I N T E R P O L Bioterrorism Prevention Programme. Adrian Baciu Coordinator Bioterrorism Prevention Program

Transcription

1 I N T E R P O L Bioterrorism Prevention Programme Adrian Baciu Coordinator Bioterrorism Prevention Program

2 THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT Types of scenarios War scenarios Terrorism Criminal acts Types of targets and goals Against humans Against animals and plants Economic and societal disruption Each actor will consider different biological agents, with different degrees of pathogenicity Depends on intent Depends on availability of agents Depends on technical skills and structure of the organization BWPP Point of view

3 In December 2001, Yazid Sufaat was arrested in Malaysia for terrorist activities as a member of Jemaah Islamiyah. According to subsequent interrogations of two captured terrorists, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad of al-qa'ida and Hambali of Jamaah Islamiyah, Sufaat was part of a plan to obtain and weaponize biological warfare agents. Maria Ressa, "Reports: Al Qaeda [sic] Operative Sought Anthrax," CNN, 10 October 2003; Judith Miller, "U.S. Has New Concerns About Anthrax Readiness," New York Times, 28 December 2003; "Yazid Sufaat," The Open Source Threat Network Database, 26 January 2004

4 Documents found in Afghanistan ostensibly reveal that al-qaeda was doing research on using botulinum toxin to kill 2,000 people. "Al Qaeda tested germ weapons," Reuters, 1 January 2002 Ahmad Rassam, arrested in a plot to bomb LAX, testifies that Bin Laden is personally interested in using lowflying aircraft to disperse BW agents. Al-Qaeda operative Ahmad Rassam, in US custody

5 With the capture of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, investigators uncovered detailed information about production plans for chemical and biological weapons. According to captured documents, certain members of al-qa`ida had plans and the requisite material to manufacture cyanide and two biological toxins, and were close to producing anthrax bacteria. Barton Gellman, "al-qaida Near Biological, Chemical Arms Production," Washington Post, 23 March 2003.

6 With the capture of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, investigators uncovered detailed information about production plans for chemical and biological weapons. According to captured documents, certain members of al-qa`ida had plans and the requisite material to manufacture cyanide and two biological toxins, and were close to producing anthrax bacteria. Barton Gellman, "al-qaida Near Biological, Chemical Arms Production," Washington Post, 23 March 2003.

7 Cyber Chem-Bio There are discussions on password-protected jihadist forums on CBW but only a small fraction of the overall dialogue on weapons and tactics; Online CBW manuals have progressed little in recent years. They are assembled from widely available open source information and contain little instruction on Weaponisation or delivery; Jihadist forum members seem to recognise their technological limitations and are more focused on acquiring commercially available chemicals for low-tech attacks than producing more sophisticated weapons. There is a small and committed network within the online jihadist community that has an enduring interest in the development of CBW. Six of eight available manuals are related to CW and three also contain recipes for botulinum toxin. Two others provide Information on other biological weapons. Jane s Intelligence Review 2007 Report

8 150. Undoubtedly Al-Qaida is still considering the use of chemical or biological weapons to perpetrate its terrorist actions. When might this happen? Nobody really knows. It is just a matter of time before the terrorists believe they are ready. They have already taken the decision to use such chemical and biological weapons in their forthcoming attacks. The only restraint they are facing is the technical complexity of operating them properly and effectively. Letter dated 1 December 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

9 WHAT LAW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS TO KNOW? Threat Assessment Motivational Indicators Organizational Indicators Financial Resources Logistical Resources Goals/Targets -mass murder -contagion -WMD-act of war Indicators of BW Production Sources of Seed Stock Knowledge/Skill Indicators Production Indicators Delivery System Signature Early Warning Indicators Secondary Indicators Bioattack Indicators Epidemiological Clues

10 Two Different Plans Covert Bioattack a release not accompanied by any articulated or known threat. The difference is the public health community is the first to detect the attack, and once it is known as an attack, law enforcement assumes the lead. Overt Bioattack An anounced release of an agent, often with some type of articulated threat.

11 BioT - Bioterrorism Prevention Police Training As a direct result of a grant of nearly one million dollars from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Secretary General Ronald K. Noble has been able to create a dedicated unit at the Interpol General Secretariat in Lyon, France. This unit will develop a program to build national and international capacity to counter the threat of bio-terrorism. The plan This bio-terrorism program will : raise awareness of the threat develop police training programs strengthen efforts to enforce existing legislation promote the development of new legislation encourage inter-agency co-operation on bioterrorism

12 BioC- Bio Criminalization Objectives for Phase I of this project will include: (1)development of a thorough understanding of what biological weapons-related criminal and administrative laws exists in which countries and identification of, and filling-in, key data gaps; (2) assistance to priority states in drafting, enacting, and enforcing national biological weapons-related civil and penal measures.

13 BioD Biocrimes Database A proposal is currently being explored to have Interpol s bioterrorism unit form a Biocrimes related Database. This proposal is in the early stages of development and subject to external funding.

14 IBTU Strategy THREE PILLARS : BTU -1 st BioT - Bioterrorism Prevention Police Training BioC - Bio-criminalization BioD Bio Events Database GLOBAL APPROACH st Interpol BioTerrorism Prevention Global Conference REGIONAL APPROACH 3 Workshops South-Africa Chile Singapore NATIONAL APPROACH Train the Trainers REGIONAL APPROACH 2 Workshops Central Asia Middle East GLOBAL APPROACH 2 Table Top Exercises for International Organizations WHO RCMP AFP Scotland Yard FBI SANDIA DoS W O R K I N G I N P A R T N E R S H I P

15 Countries 500 delegates

16 African Workshop 41 Countries 90 Delegates Asian Workshop 27 Countries 78 Delegates Americas Workshop 26 Countries 78 Delegates

17 Ukraine Workshop 21 Countries 53 Delegates Oman Workshop 15 Countries 62 Delegates 130 Countries, 361 Delegates

18 Train the Trainers Session- Kenya, Nairobi, July COUNTRIES 36 PARTICIPANTS

19 NEXT STEPS Bucharest-ROMANIA, 8-12 October 2007 Lyon-France, International Table Top Exercise, December 2007 Manila-PHILIPPINES, January 2008 Completion of Bio Incident Database

20 INTERPOL Bioterrorism Prevention Web Page

21 INTERPOL Bioterrorism Prevention Virtual Center

22 Orange Notices Pen-gun Instantaneous special thermal fuse 8mm calibre disguised weapon Letter bombs Missile parts Firearm briefcases Bomb parts

23 Interpol Incident Response Teams (IRTs) Background Commenced March 2003 Structure Management advisory Multi-disciplined Short-term (focused purpose) Field Deployment CCC leadership

24 Incident Response Team March 2004 : Tashkent - Explosion & shooting March 2004 : July 2004 : Madrid - metro explosion Tashkent - Explosions November 2003 : August 2004 : Riyadh - Bombing Dhaka - Grenade attack September 2004 : Jakarta Oct 2002 : - car explosion Australian Embassy Bali Bombing Aug 2003 : Jakarta - Mariott Bombing

25 Our world must take bio-security much more seriously. it would be comparatively easy for terrorists to cause mass death by using agents such as anthrax or weaponised smallpox. Let s not wait until something has gone terribly wrong to act collectively to meet this threat. Kofi Annan UN Secretary General (13 Feb 2005)

26 FAILURE TO PREPARE...IS PREPARATION TO FAIL Adrian BACIU Coordinator Interpol Bio Terrorism Unit Tel Fax