ABOUT THE AUTHOR. Daniel Hartnett

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2 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Daniel Hartnett Daniel Hartnett is a Truman Defense Council member and a Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses, a non-profit research organization, where he researches China's military and security affairs. Prior to joining CNA, he was the Senior Policy Analyst for Security Affairs at the congressionally mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), where he worked on policy issues related to the security aspects of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. At the USCC, Dan advised and provided analytical and legislative support to Members of Congress and their staff on China s military and security developments. He also previously worked in the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, where he participated in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations with China. Dan began his career as a Russian and Serbo-Croatian linguist in the U.S. Army, where he employed his language skills during the civil war in Bosnia. He has published several book chapters and articles on Chinese military issues. An accomplished linguist, Dan has attended several language schools including the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, the Sprachen und Dolmetscher Institute in Munich, Germany, and the Beijing Language and Culture University, Beijing, China. He has an M.A. in Asian studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and a B.A. in Chinese from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at George Mason University, where he focuses on the evolution of China's military doctrine. Disclaimer: The views expressed within are solely those of the author, and do not reflect those of any organization with which he is affiliated.

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper describes a potential disconnect between U.S. military efforts to maintain freedom of access in support of U.S. global interests and the U.S. foreign policy objective to rebalance to Asia. In order to overcome anti-access challenges to its ability to project power, the U.S. military is developing the Air-Sea Battle concept. As a concept of operations, Air-Sea Battle posits the value of attacking and destroying preemptively if possible an opponent s targeting, command, and weapons systems wherever they are located in order to disrupt the opponent s ability to hinder U.S. military operations. However, while Air-Sea Battle seeks to defeat antiaccess challenges around the globe, with no particular country or region in mind, it may be undermining U.S. foreign policy objectives in Asia. In particular, despite repeated official U.S. statements to the contrary, the concept continues to be seen as a military strategy to attack China. Should this belief solidify among the Chinese leadership, it could complicate U.S. efforts to improve relations with China a key pillar of the U.S. rebalance to Asia. In addition, it could result in an unnecessary and costly arms race between the United States and China. In order to prevent that from occurring, the United States should consider the following recommendations: Conduct a senior-level policy review to determine whether Air-Sea Battle supports or undermines the U.S. rebalance to Asia. This review should include both the Executive branch and Congress. Those conducting the evaluation should not only include military experts, but also those responsible for diplomatic and economic policymaking. Evaluate the necessity for preemptive and offensive operations to counter anti-access capabilities. Any review of Air-Sea Battle should investigate the concept s emphasis on the need to conduct early attacks against key targets wherever they may be located. In particular, this review should consider whether the necessity of this approach may be overly provocative, thus undercutting other U.S. foreign policy objectives. Investigate whether other possibilities exist to ensure access and deter aggression without undermining greater U.S. foreign policy objectives. Air-Sea Battle is not the only method available to counter anti-access challenges; alternatives do exist. All possible options should be assessed and routinely reevaluated in order to guarantee that U.S. military and diplomatic policy objectives are closely aligned. Assess the strategic messaging on Air-Sea Battle (or follow-on concepts), with a priority towards disassociating it from China. Examining how to better message the concept in order to disassociate it from China would help to better align U.S. military and foreign policy objectives. In the event that disassociation is impossible, the U.S. government should consider a complete rebranding of the concept. 1

4 INTRODUCTION The U.S. military is increasingly confronting challenges to its ability to ensure freedom of access in support of U.S. global interests due to the growth of military capabilities intended to obstruct the U.S. ability to project power. In order to overcome these anti-access challenges in the event of a conflict, the U.S. military is developing the Air-Sea Battle concept. This concept seeks to guide U.S. military development in order to provide it with the wherewithal to effectively operate in contested environments despite the actions of any potential adversary. Unfortunately, while its objective of ensuring that the U.S. military maintains its freedom of access is important, Air-Sea Battle may also be undermining a key U.S. foreign policy objective, the U.S. rebalance to Asia. This is due to the misperception that Air-Sea Battle is a military strategy to defeat China, a view that, if allowed to solidify in Beijing, could create obstacles for U.S. government efforts to improve relations with China, a key pillar of the rebalance to Asia. This paper describes how Air-Sea Battle may be unintentionally creating obstacles for the U.S. rebalance to Asia. In order to do this, the paper describes Air-Sea Battle, why it is (incorrectly) viewed as a strategy to attack China, and how this could increase difficulties for the United States to implement the rebalance to Asia. It also briefly outlines three alternatives to Air-Sea Battle. It concludes with policy recommendations to better align the U.S. military objective of maintaining freedom of access with greater U.S. foreign policy objectives. AIR-SEA BATTLE AND THE GROWING ANTI-ACCESS CHALLENGE For the past few years, the U.S. military has been developing the Air-Sea Battle concept in order to ensure the military s freedom of access in support of U.S. global interests. 1 The concept seeks to guide the future development of the U.S. military into a highly integrated force that is capable of penetrating contested environments and defeating anti-access capabilities. With Air-Sea Battle, the United States seeks to be able to assure friends and allies and deter potential adversaries. The concept is not a strategy aimed at any specific country or region, but rather is intended to be applicable to a wide variety of scenarios around the globe. 2 Developing Air-Sea Battle is seen as necessary because of the growth of military capabilities specifically intended to hinder the U.S. military s ability to get to the fight, and fight effectively once there. 3 Although preventing an opponent from deploying to or operating in an area is as old as warfare itself, so-called anti-access capabilities have become more of a challenge due to growth of military technologies which allow possessing states to specifically target U.S. power projection capabilities. Of particular concern are the spread of advanced, stealthy submarines, long-range, accurate cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced combat fighters, highly-capable air defense systems, high-tech sea mines, and sophisticated reconnaissance and surveillance systems. 4 Anti-satellite and cyber capabilities are also of concern due to the U.S. military s reliance upon satellites and networked computer systems to conduct operations. 2

5 The spread of anti-access capabilities could hinder U.S. military efforts to support U.S. national interests around the globe, particularly the objective of helping maintain global stability. As the U.S. military s 2012 strategic guidance notes, several primary missions of the U.S. military are contingent upon maintaining access, to include deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power, and operating effectively in cyberspace and space. 5 The ability of the U.S. military to fulfill these missions could be weakened if a potential adversary sought to obstruct the U.S. military from effectively operating The spread of anti-access capabilities could hinder U.S. military efforts to support U.S. national interests around the globe, particularly the objective of helping maintain global stability. in a region. 6 Furthermore, possession of such capabilities could embolden states to act more assertively in pursuit of their parochial interests, since they may feel that the United States is less likely to intervene due to the potential high costs associated with projecting power into a contested environment. Finally, in the event of a conflict between a U.S. treaty ally and a state possessing anti-access means, U.S. resolve to support its ally may be called into question, since such assurance is built in part upon the belief that the U.S. military can deploy to a given region if necessary. In order to overcome anti-access efforts and ensure access, Air-Sea Battle takes a two pronged approach. 7 The first is to develop the U.S. military into a force that can more effectively integrate its various capabilities across all domains of warfare (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) in order to allow the military to effectively draw upon strengths in one domain to make up for weaknesses in another domain. 8 The concept s second objective can be divided into two components, an offensive and defensive component. Offensively, Air-Sea Battle seeks to use this integrated force to disrupt an opponent s anti-access capabilities by attacking preemptively if possible an opponent s command, control and targeting systems, as well as the weapons and platforms themselves, regardless of where they are located. Defensively, the concept seeks to ensure that any attacks launched by an opponent are defeated before striking their target. THE CHINA CONNECTION Despite frequent official U.S. government comments to the contrary, Air-Sea Battle is commonly seen as developed specifically with China in mind. 9 This unfortunate misunderstanding stems from two reasons. First, it is a natural outgrowth of the fact that China s military possesses the most advanced anti-access capabilities. As this year s Department of Defense (DoD) annual report to Congress on China s military power states, Despite frequent official U.S. comments to the contrary, Air-Sea Battle is commonly seen as developed specifically with China in mind. 3

6 China continues to develop measures to deter or counter third-party intervention, particularly by the United States. China s approach to dealing with this challenge is manifested in a sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy or operate within the western Pacific, which the DoD characterizes as anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. 10 The U.S. government s official messaging on Air-Sea Battle, especially in the first few years, exacerbates the China connection. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, for example, justified the need to develop Air-Sea Battle in part due to China s growing ability to threaten U.S. power projection capabilities. 11 At the conclusion of a paragraph describing DoD support for the national objective of improving relations with China, the 2011 National Military Strategy stated that the U.S. military will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace. 12 This point was again made in the DoD s 2012 strategic level guidance, endorsed by both President Obama and then Secretary of Defense Panetta, which stated that because China continues to develop anti-access capabilities, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments. 13 Although a recent official document on the concept does not directly reference China, it does use the term near-peer competitor, a term often used to refer to China. 14 Finally, the DoD only calls out two other countries, Iran and North Korea, as also developing anti-access capabilities both of which lack the military capacity of China thus further highlighting the concept s perceived China focus. 15 Because of the asserted connection, real or not, between China and Air-Sea Battle, critics claim that the concept is too provocative towards China, a nuclear weapons state, permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, second largest economy in the world, and not a declared enemy of the United States. Former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Hoss Cartwright, panned Air-Sea Battle for demonizing China, adding that doing so was not in anybody s interest. 16 Robert Kelly, a professor at Pusan University, writes that the concept poses the risk of unnecessarily provoking Chinese paranoia about a U.S. containment strategy. 17 Some argue that Air-Sea Battle sets the United States down a dangerous path due to the concept s emphasis on being able to strike preemptively, thus risking rapidly escalating a crisis with China. 18 Yet others call out the concept s overly Some argue that Air-Sea Battle sets the United States down a dangerous path due to the concept s emphasis on being able to strike preemptively, thus risking rapidly escalating a crisis with China. Yet others call out the concept s overly offensive nature, which emphasizes the need to attack key targets wherever they are located. offensive nature, which emphasizes the need to attack key targets wherever they are located. 19 In the context of a China scenario, many if not all of China s command and control and targeting systems, as well as the actual weapons themselves, are likely to be located within China, 4

7 implying attacking Chinese soil an event that two RAND Corporation researchers argue would be sure to have serious geopolitical consequences. 20 Criticism of Air-Sea Battle as too provocative towards China is not simply an academic exercise, as China sees the concept specifically targeting China. In late November 2011, the spokesman for China s Ministry of National Defense stated that Air-Sea Battle reflects the kind of view that advocates confrontation and seeks one s own security at the expense of others a near perfect encapsulation of a security dilemma, whereby one state s actions to improve its security undermine the security of another state. 21 A retired Chinese major general, and senior advisor to an influential military think tank, wrote earlier this year that Air-Sea Battle is designed for military operations against China, and that the United States is quickening steps to develop [the concept] from mere theory to concrete practice. 22 Furthermore, the Chinese military s official mouthpiece, The People s Liberation Army Daily, contended that the United States is developing Air-Sea Battle because its sees China as the main future threat located in the Western Pacific region. 23 Similarly, a publication from China s premier military research institute, the Academy of Military Science an organization tasked with advising China s senior most military leadership wrote that the concept supports U.S. efforts directed at China because it is designed for fighting a modern high-end war in the Western Pacific. 24 AIR-SEA BATTLE AND THE U.S. REBALANCE TO ASIA If decision makers in Beijing come to see the United States as militarily targeting China, it could complicate U.S. efforts to implement the rebalance to Asia, a key U.S. foreign policy priority. 25 Since coming to office in January 2009, the Obama Administration has sought to prioritize the Asia-Pacific region in the U.S. foreign policy agenda. This shifting of priorities to this region reflects the drawing down of U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the growing geopolitical importance of the Asia Pacific. As a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy, the rebalance includes diplomatic, economic, and military efforts. 26 A key component of the rebalance is, as President Obama noted in 2011, to build a cooperative relationship with China, in order to ensure that China s rise is the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China. 27 The President also highlighted the need for greater communication between our militaries to promote understanding and avoid miscalculation [emphasis added]. Then National Security Advisor Tom Donilon provided greater fidelity on this issue, stating that one of the five pillars of the rebalance is building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China. 28 He also explicitly asserted that the strategy does not mean containing China. However, if the above-mentioned Chinese views on Air-Sea Battle solidify within the Chinese leadership, it could undermine U.S. efforts to improve the U.S.-China relationship. Individuals within China s civilian and military leadership that hold a more hawkish view of the United States could inadvertently be strengthened if presented with alleged evidence that the United States is seeking to contain China s rise. Conversely, those in China who argue in support of improving the bilateral relationship could be weakened if the belief grows within China that the 5

8 United States is developing a military strategy to attack China. As a result, U.S. overtures to undertake specific activities intended to build trust and confidence between Washington and Beijing may encounter increased obstacles. Taken to its extreme, the relationship could move from its current competitive nature to a more confrontational one. Furthermore, should Beijing perceive that the United States is developing a military strategy to attack Chinese soil, China could increase its investment in the very capabilities that Air-Sea Battle is intended to overcome, potentially resulting in an anti-access Air-Sea Battle arms race. Of particular note here is the preemptive and offensive nature of Air-Sea Battle, which calls for early strikes against targets wherever they are to include potentially targets within China. In response, China would likely see the need to strengthen its ability to deny the U.S. military access to China s periphery in order to prevent such attacks. This in turn would exacerbate the belief within the United States to increase resources to counter China s growing antiaccess capabilities. It is not difficult to see how such Should Beijing perceive that the United States is developing a military strategy to attack Chinese soil, China could increase its investment in the very capabilities that Air-Sea Battle is intended to overcome, potentially resulting in an antiaccess Air-Sea Battle arms race. a situation could devolve into a costly tit-for-tat spiral to out-develop each other s military capabilities. Indeed, some in China are already calling for the Chinese military to increase its investments in space and cyber capabilities in order to counter Air-Sea Battle. 29 During a time of fiscal constraint, the last thing the United States needs is a costly arms race. ALTERNATIVES TO AIR-SEA BATTLE Noting the potential for Air-Sea Battle to be too provocative towards China, in particular due to the concept s offensive and preemptive aspects, U.S. military strategists have proposed three alternatives: Offshore Control, proposed by U.S. National Defense University scholar, T. X. Hammes, which seeks to deter or defeat Chinese aggression with a distant blockade of China s critical imports and exports. 30 Offshore Control would be carried out along three parallel tracks. First, by exploiting U.S. military strengths, such as submarines, to deny China the maritime area along its periphery. Second, by defending U.S. bases and allied territory in the region from a Chinese attack. Finally, by intercepting Chinese seaborne imports and exports critical to China s economy at a distance from China s shores, thus limiting the chance of any possible Chinese retaliation. 31 War at Sea, devised by two professors from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes. 32 Their suggestion, somewhat similar to Offshore Control, is a maritime strategy that relies heavily upon U.S. submarines to deny China the use of the maritime region outside China s immediate territorial waters. In addition, a War at Sea strategy 6

9 would seek to control strategic maritime choke points, such as the Malacca Strait, through which Chinese imports and exports flow. A third, unnamed alternative is provided by the RAND Corporation s David Gompert and Terrence Kelly, who suggest a two-pronged approach. 33 First, the U.S. military should develop less targetable, more survivable forces, namely smaller, more numerous, longer-ranged and harder to find forces dispersed over a larger area. Second, they recommend the U.S. military develop its defensive capabilities in order to deny an opponent the ability to project the requisite power necessary for anti-access operations, in essence a counter-anti-access capability. CONCLUSION In sum, although Air-Sea Battle is intended to overcome challenges posed by the proliferation of anti-access capabilities, it may actually be causing more harm than good when it comes to China. Because the concept is often seen, rightly or wrongly, as specifically targeting China, it could unintentionally undermine the U.S. rebalance to Asia and possibly even lead to an unnecessary and costly arms race. That is not to say, however, that the U.S. military should abandon investigating and developing ways to overcome the very real challenges posed by the growth of anti-access capabilities. Rather this should be done within the context of larger U.S. foreign policy objectives. To that end, this paper makes the following four recommendations: It may be too late to ever fully delink Air-Sea Battle and China. Therefore, it may be better to begin anew, rebrand it, and conduct a strong strategic messaging campaign from the beginning in order to minimize any connection between China and U.S. military efforts to preserve its freedom of action in the face of antiaccess challenges. Conduct a senior-level policy review to determine whether Air-Sea Battle supports or undermines the U.S. rebalance to Asia. As Amitai Etzioni has argued, this policy review should be carried out by both the Executive branch and Congress. 34 In order to ensure that Air-Sea Battle conforms to and supports the rebalance to Asia, it is important that this review include not only those who have jurisdiction over military and defense issues, but also those who oversee other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. At a minimum, such a review could include internal assessments, outside reviews, and congressional hearings. Evaluate the necessity for preemptive and offensive operations to counter anti-access capabilities. During any review of Air-Sea Battle or subsequent operational concepts, it is necessary to investigate whether preemptive capabilities are necessary or overly provocative. In addition, the emphasis on being able to conduct offensive operations against targets wherever they are located should be examined to ensure that the concept is not too escalatory. 7

10 Foster an environment for debate about possible alternatives to countering anti-access capabilities and deterring international aggression. As a subtopic of the above mentioned policy review, the actual operational concept of Air-Sea Battle should be reviewed to determine whether, from a military angle, it is the right approach. At a minimum, this investigation should weigh the concept against alternate approaches that have been proposed, such as Hammes Offshore Control, Kline and Hughes War at Sea, and Gompert and Kelly s unnamed approach to counter China s ability to project power. Evaluate the strategic messaging on Air-Sea Battle (or follow-on concepts), with a priority towards disassociating it from China. Despite repeated attempts by the U.S. government to deny that Air-Sea Battle is specifically aimed at China, the notion continues to thrive. Therefore, it is important to reassess how to publicly portray the concept so as to better control the message. It may be too late to ever fully delink Air-Sea Battle and China. Therefore, it may be better to begin anew, rebrand it, and conduct a strong strategic messaging campaign from the beginning in order to minimize any connection between China and U.S. military efforts to preserve its freedom of action in the face of anti-access challenges. It may be impossible to completely disassociate the two, but simply continuing to deny any perceived connection is clearly not working. 8

11 ENDNOTES 1 First discussed in 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officially endorsed it in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which called upon the U.S. military to develop a joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. It has since continued to be slowly developed and implemented, under the coordination of the Air-Sea Battle Office, established in late Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), p. 32; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Multi-Service Office to Advance Air-Sea Battle Concept, News Release, November 09, 2011; Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2013), p Air-Sea Battle Office, p Ibid., p For a thorough list of potential weapons and systems that can be used to support an A2/AD strategy, see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 17 January 2012), pp Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), pp One need only reflect upon the history of major U.S. military operations over the past two decades to note the tendency of U.S. forces to first deploy to a region in preparation for follow-on operations. It is not difficult to imagine how much more difficult such operations would be without the ability to project power into a region. 7 The Air-Sea Battle Office refers to this concept of closely integrating the military as a networked, integrated force. Air-Sea Battle Office, pp For example, using naval assets, such as submarine-launched cruise missiles (sea domain) to overcome land-based air defense assets. 9 The ASB Office asserts that the A2/AD threat exceeds any single or specific theater of operations. In other words, It s not about a specific actor. It is not about a specific regime. Air-Sea Battle Office, p. 2; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Background Briefing on Air-Sea Battle by Defense Officials from the Pentagon, presentation by unnamed defense officials, 9 November 2011, 10 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People s Republic of China, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), p Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 8 February 2011), p Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, pp Air-Sea Battle Office, p. 2. For an example of the use of peer competitor to refer to China, see: Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests, v. II, Main Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2008), pp Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 31; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, p Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Cartwright Targets F-35, AirSea Battle; Warns of $250B More Cuts, Breaking Defense, 15 May 2012, 17 Robert E. Kelly, Why the West Should Relax about China, The Diplomat, 4 September 2013, 9

12 18 Raoul Heinrichs, America s Dangerous Battle Plan, The Diplomat, 17 August, 2011, 19 T.X. Hammes, Offshore Control, Strategic Forum 278 (June 2012), p. 4; Joshua Rovner, AirSea Battle and Escalation Risks, Changing Military Dynamics in East Asia, Policy Brief 12 (Jan 2012), p David Gompert and Terrence Kelly, Escalation Cause: How the Pentagon's new strategy could trigger war with China, Foreign Policy, 2 August 2013, 21 Wang Jingguo and Hao Yalin, Guofangbu Jiu Mei Zai Ao Zhu Jun Da Jizhe Wen, Chai Konghai Yiti Zhan Lilun [Ministry of National Defense Answers Reporter s Questions about U.S. Forces in Australia, Denounces the Air-Sea Battle Theory], Xinhua, 30 November 2011, 22 Tang Yinchu, US Strategic Rebalancing in Asia-Pacific and its Impact, International Strategic Studies 1 (2013):100. Major General Tang is a senior advisor for The China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), the Chinese military s premier intelligence analysis think tank, which is directly subordinate to the General Staff Department s Intelligence Department. See Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, Chinese Military Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions, The China Quarterly 171 (Sep., 2002): Fan Hongfa, Meijun Zhuanxing Jianshe Qishi Size [Four Fundamental Operations of the Transformation of the U.S. Military], People s Liberation Army Daily, 5 May 2011, p Center for National Defense Policy, Strategic Review: 2012, (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, April 2013), pp This strategy has also been referred to at different times as the Pivot to Asia or Return to Asia. 26 Tom Donilon (National Security Advisor), The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013, remarks at The Asia Society, NY City, New York, 11 March Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament, 17 November 2011, 28 The other four pillars are: strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; empowering regional institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity. Donilon, The United States and the Asia-Pacific in Gompert and Kelly, Escalation Cause. 30 Hammes, Offshore Control, pp Hammes strategy is premised upon the fact that the Chinese military currently lacks the power projection capability required in order to carry out a military retaliation far from China s shores. 32 Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: A War at Sea Strategy, Naval War College Review 65:4 (Autumn 2012): Gompert and Kelly, Escalation Cause. 34 Amitai Etzioni, Who Authorized Preparations for War with China? Yale Journal of International Affairs (Summer 2013):

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