2008 Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)

Transcription

1 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 2008 Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) January 2009 This report satisfies the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Section 232 (h), as amended by subsequent Acts, which mandates that the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation annually characterize the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS, and its elements, that have been fielded or tested before the end of the preceding fiscal year. The Act also requires the Director to assess the adequacy and sufficiency of the BMDS test program during the preceding fiscal year. This report is unclassified. Supporting information is contained in a classified appendix to this report.

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3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) continues to make progress acquiring, testing, and fielding the elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Progress has been steady with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC), but slower with Ground-based Missile Defense. The MDA has increased operational realism in all its testing. The ground test program is robust, although the MDA is still using unaccredited models and simulations while working hard to verify and validate these programs for accreditation. Aegis BMD has demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and engage simple short- and medium-range ballistic missile targets for a range of mission scenarios. GMD has demonstrated a limited capability to defend against simple, long-range ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea toward the United States. THAAD has demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and engage short-range non-separating and simple-separating targets. C2BMC has demonstrated the capability to provide situational awareness to warfighters worldwide and control the AN/TPY-2 radar in its forward-based mode. Test program data are not yet sufficient to verify, validate, and accredit BMDS models and simulations to objectively assess the capability of the BMDS. Therefore, only a subjective assessment is possible. This limitation is particularly evident in GMD testing as all intercepts have occurred within a small portion of the threat battlespace and under nearly the same intercept conditions. Although the MDA has plans to test over a wider range of intercept conditions and threat battlespace, until this is accomplished, there will be insufficient data to accredit the models and simulations needed to assess GMD operational effectiveness. Target availability and performance continue to impact both the pace and the quality of MDA flight testing. Even with the MDA s target program improvements, schedule slips are still likely. Additionally, both Aegis BMD and THAAD need advanced targets to demonstrate expanded capabilities. While there has been steady progress over the past year, additional flight testing is an imperative to anchor the models and simulations necessary to objectively characterize BMDS performance. i

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5 Table of Contents Introduction 1 Section 1.0 The BMDS Description Weapons Command and Control Sensors Capability Development Programs International Cooperative Programs BMDS Block Structure 9 Section 2.0 Progress with Baselines and Goals BMDS Capability Demonstration Level Descriptions BMDS Progress Block Capability Demonstration Level Descriptions Block Progress Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Strategic) Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Command, Control, Battle Management & Communications (C2BMC) Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Region/Theater) Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) C2BMC Patriot 25 Section 3.0 Assessment of Test Adequacy Assessment Methodology Assessment of Block Test Adequacy Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Strategic) Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Region/Theater) Patriot 40 Section 4.0 Characterization of BMDS Capability Characterization Methodology Block Performance Characterization Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Strategic) GMD Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Region/Theater) Aegis BMD THAAD Patriot 50 Section 5.0 Summary and Conclusions 53 Appendix A (Classified) Separate Cover

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7 INTRODUCTION This report satisfies the congressional reporting requirements of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) as they pertain to the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Congress specified these requirements in the Fiscal Year 2002 (FY02) National Defense Authorization Act, Section 232. The FY09 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 231, amends the FY02 Authorization Act to consolidate the reporting requirements of both the FY02 and FY06 Authorization Acts. The FY02 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended, mandates that DOT&E annually characterize the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS, and its elements, that have been fielded or tested before the end of the preceding fiscal year. The Act also requires DOT&E to assess the adequacy and sufficiency of the BMDS test program during the preceding fiscal year. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) divides the BMDS into five acquisition and fielding Blocks, each with capabilities to defend specific areas and address particular threats. In this report for 2008, DOT&E assesses program progress, assesses test adequacy, and characterizes performance of the BMDS, its elements, and each of the five Blocks of the BMDS. To aid the reader, a foldout of the BMDS Block Structure and the BMDS/Block Capability Demonstration Level Descriptions is located inside the back cover of this report. This report is comprised of an unclassified main text and a classified appendix. This structure reduces duplication of information. Section 1.0 of the main text describes the BMDS, its constituent elements and sensors, and the BMDS acquisition and fielding Block structure. Section 2.0 assesses the BMDS progress toward its Block Baselines and Goals. Section 3.0 assesses the adequacy and sufficiency of the BMDS test program. Section 4.0, together with the classified appendix, characterizes the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS, its elements, and each of its Blocks. 1

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9 Section 1.0 THE BMDS 1.1 DESCRIPTION In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense established the MDA to develop an integrated, layered-engagement BMDS. A depiction of the current BMDS concept is shown in Figure 1-1. In December 2002, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to deploy an initial set of BMDS capabilities beginning in The Secretary identified the MDA as the BMDS requirement-generating organization and suspended the BMDS from the requirement to participate in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and Department of Defense standard acquisition and reporting processes. Thus, with the exception of Patriot, MDA-developed documents, rather than operational requirements documents, capture the BMDS requirements. The MDA does, in accordance with Department of Defense directives, obtain warfighter community input on desired operational features. Figure 1-1. Integrated, Layered-Engagement BMDS The BMDS mission is to protect the United States, deployed forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight. Ballistic missile threats are grouped by range: Short-range (less than 1,000 kilometers) Medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 kilometers) Intermediate-range (3,000 to 5,500 kilometers) 3

10 Long-range (greater than 5,500 kilometers) Defenses are described in terms of three phases of threat missile flight: Boost from launch to booster burnout Midcourse flight above the Earth s atmosphere (exo-atmosphere) between boost phase and reentry into the Earth s atmosphere (endo-atmosphere) Terminal from reentry to impact To accomplish the mission of countering ballistic missile threats in all stages of their trajectories, the BMDS intends to combine the weapon and sensor capabilities of many different elements 1, and possibly other capability development 2 and international cooperative programs, with a command and control element to create a multi-layered architecture capable of providing ballistic missile defense through all phases of missile flight. 1.2 WEAPONS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) The Aegis BMD element is designed to provide U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers with the ability to defeat short- and medium-range (and eventually intermediate-range) ballistic missiles during terminal or midcourse phases of flight, and to provide surveillance and track of long-range ballistic missiles in support of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element. Aegis BMD consists of a shipboard Aegis Weapon System equipped with a modified S-band AN/SPY-1 radar, Standard Missile-2 (SM-2; terminal phase) and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3; midcourse phase) interceptors, and a modified Aegis vertical launcher system. Aegis BMD ships with long-range surveillance and track capability are deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific regions. Aegis BMD enables simultaneous ship self-defense and ballistic missile defense missions Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) The GMD element is designed to defend the United States territory, deployed forces, allies, and friends against long-range ballistic missiles from North Korea or Iran. GMD is the principal midcourse element of the BMDS and consists of three-stage Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs); fire control/communications at both Fort Greely, Alaska, and the 1 An element is a complete, integrated set of subsystems capable of accomplishing an operational role or function. 2 A capability development program is one that is working to mature a technology for possible future insertion into the BMDS as an element or component upon determining a potential for military use. 4

11 Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center, Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado; a distributed GMD communications network; and external interfaces to the BMDS. A two-stage GBI planned for basing in Europe is in development. Its mission is to defend the United States and Europe from Iranian threats Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles. The U.S. Army Patriot system protects deployed forces and critical assets from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles during terminal flight, and from air-breathing threats such as cruise missiles and fixed-wing aircraft. A Patriot battery includes an Engagement Control Station and Battery Command Post for battle management, C-band phased array radar, and launchers with either hit-to-kill Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles or older blast fragmentation PAC-2 missiles and PAC Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) The THAAD element is designed to provide terminalphase protection of forward-deployed forces, allies, and friends from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. A THAAD fire unit consists of 24 interceptors, three launchers, an AN/TPY-2 X-band phased-array radar in its Terminal Mode (TM), fire control and communications, and associated support equipment. The THAAD interceptor is designed to negate missiles in the mid endothrough low-exoatmosphere, providing terminal-phase upper-tier defense to complement the Patriot lower-tier system. 1.3 COMMAND AND CONTROL Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) The C2BMC element is intended to ultimately manage and integrate globally the various sensors, interceptors, and other components that comprise the BMDS. The current C2BMC hardware/software configuration provides situational awareness for the entire BMDS. It also provides command and control of the AN/TPY-2 X-band phased-array radar operating in the Forward-Based Mode (FBM). C2BMC data terminals are located at the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center, Colorado; Cheyenne Mountain Directorate, Colorado; Fort Greely, Alaska; the National Military Command Center; and all Combatant Commands. 5

12 1.4 SENSORS Aegis BMD AN/SPY-1 The Aegis BMD AN/SPY-1 radar is the Aegis Weapon System S-band radar (four faces, 360 degree azimuth field of view) with hardware and software modifications designed to support engagement of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as well as support surveillance and track of long-range ballistic missiles in support of GMD. The fielded radars are installed on ships deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific regions AN/TPY-2 Forward-Based Mode (FBM) The AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar is a THAAD X-band, phasedarray radar (120 degree azimuth field of view) with modified software to provide forward-based acquisition and tracking of ballistic missiles of all ranges in the boost phase and transition to midcourse phase. The radar relies on C2BMC for sensor management and to distribute its track data to other BMDS elements, most notably GMD and Aegis BMD. The MDA has deployed two AN/TPY-2 (FBM). A third dedicated forward-based AN/TPY-2 (FBM) test asset will be available in mid-fy Cobra Dane The Cobra Dane radar is an L-band, single-face (120 degree azimuth field of view) phased-array radar located at Shemya, Alaska, with hardware and software upgrades to support ballistic missile defense. Cobra Dane is one of the principal radar sensors used to develop the GMD weapon task plan for North Korean threats targeting Alaska and the continental United States Midcourse X-Band Radars Sea-Based X-band (SBX) Radar and European Midcourse Radar (EMR) The SBX provides target tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment data to the GMD Fire Control for processing with other sensor data into the weapon task plan, in-flight target updates, and hit assessment for North Korean strategic threats targeting the United States. The radar is an X-band, single-face phased-array radar on a movable mount that can position through 360 degrees azimuth. It is installed on a twinhulled, semi-submersible, self-propelled ocean-going platform. 6

13 The EMR is an X-band, phased-array radar currently located at the Kwajalein Atoll. The MDA plans to modify and relocate the radar to a site in the Czech Republic to support defense of the United States and Europe from Iranian threats. The radar will provide midcourse tracking data for the European Interceptor Site Space-Based Infrared System/Defense Support Program (SBIRS/DSP) SBIRS/DSP consists of an infrared satellite constellation and ground stations that provides the BMDS with the initial notification of a ballistic missile launch and the defended area threatened. A SBIRS/DSP active interface, which was declared operational in February 2007, enables C2BMC to receive early warning data directly from SBIRS/DSP instead of through the GMD communications network Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) Beale and Fylingdales The UEWRs are Ultra-High Frequency fixed-site, fixed-orientation phased-array radars located at Beale Air Force Base, California (two faces, 240 degree azimuth field of view); and Fylingdales, United Kingdom (three faces, 360 degree azimuth field of view). The United States Strategic Command, who operates the BMDS, will use the radars to detect, track, and discriminate ballistic threats targeting the United States. The Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs are designed to provide radar coverage for portions of the United States threatened by North Korean and Iranian threats. The radars perform both the ballistic missile defense and legacy missile warning and space tracking missions. 1.5 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS Airborne Laser (ABL) The ABL system is designed to negate enemy ballistic missiles during boost phase before they can deploy decoys or warheads. ABL consists of a high-power chemical laser installed on a modified Boeing 747 aircraft. ABL is designed to focus the laser on a threat missile s exterior casing, heating it so that the internal pressure causes the missile to rupture and terminate its boost prematurely. The MDA considers the first ABL aircraft a technology demonstrator with no deployable operational capability. 7

14 1.5.2 Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) The KEI program seeks to develop a high-performance interceptor booster for midcourse defense. Planned features of the developmental booster include high acceleration and high burnout velocity; fixed or mobile, land- or sea-based system design; and a capability to incorporate a separately developed kill vehicle, such as the Multiple Kill Vehicle. The KEI program intends to maintain options for a boost phase capability Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) The MKV program seeks to enhance engagement success against ballistic missiles with countermeasures by equipping all midcourse interceptors with an MKV system. The MKV design uses a carrier vehicle to release multiple small kill vehicles to destroy multiple objects, including decoys, in a threat cluster. This mitigates the challenge of having to discriminate between the reentry vehicle and deployable countermeasures Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) STSS is a planned low-earth-orbit satellite constellation for visible and infrared tracking of ballistic missiles from boost through reentry, including midcourse tracking in the long wavelength infrared frequency. STSS is intended to provide a space node to support data fusion, over-the-horizon radar/sensor cueing, interceptor handover, and fire control. 1.6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS Israeli Arrow Weapon System (Arrow) The Israeli Arrow Weapon System is an autonomous, ground-based, short- and medium-range ballistic missile defense system deployed at fixed sites in Israel. Arrow achieved an operational capability against short-range threats in FY01. The Arrow Block upgrade program is a joint effort underway between the United States and Israel to improve Arrow capabilities to defend against longer-range threats. Arrow is not currently part of the BMDS but is intended to be interoperable with United States regional BMD systems. 8

15 1.6.2 Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) MEADS is designed to be a highly mobile air and missile defense system for the protection of maneuver forces and critical assets from short- to medium-range ballistic missiles during terminal flight. The MEADS system is also intended to defend against a variety of air-breathing threats (aircraft, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial vehicle), air-to-surface missiles, and anti-radiation missiles. MEADS will use the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement missile. MEADS is an international co-development program with Germany and Italy. MEADS Initial Operational Test and Evaluation is currently scheduled for FY15, after which MEADS is planned to become part of the BMDS. 1.7 BMDS BLOCK STRUCTURE The MDA adds elements and capabilities to the BMDS using a spiral development acquisition approach to deliver continuously increasing levels of capability to the warfighter. Prior to FY08, the MDA developed and acquired the BMDS in biennial increments, or Blocks, designated, for example, Block 2004 and Block In recent years, Congress called on the MDA to revise its Block approach to enhance transparency, accountability, and oversight. In response, the MDA developed a new Block structure divided into five Blocks based on fielding capabilities to address particular threats. Each Block represents a discrete program of work with schedule, cost, and performance baselines. The five Blocks are defined as follows: Block 1: Defend the United States from limited North Korean long-range threats Block 2: Defend allies and deployed forces from short- to medium-range threats in one region/theater Block 3: Expand the defense of the United States to include limited Iranian long-range threats Block 4: Defend allies and deployed forces in Europe from limited Iranian long-range and intermediate-range threats 3 Block 5: Expand defense of allies and deployed forces from short- to intermediate-range threats in two regions/theaters Table 1-1 lists the elements and component interceptors/sensors assigned to each Block, as specified in the MDA FY08 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals document (January 2008). Blocks 1, 3, and 4 apply to the BMDS long-/intermediate-range threat mission (strategic) and 3 In the FY08 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals document approved on January 29, 2008, the MDA omitted intermediate-range threats from the Block 4 name. Appendix A-3 of the document clearly states goals for both long- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from Iran. Intermediate-range threats have been added by DOT&E to the Block 4 name for clarity. 9

16 employ the GMD and C2BMC elements; Blocks 2 and 5 apply to the BMDS intermediate-/medium-/short-range threat mission (region/theater) and employ the Aegis BMD, THAAD, and C2BMC elements. (Table 1-1 denotes the major incremental capability variants of C2BMC as SA (situational awareness), GEM (Global Engagement Manager), and TPY-2, discussed in detail in Section 2.0.) Combined, the five Block missions are intended to encompass the overall BMDS layered defense mission to protect the United States and its deployed forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight except boost phase, which is still in capability development. Table 1-1. BMDS Block Elements and Component Interceptors/Sensors Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Weapons* GMD: GBI (3-stage) Aegis BMD: SM-3 Block 1A SM-2 Block IV GMD: GBI (3-stage) GMD: GBI (2-stage) Aegis BMD: SM-3 Block 1A SM-3 Block 1B THAAD: Interceptors THAAD: Interceptors Sensors 4 AN/SPY-1 AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Cobra Dane SBX UEWR-Beale AN/SPY-1 AN/TPY-2 (FBM) AN/SPY-1 AN/TPY-2 (FBM) Cobra Dane SBX UEWR- Fylingdales UEWR-Thule AN/TPY-2 (FBM) EMR AN/SPY-1 AN/TPY-2 (FBM) C2BMC SA/TPY-2 SA SA/TPY-2 SA/GEM/TPY-2 SA/GEM Table 1-1 does not include the MDA capability development programs (ABL, KEI, MKV, or STSS) or the international cooperative programs (Arrow or MEADS). The MDA will add capability development programs to the appropriate Blocks when they mature and as significant new capabilities become ready for fielding, taking into account affordability and need. *Likewise, the MDA does not include Patriot in the Block structure, although the Army system is part of the BMDS and can contribute to the theater missions of Blocks 2 and 5. The PAC-3 missile underwent operational testing in 2002 and saw combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom in Patriot continues to undergo evolutionary development upgrades and testing, with major system Post-Deployment Builds, or PDBs, occurring approximately every three years. 4 In general, sensors are discussed as parts of the elements they support for mission accomplishment. They are not specifically called out in the block progress charts discussed in Section 2.0 as these charts represent the major elements of the BMDS. However, the sensors are included in each of the block performance characterizations in Section 4.0 and in the supporting classified information contained in Appendix A. 10

17 Section 2.0 PROGRESS WITH BASELINES AND GOALS The breadth of the BMDS mission and the overall maturity of the BMDS are such that a single assessment of the BMDS progress toward achieving its mission capabilities is not feasible at this time. Data from the test program are not sufficient to verify, validate, and accredit BMDS models and simulations to objectively assess the capability of the BMDS; only a subjective assessment is possible at this time. Therefore, this section is an assessment of the MDA s progress with respect to the baselines and goals in each of the mission area Blocks previously defined in Section 1.0. This section also assesses the progress of Patriot, which is not part of the BMDS five-block structure but can contribute to the theater missions of Blocks 2 and BMDS CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATION LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS BMDS progress is assessed in terms of six levels according to the rigor through which the Block capabilities have been demonstrated. Table 2-1 provides a summary of these demonstration levels from highest to lowest, as well as a color code for each assessment level. Note that these demonstration levels, with the exception of the top level (Level 6) do not take into account inventory levels assigned for each Block (number of interceptors, radar, etc.). Only the top demonstration level, as discussed below, requires the inventory levels specified in the Block baseline. Table 2-1. BMDS Capability Demonstration Levels Level Description BMDS capability verified through flight test-based, independently accredited models and simulations and/or ground testing. The Block fulfills its defined requirements and is fully integrated into the BMDS. Broad, but incomplete, demonstration of Block capabilities through independently accredited models/simulations and/or ground testing. Accreditation 5 is possible only if a sufficient quantity and quality of flight testing has been completed to support verification 6 and validation 7. Specific/limited Block capabilities demonstrated through operationally-realistic intercept flight testing with the full set of operational components. The models and simulations and/or ground testing may be used for assessment but are not independently accredited. 5 Accreditation is the official certification by the intended user that a model or simulation is acceptable for a specific application or purpose. 6 Verification is the process of determining that a model or simulation implementation accurately represents the developer's conceptual description and specifications. 7 Validation is the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model. 11

18 Level Description Specific/limited Block capabilities demonstrated through flight testing with key operational components. Flight test data obtained are expected to contribute to independent accreditation of models and simulations used for assessing performance. Specific Block capabilities demonstrated through flight testing with developmental or legacy hardware/software. The flight test data obtained support the development of engineering versions of models and simulations. Block concept defined with capabilities estimated through analysis, laboratory testing, and/or legacy models and simulations. The lowest level of Block capability demonstration (Level 1) is analysis and/or laboratory testing. Such demonstrations provide little more than a proof-of-concept that a desired Block capability is possible. The next higher level of Block capability demonstration (Level 2) is flight testing with developmental hardware/software. If the system under test is only an information system such as C2BMC, then participation in a flight test with another element is sufficient to meet this level of demonstration. A higher level of Block capability demonstration (Level 3) exists when key components (e.g., the interceptor, sensor(s), or fire control software) under test are representative of the intended operational configuration. The first three demonstration levels discussed thus far are insufficient to demonstrate an operational Block capability. An emergency capability might exist, but this capability falls short of the planned Block capabilities. The next demonstration level (Level 4), however, is a significant milestone in the development of a Block, and consists of operationally-realistic end-to-end flight testing with the intended operational components. In addition, ground tests and/or models and simulations exist and have also demonstrated the Block capability. Because this level of demonstration occurs during the Block development phase, an independent agency such as the BMDS Operational Test Agency Team need not have accredited these ground tests and models and simulations. This is the first level of demonstration to show that an actual warfighting capability exists, although this capability might be rudimentary and logistics support is likely not very deep. That is, inventories are likely low, reliance on contractors is likely high, and deployability for extended periods of time is likely problematic. The suitability and survivability of this capability is probably unknown, and the effectiveness is only estimated, not measured. Overall, although a capability exists, it is not robust. The next level of demonstration (Level 5) is also a significant milestone. It consists of a broad, but incomplete, demonstration of Block capabilities through the use of flight test-based, independently accredited ground tests and/or models and simulations. Such accreditations are possible only if a sufficient quantity and quality of flight test data have been collected to verify and validate the models and simulations. A credible Block warfighting capability exists at this level. Estimates of effectiveness, suitability, and survivability can be expected at this level (although these estimates might be preliminary with correspondingly large uncertainties). The depth of the capability is not assessed here. That is, the necessary inventories might not be 12

19 available for sustained combat, or specific regions of the battlespace, defended area, or launch area denied 8 might not be achievable with the currently demonstrated capability. However, for the parts of the battlespace, defended area, or launch area denied where the capability has been demonstrated, a moderately robust warfighting capability exists. Finally, the highest demonstration level (Level 6) is a demonstration of BMDS capabilities through independently accredited ground tests and/or models and simulations across the entire battlespace. Note that this demonstration level references BMDS system capabilities rather than individual Block capabilities. Blocks seeking to demonstrate this highest level of capability must also demonstrate that they do not degrade the capabilities of any other Blocks. Thus, to achieve this level, a Block must demonstrate full integration with the BMDS and fulfill the defined Block requirements. These Block requirements include inventory levels. 2.2 BMDS PROGRESS Figure 2-1 shows the assessment of BMDS progress in terms of the Block structure defined in Section 1.0. The horizontal axis in this figure starts from FY04, which is when the MDA declared an Initial Defensive Operations capability. The Block assessments through FY07 are retrospective looks based on the current five Block definitions, which did not exist prior to FY08. Such retrospective assessments are necessary to construct a time series of Block progress sufficient to extract meaningful trends. 8 Launch area denied refers to the geographic area from which an adversary targeting a designated defended area cannot launch a ballistic missile without the BMDS engaging it. 13

20 Demonstration Level Block 2 Block 1 Block 5 Block 3 Legend The MDA had not defined the new block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current block definitions. Assessed status. 1 Block Fiscal Year (FY) Block 1 1 Block 1 progressed from orange (Level 2) to yellow (Level 3) because of the GMD program s first use of the operationally configured interceptor and a deployable sensor (UEWR-Beale) in Flight Test Ground-Based Interceptor (FTG)-02. Although intercept was not an objective, an intercept was achieved in FTG-02. Block 2 2 Block 2 progressed from orange (Level 2) to green (Level 4) because the Aegis BMD element began the combined developmental test/operational test (DT/OT) phase of its test program starting with FT Standard Missile 3 (FTM) Block 2 progressed from green (Level 4) to blue (Level 5) because the Aegis BMD element concluded the DT/OT phase of its test program with FTM-13 and certified the suite of models and simulations necessary to assess performance. Figure 2-1. BMDS Block Progress, FY04-FY08 Block 2, which focuses on defense against short- to medium-range threats in a single region/theater, is the most mature of the five Blocks that comprise the BMDS. It is making steady progress toward achieving the Block 2 baseline. Block 1, which focuses on defense from North Korean long-range threats, is less mature than Block 2, and is making slower progress toward its baseline objectives. Blocks 3-5 provide capabilities planned for inclusion in the future BMDS and are therefore significantly less mature than Blocks 1 and BLOCK CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATION LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS Each of the Block capabilities shown in Figure 2-1 are built upon element capabilities. The Block capabilities shown reflect the progress of the most mature weapon element in the Block. To fully achieve a Block capability, each of the elements that contribute to the Block must provide the requisite capabilities assigned to them. 14

21 A methodology similar to that used for assessing the BMDS capability progress in Figure 2-1 is used for assessing element-level progress toward meeting Block capabilities. The six demonstration levels used to assess element-level capability progress correspond to the six levels already discussed for the BMDS. Also, only the top demonstration level (Level 6) requires that the inventory levels specified in the Block baseline be met. This top level is also the only level that refers to complete Block capability. All of the lower demonstration levels refer to individual element capabilities. Table 2-2 describes the demonstration levels adapted to the Block assessments based on element-level progress to date. Table 2-2. Block Capability Demonstration Levels Level Description Block capability verified through flight test-based, independently accredited models and simulations and/or ground testing. The element fulfills its defined requirements and is fully integrated into the Block. Broad, but incomplete, demonstration of element capabilities through independently accredited models/simulations and/or ground testing. Accreditation is possible only if a sufficient quantity and quality of flight testing has been completed to support verification and validation. Specific/limited element capabilities demonstrated through operationally-realistic intercept flight testing with the full set of operational components. The models and simulations and/or ground testing may be used for assessment but are not independently accredited. Specific/limited element capabilities demonstrated through flight testing with key operational components (e.g., operational interceptor, sensor(s), fire control software). Flight test data obtained are expected to contribute to independent accreditation of models and simulations used for assessing performance. Specific element capabilities demonstrated through flight testing with developmental or legacy hardware/software. The flight test data obtained support the development of engineering versions of models and simulations. Element concept defined with capabilities estimated through analysis, laboratory testing, and/or legacy models and simulations. 2.4 BLOCK PROGRESS Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Strategic) Figure 2-2 shows the Block progress for the three Blocks Blocks 1, 3, and 4 focused on long-/intermediate-range threats. GMD and C2BMC are the two elements that comprise these Blocks, although AN/SPY-1 and AN/TPY-2 (FBM) also provide significant contributions to the capability. This figure is a summary of Block progress. The following two figures provide the details for the changes depicted. 15

22 Block 1 Block Demonstration Level C2BMC/SA GMD C2BMC/TPY-2 Demonstration Level C2BMC/SA C2BMC/TPY-2 GMD 1 1 Block 4 Demonstration Level Fiscal Year (FY) C2BMC/SA C2BMC/TPY-2 C2BMC/GEM GMD Fiscal Year (FY) Legend Fiscal Year (FY) The MDA had not defined the new block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current block definitions. Retrospective assessment of a partial capability. Assessed status. Assessed status of a partial capability. Figure 2-2. Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission Block Progress 16

23 GMD Demonstration Level Block 1 Block 3 Legend The MDA had not defined the new block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current block definitions. Assessed status. 1 Block Fiscal Year (FY) 1 Block 1 progressed from orange (Level 2) to yellow (Level 3) because FTG-02 used an operationallyconfigured interceptor and a deployable sensor (UEWR-Beale). Although intercept was not an objective, an intercept was achieved in FTG-02. Figure 2-3. GMD Progress (Strategic) GMD progress towards Block 1 capability has occurred over two flight test phases. The current phase began in December 2005 and has used operationally-representative interceptors and sensors. Prior to the current phase, flight testing consisted entirely of developmental testing with surrogate boosters and sensors. The MDA has demonstrated specific, limited GMD capability for Block 1 (Level 3 in Figures 2-2 and 2-3). The MDA conducted ground tests and digital simulations that contribute to an understanding of Block 1 capability. However, the modeling and simulation components of the exercises were not accredited for Block performance assessment. Ground testing has demonstrated functionality and interoperability of operational GMD components internally and with C2BMC. In July 2008, the MDA conducted a sensor characterization flight test, which, as planned, had no interceptor participation. In December 2008, the MDA conducted a flight test that resulted in an intercept. Both tests emphasized operational realism and contributed to some further understanding of GMD Block 1 capability. Detailed analysis is in progress. The MDA continues to work toward an intercept flight test that incorporates all aspects of an operationally-realistic end-to-end flight test (further discussed in Section 3.0). Likewise for Block 3, the MDA demonstrated specific, limited capability through unaccredited ground testing. Prior year intercept flight tests of legacy Blocks contributed to an understanding of current Block 3 capability. However, the MDA conducted no Block 3 flight 17

24 test to date that would address Block 3 capability in specific intercept engagement scenarios and parameters, element maturity, and design stability (Level 2 in Figures 2-2 and 2-3). For Block 4, the MDA demonstrated concept definition (Level 1 in Figures 2-2 and 2-3) with the development of the Block 4.0 Campaign Plan for Testing the Midcourse Defense European Capability, which was approved jointly by the MDA and DOT&E, and delivered to Congress in December The MDA has estimated Block 4 capability through analysis, but has conducted no Block 4 flight tests, ground tests, or digital performance assessments to date C2BMC Demonstration Level Legend The MDA had not defined the new block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current block definitions. Retrospective assessment of C2BMC/SA a partial capability. 3 C2BMC/TPY-2 Assessed status. 2 5 Assessed status of a C2BMC/SA partial capability C2BMC/TPY-2 C2BMC/GEM Blocks 1, 3 Block Fiscal Year (FY) Blocks 1, 3 C2BMC/SA 1 C2BMC/SA progressed from red (Level 1) to orange (Level 2) due, in part, to participation in interoperability exercises with SBIRS and Patriot, and the FTM-10 flight test. 2 C2BMC/SA progressed from orange (Level 2) to yellow (Level 3) because it participated in two flight tests (FT Other [FTX]-02 and FTG-03a) where SBIRS provided early warning to the BMDS through C2BMC. 3 C2BMC/SA progressed from yellow (Level 3) to green (Level 4) because it received and displayed data from a variety of sensors during the BMDS flight test, FTX-03. Blocks 1, 3 C2BMC/TPY-2 4 C2BMC/TPY-2 progressed from red (Level 1) to orange (Level 2) because the fielded software allowed the user to task the AN/TPY-2 radar and forward selected tracks to Aegis BMD. This software was used during FTX-02 and FTG-03a. 5 C2BMC/TPY-2 progressed from orange (Level 2) to yellow (Level 3) because the track forwarding and radar management of a single AN/TPY-2 was demonstrated during flight test FTX-03. Block 4 C2BMC/SA 6 C2BMC/SA progressed from red (Level 1) to orange (Level 2) because, with the recent installation of C2BMC data terminals at European Command, MDA is ready to demonstrate SA capability for Block 4 engagements. Figure 2-4. C2BMC Progress (Strategic) The intended role of C2BMC is to manage and integrate globally all the sensors and interceptors of the BMDS. Given the wide scope of its role, C2BMC is well suited for 18

25 incremental improvements planned by the MDA. Providing situational awareness was the first incremental capability developed for C2BMC and is the most mature capability for all Blocks. Since 2007, the MDA has conducted a series of flight tests, ground tests, and digital simulation performance assessments that have measured progress in Block 1 scenarios. For Block 3, ground tests have contributed to the understanding of C2BMC as a situational awareness tool. Progress for Blocks 1 and 3 is relatively high (Level 4 in Figures 2-2 and 2-4) because the implementation of the situational awareness picture is mature, and with recent software builds, only modest changes have been made, mainly in response to requests from the warfighter. Block 4 progress is lower (Level 2) because the MDA has conducted no Block 4-specific flight tests, ground tests, or digital performance assessments. However, with the recent installation of C2BMC data terminals at the United States European Command (EUCOM), the MDA has been able to demonstrate, in a distributed ground test, the capability of this installed C2BMC equipment to support situational awareness to EUCOM, to control a deployed AN/TPY-2, and to transfer the AN/TPY-2 target tracks to an allied ballistic missile defense system. The next capability under development is the Global Engagement Manager (GEM), which is the C2BMC global command and control and battle management capability planned as part of Block 4. Figures 2-2 and 2-4 show separately the progress assessment for GEM. Overall progress to date on GEM is low because the full features of GEM will encompass many software spirals yet to come Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Region/Theater) Figure 2-5 shows the Block progress for the two Blocks Blocks 2 and 5 focused on intermediate-/medium-/short-range threats. Aegis BMD, THAAD, and C2BMC are the three elements that comprise these Blocks. This figure is a summary of Block progress. The following four figures provide the details for the changes depicted. 19

26 Block 2 Block Demonstration Level Aegis BMD Midcourse Aegis BMD Terminal C2BMC/SA THAAD Demonstration Level C2BMC/SA THAAD Aegis BMD SM-3 Blk 1A C2BMC/GEM 1 1 Aegis BMD SM-3 Blk 1B Legend Fiscal Year (FY) Fiscal Year (FY) The MDA had not defined the new Block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current Block definitions. Assessed status. Figure 2-5. Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Block Progress (Region/Theater) Aegis BMD Aegis BMD progress toward Block 2 midcourse-engagement capability has occurred over four test phases (encompassing 13 flight tests). Early flight testing as part of the Aegis Light-weight Exoatmospheric Projectile Intercept program and the subsequent developmental test phase demonstrated initial capability against short-range non-separating ballistic missile targets. Two flight tests conducted as part of a Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) operational assessment demonstrated further capability against short-range non-separating and medium-range simple-separating targets. The fourth phase of combined developmental and operational testing (DT/OT), which began in FY06, demonstrated capability with operationally-realistic hardware (including SM-3 Block 1A interceptors) and software (Aegis BMD build 3.6) in end-to-end testing. 20

27 Demonstration Level Aegis BMD Midcourse Aegis BMD Terminal Aegis BMD SM-3 Blk 1A Legend The MDA had not defined the new block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current block definitions. Assessed status. Block 2 Block 5 1 Aegis BMD SM-3 Blk 1B Fiscal Year (FY) Block 2 Aegis BMD 1 Aegis BMD progressed to green (Level 4), skipping yellow (Level 3), with the conduct of FTM-10, the first flight test of the DT/OT phase. 2 Aegis BMD midcourse defense increased to blue (Level 5) with the completion of DT/OT following FTM-13 and the certification of modeling and simulation. Figure 2-6. Aegis BMD Progress (Region/Theater) Aegis BMD capabilities developed for Block 2 provide for a midcourse defense against short-range, non-separating, and medium-range, simple-separating, ballistic missile targets. With the completion of DT/OT in FY08, Aegis BMD is shown in Figures 2-5 and 2-6 as progressing to Level 5 for midcourse-engagement capability. Aegis BMD currently falls short of Level 6, primarily because of three factors: (1) the full inventory of operational Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors for Block 2 is not yet available; (2) the program has not tested two aspects the zero-pulse mode of the third stage rocket motor and the second-pulse mode of the solid-fueled divert and attitude control system of the SM-3 Block 1A interceptor in a live engagement event; and (3) the program has not tested launch-on-remote capability (using the AN/SPY-1 radar aboard another Aegis BMD ship as a sensor) in a live event. The MDA is planning FTM-15 to demonstrate this capability using an AN/TPY-2 (TM)-to-Aegis transmission vice an Aegis-to-Aegis transmission. Aegis BMD program has conducted simulated launch-on-remote engagements, exercised launch-on-remote functionality during recent tracking exercises, and integrated ground tests using fully accredited models and simulations. Aegis BMD began a short phase of follow-on operational test and evaluation in FY08, primarily to introduce a near-term sea-based terminal-engagement capability as part of Aegis BMD build The terminal-engagement capability uses modified SM-2 Block IV interceptors to engage short-range non-separating targets. In FY08, Aegis BMD demonstrated a 21

28 terminal-engagement capability during an operationally-realistic end-to-end flight test (Level 4 in Figures 2-5 and 2-6). The Block 5 mission will use an upgraded Aegis BMD software build (4.0.1) with both SM-3 Block 1A and enhanced Block 1B (new) interceptors. The new software and interceptor are designed for engagements against intermediate-range threats, greater interoperability with the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar (for launch-on-remote engagements and cueing), and midcourse-engagement capability against more complex short- and medium-range targets and intermediate-range threats. For Block 5, Aegis BMD progress is shown as two curves in Figures 2-5 and 2-6 for the SM-3 Block 1A and Block 1B interceptors. SM-3 Block 1A flight tests to date used the Block 2 Aegis BMD 3.6 system, which is a legacy system on the path to Aegis BMD Therefore, for Block 5, the SM-3 Block 1A tests correspond to Level 2 in Figures 2-5 and 2-6. For the SM-3 Block 1B, many of the key components of the interceptor, as well as the Aegis BMD build, are still in early development stages, or Level 1 in Figures 2-5 and 2-6. The first developmental tracking exercise with Aegis BMD software is currently scheduled for FY09, with the first intercept test with the new software and the Block 1B interceptor scheduled for FY10. The MDA is planning FTM-15 to demonstrate launch-on-remote capability using an AN/TPY-2 (TM)-to-Aegis transmission. The Aegis BMD and THAAD programs have participated in mutual test events to improve Block 2 and Block 5 interoperability between the two elements. Testing has focused on the ability of THAAD to cue Aegis BMD and exchange target track data, and the ability of Aegis BMD to cue THAAD. The tests have shown that capability exists for interoperability between the two elements; although some issues due to differing interpretations and implementations of Link 16 (data link) still exist that require further analysis and correction THAAD The THAAD contribution to Block 2 consists of the THAAD stand-alone configuration, which can accept cueing from other BMDS elements. The fielding of the first two THAAD fire units, currently scheduled to be complete by the end of FY11, is necessary for THAAD to be able to contribute to operational Block 2 defense. The THAAD contribution to Block 5 consists of fielding additional THAAD fire units. The Block 5 will incorporate software modifications to the THAAD fire control planner to provide and test capability against intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well as a capability to launch off a forwarded track with remote THAAD launchers. 22

29 Demonstration Level Blocks 2, 5 Legend The MDA had not defined the new block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current block definitions. Assessed status Fiscal Year (FY) 1 THAAD progressed from red (Level 1) to orange (Level 2) because of FT THAAD (FTT)-01, an exoatmospheric missile-only characterization flight test. 2 THAAD progressed from orange (Level 2) to yellow (Level 3) because of flight tests with the operationally configured interceptor. Figure 2-7. THAAD Progress (Region/Theater) As depicted in Figures 2-5 and 2-7, THAAD progress toward Blocks 2 and 5 demonstration levels has increased steadily since the current phase of the flight test program began in FY05. To date, this phase has consisted of five intercept flight tests against threat-representative targets. These flight tests have provided useful opportunities to exercise and mature the latest software builds. During the most recent successful flight test, THAAD had operationally-representative software in both the missile and launcher. The radar and fire control unit, however, both have additional software builds to implement before reaching a production version. Additionally, flight tests to date have not yet used the radar prime power unit. The MDA currently plans to test the radar prime power unit during FTT-13 in FY12, after the MDA has delivered the first two fire units to the warfighter. As a result, Figures 2-5 and 2-7 depict THAAD at Level 3 for FY08. The MDA plans to exercise the final software build for the radar in FY09 and for the fire control unit in FY10. In previous years, target availability issues caused the cancellation of radar data collection flight tests that would have allowed the MDA to assess the radar software algorithm maturity and to implement the algorithms into the flight test program sooner. Currently, the MDA is developing a radar signal injection capability that will allow these advanced algorithms to be exercised. The capability will be ready in mid-fy09. The operational realism of THAAD flight tests has increased incrementally. The Army Test and Evaluation Command plans to accredit THAAD models and simulations for use in a 23

30 Capability Assessment Report prior to the fielding of the first two THAAD fire units at the end of Block C2BMC Demonstration Level Blocks 2, 5 2 Block C2BMC/SA C2BMC/GEM Legend The MDA had not defined the new block structure at this time. The FY status is a retrospective assessment of capability based on the current block definitions. Assessed status Fiscal Year (FY) Blocks 2, 5 CSBMC/SA 1 C2BMC/SA progressed from red (Level 1) to orange (Level 2) because of its participation in FTM C2BMC/SA progressed from orange (Level 2) to yellow (Level 3) because of its participation in FTT-07 using a fielded software spiral. 3 C2BMC/SA progressed from yellow (Level 3) to green (Level 4) because of its participation in FTT-09 and JFTM-1. Block 5 C2BMC/GEM 4 C2BMC/GEM progressed from red (Level 1) to orange (Level 2) because of its participation in FTX-03, which demonstrated its track forwarding and radar management capabilities. Figure 2-8. C2BMC Progress (Region/Theater) C2BMC progress as a situational awareness tool is the same for Blocks 2 and 5, and rates relatively high (Level 4 in Figures 2-5 and 2-8). As in the case of Blocks 1 and 3, flight and ground tests have contributed to C2BMC progress for Blocks 2 and 5. C2BMC typically participates in Aegis BMD and THAAD flight tests, demonstrating the ability to receive, process, and display relevant data to Combatant Commanders. Ground tests with C2BMC as a participant feature a mix of Blocks 2 and 5 regional and theater (as well as strategic) threats. The C2BMC contribution to Block 5 will come mainly from GEM. The intention of GEM is to facilitate the sharing of sensor data and the command and control functions of interceptors across areas of responsibility, allowing for BMDS resources to be used effectively against multiple, simultaneous threats in different regions. At this time, GEM is immature, and its progress rates low (Level 2 in Figures 2-5 and 2-8). 24

31 2.4.3 Patriot Figure 2-9 shows the progress for Patriot. As stated earlier, Patriot is not officially part of any of the existing Blocks, although its mission area overlaps with that for Blocks 2 and 5. The Patriot contribution to Block 2 capability is identical to its contribution to Block 5 capability. Demonstration Level PDB PDB-6.0 PDB-6.5 Legend Assessed status Fiscal Year (FY) PDB The Patriot PDB-6.0 system progressed from orange (Level 2) to yellow (Level 3) in 2006 with the conduct of operational flight tests. 2 The Patriot PDB-6.0 system progressed from yellow (Level 3) to purple (Level 6) in 2007 with the completion of Limited User Test operational testing with independently accredited models/simulations in ground testing. PDB The Patriot PDB-6.5 system progressed from red (Level 1) to orange (Level 2) in 2007 with the conduct of developmental flight tests. Figure 2-9. Patriot Progress The U.S. Army conducted Initial Operational Test and Evaluation of Patriot with Post-Deployment Build (PDB) system software in This test was conducted with independently accredited models/simulations and ground testing (Level 6 in Figure 2-9), and showed that this version of Patriot had substantially greater capability than the previous version. However, it also revealed numerous deficiencies and resulted in limited two-year missile buys rather than a full-rate production decision for the PAC-3 missile. In 2003, the Army employed Patriot in Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which it successfully intercepted all nine of the Iraqi ballistic missiles that threatened Patriot defended assets. The Army conducted PDB-6.0 developmental flight testing (Level 2) in 2004 and 2005, operational flight testing (Level 3) in 2006, and Limited User Test operational testing with 25

32 independently accredited models and simulations and ground testing (Level 6) in 2006 and The Army replaced PDB system software with PDB-6.0 system software in fielded Patriot units in The Army conducted PDB-6.5 developmental flight testing (Level 2) in 2007 and 2008 and plans to conduct a Limited User Test for PDB-6.5 (Level 6) in FY10. 26

33 Section 3.0 ASSESSMENT OF TEST ADEQUACY This section assesses the test adequacy of the FY/CY08 BMDS test program in terms of the Blocks defined in Section 1.0. This section also assesses the test adequacy of Patriot, which is not part of the BMDS five-block structure but can contribute to the Blocks 2 and 5 theater missions. BMDS test program adequacy varies depending on which mission the MDA is testing, the Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission (Strategic) or the Intermediate-/Medium-/Short- Range Threat Mission (Region/Theater). Flight testing at the strategic level has only examined a small and confined portion of the potential battlespace. As a result, flight test data is too limited to verify, validate, and accredit models and simulations for the full strategic mission. Testing at the regional and theater level has examined a larger portion of the battlespace. As a result, there is more data available to verify, validate, and accredit models and simulations for the full region and theater mission. However, in both cases, data is still insufficient to use models and simulations to objectively assess BMDS capability. 3.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY DOT&E reviewed four areas to assess the adequacy of the BMDS test program: test planning and execution, operational realism, modeling and simulation, and target development and employment. Each of these areas impact, both positively and negatively, the characterization of BMDS capability. In this section, these areas are assessed in two groups according to their support of either the long-/intermediate-range threat mission Blocks (strategic) or the intermediate-/medium-/short-range threat mission Blocks (region and theater). The planning and execution of ground and flight tests of the BMDS is a complex and dynamic process. The MDA must not only deconflict range and test resources for use by the various BMDS elements and other outside users, but also must integrate the various BMDS elements possessing varying maturities into BMDS system-level rather than element-level tests. Any schedule or resource perturbation has significant consequences. Test planning and execution is important to the characterization process and is discussed first. In FY05, the MDA and DOT&E agreed to a set of criteria (Table 3-1) for including operational realism in flight testing. The MDA and DOT&E generated these criteria in response to the FY05 National Defense Authorization Act, which required the MDA to conduct an operationally-realistic test of the BMDS. In its FY06 and FY07 reports to Congress, DOT&E applied these criteria in assessing the adequacy and sufficiency of the BMDS flight test program. To assess the adequacy of the FY/CY08 BMDS test program, the criteria outlined in Table 3-1 are applied to the flight tests conducted in the past year and are discussed second. 27

34 Table 3-1. MDA/DOT&E Operational Realism Criteria for Flight Testing MDA/DOT&E Operational Realism Criteria Operational Interceptor Threat-Representative Target Complex Countermeasures Operational Sensor Operational Fire Control Software Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Warfighter Participation Unannounced Target Launch End-to-End Test Description Operationally-representative interceptor modified to support mandatory flight safety and data collection requirements Threat-representative target trajectories, signatures, and scenarios Target dynamics and penetration aids Operationally-representative sensor modified to meet mandatory range safety and truth data requirements Operationally-representative fire control software, fully tested and certified through the formal software acceptance process Operationally-representative tactics, techniques, and procedures within test constraints Operationally-realistic warfighter participation consistent with real-world scenarios Target launch time unknown to warfighters Intercept test use of operational assets modified to support mandatory flight safety and data collection requirements As discussed in Section 2.0, to evaluate, or quantify, the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS, an adequate test program must consist of models and simulations that have been fully accredited for performance assessment purposes by an independent agency such as the BMDS Operational Test Agency Team. Ground tests and models and simulations can examine scenarios that flight tests cannot assess because of geographic and safety constraints. When properly verified and validated, the models and simulations provide predictions of system performance. Based on these predictions, operationally-realistic flight tests provide empirical data to confirm system performance and to refine and validate the ground tests and models and simulations. Given its importance to a comprehensive evaluation of system performance, the status of the modeling and simulation verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) effort for the BMDS Blocks is discussed third. In Table 3-1, threat-representative targets is cited as one of the operational realism criteria. Targets are an important developmental asset common to all of the Block flight test programs. The MDA is the Department of Defense agency responsible for designing, developing, producing, and procuring targets for testing the BMDS. Testing with targets that represent threat missile capabilities and ranges are fundamental to achieving operational realism and conducting an adequate flight test program. Therefore, in assessing the adequacy of the FY/CY08 BMDS test program below, the target development status is discussed fourth. 28

35 3.2 ASSESSMENT OF BLOCK TEST ADEQUACY Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Strategic) The MDA conducted testing in FY/CY08 toward assessing the operational effectiveness of Blocks 1 and 3. The MDA conducted no specific Block-level testing to assess suitability and survivability; however, the MDA acquired effectiveness test data that could apply to selected aspects of suitability and survivability. The MDA conducted no testing specific to Block Test Planning and Execution for FY/CY08 The MDA conducted the following tests in FY/CY08 for Blocks 1 and 3: Ground Test Distributed-02 (GTD-02) November The MDA demonstrated functionality and interoperability of the GMD Block 1 configuration with the BMDS and tested GMD performance. The test employed operational BMDS sensors, communications, and GMD fire control. The U.S. Army s 100th Missile Defense Brigade and 49th Missile Defense Battalion crews controlled the GMD fire control nodes during test. Performance Assessment 2007 (PA07) November PA07 was a digital simulation test which simulated performance of the BMDS Block 1 configuration including GMD. The MDA investigated multiple threat scenarios and system responses. Ground Test Integrated-03 (GTI-03) June The MDA demonstrated the functionality and interoperability of the GMD Blocks 1 and 3 configurations with the BMDS, and tested GMD performance. The test employed laboratory representations of BMDS sensors, communications, and GMD. The U.S. Army s 100th Missile Defense Brigade and 49th Missile Defense Battalion crews controlled the GMD fire control nodes during a portion of the test. Flight Test Other-03 (FTX-03) July 18, The MDA demonstrated functionality and interoperability of Block 1 sensors, C2BMC, and GMD in this sensor characterization test. No interceptor was launched. Flight Test GMD-05 (FTG-05) December 5, During this live intercept flight test, the MDA demonstrated the functionality and interoperability of Block 1 sensors, the C2BMC, and the GMD. In FTX-03, the MDA tested performance of operational sensors AN/TPY-2 (FBM), Aegis AN/SPY-1, SBX, and UEWR-Beale within a Block 1 architecture against a long-range target launched from the Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska. All sensors transmitted threat tracks to the GMD fire control. GMD fire control demonstrated a successful track correlation, engagement planning, battle management, and weapon tasking. A target malfunction prevented deployment of some of the planned target countermeasures and resulted in the target falling short of the planned intercept engagement volume. FTX-03 was not a Block 3- or Block 4-specific flight test; however, FTX-03 data contributed to some understanding of Block 3 performance. 29

36 Although the MDA is endeavoring to conduct two intercept flight tests per year to demonstrate aspects of interceptor effectiveness and suitability, and to VV&A its models and simulations, the MDA was only able to conduct one intercept test, FTG-05, in FY/CY08. The MDA delayed a planned intercept test when a test-specific interceptor component, needed to transmit data from interceptor to ground, failed during integration testing. The MDA subsequently cancelled the intercept attempt and added FTX-03. During FTG-05, the MDA successfully correlated tracks from four important Block 1 sensors: Aegis BMD, SBX, an AN/TPY-2 (FBM), and UEWR Beale. Through the C2BMC, the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, located at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, controlled an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar deployed to Juneau, Alaska. The U.S. Army s 49th Missile Defense Battalion crew, operating from Fort Greely, Alaska, controlled the GMD fire control and managed the intercept during the test. Although the target experienced the same anomaly that occurred during FTX-03, the interceptor, launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), California, appeared to accomplish a successful intercept. A detailed analysis of the flight data is in progress. The MDA ground testing continued, focusing on a legacy Block 1 configuration in GTD-02 and on Blocks 1 and 3 in GTI-03. GTD-02 and GTI-03 demonstrated functionality, interoperability, and human-in-control capability. The MDA plans to incorporate the Blocks 1 and 3 software versions tested in GTI-03 into the BMDS operational baseline in FY09. The MDA conducted a digital simulation of the BMDS for the first time in PA07. PA07 investigated behavior of the BMDS and provided insight into functionality, interoperability, and performance. The MDA has developed a comprehensive information assurance test program closely following DOT&E policy for operational test and evaluation of information assurance. During the past year, the MDA completed numerous activities associated with information assurance: In September 2008, the 92nd Information Operations Squadron conducted a comprehensive network penetration test on the C2BMC. The MDA conducted several Controls Validation Tests throughout FY08 to include the UEWRs at Beale AFB, California, and Thule, Greenland; the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska; the SBX Radar; the Missile Assembly Buildings at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg AFB, California; and the Launch Control Center at Vandenberg AFB, California. The MDA also conducted a penetration test of the SBX in June The MDA has successfully incorporated information assurance provisions in its new contracts. The MDA exceeded the Department of Defense workforce training and certification requirements by 3 percent. The MDA, in conjunction with the Combatant Commanders and supporting Services, established a BMDS Operations Support Center. The center coordinates with Combatant 30

37 Commanders and MDA elements to provide continuous system status as well as support readiness conditions and operational issues. The MDA also resourced the implementation of the Global Integrated Network Coordination Center, which monitors operational status of communication links supporting the BMDS Operational Realism Assessment Table 3-2 provides the assessment of flight test operational realism for FY/CY08 flight tests in support of the long-/intermediate-range threat mission blocks (strategic) (Blocks 1, 3, and 4) using the criteria in Table 3-1. Table 3-2 also identifies the Block(s), e.g., Block 1, supported by each flight test. Table 3-2. Operational Realism Assessment for FY/CY08 Flight Tests in Support of Strategic/Intermediate-Range Blocks MDA/DOT&E Operational Realism Criteria FY/CY08 Flight Tests FTX-03 FTG-05 Operational Interceptor NT A Threat-Representative Target P P Complex Countermeasures NT NT Operational Sensor A A Operational Fire Control Software A P Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures P A Warfighter Participation A A Unannounced Target Launch A A End-to-End Test P A Block(s) Supported 1 1 Key: A Achieved, P Partially Achieved, NT Not Tested For the Block 1 FTX-03 sensor characterization flight test and the Block 1 FTG-05 intercept flight test, the MDA met, or partially met, seven and eight (respectively) of the nine MDA and DOT&E criteria for flight test operational realism. Four operational BMDS sensors, the to-be-fielded GMD Block 1 fire control software (with some exceptions discussed in Appendix A), and selected operational communications participated in the both FTX-03 and FTG-05. The MDA did not plan for an interceptor during FTX-03 or complex countermeasures during either FTX-03 or FTG-05 test resulting in a Not Tested rating for these areas. In both tests, the MDA did plan countermeasures testing, but apparently, the same malfunction prevented deployment of the planned countermeasures aboard the target missiles. 31

38 Although the remaining criteria rate as Achieved or Partially Achieved in this test, there exist practical limitations of a single test that warrant consideration in future flight tests; for example: Threat-Representative Target To date, flight tests have presented very similar target object separation velocities and consequent object presentations to the sensors and the interceptor. In addition, the flight tests have presented the target deployment vehicle with dynamics unlike any threat-realistic object. Operational Sensors Both FTX-03 and FTG-05 imposed an artificial field-of-view restriction on a specific operational BMDS sensor. Operational Fire Control Software With two exceptions during FTG-05, the MDA used the fielded software. These exceptions are discussed in Appendix A. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures The SBX has not progressed to an operational baseline capability. The MDA and warfighter community are still developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures they will use to operate the SBX. Safety constraints limited the warfighters abilities to complete tactics, techniques, and procedures in an operationally realistic manner. Warfighter Participation For both FTX-03 and FTG-05, contractors, not warfighters, operating from the SBX, controlled the radar. Although contractors will maintain the SBX, the MDA and the warfighter community have not yet determined who will operate the radar. The other radars were operated in accordance with the warfighter concepts of operation. For the first time, the warfighters controlled a live intercept test, FTG-05, from the GMD fire control node at Fort Greely, Alaska. Unannounced Target Launch For both FTX-03 and FTG-05, warfighters in control of the GMD fire control did not know the specific, planned test execution time, but knew within which crew shift the test was planned. End-to-End Test As planned by the MDA, FTX-03 did not conclude with an intercept of the target Modeling and Simulation VV&A Status The modeling and simulation VV&A effort progressed in FY/CY08. However, the BMDS Operational Test Agency Team did not accredit either the FY/CY08 BMDS Block level ground tests or the digital simulation test, which together encompassed Blocks 1 and 3. Block 4 specific modeling and simulation does not yet exist. In FY/CY08, for the first time, the MDA and the BMDS Operational Test Agency Team jointly developed and agreed upon acceptability criteria for verification and validation data products that would support an accreditation decision. This was a process that occurred after GTD-02 and was developed initially in support of PA07, so that neither of these tests fully benefitted from the process. GTI-03 was the first ground test to benefit from acceptability criteria. Even with this progress, the team could not accredit GTI-03 for the purpose of 32

39 performance assessment. Shortfalls existed within the verification and validation data. Specific features lacking in adequate verification and validation or the subject of model caveats and limitations include the following: Threat models Lack of consistent representation across the models of threat flyout characteristics such as trajectories; stage dynamics; staging related objects, debris, and maneuver dynamics; and threat suite objects and dynamics Radar models Limited atmospheric propagation; attenuation within the range of expected atmospheric conditions including rain, snow, and dust; radar reflection from threat objects; antenna performance; uncompensated radar biases; and reporting responsibility Kill vehicle models Limited optical signatures of threat objects within the range of expected object deployment and illumination conditions; near field debris; and kill vehicle performance within a range of expected conditions for divert; angles to the sun, moon, and earth horizon; and closing velocity Lethality models Lack of additional threat models beyond the single incorporated threat model Target Development Status In FY/CY08, target reliability was a continuing problem. The FTX-03 and FTG-05 target missiles did not successfully deploy the planned countermeasures. During FTX-03, the unplanned added weight caused the target payload to fall short of the planned target aimpoint. The MDA planned for this situation during FTG-05 by expanding the engagement zone. Although the same target failure appeared to have occurred, the target reached the adjusted engagement zone allowing for a successful intercept. Until this problem is solved, this target failure mode is a risk in future flight tests using countermeasures. Targets continued to be assembled from retired intercontinental ballistic missile parts and motors. Target development and assembly occur on a test-by-test basis and requires approximately 18 months. These factors contribute to difficulty in achieving target availability and reliability. Although the MDA developed the Flexible Target Family with the thought that it would improve reliability and timeliness, and reduce cost through production efficiency and modular flexibility, the program is behind schedule, modified from the original plan, and underfunded Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Region/Theater) The MDA conducted testing in FY/CY08 to assess the performance of Blocks 2 and 5. For Aegis BMD, the FY/CY08 test events supported mainly Block 2. The MDA conducted no testing that used the Block 5 suite of Aegis BMD operational components, which are still in early development. For THAAD, the FY/CY08 test events addressed below support both Blocks 2 and 5, since the THAAD Blocks 2 and 5 capabilities are nearly identical and differ primarily in the number of fielded THAAD fire units. 33

40 Test Planning and Execution for FY/CY Aegis BMD The Aegis BMD program conducted four intercept flight tests in FY/CY08: Flight Test Maritime (FTM)-13 November 6, An Aegis BMD cruiser conducted a near-simultaneous engagement of two short-range non-separating ballistic missile targets using an SM-3 Block 1A salvo of two missiles. FTM-13 was the first Aegis BMD intercept test involving a ballistic missile raid scenario. Japanese FTM (JFTM)-1 December 17, A Japanese Aegis BMD destroyer conducted an engagement of a medium-range simple-separating ballistic missile with an SM-3 Block 1A interceptor. JFTM-1 was the first live engagement mission for a Japanese BMD ship. FTM-14 June 5, An Aegis BMD cruiser conducted an engagement of a short-range ballistic missile target in the terminal phase of flight using a salvo of two modified SM-2 Block IV interceptors. FTM-14 was the first intercept test of the near-term sea-based terminal capability using an engineering load of Aegis BMD software. JFTM-02 November 19, A Japanese Aegis BMD destroyer engaged a medium-range simple-separating ballistic missile target with an SM-3 Block 1A interceptor. The SM-3 interceptor performed well during most of its fly out, but it failed to intercept the target. MDA is investigating this interceptor failure. The above four tests address various capabilities that are part of Blocks 2 and 5 of the BMDS. For Aegis BMD, Block 2 capability is a subset of Block 5 capability. FTM-13 completed the combined DT/OT phase of flight testing for the Aegis BMD 3.6 system. FTM-14 began a short phase of follow-on operational test and evaluation for the Aegis BMD system, which introduces the sea-based terminal capability and merges anti-submarine warfare functionality into the system load. Aegis BMD has not flight tested all pulse modes of the third-stage rocket motor and solid-fuel divert and attitude control system. The MDA should conduct an analysis using verified and validated modeling and simulation across its engagement envelope and threat set to determine the extent to which the second pulse of the SM-3 Block IA kinetic warhead divert system would be invoked. The MDA should use this analysis to determine what, if any, additional flight testing is required. The MDA should conduct an analysis of the third-stage rocket motor zero-pulse mode using verified and validated modeling and simulation to assess its capability since this mode would be difficult to safely demonstrate in a flight test. Also, the MDA should perform flight testing with externally cued engagements. To date, the only cued engagements have been simulated. Also, more tests of the sea-based terminal capability are needed to characterize the efficacy and suitability of that capability. In FY08/CY08, Aegis BMD also participated in two other live-target test events and training exercises related to Block 2 mission capabilities: 34

41 Flight Test THAAD-08 (FTT-08) October 27, As part of the THAAD firing mission, THAAD successfully sent a cue to Aegis BMD via a satellite link. In addition to testing THAAD-Aegis BMD interoperability, Aegis BMD performed a successful simulated engagement of the medium-range separating target used in the THAAD engagement mission. Flight Test Other-04 (FTX-04) June 13, An Aegis BMD cruiser tracked and performed simulated engagements against two in flight medium-range simple-separating targets simultaneously in a stressing scenario. In addition, an Aegis BMD ship sent a cue to THAAD, and an Aegis-THAAD track data exchange was successful. Pacific Blitz 2008 October 31, Two Aegis BMD destroyers each tracked and engaged non-separating short-range ballistic missile targets as part of a U.S. Navy training exercise. One of the two engagements resulted in a successful intercept. In FY/CY08, the MDA did not flight test Aegis BMD capabilities in development for Block 5. Currently, the MDA has scheduled the first developmental tracking exercise with Aegis BMD software for FY09, and the first intercept test with an SM-3 Block 1B interceptor for FY10. The MDA plans a simulated launch on AN/TPY-2 (TM) for FY09 during FTM-15, which does address some of the functionality for Block THAAD The THAAD program conducted two intercept flight tests in FY/CY08 and encountered a target failure during a third flight test: FTT-08 October 27, This test was an intercept of a threat-representative short-range non-separating target in the exoatmosphere. The interceptor was hot conditioned to simulate operations in a hot environment. FTT-08 was the third of three successful flight tests at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaii. FTT-09 June 25, THAAD intercepted a simple, spin-stabilized, non-reorienting separating target in the low endoatmosphere. FTT-09 was the first THAAD intercept of a separating target, and the first daytime launch. The interceptor and launcher also demonstrated their final software builds for the first time, and THAAD passed a cue to Aegis BMD. Aegis BMD used the cue to establish a track and perform a simulated SM-3 intercept. FTT-10 September 17, A target failure shortly after launch caused a test abort. The target never reached the designated safe intercept area, and no interceptors were fired. No backup target was allocated for this test. This was an original equipment item, and not a target developed by the MDA. The MDA has not determined the root cause of the target failure. FTT-10 was to demonstrate a number of first-time objectives, such as a salvo of two THAAD interceptors against a single separating target, cold conditioning one of the THAAD interceptors to simulate launch operations in a cold environment, and a cue from Aegis BMD to 35

42 THAAD as part of the live engagement. The MDA planned this test as a combined developmental and operational test, with minimal contractor involvement. Because of the significance of this flight test, and given that all the future flight tests already carry a considerable number of unique data collection objectives for model verification and validation, the MDA has rescheduled FTT-10 for FY09. The MDA re-baselined the THAAD flight test program in FY07 because of target availability and budget limitations. The re-baselined program did not allocate for re-testing or backup targets. The re-baselined schedule has enough margin to allow for an FTT-10 retest without disruption, but the budget impact may add risk to future events. In FY08, target affordability and availability drove a delay of the remaining four planned flight tests, FTT-11 through 14, by more than six months. Because of debris concerns associated with the longer range of the FTT-13 and -14 targets, the THAAD program plans to move flight testing to the Reagan Test Site in the Marshall Islands to conduct these tests. This may present further budget and schedule issues. In FY/CY08, in addition to the flight tests, government ground qualification testing, lethality sled testing, and interoperability testing also took place. The THAAD government ground test qualification program completed a 40-foot drop test of the missile component, and the fire control unit and radar began mobility testing at the Aberdeen Test Center, Maryland. Combined contractor/government electromagnetic environmental effects ground qualification testing also continued for the missile and launcher. Hardware integration issues on the radar Prime Power Unit may cause some schedule delays and conflicts between use of available assets in support of the government ground test program and equipment training for the fielding of the first two fire units. While alternate power sources are available for the radar for both flight and ground testing, the late delivery of this unit decreases operational realism in testing. The THAAD lethality program continued, with a high-speed sled test in December 2007 against a surrogate warhead of a new threat class. The program also continued development of a reduced-scale light gas gun THAAD-representative projectile in preparation for FY09 light gas gun development and data shots. The THAAD program is using the test data to assess the lethality of THAAD against a variety of targets and to support the development and validation of target models for lethality simulation tools. The MDA conducted the final two planned sled tests against different threat warheads in October and December Even after completion of these sled tests, additional testing of these warheads and hydrocode simulation analyses may be required to assess THAAD lethality against these targets and to develop and validate lethality models for new and emerging threats. In addition to the interoperability demonstrated in FTT-08 and FTX-04 referenced in above, THAAD interoperability testing also included two Aegis BMD flight tests JFTM-1 in December 2007 and FTM-14 in June Through Link 16, THAAD and Aegis BMD exercised two-way communication, track exchange, and correlation. THAAD acquired a target via a cue from Aegis during FTM-14. Lessons learned from these events support modifications to Link 16 interoperability and fire control software for all BMDS Link 16 participants. Additionally, Ground Test Other-03a (GTX-03a) in February 2008 and GTI-03 in 36

43 June 2008 used hardware-in-the-loop systems and simulations to test interoperability between THAAD, Aegis BMD, Patriot, GMD, C2BMC, and the BMDS sensors Operational Realism Assessment Table 3-3 provides the assessment of flight test operational realism for FY/CY08 flight tests in support of the intermediate-/medium-/short-range threat mission Blocks (region/theater) (Blocks 2 and 5) using the criteria in Table 3-1. Table 3-3 also identifies the Block(s), e.g., Block 2, supported by each flight test. Table 3-3. Operational Realism Assessment for FY/CY08 Flight Tests in Support of Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Region/Theater) MDA/DOT&E Operational Realism Criteria FY/CY08 Flight Tests FTT-08 FTM-13 FTM-14 FTT-09 Operational Interceptor P A A A Threat Representative Target A A A A Complex Countermeasures NT NT NT NT Operational Sensor P A A P Operational Fire Control Software P A P P Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures P A A A Warfighter Participation A A A A Unannounced Target Launch P A A A End-to-End Test A A A A Block(s) Supported 2, ,5 Key: A Achieved, P Partially Achieved, NT Not Tested In FY/CY08, both the Aegis BMD and THAAD flight test program exhibited increased operational realism. For Aegis BMD, trained fleet sailors conducted FTM-13 and FTM-14 using fielded interceptors and other system hardware. However, FTM-14 used an engineering load of Aegis BMD software, rather than a fully certified system load; Aegis BMD certification is scheduled to take place in early FY09. Countermeasure capabilities are not a part of the threat set for the Aegis BMD 3.6 system and were not included in the flight tests. In FY/CY08, the THAAD flight test program incorporated for the first time final configurations for the interceptor and launcher and improved the process of keeping knowledge of the launch time from the warfighters. The MDA improved the use of operational tactics, techniques, and procedures and added more communication links to the test architecture. If FTT-10 had succeeded, it would have further increased operational realism since it was planned 37

44 as a combined DT/OT test. The MDA plans to use the final configurations of the radar and fire control unit for FTT-11 in FY09 and for FTT-13 in FY10, respectively Modeling and Simulation VV&A Status Aegis BMD FTM-13 was the final flight test of the DT/OT phase of Aegis BMD 3.6 development, which addresses Block 2 midcourse defense. DT/OT flight testing was sufficient to demonstrate a broad range of system capabilities and allow the program office to perform a verification and validation assessment of the core Aegis BMD modeling and simulation suite in support of accreditation by the U.S. Navy Operational Test Agency (COMOPTEVFOR), for operational testing. COMOPTEVFOR accredited the modeling suite in FY08, and performed runs-for-therecord to support their evaluation of the Aegis BMD 3.6 system. The completion of DT/OT flight testing and the VV&A status of the Aegis BMD modeling and simulation suite supports Level 5 progress toward the Block 2 mission, as detailed in Section 2.0. The modeling and simulation suite for Aegis BMD 3.6.1, which includes the addition of sea-based terminal capability, has not yet undergone VV&A. The required models are relatively mature, but more flight testing is needed to allow for a full VV&A in support of an evaluation of Aegis BMD The MDA will need to modify the core Aegis BMD models and simulations to support the Block 5 Aegis BMD and SM-3 Block 1B interceptor. Necessary verification and validation data for those models will not be available until completion of flight testing for the new system that commences in FY THAAD The primary THAAD models and simulation all have VV&A plans in place, and verification and validation is ongoing as flight and ground testing progresses. The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command plans to conduct an independent accreditation of THAAD models and simulations before using the data in their Capability Assessment Report in support of the fielding decision for the first two THAAD fire units in FY10. THAAD participation in GTX-03a and GTI-03 in FY/CY08 used hardware-in-the-loop configurations with a combination of engineering and formal release software, linked through the hardware-in-the-loop Missile Defense System Exerciser. These data should help THAAD assess their software functionality and interoperability Target Development Status Aegis BMD Aegis BMD continues to leverage existing rocket technology to produce the inexpensive Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle-A (ARAV-A) for use in tracking and midcourse engagement missions requiring a short-range ballistic missile target. FTM-13 used two 38

45 ARAV-A targets. ARAV-A targets are significantly cheaper to produce than the Target Test Vehicles (TTVs) (constructed from a Minuteman I missile second stage) used in early intercept missions. For medium-range targets, Aegis BMD continues to use the Medium Range Target (MRT) for engagement missions. JFTM-1 used such a target. Aegis BMD initially procured MRTs under the Space and Missile Defense Command Consolidated Theater Targets Services (CTTS) contract (awarded in 1998). Medium Range Targets are now part of the MDA Targets Prime Contract (awarded in 2003). MRT costs have increased over time due largely to requirements changes and schedule slips. Unfortunately, no engagement-capable ARAV alternative for medium-range threats exists. The ARAV-B, which is a simple-separating variant, is not certified for engagements, but is certified for tracking. To address future missions with the Aegis BMD system, the MDA is developing an ARAV-C target for use in both tracking and engagement missions that require a more complex separating target. The ARAV-C should provide a less costly alternative to the MRT for a medium-range target. Currently, the MDA has scheduled the first tracking and engagement exercises using ARAV-C targets for FY09 and FY11, respectively. For the upcoming FTM-15 mission (currently scheduled for FY09), the MDA is developing a long-range target as part of its Flexible Target Family to test launch-on-remote functionality. Costs are projected to be $50 Million or higher for FTM-15. This is a substantial increase in cost over any previously tested target for an Aegis BMD mission THAAD As previously stated, the MDA re-baselined the THAAD flight test program in FY07 to account for increasing target costs and schedule delays. As part of the re-baseline, due to target availability, the MDA decided to use an original equipment manufacture target for the most recent flight test, FTT-10, which suffered a target failure. Since this was an original equipment item, and not a target developed by the MDA, the failure of this target is not necessarily indicative of issues within the MDA target development process. An original equipment target carries inherent risk, however, and there was no spare target allocated for this test. The MDA has allocated additional budget to conduct the FTT-10 retest (FTT-10a). Additionally, the MDA has accelerated another target to support execution of an alternate test with a backup target should the second original equipment manufacture target also fail. THAAD has four additional flight tests planned over the next three years. The three targets needed for the first two tests are on contract, and design and manufacture is underway. These consist of two distinct target types, the first of which FTT-09 used successfully. The target type for the final two flight tests is in the early stages of design and manufacture. Many aspects of this target type are unique and previously not used. The first of these new targets is under contract. The MDA has not yet contracted for the second of these new targets. The FY/CY08 progress on target development and procurement for the THAAD program was reasonable. With two distinct target types yet to be delivered, however, and much of the 39

46 work for the final target type yet to come, it is too soon to assess if target issues are resolved for THAAD Patriot As stated earlier, Patriot is not officially part of any of the existing Blocks, although its mission area overlaps with that for Blocks 2 and 5. The Patriot contribution to Block 2 capability is identical to its contribution to Block 5 capability Test Planning and Execution for FY/CY08 In FY/CY08, the Army conducted two major developmental Patriot flight tests resulting in one successful test and one no-test due to target failures. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force conducted a partially successful test of the PAC-3 missile and the Japanese Patriot ground system in September Counter Anti-Radiation Missile (CARM) Flight Tests December 10-13, During an anti-radiation missile-tracking test, Patriot detected and tracked a threat-representative anti-radiation missile target. The Patriot operator manually classified the target as an anti-radiation missile. The test revealed classification issues that were corrected after the test. These classification improvements were to have been validated in intercept flight tests against two anti-radiation missile targets, but both targets failed shortly after launch. Flight Test 7-1A May 21, During the first successful flight test of the Missile Segment Enhancement missile, Patriot fired a control test missile at a simulated aircraft target. The test collected all required data and met all objectives. The interceptor flight events were generally in good agreement with preflight predictions. Japan 08 September 17, The first PAC-3 missile launched during the Japan 2008 PAC-3 missile flight test intercepted and killed the ballistic missile target. The second PAC-3 missile acquired the target prior to the first missile intercepting it, but then suffered a seeker anomaly and dropped track on the target. The seeker anomaly is under investigation Operational Realism Assessment Table 3-4 provides the assessment of flight test operational realism for Patriot using the criteria in Table 3-1. Patriot had limited operational realism in FY/CY08 because of the anti-radiation missile target failures and the developmental test nature of the other Patriot flight test. 40

47 Table 3-4. Operational Realism Assessment for FY/CY08 Patriot Flight Tests MDA/DOT&E Operational Realism Criteria FY/CY08 Flight Tests CARM 7-1A Operational Interceptor NT 1 P Threat-Representative Target NT 1 NT 2 Complex Countermeasures NT NT Operational Sensor A NT Operational Fire Control Software A P Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures A NT Warfighter Participation A NT Unannounced Target Launch NT NT End-to-End Test NT 1 NT 2 Block(s) Supported 3 2, 5 2, 5 Key: A Achieved, P Partially Achieved, NT Not Tested Notes: 1 Anti-radiation missile targets failed shortly after launch. 2 No target. 3 Patriot is not part of the existing MDA Blocks. The Patriot mission area overlaps Blocks 2 and Modeling and Simulation VV&A Status The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command accredited the PDB-6 versions of the primary Patriot models and simulations in FY06 and FY07. The Army has yet to accredit the PDB-6.5 version of the primary Patriot models and simulations, and the program office has yet to release VV&A plans for most of them Target Development Status The Patriot program suffered two anti-radiation missile target failures in FY/CY07. The program is investigating alternative sources for anti-radiation missile targets. The Patriot Test and Evaluation Master Plan requires at least one intercept test against an anti-radiation missile target. 41

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49 Section 4.0 CHARACTERIZATION OF BMDS CAPABILITY As stated in Section 2.0, data from the test program is not sufficient to objectively assess the capability of the BMDS; only a subjective assessment is possible. This section, together with the classified Appendix A, characterizes the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS, and its elements that have been fielded or tested before the end of FY/CY08 in terms of the Blocks defined in Section 1.0. This section also characterizes the performance of Patriot, which is not part of the BMDS five-block structure but can contribute to the theater missions of Blocks 2 and CHARACTERIZATION METHODOLOGY DOT&E identified a set of critical operational issues (COIs), initially reported in the FY07 DOT&E BMDS report to Congress, to characterize the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS. The key COIs are: 1. Effectiveness: Is the BMDS operationally effective against strategic/theater threat ballistic missiles? a. Detect and Track: Can the BMDS detect the threat and, given detect, track the threat? b. Classify and Discriminate: Can the BMDS perform threat classification (threat or non-threat) and discriminate the lethal threat object from decoys, countermeasures, and other objects, given track? c. Engage and Intercept: Can the BMDS engage and intercept the threat with a missile, given track and threat classification? d. Lethality: Can the BMDS kill the strategic threat under the expected intercept conditions, given intercept? e. Battle Management: Does the BMDS successfully manage information between sensors and elements to contribute to strategic and theater mission success? f. Kill Assessment: Can the BMDS accurately determine if the system successfully negated the threat object? 2. Suitability: Is the BMDS suitable for global (strategic and theater) missile defense operations? a. Interoperability: Are the BMDS elements, sensors, and components interoperable with each other? b. Reliability: Are the BMDS elements, sensors, and components sufficiently reliable to provide a credible defense? c. Availability: Are the BMDS elements, sensors, and components sufficiently available for operations to provide a credible defense? 43

50 d. Maintainability: Are the BMDS elements, sensors, and components sufficiently maintainable so that the system downtime is short enough to maintain a credible 24/7 defensive posture? 3. Survivability: Is the BMDS survivable against enemy attack or in its intended operating environment? a. Conventional Attack: Is the BMDS survivable against or vulnerable to conventional enemy attack? b. Intended Operating Environment: Are the BMDS elements, sensors, and components survivable in their intended operating environments? These COIs are used in classified Appendix A to characterize the current performance of each of the BMDS Blocks. The characterization adopts categories of Good, Fair, Limited, and Not Characterized (see the appendix for the category definitions). Using these categories, the appendix provides the classified characterization of the COIs for Blocks 1 through 5, as well as for Patriot. For Patriot, however, the characterization categories of Requirements Met, Requirements Partially Met, and Requirements Not Met are used, since tests results can be directly compared to the requirements found in the Army Patriot Operational Requirements Document. Data sources considered in the characterization include flight tests, ground tests, war games/capability demonstrations, models and simulations, and actual operational use of the Block elements and components. The following section provides an unclassified summary of the characterization of Block performance with specific unclassified examples of demonstrated capabilities. 4.2 BLOCK PERFORMANCE CHARACTERIZATION Long-/Intermediate-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Strategic) Blocks 1 and 3 are comprised of GMD, C2BMC, and the BMDS sensors. C2BMC contributes to the battle management COI, and is characterized in the appendix with respect to its contribution to this COI. Block 4 has no fielded or tested assets, and its operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability are not characterized in this report GMD GMD for Blocks 1 and 3 consists of fire control components located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and Fort Greely, Alaska, and ground-based interceptors emplaced in silos located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg AFB, California. The currently fielded BMDS sensor components include the Cobra Dane radar in Shemya, Alaska; the AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar in Shariki, Japan; UEWRs at Beale Air Force Base, California, and Fylingdales, United Kingdom (Block 3); and the AN/SPY-1 long-range surveillance and track radar installed in Aegis BMD-equipped ships deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific regions. The effectiveness characterization is based primarily on two Block-level ground tests, one digital simulation test, and a sensor characterization flight test. DOT&E considered some 44

51 data from the December 2008 intercept flight test in this analysis; however, the MDA is still completing the analysis of the data from that test. The MDA ran each of the ground tests over several days with multiple simulated threat scenarios against a Block representation (either hardware-in-the-loop or selected fielded assets). Warfighters controlled the Block representations in a portion of these tests. The MDA also ran the digital simulation test over several days with multiple simulated threat scenarios against a fully digital Block representation. The sensor characterization and intercept flight tests both exercised selected GMD assets, C2BMC, and four BMDS sensors against a long-range ballistic missile target. The suitability characterization is based on data collected on the current, fielded system. Suitability data collection improved in FY/CY08. Although improved, data collection was not comprehensive and fell short of supporting an authoritative, end-to-end suitability assessment. The GMD program collected specific suitability data and established a reliability, availability, and maintainability database system that it began populating. The MDA and the warfighters gathered and published Block level suitability data for Blocks 1 and 3 on a daily basis. The survivability characterization is based primarily on analysis. The MDA develops tests to simulate key aspects of the threat and subjects the systems to those simulated environments. It uses analyses, anchored-by test data, to satisfy the survivability requirements Effectiveness Block 1 has a limited capability to defend against simple, long-range ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea toward the United States. Block 1 has demonstrated the capability of the BMDS sensors to detect and track threats and to transmit track data to GMD, although it has not demonstrated sensor performance throughout the expected range of adverse natural environments. Detection and tracking of threats targeting specific regions of the United States are less robust since they are dependent on the performance of a single sensor. Block 1 has demonstrated a capability to discriminate and classify threats, but the current capability precludes employment of optimum warfighter engagement tactics. See Appendix A for additional information. For a limited set of conditions such as closing velocity, crossing angle, solar illumination, and threat object spacing and dynamics, Block 1 demonstrated engagement and intercept in prior year intercept flight tests. Block 1 has not demonstrated interceptor performance in a salvo defense (multiple interceptors against a single target) or in a multiple simultaneous engagement (multiple interceptors against multiple targets) in a flight test. Block 1 has demonstrated these capabilities in ground tests. The MDA has only demonstrated lethality against a single target type. Block 1 has demonstrated the battle management capability of GMD and C2BMC. Some specific limitations are noted in the appendix. Block 3 has a similar capability to defend against simple, long-range ballistic missile threats launched from Iran toward the United States, though the MDA has not demonstrated this in a Block 3 specific flight test. Block 3 detection and tracking capability is similar to Block 1 except that specific regions of the United States are not fully covered. Some additional specific limitations are noted in the appendix. 45

52 Suitability Blocks 1 and 3 are partially suitable for their missions based on a very limited database. More data are required to perform a comprehensive characterization of the suitability of the Blocks. Fielded interceptors include limited lifetime parts and older hardware versions that potentially reduce interceptor suitability and, possibly, effectiveness. The MDA initiated a refurbishment program and has refurbished some interceptors. Selected refurbishment efforts require interceptors to be shipped to California and/or Alabama. The MDA has yet to station SBX at its home port of Adak, Alaska, leaving the suitability of the SBX to be operated and maintained in that environment unknown. However, the MDA has stationed the SBX in challenging sea conditions and has implemented several upgrades to address operational suitability. Specific additional suitability shortfalls are identified in the appendix Survivability Blocks 1 and 3 are partially survivable for their missions. More data are required to perform a comprehensive characterization of the survivability of the Blocks. Specific assets are lightly protected from a physical attack. Specific assets are unhardened to nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. The MDA has initiated efforts to address some of these limitations. Specific additional survivability shortfalls are called out in the appendix. The MDA has performed sufficient information assurance testing at the developmental level for the system to be granted an authority to operate. The MDA is beginning to conduct important penetration and exploitation testing. This testing is necessary to characterize the information assurance survivability of the system with confidence Intermediate-/Medium-/Short-Range Threat Mission Blocks (Region/Theater) Blocks 2 and 5 are each comprised of the Aegis BMD, THAAD, and C2BMC elements. Of these, the MDA has fielded Aegis BMD and C2BMC, while THAAD is still in its development phase with a potential emergency employment capability only. C2BMC contributes to the battle management COI for effectiveness. Its contribution to this COI is characterized in the appendix. For THAAD, the characterization of Block 5 is identical to that for Block 2, since the THAAD Block 5 contribution currently consists primarily of fielding additional THAAD fire units. However, the MDA is planning to incorporate software modifications to the THAAD fire control planner to provide for and test capability against intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well as a capability to launch off a forwarded track with remote THAAD launchers. Aegis BMD, however, must develop new capabilities to engage intermediate-range threats. This will require a new enhanced interceptor (SM-3 Block 1B) and updated fire control software which are under development Aegis BMD The Aegis BMD Block 2 configuration consists of U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers equipped with software build 3.6 (the Navy-certified version for midcourse defense; BMD

53 includes sea-based terminal defense), SM-3 Block 1A interceptors for midcourse defense, and modified SM-2 Block IV interceptors for terminal phase defense. The capabilities of the Aegis BMD 3.6 system that apply to Block 2 include organic and cued engagements against nonseparating short-range and simple-separating medium-range ballistic missiles, and anti-air warfare and multi-mission functionality. The characterization of Aegis BMD Block 2 capabilities is based primarily on six Aegis BMD flight test events that constituted the combined DT/OT phase and the COMOPTEVFOR operational assessment. DT/OT also included a maintenance demonstration to provide further data on reliability, maintainability, and availability. The Navy demonstrated near-term sea-based terminal engagement capability during follow-on operational test and evaluation for the system. As appropriate, results from the seven flight tests conducted before the combined DT/OT are also considered in the characterization. The Block 5 configuration of Aegis BMD will consist of software build and both SM-3 Block 1A and Block 1B interceptors. SM-3 Block 1B interceptors are designed to add capability to engage intermediate-range threats. Greater emphasis on inter-element interoperability is also a focus in Block 5. The MDA has not yet conducted flight tests with the Block 5 suite of Aegis BMD operational components Effectiveness Block 2 Aegis BMD has demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and engage simple short- and medium-range ballistic missile targets for a range of mission scenarios. In these test missions with the Aegis BMD 3.6 system, Aegis BMD intercepted eight out of 10 short-range non-separating ballistic missiles (two of which were engaged simultaneously), three out of three medium-range simple separating ballistic missiles, and one out of one medium-range ballistic missiles presenting complex target dynamics. COMOPTEVFOR determined Aegis BMD to be operationally effective during its operational assessment. For the first of the two failed intercept attempts, a kinetic warhead divert valve malfunctioned. Following this failure, the program replaced the old divert valve with one incorporating a new design. The MDA attributed the failure during the second failed flight test to incorrect fire control input parameters set by the operators. The Navy implemented subsequent training and software changes intended to prevent this from occurring in the future. Aegis BMD has not flight tested all pulse modes of the third-stage rocket motor and solid-fuel divert and attitude control system. The MDA should conduct an analysis using verified and validated modeling and simulation across its engagement envelope and threat set to determine the extent to which the second pulse of the SM-3 Block IA kinetic warhead divert system would be invoked. The MDA should use this analysis to determine what, if any, additional flight testing is required. The MDA should conduct an analysis of the third-stage rocket motor zero-pulse mode using verified and validated modeling and simulation to assess its capability since this mode would be difficult to safely demonstrate in a flight test due to the requirement to fly the target nearly directly over the SM-3 launching ship endangering both the 47

54 ship and its crew. Also, the MDA should perform flight testing with externally cued engagements. To date, the only cued engagements have been simulated. Flight testing of the system demonstrated the capability to engage a short-range ballistic missile target in the terminal phase of flight with a modified SM-2 Block IV interceptor. More flight testing of the sea-based terminal capability is needed, however, to characterize Aegis BMD effectiveness with higher confidence. Aegis BMD capabilities that address Block 5 are still in development, so a thorough characterization of effectiveness cannot be made. However, the SM-3 Block 1A interceptor, which will migrate to the system, has performed well in flight testing of the 3.6 system Suitability Analyses of data obtained during DT/OT flight missions and the maintenance demonstration suggest that the Aegis BMD 3.6 system is sufficiently suitable to meet operational availability specifications. The MDA observed numerous software critical failures during testing, especially in relation to command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems, but the system still meets warfighter availability needs. COMOPTEVFOR determined Aegis BMD to be operationally suitable during its operational assessment. The Aegis BMD program continues to assess its interoperability with and in support of the BMDS. Block 2 interoperability has shown improvement and is maturing, though the system has encountered problems that the MDA must address. Implementation of quantitative standards (such as MIL-STD-6016) has been uneven and ill-defined at the element level, which has led to unintended consequences in regard to interoperability discussed in Appendix A. Waterfront integration testing during the lead-up to test events has introduced concerns whether U.S. Navy Aegis BMD crew manning and fleet material condition are adequate to support the Aegis BMD mission. Thus far, the MDA executed test events as planned, but expended significant resources (training time, preventative and corrective maintenance, etc.) prior to the flight test missions to ensure overall test readiness. It is unclear at present whether that level of support will be available during normal operations once the system transitions to the Navy. Pacific Blitz 2008, conducted by Commander Third Fleet, did much to dispel these concerns. In this Fleet Exercise, two Aegis BMD-configured destroyers successfully detected, tracked, and engaged two short-range ballistic missile targets with minimum workups, system grooming, and a priori knowledge of the events. The SM-3 Block 1 missiles used were at the end of their 4-year service life. The fact that one missile malfunctioned during operations does not detract from the fact that operational Navy ships and crews successfully exercised their BMD mission responsibilities. The Aegis BMD system intended for Block 5 is in development, so no statements are possible in regard to overall operational suitability of that system. However, the SM-3 Block 1A interceptor, which is part of the Block 5 configuration, has proven to be suitable. 48

55 Survivability Although not stressing, multi-warfare exercises during DT/OT demonstrated a capability to perform simultaneous anti-air warfare ship self-defense and BMD functionality. The exercises also demonstrated multi-mission functionality with a simulated Tomahawk strike. Testing to date occurred during available weather conditions and did not stress the system in regard to extreme weather conditions (rain, sea states, etc.). However, the fundamental capability during extreme weather conditions is similar to the capability of the parent ship although there may be limitations due to sleet, snow, or freezing rain. Also, the MDA did not conduct tests to determine the effects of nuclear, biological, or chemical environments on the system, nor was realistic testing conducted in a Global Positioning System-denied environment. The MDA has performed sufficient information assurance testing at the developmental level for the system to be granted an authority to operate. The MDA is beginning to conduct important penetration and exploitation testing. This testing is necessary to characterize the information assurance survivability of the system with confidence. Block 5 capability is in development. As a result, a characterization of Aegis BMD Block 5 survivability cannot be made THAAD The THAAD Block 2 configuration consists of two THAAD fire units. Each fire unit is comprised of 24 interceptors, three mobile launchers capable of holding eight interceptors each, a radar, a fire control unit, and battery support equipment. The MDA will field the first fire unit by the end of FY10 and the second fire unit by the end of FY11. In the interim, the MDA has declared a THAAD Minimum Engagement Package available for emergency activation if requested by the warfighter. Fielding of the first fire unit in FY10 will support MDA s Partial Capability Delivery status for THAAD. THAAD cannot contribute to Block 2 defensive missions until that time. DOT&E used the five intercept flight tests to date against threat-representative targets to characterize THAAD capability. Where applicable, data from other tests, such as ground qualification testing and track exchange exercises with Aegis BMD, are also considered in this assessment Effectiveness Currently, THAAD has demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and engage short-range non-separating and simple-separating targets. In five flight tests, THAAD intercepted four out of four short-range non-separating ballistic missiles, and one out of one simple-separating ballistic missile. THAAD has demonstrated a capability to intercept threat missiles both inside and outside the atmosphere, the only BMDS element specifically designed with this capability. Although THAAD has demonstrated an engagement capability, tests to date have not used the final THAAD Blocks 2 and 5 configuration. In particular, the MDA has yet to 49

56 implement the advanced radar algorithms required for full discrimination. The MDA intends to flight test this capability in FY09. Additionally, the MDA plans to implement another THAAD fire control unit software update in the final configuration. A full characterization of effectiveness will require flight tests using the final Block radar and fire control unit builds. Such tests should also include more complex and longer-range targets Suitability The THAAD program collects data on key suitability COIs such as reliability, availability, and maintainability as part of the ground qualification test program. This test program began last year and is scheduled to continue through FY12. Mobility and safety testing are ongoing, but the bulk of the program has not yet occurred. Soldiers began new equipment training in FY08; however, the majority of training exercises are scheduled in the future. As a result, a characterization of suitability is not yet possible. The THAAD program continues to assess its interoperability with and in support of the BMDS. The program has addressed, to some degree, early shortfalls in the quality and formatting of target track data. Additional testing, involving all BMDS Link 16 participants, is needed to ensure effective information is passed between them Survivability Electromagnetic environmental effects testing began for THAAD in FY07 and will continue for all of the components through FY10. The missile component is performing a series of nuclear survivability tests at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, although the bulk of nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination survivability for the other components will depend upon the analysis by the Western Desert Test Center, Utah. Since most of this testing is ongoing or planned for the future, a characterization of survivability is not yet possible. The MDA has performed sufficient information assurance testing at the developmental level for the system to be granted an interim authority to operate Patriot The Patriot configuration characterized in this report uses PDB-6 system software, which the Army developed in part to correct deficiencies found during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The characterization is based primarily on Patriot performance against tactical ballistic missiles during the PDB-6 Limited User Test, conducted between August 2006 and February The PDB-6 Limited User Test was the first major operational test for the Patriot air and missile defense system since Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in The Patriot Block 2 characterization is identical to the Patriot Block 5 characterization Effectiveness Patriot met the Operational Requirements Document system effectiveness and defended area Key Performance Parameter requirements against some tactical ballistic missiles, but failed to meet the requirements against others (see the appendix for the specific number and type of 50

57 missiles). Patriot did not meet the Operational Requirements Document emplacement and march order time requirements. Patriot demonstrated the capability to exchange data with other air and missile defense systems during PDB-6 Limited User Testing. There were problems in setting up and maintaining some Patriot communications equipment (see the appendix for classified details). Patriot encountered problems in establishing an information exchange with Aegis anti-air warfare ships, including excessive message rates and misleading target designations and track displays from Aegis Suitability Patriot met its operational requirements for availability, reliability, and maintainability. The U.S. Army did not test Patriot supportability and transportability during the PDB-6 Limited User Test. These issues were satisfied through testing prior to the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in Patriot met some of its manpower, personnel, and means of employment requirements. However, PDB-6 software increases operator workload and requires additional manpower. The level of expertise required for Patriot PDB-6 operations exceeds the current Army training standard Survivability Patriot lethality information is not available against anti-radiation missiles, so it is not possible to characterize Patriot survivability against these threats. The Army did not adequately test counter-reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; electronic countermeasure environments; and ballistic threats during the PDB-6 Limited User Test. Therefore, DOT&E cannot characterize Patriot survivability against these areas. Patriot information assurance infrastructure and management require improvement. The Patriot system does not meet all its electromagnetic environments and nuclear, biological, and chemical environments requirements. 51

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59 Section 5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The MDA continues to make progress acquiring, testing, and fielding the elements of the BMDS. The breadth of the BMDS mission and the overall maturity of the BMDS are such that a single assessment of the BMDS progress toward achieving its mission capabilities is not feasible at this time. This report assesses three major areas: (1) progress with respect to the baselines and goals in each of the mission area Blocks; (2) the adequacy of the FY/CY08 BMDS test program in terms of the Blocks; and (3) the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS and its elements that have been fielded or tested before the end of FY/CY08 in terms of the Blocks. The MDA s progress with respect to the baselines and goals reflects the varying maturities of the weapons, sensors, and C2BMC that comprise the five Blocks of the BMDS. Block 2, which focuses on defense against short- to medium-range threats in a single region/theater, is the most mature of the five Blocks that comprise the BMDS. It is making steady progress toward achieving the Block 2 baseline. Block 1, which focuses on defense from North Korean long-range threats, is less mature than Block 2, and is making slower progress toward its baseline objectives. Blocks 3-5 provide capabilities planned for inclusion in the future BMDS and are therefore significantly less mature than Blocks 1 and 2. Test program data are not yet sufficient to verify, validate, and accredit BMDS models and simulations to objectively assess the capability of the BMDS. Therefore, only a subjective assessment is possible. This limitation is particularly evident in GMD testing as all intercepts have occurred within a small portion of the threat battlespace and under nearly the same intercept conditions. Although the MDA has plans to test over a wider range of intercept conditions and threat battlespace, until this is accomplished, there will be insufficient data to accredit the models and simulations needed to assess GMD operational effectiveness. GMD has demonstrated a limited capability to defend against simple, long-range ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea toward the United States (Block 1). Aegis BMD has demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and engage simple short- and medium-range ballistic missile targets for a range of mission scenarios (Block 2). THAAD has demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and engage short-range non-separating and simple-separating targets (Block 2). Patriot has met most operational requirements for effectiveness, suitability, and survivability, and is operationally deployed worldwide (Block 2). C2BMC has demonstrated the capability to provide situational awareness to warfighters worldwide and to control the AN/TPY-2 radar in its forward-based mode (Block 1). 53

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61 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 2008 Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Classified Appendix A Provided Under Separate Cover 55

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