responsibility based on the specific tasks for which individual Allies SF are trained. d. Countering CBRN Threats at Sea: the shortfall in NATO s ability to counter CBRN threats in the hands of terrorists and non-state actors intent on proliferation is caused primarily by a lack of technology. There is clear scope for USVs to mount sensors which will assist in the short-range detection of nuclear radiation emanating from an unshielded source. UUVs are already capable of detecting a range of traces from CBRN materials in water, but it will very rarely be possible to identify their source. Much research and development effort is now going into improving this situation, but it seems likely that the greatest advantage that USV and UUV will offer in filling this capability gap is the generic advantage of all unmanned systems: namely that no human is put at risk when they approach a suspected CBRN carrier. e. Beyond Line of Sight Communications: the laws of physics make it difficult for MUS to contribute significantly in this capability shortfall area, primarily because of their relatively low antenna height and inability to generate large amounts of power for extended periods. However, there is undoubtedly scope for both USV and UUV to act as BLOS communications relay platforms under certain limited conditions and when fitted with the appropriate equipment. The USV fitted with a deployable high altitude aerial mounted in a balloon would offer the advantages of unmanned penetration into contested areas, followed by limited BLOS relay facilities until the enemy decided to blow it out of the water. The UUV would theoretically be capable of the same, but with the advantage of remaining covert until deploying the aerial. Notwithstanding the NATO LTCR assessment of potential in this area, neither maritime platform seems a high priority candidate for addressing this capability shortfall. The 32

33 maritime UAV, linked to key C2 platforms operating within the Joint sea base clearly offers a much greater capability. SHORTFALLS IN CURRENT MUS SUPPORT AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES 67. Analysis of the generic requirements of any unmanned system reveals that there are a number of critically important capabilities in any such vehicle which must be provided if it is to be effective within its designated mission area. These include capabilities such as: a. Mission enablers such as: navigation systems, obstacle avoidance, fail-safe mode, autonomous decision-making sufficient to support the core mission etc b. Mission-specific requirements such as: weight, reliability, size, endurance, payload capability, detection and attack avoidance, self-defence measures, speed of response and operating envelope. 68. It has not been possible to examine how well existing USV and UUV are designed to achieve these capability requirements. However, the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (of Excellence) highlighted a number of generic shortfalls in its Flight Plan published in March 2008 at Reference F. These included: a. Command and Control Architecture: developing capability to integrate unmanned systems into the Joint and Combined battlespace; b. Hardware/Software: shortfalls exist and will exist in areas where equipment and technology have to be leased to support operations (contract ISR in the Balkans AOR); c. Battlespace (Airspace) management: develop concepts of employment to avoid collision, safety and efficiency for all users; d. Operators and Training: lack of standardized concepts, doctrine and procedures for the Combined and Joint battlespace NATO s acceptance of national training and standards; e. Integration and Interoperability: development of current Standing Agreements (STANAGs); f. Mission Planning and Tasking: NATO s ability to incorporate its tasking into national channels for UAS systems (national impact). While there will undoubtedly be other generic shortfalls in the maritime environment, many of the above will be common and should be used as a starting point for a comprehensive study as part of a wider review of the options to build a coherent approach to unmanned common enabling systems. IMPACT OF ONGOING STUDIES/RESEARCH ON FUTURE MUS CAPABILITIES 69. Current trends and probable developments in emerging unmanned systems technologies are examined closely within Reference A within 3 frameworks based on push, contextual, and pull 33

34 factors. Push factors result from the progress and breakthroughs in research and development. Contextual factors are organizational, economic, legal, and regulatory issues impacting the development of technology. Pull factors are social and cultural forces that shape the degree to which technology is accepted into society. In varying degrees independently and dependently, all 3 factors are constantly at work shaping which unmanned systems are developed and available to fill operational requirements. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 70. Future MUS capabilities will be determined within the current 3 framework categories. The key will be to manipulate the balance between them back to a point where the demands created by military requirements lead the development rather than industry telling nations what they should have. A brief examination of the current balance between these 3 frameworks follows: a. Push Factors: subject matter expert analysis points to the conclusion that advances over the next decade will come from an intersection of biological sciences, engineering, materials science, and computer-information science. Future potential for improved MUS depends heavily on continued investment in research and development in the critical areas which underpin these intersecting disciplines. b. Contextual factors: the never ending challenges of military funding will remain one of the most salient factors in determining NATO s ultimate development and utilization of unmanned systems to fill current and projected operational requirements. Optimizing scarce resources can be a double-edged sword. On one side of this sword is the scarcity of funding to acquire or sustain current force structures and equipment. The requirement to optimize these scarce resources may in fact ultimately drive leaders to call for solutions that accelerate the development, acquisition and incorporation of potentially more capable and less costly unmanned systems. The other side of this sword, akin with the same scarce resources, may actually drive leaders to utilize limited resources to find quicker more readily available and proven modes of capability which in the longer run could hinder unmanned systems advancement and utilization. Government policy, regulation, education, military culture, and private sector requirements and capabilities all shape the environment in which unmanned systems are developed and become relevant and available for military operations. c. Pull Factors: conditions in economic markets and societal influences greatly impact the absorption and utilization of technology. In a world driven by a never-ending barrage of media from television, internet, and print, nations become less and less able to successfully adopt military doctrine that has allowance for excessive loss of life, equipment and property. Conflict-driven factors such as asymmetric threats and the development of capability which makes human exposure more complex and dangerous pull technological application forward. Growing acceptance within society will usually result in growth of markets and resultant increases in R&D. Economies of scale will eventually develop with more capable and less costly technological solutions becoming available. 71. The importance of identifying early the potential for aligning solutions across the military operating environments in which Unmanned Systems will be employed (land, sea, air, space and 34

35 cyberspace) and moving away from environmentally-focused R&D and subsequently investment cannot be overemphasized. Technology that underlies common functions and system interoperability will be the key to achieving economies of scale and a more rapid pace of overall capability development. Specific examples of technology that are being developed include: environmental capability, signature management, architecture, world model, communication, human detection, human-robot interaction, obstacle clearance, and power. Therefore, it would be of significant importance for NATO to consider, from the outset, developing, sharing, and implementing these key technologies across all systems and operating environments. This should enhance collaboration and maturation of unmanned systems and the supporting industry. PRIORITIZING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION TO DEVELOP MUS CAPABILITIES 72. NATO should continue to incorporate unmanned systems into future operational visions, plans, and acquisition strategies. How contributing nations plan, source, and fund for NATO operations should take into consideration the ability to utilize unmanned systems. Where critical unmanned systems capabilities represent the next generation of common enablers, they should be seen as such and funded within a collective context. It is important to sustain current support to the war fighter while making every effort to accommodate unmanned systems technologies along with more traditional technologies as soon as possible. 73. Key objectives and ongoing areas of emphasis to guide unmanned systems communities include the following extracted from Reference K: a. Resolving Bandwidth issues; b. Developing cognitive processes; c. Common Control and Communications; d. Cooperative Behaviour; e. Dynamic obstacle interface; f. Human Systems Integration; g. Launch and Recovery; h. Power Systems; i. Reliability; j. Survivability; k. Sensors/Weapons. 35

36 74. A contributing nation s official government oversight findings published at Reference H, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Can Help Address Operational Challenges, highlight the challenges faced in the procurement of unmanned systems: Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcome (as major manned weapon systems) changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems Key steps conducive to success include preparing a comprehensive business case, adopting a knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategy, and sustaining disciplined leadership and direction Ongoing efforts to coordinate.programs are encouraging and could be a model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and interoperability. These clear and compelling findings reemphasise that development and acquisition of MUS capabilities must be a comprehensive, sustained, and focused effort. Programmes that should be supported and funded should clearly support delivery of the strategic vision and must align fully with emerging operational concept development. 75. In today s dynamic battle space, it is imperative that commanders have comprehensive battle space awareness. Lessons learned from ongoing operations throughout the Alliance stress the recurring theme that unmanned systems that provide persistent and reliable ISR should be a development and acquisition priority. In Reference A, operational commanders indicate that current manned surface, subsurface, and aviation assets continually face operational challenges of material availability, maintenance readiness, crew limitations, and constraining operational risks that make persistent around the clock presence challenging. This study has highlighted the potential for USV and UUV to fill some of these persistent ISR gaps. 76. Other areas of emphasis include the development of systems and components that make communications and interoperability most obtainable. Systems that are persistent and do not require a greater deal of maintenance should also be highly prioritized. Capabilities that allow for seamless human operator and control interfaces are also critical. 77. Rear Admiral Mark Kenny, director of the U.S. Navy s Irregular Warfare Office, at the February 2009 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) in Washington, D.C., reported at Reference J, stated that the U.S. Navy plans to procure unmanned systems with relatively simple launch mechanisms, deploying autonomous vehicles from the surface and from beneath the water. He also noted that there is a need for much quicker development of technology to meet emerging military and terror threats, but the Navy must consider budgetary constraints, always vigilant for the proverbial bang for the buck. This current vision is a reminder that MUS development and acquisition must be responsive, immediately relevant, and cost effective. SCOPE FOR EMERGING MUS TECHNOLOGIES TO OVERCOME EXISTING AND PREDICTED FUTURE SHORTFALLS 78. In the short term, MUS will potentially become a critical enabler in support of many Joint Force operations because they offer a solution to the persistent maritime ISR capability shortfall. The first and most critical benefit from more widespread Alliance deployment of MUS in the maritime 36

37 environment would be the increased battle space awareness of operational commanders, the improvement in tactical intelligence and information gathering and dissemination, and the resultant improvements in decision-making based on the enhanced situational awareness of all battle space operators. Current and near-term MUS capabilities are achieving rapidly improving reliability during operations. Examples of this are unmanned air systems ISR application and support in current operations in Southwest Asia, in support of MSO in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden and in support of critical infrastructure protection in the northern Persian Gulf. 79. As previously noted, a second current and near term solution provided by MUS is in countering naval mines. Technology application and development is accelerating to integrate MUS fully into the fight to detect and neutralize mines. Improved recognition algorithms and integration of sensors is leading to a higher success rate in identifying, marking and destroying naval mines. 80. The acquisition process adopted by most Allies is an iterative one in which defence industry presents an unmanned system technology/capability to the military procurement organisation and it then finds its way into a military mission. Over time, the unmanned system evolves to become a critical component of that capability as a result of its performance, ease of maintenance, reduction of risk to humans, persistence, and reliability. In Reference O, author P.W. Singer observes issues with doctrine and MUS application: what are the best ways to use it (the technology) and what are the best ways to organize yourself?...there s no pattern, there s no vision It s not an issue that we re buying these systems in greater numbers, it s that there s no doctrine The key to success is not just inventing or buying a new technology, but also how you harness it. The Germans, French, and British, for instance all had tanks, aircraft, and radios at the start of World War II, but the Germans figured out how to combine them all together into the blitzkrieg, a new way of mechanized warfare 81. In this light, there is an argument that it would be better to develop doctrine to immediately utilize existing unmanned technology to fill existing operational shortfalls rather than continue to pursue nirvana. The options to deliver quick results in the MUS environment might include partnering with nations who already have advanced capabilities, to avoid nugatory R&D expenditure. Once this capability is applied, then eventual lessons learned and required enhancements could be brought back to research, development and acquisition teams for advancement. An example would be the force generation process for potential NATO Standing Maritime Groups to the Middle East. Forces could be generated, trained and deployed with national assets that have existing MUS capability that can be readily integrated into required force structures. Improved capability in ISR and communications support during irregular warfare and cooperative defence could also be gained immediately. 82. There are currently significant ongoing efforts to develop and implement Concepts of Operations for the employment of UAV/MUS within NATO nations. NATO should align future planning in careful consideration of current and potential MUS capabilities and ensure careful alignment with current and foreseeable operational requirements. However, the most cost-effective way of achieving quick-wins is almost certainly in improving the coherence of our collective and individual national acquisition strategies across the 3 operating environments. 37

38 83. As presented in Reference I, the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC) is proposing to change the game in surveillance and reconnaissance using distributed, mobile, autonomous systems with open architectures that are scalable, affordable, interoperable and capable of overt interaction and intervention. By developing network collaborative ASW through cross-platform advances in NATO underwater systems, linking underwater and above-water systems, and improving/building gateways to existing NATO C2 systems, shortfalls in underwater surveillance and communications will be mitigated by unmanned systems and applications. 84. In the area of Mine Counter Measures (MCM), the NURC has a goal to significantly shorten the reacquire/identify/neutralize timeline and enhance interoperability and affordability by a welldesigned combination of higher error identification and lower cost neutralization. 85. Proposals for advancement of MUS in port protection to expand security options for maritime operators by providing integrated, intelligent situational awareness and technologies for non-lethal response to perceived threats are under development. Additionally, maintaining superior battle space environmental awareness is a key consideration with pushing the limits of ocean predictability using ensemble forecasting and targeted, international observations coordinated through adaptive feedback control. IMPROVING COORDINATION THROUGH BETTER INTEROPERABILITY AND INTEGRATION KEY DRIVERS OF IMPROVED COORDINATION INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS 86. Reference A defines interoperability as the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. Properly implemented, it can serve as a force multiplier and can simplify logistics. Achieving interoperability in multinational MUS requires that national unmanned systems should address interoperability on a number of levels: a. Among different systems of the same modality: b. Among systems of different modalities: the planned ability of ground and air vehicles of contributing NATO nations to work cooperatively is an example of this level of future interoperability; c. Among systems operated by different nations and military units under various concepts of operations (CONOPSs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) ( i.e., in joint operations): an example of this is the Joint Force Air Component Commander s Air Tasking Order (ATO). d. Among military systems and systems operated by other entities in a common environment. The ability of military Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to share the National Airspace System (NAS) and international airspace with commercial airliners and general aviation, as well as MUSs to share waterspace with commercial vessels, are examples of this level of future interoperability; 38

39 e. Among systems operated by NATO, individual Allies, and coalition partners, in combined operations. 87. Two of the key features of unmanned systems in the future will be interconnectivity and interoperability. An operational construct and architectural framework will be required that integrates warfighters, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, scalable across the spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and from sea to land. This construct is an inherently Joint and Combined concept; it relies on and provides essential capabilities to the Joint and Combined communities and other Military Departments and agencies. By developing cooperative behaviours, the designers of unmanned systems will ensure that data products are delivered to the proper operating systems and via established communication paths to allow the most effective use and dissemination of those data products to warfighters. 88. Great emphasis should be placed on several technical aspects of system interoperability, including the ability to interconnect physically using similar connectors or data links, ability to exchange information on common modulation formats, and achieving common language. Devoting resources to solving issues with command and control, integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data are imperative to ensure that multiple systems across all domains are able to effectively operate. 89. As well as ideas and thoughts presented earlier in this study, additional suggested areas for further development include the need for NATO to standardize guidance pertaining to command and control of unmanned systems in different environments. Nations should emphasize achieving a minimum level of interoperability of unmanned systems in NATO, both operating unmanned systems as well as the ability to operate manned systems with unmanned systems. The sense and avoid capability on unmanned systems is a very important requirement for unmanned systems and should be considered in all future requirements. Force development and integrating systems capabilities and requirements so that Alliance personnel are trained and experience with unmanned systems will need to be addressed. Clear definition and benchmarks of interoperability are required across all levels for key stakeholders, as interoperability may have different meanings to different people (interfaces, architectures, software/hardware). 90. If NATO is to fully leverage unmanned systems, it must do so in consideration of the myriad of types of systems that will have to work together effectively. A key consideration for interoperable systems will be the ability to communicate collected data. A step further will be then to take the communicated, collected data and coordinate tasks and objectives. A measure of efficient interoperability is ultimately the time human attention is required to accomplish a mission. Insufficiently interoperable systems increase the requirement for human attention. 91. Key elements of successfully implementing interoperable MUS include: a. Multinational policy that takes into account the need to shape and modify contributing nations business and contractual relationships such that that systems are developed, procured, and operated to be effectively interoperable; b. Multinational effort in assuring development of trusted paths of command and communication to unmanned systems; 39

40 c. Application of a single standard for message formats and data protocols. The long-term goal within NATO should be the evolution to a unified standard where practical. An effort to integrate or combine standards should be pursued by the appropriate body of oversight and governance to advanced concepts and technology. 92. A compelling gap to overcome will be the security and safety of systems in all environments with other unmanned and manned systems as well as with other obstructions and obstacles. 93. Engineering implementation is as important as technology development for success. System engineering considerations are often driven by the sensors, energy sources, and payloads as well as logistic concerns. However, size and number of vehicles to be used, overall system costs, and interoperability of systems, all need to be considered in developing needed capabilities. 94. Interoperability is achieved by buying common components, systems, and software and / or by building systems to common standards. It is most affordable when built into systems during the design and acquisition phases. Formal standards best ensure interoperability is incorporated during these phases. 95. Reconnaissance: the importance of interoperability in reconnaissance is particularly acute. This is because reconnaissance spans all 3 operating environments, often simultaneously. The reconnaissance mission that is currently being conducted by unmanned systems needs increased standardization and interoperability to gain capability and economic efficiencies across the classes and domains. Satellites, manned aircraft and submarines, and unattended sensors all have limitations that can be addressed by unmanned systems. Certain efficiencies can be realized when unmanned systems operate together to improve capability with lower costs. 96. Coupled with a lack of proactive, enforceable measures, a gap involving stakeholder definition of Joint capability requirements and oversight exists in recent national unmanned systems acquisitions. Key areas of common concern involve standards definition, acceptance, and implementation for the greater good of Joint interoperability. Standards determination and implementation, when well informed with effective stakeholder oversight and proactive measures, lead to valid results. Properly enforced, the common and enforced standards can integrate subsystems, systems, and systems of systems for greater interoperability. A balanced, well-governed collaborative and coordinated process is capable of producing greater benefits for Combined and Joint forces. KEY DRIVERS OF IMPROVED COORDINATION STANDARDISED PROCEDURES AND DOCTRINE 97. Standards (formal agreements for the design, manufacture, testing, and performance of technologies) are a key enabler of interoperability. Where needed standards do not exist or prove insufficient, NATO can fulfil a coordination role in building consensus-based standards. Such standards enable quality assurance, further nationally aligned NATO commercial acquisition goals, support conservation of resources, support national industrial bases, promote dual-use technology, and improve NATO s mobilization capabilities. 40

41 98. Currently, the primary NATO and civilian standardization requirements are developed and being built in compliance with the Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS). The application of these definitions is valid for determining compliance for research, development, and acquisition of government or commercially developed products. 99. The JAUS is an architecture specified for use in research, development, and acquisition primarily for unmanned systems. The implementation of JAUS requirements provides for an interoperability capability for commanding and controlling all unmanned systems platforms An example is the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Committee F41 on Unmanned Maritime Vehicle Systems. It was formed in 2005 and meets annually addressing issues related to standards development for unmanned undersea and surface vehicles. This Committee facilitates an interoperable, modular, and multi-functional family of platforms and capabilities. The committee s work and progress can be expected to continue to set international benchmarks NATO Standardization Agency, through the work of its Joint Capability Group on Unmanned Air Vehicles (JCGUAV), has produced Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4586 for UAS message formats and data protocols, STANAG 4660 for interoperable command and control links, STANAG 4670 for training UAS operators, and STANAG 7085 for the Common Data Link (CDL) communication system. It has also drafted STANAG 4671 for UAS airworthiness STANAG 4586 signalled movement forward for the implementation of unmanned systems (specifically air systems) to meet expected NATO operational requirements. The agreement s focus is to bring together NATO contributing nations efforts in the development of national software by stating a standard for data link interface between unmanned control stations and the unmanned vehicle, the command control interface between the control station and C4I systems, and the human control interface between the control station and operators. AREAS WHERE STANDARDISATION REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT 103. Interoperability is not attainable unilaterally. It is only achievable within NATO by working in concert with all contributing nations, their respective defence departments and business/industry partners, as well as other national services and agencies. Adoption and adaptation of emerging commercial wireless network management technologies for managing quality service in mixed application environments becomes critical in ensuring unmanned system interoperability. Other considerations include integrating network capacity to unmanned system planning, ensuring unmanned system designs anticipate requirements to support different payloads / configurations that may be required to operate in varied security levels, and developing control signals and systems that ensure integrity and authenticity precluding cyber attack and vulnerability. IMPACT OF CONTRIBUTING NATIONS ONGOING MUS PLANS ON FUTURE INTEROPERABILITY 104. As discussed throughout previous chapters, reference (A) is an ongoing and increasingly encompassing and relevant source and starting point for any organization and/or nation wishing to 41

42 develop a way ahead for the development of unmanned systems technology to support operational war fighters. As stated in reference (A): As the Department of Defense (DoD) continues to develop and employ an increasingly sophisticated force of unmanned systems over the next 25 years (2009 to 2034), technologists, acquisition officials, and operational planners require a clear, coordinated plan for the evolution and transition of unmanned systems technology. This document incorporates a vision and strategy for UAS, UGVs, and UMSs (defined as unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs)) that is focused on delivery of warfighting capability. Its overarching goal, in accordance with the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), is to focus military departments and defense agencies toward investments in unmanned systems and technologies that meet the prioritized capability needs of the Warfighter 105. One of the most important aspects of this work is that it was written to be transparent and broadly applicable to the Alliance and coalitions partners in efforts to develop and acquire unmanned systems The greatest areas for future collaboration and interoperability will be shifting organizational cultures and thinking to develop doctrine, training, and command and control of forces to work closely with unmanned systems. All levels of the military will need to be able to understand unmanned systems capabilities, commonly control and extrapolate useful information from unmanned systems, deny adversaries ability to counter and exploit unmanned systems, and finally to develop requirements for unmanned systems that serve to functionally enhance and improve effective joint war fighting. There are other more specific candidate areas for improved coordination for unmanned systems such as logistics, humanitarian assistance, force application, battle space awareness, and protection NATO should begin to develop common USV and UUV platforms as common assets, that can operate interoperably between all systems in all environments with the capability to configure their sensors and payloads in accordance with another Ally s requirements and guidelines. These systems should have common frames, propulsion, and control mechanisms. This will streamline acquisition systems and training requirements. Technology and capability to bridge current systems with future systems to ensure they can operate together should also be pursued. KEY DRIVERS OF IMPROVED COORDINATION INTEGRATION 108. Integration is often seen as the most advanced step evolving from improved interoperability and well-established standardisation. Successful integration even with a single operating environment usually requires a central coordinating authority to manage such an advanced project. The challenge for unmanned systems development is that it will be most efficient if synergies across the 3 operating environments are fully exploited, but the NATO acquisition coordination system appears to be largely environment-based ie there is a NATO Naval Armaments Group focused on naval platform issues, but not a single oversight body to deal with Joint requirements and interoperability between the 3 operating environments. The benefits of having a cross-environment view and of setting standards which need to be met for unmanned system C2 and platform management for all common enabling systems would be significant in terms of reduced training burdens and a rationalised communications management system. To achieve real progress in improved requirements definition, interoperability and standardisation, it may be desirable to create an ad hoc oversight committee drawn from the existing 42

43 Armaments Groups, but charged with creating a coherent framework for collaborative acquisition and operation of unmanned systems. Such an oversight committee would not need to be permanent. WAY AHEAD - ACHIEVING MUS GOALS AND VISION PROCESSES TO DEVELOP AND CODIFY MUS REQUIREMENTS INTO APPROPRIATE NATO PROCESSES 109. In line with the 2006 endorsed NATO Comprehensive Political Guidance, Reference P, and as articulated throughout this study, there will be an evolving security environment imposing dynamic challenges and risks to the Alliance. This will require an enhanced ability to respond quickly to unforeseen circumstances, anticipate and assess a myriad of threats including terrorism and the proliferation of WMD and operate in remote and adverse conditions. The Alliance s ability to continue to transform with the conceptual and organizational agility to develop robust capabilities that are deployable, sustainable, interoperable, and usable will continue to be tested. MUS provide numerous operational advantages to NATO in enabling the expeditionary force posture required and described above. Moving forward to ensure the standardization and interoperability of MUS will help NATO achieve its long-term security objectives The capability of the existing planning and committee processes to deliver the crossenvironmental interoperability and integration identified above should be urgently examined. If the system does not appear capable of the cross-environmental coordination required, an Oversight Committee should be established temporarily and drawn from the members of the existing authorities responsible for elements of Unmanned Systems development, to provide the cross-environmental integration required This Study represents an initial focal point bringing together prevalent trends, lessons learned, and key considerations for MUS. Upon promulgation of this Study, a subsequent step might be a follow-on forum that solely discusses unmanned systems (air, ground, and maritime), defines these systems capabilities and future roles in NATO, begins to implement the roadmap process, and builds consensus through the appropriate NATO processes In parallel, the key unmanned systems stakeholders should progress from the initial stages of defining capabilities and roles, building timelines out to 2030 and developing agreements to devoting resources and ensuring that unmanned systems in their specific operating environments (air, ground, and maritime) are fully compatible. Critical components of this progression should include standardizing common control equipment (controllers, launch and recovery systems, communication paths, hardware/software), human interface standards, operator training requirements, and technical/logistical support. This process would be include the committees and organizations with equity in areas such as operational planning, technology, acquisition, logistics, and budgeting In concert with the development of common environmental standardization, there must be a linkage that allows for systems to operate effectively in the Joint environment. Technical standards that ensure compatibility in unmanned systems should also ensure a process for eventual compatibility between unmanned systems in the other environments. 43

44 CONCLUSIONS 114. This Study has highlighted the very significant potential that Maritime Unmanned Systems have to provide critical enabling capabilities for current and future maritime expeditionary operations. MUS already offer potential solutions to some of the Alliance s most pressing capability shortfalls in the maritime operating environment There is an urgent need for work in the unmanned systems arena to be energized. Multiple capability enhancements will accrue from improved multinational coordination of unmanned capabilities, and assessment of where unmanned systems offer significant operational improvements in mission completion over their manned equivalent. This aspect is particularly true in the maritime environment involving dirty, dull, repetitive and dangerous jobs. Areas such as extreme environments, high levels of risk for the loss human and material, political exposure, as well as reduction in critical limiting human factors such as crew rest and human physiology should be analyzed The greatest initial potential for MUS to address capability shortfalls is in the Countering Naval Mines area and in all aspects of maritime ISR where UUVs, with their covert nature, offer access to the highest fidelity intelligence and continued access even in contested areas, inaccessible to all other platforms, except manned submarines Rapid initial improvements in NATO s acquisition of unmanned systems could be achieved by establishing standardised C2 procedures for all unmanned systems and, where this is not possible, looking at ways of ensuring interoperability between existing national unmanned systems within and between all operating environment Increased investment and improved coordination should be considered to fully leverage MUS potential. Other key areas to consider include processes to codify MUS doctrine such as a STANAG, increasing NATO MUS research and development investment, as well the development of an integrated roadmap for defining critical milestones for NATO to reach decisions and acquire the desired MUS capability An urgent examination of the current requirements definition and acquisition systems within the NCS is required to identify whether the necessary cross-environmental coordination can be achieved. If not, it is proposed that an Oversight Committee be stood up, with members drawn from existing Armaments Groups etc to establish a more coherent policy approach to the use of unmanned systems within NATO for the 21 st century. This Oversight Committee should focus on clarifying NATO s strategic objectives for unmanned systems, its operational requirements from them and the investment strategy to fund those unmanned systems which will become critical enablers for the Joint Force. It should also direct a cost-benefit analysis to assist in the development of the best balance between manned and unmanned systems and review the training requirements and legal constraints which further investment in unmanned systems will undoubtedly generate. 44

45 ANNEX A: REFERENCES A: US Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmaps FY ; DOD Unmanned Systems Roadmap B: The US Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) Master Plan, 23 July 2007 C: The US Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan, 09 November 2004 D: Shaping the Future of Naval Warfare with Unmanned Systems, Dahlgren Division/Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City, July 2001 E: TNO report TNO-DV 2006 A455 Unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, The Hague, 03 July 2007 F: JAPCC Flight Plan for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in NATO Mar 2008 G: ACT Long Term Capability Requirements (LTCR) Study H: GAO Study report GAO T of 6 April 2006 I: AUVSI annual program review and comments Feb 2009 J: AUVSI March 2009 Unmanned Systems Program Review Vol. 27 No 3 K: JAPCC featured article, UAS in NATO: Fostering Transformation L: National Defense Industry Report, Standards Committee briefing, NDIA Robotics Division, June 2008 M: The Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems, Compliance Specification Version 1.1, 10 March 2005 N: Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations, Committee on Autonomous vehicles in support of Naval Operations National Research Council, 2005 O: Author P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict of the 21st Century, as reported in AUVSI March 2009 report, Something Big Is Happening P: Comprehensive Political Guidance, as endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government, 29 Nov 2006 Q. MC0550 Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Comprehensive Political Guidance

46 ANNEX B: ACRONYM LIST ACC ACD&P AMCM ASD ASTM ASW ASW USV AT&L ATC ATO AUV BAMS BLOS C2 C4I CASEVAC CBA CBRNE CC CCD CDD CDL CN3 CNO COCOM COE CONOPS CONUS DARPA DoD EO/IR EOD FMV FY GAO GCS GCU GPS HF ICAO Air Combat Command Advanced Component Development and Prototypes Airborne Mine Countermeasures Assistant Secretary of Defense American Society of Testing and Materials Antisubmarine Warfare Antisubmarine Warfare Unmanned Surface Vehicle Acquisition Technology and Logistics Air Traffic Control Air Tasking Order Air Unmanned Vehicle Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Beyond the Line of Sight Command and Control Command and Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Casualty Evacuation Capabilities-Based Assessment Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive Centralized Controller Coupled Charged Device Capability Development Document Common Data Link Communication/Navigation Network Node Chief of Naval Operations Combatant Commander Center of Excellence Concept of Operations Continental United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Department of Defense Electro-Optical/Infra-Red Explosive Ordnance Disposal Full Motion Video Fiscal Year Government Accountability Office Ground Control Station Ground Control Unit Global Positioning System High Frequency International Civil Aviation Organization 46

47 ID INS IOC/FOC IOT&E IPB IPL IR ISO ISR JAUS JCA JCGUAV JFC JFMCC JUAS L&R LOS LTCR MCM MDA MIO MIW MOA MOU MS MUS NATO NAVAIR NTL ONR R&D RDT&E RHIB RIB ROE ROV SA SATCOM SDO SDV SMCM SME SOF STANAG Identification Inertial Navigation System Initial Operational Capability/Final Operational Capability Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Integrated Priorities List Infrared International Standards Organization Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems Joint Capability Area Joint Capability Group on Unmanned Air Vehicle Joint Force Commander Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Launch and Recovery Line Of Sight Long Term Capability Review Mine Countermeasure Maritime Domain Awareness Maritime Interdiction Operations Mine Warfare Memorandum of Agreement Memorandum of Understanding Maritime Security Maritime Unmanned System North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval Air Systems Command NATO Task List Office of Naval Research Research and Development Research, Development, Training, and Evaluation Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Rigid Inflatable Boat Rules of Engagement Remotely Operated Vehicle Situational Awareness Satellite Communications Standards Development Organization Special Operating Forces Delivery Vehicle Surface Mine Countermeasure Subject Matter Expert Special Operations Forces Standardization Agreement 47

48 TBD To Be Determined TCS Time Critical Strike TDA Tactical Decision Aid 3-D Dull, Dirty, Dangerous UAS Unmanned Aircraft System UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle UMS Unmanned Systems USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle UUV Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 48

49 ANNEX C: Lessons from Real-World MUS employments MCM during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM As discussed in Refs A and E, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) US Navy Special Clearance Team (NSCT) One, along with Royal Navy and Australian forces handled the task of exploratory mine hunting to render the IRAQI port of Umm Qasr safe for incoming humanitarian aid shipments. NSCT One accomplished its mission with the aid of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV). They also conducted additional UUV operations further up the river at Az Zubayr and Karbala, Iraq. NSCT One's primary mission was to conduct low-visibility underwater mine and obstacle reconnaissance and clearance operations from over the horizon to the seaward edge of the surf zone. The port of Umm Qasr and associated waterways presented the team with a lot of sediment to deal with, accumulated debris, and an above average collection of flotsam and jetsam that had to be taken into account and thoroughly searched. NSCT One used the Remote Environmental Measurement Units Support (REMUS) UUV, which is a two man portable unit that weighs approximately 80 pounds and is specifically designed to classify and map ocean bottoms. NSCT One went into action by initially checking the bottom for mines. Then the divers conducted tactile searches of the quay wall out into the surrounding water to determine any possible mine burial zones. One of the main challenges in their exploratory mine hunting operation was dealing with tidal extremes of up to 15 feet between high and low tides and the pull of currents up to five knots. There were also sandstorms that made visibility murky on land, as well as deposited silt and sediment along the wharfs, piers and moorings of the old port city. In all, NSCT One conducted ten missions in the waters off Umm Qasr, covering a total of 2.5 million square meters. It discovered and marked 97 man-made objects and shapes, each of which had to be checked out, even if they turned out to be rusty anchors or old truck tires. The Remus UUV was able to operate 24 hours a day and verify that the port was mine free. 49