Are Any of the US Claims About the European Missile Defense System True?

Transcription

1 US Department of Defense and State Department Documents S Important Properties of Missile Defense s ( of ) Documents Disseminating Information About the US Proposed Missile Defense for Europe MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group Side-by-Side Size Comparison of Missile Defense Agency Forward-Based X-Band and US UHF Upgraded Early Warning Technological Issues Relevant to the Policy Debate On European Missile Defense in the Czech Republic US Upgraded UHF Early Warning Are Any of the US Claims About the European Missile Defense System True? Emitted Waves Are Long Wavelength with High Power European Site Initiative Update For Czech Republic Theodore A. Postol Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Voice: ; FAX: ; postol@mit.edu Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Prague, Czech Republic November 7 to 9, 8 Important Properties of Missile Defense s ( of ) Lt Gen Trey Obering, USAF Director Missile Defense Agency 7-MDA-564 (8 MAY 7) ms-959 / 547 Antenna Area = 9. m Discrimination Ranges that Could Actually be ACHIEVED by the and s Major Finding. The European Midcourse () cannot perform the functions that the MDA has claimed for it. Apparent Size of Cone-Shaped Warhead at X-Band Cross Section ~.m. If Absorbing Material is used to make warheads more stealthy, the range will be even smaller, perhaps 4 km or so. PAVE PAWS meter Diameter ~ 755 m Antenna Area Emitted Waves Are Short Wavelength with Low Power 4. This suggests that the is being placed in the Czech Republic with the expectation that it will undergo very substantial upgrades after it is emplaced. Apparent Size of Cone-Shaped Warhead at X-Band Cross Section ~.m 9. m Antenna Area 7 KW 's Effective Target Acquisition Capability Relative to the 5 Emitted Waves Are Short Wavelength with Low Power 6 7 Important Note About Ing. Milan Hlobil s Paper About the Potential Health Hazard of the Proposed for Brdy Answer to the Paradox of Ing. Milan Hlobil s Wrong Answer Major Finding. Ing. Milan Hlobil correctly estimated the average and peak power of the X-band radar proposed for Brdy Hills based on the information provided by the US Missile Defense Agency and the Czech Ministry of Defence. The US Missile Defense Agency and the Czech Ministry of Defence provided inaccurate information to the Czech people and their Parliament.. This data stated that the radar would be able to detect a target the size of baseball at a range of to 5 km. The actual average power of the radar is, Watts, about 5 times smaller than that correctly estimated by Ing. Hlobil, based on the misinformation he received from the Czech Ministry of Defense.. The threat to Europe and the United States described in US Missile Defense Agency Briefings to officials of the Czech Republic and other European nations is inconsistent with the vast body of publicly available information. The truth is: The radar does not have a range of, km to,5 km against a baseball sized target. 6. How could Ing. Hlobil s estimates be wrong if he used the right method for calculating his result? 9 The Czech Parliament may want to consider looking into the matter of who in the Defence Ministry was responsible for supplying the misleading information to the public. Actual Size of Derived from Rocket Technology Used in Iranian SLV MDA Represented as Similar in Size and Weight to SLV Most recently launched Iranian Space Vehicle. The assertions and diagrams in Missile Defense Agency Briefings are inconsistent, and seem to use unreliable public sources and imagination for data, rather than using analysis based on from the US and other intelligence agencies. Its actual range is about 6 to 8 km! 5. In spite of Ing. Hlobil s use of the correct method for estimating the radar s calculations, his answer was incorrect. 8. It is also inconsistent with what is known about the technologies that the Iranians would have to master to make observable progress towards developing large high-lift long-range ballistic missiles.. A baseball sized target would have a Cross Section.8 m. 4. Using this information Ing. Hlobil correctly estimated that the radar would have to have an average power of about,, Watts and a Peak Power of about 5,, Watts. Washington, DC. It does not have the power and aperture to achieve a detection range much greater than 6 to 7 km against an actual warhead! 5 m Antenna Area ~ - KW MDA Forward-Based X-Band () 4 Seattle, WA Emitted Waves Are Long Wavelength with High Power MDA Thinned X-Band Phased Array Antenna Area = 9. m UEWR Apparent Size of Cone-Shaped Warhead at UHF/VHF Cross Section ~..5m Antenna Area ~ 8 to 9 m Emitted Waves Are Short Wavelength with Low Power MDA Forward-Based X-Band April 7 Comparison of the Relative Sizes and of the UEWR, the European Midcourse (), and the Forward-Based X-Band () Side-by-Side Size Comparison of Missile Defense Agency Forward-Based X-Band and Missile Defense UHF Upgraded Early Warning s UHF Upgraded Early Warning Antenna Area = 8~9 m 4. In short, their claim of an imminent IRBM and threat from Iran has no merit. MDA SLV Observed SLV ~5- tons Major Finding MDA Advanced New Rocket Motors Light Airframes ~5 tons Incremental Clustered Motors SCUD Airframes ~5 tons Discrimination Ranges that Could Actually be ACHIEVED by the and s Major Finding 4 Seattle, WA. If the US is serious about building a missile defense to defend the continental United States, the will absolutely have to be upgraded at some future time.. The only radar in Europe that will be usable for attempts to discriminate warheads and decoys will be the intelligence gathering radar at, Norway.. If the is not fully upgraded, the entire eastern two-thirds of the continental United States will not have any missile defense radar that could potentially try to provide a radar discrimination function for the US missile defense.. False statements made to the Norwegian Parliament by the Norwegian Defense Minister in 999 about the true purpose of this radar caused a major national scandal in Norway, and led to protests from the Russian government.. All of the other currently available radars are low-frequency and will never be able to provide this service.. It appears very likely that the radar will have a SECRET role in the functioning of the European Missile Defense system until the is fully upgraded. 4. These facts indicate that the United States will have to upgrade the so it can be used to try to perform discrimination services for missile defense of the eastern two thirds of the continental United States. Washington, DC 4 5 6

2 Fixed Azimuth Comparison of the Relative Sizes and of the UEWR, the GLOBUS II at, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band () Comparison of the Relative Sizes of the European Midcourse, the GLOBUS II at, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band () Major Finding 5 Geometry of the Fixed Azimuth and Variable Elevation Scan Pattern of the UEWR Globus II. The Forward-Based X-Band () that is supposed to be placed in southern Europe as part of the European missile defense does not have sufficient range to reliably acquire warheads that would be launched by hypothetical Iranian IRBMs and s against Europe and the United States. Washington, DC Seattle, Washington Hawaii Hokkaido, Japan. At least three radars would be needed to perform this function, and even under these conditions the radars may still not be adequate. Fixed Azimuth PAVE PAWS meter Diameter ~ 755 m Antenna Area 5 m Antenna Area ~ - KW. If the radars could do their job, the US would need to place and operate these radars in locations like Georgia, Eastern Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and/or Afghanistan. 9. m Antenna Area 7 KW GLOBUS II 7 meter Diameter ~ 57 m Antenna Area 7 GLOBUS II ~ 57 m Antenna Area 7 meter Diameter 9. m Antenna Area 5 6 KW 8 4. It is clear that even if political negotiations make it possible to base these radars in these locations, the radars would be highly vulnerable to low-technology commando attacks. 9 The reason three radars are needed is shown above. The radars are not of sufficient range ( km) to track missiles on trajectories going to the full range of possible attack trajectories. This problem can only be addressed by creating a fence of short-range radars around Iran. This need for three radars could not possibly have been unknown to the Missile Defense Agency. Major Finding 6 False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s. The placement of Missile Defense s in Poland creates the possibility that when the system is upgraded and expanded, as will be necessary to make it even marginally functional, the interceptors will be in a position to engage Russian Strategic missiles launched over the poles towards the United States.. The US maintains that this is not possible, but calculations show that this claim is false.. Furthermore, the US is developing a follow-on interceptor, the KEI (Kinetic Energy ) which has a shorter powered flight time relative to the current Ground-Based. 4. The KEI can be launched from large mobile launchers, and therefore could pose yet another perceived threat to Russian s. s Cannot Catch Russian Missiles launched 5- sec after threat, sec, sec Apogee 8 sec 6 sec 4 sec Russian Moscow s Cannot Catch Russian Missiles, sec, sec 8 sec Russian Trajectory Apogee 6 sec 4 sec launched 5- sec after threat Moscow Russian 5. Concerns by Russia over the future viability of its strategic forces could pose a major obstacle to future arms reductions. Time (sec) after Russian U.S. European Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability Time (sec) after Russian U.S. European Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability 6. This could then have implications for the future of the Nonproliferation Treaty of MDA-6 ( JUN 7) ms-967b / MDA-6 ( JUN 7) ms-967b / False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s Ability of Polish-Based s to Engage Russian s from Tatischevo Ability of Polish-Based s to Engage Russian s from Vypolzovo Two Stage Pegasus 8. km/sec Against SS-5/7 ed from Vypolzovo Russia Intercept Points for Two Stage Pegasus 8. km/sec Against SS-5/7 and SS-8/9 s ed from Vypolzovo Russia Speed = 8./8.8 km/sec = 8./8.8 km/sec Speed Completes Powered Flight.5 minutes minute (SS-7) at 8 seconds also of from Poland Breaks Horizon 8 seconds minutes Intercept Point Against SS-8/9 Intercept Point Against SS-5/ UK Warning Polish Site Tatischevo UK Warning Polish Site Vypolzovo 5 6 Location of Intercepts (8. km/sec) Location of Intercepts (8.8 km/sec) Location Where First Acquires the Target Czech X-Band 7 Location of Intercepts (8. km/sec) Location of Intercepts (8.8 km/sec) Location Where First Acquires the Target Czech X-Band 8 Major Finding 7 Effects of Countermeasures on Emerging Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats First Generation Countermeasures Predicted by the US Intelligence Community Cross Section of a Meter Long Round-Nose Cone-Shaped Warhead Properties of Absorbing Materials at Frequencies at or Near X-Band. The US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States (issued in September 999) predicts that any emerging Iranian threat will be accompanied by countermeasures that would defeat both the radar and infrared discrimination functions of both the current and any future upgraded US missile defense.. If this US intelligence finding is correct, it means that the current US missile defense, and its upgraded future system, will be obsolete the first time an Iranian is flight tested. Separating RVs Radical reductions in the radar detectivity of warheads against X-Band radars (Cross Sections of. m or less) Spin-Stabilized RVs Removal of potentially exploitable fluctuations in the size of an otherwise tumbling warhead s X-Band Cross Section. These can be used to increase detection ranges relative to tumbling warheads RV Reorientation Guarantee that warheads are oriented so as to minimize the X-Band radar s detection range against the warhead Absorbing Material (RAM) Guarantee that warheads will be invisible to the X-Band radar. Also confounds discrimination by X-Band s Booster Fragmentation Hides the low- Cross Section warhead among numerous low and high Cross Section fragments Low-Power Jammers Eliminates the ability of the X-Band radar to detect, track, or discriminate against either warheads or decoys. A dumb jammer of roughly. Watts would be adequate for defeating the proposed European Midcourse to be located in the Czech Republic. grams of could easily hide a warhead or a decoy from the X-Band radar. The countermeasure would deply many clouds of, some of which contain warheads, decoys, or nothing, to overwhelm the X-band radars Spin Stabilized Warheads Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation Frequency of GBR X-Band Graded dielectric reticulated foam radar absorbing material. This material is about.9 centimeters thick and weighs about ounces per square foot. Data from: Richard N. Johnson, Absorbing Material: A Passive Role in An Active Scenario, The International Countermeasures Handbook, th Edition, 986, EW Communications, Inc., Frequency of GBR X-Band Frequency of GBR X-Band Resonant radar absorbing covering. This absorber is tuned to 8.5 GHz. It is roughly.8 centimeters thick and weighs about. pound per square foot. Absorbing Materials 9 Simple (Balloon) Decoys Could be used to degrade the ability of kill vehicle to hit the warhead (note US anti-satellite attack on an alleged tank of Hydrazine). More importantly, can make it impossible for Kill Vehicle to know which of many balloons might contain a warhead. Can also be filled with radar absorbing foams, to make the balloons and warheads invisible to the X-Band radars. m Dual-band radar absorber with resonant absorbtion at 9 and 8 GHz. This material is about.45 centimeters thick and weighs about.5 pounds per square foot.

3 X-Band Transmit/Receive Module Average power Watts, Peak Power Watts.66 inches.5 in Low-Power Jammers? MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group Appendix Statements Made by Responsible US Officials 4 Some Notable Quotes "As you see, if there are Russian launches from interceptor sites we could establish tracks on those, but although we can establish those coverages the interceptors cannot catch them." LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY A. TREY OBERING, III Director, Missile Defense Agency March, 7 Q&A SESSION As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after the April 9 NATO-Russia Council meeting, "The Allies were convinced and are convinced that there are no implications of the United States system for the strategic balance... Ten interceptors will not, and cannot affect the strategic balance and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia." "U.S. missile defense plans are neither directed at nor a threat to Russia. Due to the location and capabilities of the European missile defense assets, the proposed system would have no capability against Russian s." Missile Defense Cooperation U.S. Missile Defense Factsheet "Senior Russian officials as well as their experts understand the limited capabilities of the interceptors and the X-band radar, including why the European-based assets would have no capability against Russian s launched at the United States, and how it is optimized for engaging ballistic missile threats launched out of Iran." Brian R. Green Statement for the Record to the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee, /7/7 5 Some Notable Quotes "First of all, these interceptors, the radars, are not designed against the Russian threat. You're not going to counter the hundreds of Russian s and the thousands of warheads that are represented by that fleet with interceptors in a field in Europe. The radar that we were putting there -- first of all, it is designed against the Middle Eastern threat, not against the Russian threat. With the radar that we have there that we have proposed, it is a very narrow beam radar. It has to be queued. And so even if we wanted to try to track Russian missiles with that radar, we could only track a very, very small percentage of those missiles. And even if we could, passing that information off and having an interceptor try to intercept the Russian missile, we can't do it. The interceptors that we would place in Europe are not fast enough to catch the Russian s. We're in a tail chase from a location in Poland and if you'd like, in that -- in response to any questions, I can show you some slides on that as well. " AIR FORCE LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC THURSDAY, FEBRUARY, 7, : P.M. EST "MR. HADLEY: Of course the deployment that we're talking about in Europe is not about Russia at all. It's not aimed at Russia. The systems we would deploy do not have capability of any significant character against Russian s destined for the -- that are aimed at the United States. Just doesn't have any capability." Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steven Hadley on the President's Trip to the G8 Summit and Europe White House Conference Center Briefing Room June, False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense European s and s Cannot Possibly Defend Northern Japan European s Are Fast Enough to Overtake and Intercept Russian s The European Midcourse () Cannot Possible Have the Range to Perform Discrimination Services for the European Defense System False Claims Made in Presentations to European (and Japanese?) Allies by Missile Defense Agency that US Proposed European Missile Defense Can Defend Northern Japan X-Band Transmit/Receive Module Average power Watts, Peak Power Watts Devices that Can Be Used to Build X-band Jammers Devices that Can Be Used to Build Low-Power X-band Jammers Low-Power Jammers NO PLAUSIBLE WAY FOR DEFENSE SYSTEM TO OBTAIN PRECISION TRACKING DATA NEEDED TO GUIDE INTERCEPTORS FROM ALASKA!.66 inches in Eastern Turkey too Far from Missile Trajectory to Track the Deployed Warhead (RCS ~.m ) X-Band in Czech Republic Below Horizon Sea-Based X-Band Off Adak Below Horizon.5 in from Iran 4 Low-Power Jammers? X-Band Transmit/Receive Module Average power Watts, Peak Power Watts.66 inches The slide below is a typical Missile Defense Agency representation of what they claim is the threat from Iran. The particular threats of concern are the "Ashura medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), a possible space launch vehicle (SLV) and an, which is projected for to 5. Note that the Ashura is depicted as a two-stage ballistic missile as is the possible space launch vehicle. The Ashura is also depicted as somewhat larger than the Shahab-. Both of these vehicles are depicted as if the ratio of the size of each of the two stages is appropriate for a long range ballistic missile. As will be shown in the next slides, these depictions of the "threat" are misleading and actually contradict the publicly known facts The slide below is a typical Missile Defense Agency representation of what they claim is the threat from Iran. The particular threats of concern are the "Ashura medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), a possible space launch vehicle (SLV) and an, which is projected for to 5. Note that the Ashura is depicted as a two-stage ballistic missile as is the possible space launch vehicle. The Ashura is also depicted as somewhat larger than the Shahab-. Both of these vehicles are depicted as if the ratio of the size of each of the two stages is appropriate for a long range ballistic missile. As will be shown in the next slides, these depictions of the "threat" are misleading and actually contradict the publicly known facts.5 in Low-Power Jammers? These renditions of the Iranian threat are misleading MDA s graphic seems to indicate that this is a -stage missile but it is NOT The MDA slide misidentifies the Kavoshgar- as the Ashura, a new missile that is supposed to be significantly larger than the Shahab-. Note the unbroken cable raceways on both missiles, indicate that they are single stage missiles, not two-stage missiles as depicted by the Missile Defense Agency. Also note that the diameter of thekavoshgar- is essentially the same as that of the Shahab-, although the Shahab- is about 5 to % shorter. These differences in length are much like the variants of the SCUD-B and SCUD-C, both of which utilize the same missile technology

4 Actual Upper Stage Actual Upper Stage Upper Stage The figures below show the relative size of the as represented by the Missile Defense Agency and it slides. This is shown next to the space launch vehicle postulated by the Missile Defense Agency and it slides. The two larger renditions of the s, one labeled "Advanced," and the other "Incremental," are scaled to show the relative size of s that are derived under two different assumptions. The "Advanced " assumes new rocket motors and a much more advanced and lighter airframe then has so far been demonstrated in Iranian missile technology. The second "Incremental " assumes that existing rocket motors and airframe fabrication techniques are used to try to fabricate an with technologies similar to that used in the Shab-. The "Advanced " would weigh about tons and the "Incremental " would weigh about 5 tons. In order for a missile that weighs between and 5 tons to lift off the ground it will need either a smaller number of new and advanced rocket motors or a large number of existing Shahab- rocket motors clustered to provide the lift needed for takeoff. In the first case, the Iranians would have to develop a new, large, and far more advanced rocket motor than that used in the Shahab-. They would also need to develop new and highly advanced manufacturing techniques to build lighter airframes. The Iranians have yet to develop a rocket motor on their own. The lighter airframes are a major technical and industrial development for which there appears to be no evidence. If instead the Iranians cluster rocket motors from the Shahab-, they would have to master the technique of operating numerous rocket motors reliably on each rocket stage. These would require new turbo pumps, which the Iranians have never developed, and it would be necessary to fabricate airframes that are gigantic relative to what the Iranians have so far developed. While none of these developments can be ruled out at some future time, it is very clear that the Iranians are not close to demonstrating any of the technologies they would need to build a long-range or IR BM capable of threatening Western Europe and the United States. Incremental Clustered Motors SCUD Airframes Advanced New Rocket Motors Light Airframes Cluster large numbers of existing available low thrust rocket motors configured so that the will work reliably Lower Stage MDA MDA SLV? As one can see, the Missile Defense Agency's rendition of the space launch vehicle is misleading, as the actual rocket tested by Iran is essentially a vehicle that uses a slightly elongated Shahab- as the first stage and a highly suboptimal small second stage. This indicates only a very modest advance in Iranian rocket technology. Further details of the upper stage indicates that it uses the same relatively low energy fuel as the SCUD-B. It does appear to use a set of small rocket motors that may be gimbaled. None of these innovations point toward a heavy lift capability to build an. 49 Developed new large rocket motors with thrusts of roughly 5 tons or so 5 Actual Size of Derived from Rocket Technology Used in Iranian SLV 7 lb lb 6 MDA Represented as Similar in Size and Weight to SLV 5 lb lb lb 5 Most recently launched Iranian Space Vehicle lb 4 lb Warhead, lbs (, kg) lb 9.m 5.4m 7.5m North Korean Nodong SCUD-B Range (km) Weight ~5, lbs Weight ~4, lbs Weight ~, lbs Weight ~55, lbs Weight ~75, lbs Preliminary weight versus Range Estimates and Notional Drawings of Vehicles MDA SLV Observed SLV ~5- tons 5 Comparison of the Relative Sizes and of the UEWR, the European Midcourse (), and the Forward-Based X-Band () What Do the Actual Components Look Like? The s ( of ) 5 lb 5 lb 5 Gross Weight versus Range (SCUD versus Modern Rocket Technology) 8 Weight (Thousands of Pounds) 5 MDA Advanced New Rocket Motors Light Airframes ~5 tons Incremental Clustered Motors SCUD Airframes ~5 tons 54 The Forward-Based X-Band (FMX) Has Limited Acquisition Abilities Against. m Cone-Shaped Warheads at Ranges Greater Than km National Missile Defense Ground-Based Prototype (NMD-GBR-P) X-Band to be Used in National Missile Defense System UEWR 5 m Antenna Area ~ - KW PAVE PAWS meter Diameter ~ 755 m Antenna Area 9. m Antenna Area 7 KW 57 Initial Discrimination Range Capabilities: Cross Section =. m, S/N =, 9 km Range Dwell Time =. sec,. Watts per T/R Module Ugraded Discrimination Range Capabilities: Cross Section =. m, S/N =, 49 km Range Dwell Time =. sec, Watts per T/R Module Tracking Range With Upgrades: Cross Section =. m, S/N =, 7 km Range Dwell Time =. sec, Watts per T/R Module 58 False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II on January, 975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT), Properties of Absorbing Materials at Frequencies at or Near X-Band Frequency of GBR X-Band Frequency of GBR X-Band Absorbing Materials (RAM) Countermeasures to the Defense Resonant radar absorbing covering. This absorber is tuned to 8.5 GHz. It is roughly.8 centimeters thick and weighs about. pound per square foot. Graded dielectric reticulated foam radar absorbing material. This material is about.9 centimeters thick and weighs about ounces per square foot. Data from: Richard N. Johnson, Absorbing Material: A Passive Role in An Active Scenario, The International Countermeasures Handbook, th Edition, 986, EW Communications, Inc., Booster Fragmentation Frequency of GBR X-Band Absorbing Materials Booster Fragmentation Countermeasures to the Defense Dual-band radar absorber with resonant absorbtion at 9 and 8 GHz. This material is about.45 centimeters thick and weighs about.5 pounds per square foot

5 False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II on January, 975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT), X-Band Transmit/Receive Module Average power Watts, Peak Power Watts Devices that Can Be Used to Build X-band Jammers Booster Fragmentation.66 inches Low-Power Jammer Countermeasures to the Defense.5 in 6 Ft and Minuteman Warhead Figure 8.4. The Signature of Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II B-7 (6-8) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle. From David K. Stumpf, Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program, The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Copyright, pages Low-Power Jammers? Devices that Can Be Used to Build Low-Power X-band Jammers Defense Exhaustion Strategy Using Weight and Frequency Dependence of Low-Power Jammers Roughly grams or less of will Conceal a Warhead/Decoy for to minutes from an X-Band! One Kilogram of Reflects More Than million Times More Signal than a Single Warhead Countermeasures to the Defense NOTE: Nose-On RCS of a Round- Back Cone-Shaped Warhead with a Pointy Nosetip at X-Band is About. m Frequency dependence of the Cross Section (RCS) of chaff. The RCS per dipole is inversely proportional to radar frequency. This effect can be offset by reducing the dipole diameter as frequency increases. The data shown above is from R. Layne DuBose, Systems for Ships Defense, The International Countermeasures Handbook, th Edition, 986, EW Communications, Inc., Palo Alto, California, pp Cross Section of Dipoles Cross Sections of Various Shapes of Interest in Ballistic Missile Defense Applications Targets are Identified by Their Brightness in Two Infrared Wavelength Bands Targets As They Might Be Seen at kilometers range ~ seconds to impact, lateral separation ~.5 km?, total divert ~.5 km/sec? Target 7 The peak radar cross section of a tuned dipole is Target Target Target 5 Target 6 Target 8 The average radar cross section of a randomly oriented tuned dipole is,. 5 6 Balloon Countermeasures to the Defense Target Target 9 Target 4 Target Balloons 76 IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 5 km for FOV.5º Some Photos of Objects that Could Appear Like Warheads Statement Indicating that p agement of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Knew About the Discrimination Problems Identified in the IFT-A Experiment IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 5 km for FOV.5º Balloons ~.5 km. Meter Diameter Balloon (Roughly Ten Times Brighter than the Mock Warhead) Mock Warhead Rocket Stage that Deployed the Mock Warhead and Balloon ~ km 77 Large Balloon. Meter Diameter Balloon Balloon With White Coating With Reflecting Coating With Black Coating Light Rigid Replica Decoy Minuteman Inflatable Decoy Minuteman Warhead Balloons 78 "So the decoy is not going to look exactly like what we expected. It presents a problem for the system that we didn't expect," Balloons Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, while being filmed by 6 Minutes II after learning that the. meter balloon misdeployed (did not inflate properly) during the IFT-5 experiment 79 Balloon Canister is Now the Least Bright Object: Hence, the Balloon Canister Looks Like the Warhead Balloons ~.5 km. Meter Diameter Balloon (Roughly Ten Times Brighter than the Mock Warhead) Mock Warhead Rocket Stage that Deployed the Mock Warhead and Balloon ~ km 8

6 Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle Focal Plane Array from the IFT-A NMD Experiment Estimated Characteristics of Boeing Kill Vehicle Optics 55 inches Cooled Baffle Focal Plane Array Focal Plane Array inches (~6 cm) Cooled Baffle Reflective Mirror 5 degree Field of View 5 degree Field of View What Do the Actual Components Look Like? The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle ( of ) Fraction of S Steradians Exposed to Hot Mirror 8 8 How Objects Appear to the Kill Vehicle Resolution Limits Associated with Current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle Technology Individual Infrared Detector Reduction in Photon Noise Expected Appearance of the Target Warhead at About One Second Before Impact (Roughly 7 Kilometers Range) Image of Target Warhead Projected Onto the Focal Plane Array by Optical Lenses or Mirrors G AMirror S R S R sin T / S R sin T / sin T / #.4 # IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV - meters Focal Plane Array G AMirror S R Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 5 km for FOV.5º -5 meters. Meter Diameter Balloon (Roughly Ten Times Brighter than the Mock Warhead) - meters What Do the Actual Components Look Like? The s ( of ) Mock Warhead The Inflated Balloon is Heated by the Sun and is 7 to Times Brighter Than the Warhead at Infrared Wavelenghts Image of Warhead Reduced to Intensity Values in Two Individual Detectors ~ km The Kill Vehicle Has Been Programmed In Advance to Select the Least Bright Object It Is Supposed to See. Lens or Equivalent Mirror Rocket Stage that Deployed the Mock Warhead and Balloon As Long As Nothing Is Done to Cause Another Object to Be the Least Bright Object, the Kill Vehicle Will Correctly Select the Warhead ~.5 km Orbital Sciences Ground-Based and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles Locations of Sites Associated with European and US Missile Defenses US Site Farm European Site Requirements for Expanded Numbers of s Farm SCEA April 5 UNCLASSIFIED Vandenberg Air Force Base Ft. Greely, Alaska KEI Element Description - Land Block Ft. Greely, Alaska KE s Common Land/Sea 4 diameter, 466 Length,, lb High Vbo, High Acceleration Booster Multi- Use Color Seeker High Delta V, High Acceleration KV Mobile CBMC Mobile er ONIR Direct Downlink Flexible BMDS Sensor Interfaces Integrate to BMDS through CNIP C-Band, Shout Back Data Link Nuclear Hardened C-7 Transportable 6-MDA-45 (7 FEB 6) 6-MDA-95 ( JAN 6) ms-854 / MDA-95 ( JAN 6) ms-854 / ms-854 / 6 s Per er Oshkosh M7 HET Tractor 4 axis Trailer C-7 Transportable CONUS and NATO Road Mobility 6 95 Public Release, Case No. 5-MDA-895, Approved Ap ril 9, 5 UNCLASSI FIED 9 96

7 Area Covered by Missile Expanded Polish Site Area Covered by Missile Expanded Polish Site United States Capitol United States Capitol Major Finding Discrimination Ranges PREDICTED for and s by the Missile Defense Agency Locations of Postulated Ballistic Missiles ed from Iran to Europe and the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals Major Findings About the Actual Capabilities and Limitations of the Different Components of the US Proposed Missile Defense for Europe Major Findings About the Actual Capabilities and Limitations of the Different Components of the US Proposed Missile Defense for Europe 5. The European Midcourse () cannot perform the functions that the MDA has claimed for it. 6. It does not have the power and aperture to achieve a detection range much greater than 6 to 7 km against an actual warhead! 7. If Absorbing Material is used to make the warhead more stealthy, the range will be even smaller, perhaps 4 km or so. Chicago Helsinki 8. This suggests that the is being placed in the Czech Republic with the expectation that it will undergo very substantial upgrades after it is emplaced. and RCS=. m and RCS=. m 4 Discrimination Ranges that Could Actually be ACHIEVED by the and s Chicago Locations of Postulated Ballistic Missiles ed from Iran to Europe and the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals Major Finding 5. If the is not fully upgraded, the entire eastern two-thirds of the continental United States will not have any missile defense radar that could potentially try to provide a radar discrimination function for the US missile defense. What Has Happened to the Acquisition s the US Missile Defense Program? Original System Plans Required that the UEWRs be Used for Acquisition and X-Band s be Used for Discrimination! Proposed and Defense of the Eastern Two-Thirds of the Continental United States Tracking Locations of Postulated s ed from Iran to the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals Helsinki 6. All of the currently available radars are low-frequency and will never be able to provide this service. Tracking Tracking Tracking and RCS=. m 7. These facts indicate that the United States will have to upgrade the so it can be used to try to perform discrimination services for missile defense of the eastern two thirds of the continental United States.. seconds Integration and RCS=. m Tracking. seconds Integration and RCS=. m Locations of Line-of Sight Line-of Sight Line-of Sight and RCS=. m Line-of Sight Line-of Sight Discrimination Ranges that Could Actually be ACHIEVED by the and s Major Finding European Defense Coverage of UHF and X-Band Discrimination Ranges that Could Actually be ACHIEVED by the and s Seattle, WA Farm Seattle, WA Washington, DC 4. The only radar in Europe that will be usable for attempts to discriminate warheads and decoys will be the intelligence gathering radar at, Norway. 5. False statements made to the Norwegian Parliament in 999 about the true purpose of this radar caused a major national scandal in Norway, and led to protests from the Russian government. 6. It appears very likely that the radar will have a SECRET role in the functioning of the European Missile Defense system until the is fully upgraded. Farm Washington, DC 9

8 Comparison of the Relative Sizes and of the UEWR, the GLOBUS II at, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band () Comparison of the Relative Sizes of the European Midcourse, the GLOBUS II at, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band () Major Finding 4 UEWR Globus II PAVE PAWS meter Diameter ~ 755 m Antenna Area 5 m Antenna Area ~ - KW. The US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States (issued in September 999) predicts that any emerging Iranian threat will be accompanied by countermeasures that would defeat both the radar and infrared discrimination functions of both the current and any future upgraded US missile defense. 4. If this US intelligence finding is correct, it means that the current US missile defense, and its upgraded future system, will be obsolete the first time an Iranian is flight tested. US Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments 9. m Antenna Area 7 KW GLOBUS II 7 meter Diameter ~ 57 m Antenna Area GLOBUS II ~ 57 m Antenna Area 7 meter Diameter 9. m Antenna Area 5 6 KW Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures US Intelligence findings predict that even an upgraded US Missile Defense will be defeated by postulated Iranian/ North Korean s when they are first deployed! 7 Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Statement for the Record to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 5 by Robert D. Walpole National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs September 6, 999 Penetration Aids and Countermeasures We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also develop various responses to US theater and national defenses. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite technologies. y countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available technology including separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys to develop penetration aids and countermeasures. These countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight test their missiles. 8 Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on missile advances around the world, particularly from Russia and North Korea. Moreover, some countries that have traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are now sharing more amongst themselves and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures. We assess that countries developing missiles also will respond to US theater and national missile defenses by deploying larger forces, penetration aids, and countermeasures. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably will sell some related technologies. y of these countries probably have considered ballistic missile defense countermeasures. Historically, the development and deployment of missile defense systems have been accompanied by the development of countermeasures and penetration aids by potential adversaries, either in reaction to the threat or in anticipation of it. The Russians and Chinese have had countermeasure programs for decades and are probably willing to transfer some related technology to others. We expect that during the next 5 years, countries other than Russia and China will develop countermeasures to Theater and National Missile Defenses. 9 Speeches & Testimony Iranian Ballistic Missile, WMD Threat to the US The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to the United States Through 5 Statement for the Record to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs (as prepared for delivery) September, 6-. Most believe Iran will likely test an IRBM probably based on Russian assistance during this period. All assess that Iran could flight test an that could deliver nuclear weapon-sized payloads to many parts of the United States in the latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology obtained over the years. Ballistic Missile Defense Countermeasures. y countries, such as Iran, probably will rely initially on readily available technologies to develop penetration aids and countermeasures, including: separating RVs, radar absorbent material, booster fragmentation, jammers, chaff, and decoys. These countries could develop some countermeasures by the time they flight-test their missiles. More advanced technologies could be available over the longer term. Some of the factors that will influence a nation s countermeasures include: the effectiveness weighed against their cost, complexity, reduction in range-payload capability; foreign assistance; and the ability to conduct realistic tests. Effects of Countermeasures on Emerging Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats Cross Section of Large Round-Nose Warhead First Generation Countermeasures Predicted by the US Intelligence Community Separating RVs Radical reductions in the radar detectivity of warheads against X-Band radars (Cross Sections of. m or less) How the Countermeasures Work Spin-Stabilized RVs Removal of potentially exploitable fluctuations in the size of an otherwise tumbling warhead s X-Band Cross Section. These can be used to increase detection ranges relative to tumbling warheads RV Reorientation Guarantee that warheads are oriented so as to minimize the X-Band radar s detection range against the warhead Absorbing Material (RAM) Guarantee that warheads will be invisible to the X-Band radar. Also confounds discrimination by X-Band s Booster Fragmentation Hides the low- Cross Section warhead among numerous low and high Cross Section fragments Low-Power Jammers Eliminates the ability of the X-Band radar to detect, track, or discriminate against either warheads or decoys. A dumb jammer of roughly. Watts would be adequate for defeating the proposed European Midcourse to be located in the Czech Republic. Separating RVs, Spin Stabilized RVs and Re-Oriented RV Countermeasures to the Defense Spin Stabilized Warheads Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation grams of could easily hide a warhead or a decoy from the X-Band radar. The countermeasure would deply many clouds of, some of which contain warheads, decoys, or nothing, to overwhelm the X-band radars Simple (Balloon) Decoys Could be used to degrade the ability of kill vehicle to hit the warhead (note US anti-satellite attack on an alleged tank of Hydrazine). More importantly, can make it impossible for Kill Vehicle to know which of many balloons might contain a warhead. Can also be filled with radar absorbing foams, to make the balloons and warheads invisible to the X-Band radars. m 4 Cross Section of Upper Rocket Stages -Range Fans for m Targets for and Missile Defense s -Range Fans for. m Targets for and Missile Defense s -Range Fans for US Proposed and Missile Defense s RCS - dbsm Cross Section of Circular Cylinders at Frequencies of. and. GHz Cylinder Dimensions Approximate Titan II m Diameter x m Length RCS at. GHz Cylinder with Endplates Cylinder with Endplates Rocket Motor Behaves Like Corner Reflector Rocket Motor Cross Section at X-Band No Endplates 5 Locations of Postulated s ed from Iran to the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals and RCS=. m Locations of Postulated s ed from Iran to the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals. m RCS m RCS and RCS=. m Locations of Postulated s ed from Iran to the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals - RCS at GHz Spin Stabilized Warheads - Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation -4 Cylinder with No Endplates Aspect angle, Theta [Degrees] 5 and RCS=. m and RCS=. m 6 and RCS=. m 7 and RCS=. m and RCS=. m and RCS=. m 8

9 Observations and Conclusions False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense Observations and Conclusions European s and s Cannot Possibly Defend Northern Japan The Bush administration has been systematically providing inaccurate information to its European allies (and apparently to NATO) about the US proposed missile defense for Europe. Appendix Further Observations and Conclusions It is highly implausible that this campaign of providing such basically false technical information was or is an accident. The implications of these US actions, and the passive response to it by the European allies and NATO, raises serious questions about the future of US- European security relations. These problems will have to be solved by any of the US Presidential candidates when they take the office, but the European allies should not assume that the US was solely to blame for this deplorable historical incident in US-European security relations. False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense European s Are Fast Enough to Overtake and Intercept Russian s The European Midcourse () Cannot Possible Have the Range to Perform Discrimination Services for the European Defense System 9 Orbital Sciences Ground-Based and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles Pegasus Vehicle Ground-Based Achieves 6. km/sec Carrying a of 95 lbs Ground-Based Achieves 8.5 to 8.7 km/sec Carrying a of to 55 lbs Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle The GBI Has a Higher Lift Capability than the US Midgetman! Orion 5XL Rocket Stage Estimated Dimensions and Weight of the National Missile Defense Vehicle Length Diameter Component Weight Rocket Components (ft) (ft) Shroud Orbital Sciences GBI Orbital Sciences GBI Midgetman (Kill Vehicle) Adaptor st Stage (Orion 5XLG) ,8 nd Stage (Orion 5XL) ,5 Orion 5XLG Rocket Stage tal ,655 Estimated Performance Parameters of the National Missile Defense Vehicle Burn Time Vacuum Specific Vacuum Thrust Component Weight Propellant Weight Empty Weight Rocket Components (sec) Impulse (sec) Shroud (Kill Vehicle) Adaptor Empty/Full Mass Fraction st Stage (Orion 5XLG) ,5 7,8 5,48,.64 nd Stage (Orion 5XL) , 9,5 8, tal , The Ground-Based Can Carry a Full Minuteman III BUS and Three Warheads to 6,+ Kilometers False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense European s and s Cannot Possibly Defend Northern Japan Minuteman Shroud, Warheads, and BUS Orbital Sciences GBI European s Are Fast Enough to Overtake and Intercept Russian s The European Midcourse () Cannot Possible Have the Range to Perform Discrimination Services for the European Defense System False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claims Made in Presentations to European (and Japanese?) Allies by Missile Defense Agency that US Proposed European Missile Defense Can Defend Northern Japan s Cannot Catch Russian Missiles in Eastern Turkey too Far from Missile Trajectory to Track the Deployed Warhead (RCS ~.m ) X-Band in Czech Republic Below Horizon NO PLAUSIBLE WAY FOR DEFENSE SYSTEM TO OBTAIN PRECISION TRACKING DATA NEEDED TO GUIDE INTERCEPTORS FROM ALASKA! Sea-Based X-Band Off Adak Below Horizon, sec, sec 8 sec launched 5- sec after threat Apogee 6 sec 4 sec Russian Moscow from Iran Time (sec) after Russian U.S. European Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability MDA-6 ( JUN 7) ms-967b /

10 False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s s Cannot Catch Russian Missiles, sec, sec 8 sec Russian Trajectory Apogee 6 sec 4 sec launched 5- sec after threat Moscow Russian Location of SS-8/9 Russian at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight Altitude (km) 5 4 (4sec) SS-8/9 Powered Flight Profile Locations Every 5 Seconds Two Stage Pegasus 8. km/sec Against SS-8/9 ed from Vypolzovo Russia Completes Powered Flight minute.5 minutes (SS-8/9) at seconds also of from Poland 5 seconds 4 Breaks Horizon minutes Time (sec) after Russian Second Stage Ignition I t t U.S. European Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability 7-MDA-6 ( JUN 7) ms-967b / Range (km) False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That s Cannot Engage Russian s False Claim That in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense Location of SS-5 Russian at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight Two Stage Pegasus 8. km/sec Against SS-5/7 ed from Vypolzovo Russia Intercept Points for Two Stage Pegasus 8. km/sec Against SS-5/7 and SS-8/9 s ed from Vypolzovo Russia Altitude (km) 5 4 SS-5 Powered Flight Profile (7 sec) Locations Every 5 Seconds Third Stage Ignition I t t Completes Powered Flight.5 minutes minute (SS-7) at 8 seconds also of from Poland Breaks Horizon 8 seconds minutes Intercept Point Against SS-8/9 Intercept Point Against SS-5/7 8 Second Stage Ignition I t t Range (km) False Claim That in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense -Range Fans for and US Proposed and Missile Defense s European Site Initiative Update For Czech Republic with One Pulse and RCS=. m. seconds Integration and RCS=. m The US Missile Defense Agency s Description of How the Proposed Missile Defense for Europe Will Work Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited April 7. seconds Integration and RCS=. m MDA-564 (8 MAY 7) Lt Gen Trey Obering, USAF Director Missile Defense Agency ms-959 / Sensor Viewing Comparisons Sea-Based X-band Cobra Dane Early Warning Aegis Upgraded Early Warning How It Works According to the US Missile Defense Agency 57 6-MDA-94 ( JAN 7) ms-954 /

11 Important Properties of Missile Defense s ( of ) Important Properties of Missile Defense s ( of ) Side-by-Side Size Comparison of Missile Defense Agency Forward-Based X-Band and US UHF Upgraded Early Warning Side-by-Side Size Comparison of Missile Defense Agency Forward-Based X-Band and Missile Defense UHF Upgraded Early Warning s UHF Upgraded Early Warning Antenna Area ~ 8 to 9 m Apparent Size of Cone-Shaped Warhead at UHF/VHF Cross Section ~..5m US Upgraded UHF Early Warning Antenna Area = 8~9 m Emitted Waves Are Long Wavelength with High Power Emitted Waves Are Long Wavelength with High Power Apparent Size of Cone-Shaped Warhead at X-Band MDA Thinned X-Band Phased Array MDA Forward-Based X-Band () Antenna Area = 9. m Cross Section ~.m Emitted Waves Are Short Wavelength with Low Power MDA Forward-Based X-Band Emitted Waves Are Short Wavelength with Low Power 's Effective Target Acquisition Capability Relative to the Apparent Size of Cone-Shaped Warhead at X-Band Cross Section ~.m 6 Antenna Area = 9. m 6 Emitted Waves Are Short Wavelength with Low Power False Claim That Can Perform Discrimination Services for the Defense Cross Section of a Meter Long Round-Nose Cone-Shaped Warhead How It Will REALLY Work According to the Principles of Science and Engineering IMPORTANT FACT IGNORED BY THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY The Cross Section (RCS) of warheads at X-Band is roughly times larger than that of a Locust! With RV orientation and/or RAM, the RCS of a warhead at X-Band can easily be made comparable to or smaller than the RCS of a Locust. Spin Stabilized Warheads Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation. m MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group Appendix Statements Made by Responsible US Officials

12 Fixed Azimuth Some Notable Quotes "As you see, if there are Russian launches from interceptor sites we could establish tracks on those, but although we can establish those coverages the interceptors cannot catch them." LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY A. TREY OBERING, III Director, Missile Defense Agency March, 7 Q&A SESSION As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after the April 9 NATO-Russia Council meeting, "The Allies were convinced and are convinced that there are no implications of the United States system for the strategic balance... Ten interceptors will not, and cannot affect the strategic balance and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia." "U.S. missile defense plans are neither directed at nor a threat to Russia. Due to the location and capabilities of the European missile defense assets, the proposed system would have no capability against Russian s." Missile Defense Cooperation U.S. Missile Defense Factsheet "Senior Russian officials as well as their experts understand the limited capabilities of the interceptors and the X-band radar, including why the European-based assets would have no capability against Russian s launched at the United States, and how it is optimized for engaging ballistic missile threats launched out of Iran." Brian R. Green Statement for the Record to the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee, /7/ Some Notable Quotes "First of all, these interceptors, the radars, are not designed against the Russian threat. You're not going to counter the hundreds of Russian s and the thousands of warheads that are represented by that fleet with interceptors in a field in Europe. The radar that we were putting there -- first of all, it is designed against the Middle Eastern threat, not against the Russian threat. With the radar that we have there that we have proposed, it is a very narrow beam radar. It has to be queued. And so even if we wanted to try to track Russian missiles with that radar, we could only track a very, very small percentage of those missiles. And even if we could, passing that information off and having an interceptor try to intercept the Russian missile, we can't do it. The interceptors that we would place in Europe are not fast enough to catch the Russian s. We're in a tail chase from a location in Poland and if you'd like, in that -- in response to any questions, I can show you some slides on that as well. " AIR FORCE LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC THURSDAY, FEBRUARY, 7, : P.M. EST "MR. HADLEY: Of course the deployment that we're talking about in Europe is not about Russia at all. It's not aimed at Russia. The systems we would deploy do not have capability of any significant character against Russian s destined for the -- that are aimed at the United States. Just doesn't have any capability." Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steven Hadley on the President's Trip to the G8 Summit and Europe White House Conference Center Briefing Room June, Russian Voronezh Class Third Generation Upgraded VHF Early Warning that is Potentially Usable in a Light National Missile Defense System The size of the and its limited average power make it considerably less capably than large lower frequencies radars like the US UEWR and the Russian Voronezh VHF radars for acquiring and and tracking naturally stealthy ballistic missile warheads at long-range. Arrow GreenPine Missile Defense Russian Voronezh VHF Early Warning Forward-Based X-Band () 79 Slide from Russian Views on the Deployment of US Missile Defense Assets in Europe, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Provided by Colonel Vladimir Egorov to Ted Postol in Berlin, October 8-9, 7 8 Geometry of the Fixed Azimuth and Variable Elevation Scan Pattern of the Geometry of the Fixed Azimuth and Variable Elevation Scan Pattern of the Fixed Azimuth Trajectories that Can Be Tracked by the Armavir and Gabala s Postulated es from Iran Fixed Azimuth Geometry of the radar search fan. Fixed azimuth is about and variable elevation scan is 9 +. The range of depicted radar range is km. The effect of earth curvature is shown relative to the distances depicted. Slide from Russian Views on the Deployment of US Missile Defense Assets in Europe, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Provided by Colonel Vladimir Egorov to Ted Postol in Berlin, October 8-9, Slide from Russian Views on the Deployment of US Missile Defense Assets in Europe, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Provided by Colonel Vladimir Egorov to Ted Postol in Berlin, October 8-9, Geometry of the Fixed Azimuth and Variable Elevation Scan Pattern of the Throw Weights of Potential s to, Kilometers Range Orbital Sciences Ground-Based and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Pegasus Vehicle Seattle, Washington Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle Washington, DC Hawaii Minuteman III Warhead Minuteman III Warhead Minuteman III Warhead Hokkaido, Japan Orion 5XL Rocket Stage Fixed Azimuth Estimated Dimensions and Weight of the National Missile Defense Vehicle Length Diameter Component Weight Rocket Components (ft) (ft) Shroud (Kill Vehicle) Adaptor st Stage (Orion 5XLG) ,8 nd Stage (Orion 5XL) ,5 tal ,655 Orion 5XLG Rocket Stage Estimated Performance Parameters of the National Missile Defense Vehicle Rocket Components Burn Time (sec) Vacuum Specific Impulse (sec) Vacuum Thrust Component Weight Propellant Weight Empty Weight Empty/Full Mass Fraction Shroud (Kill Vehicle) The reason three radars are needed is shown above. The radars are not of sufficient range ( km) to track missiles on trajectories going to the full range of possible attack trajectories. This problem can only be addressed by creating a fence of short-range radars around Iran. This need for three radars could not possibly have been unknown to the Missile Defense Agency. 85 Midgetman Weight, lbs Throw Weight lbs Minuteman III Weight 75, lbs Throw Weight,5 lbs European GBI Weight 49,5 lbs Throw Weight,5 lbs 86 Adaptor st Stage (Orion 5XLG) ,5 7,8 5,48,.64 nd Stage (Orion 5XL) , 9,5 8, tal , Ground-Based Achieves 6. km/sec Carrying a of 95 lbs Ground-Based Achieves 8.5 to 8.7 km/sec Carrying a of to 55 lbs The GBI Has a Higher Lift Capability than the US Midgetman! The Ground-Based Can Carry a Full Minuteman III BUS and Three Warheads to 6,+ Kilometers Orbital Sciences GBI Orbital Sciences GBI Midgetman Minuteman Shroud, Warheads, and BUS Orbital Sciences GBI