Aishite imasu Group. The Presentation of Final Exercise. RTC on PP For Nuclear Materials and Facility
|
|
|
- Sharleen Day
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 RTC on PP For Nuclear Materials and Facility The Presentation of Final Exercise Aishite imasu Group On 19 th -30 th October, 2015 Japan Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Support center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security
2
3 The Members of Aishite imasu Group Position Title Family Name Given Name Organization Country Instuctor Mr Nakamura Yo ISCN, JAEA Japan Leader Ms Indragini JAEA Research Fellow / BATAN Indonesia Member Ms. De Jesus Teresita Guerrero Philippine Nuclear Research Institute Philippines Member Ms. Kraikaew Jarunee Office Atomic of Peace Thailand Member Member Member Member Mr. Artmonov Vitalii Viktorovich National Guard of Ukraine Ukraine Mr. Lathdavong Phonesavanh Mr. Ozkara Ali Ministry of Science and Technology Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEA) Laos Turkey Mr. Thon Mao Ministry of Mines and Energy Cambodia
4 OUTLINE Scenario Design Basis Threat Adversary Sequence Diagram Effectiveness of Existing PPS at Bugatti Effectiveness of Upgraded PPS at Bugatti 4
5 Scenario Bugatti management is concerned that the current PPS may not meet protection requirements to protect against a sabotage attack of the PTR reactor with potential HRC release; The adversary has 20kg of tools and explosives and required 45 seconds to perform sabotage at the target; Bugatti management has determined the minimum protection requirement for PPS effectiveness (PE) is or > 0.85 The Sabotage occurred during Night shift
6 DBT Adversary attributes and Characteristics Type of Adversary Likelihood of Potential Action Motivation Capabilities Attributes and Characteristics Number of attackers 6 Type of Weapons Explosive Transportation Power and Hand Tools Technical skill Level of Funding Infrastructure Insider Protestor, Criminal and Terrorist Theft, Sabotage Ideological, Economic Automatic Rifle High Explosive, many Large Truck Variety of hand tools Sophisticated use of high explosive Create a radiological release A lot of funding Some infrastructure Passive
7 Bugatti facility Diagram Offsite P3 Vehicle Entrance P4 Delivery Vehicle P 2 Personal Entrance P1 CAS building Concrete Fence Limited Access Areas Vehicle gate P8 Emergency vehicle gate Personal gate Fence Protected Areas D60 windows Main gate P6 Building Roof Reactor hall Roof Cooling Area 20cm Concrete Wall 30cm Concrete wall PTR Building D60 D60/1 Door 30cm Concrete wall Reactor hall Roof Cooling Area Reactor Hall
8 Existing PPS at Bugatti Facility
9 * * 2.5 meter concrete panel wall
10
11
12
13 Adversary Response time Description Unarmed Guard Local Police Military Alarm communication time Alarm assessment time Communication with GPM Preparation time Travel time Onsite Total response time
14
15
16 Response Response Force Number Night Cumulativ e number Time remaining No Jump With Jump PN Observation Guard Physical Local patrol Deadly Force Military
17 Existing PPS AT Bugatti-P E P E P I P N P I (MVP) : 0 P N : 0 P E : 0 17
18 Upgraded PPS
19 UPGRADING PPS AT LNRI PHYSICAL PROTECTION INTEGRATES: Personnel Procedures Equipment 19
20 Description Guard (with Rifle) Local Police (Barrack Inside the Facility) Military Alarm communication time Alarm assessment time Communication with GPM Preparation time Travel time On site deployment time Total response time
21
22
23 Upgrading Data for Detection, Delay and Response
24
25 * Local Police Video motion Guard
26 Vibration Sensor BMS Grid Mesh High S Padlock Video Motion Roof Light Active Infrared Sensor Glass Break Chain-link Fence
27 Response Response Force Number Night Cumulativ e number Time remaining No Jump With Jump PN Physical force Guard Physical force Local patrol Deadly Force Military
28 UPGRADING PPS AT Bugatti-P E P E P I P N Elements No Military With Military Notes PI (MVP) PN PE Path with Jump 28
29 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS Memorandum of Understanding Bugatti with other stakeholders: police and military - backup for normal and emergency situation - Joint exercise Lighting around facility to optimize assessment Location of Secondary Alarm system and Central Alarm System Sufficient training for guards Maintenance of equipment Performance Testing: subsystem and whole (personal-proceduresequipment) Insider Threat: Preventive and Protective Measures Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement and Education 29
30 Conclusion - Bugatti Facility is increasing the PPE Elements Before After PI PN PE For an Effective Physical Protection System, upgrading the following - Increase Probability of Detection (PD) by adding Intrusion Detection Sensors and number of personnel; - Increase delay time by adding delay barriers; - Decrease response time; - Increase number of competent response force; - Review procedures.
31 Learning Local language Countries Local Language English Philippines SALAMAT PO Cambodia Laos Ukraine Turkey Thailand Indonesia SAUM ARKOUN KHOP JAI DJA KU YU TER SEK KUR LER KHOP KHUN TERIMA KASIH Thank You Very mush
32 Thank you very much for your attention Any Question for Our Group?
M.Khaliq Division of Nuclear Security
IAEA Guidance: Overview of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) Methodology and Integration in the Nuclear Security Series M.Khaliq Division of Nuclear Security International Workshop on the Lessons Learned from
Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations After 11 September 2001
Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations After 11 September 2001 Joachim B. Fechner Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Bonn, Germany I. Introduction The terrorist
Development of Nuclear Security Culture. Shunsuke KONDO Chairman Japan Atomic Energy Commission
Development of Nuclear Security Culture Shunsuke KONDO Chairman Japan Atomic Energy Commission Commitment of Global Community to Strengthening of Nuclear Security 1 The possibility that nuclear or other
Yosuke Naoi Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Volume 2 Number 1 Education and Training Issue International Journal of Nuclear Security 11-30-2016 The Capacity-Building Support Activities of the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation
1 Introduction to ITC-26. Introduction to the ITC and DEPO. October 24 November 11, 2016 Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA Greg Baum
Introduction to the ITC and DEPO October 24 November 11, 2016 Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA Greg Baum L2 Learning Objectives After completing this module, you should be able to: Recognize the basic goal
Summary of Country Reports Current Status of 12 FNCA Member States
Summary of Country Reports Current Status of 12 FNCA Member States Naoki Kobayashi Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security(ISCN) Japan Atomic Energy Agency(JAEA) December
Overview of Physical Security and Protective Measures
Overview of Physical Security and Protective Measures NAVFAC Northwest Presented by: Richard Cofer, P.E. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic Capital Improvements Business Line Engineering Criteria
Protecting U.S. Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Re-assessing the Current Design Basis Threat Approach
Protecting U.S. Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Re-assessing the Current Design Basis Threat Approach Alan J. Kuperman and Lara Kirkham Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (www.nppp.org)
Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response Training and Capability Development in South East Asia
Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response Training and Capability Development in South East Asia Presented by Andrew Popp Regional Security of Radioactive Sources Project Andrew Popp, John Bus,
Modelling Missions of Light Forces
Modelling Missions of Light Forces Karl A. Bertsche Defence and Civil Systems Domier GmbH Friedrichshafen Germany Postal Address: 88039 FriedrichshafedGermany E-mail address: bertsche.karl@domier.dasa.de
STRENGTHENING THE NAVAL TRANSPORT PROTECTION CAPACITIES OF ROMANIAN GENDARMERIE
STRENGTHENING THE NAVAL TRANSPORT PROTECTION CAPACITIES OF ROMANIAN GENDARMERIE POTENTIAL THREATS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY Potential threats to nuclear security shipment involve criminals or terrorists acquiring
KINAC/INSA activities and views Nov. 29, 2016 Sung Soon Jang
The International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security KINAC/INSA activities and views Nov. 29, 2016 Sung Soon Jang Korean Center of Excellence - INSA
7Stockpile Management: Security
7Stockpile Management: Security Michael Ashkenazi Overview Stockpile security refers to the protection of ammunition, weapons, and explosives against any malevolent actions, including theft, sabotage,
Establishing Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme
Establishing Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme D. Jinchuk Office of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security International Atomic Energy Agency Outline Nuclear
Safety, Security and Safeguards Culture. Todd Cervini PD Committee Member NAYGN
Safety, Security and Safeguards Culture Todd Cervini PD Committee Member NAYGN PNNL-SA-. International Safeguards Culture North American Young Generation in Nuclear Washington, DC Steve Mladineo May 12,
Physical Protection Systems Education at PIEAS: Current Status, lessons Learned, and Future Prospects
Physical Protection Systems Education at PIEAS: Current Status, lessons Learned, and Future Prospects By Dr. Tariq Majeed Dr. Inam ul Haq Pakistan institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS)
Global Security Evolution
Global Nuclear Security Framework - Physical Protection of Nuclear Material & Facilities and Illicit Trafficking (IAEA role and Guidance) Global Security Evolution Cold War Post Cold War Post 9/11 Nation-States
Overview of Electronic Security Systems
Overview of Electronic Security Systems NAVFAC Northwest Presented by: Richard Cofer, P.E. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic Capital Improvements Business Line Engineering Criteria and Programs
William Tobey September 18, 2017
Cooperative Threat Reduction and the 2017 Threat Environment NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WORKSHOP ON COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS FOR THE NEXT 10 YEARS AND BEYOND William Tobey September 18,
Summary of Country Reports Current Status of 11 FNCA Member States*
Summary of Country Reports Current Status of 11 FNCA Member States* 7 th Workshop on Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project of Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA) September 20, 2017 *For ROK,
Nuclear Security Regime in Indonesia
Nuclear Security Regime in Indonesia Suharyanta Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) Counter Terrorism CBRNE An ASEAN Perspective Jakarta, 11 December 2013 Outline Introduction Scope of nuclear security
Capabilities for Using Chemical, Biological, How Serious is the WMD Terrorism Threat?: Terrorist Motivations and. Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons
How Serious is the WMD Terrorism Threat?: Terrorist Motivations and Capabilities for Using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons Gary Ackerman Director, WMD Terrorism Research Program
GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY PROGRAM OVERVIEW
GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY PROGRAM OVERVIEW GTRI Mission Mission: Reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide Goals:
Safeguards and Nuclear Security: Synergies, bridges and differences. Anita Nilsson, Jean-Maurice Crete, Miroslav Gregoric
Safeguards and Nuclear Security: Synergies, bridges and differences Anita Nilsson, Jean-Maurice Crete, Miroslav Gregoric Safeguards and Nuclear Security Synergies, bridges and differences From Greek sunergia,
ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION
Designing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative s Nuclear Security Education Program C. M. Marianno, W. S. Charlton, A. R. Contreras, K. Unlu, R. C. Lanza, G. E. Kohse ABSTRACT As part of the National
Public School Security Workshops
Public School Security Workshops Artesia: April 13, 1:00-4:00 PM Santa Rosa: April 16, 1:00-4:00 PM Albuquerque: April 17, 9:00 AM-12:00 PM Deming: April 19, 1:00 PM-4:00 PM Gallup: April 24, 9:00 AM-12:00
Security Programs for Category I or II Nuclear Material or Certain Nuclear Facilities
REGULATORY GUIDE Security Programs for Category I or II Nuclear Material or Certain Nuclear Facilities G-274 March 2003 REGULATORY DOCUMENTS The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) operates within
STRENGTHENING REGULATORY REQUERMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN INDONESIA BASED ON INFCIRC 225 REV.5. Presented by : Suharyanta BAPETEN
STRENGTHENING REGULATORY REQUERMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN INDONESIA BASED ON INFCIRC 225 REV.5 Presented by : Suharyanta BAPETEN International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Defense-in-Depth in Understanding and Countering Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
Defense-in-Depth in Understanding and Countering Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Charles D. Ferguson President Federation of American Scientists Presentation to Countering Nuclear and Radiological Threats
Overview of Safeguards, Security, and Treaty Verification
Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header Overview of Safeguards, Security, and Treaty Verification Matthew R. Sternat, Ph.D. Sandia National Laboratories
UNCLASSIFIED. R-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE PE A: Landmine Warfare and Barrier Advanced Technology FY 2012 OCO
Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2012 Army DATE: February 2011 COST ($ in Millions) FY 2010 FY 2011 Base OCO Total FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 Cost To Complete Total Cost Total Program
ARMY RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION (R2 Exhibit)
Exhibit R-2 0602712A Countermine Systems ARMY RDT&E BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION (R2 Exhibit) FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 Total Program Element (PE) Cost 26267 29171 22088 21965
Civil Protection Operational Management Plan of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (Provisional translation)
Civil Protection Operational Management Plan of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (Provisional translation) Revised: April 2016 Revised: December 2015 Revised: May 2013 First published: December 2005 Japan Atomic
International Joint Efforts to Address Training Needs in Nuclear Security International Symposium on Nuclear Security 30 March 3 April 2009 Vienna,
International Joint Efforts to Address Training Needs in Nuclear Security International Symposium on Nuclear Security 30 March 3 April 2009 Vienna, Austria International Joint Efforts to Address Training
Introduction to Physical Security
Introduction to Physical Security September 2017 Center for Development of Security Excellence Lesson 1: Course Introduction Introduction Welcome Every day, on our military installations and within DoD
Nuclear Security in China
China Atomic Energy Authority Nuclear Security in China QU Zhimin China Atomic Energy Authority 30 March to 3 April 2009 Vienna, Austria International Symposium on Nuclear Security Contents China's Infrastructure
UNCLASSIFIED. R-1 Program Element (Number/Name) PE A / Landmine Warfare and Barrier Advanced Technology. Prior Years FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015
Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2015 Army Date: March 2014 2040: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Army / BA 3: Advanced Technology Development (ATD) COST ($ in Millions) Prior
APPROACHES TO DESIGN BASIS THREAT IN RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
APPROACHES TO DESIGN BASIS THREAT IN RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY Dmitry Kovchegin Harvard University 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA 617/384-8166
Introduction to Nuclear Security and Threats of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism. Charles D. Ferguson, Ph.D.
Introduction to Nuclear Security and Threats of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Charles D. Ferguson, Ph.D. Board Director, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board cferguson@nas.edu March 16, 2018 Presentation
MANUAL FOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS
DOE M 5632.1C-1 Change 1: 4-10-96 MANUAL FOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS U.S. Department of Energy Office of Security Affairs Office of Safeguards and Security DISTRIBUTION:
JAEA s Instructor Training Program for Asian Countries. Nuclear Human Resource Development Center (NuHRDeC) Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)
JAEA JAEA s Instructor Training Program for Asian Countries Nuclear Human Resource Development Center (NuHRDeC) Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) 1 Contents Introduction Instructor Training Program Instructor
The Integral TNO Approach to NAVY R&D
NAVAL PLATFORMS The Integral TNO Approach to NAVY R&D TNO Knowledge for Business Source: AVDKM Key elements to TNO s integral approach in support of naval platform development are operational effectiveness,
Protecting Our Nation. A Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
Protecting Our Nation A Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Shyrl Coker Sarah Loh Rebecca Richardson Jeffrey Riley Rebecca
Note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee
United Nations S/AC.44/2013/10 Security Council Distr.: General 15 July 2013 Original: English Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) Note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from
Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence in Northeast Asia
Session IV Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security () Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence in Northeast Asia Kazuko HAMADA Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation
HALL GREEN SCHOOL. LOCKDOWN PROCEDURES July Adopted: 25 May 2016 Next Review: July 2017 Next Review: July Mrs J Owen Chair of Governors
HALL GREEN SCHOOL LOCKDOWN PROCEDURES July 2017 Adopted: 25 May 2016 Next Review: July 2017 Next Review: July 2018 Governing Committee: Responsibility: Finance and General Purposes Committee Mr D Adams
Planning Terrorism Counteraction ANTITERRORISM
CHAPTER 18 Planning Terrorism Counteraction At Army installations worldwide, terrorism counteraction is being planned, practiced, assessed, updated, and carried out. Ideally, the total Army community helps
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY UNITED STA TES NAVAL ACADEMY 121 BLAKE ROAD ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY UNITED STA TES NAVAL ACADEMY 121 BLAKE ROAD ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21402-1300 USNA INSTRUCTION 3100.1A USNAINST 3100.1A 6/IT 2 O SEP 2006 From: Subj: Superintendent SPECIAL INCIDENT
Risk Analysis for Army Property
Department of the Army Pamphlet 190 51 Military Police Risk Analysis for Army Property Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 30 September 1993 Unclassified SUMMARY of CHANGE DA PAM 190 51
Nuclear Security Legal and Regulatory Framework in UAE. Saif Al Kaabi Director, Nuclear Security Department
Nuclear Security Legal and Regulatory Framework in UAE Saif Al Kaabi Director, Nuclear Security Department Presentation Outlines UAE Policy UAE party to International Instruments Cooperation with International
Thwarting the Modern Terrorist at Hotels and Special Events
Thwarting the Modern Terrorist at Hotels and Special Events Agenda Introduction Attacks on Special Events Attacks on Hotels Diagnosis of Tactics Utilized Mitigation Strategies Questions Closing Special
International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities Vienna, Austria Nov 16 th, 2017
Protection against unauthorized removal of nuclear material during use, storage and transport and sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities in Finland International Conference on Physical Protection
Self-Checklist of Audit for Issuing Interim ISSC
Self-Checklist of Audit for Issuing Interim ISSC Record No. Name of Ship Flag Name of Company Date of Checking Initiation Date of SSP implementation onboard the ship Place Checked by Is the copy of valid
805A-36A-6162 Ensure the Physical Security Compliance of a Disbursing Office Status: Approved
Report Date: 13 Apr 2018 805A-36A-6162 Ensure the Physical Security Compliance of a Disbursing Office Status: Approved Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4. Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
[National Security Presidential Directives -17] HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4 Unclassified version December 2002 Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction "The gravest
REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF UNPLANNED EXPLOSIONS AT MUNITIONS SITES (UEMS)
REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF UNPLANNED EXPLOSIONS AT MUNITIONS SITES (UEMS) PREPARED FOR Meeting of Experts on CCW Protocol V 10-11 April 2013 PRESENTED BY Steve BROWN Senior Technical Officer, NSPA General
Nuclear Terrorism: Threat Briefing How Serious is the Threat?
How Serious is the Threat? Nuclear Security Summit April 12-13, 2010 Nuclear terrorism is the most serious danger the world is facing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former director of the IAEA and winner of the 2005
MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 January 1999 PAGE 1 OF 9
MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY POLICY AND PROCEDURE #49 SUBJECT: Building Checks and Searches EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 January 1999 PAGE 1 OF 9 REVIEW DATE: 30 November 2017
Nuclear & Radiological Field Training Center. Don Bowes National Security Complex Oak Ridge, Tennessee (865)
Nuclear & Radiological Field Training Center Don Bowes National Security Complex Oak Ridge, Tennessee (865) 241-8975 bowesdg@y12.doe.gov VISION The Nuclear & Radiological Field Training Center serves as
Santa Ana Police Department
355 Procedures for the Use of the Special Weapons and Tactics Team Santa Ana Police Department Department Order #355 - Procedures for the Use of the Special Weapons and Tactics Team 355 Procedures for
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Kim R. Fowler KSU ECE February 2013
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Kim R. Fowler KSU ECE February 2013 Purpose for FTA In the face of potential failures, determine if design must change to improve: Reliability Safety Operation Secondary purposes:
Nuclear material security in Thailand
Nuclear material security in Thailand Ms. Jarunee Kraikaew (Nuclear Chemist, Senior level) Nuclear non-proliferation center (NPC) Bureau of Technical Support for Safety Regulation (BTSR) Office of Atoms
City of Waterbury Safety & Security Assessment
City of Waterbury Safety & Security Assessment Dear School Official, Pursuant to guidelines set forth by the Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness and the Department of Homeland Security,
Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities
Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities Mark Holt Specialist in Energy Policy Anthony Andrews Specialist in Energy and Defense Policy August 23, 2010 Congressional Research Service CRS Report
GAO. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION Further Actions Needed by U.S. Agencies to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear and Radiological Materials
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT Wednesday, March 14, 2012 United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Training Design for PPSM of Radioactive Source in Indonesia
Training Design for PPSM of Radioactive Source in Indonesia Yustina Tri Handayani BATAN NATIONAL NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY BATAN INDONESIA 1 INTRODUCTION PPSM of radioactive source : to ensure security of
UNCLASSIFIED. R-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE PE D8Z: Nuclear and Conventional Physical Security/Countering Nuclear Threats FY 2013 OCO
Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2013 Office of Secretary Of Defense DATE: February 2012 COST ($ in Millions) FY 2011 FY 2012 Base Physical OCO Total FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 To
HANFORD PATROL TRAINING ACADEMY , Credit Recommendation Guide
HANFORD PATROL TRAINING ACADEMY 1987 2004,2008 2009 Credit Recommendation Guide The following courses have been evaluated by Corporate Articulation to potentially fulfill General Education or Elective
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT (NPD) WORK PLAN
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT (NPD) WORK PLAN Context: Participants in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have indicated the desire to advance the focus of the organization beyond
Legal and Regulatory Framework of Nuclear Security in Indonesia
Legal and Regulatory Framework of Nuclear Security in Indonesia Dahlia Cakrawati Sinaga Installation and Licensing Directorate of Nuclear Material Nuclear Energy Agency Abstract Nuclear security is one
DISTRICT SECURITY OFFICER
PERSONNEL COMMISSION Class Code: 5202 Salary Range: 24 (C1) DISTRICT SECURITY OFFICER JOB SUMMARY Under general direction, patrol and monitor District properties to protect District property against vandalism,
Department of Defense INSTRUCTION. DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)
Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5210.83 July 12, 2012 Incorporating Change 1, Effective February 22, 2018 USD(I) SUBJECT: DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) References: See
Insider Mitigation Program for Nuclear Facilities. Joe Rivers Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Insider Mitigation Program for Nuclear Facilities Joe Rivers Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Concept of the Insider Threat Is Not New Quis custodiet
83 rd Legislative Session Passed House Concurrent Resolution No. 219 in support of the Establishment of a Regional Center for Public Safety
83 rd Legislative Session Passed House Concurrent Resolution No. 219 in support of the Establishment of a Regional Center for Public Safety Excellence 1 SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE Created in 1993 by Texas Senate
Building Services Manager (BSM) then Bursar through to the Head. Assisting the BSM in managing the Cleaning Staff
Old Palace of John Whitgift School Caretaker JOB DESCRIPTION Reports to: Responsible for: Building Services Manager (BSM) then Bursar through to the Head Assisting the BSM in managing the Cleaning Staff
Nuclear/Radiological Outreach
Nuclear/Radiological Outreach Bernadette R. Bland, Supervisory Special Agent Countermeasures Oscar R. Hernandez, SNL IPA Intelligence Analysis OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1 Overview FBI Jurisdiction WMD Directorate
Details of Study Report 1 1 Introduction 2 International Emergency Response Systems 3 Present Situation and Approach in East Asia 4 Conclusion
Study on How to Build Nuclear Emergency Response Systems in East Asia Fumihiro Ochi Researcher Nuclear Energy Group, Strategy Research Unit The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan September 14, 2015 Details
UNCLASSIFIED. R-1 Program Element (Number/Name) PE A / Nuclear Arms Control Monitoring Sensor Network. Prior Years FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015
Exhibit R2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2015 Army : March 2014 2040: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Army / BA 5: System Development & Demonstration (SDD) COST ($ in Millions) Years FY
NATO MEASURES ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
NATO MEASURES ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Executive Summary Proliferation of WMD NATO s 2009 Comprehensive
UNCLASSIFIED FY 2009 RDT&E,N BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET DATE: February 2008 Exhibit R-2
Exhibit R-2 PROGRAM ELEMENT: 0605155N PROGRAM ELEMENT TITLE: FLEET TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION COST: (Dollars in Thousands) Project Number & Title FY 2007 Actual FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations Non Intrusive Inspection (NII) Division Official Presentation July 2005 1 NII Program History In 1995, the U.S. Customs Service developed a
In order to cross the walls of the city, not a single act of violence was needed. All that was needed was the good faith and naivety of the enemy.
Speech by the Chief of Defence of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands, Admiral Rob Bauer, at the International Operational Cyber Symposium on October 26 th 2017, Amsterdam Note: check against delivery!
Make your way to the back of the exhibition space and find the Trabant car
Activity trail Key stage 3 & 4 Cold War Trail 1. Germany divided: East and West Make your way to the back of the exhibition space and find the Trabant car Who owned this car? Was this car easy to get hold
Washington State Patrol
Washington State Patrol Vessel and Terminal Security Division Operations Briefing Presented to: AAPA Port Security Seminar July 19, 2006 For Official Use Only 1 Mission Statement: The Vessel and Terminal
Coordination for Emergencies is provided by Republic Act No , (Approved 27 May 2010) An Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk
Coordination for Emergencies is provided by Republic Act No. 10121, (Approved 27 May 2010) An Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System, providing for the National
Radiological Terrorism: Introduction
Radiological Terrorism: Introduction The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Attack against or sabotage of a
Recommended Work Keys Scores for Law Enforcement
Great Oaks Law Enforcement Essential Skills Profile This profile provides an outline of the skills required for successful completion of this career program. Additional information is located on the Great
UNCLASSIFIED FY 2008/2009 RDT&E,N BUDGET ITEM JUSTIFICATION SHEET DATE: February 2007 Exhibit R-2
Exhibit R-2 PROGRAM ELEMENT: 0605155N PROGRAM ELEMENT TITLE: FLEET TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION COST: (Dollars in Thousands) Project Number & Title FY 2006 Actual FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010
Active Shooter Guideline
1. Purpose: This procedure establishes guidelines for Monterey County Public Safety Personnel who respond to Active Shooter Incidents (ASI). The goal is to provide effective rescue and treatment procedures,
GAO. COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries.
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT Tuesday, June 21, 2005 United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Subcommittees on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Department of Defense INSTRUCTION
Department of Defense INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5100.76 February 28, 2014 USD(I) SUBJECT: Safeguarding Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) References: See Enclosure 1 1. PURPOSE. This
Fukushima and JSDF Difficult communication between off-site and on-site
Fukushima and JSDF Difficult communication between off-site and on-site 19 march 2014 Senior Research Manager, SHIGEMATSU WORKS CO., LTD (Ex-Deputy Commandant of Chemical School GSDF) Major General(Retired)
DEPUTY SHERIFF-OPERATIONS
1. 4. 5. Monterey County DEPUTY SHERIFF-OPERATIONS DEFINITION Under general supervision, to patrol an assigned area and enforce state and local laws, perform crime prevention and crime detection activities,
1 Background. 1.1 Deliberate Attacks. 1.2 Natural Hazards/Accidents
Potential Indicators, Common Vulnerabilities, and Protective Measures: Religious Facilities April 2014 1 Background The United States has approximately 345,000 religious congregations consisting of about
San Francisco Bay Area
San Francisco Bay Area PREVENTIVE RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DETECTION REGIONAL PROGRAM STRATEGY Revision 0 DRAFT 20 October 2014 Please send any comments regarding this document to: Chemical, Biological,
Licensing Process of Physical Protection System of Nuclear Material & Facilities in Pakistan
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Licensing Process of Physical Protection System of Nuclear Material & Facilities in Pakistan Mr. Mahboob Ali Member (Executive) Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
Combating Terrorism: Prevention, Protection & Response
13-14 June 2016 Hong Kong Combating Terrorism: Prevention, Protection & Response Nowhere to run, Nowhere to hide Key Benefits of Attending This Workshop: UNDERSTAND why defining and labeling terrorism
COORDINATING CB ENGAGEMENT SCENARIOS WITH THE CBRN DATA MODEL
COORDINATING CB ENGAGEMENT SCENARIOS WITH THE CBRN DATA MODEL by Stephen Helmreich Computing Research Laboratory / NMSU Sundara Vadlamudi,, Markus Binder Monterey Institute of International Studies OUTLINE
Jordan Nuclear Security Measures
Jordan Nuclear Security Measures 1 Agenda Introduction Prioritized Threats National Committees Legal Framework National Capabilities Roles and Responsibilities 2 Prioritized Threats Security of Nuclear
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND. Sofia May 2014 Bulgaria
7- th Conventional armament and ammunition reduction workshop Sofia 12 15 May 2014 Bulgaria JOC/J-4 Maintenance officer major Ljupco Karanfilovski 1 AGENDA National excess(surplus) Staff training for physical