Balancing Operational Factors vs. the Objective: Identification of Critical Factors and Centers of Gravity:

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1 Guadalcanal and adjacent positions; and obtaining control of the sea around Guadalcanal and the adjacent sea area. For each of these objectives there were several minor objectives. For the amphibious forces, minor tactical objectives included the capture of Tulagi and Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands. In the UN landing at Inchon (Operation CHROMITE) on 15 September 1950, the major tactical objectives were to capture the port of Inchon, seize Kimpo airfield (some 16 miles from the beachhead), cross the Han River, and then advance to the South Korean capital of Seoul. 10 Each of these objectives required the accomplishment of several minor tactical objectives. Balancing Operational Factors vs. the Objective: In determining a strategic or operational objective, one should carefully weigh and fully take into account the effect of operational factors. Any serious disconnect between the ultimate or intermediate objective and the corresponding space-time-force factors will endanger the success of the campaign or major operation itself. If the imbalance cannot be resolved, then one s objective should be changed or scaled down and brought into harmony with the operational factors. The most complex circumstance is balancing operational factors versus operational or strategic objectives in land warfare. The problem is usually less severe in the air and maritime environments. In their final plan to invade Soviet Russia in June 1941, the Germans did not properly determine the ultimate strategic and initial operational objectives. This was one of the major reasons for the ultimate failure of the entire campaign. The initial German operational objectives focused on destroying the mass of the Soviet forces deployed in western Russia. The planners envisaged employing strong, fast forces to quickly penetrate into the depth of the Soviet front north and south of the Pripyat Marshes and then destroy the thus-divided enemy groups. Army Group North was tasked to destroy Soviet forces in the Baltic, seizing the Baltic ports plus Leningrad and Kronstadt. Support of the panzer forces of Army Group Center would be decided by the army s general staff. Army Group Center s initial operational objective was to destroy enemy forces in White Russia and then reach the Smolensk area and create favorable conditions for cooperation with Army Group North in the Baltic. The army s general staff would decide whether to attack Moscow without diverting forces northward. Army Group South would advance toward Kiev, destroy Soviet forces in the western Ukraine and Galicia, and seize the Dnieper s crossings south of Kiev. 11 Also, in planning their great offensive in southern Russia in the summer 1942 to reach the Volga River Caucasus line, the Germans had a serious mismatch between the factors of forces and space because of the steadily reduced combat strength on the ground. 12 In preparing to invade mainland Italy in the summer of 1943, the Allied commanders and their planners were well aware of the potential impact the factors of space and force might have on mounting major operations to seize Sardinia, Corsica, and southern France. They were also fully cognizant of the difficulties of accomplishing vital objectives in launching a campaign in the Balkans. However, they apparently underestimated the factors of time and force in conducting a campaign in Italy, where the shape of the country; the rugged terrain, combined with climate and weather; and the skillful defense of the Germans resulted in a slow and costly advance along the entire length of the peninsula. This was in spite of the overwhelming superiority the Allies had in the air and at sea. Identification of Critical Factors and Centers of Gravity: The concept of a center of gravity is, along with the determination of the ultimate and intermediate objectives, the most critical part of any military planning process. After determining the ultimate strategic or operational objective, the operational commander and his planners should determine a corresponding enemy and also friendly center of gravity. Whenever the objective is modified or changed, all the critical factors should be reevaluated, and then a new center of gravity should be determined. Determination of the enemy s center of gravity is a critical element in establishing clarity of purpose, focusing effort, and, ultimately, generating synergistic effects in the employment of one s sources of military and nonmilitary power. A plan for a campaign or major operation should be clearly focused on destroying or neutralizing the enemy s center of gravity while IX-90

2 adequately protecting one s own; otherwise, the ultimate operational or strategic objectives will require far more time and resources than available or the entire expedition may even end in failure. Therefore, a great deal of thinking and discussion should take place before the operational commander and his staff can determine proper centers of gravity with any degree of confidence. The process of determining an enemy or friendly center of gravity starts with a real or assumed objective to be accomplished. Directly related to the objective is a corresponding situation (tactical, operational, or strategic) (see Figure 16). The larger the scale of the objective, the larger the space in which friendly and enemy forces will be employed. Also, the larger the factor of space, the more complex the situation is. Based on the analysis of the military situation, a list of enemy and friendly critical strengths and critical weaknesses should be compiled. In the next step of the process, only those critical strengths that can prevent the accomplishment of the enemy s objective and the friendly objective should be listed. Those elements of a given critical strength that serve as integrators, protectors, and supporters/sustainers should not be considered the potential strategic center of gravity. Likewise, the military critical strengths related to the factor of space, such as theater geometry, and the elements of the outer core of the enemy and friendly combat potential/power that cannot endanger the respective centers of gravity should not be considered potential centers of gravity. The list of critical strengths that are not considered candidates for center of gravity should be retained for further analysis aimed at determining methods of indirectly attacking the enemy s or protecting the friendly center of gravity. Finally, a determination should be made concerning which among the critical strengths retained for further analysis are the most essential for the accomplishment of one s real or assumed objective in terms of the factors of space and time. Before final determination of the enemy s center of gravity as the focus of planning, tests for validity should be conducted. The first question to ask is whether destroying, neutralizing, or substantially weakening or degrading the enemy s selected center of gravity would create a ripple FIGURE 16: PROCESS OF DETERMINING CENTER OF GRAVITY 1 THE OBJECTIVE TACTICAL OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC 2 MILITARY SITUATION TACTICAL OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC 3 ANALYZE RESPECTIVE MILITARY SITUATION IN TERMS OF THE FACTORS OF SPACE AND FORCE 4 TO ATTACK DERIVE A LIST OF FACTORS COMMANDER S QUESTIONS ON CENTER OF GRAVITY WOULD ITS SERIOUS DEGRADATION, NEUTRALIZATION, OR DESTRUCTION LEAD TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MY ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE? CAN IT PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY ENDANGER MY FORCES FROM ACCOMPLISHING THEIR ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE? CAN IT PREVENT OR SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE MY FORCES CONSOLIDATING THEIR OPERATIONAL OR STRATEGIC SUCCESS? ENEMY CENTER OF GRAVITY 5 LIST SEPARATELY FOR AND ENEMY SIDE THOSE STRENGTHS THAT IN SOME WAY CAN PREVENT THE ENEMY OR SIDE FROM ACCOMPLISHING ITS ASSIGNED OR ASSUMED OBJECTIVE 7 8 MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE MOST STRENGTH FOR ACCOMPLISHING ASSIGNED (OR ASSUMED) OBJECTIVE FOR THE ENEMY AND SIDE STRENGTHS CENTER OF GRAVITY ENEMY WEAKNESSES TO PROTECT 6 LIST POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES ENEMY ELIMINATE FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION STRENGTHS THAT LACK ATTRIBUTES OF FIRE POWER/MOBILITY OR SOURCE OF AUTHORITY/WILL TO FIGHT/ LEVERAGE GEOGRAPHY/LOCATION THEATER GEOMETRY COMMAND STRUCTURE INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICS PROTECTION OTHER IX-91

3 or cascading effect resulting in the progressive deterioration of the enemy s morale, cohesion, and will to fight and thereby prevent the enemy from accomplishing his objectives. The second question is whether one s forces are adequate to destroy or neutralize the enemy s center of gravity, given existing military and nonmilitary limitations on the employment of one s forces. The answers to both questions should be affirmative; otherwise, previously identified critical factors should be reassessed and a different strategic and subordinate operational center of gravity determined. 13 Another question to be asked is which of the enemy s critical strengths will considerably hinder or even prevent one s side from consolidating its strategic or operational success. The same questions, but from the enemy s operational commander s view, should be asked once the friendly center of gravity is determined. Identifying the enemy s strategic or operational center of gravity is often a difficult task indeed, largely because a number of unquantifiable or hard-to-measure elements are involved. For instance, as a strategic center of gravity, the enemy s will to fight is too broad and imprecise, while the leader s or the ruling elite s will to fight is somewhat more specific. A perennial problem is a strong tendency to mirror-image the enemy. Another pitfall is of being misled by one s ethnocentric views in assessing other cultures and societies. One should never assume that the enemy thinks and acts as one does. What might be a critical strength for friendly forces might be less so, or not important at all, for the enemy. 14 In identifying the enemy s center of gravity, one should take the enemy s perceptions of reality as fully into account as his value system. This means that what might influence the enemy to abandon or change his assumed objective should be fully understood. The consequences of determining a wrong center of gravity at the strategic level are often severe and are often fatal to one s entire war effort. Also, failure, for any reason, to determine a proper center of gravity in a major operation not only can lead to setbacks but also can be fatal to the operation s outcome. For example, Napoleon I in his invasion of Spain in February 1808 quickly defeated three Spanish armies totaling some 100,000 men, entered Madrid, and made plans for subjugating the country. However, he made a grievous error by ignoring the much smaller but more capable 30,000-man British forces under Sir John Moore, then concentrating on the middle Douro River. Subsequently this force came very close to cutting off the French lines of communications in Spain. Hence, Moore s army was actually the greater threat to the French forces in Spain or the operational center of gravity, in modern terms. 15 In planning the German reoccupation of the Kerch peninsula in the Crimea between 8 and 15 May 1942 (Operation TRAPPENJAGD [BUSTARD HUNT]), General (later Field Marshal) Manstein identified the enemy forces defending the Kerch peninsula, rather than the Soviet Coastal Army (composed of eight divisions) and the defense of Sevastopol, as the greatest threat to his forces. The front line on the Kerch peninsula (stalemated along the Parpach Isthmus after 11 April 1942) was defended by the Soviet Crimean Front, composed of three Soviet armies (the 44th, the 47th, and the 51st) with 18 divisions and eight other combat formations, mostly brigade or regiment size. The Soviet forces could be quickly reinforced from the Caucasus area across the Kerch peninsula. If these forces were destroyed, then the fate of the Soviet garrison at Sevastopol would be sealed. Manstein determined the Soviet 41st and 47th armies, specifically, to be what in modern terms is called the enemy s operational center of gravity. About two-thirds of the divisions of the Crimean Front were in these two armies. These two armies were deployed inside a salient along the narrow Parpach Isthmus, which extended westward well beyond the southern portion of the Parpach line held by the 44th Army. The geography made it impossible for the Soviet commander to simultaneously employ the bulk of his forces. Hence, Manstein decided that to secure his operational objective, these two armies must be destroyed first. 16 His opponent, Lieutenant General D. T. Kozlov, in contrast, never recovered from selecting the wrong operational center of gravity the XXXII and VII Romanian Corps. An operational or strategic objective can sometimes be accomplished without destroying or neutralizing the enemy s center of gravity, provided that one s forces are greatly superior in combat power to those of the opponent. However, almost invariably, one s failure to defeat the enemy s center of gravity significantly complicates or even precludes consolidation of the strategic or operational success. For example, in the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 IX-92

4 (Operation HUSKY), the British Eighth Army and the U.S. Seventh Army landed at two different sectors at the southeastern part of the island. Their initial objectives after landing were to seize certain airfields and the ports of Syracuse and Licate, and then to capture the ports of Augusta and Catania and the airfield complex at Gerbini. 17 Afterward the real objective for both armies should have been the destruction of the Axis ground forces on Sicily, and the German panzer and mechanized forces in particular not the capture of additional ports and airfields. The failure to focus on the destruction of the enemy operational center of gravity (the German panzer and mechanized forces) in Sicily after their landing on 10 July 1943 did not prevent the Allies from accomplishing their ultimate operational objective capturing Sicily and obtaining sea and air superiority in the central Mediterranean. However, between 1 and 17 August the Germans evacuated to Italy s mainland (Operation LEHRGANG) about 40,000 of their battle-hardened troops (including the Hermann Goering Division, 15th and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, and 1st Parachute Division), 51 tanks, 163 guns, 1,875 tons of ammunition, 9,800 vehicles, and 16,800 tons of equipment across the Strait of Messina. 18 These forces later faced the Allies in their landing at Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE) in September In addition, the Italians evacuated 70,000 to 75,000 of their troops, 100 guns, and 500 vehicles from the island. 19 The Allied failure to destroy the enemy operational center of gravity resulted in the need for 38 days of hard fighting to secure Sicily, followed by the stiff German resistance during the Allied advance on Italy s mainland. In general, the more capable the enemy force, the harder it is to identify the enemy s operational center of gravity. The problem is more manageable if the enemy possesses smaller and less sophisticated forces, or if one part of his forces is much better equipped and trained than the others are, as was the case in the Gulf War of when the seven Iraqi Republican Guards (IRG) represented the most important operational center of gravity for the U.S. and coalition planners. By mid-january 1991, the Iraqis had deployed 42 to 43 divisions of about 336,000 poorly trained men in what the United States declared the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). In addition, seven highly mobile, much better trained, and well-equipped IRG divisions, kept as operational reserve, were deployed in the Shaibah area. 20 In the Kosovo conflict of 1999 (Operation ALLIED FORCE), the NATO planners correctly identified Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, his inner circle and armed forces, and Serbia s military-economic potential as a whole as a strategic center of gravity. They also properly chose the Yugoslav fighter aircraft and associated air defenses as the operational center of gravity for accomplishing the first operational objective in the operation obtaining air superiority. However, NATO s planners wrongly assumed that the 52nd (Pristina) Corps was the operational center of gravity on the ground in the (undeclared) Kosovo joint area of operations. That would have been true if NATO had planned to mount a ground invasion of Kosovo. However, one of NATO s stated objectives was to prevent Serbian actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore, the proper center of gravity on the ground was the Serbian security and paramilitary forces involved in the ethnic cleansing. To complicate the situation for the planners, these forces were deployed in small, mobile, and widely dispersed groups, making them very hard to destroy from the air. In the initial phase of the war in Iraq in 2003 (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), the operational center of gravity for land- and carrier-based air operations was Iraqi fighter aircraft and ground-based air defenses. In southern Iraq, the operational center of gravity in the initial major air-land operation for the planners was the two most capable divisions (6th Armored and 51st Mechanized) of the Iraqi regular army III Corps in the Basra-Nasiriyah area. However, in the course of the execution, not the regular Iraqi forces but the paramilitary Fedayeens emerged as the true operational center of gravity in southern Iraq. These forces fought fanatically and tenaciously. They also operated without a rigid chain of command and were dispersed among many cities and towns. 21 In coalition warfare, the operational center of gravity is usually found among the critical strengths of the partner that has the strongest will to fight and the best-trained and bestequipped forces. In World War II, whenever German and Italian forces were employed in the same area, it was invariably German panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions that comprised a real operational center of gravity for the Allied planners. For instance, in the Allied counteroffensive IX-93

5 in North Africa in mid-november 1941 (Operation CRUSADER), determining the Axis operational center of gravity was relatively easy because of the vast disparity in the quality of leadership and weapons between the German and Italian forces. The Panzergruppe Afrika consisted of the German Afrika Korps, the Italian XXI Corps, and the Italian Armored Corps. General Ludwig Cruewell commanded Afrika Korps, composed of the 15th and 21st Panzer divisions and the Afrika Division (later designated as the 90th Light Division). The Italian XXI Corps consisted of five infantry divisions, while the Italian Armored Corps was composed of the Ariete AD and the Trieste motorized division. The Afrika Korps had two-thirds of all the tanks in the entire Panzergruppe Afrika. The Italians had only 154 tanks, which were inferior in quality to the German tanks. The Italian leadership was poor. The Italian forces lacked antitank weapons, while the Germans used their excellent 88-mm FLaK 18 guns. 22 Interior versus Exterior Geostrategic Position: The initial geostrategic position used by one s forces has a considerable effect on the initial course of a campaign. Among other things, the initial geostrategic position determines the direction/axis of advance, integration of the logistical support and sustainment, and operational reach of friendly forces. It also determines whether component major operations in a campaign will be conducted from the interior or exterior lines of operations. The operational commander and the planners should evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position occupied by friendly forces and the enemy s positions. Depending on whether a campaign is offensive or defensive, the ratio of forces on both sides, and the theaterwide supporting structure, the operational commander has to decide how to maximize the advantages of the position his forces occupy, and minimize or drastically reduce the value of the position the enemy forces occupy. The position of one s forces should be improved in geostrategic terms after the completion of each campaign phase and certainly after the successful completion of the campaign. German forces invaded France in August 1914 and Soviet Russia in June 1941 from central geostrategic positions. However, they operated from exterior geostrategic positions in their invasions of Poland in September 1939 and Yugoslavia in April U.S. forces attacked the Taliban forces in Afghanistan in October 2001 and invaded Iraq in March 2003 from exterior geostrategic positions. Allied forces operated from exterior geostrategic positions in their Solomons, Central Pacific, New Guinea, and Philippines campaigns in , while the Japanese forces operated from a central geostrategic position. Interior versus Exterior Lines: In contrast to the operational design for a campaign, in the operational design for a major operation the focus should be on the selection of the lines of operations along which one s forces would operate. The initial position of one s forces determines whether the planned major operation will be conducted using interior or exterior lines of operations. Each of these lines offers some advantages and also disadvantages. They need to be properly evaluated so that the operational commander and his staff can try to maximize the respective advantages and minimize disadvantages. A major offensive operation conducted from the interior line of operations normally aims to concentrate one s forces and then defeat the enemy forces in succession. Then great speed of movement and short but devastating strikes can ensure success. When one s forces are inferior, the best course of action is to strike the enemy force, as early as possible, in the process of concentration. Optimally, one s forces should operate along relatively short, multiple, and interior lines. Such lines generally favor smaller but highly mobile attacking (or defending) forces. Therefore, it is often highly advantageous either to occupy a central position before the start of hostilities or to obtain it during the course of combat. A wide movement on land is best conducted by operating along interior lines of operations. Using exterior lines offers opposite advantages and disadvantages from those gained by operating along interior lines. Among other things, exterior lines require the employment of relatively larger forces and facilitate an enveloping maneuver, but they demand greater speed of movement and agility from the operational commander. The commander has to act with initiative. 23 IX-94