Central Service Association Of Ontario Fahrenheit 270. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Transcription

1 Central Service Association Of Ontario Fahrenheit 270 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

2

3

4 ISMP CANADA Vision Independent nonprofit Canadian organization Established for: the collection and analysis of medication error reports and the development of recommendations for the enhancement of patient safety. Serves as a national resource for promoting safe medication practices throughout the health care community in Canada.

5 ISMP Canada Mission: Committed to the safe use of medication through improvement in drug distribution and drug delivery system design. Collaborate with healthcare practitioners and institutions, schools, professional organizations, pharmaceutical industry and regulatory & government agencies to provide education about adverse drug events and their prevention

6 Objectives To introduce the principle and application of FMEA tool/process To discuss its application in healthcare facilities To briefly review the FMEA process

7 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis ISMP Canada one day workshop 4 exercises of minutes Practce on your own issues

8 Human Factors Engineering 101 HFE: a discipline concerned with design of systems, tools, processes, machines that take into account human capabilities, limitations, and characteristics

9 Human Factors Engineering Research and practical applications designed to improve the interface of humans with systems Develops practical design principles that account for the psychological and physical characteristics of people

10 Human Factors Engineering Principles Simplify key processes Standardize work processes Anticipate that human make errors Use checklists Improve label design Promote effective team functioning

11 Constraint: Hydromorphone 10 mg was removed

12 The Brain Flip Needed in HealthCare Engineering Begin with premise that anything can and will go wrong Don t expect humans to perform perfectly or without variation Design systems accordingly and are proactive Health Care Errors are the result of human failures Humans generally perform flawlessly Perfect performance is the expectation Use re-training, and punishment to root out bad apples

13 Human Factors Guiding Principle Fit the task or tool to the human, not the other way around.

14 High Reliability Organizations (HRO) Characteristics Collective preoccupation with the possibility of failure Expect to make errors and train their workforce to recognize and recover from them Continual rehearsal of familiar scenarios of failure

15

16 FMEA Definition FMEA is a team-based systematic and proactive approach for identifying the ways that a process or design can fail, why it might fail, the effects of that failure and how it can be made safer. FMEA focuses on how and when a system will fail, not IF it will fail.

17 Why FMEA? Brings analysis logic into the hospital Is a proactive approach for quality and safety Initiates system fixes before a patient dies or is injured Makes systems more robust and enhances performance Makes systems more fault tolerant Focuses on systems, not individuals

18 Everyday FMEA Do you take actions to prevent yourself from being late to work? Do you take a shortcut when you see traffic building up in a familiar place? Do you try to distinguish big problems from little problems? Do you see the possibility of eliminating some problems, but need a better way to show that to people? Yes No

19 FMEA versus RCA (when to use) FMEA = Future (preventative) RCA = Retrospective (after the event or close call)

20 FMEA Origins FMEA in use more than 40 years beginning in aerospace in the 1960s 1970s and 1980s used in other fields such as nuclear power, aviation, chemical, electronics and food processing fields ( High Reliability Organizations) Automotive industry requires it from suppliers, reducing the after-the the-fact corrective actions

21 FMEA is a tool to: Analyze a process to see where it is likely to fail. See how changes you are considering might affect the safety of the process.

22 CCHSA Patient Safety Goals 2005 Create a culture of safety within the organization The organization has in place a formal team/committee whose sole focus is patient safety, and that does one proactive RCA or FMEA a year.

23 FMEA Steps Step 1 Step 2 Select process and assemble the team Diagram the process Step 3 Step 4 Brainstorm potential failure modes and determine their effects Identify the causes of failure modes

24 FMEA Steps (cont) Step 5 Prioritize failure modes Step 6 Redesign the processes Step 7 Analyze and test the changes Step 8 Implement and monitor the redesigned processes

25 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Select a high risk process and assemble the team

26 Select a high-risk process Internal data aggregate data, significant individual events Sentinel Events CCHSA Patient Safety Goals ISMP Canada Executive buy-in Select processes with high potential for having an adverse impact on the safety of individuals served.

27 High Risk Processes - Definition Those processes in which a failure of some type is most likely to jeopardize the safety of the individuals served by the health care organization. Such process failures may result in a sentinel event.

28 High Risk Processes - Examples Medication Use Operative and other procedures Blood use and blood components Restraints Infection control Care provided to high-risk population Emergency or resuscitation care

29 Assemble a team Leader Facilitator Scribe / Recorder Process experts Include all areas involved in the process Outsider /Naïve person 6-10 optimal number

30 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Select a high risk process and assemble the team Diagram the Process

31 Diagram (flow chart) the process Define beginning and end of process under analysis Chart the process as it is normally done Using the collective process knowledge of the team, a flow chart is sketched.

32 Why diagram the process? Diagrams clarify things between members Narrows the topic goes from broad topic e.g. narcotic use process to narrow topic e.g. morphine removed from narcotic drawer

33 Narcotic Drug Use Process Number Basic Steps Receive drugs from Pharmacy vendor Check drugs into pharmacy Dispense to patient care area Remove from stock one dose at a time as patients request medication Administer drug to patient Document drug administration and record waste

34 Narcotic Drug Use Process Select One Portion of Process at a Time to Diagram Receive drugs from Pharmacy vendor Check drugs into pharmacy Dispense to patient care area Remove from stock one dose at a time as patients request medication Administer drug to patient Document drug administration and record waste

35 Narcotic Drug Use Process Diagram the Sub-Process Steps Receive request from Patient Care Area Technician pulls drug from Narcotic vault / cabinet Narcotic and request set out to be checked Pharmacist checks drug against request Technician assembles drug(s) Technician hand carries to the Patient Care Area

36 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Select a high risk process and assemble the team Diagram the Process Brainstorm potential failure modes

37 Brainstorm potential failure modes 1. People 2. Materials 3. Equipment 4. Methods 5. Environment Failure modes answer the WHAT could go wrong question

38 Handy Hints Failure Modes are the WHATs that could go wrong Failure Mode Causes are the WHY s May be more than one cause for each failure

39 Narcotic Drug Use Process Potential Failure Modes 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F Receive request from Patient Care Area Technician pulls drug from Narcotic vault / cabinet Narcotic and request set out to be checked Pharmacist checks drug against request Technician assembles drug(s) Technician hand carries to the Patient Care Area Request never received Technician pulls wrong drug Technician forgets to set out on counter Pharmacist doesn t check Technician grabs partial Technician drops drug or request Pharmacy is closed Technician doesn t pull drug Drug diverted while sitting out on counter Pharmacist checks only part of request Technician grabs order for closed unit Technician hijacked on way to patient care area Request is blank Technician pulls wrong quantity Drug slips off the counter or falls through crack Pharmacist checks inaccurately Technician mixes up drugs and requests Technician mixes up drugs and requests Process Steps Potential Failure Modes

40 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Select a high risk process and assemble the team Diagram the Process Identify Failure Modes Identify Effects And Causes

41 Effects of the Failure Modes Review each failure mode and identify the effects of the failure should it occur May be 1 effect or > 1 Must be thorough because it feeds into the risk rating If failure occurs, then what are the consequences

42 Identify root causes of failure modes Focus on systems & processes, not individuals Asks why?, not who? Prospective application of RCA Critical to identify all root causes and their interactions

43 Single Point Weakness A step so critical that its failure will result in a system failure or adverse event Single point weaknesses and existing control measures modify the scoring Single point weaknesses should all be acted upon IF effective control measures are in place, it would cancel the need to take further action (risk is mitigated)

44 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Select a high risk process and assemble the team Diagram the Process Brainstorm potential failure modes and determine their effects Identify causes of failure modes Step 5 Prioritize Failure Modes

45 Prioritize failure modes Score severity of effect of failure mode Score frequency of occurrence of failure mode Score likelihood of detection (detectability)) of failure prior to the impact of the effect being realized

46 Severity The seriousness and severity of the effect (to the process or system or patient) of a failure if it should occur. Severity Description Score No effect 1 Slight 2 Moderate 3 Major 4 Severe / Catastrophic 5 Score based upon a reasonable worst case scenario

47 Frequency Also known as occurrence it is the likelihood or number of times a specific failure (mode) could occur Frequency Description Score Yearly 1 Monthly 2 Weekly 3 Daily 4 Hourly 5

48 Detectability The likelihood of detecting a failure or the effect of a failure BEFORE it occurs Detectability Description Score Always 1 Likely 2 Unlikely 3 Never 4 Many events are detectable or obvious after they occur but that is not a FMEA detectable event by definition.

49 Examples of Detectability Break away locks Emergency drug boxes with pop up pin Ampoules Low battery alarm

50 Calculate the Risk Priority Number Determine the impact of the failure on the patient or the system using the severity, frequency and detectability parameters Multiply three scores to obtain a Risk Priority Number (RPN) or Criticality Index (CI) Also assign priority to those with a high severity score even though the RPN may be relatively low RPN = Severity x Occurrence x Detection

51 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Select a high risk process and assemble the team Diagram the Process Brainstorm potential failure modes and determine their effects Identify causes of failure modes Step 5 Step 6 Prioritize Failure Modes Redesign the Process

52 Redesign the process Apply strategies to decrease occurrence, decrease severity, or increase detection Goal: prevent harm to the patient Simplification, automation, standardization, fail-safe mechanisms, forcing functions, redundancy

53 Evaluating Redesign Options Don t just pick training and policy development. They are basic actions but not very strong or long lasting Go for the permanent fixes when possible Elimination of the step or the function is a very strong action Most actions are really controls on the system Sometimes your team might have to accept some of the failure modes as un-fixable

54 Rank Order of Error Reduction Strategies 1. Forcing functions and constraints 2. Automation and computerization 3. Simplify, standardize and differentiate 4. Reminders, check lists and double check systems 5. Rules and policies 6. Education 7. Information 8. Punishment (no value)

55 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Select a high risk process and assemble the team Diagram the Process Brainstorm potential failure modes and determine their effects Identify causes of failure modes Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Prioritize Failure Modes Redesign the Process Analyze and Test the Changes

56 Analyze and test the changes Conduct FMEA of re- designed process Use simulation testing whenever possible Conduct pilot testing in one area or one section

57 FMEA Process Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Select a High Risk Process and Assemble a Team Diagram the Process Brainstorm Potential Failure Modes and Determine Their Effects Identify Causes of Failure Modes Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Step 8 Prioritize Failure Modes Redesign the Process Analyze and Test the Changes Implement and Monitor the Redesigned Processes

58 Implement and monitor the redesigned process Communicate reasons for process changes Find change agents Define process and outcome measures Share results Monitor over time

59 Gains using FMEA Safety minded culture Proactive problem resolution Robust systems Fault tolerant systems Lower waste and higher quality

60 Emphasis on prevention may reduce risk of harm to both patients and staff. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), IHI and Quality Health Care.org, 2003

61 References McDermott- The Basics of FMEA Stamatis Failure Mode Effect Analysis: FMEA from Theory to Execution (2 nd ed) JCAHO Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Health Care. Proactive Risk Reduction Manasse, Thompson (Lin, Burkhardt) -Logical Application of Human Factors In Process and Equipment Design (in press).