Safety, Security and Safeguards Culture. Todd Cervini PD Committee Member NAYGN

Transcription

1 Safety, Security and Safeguards Culture Todd Cervini PD Committee Member NAYGN

2 PNNL-SA-. International Safeguards Culture North American Young Generation in Nuclear Washington, DC Steve Mladineo May 12,

3 Safety Culture That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. 3

4 Security Culture The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. 4

5 What are International Safeguards? By definition, the international safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities. 5

6 IAEA Safeguards Agreements Non-Nuclear Weapon States conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153) with the IAEA on all nuclear material and activities in the State. Nuclear Weapons States implement Voluntary Offer Agreements with the IAEA to cover parts of their civil nuclear fuel cycles. Non-NPT Member States implement item-specific or limited scope safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/66), which cover specified materials, facilities and other items. Multi-lateral Safeguards Agreements Additional Protocol & Small Quantities Protocol 6

7 Technical Basis of Safeguards Quantity and timeliness goals are based on the principle that a certain quantity of fissile nuclear material is needed for a State to manufacture its first nuclear explosive device and that a certain length of time is required to convert nuclear material in various forms into a form suitable for a weapon. Significant Quantity: approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Conversion Time: time required to convert different forms of nuclear material to the metallic components of a nuclear explosive device. Detection Time: maximum amount of time that may elapse between diversion and detection of that diversion. 7

8 8 ESARDA Bulletin

9 Safeguards Culture Literature Review Organizational Culture Analysis Definitions Next Steps 9

10 Suggested Definitions A shared belief among individuals, organizations, and institutions that strict attention to international safeguards requirements and affirmative cooperation with safeguards authorities will enhance their nonproliferation stature and benefit their missions. Mladineo and Frazar The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance safeguards or to achieve effective and efficient safeguards. Naito A shared belief by IAEA safeguards authorities, inspectors, and analysts that the people, processes, and procedures used by the IAEA to draw safeguards conclusions are effective and efficient. Mladineo and Frazar 10

11 Safeguards Culture Indicators of a State s safeguards culture can inform the IAEA about the State s safeguards program, and that this information could be used to help improve a State s safeguards performance These indicators can be used to improve the Safeguards Culture, or Awareness at a Facility Practical Application of Theoretical Underpinnings (Edgar Schein) Potential Indicators of Safeguards Culture at a Facility 11

12 From Theory ARTIFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS THE THREE LAYERS OF CULTURE 12

13 to Practice ARTIFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS THE THREE LAYERS OF CULTURE Artifacts that reflect priority on performance: Self Inspection Program Corrective Action Mechanisms Corporate Governance Best Practices Proactive Anomaly Resolution Meticulous Measurement and Reporting Processes Performance Values: Accurate and complete reporting enhances facility s mission Cooperation with the IAEA leads to effectiveness and efficiency Underlying Assumptions: Compliance with safeguards requirements is necessary Quality of effort is important to the mission 13

14 Indicators of Safeguards Culture Strong, Positive Underlying assumption that compliance is important Believe quality performance is important to mission Strong, Negative Underlying assumption that compliance is not important Take steps to hinder safeguards implementation and inspections Weak, Positive Underlying assumption that compliance is important Do not place high priority on good performance Weak, Negative Underlying assumption that compliance is not important Do not take steps to hinder safeguards implementation or inspections 14

15 Awareness at a Facility Attain Top Level Management Support Establish a Regulatory Basis Focus on effective implementation of domestic safeguards Identify Target Facilities and their Training Needs Encourage management to pay explicit attention to 3S 15

16 16 Questions?

17 17 Backup Slides

18 Next Steps Expand discussion about safeguards culture to international experts in safeguards and culture. Collaborate with interested facility or regulator partner to develop a more rigorous set of indicators for safeguards culture Follow-on collaborations could explore activities that promote strong, positive safeguards culture 18

19 Organizational Culture Whatever the type of culture one is describing, its basic function is to act as a guide for employee behavior. "A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way you perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd Ed., Jossey-Bass ISBN e problems"(schein, 2004, p. 17). 19

20 Security Culture (What is That?) (Can it be Measured?) Presentation for NAYGN May 12, 2013 Paul Ebel BE Inc. (Hilton Head, SC)

21 Radioactive Sources Code of Conduct Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2003) Every State should... ensure: (b) the promotion of safety culture and of security culture with respect to radioactive sources. What is That? 21

22 Fundamental Principles Incorporated in Amendment to the CPPNM, July 2005 Fundamental Principle F Security Culture: All organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the security culture, to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in the entire organization. What is That? 22

23 IAEA Definition of Nuclear Security Culture From IAEA Implementing Guide Section 2 The assembly of characteristics, principles, attitudes and behaviour of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. Appropriate Nuclear Security Culture ensures that the implementation of nuclear security measures receive the attention warranted by their significance. That s what it is? 23

24 Scope of IAEA Implementing Guide Defines basic concepts and elements of nuclear security culture Provides an overview of the attributes of nuclear security culture States that nuclear security culture is influenced by top down standards, regulations, and pressure Emphasizes that nuclear security ultimately depends on individuals ( bottom up ) Beliefs and attitudes are the basis Stated principles guide behaviour Management systems and individual behaviour can be seen and evaluated 24

25 Basis for Nuclear Security Culture Edgar Schein model of organizational culture and leadership (1997) Layers range from invisible and nonmeasurable to visible and measurable Visible layers have performance indicators Invisible must be inferred from visible Bottom layer is base for other characteristics (invisible) Credible threat exists Nuclear security is important 25

26 Edgar Schien Model of Culture ARTIFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

27 Simplified Model for Organizations THE OUTCOME OF AN EFFECTIVE OVERALL NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM IS ACHIEVED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE WELL DEVELOPED AND EFFECTIVE BEHAVIORS FOSTER A HEALTHY SECURITY CULTURE Artifacts SIMPLE PRINCIPLES ARE USED TO GUIDE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS Espoused Values THE ASSUMPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT AND SECURITY IS IMPORTANT - WIDELY SHARED Assumption

28 Model Tailored to Fit Nuclear Facilities THE OUTCOME OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM IS ACHIEVED Enhanced Nuclear Security System Performance MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE WELL- DEVELOPED AND EFFECTIVE Visible Security Policy Staff Code of Conduct Clear Roles and Responsibilities Performance Measurement Good Work Environment Training and Qualification Work Management Information Control Material Accounting Systems Cyber-Protection Staff Screening Quality Assurance Change Management Operating Experience Feedback Contingency Plans and Drills BEHAVIORS FOSTER A HEALTHY SECURITY CULTURE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS Standards and Expectations Use of Authority Decision-Making Good Supervision Involvement of Staff Open Communications Improving Performance INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS (Apply to everyone) Professional Conduct Personal Accountability Following Procedures Teamwork and Collaboration Questioning and Reporting Open Communications SIMPLE PRINCIPLES ARE USED TO GUIDE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS (Examples) Leadership Commitment to Nuclear Security Honesty, Integrity, Responsibility Good Equipment Condition Commitment to Procedures Learning and Improvement NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES THE ASSUMPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT AND SECURITY IS IMPORTANT - WIDELY SHARED Threats of Malicious Acts by Insiders and Outsiders are Credible

29 Model Tailored to Fit Nuclear Facilities THE OUTCOME OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM IS ACHIEVED Enhanced Nuclear Security System Performance MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE WELL- DEVELOPED AND EFFECTIVE Visible Security Policy Staff Code of Conduct Clear Roles and Responsibilities Performance Measurement Good Work Environment Training and Qualification Work Management Information Control Material Accounting Systems Cyber-Protection Staff Screening Quality Assurance Change Management Operating Experience Feedback Contingency Plans and Drills BEHAVIORS FOSTER A HEALTHY SECURITY CULTURE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS Standards and Expectations Use of Authority Decision-Making Good Supervision Involvement of Staff Open Communications Improving Performance INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS (Apply to everyone) Professional Conduct Personal Accountability Following Procedures Teamwork and Collaboration Questioning and Reporting Open Communications SIMPLE PRINCIPLES ARE USED TO GUIDE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS (Examples) Leadership Commitment to Nuclear Security Honesty, Integrity, Responsibility Good Equipment Condition Commitment to Procedures Learning and Improvement THE ASSUMPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT AND SECURITY IS NUCLEAR SECURITY IMPORTANT CULTURE FOR NUCLEAR - WIDELY FACILITIES SHARED Threats of Malicious Acts by Insiders and Outsiders are Credible

30 Model Tailored to Fit Nuclear Facilities THE OUTCOME OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM IS ACHIEVED Enhanced Nuclear Security System Performance MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE WELL- DEVELOPED AND EFFECTIVE BEHAVIORS FOSTER A HEALTHY SECURITY CULTURE Visible Security Policy Staff Code of Conduct Clear Roles and Responsibilities Performance Measurement Good Work Environment Training and Qualification Work Management Information Control Material Accounting Systems Cyber-Protection Staff Screening Quality Assurance Change Management Operating Experience Feedback Contingency Plans and Drills LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS Standards and Expectations Use of Authority Decision-Making Good Supervision Involvement of Staff Open Communications Improving Performance SIMPLE PRINCIPLES ARE USED TO GUIDE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS (Examples) INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS (Apply to everyone) Professional Conduct Personal Accountability Following Procedures Teamwork and Collaboration Questioning and Reporting Open Communications Leadership Commitment to Nuclear Security Honesty, Integrity, Responsibility Good Equipment Condition Commitment to Procedures Learning and Improvement NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES THE ASSUMPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT IS WIDELY SHARED Threats of Malicious Acts by Insiders and Outsiders are Credible

31 Model Tailored to Fit Nuclear Facilities MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE WELL- DEVELOPED AND EFFECTIVE THE OUTCOME OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM IS ACHIEVED Enhanced Nuclear Security System Performance Visible Security Policy Staff Code of Conduct Clear Roles and Responsibilities Performance Measurement Good Work Environment Training and Qualification Work Management Information Control Material Accounting Systems Cyber-Protection Staff Screening BEHAVIORS FOSTER A HEALTHY SECURITY CULTURE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS Standards and Expectations Use of Authority Decision-Making Good Supervision Involvement of Staff Open Communications Improving Performance INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS (Apply to everyone) Professional Conduct Personal Accountability Following Procedures Teamwork and Collaboration Questioning and Reporting Open Communications SIMPLE PRINCIPLES ARE USED TO GUIDE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS (Examples) Quality Leadership Assurance Commitment to Nuclear Security Honesty, Integrity, Responsibility Change Management Good Equipment Condition Commitment to Procedures Learning and Improvement Operating Experience Feedback Contingency Plans and Drills NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES THE ASSUMPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT IS WIDELY SHARED Threats of Malicious Acts by Insiders and Outsiders are Credible

32 Model BEHAVIORS Tailored FOSTER to Fit A HEALTHY Nuclear SECURITY Facilities CULTURE THE OUTCOME OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM IS ACHIEVED Enhanced Nuclear Security System Performance MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE WELL- DEVELOPED AND EFFECTIVE Visible Security Policy Staff Code of Conduct Clear Roles and Responsibilities Performance Measurement Good Work Environment Training and Qualification Work Management Information Control Material Accounting Systems Cyber-Protection Staff Screening Quality Assurance Change Management Operating Experience Feedback Contingency Plans and Drills LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS Standards and Expectations Use of Authority Decision-Making Good Supervision Involvement of Staff Open Communications Improving Performance INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS (Apply to everyone) Professional Conduct Personal Accountability SIMPLE PRINCIPLES ARE USED TO GUIDE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS (Examples) Leadership Commitment to Nuclear Security Following Procedures Honesty, Integrity, Responsibility Good Equipment Condition Commitment to Procedures Learning and Improvement Teamwork and Collaboration Questioning and Reporting Open Communications NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES THE ASSUMPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT IS WIDELY SHARED Threats of Malicious Acts by Insiders and Outsiders are Credible

33 Model Tailored to Fit Nuclear Facilities THE OUTCOME OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM IS ACHIEVED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE WELL- DEVELOPED AND EFFECTIVE Visible Security Policy Staff Code of Conduct Clear Roles and Responsibilities Performance Measurement Good Work Environment Training and Qualification Work Management Information Control Material Accounting Systems Cyber-Protection Staff Screening Quality Assurance Change Management Operating Experience Feedback Contingency Plans and Drills BEHAVIORS FOSTER A HEALTHY SECURITY CULTURE Enhanced Nuclear Security System Performance LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS Standards and Expectations Use of Authority Decision-Making Good Supervision Involvement of Staff Open Communications Improving Performance INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS (Apply to everyone) Professional Conduct Personal Accountability Following Procedures Teamwork and Collaboration Questioning and Reporting Open Communications SIMPLE PRINCIPLES ARE USED TO GUIDE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS (Examples) Leadership Commitment to Nuclear Security Honesty, Integrity, Responsibility Good Equipment Condition Commitment to Procedures Learning and Improvement NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES THE ASSUMPTION OF A CREDIBLE THREAT IS WIDELY SHARED Threats of Malicious Acts by Insiders and Outsiders are Credible

34 Rationale for Evaluation Methodology IAEA Nuclear Security Series No 7 Implementing Guide, Nuclear Security Culture (2008) 28 Characteristics of Organizational Security Culture 120 Indicators of Good Organizational Security Culture IAEA Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture (2009) Three-Day Workshop Workshop Implies Exercises Exercises are Artificial Evaluation Tools Always asked Can this be used for Real Evaluation?

35 Evaluation Worksheets for Each of the 28 Characteristics

36 Collect Data from Worksheets to Indicate Weak Areas

37 BATAN S Nuclear Facilities Malaysia South China Sea Malaysia Brunei Philliphine North Pacific Ocean Sumatera Kalimantan Sulawesi JAWA Irian Jaya Serpong, Nuclear Research Center Yogyakarta, Nuclear Research Center AUSTRALIA Bandung, Nuclear Research Center 37

38 Self-Assessment Exercise: Scope Facility Number of employees Registered respondents Returned questionnaire Written Comments Yogyakarta Bandung Serpong

39 BATAN Conclusions from Evaluation Surprising that communications down is poor (started doing something about it immediately) Comforted in the fact that most felt security was important. Found that incentives for good management suggestions were not understood by Security Personnel. Plan to do reevaluation in a year or two to see if things have improved. Felt that the process itself was of value

40 Presentation of the Indonesia Experience in the following: NAYGN Meeting in Washington May 2013 IAEA Technical Meeting (April 2013) IAEA Conference on Nuclear Security (July 2013) INMM Annual Meeting (July 2013)

41 So, in Conclusion Security Culture is important It has finally been defined by the IAEA It can be measured to some degree Evaluation techniques have been used in Indonesia. Thank You for your attention

42 Anndria Gaerity Director, Emergency Services PSEG Nuclear, LLC

43 Susan Landahl Senior Vice President, Operations, Integration and Business Development Exelon Nuclear

44 A Leadership Perspective on Safety, Security, and Safeguards Culture Susan Landahl Senior Vice President Operations Integration and Business Development May 12, 2013

45 Overview of Exelon Ranked #1 Gas & Electric Utility in U.S. Fortune 500 $23.5 billion (USD) in annual revenues Over 34,000 MWe of Generating Capacity, of which over 19,000 MWe is Nuclear Traditional Transmission and Distribution Exelon Nuclear operates 17 reactors at 10 sites, plus operation of Fort Calhoun NPP U.S. leader in safety, efficiency and innovation Over 16,000 MWe of fossil and renewable energy ComEd distributes electricity to 3.8 million customers in Illinois PECO distributes electricity to 1.6 million customers and distributes gas to 500,000 customers in Southeast Pennsylvania BGE distributes electricity to 1.2 million customers and distributes gas to 700,000 customers in Northeast Maryland Joint venture (50.1% Exelon) CENG operates 5 reactors at 3 sites A leading competitive retail and wholesale energy supplier Over 1 million residential customers 45 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

46 Benefits of Fleet Operations Exelon Generation uses a comprehensive management system, known as the Exelon Nuclear Management Model, to manage its fleet of nuclear plants. The management model is documented in a suite of standardized policies, programs and procedures but its success is driven by a strong leadership team and effective independent oversight. Aligns the entire organization with a common vision, shared values, and a passion for performance excellence and stretch goals Fosters a strong safety culture (nuclear, industrial, radiological, environmental) Efficiently implements technical solutions through a design once, install many approach Uses Peer Groups to collectively drive initiatives and close performance gaps - Ensure the transfer of best practices and knowledge across the fleet - Drive continuous performance towards top quartile industry performance 46 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

47 Exelon Nuclear Security Established in 2008 due to poor performance at one of our stations Brought the Security function internal to Exelon - opened up career paths, promotional opportunities into other Site functions Security Manager reports to the Site Vice President Union representation varies depending on the Station Consistent programs, procedures, organization, performance indicators, etc. across the Fleet Strong Corporate Security Organization Security Operations Access Authorization Programs 47 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

48 Safety, Security, and Safeguards Culture Exelon uses an integrated approach to promote safety, security and safeguards at its nuclear facilities Safety - the measures used during the performance of all activities to protect the reactor core, plant systems, and the health and well-being of the public and Exelon employees. Programs which contribute to achieving safety include: - Fostering a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture - Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) - Industrial Safety Programs 48 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

49 Safety, Security, and Safeguards Culture Security - the measures used to assure effective cyber security, access control, prevention of radiological sabotage, and prevention of the theft of special nuclear material at nuclear facilities. Safeguards - the measures used (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material in quantities determined by the NRC to be significant to the public health and safety or the common defense and security. (Special Nuclear Material: material which can be made into a nuclear explosive device plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in U-233 or U-235) 49 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

50 What is Safeguards Information? Information not classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data which specifically identifies detailed control and accounting procedures for the physical protection of Special Nuclear Material Detailed security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of nuclear material Security measures for the physical protection of and location of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of the facility Any other information that could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of sabotage or theft or diversion of source, byproduct, or Special Nuclear Material 50 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

51 What Drives Nuclear Security in the United States? Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Energy Reorganization Act of CFR 73 Physical Protection of Plants and Materials The Energy Policy Act of 2005 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Oversight United States Department of Energy (DOE) Oversight 10 CFR 810 Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities Bilateral agreements ( 123 Agreements ) between the United States and other countries to allow the exchange of reactor technology for peaceful purposes 51 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

52 What Drives Nuclear Security Globally? IAEA International Conventions and Legal Agreements The IAEA is the world's center of cooperation in the nuclear field. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technologies A chief function of the IAEA is to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose IAEA NG-G-3.1, Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power Section 3.2, Nuclear Safety Section 3.6, Safeguards Section 3.15, Security and Physical Protection 52 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

53 Nuclear Facility Security Commercial nuclear power plants have a series of physical barriers, a trained security force, specific access authorization criteria, and an ongoing fitness-for-duty program Three primary areas of vulnerability: controls on the nuclear chain reaction, cooling systems, and spent fuel storage facilities After the events of 11 September 2001, Nuclear Security was elevated as a focus area for combating the threat of nuclear terrorism so as to prevent radiological sabotage a deliberate act against a plant that could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety through exposure to radiation 53 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

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55 Nuclear Facility Security (Continued) Nuclear employees Prior to employment, subject to: Background Investigation that includes both a criminal history and credit check Fitness For Duty screening Clinical/psychological evaluation Physical Fitness Test for Security Officer Candidates While at work, you are a part of a Behavioral Observation Program, random Fitness-for-Duty testing and periodic renewal of background checks and clinical evaluation 55 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

56 Nuclear Facility Security (Continued) To gain access to a U.S. nuclear facility All commercial deliveries inspected Personal vehicle search/inspection Personnel pass through explosive and metal detectors Hand carried items undergo X-ray and random search Alarming any detector or failure to follow process results in a hand pat down search 56 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

57 Nuclear Facility Security (Continued) To ensure intruders do not enter Multiple vehicle barriers Multiple layers of razor fencing Intrusion detection prior to entry Camera systems Video monitoring Armed Officer patrols and surveillance 57 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

58 Nuclear Facility Security (Continued) Cyber Security 10 CFR 73.54, Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks Reg. Guide 5.71, Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities Elements include: Multiple fire walls Data Diodes Tours and controls of Critical Digital Assets Maintenance and tracking protocols for interface with Critical Digital Assets Data Loss Prevention Program User understanding and engagement 58 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

59 At the Ready Periodic Training is Essential Integrated into normal shift rotation Triennial Force-on-Force exercises Hostile Action Drills taking EP drills to the next level Local/state/federal agency participation 59 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

60 Nuclear Security: Fundamental Beliefs of Leadership Safety Culture An organization s values and behaviors modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority. Nuclear safety is a collective responsibility. No one in the organization is exempt from the obligation to ensure safety first. Leadership has a critical role for maintaining an unwavering commitment to nuclear safety which includes periodic assessments of the health of the Safety Culture in their organizations Nuclear safety is our overriding priority 60 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

61 Nuclear Security - Leadership Obligations Communicate the importance of Security in protecting and safeguarding the nuclear facility Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique Set the vision and standards Establish the appropriate resources both personnel and monetary Include Security as part of the Team 61 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

62 Nuclear Security - Leadership Obligations (Continued) Demonstrate Support Walk the Talk Follow all security policies and procedures Maintain equipment and facilities Meet with security personnel to actively seek out their opinions and concerns Follow up on concerns to ensure that they are resolved in a timely manner Value the individuals and their roles in the organization 62 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.

63 What is a Security Culture? The superior man, when resting in safety, does not forget that danger may come. When in a state of security he does not forget the possibility of ruin. When all is orderly, he does not forget that disorder may come. Thus his person is not endangered, and his States and all their clans are preserved. - Confucius 63 This briefing is unclassified no safeguards material will be discussed.