NATO UNCLASSIFIED. 28 August 2013 WORKING PAPER AC/334-WP(2013)0029 WORKING GROUP OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL EXPERTS

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1 28 August 2013 WORKING PAPER AC/334-WP(2013)0029 WORKING GROUP OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL EXPERTS NCIA TBCE FUNCTIONAL SERVICES FOR COMMAND & CONTROL (C2) OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) DEFENCE CAPABILITIES PROJECT 2011/0IS Enclosed you can find a copy of above-mentioned document submitted by NCIA that is scheduled for discussion at the AC/334 (WGNTE) meeting to be held on 23 rd September Enclosure 1: NCIA TBCE CBRN FS PROJECT 2011/0IS03078I Original: English K:\07_MI\Technology Implementation\WGNTE Joint\WP 2013\AC_334_WP_2013_0029.doc -1- DMS

2 Enclosure AC/334-WP(2013)0029 TYPE B COST ESTIMATE Functional Services for Command and Control (C2) of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Capabilities (SHORT TITLE: CBRN FS) CP NUMBER 9C0107 (PART) PROJECT 2011/0IS03078 Page 1 of 75

3 Table of Contents 1. REFERENCES BACKGROUND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS CURRENT CAPABILITIES BUSINESS CASE PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT INTERDEPENDENCIES ASSUMPTIONS RISK MANAGEMENT PROCUREMENT STRATEGY SCHEDULE REQUIRED RESOURCES PROJECT MANAGEMENT ABBREVIATIONS ANNEX A : CBRN-FS INCREMENT 1 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANNEX B : CBRN-FS OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE INCREMENTS ANNEX C : INVESTMENT COST ESTIMATE FOR ICB CONTRACT (WP1) ANNEX D: INVESTMENT COST ESTIMATE FOR EA LICENSE PROCUREMENT (WP2) ANNEX E: SCOPE OF INTERNAL ENGINEERING SERVICES (WP3) Page 2 of 75

4 1. References 1.1. Project References A. AC/4(PP)N(2012) BC-D(2012)0019, Capability Package 9C0107 Functional Services for Command and Control of Operations Capability Package Implementation Plan (PIP), 21 Feb B. C-M(2011)0100-AS1, 12 Dec C TSC FCX 0010/SER: NU 0185: Allied Command Transformation, Project Mandate for Project Functional Services for CBRN Defence, 13 April D. AC/4-DS(2012)0019, CBRN-FS Advance Planning Funds (APF) Authorization, 10 July E TSC FEE 0010/SER: NU 0265: CBRN User Requirements to enable TBCE, 1 May General References F. STANAG 2451 Allied Joint Doctrine For Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence, AJP-3.8 Edition A Version 1, 30 March 2012 G. ATP-45(D) - Allied Tactical Publication 45: Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Incidents (Operators Manual) [STANAG 2103 CBRN (Edition 10)], 26 May H. AEP-10 - Allied Engineering Publication 10: NATO Handbook for Sampling and Identification of Biological and Chemical Agents (Procedures and Techniques) [STANAG 4359 (Edition 1)] 29 January I. AEP-45(C) - Allied Engineering Publication 45: Programmers manual for reporting nuclear detonations, biological and chemical attacks, and predicting and warning of associated hazards and hazard areas [STANAG 2497], December J. AEP-49 - Allied Engineering Publication 49: NATO Handbook for Sampling and identification of Radiological Agents (SIRA) (Operational) [STANAG 4590 Edition 1], 15 January K. AEP-66 - Allied Engineering Publication 66 Edition 1: NATO Handbook for Sampling And Identification Of Biological, Chemical, And Radiological Agents (SIBCRA), the document has not yet been ratified. L. ACO Directive 75-3, CBRN Defence Organisation, Equipment and Training for ACO Headquarters under OPCOM/OPCON of SACEUR, 10 November M. SH/J5/PDX/ , 3000 TC-50 Ser: NC0008. Bi-SC Guidance for Defence Planning (GDP) 2005, Vol 11, Annex A Military Function 01 : Command and Control. Page 3 of 75

5 N. AC/4-D(2007) Non-Article 5 NATO led operations NSIP Procurement Regulations Framework Document, 13 July O. AC/4-D(2008)0002-REV1 - Procedures And Practices For Conducting NSIP International Competitive Bidding Using Best Value Evaluation Methodology, 27 April P. AC/322-N(2012) Minimum Level Of Command And Control (C2) Services Capabilities In support of Joint NATO Operations in a Land Based Environment, 25 January, Q. AAP-6, NATO Glossary Of Terms And Definitions (English And French) R. MC 0603, NATO Comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Concept, 4 Dec S. RFI-ACT-SACT , NATO Standard CBRN Sensor Interface,11 January T. JHQ SOP 214, Operations in a CBRN Environment, 28 Nov U. Bi-SC CIS Community Security Requirement Statement (CSRS) Version 1.0, 23 Aug 2005 V. International Telecommunication Union, Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Recommendation X.1303 (ITU), Common Alerting Protocol (CAP), September W. Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL) Distribution Element, v. 1.0, OASIS Standard EDXL-DE v1.0, 1 May X. Bi-SC Capability Package 0A1303 Revision 1, Provide Ballistic Missile Defence Capabilities Y. AC/259(MD-PG)D(2012)0001, Ballistic Missile Defence NATO Staff Requirement, 2 Nov 2012 Z. MC 0590 (Final) NATO Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear (CBRN) Reach Back And Fusion Concept, 12 Aug Background 2.1. Source Capability Package The Project 0IS03078 Provide Functional Services for Command and Control of Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Defence (in short CBRN-FS ) Increment-1 is included in the Capability Package (CP) 9C0107 Functional Services for Command and Control of Operations, [Reference A]. The CP 9C0107 was approved by North Atlantic Council at Reference B. Page 4 of 75

6 2.2. CBRN Defence CBRN Defence comprises plans and activities intended to mitigate or neutralize adverse effects on operations and personnel resulting from: the use or threatened use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons and devices; the emergence of secondary hazards arising from counter-force targeting; or the release, or risk of release, of Toxic Industrial Material (TIM), into the environment. [Reference F 1 ] The aim of CBRN Defence is to help to prevent the CBRN incidents, protect NATO forces from the effects of CBRN incidents, and to take recovery actions, so that NATO forces are able to accomplish the mission and maintain freedom of action in a CBRN environment. [Reference F] The purpose of CBRN Defence is to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction including CBRN weapons and devices and ensure that NATO forces are able to accomplish their mission and maintain freedom of action in an environment of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) threats and incidents CBRN Defence is divided into five enabling components (Reference F - AJP- 3.8 Chapter 3, Enabling Components of CBRN Defence ). The foundations for these enabling components are established based on CBRN defence policy, doctrine, capabilities, procedures, organisations and training. The five enabling components are summarized below: Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) refers to the activities of detecting and characterizing CBRN incidents, identification of the agents and hazards, delineation/marking out of areas of contamination, and monitoring the changes. These are largely in-the-field activities undertaken by specialist CBRN units reporting to, and with support from, higher echelons and possibly from reach-back elements Information Management concerns the management of all forms of information related to CBRN Defence. The operational Communication and Information Systems (CIS) network is used to collect, process, store and disseminate CBRN defence data in order to: collate information about threats and risks and assess them ; plan the deployment of and manage detection, identification and monitoring systems; report incidents; predict hazards, identify and warn forces at risk; compile the CBRN contribution to the common operational picture (COP); command and control CBRN units and assets; manage hazards; and, 1 Note that the next edition of the AJP-3.8, currently under development, redefines CBRN defence as follows: The plans, procedures and activities intended to contribute to the prevention of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, to protect forces, territories and populations against, and to assist in recovering from, such incidents and their effects. Page 5 of 75

7 plan and manage physical protection, medical countermeasures and medical support Physical Protection is required so personnel can survive CBRN incidents and continue to operate in a CBRN hazard environment. Measures to protect facilities, aircraft, ships, vehicles and equipment are also included Hazard Management limits the impact of CBRN hazards. Hazard management is based on the principles of pre-hazard precautions, hazard control through avoidance, control of hazard spread, control and management of individual exposures, and decontamination Medical Countermeasures and Support serves to diminish the susceptibility of personnel to CBRN hazards and to determine if personnel have been exposed. The treatment and evacuation of casualties in a CBRN environment, whether contaminated or not, must be considered. Medical staffs are responsible for advising the commander on medical countermeasures and support. 3. Operational Requirements 3.1. Purpose of CBRN_FS The CBRN Defence Command and Control (CBRN Defence C2) Functional Service is an assembly of software applications, methods and procedures that enables NATO commanders and their staffs to exercise command and control over CBRN defence units and assets. [CBRN-FS Project Definition, based on Reference Q] The CBRN FS will provide operation C2 with functionalities supporting the NATO to prevent CBRN incidents, to protect NATO forces from the effects of CBRN incidents, and to take recovery actions, so that NATO forces are able to accomplish the mission and maintain freedom of action in a CBRN environment The Project Mandate (Reference C) also provides some specific objectives of the CBRN-FS project to include a capability to develop, display, disseminate and maintain the CBRN defence contribution to the Joint Common Operational Picture thus enabling NATO consultation, command and control arrangements at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to: Decide on an appropriate NATO response to a CBRN threat, including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation activities or hostile CBRN incident against NATO forces and/or NATO territory; Assess CBRN defence related intelligence and identify options and develop recommendations to NATO commanders to support or conduct appropriate CBRN counter and defensive measures to break the CBRN incident chain as early as operationally feasible; Page 6 of 75

8 Perform CBRN calculations, including prediction of hazard and hazard propagation based on meteorological and terrain data, facilitate route planning in order to ensure freedom of movement, generate reports and warning messages, and display the results; Store and manipulate CBRN defence related data, including: CBRN forces availability, units at risk, reports, routes and damages for both exercises and operations separately; Send assessment and warning reports to forces at risk; and Exchange information 2 with Ballistic Missile Defence C2 capability concerning early warning of ballistic missiles, Consequences of Interception and/or Consequences of Engagement (COI/COE) In the context of CBRN definition provided in Reference F - AJP-3.8 Chapter 3, the scope of the CBRN-FS is limited to provision of the CBRN Information Management component at the Strategic and Operational levels of command, i.e., SHAPE, Joint Force Command (JFC) and Component Command (CC) levels. The tasks of Detection Identification and Monitoring (DIM), Physical Protection, Hazard Management and Medical Countermeasures & Support are to be planned and monitored by CBRN-FS, but executed by lower (national) echelons using other (nationally-provided) systems, which require CBRN-FS to interface and exchange data with national systems. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the scope of CBRN-FS capability in the context of CBRN components and tasks defined in Reference F. 2 The extent of the exchange in Increment 1 will, for technical, operational, procedural and timescale reasons, be fairly limited. See section Page 7 of 75

9 Figure 1 - Scope of CBRN FS with respect to CBRN Defence Components 3.2. Functional Requirements Intended Use CBRN-FS capability shall be used by NATO and national CBRN personnel in support of NATO operations and for training these personnel. The users of the CBRN-FS have different information requirements and therefore different demand for using the capability. The information requirements of the users deployed at a site determine the logical configuration of CBRN-FS capability at the site. CBRN-FS shall be available in the following configurations: CBRN Major site - supporting the principal Users who undertake activities in support of most or all CBRN enabling activities 3 and are authorised to contribute and maintain the CBRN portions of the NATO Joint Common Operational Picture. These sites are assumed to maintain shared information and provide services for CBRN-FS clients and other functional services (FS) in order 3 CBRN Information Management (including CBRN W&R), support to CBRN Detection / Identification / Monitoring (DIM), support to Physical Protection, support to Hazard Management, support to Medical Countermeasures. Page 8 of 75

10 to enable the personnel to access the CBRN-FS functionality and information that they require in order to fulfil their roles 4. CBRN Access site - supporting other users, mainly but not exclusively by providing CBRN Warning & Reporting functions. CBRN experts from these locations are assumed to access remotely the systems managed by CBRN major sites. Sites accessing CBRN products developed by users working at CBRN Major and Access sites. The Key Users of the CBRN-FS capability belong to the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and include the following Commands and Organization Elements, as described in the Table 1. It distinguishes the major and access sites, and shows the roles to be supported by CBRN-FS (iaw AJP nomenclature). CBRN-FS system will implement CBRN Information Management component including CBRN Warning and Reporting (W&R) and planning of the remaining components. Note that the anticipated CBRN Reach Back & Fusion (RB+F) element is a prospective user of the CBRN FS. However, since this element is outside the scope of NATO Common Funding, it is not shown in Table 1. The CBRN RB+F element will require access to all COP data needed for providing proper CBRN reachback. CBRN Enabling Component (AJP 3.8-1) Id Name Location Configuration DIM (Planning) CBRN Info Mgmt. / CBRN W&R Physical Protection (Planning) Hazard Management (Planning) Medical Countermeasures & Support (Plan) 1 SHAPE Belgium Major 2 JFC HQ Netherlands Major 3 JFC HQ Italy Major 4 MARCOM UK Major 5 LANDCOM Turkey Major 6 AIRCOM Germany Major 7 CAOC Germany Access 8 CAOC Spain Access 9 E-3A Component Germany Access 4 Existing SOPs identify roles including Chief CBRN Operations, Deputy Chief CBRN Operations, Staff Officer Plans, Staff Assistant Plans, Staff Officer CBRN Operations, Plotter, though this may change with future doctrine. Page 9 of 75

11 CBRN Enabling Component (AJP 3.8-1) Id Name Location Configuration DIM (Planning) CBRN Info Mgmt. / CBRN W&R Physical Protection (Planning) Hazard Management (Planning) Medical Countermeasures & Support (Plan) 10 Heavy Airlift Wing Hungary Access Table 1 CBRN-FS locations at NATO Command Structure NATO Deployable Configuration The deployable configuration has been configured (sized) to support the full spectrum of NATO operations defined in the Deployable Communication Information Systems (DCIS) Concept scenarios described in Reference P, taking into account the NATO Level of Ambition such as the concurrency requirements for Major Joint Operations (MJOs) and Small Joint Operations (SJOs). Note that the anticipated CBRN RB+F element is not included in Table 2 for the reason mentioned in , but would be required to support any NATO operation from its PE location (which remains to be determined). Configuration CBRN Enabling Component (AJP 3.8-1) Id Name Major Access DIM (Planning) CBRN Info Mgmt. / CBRN W&R Physical Protection (Planning) Hazard Management (Planning) Medical Countermeasures & Support 1 JTF HQ: Joint Task Force HQ (Including CBRN Joint Assessment Team (JAT)) 2 MCC: Maritime Component Command 3 JLSG: Joint Logistics Support Group (Log HQ) 4 POD: Point of debarkation/embarkation (log function) CBRN Area Control Centre 3 - CBRN Collection Centre Number indicates the number of sets of capability to be acquired in order to support the NATO Level of Ambition. Page 10 of 75

12 Configuration CBRN Enabling Component (AJP 3.8-1) Id Name Major Access DIM (Planning) CBRN Info Mgmt. / CBRN W&R Physical Protection (Planning) Hazard Management (Planning) Medical Countermeasures & Support 5 SOCC: Special Ops Component Command 6 DOB: Deployed operation (air)base (Log function) 7 OLRT: Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team 8 JFACC: Joint Forces Air Component Command 9 DACCC: Deployable Air Command and Control Centre 10 LCC: Land Component Command (including CBRN Bn) CBRN Collection Centre CBRN Collection Centre 11 POCC: Psychological Operations Component Command CBRN: CBRN Battalion HQ NAEW: NATO Airborne Early - 4 Warning Forward Operation Base 14 FLSB: Forward Logistics Support Base - 4 Table 2 - CBRN locations for Deployed Operations (taking into account the NATO LoA and concurrency requirements) Stand-alone training and support systems Separate installations of the system will be provided to the training locations to support training and exercises. The reference system at NCIA-SD will be used to provide technical support to the operational systems. The system shall include software development environment required to support changes in the NATO-specific software modules. The reference system at the NCI Agency Service Supply (NCIA-SS) will be used to support system integration with other Bi-SC AIS services and system validation by the users following the project incremental approach. Page 11 of 75

13 Id Name Location Remark 1 JWC Norway Training system (Collective Training) 2 JFTC Poland Training system (Collective Training) 3 NATO CIS School Portugal Training system (System & Admin Training) 4 NCIA-SD Belgium Reference system (System support) 5 NCIA-SS Netherlands Reference system (FAS integration) Table 3 - CBRN FS locations for Training and Support The tables above define only the sites within the scope of CBRN-FS Increment 1. It is envisaged that selected information products generated by the CBRN-FS will be shared with other entities involved in the Comprehensive CBRN mission. This may include entities such as NATO HQ (Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD), for onward sharing with Nations), NATO Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre, NATO Civil Military Fusion Centre and Reach-back Centres (e.g. CBRN COE), etc The external distribution of products developed with CBRN-FS will be done externally to the CBRN-FS system; therefore it is excluded from the scope of this project. Note that NATO HQ is responsible for Military-Civil affairs through the CEPD, and Nations themselves are responsible for Civil Protection (including Civil Warnings), so these elements are out-of-scope for CBRN- FS Intended Use & Functional Requirements Intended Use In line with the Military Committee-endorsed NATO Comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Concept (Reference R), CBRN-FS will enable a more proactive role for NATO in preventing, protecting and recovering from CBRN incidents to align with twenty-first century threats. In the past, CBRN defence efforts have primarily focused on defending against CBRN threats taking a passive approach, centred on mitigation. The new comprehensive approach emphasises prevention, protection and recovery. Figure 2 shows the main elements of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) that will be supported by CBRN-FS in peacetime and crisis planning, and the relationships between them and other entities outside the NCS. The entities in yellow are considered to be the Major CBRN-FS sites. They also support CBRN Situational Awareness and Knowledge Development. Page 12 of 75

14 Figure 2 NOV-1 CBRN-FS Operational Concept Diagram in static environment Figure 3 illustrates the relationships between static and deployable elements once a deployed operation is initiated and underway. The JTF HQ performs the role of the CBRN Area Control Centre (as defined in doctrine and procedures, Reference G), and the component commands act as CBRN Collection Centres. The collection centres have defined responsibilities to immediately warn 6 entities and units of CBRN threats reported to them 7 by subordinate units, CBRN recce teams, and automated CBRN sensors. The Area Control Centre has responsibility for validating warnings, issuing validated warnings 8 to subordinate entities, and reporting 9 to higher echelons. 6 Warnings issued as CBRN 1 or CBRN 2 messages. All CBRN Message Text Formats (MTF) are published in APP-11 (NATO Message Catalogue). 7 Reported as CBRN 1, CBRN 4, CBRN 5, and CBRN 6 messages. 8 Warnings issued as CBRN 3 messages 9 CBRN SITREP, Page 13 of 75

15 Figure 3 - NOV-1 CBRN-FS Operational Concept Diagram in deployed environment Key User Functions CBRN-FS will support the Bi-SC AIS user in the management of all forms of information related to CBRN Defence. Key user functions identified in NATO doctrine (Reference F) include: - The user shall be able to collate CBRN-related information (including Toxic Industrial Material (TIM)) in a timely manner - The user shall be able to assess CBRN threats and risks - The user shall be supported by fully automated CBRN Warning & Reporting - The user shall be able to predict CBRN hazards - The user shall be able to identify forces at risk from CBRN threats - The user shall be able to warn forces at risk from CBRN threats - The user shall be able to exchange CBRN Information Page 14 of 75

16 The user shall be able to compile the CBRN contribution to the COP 10 - The user shall be able to command and control CBRN units and assets. CBRN-FS will support the Bi-SC AIS user in planning the deployment of DIM systems, the management of DIM systems, and C2 of subordinate CBRN units equipped with DIM systems. Some key user functions are: - The user shall be able to plan the deployment of DIM Systems. - The user shall be able to manage DIM systems. - The user shall be able to collate information (from DIM activities). - The user shall be able to command and control CBRN units. CBRN-FS will support the Bi-SC AIS user in the management of all forms of individual protection and collective protection. Pre-hazard precautions can greatly reduce the effectiveness of the potential attack by CBRN weapons and devices and, should CBRN incidents occur, can minimize the effects of CBRN agents. A key user functions is: - The user shall be able to Plan and Manage Physical Protection. CBRN-FS will support the Bi-SC AIS user in the management of CBRN hazards. A key user function is: - The user shall be able to manage hazards. CBRN-FS will enable the Bi-SC AIS user to support the planning of medical countermeasures 11. A key user functions is: - The user shall be able to support the information needs of the medical staffs Functional Requirements 10 Effective C2 of the CBRN situation can only be maintained when CBRN information is an integrated part of the common operational picture (COP). It is essential that CBRN defence information, particularly critical issues such as safety matters and warning messages, is communicated rapidly both up and down the chain of command and horizontally with other units, agencies and civilian authorities in adjacent locations. 11 This will require information exchange between the CBRN community and the MEDICS community. The scope of the MEDICS project (part of LOG FS) includes: Medical Planning (including casualty rate estimation, and medical support planning) Medical Management Clinical Support Health Surveillance (including disease surveillance, and force health status) Medical Intelligence Some of the functions will require input from CBRN-FS. Page 15 of 75

17 Annex A lists requirements that were captured during the CBRN Operational Users Working Group OUWG meeting held at the JCBRN Centre of Excellence (COE) in Vyskov, Czech Republic (16-17 January 2013), that shall be included in Increment 1. Annex B lists requirements captured during the OUWG meeting that were agreed to be deferred to later project increments due to their complexity or the constraints imposed by the scheduling and approved technical requirements of other Bi-SC AIS FS upon which CBRN-FS is dependent Enabling requirements The need for a fully automated warning and reporting process, demands a standardization of the CBRN sensor information reported by National/NATO CBRN entities. Although this process is initiated at the lower command echelons, it is followed through by the NCS CBRN processes. ACT has recently issued a Request For Information (RFI) for a NATO Standard CBRN Sensor Interface (Reference S). The CBRN-FS project should capitalise on this. However, the scope of CBRN-FS Increment 1 is limited to presentation of information provided by national systems in the format of ATP-45 (D) messages. It is envisaged 12 that CBRN information may be provided to national civil protection authorities. Nations have yet to agree on the method to be used for any interface between NATO and national civil protection authorities, but it could include XML-based message formats such as the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) 13 and messaging standards such as Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL) 14. Note however that civil protection itself remains a national responsibility. The conversion of the data to CAP or EDXL formats is not included in the scope of the CBRN-FS Increment Interoperability CBRN-FS plays important role in the network of Bi-SC AIS services by providing operational picture and planning information contributing to several Functional Services procured under the Bi-SC AIS programme. The high-level relationship with other functional services is shown in Figure NATO HQ (CEPC) is investigating the provision of CBRN information to Nations. 13 The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is an XML-based data format for exchanging public warnings and emergencies between alerting technologies. CAP allows a warning message to be consistently disseminated simultaneously over many warning systems to many applications. CAP increases warning effectiveness and simplifies the task of activating a warning for responsible officials. 14 The Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL) is a suite of XML-based messaging standards that facilitate emergency information sharing between government entities and the full range of emergencyrelated organizations. EDXL standardizes messaging formats for communications between these parties. EDXL was developed as a royalty-free standard by the OASIS International Open Standards Consortium. Page 16 of 75

18 Figure 4 - Relationship of CBRN-FS to other Bi-SC AIS CBRN-FS is planned to contribute to number of Functional Services developed under either active or future procurement projects. It will provide information to the Medics portion of Logistics Functional Service (LOGFS) to enable, for example, disease surveillance and casualty rate estimation, while providing information on hazard areas. CBRN-FS will be able to contribute the CBRN Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (CBRN IPOE) to INTEL FS for inclusion in the Joint IPOE and consume intelligence data from INTEL FS. It will need to receive ballistic missile intercept notifications through the Air C2 System (AirC2IS), the most critical being the receipt of the CBRN Missile Intercept Report 15. It will support the planning process by providing threat and risk assessments to the Tool for Operational Planning (TOPFAS). 15 The responsibility for issuing the CBRN missile intercept report (CBRN MIR) rests with the authority conducting the missile intercept tasks. (STANAG 2103 / ATP-45(D)) Page 17 of 75

19 CBRN-FS will use environmental information (meteorological, oceanographic and geographical) provided by Core Geographical Information System (Core GIS) and Environmental Services (Env-FS). The planning and monitoring will be carried out using tactical information provided by other Functional Services, as the recognised ground picture (RGP) data from LC2IS and recognised maritime picture (RMP) date in APP-11 format. The results will be distributed either as ADatP-3 messages or CBRN overlays (e.g. NATO Vector Graphics (NVG) XML format) displayed on the Common Operational Picture (COP) and other Functional Services. For geospatial information NATO has adopted the service model described by the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC), including Web Map Service (WMS), Web Feature Service (WFS) and Web Coverage Service (WCS), as well as Web Map Tile Service (WMTS). For non-geospatial information (e.g. texts, diagrams, multi-media files) general web services, e.g. based on the XML, are to be used. CBRN-FS will make use of Core Services, including: NATO Information Portal (NIP) to extend the common portal platform, Document Handling System (DHS) to publish CBRN products, NATO Directory Services for user administration activities and Core Messaging (which includes functionality such as and directory services). Core Services follow the principles of the NATO Network Enhanced Capability (NNEC) approach, offering distributed services to the NATO community through a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) framework and adhering to the same SOA standards as applied to all Bi-SC AIS projects such as (for example) AirC2IS, Intel FS, NCOP. The Agency expects to reuse NATO SOA implementations in order to achieve the NATO Summit requirements for NNEC. The Core Services are enabled by the communication networks and associated transport services. For CBRN, the main ones are the NATO General Communications System (NGCS) and the Deployable Communications & Information System (DCIS). These communication services are also critically important for the CBRN Warning & Reporting to ensure that W&R messages are transmitted and received. Finally, communication enablers such as the Information Exchange Gateways are necessary for interoperability with C2 users outside of the CBRN-FS operational network. This includes National C2IS, external C2 Systems, and CBRN Collection Centres which are the interface points to CBRN Units in the field. Selected CBRN information will be made available to national civil protection authorities. Note however that civil protection itself remains a national responsibility Modes of operation The CBRN-FS capability will be used in static and deployed modes in Operational/Peacetime/Crisis and Exercise scenarios. Page 18 of 75

20 The CBRN-FS in operational environment will operate in Operational Mode, connected with Functional Services and external systems appropriately configured. The Training Mode will allow simulating the input with the archived data and pre-defined test scenarios. The CBRN-FS systems supporting training and exercise will support both training and operational modes of operation Non-functional requirements Security The service security model is Secret-High. CBRN-FS shall be used on the NATO SECRET and the future MISSION SECRET security domains. The MISSION SECRET security domains, used to host the CBRN-FS software, will be provided by Deployed CIS. The system shall allow releasing of selected unclassified information to external entities supporting NATO CBRN defence. Security labelling of CBRN-FS product shall be implemented in order to facilitate the release of such products through (possibly automated) means to Systems, Services and Users in lower security classification domains such as NATO RESTRICTED or. CBRN-FS will comply with the Bi-SC AIS Community Security Requirement Statement (CSRS) (Reference U). Since the CBRN-FS could be deployed on NS and MS, it must receive the appropriate security accreditation required to operate. The process involves security risk assessment and implementation of the agreed NATO security rules. The systems must be capable of operating with NATO security settings applied on servers and workstations. The NATO Security Accreditation Board (NSAB) shall act as the Security Accreditation Authority (SAA) responsible for assigning security accreditation for CBRN-FS. CBRN-FS will comply with additional software security requirements in order to pass the security testing being a part of Independent Testing and Validation (IT&V), to enable it be added to the Approved Fielded Product List (AFPL) Compliancy with NNEC CBRN-FS shall be compliant with the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) architecture based on Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) as described in NC3A RD 2814 Bi SC AIS SOA Implementation Guidance Performance Page 19 of 75

21 The Services delivered by CBRN-FS shall support all conceivable Article 5 contingencies and contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, including NA5CRO and in accordance with NATO's Level of Ambition (Reference R). Additionally, the Services delivered by CBRN-FS shall support NATO peacetime operations (including exercises and training) Scalability and sizing Each of the CBRN-FS major locations is assumed to host a CBRN Cell comprising five positions (Chief/Deputy Chief CBRN Operations, SO Plans, SA Plans, SO CBRN Ops, Plotter). This assumption is based on Joint HQ Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) (Reference T). On order, CBRN W&R will be established, which will require significant augmentation. Thus it is assumed that at CBRN-FS major locations there shall be scalability of service from five (5) users up to 25 concurrent users accessing the site. The number includes the users accessing the system remotely. CBRN servers will have also to provide services to other Bi-SC AIS services, as defined by NATO Network Enhanced Capability (NNEC) approach Reliability and availability The overall CBRN-FS reliability and availability will be based on the application set, the underlying site infrastructure capability, and inter-site communications. Reliability of CBRN-FS shall not be lower than 98%. Availability of CBRN-FS shall not be lower than 95% Maintainability The solution must minimise manpower involved in the system s operation and maintenance throughout the system lifecycle. CBRN-FS capability must provide a central system administration capability for each domain to allow system administrators to monitor the status of all main systems and the flow of information between the various components. At each deployment location, the CBRN-FS software shall be integrated with the central management system supporting the site CIS. This shall at least allow adequate fault isolation and troubleshooting interface to enable the system maintainers to restore the CBRN-FS functionality in a timely manner. The Contractor will provide the source code, scripts and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) for all the software components specifically developed for NATO. The configuration of the source code and the scripts shall allow its maintenance by NATO. Page 20 of 75

22 The Contract shall provide software development environment required to support changes in the NATO-specific software modules. The source code of the COTS and GOTS components and the software development environment will not be acquired within this project. The selected contractor will be required to implement a program of continuous improvement of the system s maintainability without detriment to reliability Survivability CBRN-FS will be available on static and deployable NATO command sites. At these locations CBRN-FS will take advantage of the site(s) disaster recovery infrastructure and processes. CBRN-FS will be available on sites where physical protection is implemented so personnel and equipment can survive CBRN incidents and continue operating in a CBRN hazard environment Environmental requirements CBRN-FS capability will be loaded on the servers within existing server room physical environments already provided with adequate power supply, heating and cooling. CBRN-FS will comply with the site specific security procedures and processes Safety The Contractor shall be required to identify, assess, and incorporate features in the design of the CBRN software that will eliminate or mitigate risks associated with both Functional Safety and Health and Safety Implementation Constraints The CBRN-FS Software shall be able to run on the virtual or physical hardware in operating system infrastructure available at the sites at the time of the deployment. This shall include system deployment in the data centres to be implemented by the IT Modernisation project. - Currently the majority of NATO systems run on Microsoft operating systems and majority of the sites provide virtual environment based on VMware. - The availability of significantly increased bandwidth within the NATO Command Structure and to national organizations will open up the possibility of shifting processing and storage from the current highlydistributed model to one that consolidates these functions to a smaller number of robustly-connected sites. CBRN-FS shall use Bi-SC AIS core services (e.g. content management system, , etc.) available at the sites. Page 21 of 75

23 CBRN-FS shall use the infrastructure being implemented through the NATO Communications Infrastructure (NCI) project in CP 104. The NCI provides the backbone for connectivity among commands, to SATCOM ground stations, and to NATO Nations, as well as other NATO organizations, and NATO-associated multinational organizations. CBRN-FS shall be capable of operation within the existing manpower. The system design shall minimise total system life cycle costs, including its future Operations and Maintenance (O&M). This requires re-use or integration with the hardware and COTS elements deployed in the NATO environment. The CBRN-FS implementation shall be able to interface with Hazard Prediction Analysis Capability (HPAC), or its successor (assumed 16 to be provided to NATO by a Nation), to support advanced CBRN prediction functions, including the plume modelling. 4. Current Capabilities 4.1. Overview NATO Commands carry out the reporting, predicting and warning of CBRN Incidents and hazards in accordance with the procedures given in ATP-45D (Reference G). CBRN messages are composed manually and sent by voice or signal message over existing CIS links Some NATO Commands and forces have incorporated ATP-45D based software into stand-alone IT-based equipment. Here data is entered via a keyboard so that prediction and modelling is processed automatically with the results displayed on digital mapping Available Software CBRN Warning and Reporting is in general supported by proven commercialoff-the-shelf (COTS) and governmental-off-the-shelf (GOTS) available tools such as HPAC, CBRN Analysis, NBCWarn and HEAT as well as national developments such as JWARN (USA), NEWS (DEU) etc CBRN-Analysis software and HPAC were accepted by NATO for use in ACO HQs, as noted in Reference L. 16 Discussions are currently underway between NATO and the US to ensure that the HPAC plume modelling capability that was approved for use in NATO (Reference L) is available for this component. Page 22 of 75

24 The current NATO capability for CBRN Warning and Reporting is mainly provided CBRN-Analysis. The software was developed by Bruhn Newtech with subsequent licences purchased by NATO CBRN-Analysis provides real time information on downwind hazards arising from events involving the release of hazardous materials (terrorist use of WMD, accidental or intentional release of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical or Toxic Industrial Material, or the offensive use of WMD). From a manual data input, CBRN-Analysis automatically calculates the hazard area and instantly displays it on a map of the area of responsibility, within which key interest areas and personnel at risk can be identified. An integrated Emergency Response Guide provides guidance on casualty handling and appropriate protective clothing. This guide contains over 3,500 different types of industrial chemicals and radiological materials The Hazard Prediction Analysis Capability (HPAC) is the US product developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) The main component of HPAC is the model for calculating the outcome of thousands of possible scenarios involving a variety of weapons and materials. The model can determine the human medical effects, toxicity levels, contaminated areas, population exposure, hazard areas and casualties should WMD materials be unleashed in an attack or dispersed in a military strike or by accident. The HPAC provides Application Programming Interface (API) that allows its integration within other software tools. When the US distributed HPAC to selected non-governmental organizations, it became a benchmark for modelling of dispersion of CBRN agents in the atmosphere. HPAC has been endorsed by ACO (Reference L) for use in NATO and it is taught at NATO course in Oberammergau (Course Id N-80). However, since there is no formal agreement (MOU) between NATO and the US for use of HPAC, use in NATO structures is officially limited to the US staff NBCWarn is a commercial product developed by OptiMetrics It enables the operator to rapidly gather, correlate and assess CBRN reports from the battlefield, and generate real-time hazard predictions and warnings. NBCWarn effectively replaces a complex, time-consuming, and error-prone manual process. The system is compliant with ATP-45C and AEP-45B. It handles both NATO and US message formats; converts between formats automatically. Automatically generates, displays, and animates HPAC hazards; exports HPAC hazards in common formats. Page 23 of 75

25 Provides the identical warning and reporting capabilities found in JWARN, the software adopted for use by the US military 4.3. Existing System(s) CBRN-Analysis and HPAC are available and operational in a number of sites and commands in the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure Other software applications are also available and operational (e.g. JWARN) In addition, there are historical operational databases (e.g. Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM) and other relevant CBRN databases): Created and maintained by NATO Commands (e.g. HQ ISAF, HQ KFOR, JFC HQs, J CBRN Def COE and Intelligence Fusion Centre. Created and maintained by other Organizations (e.g. by non-proliferation control bodies e.g. OPCW, IAEA or other related bodies such as the WHO) Some limited CBRN support functionality is provided with different FAS es (e.g. LC2IS) Weaknesses of Existing System(s) First and foremost, the existing systems do not meet the capability requirements in accordance with NATO-approved capability codes for CBRN In addition, the current systems do not support integration and re-use of other Bi-SC AIS functional or core services Other weaknesses are listed in the following: The existing capability is limited to specific locations and is therefore not available to static and deployable entities of the NATO Command Structure/NATO Support Structure involved in on-going NATO operations). Various versions of CBRN-Analysis software are currently deployed and there are no common Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in place. There is limited automation in the information exchange between units due to the incompatibility of the different versions of software. The current system does not provide commonality across the user population and hence fails to satisfy the need for interoperability between units Support Support and Maintenance Agreements (SUMAs) for some of the existing systems have expired. Page 24 of 75

26 The only system having valid licence and being supported for use in NATO is CBRN-Analysis. This includes 25 licences at NCS and 10 licences at ISAF. There is no central configuration management and control of licences Security limitations The CBRN-Analysis relies on a hardware security key provided via a dongle. The system is a desktop application intended for a single user. It does not support user authentication and collaboration Other Functional limitations The current support is only focused on Warning and Reporting (not CBRN- Defence C2 functionality) Advanced hazard prediction capability (i.e. with explicit plume modelling) is only available through the use of HPAC. Consequently, it has limited use within NATO. When a plume modelling application is not available, only rudimentary methods may be used Consequences of Not Delivering the Required Capabilities A key shortfall (5-3-1) in the Bi-SC Guidance for Defence Planning (Reference M) ranked 19 out of 198, will remain outstanding, namely: Lack of integrated CBRN CIS to provide timely, accurate and appropriate information to model, aid CBRN decision making and enhance overall situational awareness during the planning and conduct of operations A lack of integrated CBRN defence capabilities in a mission critical area, such as Command and Control (C2), would have significant impact on the ability of NATO to achieve its operational tasks and mission Without CBRN-FS, NATO will not have a fully operational CBRN capability, integrated into the NATO AIS for the conduct of CBRN missions and tasks Without CBRN-FS, many essential user functions would not be supported at all, or at best, only partially supported, as shown in the table below. Page 25 of 75

27 To collate information Essential User Function To assess threats and risks To automate CBRN Warning & Reporting To predict hazards To identify forces at risk To warn forces at risk To exchange CBRN Information To compile the CBRN contribution to the COP To command and control CBRN units and assets To plan the deployment of DIM Systems To manage DIM systems To collate information (from DIM activities) To plan and Manage Physical Protection To manage hazards To support the information needs of the medical staffs Fulfilled without CBRN-FS? No No Partially No Partially Yes Partially Partially Partially No No No Partially Partially No Table 4 - Impact of not delivering the required capabilities Page 26 of 75

28 5. Business Case 5.1. Expected Benefits Compared to the current situation, CBRN-FS will replace the existing capability and provide the commands with new and improved capability that will help to prevent CBRN incidents, to protect NATO forces from the effects of CBRN incidents, and to take recovery actions, so that NATO forces are able to accomplish the mission and maintain freedom of action in a CBRN environment. More specifically: Prevention will be enhanced by the ability to make comprehensive assessments of threats and risks, supported by more efficient collation of information from a wider variety of information sources. Support to comprehensive operations planning will be improved. Protection will be enhanced by CBRN W&R Information Management that is significantly more automated than in the past. An advanced hazard prediction capability will be (re-)established. Warnings to forces at risk will be propagated faster and more efficiently. The CBRN contribution to the COP will enhance the situational awareness of NATO forces, enabling them to be better prepared to accomplish their respective missions. Information received from specific nationally-provided CBRN assets (such as DIM systems) can will be better integrated and exploited, resulting in improved physical protection. Recovery actions will become more effective and efficient through better hazard management capabilities, and the information needs of other command entities (such as medical planning) will be better supported than at present Options considered Option 1 - Do nothing Advantages No new acquisition is performed, resulting into capital investment savings. Disadvantages The weaknesses of the current systems are described in section 4.4. The negative operational consequences associated to this option are presented in section Option 2 - Enhance Existing CBRN W&R System Advantages The CBRN-Analysis software could be upgraded to the latest version available and installed at all required sites for all CBRN users. Page 27 of 75

29 Disadvantages This would only be a very limited implementation of CBRN Defence capabilities not meeting the requirements stated in the JSSR and Project Mandate The CBRN-Analysis is not a NATO property and any software upgrade would require Sole Source Procurement from its provider. The software architecture is obsolete and it would require major changes to comply with the current Bi-SC AIS concept of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). The current contract for CBRN-Analysis provides limited number of licences that would need to be extended. CBRN Analysis is not the only CBRN W&R tool used in NATO. The solution is not optimal in terms of procurement Option 3 - Implement a new capability based only on COTS selected through competition Advantages State-of-the-art solutions offered by the industry, based on Service Oriented Architectures (SOA), can be exploited and would enable full compatibility with the other functional services implemented through the Bi-SC AIS Programme. The responses provided by the industry to the Market Survey on CBRN- FS showed great interest in participating in a competition for the CBRN- FS implementation contract. Some of the proposed COTS are already compatible with majority of NATO requirements. A complete implementation of CBRN Defence capabilities will be achievable in incremental steps The modern solutions offered by the industry are often based on the service oriented architecture used by BI-SC AIS. Disadvantages One of the crucial components of the solution to be offered by the bidders is a diffusion model for calculating the impact of CBRN incident. There are only few existing models with the quality recognized within NATO Option 4 - Implement a new capability through FMS procurement of Joint Effects Model (JEM) Advantages HPAC is a well-recognized diffusion model for hazard prediction in NATO provided by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The HPAC functionality will be delivered through a new product called Joint Effects Model (JEM). Page 28 of 75

30 Disadvantages Since JEM is developed for the US, the software does not implement NATO requirements, so it would have to be significantly augmented or NATO would have to relax its own requirements. Integration of JEM with BI-SC AIS services would require additional development and management of the NATO-specific baseline by the US. Any extension of JEM would require complicated FMS procurement with NCI Agency having limited control over the implementation and cost. Using the FMS procured product for implementing of the CBRN-FS capability would limit the ability to release that software to NATO nations and other nations participating in NATO operations. Since the HPAC functionality is not only included in JEM but also in Consequences Assessment module from Integrated Weapons of Mass Destruction Toolset (IWMDT), it is not yet clear how the HPAC functionality is to be maintained Recommended Option Comparative Analysis Options Strengths Weaknesses Option 1 Do nothing Option 2 Enhance existing system - CBRN Analysis Option 3 Implement a new capability based on COTS selected via No extra investment cost and minimal resource option. The solution is already known to NATO operators. Will meet NATO operational requirements (prevent, protect and recover CBRN incidents). Continue CBRN support to NATO with obsolete set of tools and no interface with national systems. NATO operational requirements are not met. No integration with Bi-SC AIS services No standard O&M support arrangements (see sections 4.4 and 4.5 for the weaknesses) Suboptimal procurement: extra licenses and software programming required through Sole Source Procurement. The system is obsolete and requires huge enhancement. Not all requirements can be fulfilled. The cost of the offered diffusion model may be very Page 29 of 75

31 competition Option 4 Implement a new capability through FMS procurement of JEM (Joint Effects Model) Competitive pricing and Total Life cycle costs through a Best Value procurement procedure. Based on a sound solution proven in operation JEM s predecessor HPAC. high and/or quality low. Provision to other NATO Nations requires US approval. Development through FMS procurement will be complicated, resulting in a long procurement process with limited input on requirements by NATO. Complicated arrangements to baseline a NATO version. Provision to a Nation requires US approval Recommendation Table 5 - Business Case Comparative Analysis Option 3 is recommended Justification By adopting a Best Value bid-evaluation methodology, the recommended Option 3 will allow selecting a high quality technical solution at a competitive price. In order to assure compatibility of the selected solution with the HPAC models, the bidders will be requested to offer implementation of an interface with HPAC or its successor. Page 30 of 75

32 6. Proposed Implementation 6.1. Target Architecture System Components CBRN-FS will consist of software to be hosted on the standard NATO ICT infrastructure. The existing NATO hardware and software environment is to be used to deploy CBRN-FS. Figure 5 NOV-2 Operational Node Connectivity Diagram The configuration of the CBRN-FS will differ depending on the infrastructure of the deployment environment. In the deployed environment, supported by the Deployed CIS infrastructure, there will be a distributed system with multiple Major Sites providing server capacity and replication of selected data on need-toknow basis. Page 31 of 75

33 In the static environment the deployment will be done on data centres and virtualised server platforms provided by the IT Modernisation project. In this environment, the system will be centralised, however allowing for the configuration of task-specific users groups. The training and reference system will work in independent configurations The CBRN-FS system will have service oriented architecture consisting of: - CBRN-FS application server instances (hereafter named servers ) - CBRN-FS application clients. The servers will provide: - Data processing - Data database - Interfaces with other services/systems The CBRN-FS application clients shall be able to operate while connected remotely to the servers (e.g. from Access Sites), using the bandwidth available at the NATO General Communication System (NGCS). The servers are to be deployed at the Major Sites or the data centres that support them. They shall allow collaboration of all the CBRN-FS users either deployed at the site or accessing the system remotely from connected Access Sites. CBRN-FS shall allow synchronisation between databases at the servers deployed in different Major Sites, thus supporting the exchange of selected information and collaboration between the sites. The application clients shall provide all functionality as defined in Annex A, configurable to support either the full functionality to be available at a Major Site, or a subset defined for an Access Site. The functionality available at an Access Site shall at least include CBRN Warning and Reporting and presentation of all products developed at Major Sites. In case of limited connectivity, each Major Site is expected to be fully operational without any external connectivity based on the information provided by the locally available systems and the units connected directly to the Major Site. This requirement does not apply for the sites accessing the servers remotely Software Architecture The CBRN-FS shall be provided as an integrated and coherent system, although it may be composed of different COTS components. Page 32 of 75

34 The CBRN-FS application will provide the following major functional components: - Automated Warning and Reporting (W&R); - Hazard Prediction; - Operational Planning; - Diffusion Model; - COP rendering; - Human Machine Interface (HMI). Automated Warning and Reporting (W&R) component will be based on an ATP-45D-compliant message handling application which shall leverage Bi- SC AIS core-services and Core Service Infrastructure. The Increment 1 of the CBRN-FS will support collection of information from external sources based on ATP-45D messages. It is expected that the Increment 2 will include CBRN Sensor Interface, allowing accessing direct files with sensor measurements. Hazard Prediction component will implement hazard prediction functionality described in ATP-45D. Hazard Prediction component will include a limited Ballistic Missile Defence / Consequences of Intercept (BMD/COI) module. In Increment 1, this will be in accordance with ATP-45D, i.e. processing of a CBRN Missile Intercept Report (MIR) (if available) for short-range ballistic missiles engaged by lower-layer BMD systems. It will consider only the residual payload from the intercept, and not the physical debris. NATO has yet to define the mathematical methods and produce a tactical publication for other cases (such as upper-layer BMD systems engaging longer range ballistic missiles). Operational Planning will be based on external interfaces to other Bi-SC AIS Functional Services, including Environmental FS, INTEL FS, TOPFAS, LogFS (MEDICS). It will provide: - Support to Operational Planning; - Support to CBRN Functional Components (Planning and management of DIM. Hazard Management, Medical Support, Physical Protection). Diffusion Model component will provide an interface to a Diffusion Model simulation component to enable plume modelling (for Planning and Analysis, not Hazard Warning). COP Rendering component will provide an external interface (see Section Interoperability) with the NATO Common Operational Picture (COP) in order to contribute the CBRN picture to the COP. Page 33 of 75

35 Human Machine Interface (HMI) component will provide: - Visualisation and edition of alphanumeric information - Geo-spatial visualization and manipulation - Display of specialised visualisations - Interface to all other components - System Administration and Configuration Support for the administration and configuration of (role-based) access to all end-user functions. The system will provide internal Data & Content Management Support component, providing the specific functions required to import external data (e.g. on databases), manage such data, manage the reference and support documents in the CBRN Workspace. Standard data and content management functions are provided by Core Services (e.g. Document Handling System and Enterprise Portal). This component consists of: - Document and Content Management support, including e.g. the CBRN specific meta-data management - Data management functions (create, retrieve, update, delete) of structured CBRN databases. The proposed target architecture is summarized in the following figure (logical node). Figure 6 - System Overview (NSV-1) Page 34 of 75