Release: Version 1.0 Release Date: 08 May National Flood Events Operational Debrief Report

Transcription

1 National Flood Events 2014 Operational Debrief Report Release: Version 1.0 Release Date: 08 May 2014 Doc Ref: National Flood Events Operational Debrief Report User Division: CFOA National Resilience Approved by: CFO Dan Stephens (CFOA Chair of National Resilience Board) Date Approved: 07 May 2014

2 Contents Contents... 2 Foreword... 3 Executive Summary Context Scenario Flood Response Recovery Debrief Framework Evaluation and Findings Summary...24 Page 2 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

3 Foreword This report has been commissioned by the Chair of the Chief Fire Officers Association National Operations Committee and contains the findings in relation to the response made by the Fire and Rescue Service and partner organisations to the flood events that occurred during January and February 2014 set against the context of the National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF). The NCAF guidance is designed to be robust yet flexible and can be adapted to the nature, scale and requirements of an incident providing support for Fire and Rescue Services in the resolution of major incidents, affording them valuable support particularly in their interface between local and central government. This report seeks to determine whether the response to the national flood events was best served by the existing NCAF arrangements, and to highlight where any lessons identified could be utilised to review policies, practices and procedures both at the local Fire and Rescue Service level and also in terms of the national mutual aid support framework. It should be noted that from the perspective of activities undertaken within the NCAF, where synergies have been identified between previous flood events (eg the tidal surge event of December 2013 and the wide-scale flood events that occurred in November/December 2012), any recommendations contained within this report have also been measured against progress in terms of previously identified learning outcomes from the debrief reports covering those events. Finally, it should also be borne in mind that a review of the NCAF arrangements has been commissioned by the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser and is currently ongoing with outcomes yet to be decided. On this basis this report offers further valuable evidence and information which if utilised could assist in shaping the revised NCAF which is due to be published later in Brian D Ward CFOA National Resilience Officer 7 May 2014 Page 3 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

4 Executive Summary The response undertaken to the unprecedented flooding incidents that occurred throughout January and February highlighted the dedication and professionalism of the Fire and Rescue Services involved. However, as with all major incidents there have been learning outcomes identified which provide opportunities for improvement that will further enhance such a response in the future. All respective stakeholders (to include relevant Government Departments) and FRSs should take note of the recommendations contained within this report to ensure that in similar circumstances in the future, the best possible level of protection for the public and critical infrastructure is maintained. This will ensure any future response to major incidents, particularly those that are widespread and affect a number of geographically disparate Fire and Rescue Services, are as effective and efficient as possible. Without a clear statement of responsibility or centralised direction at governmental level regarding incidents of this nature, it is inevitable that FRS and Local Resilience Fora will have varying levels of understanding and ability to deal with incidents that may only be recognised as a local risk having localised impacts. Furthermore, it is also notable that there still appears to be a number of FRSs where understanding of NCAF arrangements in particular, and flood response arrangements (to include the spread of organisations involved including voluntary responders), could be improved. This aspect needs to be rectified as a matter of priority in preparation for future deployments otherwise there may be growing reluctance, particularly on the part of some voluntary organisations, to provide support when requested to do so. It has been acknowledged that in terms of the response, most affected FRSs were required to call upon a significantly higher number of resources than had previously been encountered, acknowledging that in some cases existing pre-planning had not envisaged deployments on such a large scale. This provided considerable challenges across the command, control and co-ordination spectrum, which through sheer tenacity were overcome. However, undoubtedly in some instances this led to problems being encountered with provision of welfare arrangements. There are also some questions to be addressed as to whether the Fire and Rescue Service in general would be better placed utilising the same methodology as that employed by the military - to call for assistance on a basis of desired effect rather than a number of assets required, and allow capabilityspecific knowledge to provide a suitable response plan. The use of the bespoke FRS Reporting Tool was hailed once again as successful in basic application for strategic co-ordination of the response to the flooding events and therefore direction should be given to continued use by all FRS Control Rooms for the foreseeable future. It should also be acknowledged that in terms of a response of this nature in the future by the Fire and Rescue Service, there are a number of areas where benefit would be derived from an ongoing dialogue between the Chief Fire Officers Association and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). On this basis any discussions that take place should consider the effects of current austerity measures and the impact these will have on the ability of individual services to respond under existing National Mutual Aid Protocols. Consideration should also be given to whether there is scope for further investment by DCLG, to enhance current pumping capacity within the Fire and Rescue Service in order to negate calls for assistance in terms of equipment from outside of the UK. Furthermore, in light of the relative success of the Fire and Rescue Service response to these events within the context of the NCAF, it is hoped that the ongoing review of the framework will subsequently Page 4 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

5 maintain an element of operational guidance to ensure future deployments of this nature remain equally as effective and efficient. Future response to major or catastrophic incidents under National Mutual Aid protocols must build upon the learning and recommendations from this report to ensure reliable and valued support to the communities and businesses that we serve. RISK ASSESSMENT Whilst the findings and subsequent recommendations within this report are not considered to be risk critical, any future response to major or catastrophic incidents where National Resilience or nationally declared assets are deployed must build upon the learning and recommendations from this report to ensure reliable and valued support is provided to the communities and businesses that we serve. BUDGET IMPLICATIONS In terms of cost, most of the recommendations within this report can be addressed utilising existing resources in terms of personnel, assets and funding. ACTION The recommendations contained within this report if implemented in full would need a response from the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser, DCLG s Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) Team, the National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT), the Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre (FRSNCC), individual Fire and Rescue Services and voluntary sector partner organisations. RECOMMENDATIONS Following collation and subsequent evaluation of all available evidence appertaining to the response to the national flood events of January and February 2014 by the Fire and Rescue Service and partner organisations, 44 recommendations are provided for due consideration by all parties who have a vested interest. Note: The recommendations made by this report should be read in conjunction with those from the earlier reports (covering the floods in the latter part of 2012 and the tidal inundation at the end of 2013), to give a full overview of the direction of travel required to achieve the best possible outcomes from the lessons identified in all cases for flood response in England. Page 5 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

6 1 Context The Government retains strategic responsibility for National Resilience in the event of wide-area emergencies or major disasters. In meeting this responsibility, it relies on the leadership role of Fire and Rescue Authorities and recognises that National Resilience is best built on the basis of local professional expertise and understanding of risk. The Fire and Rescue National Framework clearly defines National Resilience as the capacity and capability of fire and rescue authorities to work together and with other Category 1 and 2 responders to deliver a sustained, effective response to major incidents, emergencies and disruptive challenges, such as (but not limited to) those identified in the National Risk Assessment. It refers to risks that need to be planned for on a strategic, national basis because their impacts and consequences would be of such scale and/or complexity that local resources would be insufficient, even when taking into account mutual aid arrangements, pooling and reconfiguration of resources and collective action. Within the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework, the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser has responsibility for the co-ordination of national assets during catastrophic and major emergencies. In doing so it is important that incidents of national significance are effectively co-ordinated and that suitable arrangements are in place to ensure that ministers receive the necessary advice, guidance and support to ensure that the impact of such events on the wider community are minimised. In addition, during emergencies, the Department for Communities and Local Government will work with other government departments, fire partner organisations and the devolved administrations to coordinate the deployment arrangements for specialist fire and rescue service assets as set out in the National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF). The NCAF is designed to strengthen the Fire and Rescue Services ability to respond to and resolve major emergencies and crises that require wide-spread support to affected services. It consists of two key aspects namely: Locations: o DCLG Operations Cell o Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre o Strategic Holding Areas Identified specialist roles and functions: o DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Directorate (RED) Team o Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor (CFRA) o National Strategic Advisory Team (NSAT) o National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) o Enhanced Logistics Support Officers (ELSOs) and specialist Capability Tactical Advisers It is with this in mind that this report seeks to scrutinise the events surrounding the flood events across January and February 2014, to identify observations and experiences and to provide learning outcomes that can be drawn upon to feed into the current review of the NCAF ensuring that the framework continues to evolve and remain effective in meeting its objectives. 2 Scenario From December 2013 through to February 2014, Britain faced the most extreme series of weather events ever experienced. The tidal surge affecting the east coast of England in early December 2013 was the largest in 60 years and in some places wave heights were recorded that exceeded those during the tragedy of Page 6 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

7 The storms over the Christmas and New Year period were considered to be notable but not exceptional for the winter period (Met Office), and were followed by the wettest January in the south of England since records began (see Fig 1). Rainfall for December 2013 to February 2014 was measured at 500mm, the highest recorded for 100 years. In terms of ground water levels (especially levels in bore holes), these were viewed as being exceptionally high, and as a result may continue to pose a risk of further ground water flooding for some months to come (dependent on future rainfall levels). Fig 1: Average Rainfall Winter 2103/14 Around 6 major storms hit the South and South West of England during January and February 2014, separated by intervals of 2 to 3 days. The sequence of storms followed the earlier stormy period from mid-december 2013 to early January However, the later storms from early to mid-february were much more severe with the highest waves ever measured in Britain being recorded as impacting against the South West coast of England. Overall, the period from mid-december 2013 to mid-february 2014 saw at least 12 major winter storms. When considered overall, this was the stormiest period of weather the UK has experienced for at least 20 years. As a result of the above factors, serious wide area and coastal flooding resulted across many different parts of the South of England, including Cornwall (Wheal Jane Mine), the Somerset Levels, the Thames Valley (from Oxford down through Royal Berkshire and into Surrey), London (where critical infrastructure was threatened at the Kenley Water Treatment Works) and Kent (fluvial, pluvial and groundwater flooding). It has been estimated that in excess of 7,000 homes were actually flooded with many more suffering the effects of restricted access due to widespread transport disruption, impassable routes and unusable services due to flooding affecting local infrastructure and plant (sewerage, power, etc). Figure 2 contains a series of Flood Guidance Statements issued by the Environment Agency, and depicts the developing situation from the start of December onwards with the peak being reached on Friday 14 February It should be noted that from 22 December 2013 through to late March 2014, the UK remained on a constant state of alert from flooding (denoted by yellow, amber or red areas on the maps). Page 7 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

8 Week Starting 02/12/13 16/12/13 23/12/13 30/12/13 06/12/14 13/01/14 20/01/14 27/01/14 03/02/14 10/02/14 17/02/14 24/02/14 03/03/14 Fig 2: Flood Guidance Statements December 2013 March 2014 Page 8 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

9 From a Fire and Rescue Service perspective, the arrangements outlined within the NCAF, were implemented in full although it is notable that for the events occurring from late January through to early March, the DCLG Operations Cell was not formally stood up. The unprecedented scale of mobilisation in support of a number of Fire and Rescue Services was considered to have been the largest simultaneous operational deployment of personnel and equipment since the Second World War. 3 Flood Response Early January 2014 During the period leading up to Christmas in 2013, weather forecasters were once again issuing information indicating the possibility of tidal flooding in the early part of January due to a combination of high tides (at the upper end of expected norms) coupled with the potential for gale force winds and heavy rain contained within a storm front massing in the mid-atlantic. The areas indicated as being most at risk encompassed the South West of England and to a lesser degree the South Wales coast. FRSs and other stakeholders across the region closely monitored the developing situation and made ready to invoke emergency response plans should the need arise. 2 January 2014 The Flood Forecasting Centre issued a Flood Guidance Statement (Fig 3) as the storm front drew closer to the UK, confirming the likelihood of tidal flooding across the South West coastline and into the lower reaches of the Severn Estuary, heading up-stream as far north as Gloucester, and giving amber warnings for the remainder of the west coast of the UK from South Wales as far north as the Scottish border. Fig 3 - Flood Guidance Statement 15:00hrs Thursday 02 January 2014 Whilst severe in effect, the flooding on this occasion was more localised and short-lived. Acting on intelligence received from partner agencies as above, Flood Response assets (all Type B boat rescue teams) from both the FRSs and voluntary partners were pre-deployed at the specific request of Devon & Somerset FRS in response to severe flood warnings relating to coastal and river flooding. Twelve assets were requested and were initially mobilised to a Rendezvous Point at Taunton Deane Motorway Services in Somerset, from where there they were deployed on to 7 strategic locations within the FRS area to respond to localised incidents as the need arose. The deployments were as follows: Merseyside FRS x 2 - Cheddar SARA x 2 (Sharpness and Wyre Forest) - Plymouth Page 9 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

10 RNLI x 2 (Poole) - Barnstaple Norfolk FRS x 1 - Exeter West Midlands SART x 1 - Exeter Lincolnshire FRS x 4 - Nether Stowey (2), Teignmouth and Totnes 6 January 2014 A period of intense rainfall coupled with strong winds had a residual effect on the South coast of England continuing over the next few days albeit with less severity. Dorset remained as an area of high risk. Fig 4 - Flood Guidance Statement 10:30hrs Monday 06 January 2014 Dorset FRS received a severe flood warning for the River Stour covering the above period and requested both boat teams (RNLI x 2 Poole) and a Flood Response Tactical Adviser. These assets were deployed to Christchurch for the duration of the severe flood warning. It should be noted that for the events in early January, neither Devon and Somerset nor Dorset FRS requested mutual aid support in the form of HVP assets. Other areas of the UK experienced a lower level of flood-related incidents during this period, and these were dealt with at a local level by individual FRSs. Major Incident Overview (Late January Early March 2014) On 24 January 2014, Somerset County Council declared the ongoing flooding on the Somerset Levels as a major incident, and the local MP Jeremy Browne highlighted the plight of the local people to Central Government. The various large-scale deployments in response to flooding commenced with the request for the mobilisation of 10 HVPs by Devon & Somerset FRS following a statement given by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons regarding the ongoing flooding situation in the Somerset Levels during Prime Minister s Question Time on 29 January The subsequent succession of storm fronts cascading across the UK meant that within a matter of days further mutual aid support was being requested by FRSs in Cornwall, Buckinghamshire, Dorset, Hampshire, London, Oxfordshire, Royal Berkshire, Surrey and Hereford and Worcestershire to address flood threat/events. Despite suffering further affects from flooding following the earlier storms in late December, Kent managed all events within the county at a local level (see Fig 5 below). Page 10 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

11 Pre-deployment due to fluvial flood threat Mitigation of fluvial & groundwater flooding Fig 5: Affected areas in England Early recognition was given to the requirement for logistical support in certain locations due to the high number of assets being requested. To this end, three Strategic Holding Areas (SHAs) were established: Taunton Deane Services to support the Somerset Levels Whitley Wood Fire Station to support incidents across Royal Berkshire Reigate Fire Station to support incidents within Surrey. It is particularly noteworthy that all National High Volume Pump (HVP) modules within England and Wales (51 1 including the strategic reserve set) were at one point either actively deployed or engaged in strategic cover moves to achieve the following outcomes: Support to Environment Agency pumping strategies (Somerset) Protection of critical infrastructure from the effects of flooding (London) Reduction of water levels in a reservoir to prevent overtopping/inundation (Kent) Removal of flood water to affected commercial/domestic properties (Bucks, Royal Berks, Hants, Oxon, Somerset, Surrey) 1 Note: This figure comprises all National Resilience HVPs plus the Tyne and Wear FRS HVP Page 11 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

12 Reduction in levels of flood water to protect commercial/domestic properties at risk (Bucks, Royal Berks, Hants, Oxon, Somerset, Surrey) Reduction in levels of flood water to prevent catastrophic environmental damage (Cornwall). The following table outlines the locations involved and the total number of assets attributed to each location including HVP, Flood Response and conventional fire appliances at the height of operational activity: Total mobilisations for incidents listed below Flood Rescue Type B Flood Rescue Type C Flood Rescue Tactical Advisers HVP Units HVP Support Crew Double Hose Box Units HVP Tactical Advisers Fire Appliances with Level 2 qualified crew * Enhanced Logistics Support Other Assets * Royal Berkshire Multiple Locations Totals Devon & Somerset Somerset Levels Totals Surrey Multiple Locations Totals Buckinghamshire Marlow Totals Oxfordshire Oxford Totals London Multiple Locations Totals Hampshire Winchester Totals Kent Maidstone Totals Cornwall Wheal Jane Mine Totals Dorset Strategic Cover Move Totals Hereford and Worcester Strategic Cover Move Totals * Notes: Page 12 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

13 1. Other assets include Incident Response Units x 3 (for crew welfare), the HVP Hose Ramping Module and a HVP Ancillary Equipment Module (Wales). 2. The figures given as totals include multiple deployments of individual assets to disparate incident locations and therefore may appear to exceed the total number of assets actually available at any single point in time. 3. Further specific information regarding the use of Flood Response assets will be provided through reporting to the NRB via the CFOA Lead Officer for Flood Response. 4. Definition: Level 2 - Water Rescue First Responder (DEFRA Flood Rescue Concept of Operations). The National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT) enacted its operational role as defined within the NCAF, providing support to incident locations as outlined below: Information, advice and support to the National Strategic Advisory Team (NSAT) role Information, advice and support to the Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre (FRSNCC) Information, advice and support to the Silver Command function in Devon and Somerset, Royal Berkshire and Surrey Liaison, co-ordination and capability advice to support activities at the Bronze operational level Enhanced Logistics Support Officers (ELSOs) to manage Strategic Holding Areas (SHAs) in Devon and Somerset, Royal Berkshire and Surrey. Additionally, an NRAT Operations Support Cell led by the National Resilience Officer was established at the National Resilience Centre, Fire Service College, in order to provide a focal point for the central coordination of information and support to the DCLG Operations Cell, the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser (CFRA), the NRAT, and the NRAT Duty Officer. The Terms of Reference for the NRAT Operations Support Cell specifically included: To support the NRAT Duty Officer with capability and deployment overview To support the duty NSAT with capability and deployment overview To support NRAT officers and the NRAT Duty Officer with information as requested To provide support for all NRAT officers deployed as part of the NCAF To co-ordinate and support capability Tactical Advisers To produce and maintain the NRAT incident duty rota To provide capability technical support and information as required To liaise with Babcock Critical Services regarding maintenance support to ongoing operations (to include the recovery process) To collate pertinent information from deployed NRAT officers regarding the NR response for use in subsequent debriefs and reports To produce capability-specific guidance for FRSs to support the decontamination, recovery and repatriation of deployed assets. 4 Recovery In terms of recovery from flooding events, be they tidal, fluvial or pluvial, there is written guidance provided by the Environment Agency, DEFRA and NRAT covering decontamination of equipment, which encompasses both HVP and Flood Response assets. Such guidance is designed to prevent unnecessary contamination of water sources, to prevent the harmful transference of non-native species within the environment, and to ensure the health and well-being of responders. It is understood that as Page 13 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

14 far as is reasonably practicable all responding assets where utilised were decontaminated/cleaned with due cognisance being given to such guidance. Despite the large volume of mobilisations from disparate locations to support the flood events, all assets and personnel were repatriated to their host FRSs or organisations in an expedient manner without any reported major difficulties; the recovery effort was duly supported by all FRS involved, the NRAT Operations Recovery Support Cell and Babcock Critical Services. 5 Debrief Framework The framework for the debrief of activity in response to the National Flood Events 2014 is based upon the Observation, Analysis, Judgement and Recommendation methodology devised for evaluation of operational activity at all levels, and is comprised of the following key elements: The collation and analysis of debrief feedback from affected and assisting FRSs co-ordinated by CFOA The CFOA National Floods debrief event (Fire Service College) 2 April 2014 The NRAT Floods debrief event (National Resilience Centre) 16 April 2014 The six Key Areas of Focus for the debrief framework are: NCAF Arrangements Mutual Aid Mobilising and Receiving Arrangements Communications Welfare Arrangements Views of partner agencies and affected FRS on the national response. The outcomes, analyses and recommendations derived from all elements of the debrief framework based upon the six Key Areas of Focus are provided in Section 6 Evaluation and Findings of this report. 6 Evaluation and Findings The following observations, analysis and recommendations have been made based on responses received from various stakeholders including DCLG, CFRA, FRS, NRAT, Met Office, DEFRA and voluntary organisations, and take account of issues that only affect a national mutual aid type of response for flooding and the associated NCAF arrangements. Perceived local issues should be addressed internally by individual FRSs. NCAF Arrangements Observations: It remains unclear to all stakeholders in the first instance how a national mutual aid response will be financed In the initial stages of the developing situation, resourcing requests were not always being made via FRSNCC/FRS Control Rooms Demands on the FRSNCC exceeded capability, expectations and funded staffing levels The NCAF was insufficiently resourced at strategic level Page 14 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

15 A lack of knowledge regarding functionality of the NCAF arrangements and individual roles and responsibilities was demonstrated on a number of occasions by different FRSs at various locations, notably amongst those fulfilling C&C roles NCAF arrangements do not currently encompass mutual aid requests for FRS assets other than National Assets Some initial deployments to certain areas were rushed and not based on operational need There is a lack of understanding regarding the role of specific types of Tactical Adviser provided under the NCAF arrangements Analysis: Some affected FRSs retained HVP assets for resilience purposes which were provided as part of the initial response without ever deploying them to incident scenes. Uncertainty surrounding an approval process (particularly in terms of funding arrangements) to undertake required actions ultimately led to a delay in some cases in resourcing NCAF requirements, placing unrealistic expectation against some FRSs to provide a timely response At times there were communication issues between the FRSNCC, CFOA National Resilience and FRS Fire Control Rooms due to facilitation of resourcing requests directly between FRS Control Rooms On occasion when stakeholders tried to contact FRSNCC they either did not answer or there was a delay The FRSNCC does not have a protocol for dealing with information received relating to offers of assistance from external organisations and companies DCLG did not establish the Operations Cell at Eland House which made central co-ordination of the overall response via CFRA/NSAT challenging Due to incident and political demands there was at times insufficient availability of CFRA Officers which led to a perceived lack of strategic decision making and support at a national level The NSAT capability needs to be fit for purpose utilising identified CFOA Capability Leads that can provide better coverage, given the location of FRSNCC and DCLG Operations Cell There is a need to reaffirm understanding and improve knowledge amongst FRS of the NCAF arrangements to ensure correct application and operation for future events Co-ordination arrangements for FRS assets other than National Assets was at times disjointed; appliances and officers were provided with little tasking information, and co-ordination could be improved Considerable pressure was placed on some FRSs and their personnel to achieve attendance on scene before proper strategic/tactical plans had been developed or put in place at the local level. Recommendations: 1. That a methodology for access to centralised funding mechanisms that are clearly understood by all stakeholders is provided, thus ensuring requests for support are anticipated, received at the earliest opportunity, and acted upon in a timely manner 2. That the ongoing NCAF review should incorporate a form of incident annotation with associated trigger points that can be easily applied during wide-area emergencies or major disasters requiring mutual aid support Page 15 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

16 3. That at all times requests for national mutual aid support for nationally declared assets are made via FRSNCC in order that a clear picture of overall availability is maintained 4. Where a major incident in a single geographical location or multiple incidents occur simultaneously across geographically disparate areas that require significant resourcing support, DCLG implements the Operations Cell as an integral part of the NCAF arrangements on every occasion 5. Review the level of staffing for CFRA roles to support operational activities under NCAF 6. The call for NSAT support should be made at the earliest opportunity in order to facilitate strategic support to the CFRA roles 7. Review NSAT provision with the aim of providing better geographical coverage for England and Wales 8. Review the current model for provision of the FRSNCC function to ensure a scalable response at all times from this vital component of the NCAF structure 9. That all FRSs revisit training for all personnel covering the NCAF arrangements to improve knowledge, understanding, application and operation 10. That the revision of the NCAF seeks to include the potential for mutual aid requests for FRS assets other than National Assets, and that supporting mechanisms are developed to facilitate such deployments 11. That future calls for mutual aid support should be driven from the bottom up and address specific technical hazard and impact information to inform response requirements 12. That a programme of periodic NSAT CPD events are established and incorporate the concept of horizon scanning including up-to-date threat and security situation developments as outlined in the NCAF. Mutual Aid Observations: It remains unclear to all stakeholders in the first instance how a national mutual aid response will be financed Some affected FRSs requested conventional fire appliances and crews to support the response to flooding Short-notification timescales were given which placed undue pressure on assisting FRSs Some assisting FRSs were unsure of the exact nature of some of the assets being requested, eg wading vehicles, and thereby declined the request for support Some affected FRSs did not provide sufficient mid- to long-term incident planning information to assisting FRSs Insufficient numbers of Tactical Advisers were requested in the initial stages to support the needs of the incident(s) Flexi-Duty Command Officers were supplied by assisting FRSs upon request, to support the command structure within an affected FRS and at times felt under-utilised Capabilities offered by some voluntary sector organisations proved to be disparate and unreliable Page 16 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

17 Extended deployments created difficulties in terms of local resilience within supporting FRSs. Analysis: Uncertainty surrounding application of costs through recharging mechanisms led in some cases to delays in initial response from supporting FRS an approval process (particularly in terms of funding arrangements) to undertake required actions ultimately led to a delay in some cases in resourcing NCAF requirements, placing unrealistic expectation against some FRSs to provide a timely response Co-ordination arrangements for FRS assets other than National Assets was at times disjointed; appliances and officers were provided with little tasking information, and co-ordination could be improved Some assisting FRSs encountered difficulties in maintaining their internal resourcing and resilience arrangements due to short-notification timescales for providing assistance Some FRSs were unable to make an informed judgement regarding the type of assistance/equipment being requested, and therefore assets were not necessarily mobilised in the most expeditious manner Some assisting FRSs encountered difficulties with the ongoing management of the requested support due to a lack of information such as required crewing models, anticipated duration of deployment, etc A degree of decision inertia was caused due to the lack of capability-specific Tactical Advice available both in the initial stages and at times during the response phase; this on occasion hindered the development of effective mid- to long-term incident plans There appeared to be no due consideration given to the actual tasking provided for supporting Flexi-Duty Command Officers based upon the available skill sets of those responding Due to the scale of the response, it was sometimes difficult for voluntary organisations to coordinate their activities and respond effectively Extended deployments create fiscal and resourcing implications for supporting FRSs, particularly against the background of current budgetary pressures on all FRSs. Recommendations: 13. That CFOA NOC looks to develop and agree standard charging guidance for all FRS to work to 14. All FRSs should give due cognisance to all sources of specialist technical advice (eg capability-specific Tactical Advisers) to support the development of strategic planning for incident response in rising tide scenarios in order to be able to achieve timely and informed requests for national mutual aid 15. That the cadre of Tactical Advisers to cover HVP and Flood Response is increased to provide sufficient numbers to effectively resource requests during major incidents Page 17 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

18 16. Affected FRSs should base requests for specialised assets or vehicles upon the desired effect or capability required rather than detailing a specific type of vehicle with which certain FRSs may not be familiar. For example, instead of requesting a wading vehicle, FRSs should request a vehicle which has the capability to safely drive through floodwater up to a maximum depth of All FRSs should ensure that the Tactical Adviser concept as outlined within the NCAF is fully understood within organisations and that Incident Commanders give due consideration to the early request for capability-specific Tactical Advisers to assist with the timely provision of incident plans to enable adequate resourcing and a successful resolution to operations 18. Affected FRSs should assess organisational/operational capability gaps and then request Flexi-Duty Officers with the pre-requisite skill sets to meet the identified operational demands 19. All FRSs should aim to regularly engage, train and exercise with voluntary organisations in their FRS authority area that are likely to respond in the event of major incidents, in order to become familiar with the level of capability that such organisations may offer 20. The adoption of a standard deployment duration template should be explored by CFOA NOC which incorporates the utilisation of supporting FRSs on a rotational basis in order to share/spread the burden upon individual services. Mobilising and Receiving Arrangements Observations: Conventional FRS assets often by-passed the SHA/ELS function and effectively self-deployed directly to incident scenes ELS teams and ELSOs were required to deal with resource logistics as expected but in some instances due to a lack of understanding surrounding the ELS function some areas of Incident Command started to overlap into the ELS role There was no standard crew size accompanying assisting assets There was no tracking of assets within affected FRSs once they left the SHA A number of urgent requests were made by affected FRSs for national assets. These assets were requested to be in attendance within a short time span (eg within 7 hours). However, when they arrived they were not immediately utilised Some of the identified SHAs within affected FRSs were completely unsuitable for the role A number of assisting assets were deployed to affected FRSs without the FRSNCC being informed There is a lack of understanding in certain FRSs that NR assets require a bespoke support structure to enable correct function. Therefore, some affected FRSs refused certain elements that would have made the overall response work more effectively, eg ELS function Safe approach routes to SHAs were not always identified and communicated by affected FRSs. Page 18 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

19 Analysis: Co-ordination arrangements for FRS assets other than National Assets was at times disjointed; appliances and officers were provided with little tasking information, and co-ordination could be improved. At times this led to issues around command, control and asset accountability The use of ELS for C&C functions sits outside of the agreed/established protocols for use; this caused confusion and complications especially when relief ELS crews were brought in to undertake the role Some assisting assets arrived with more personnel than expected, which created additional logistical and cost burdens to affected FRSs There was a misconception that once national assets are deployed into an affected FRS from the SHA, their exact location does not need to be continuously reported to the ELS function; this made central reporting difficult and caused problems for the National Resilience Prime Contractor when attempting to respond to asset defects/breakdowns Some requests for supporting assets were not made in a timely and informed manner; this led to frustration and confusion amongst some assisting crews and questions subsequently being raised by some FRSs as to whether the timing of some mobilising requests were appropriate Some assisting FRS resources were delayed in their attendance at SHAs due to access routes being compromised by road closures or diversions due to flooding. Recommendations: 21. The ELS function should only be used for the logistical management of resources supplied to support an affected FRS in accordance with agreed protocols 22. When providing national mutual aid, all supporting FRSs should promptly notify the affected FRS of the exact number of personnel accompanying their supporting asset(s) in order to support the facilitation of appropriate and timely logistical/welfare arrangements 23. The importance of a robust, continuous communications conduit between the affected FRS control and the ELS function should be re-emphasised to all FRSs and all ELS host services 24. Affected FRSs should seek advice/assistance at the earliest possible stage from NRAT Capability Advisers and/or appropriate capability Tactical Advisers in order to develop suitable response plans which inform appropriate mobilisation requests Note: This type of advice can be sought during periods of steady state at any time and used to assist in the development of specific risk management plans 25. When establishing SHAs, affected FRSs should identify and communicate information on safe approach routes for supporting resources as soon as reasonably practicable. Communications Observations: Assisting FRSs utilised a number of different interpretations of asset call-signs for national-scale mobilising A number of different contact telephone numbers were utilised for FRS liaison officers within affected and assisting FRS Page 19 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

20 There was difficulty in effectively communicating with some voluntary sector partners during deployments There was a lack of clarity regarding the allocation of multi-agency Airwave radio channels There was difficulty in effectively communicating both with and within FRSNCC and the DCLG Operations Room with internet connectivity for mobile devices and mobile telephone signal being poor and sporadic There were difficulties at times in maintaining a commonly recognised information picture between NCAF roles and locations CFOA briefing papers were issued to all CFOA members on a regular basis throughout the deployments WebEoC remains unsuitable and too complex for use as an effective incident logistics management tool There are inconsistencies in how HVP assets are referred to: the primary system used in FRSNCC utilises different call-signs/module identifiers to those used on the CNR Asset Status Tool Analysis: Current methods for recording incident information within FRSNCC are not joined up. The NAT (National Asset Toolkit) database is stand-alone. Confusion was prevalent within FRSNCC, SHAs and affected FRS controls due to the inability to rationalise call-signs with assisting asset types Contact between the affected FRSs and supporting FRS assets/els was at times sporadic and difficult to maintain. This occurred due to the use of Flexi-Duty Officer mobile phone numbers which changed frequently due to rota patterns and personnel changes An incompatibility/absence of communications with some voluntary sector partners created difficulties in implementing effective inter-agency liaison and incident response Multi-agency partners were all utilising different Airwave radio channels which created difficulties with inter-agency liaison, communication and, at times, command and control NRAT Officers assigned to support the FRSNCC as an NCAF location experienced difficulties in maintaining effective communications with other NCAF locations and roles There is confusion regarding the required format for a CRIP template for reporting during incidents. Multiple styles of report format were produced causing confusion and unnecessary duplication of information often with minor differences occurring due to timing of report production The delivery of operational information to CFOA members proved to be highly successful and prevented duplicity in calls for up-dates regarding resourcing There was difficulty for ELS crews to maintain an overall picture of asset disposition due to the complexities and functionality of the WebEoC system. There was also difficulty for NRAT officers when undertaking the role of ELSO in maintaining an accurate log of decisions and advice offered to key stakeholders Differences in system functionality and recording methodology caused confusion amongst the various NCAF roles. Page 20 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

21 Recommendations: 26. Plain speech asset descriptors should always be used in order to prevent confusion during mutual aid mobilisation, particularly when using main scheme radio communications 27. Affected FRS should make greater use of Airwave radio channels available to them in order to facilitate continuity in communications between various functions/locations 28. Affected FRS should look to provide a level of Airwave radio capability to voluntary sector partners to ensure that an effective communication strategy is established and maintained throughout the incident duration 29. Where a multi-agency response is implemented, agreement should be reached on an appropriate and common Airwave radio channel that can be utilised to support effective operational activity Note: MAMA (Multi-Agency Mutual Aid) channels are accessible in all Airwave terminals/handsets 30. DCLG and FRSNCC urgently look to improve internet connectivity for mobile devices and mobile phone network access and provide an appropriate number of landlines (with numbers publicised to all FRS), within the FRSNCC and DCLG Operations Cell locations 31. An agreed reporting template (Common Reportable Information Picture or CRIP ) should be developed and used across all NCAF roles and locations 32. CFOA members briefings should be considered an integral part of any future response 33. A suitable replacement for WebEoC is sourced by NRAT 34. Agreement is reached to establish an integrated solution between the various systems employed which currently support the roles and locations within the NCAF structure Note: Recommendations 31 & 32 are currently being progressed via the NCAF - ESS (Electronic Support System) Project. Welfare Observations: Some personnel mobilised from other services stuck rigidly to their shift pattern in service and didn t alter to meet the needs of the situation Some responding national teams were unwilling to split crews to meet incident demands Hotels at times were over-booked with insufficient room for all attending crews (ie crew members had to share rooms on pull-out beds) Some crews had to change accommodation location and/or their personal effects had to be relocated whilst they were deployed Meal provision as part of pre-booked accommodation arrangements for assisting crews did not always take cognisance of crew resting times (eg crews were not always able to access pre-paid meal arrangements due to their assigned working shift patterns) Generally welfare provision in and around SHAs was good. However, incident ground welfare provision for crews was regarded as sporadic and generally poorly resourced (eg provision of portable toilets) Page 21 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014

22 There was potential for contamination of responders/ppe from floodwater; decontamination facilities were not provided at SHA locations. Analysis: Crews from other services were expected to make up the shortfall The ability to divide crews to meet the needs of the incident would have reduced the burden in terms of relief crewing requirements as well as lowering demands for accommodation thereby enhancing welfare arrangements Affected FRSs did not have robust arrangements in place to deal with the welfare requirements of personnel from supporting FRS particularly during out of hours /weekend/bank Holiday periods, which led to undue or unnecessary pressure being placed on operational command structures to facilitate accommodation/welfare arrangements. On occasion this led to insufficient provision being put in place both in terms of accommodation and arrangements on scene Affected FRSs were in some cases unwilling to block-book accommodation for sufficient duration due to perceived cost issues. This led to short notice being given to hotels for extensions when accommodation was needed for much longer periods, and often rooms had been reallocated to other clientele Accommodation appears to have been booked in most cases on a bed and breakfast basis with the need to provide welfare requirements (food) for responding crews on a variety of shift patterns being overlooked. This meant that in some instances supporting crews were left in a position whereby they had to make stand-alone provision to cover meals other than breakfast Due to the presence of effluent and other contaminants in floodwater, decontamination arrangements for crews /responders are vital. Recommendations: 35. CFOA NOC establish an agreed duty/roster system for all out of service deployments that can be implemented to achieve a fair system of crew rotation at incident, and enhance the ability of the affected FRS to plan for relief crewing 36. CFOA NOC establish an agreed protocol to enable the suitable division of responding crews in a safe manner to facilitate an efficient/effective response that meets the specific needs of the affected FRS/nature of the incident 37. All FRSs should be reminded of their responsibility as a receiving service in terms of the provision of suitable welfare arrangements for supporting crews, and ensure that they have sufficient cover in place to facilitate such provision particularly during periods considered to be outside of normal office hours 38. For incidents of this magnitude, all FRSs should consider overall welfare provision at incident scene (to include decontamination) for responding crews, especially at those sites with anticipated prolonged attendance, and provide suitable facilities as far as is reasonably practicable. Views of partner agencies and affected FRS on the national response Observations: Page 22 of 25 National Flood Event Operational Debrief Report V1.0 May 2014