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1 aircraft Allied superiority in, 75 German views on British use of, Third Army use of, use in counter-battery work, 151 Amiens, Battle of, 24 German view of importance of tanks to outcome, armies, British Third Army apparent youth of soldiers in, 54 asks Haldane to push on, 8 October, 89 assault formations, 134 assault on Hindenburg Line, 27 September, 30 attacks database, 135, 141, 145, 150 average rate of advance, 78 close air support from III Brigade, RAF, 137 command summary, 214 command group cohesion, 215 composition in mid-august and attack plans, 24 5 construction of light railways, 88 construction of railways and roads, 82 6 decline in infantry strength of, 41 delay, 20 October, 89 effect of logistics on operations, November, 90 gains and losses, 21 August 11 November, 36 German opposition facing, 21 August, 26 logistic challenges summary, 89 logistic requirement, 80 long-range artillery interdiction, 151 manpower summary, 68 manpower advantage of, 40 1, 49 morale qualitative assessments of, quantitative assessments of, NYD(N) cases, 101 operations, 21 August 7 September, 26 9 operations preliminary to assault on Hindenburg Line, operations, 8 23 October, 31 2 operations, 23 October-11 November, 32 5 orders for open warfare, 206 orders in improvised fighting, 206 orders VI Corps to take over army front, 9 November, 91 planning for attack on the Hindenburg Line, ration strength, 80 role in Hundred Days and representativeness of, schools, 60, 62, 63 senior ranks dominated by pre-war officers, 157 set-piece barrages, 147 shortage of road capacity, 88 training, lack of time for, 63 5 Fourth Army ages of German prisoners taken, August, 52 armies, German Second and Seventeenth armies, representativeness of, Second Army, 26 artillery ammunition expenditure, 76 availability of labour, 227 casualties, 45 6 combat-worthiness of divisions, 33, 35 complains of RAF interference, 163 failure on 18 September, 163 MIA as a percentage of total casualties,

2 278 armies, German (cont.) nervous cases, 106 reduced British tank threat, 177 view of British infantry, 161 Sixth Army, 169 Seventeenth Army, 25, 28 anti-tank tactics, 175 casualties, 29, 45 6 combat-worthiness of divisions, 34 composition in mid-august, 25 6 decline in infantry strength, 46 failure of 22 August counter-attack, 231 manpower, 41, 48, 49 MIA as a percentage of total casualties, 105, 109, 117 officer casualties, 71 ratio of MIA to KIA, 119 supply situation of, 77 army groups, German Army Group Boehn, 232 3, 236 casualties, 46 complains of RAF interference, 163 defence instructions, 236 exhaustion of, 232 Army Group Rupprecht, 18, 19, 227, 229, 232 casualties, 45 6 defensive instructions, 168 lessons of Hamel for anti-tank defence, 176 artillery balance of strength in, 76 decentralisation of command of, 193 German views on British use of, Third Army use of, attrition, Auftragstaktik, 234, Bapaume, 203 captured by New Zealand Division, 29 August, 28 Beach, James, 11, 18 19, 23, 115, 156 Beaulencourt 21st Division attack on, 1 September, Below, General der Infanterie Otto von, 231, 233, 241 commander of Seventeenth Army, 25 Below, Generalleutnant Hans von, criticism of Ludendorff, 230, 235 view of British tactics, 160 Bidwell, Shelford and Graham, Dominick, 11 Boehn, Generaloberst Max von, 229, 241 Bourne, John, 8, 11 British army age of soldiers, 53 5 bottom-up innovation, 156 decline in manpower available in 1918, and effects thereof, 41 5 experience level of soldiers, 56 7 innovation resistance to top-down change, officers distrust of top-down standardisation, 66 7 pre-war ethos regimental particularism, 156 resistance to top-down change, quality of replacements, 55 6 training at home, 58 Brown, Ian Malcolm, 80 Byng, General Sir Julian, 8, 222 attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, command group cohesion, 215 concerns about supply, 90 destruction of private papers, 9 disagreement with Haldane, 202 needs Rawlinson s help, 30 Order of the Day, 11 November 1918, 1 orders in open warfare, 206 orders pursuit, 3 September, 28 plan for 23 August, 204 planned pause on 22 August, 26 planning 21 August attack, 202 planning attack on Hindenburg Line, 197 planning for 4 November attack, 211 pushes for early attack on the Hindenburg Line, 29, 89, 197 relationship with Haldane, 223 responds to Haig s pressure to maintain momentum, August, 26 7 response to Maxse s pamphlets, 67 takes foot off pedal, 8 November, 212 Cambrai, Battle of (November 1917): tactical lessons of, 196 Campbell, Major-General David, 224 relationship with Shute, 159 cavalry Third Army use of, Citino, Robert, 234 command British decentralisation in Third Army summary, decentralisation of artillery control, 208 decentralisation of, in open warfare, summary,

3 279 impact of personality on, importance of informal relationships to, planning instructions in SS 135, planning set-piece attacks in practice attack on the Hindenburg Line, pre-war principles of, use of initiative, command culture definition, 215 command group definition, command groups in Third Army cohesion of, German command groups, cohesion of, compared with British, over-centralisation and rigidity of, mission or directive, 234, See Auftragstaktik Command and Communications German defensive problems, Command, British German view of, 226 communications alternatives to wire, difficulty of maintaining in open warfare, German problems, 191 in static warfare, increased volume in open warfare, 183 runners, speed of battlefield, 188 training for, British, visual signalling and pigeon, 186 wireless, Connelly, Mark, 157 Corps, American II, 18, 40 Corps, British Australian, 9, 16 Canadian, 8, 9, 16, 31, 196 Cavalry, 135 schools, 59 Tank, 74, 135, 155 declining value of, heavy casualties, RAF support for, 138 schools, 59 IV infantry strength of, 41 no attacks without artillery support, 146 Notes on Tactics and Training, 131, 156 RAF support for, 138 signals office throughput, 183 trouble with 63rd Division, usage of cable, 183 V infantry strength of, 41 liberates German cabbages, 87 planning the attack on the Hindenburg Line, 200 VI artillery usage, 147 attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, expenditure of artillery ammunition, 76 heavy artillery, infantry strength of, 41 MIA as a percentage of total casualties, 105 planning for attack on the Hindenburg Line, 198 planning the attack on the Hindenburg Line, 200 prisoners taken by, 117 shocked by German tank attack, 8 October, 150 XVII communications, 179 RAF support for, 139 use of wireless, 186 Corps, German divisions switched between, 237 I Bavarian artillery deployment, 177 I Bavarian Reserve, 26 II Bavarian, 26, 229 artillery deployment, 177 command of the defence, 174 counter attacks, 231 defence scheme, 170 morale, problems of defence in depth, 174 problems with defence in depth, 172 view of British leadership, 226 view on tanks, 175 III Bavarian, 26 IV Reserve, 19, 26, 160, 229 RAF impact on, 163 XI, 26 XIV Reserve, 26, 74, 161, 171, 228 failed attack on Riencourt, 31 August, morale, XVIII, 26 morale, 74 recentralises command, 173

4 280 Corps, German (cont.) view on tanks, 164, 175 LI, 26, 160, 230, 235, 241 importance of smoke, 164 LIV, 26, 170 morale, 113 RAF impact on, 163 defensive fortifications, German poor state of, shortage of labour for construction of, defensive policy, German each line to be held to the last, failure of elastic defence, Deist, Wilhelm, 14, 92 Deverell, Major-General Cyril, 67, 146, 223 relationship with Haldane, 224 Divisions, British Guards, 1, 24, 207 attack on 4 November, 211 bottom-up innovation, 156 command groups, devolution of command, 210 Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Gort s initiative, Matheson s quality control, 222 micro-management, 209 peaceful penetration, 213 planning for attack on Hindenburg Line, 27 September, rifle strength in action, 43 signals, 27 September, 184, situation reports, 189 traffic control, 88 training, 64, 66 New Zealand, 1, 9, 16, 24 command groups, field artillery, 208 German view of, 160 quality of manpower, 57 signals, 184 stragglers, 104 takes Bapaume, 28 takes Le Quesnoy, 34 trouble with 63 rd Division, st Cavalry, 25 2nd, 1, 24, 207 attack frontages, 131 creeping barrage, 148, 198 field artillery, 208 initiative from below, 209 morale, 99 quick tempo, tank co-operation, 143, 144 training, 64 2nd Cavalry, 25 3rd, 1, 24, 207 artillery, attack frontages, calls for more initiative, 209 casualties, 29 cavalry co-operation, 136 command, 200 creeping barrage, 198 micro-management, 203 ration strength, 57 tank co-operation, th, 1, 24 assault formations, 134 combined arms, 130 command groups, 216 communications, 183, 191 field artillery, 208 German view of, 160 micro-management and delegation, 201 supply, 86 tank co-operation, 144 training, 64 use of field atillery in mobile warfare, th, 1, 25 battalion strengths, 43 casualties, 29 field artillery, 208 German view of, 160 manpower, 57 outnumber opponents, 20 October, 50 situation reports, 190 traffic control, 88 training, 64 19th, 149, st, 1, 25 assault formations, 134 attack on Beaulencourt, field artillery, 208 traffic control, 88 24th, 88, rd assault formations, 162 attack on 21 September, 177 Pinney as GOC, signals, speed of transmission of, th, 1, 24 communications, 183 fire and movement, 129 German view of, 160 rifle strength in action, 43 supply, 90 training, 62 3

5 281 trench strength, th, 1, 25 court martial rate, 104 German view of, 160 lack of activity in early 1918, 64 training, 66 42nd, 1, 24 advanced guard composition, 136 assault formations, 134 attack frontages, 132 cavalry co-operation, 136 field artillery, 150, 208 initiative, lack of time for training, 64 machine guns, 140 sickness rate, 100 signals, 185 tank co-operation, lack of, 141, nd, 149, th, 207, th, 129, 131, 186 communications network, th, 24 61st engineers activity, 85 manpower, 55 supply, 90 Thorne s impressions, nd, 1, 25, 30, 44, 62 attack on 4 November, 211 attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, barrages, 147 creeping barrage, 198 initiative, 209 need for forward command, stickiness in pursuit, traffic control, 88 training, 64 trench-fighting, rd, 24, 66 command groups, 218 fire and movement, 130 Lawrie sacked, 155 problems at Thilloy, war-weary prisoners, 100 Divisions, German Deutsche Jäger called scabs, 113 morale, 110 Guards Cavalry homecoming parade in Berlin, 3 4 1st Guards Reserve morale, 110 rotation between corps, 237 training, 69 2nd Guards Reserve morale, 109 retreats as ordered, 21 August, 26 3rd Reserve morale, 112 3rd Marine morale, 109, 114 sickness rate, 78 4th Bavarian artillery deployment, 176 communications, 173 counter attacks, 231 defence scheme, 170 fails to retreat as ordered, 21 August, 26 failure of counter attack, 31 August, 232 failure of counter attacks, 172 morale, 109 protests against attack orders, th Bavarian officer casualties, 71 training, 70 6th manpower, 50 6th Bavarian Reserve command group cohesion, 238 morale, th Bavarian, 116, 234 manpower, 54, 69 training, 69 12th Reserve stragglers, th arguments over commitment of, th Bavarian command group cohesion, 238 counter attacks, failure of counter attack, 31 August, state of, early November, 113 vew of British tactics, 160 weakness of, st Reserve defence scheme, 170 morale, rd overrun by fire and movement, 161 replacements, 51 25th morale, 111, th Reserve morale, th morale, th

6 282 Divisions, German (cont.) morale, 109, th Reserve command group cohesion, 238 morale, 114 pre-war regular officers in, th Reserve morale, th Reserve shortage of officers, 71 52nd morale, th manpower, 49 83rd command group cohesion, 238 training, th morale, th command group cohesion, 238 man on the spot calls off attack, 13 September, 240 morale, 112 out-manoeuvred, 97 replacements, 51 rotation between corps, 237 training, th deserters, 115 exhaustion of, 50 1 shortage of officers, st failure to counter attack, 18 September, rd failure of counter attacks, 172 manpower, 49 view of British, th officer casualties, 71 shortage of officers, th manpower, th manpower, th manpower, th morale, th morale, 109, 111, 112 Ebert, Friedrich Stab-in-the-back myth, 3 Edmonds, Sir James influence on historiography, Feilding, Major-General Geoffrey, 223 Fennell, Jonathan, 95 6 Fergusson, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles response to Maxse s pamphlets, 67 view of 63rd Division, 221 Field Service Regulations I (1909), 7 Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 5, 10, 13 and bataille générale, 23 4 appointed supreme allied commander, 22 goes on the offensive, 23 4 plans for late September co-ordinated offensive, 29 plans for Lorraine offensive, 40 plans to follow up success at Battle of Amiens, 24 pressure on Haig, 26 view of British contribution in Hundred Days, 1 food supply German, 78 French, David, 72, 155, 157 Fuller, J. F. C., 10 gas Third Army use of, 137 German army age of soldiers, 52 3 attrition of officers, 70 2 decline in manpower, 1918, 45 9 deterioration by early November, 33 4 further deterioration in early November, 34 5 morale British intelligence estimates of, mail censorship reports on, quantitative assessments of, shirking, surrender, quality of replacements, 50 2 supposed tactical excellence of, 165 German defeat summary of hypotheses for, 15 German sources problems of, Griffith, Paddy, 188 Haig, Field Marshal Sir Douglas, 5 concerns about manpower, 44 description of the Hundred Days campaign in his official despatch, 38 discounts POW reports, 115 on logistics, 78 9

7 283 operational method, 23 orders greater aggression, 214 planning attack on the Hindenburg Line, 197 presses Byng to push on, August, 26 7 reins Byng in, 29 relationship with De Pree, 221 view of importance of attrition to the outcome, 246 Haldane, Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer, 24 attack on Havrincourt, 12 September, command problems, 206 complains of cautious advance, 212 complains of stickiness, 44, 214, 223 delegation, 207 difficulty of training men, 44 dispute with Byng and Harper, 202 hesitates, 207 plan for 23 August, 204 plan for 4 November, 211 quality assurance, 201 relationship with Byng, 223 relationships with subordinates, response to Maxse s pamphlets, 67 shortage of spares for lorries, 86 spurs on subordinates, 207 supply problems, 89, 90 view of cavalry, 136 view of tanks, 142 Hall, Brian, 179 Harper, Lieutenant-General Sir George Montague, 24 disagreement with Haldane, 196 dispute with Lawrie, 155 experience of Cambrai, 196 need for artillery support, 146 response to Maxse s pamphlets, 67 Harris, J. P., 8, 12, 13, 125, 142, 192 Havrincourt, attack on, 12 September, Heye, Oberst Wilhelm, 240 Hindenburg, Feldmarschall Paul von, 2, 30 1, 98, 230 Horne, General Sir Henry, 8, 24 Hundred Days, 1 rolling attrition rather than manoeuvre warfare, 36 7 tempo of campaign and nature of operations, 37 8 intelligence Allied estimates of German manpower decline, 50 British estimates of German morale, for attack on the Hindenburg Line, 198 German views of British tactical skill, 162 Ironside, Brigadier-General Edmund, 204 5, 219 Jahr, Christoph, 92 3, 94, 115 Kuhl, Generalleutnant Hermann von, 76 chief of staff to Crown Prince Rupprecht, 25 Lawrie, Major-General C. E., sacking of, Learning curve, 11 12, Liddell Hart, Basil, 10 logistics British problems, 78 9 British traffic control, 88 9 impact on British advance, light railways, British use of, 87 8 motor transport British use of, 86 7 railways British use of, 81 2 railways British construction problems, 82 4 roads British construction of, 84 6 summary of British supply system, 80 1 Loßberg, Generalmajor Fritz von, 23, 227, 232 chief of staff, Second Army, 26 Ludendorff, General der Infanterie Erich, 2, 23 artillery deployment, 177 asserts OHL control of tactical doctrine, defensive policy of, 227 encourages men, July, 162 fires Boehn, 233 further attempts to impose common doctrine, gambles, spring 1918, 22 goes over to the defensive, 23 importance of artillery to the defence, 176 micro-management, 170 nervous strain, orders changes to defence in depth, summer 1918, reaction to Battle of Amiens, 24, 174

8 284 Ludendorff, General der Infanterie (cont.) response to Allied attacks on Hindenburg Line, 30 1 spring offensives 1918, 22 3 success in imposing common doctrine, view of British tactics, 160 view of possible replacement pool, 45 manpower age profile of British soldiers, 53 5 age profile of German soldiers, 52 3 Allied intelligence estimates of decline of German, 50 balance in early November, balance in Third Army sector, 40 1 decline in British, 41 5 decline in German during 1918, 45 9 effect of American build-up on balance of, 40 experience level of British soldiers, 56 7 lack of time to integrate German replacements, 50 1 quality of British replacements, 55 6 quality of German replacements, 50 2 Marne, Second Battle of the, 22 3 Marwitz, General der Kavallerie Georg von der, 74, 233, commander of Second Army, 26 criticism of Ludendorff, 235 matériel British production of, 79 German production of, 76 8 Matheson, Major-General Torquil, 44, 156, 189, 222, 223 Maxse, Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor, 62, 65, 66 pamphlets issued as Inspector-General, Training, 62, 67 modern war, definition, 5 7 morale definition, 94 6 surrender, Morgen, Generalleutnant Curt von, 74 comments on Hindenburg Line, Mudra, General der Infanterie Bruno von, 233 Oberste Heeresleitung, 3, 76 artillery, 176 attempts to impose common defensive doctrine, central control of reserves, 236 control of tactical doctrine, deceives men, 167 defensive tactics, 165 demand for artillery guns, 76 goes over to the defensive, 23 last formal intervention in tactical doctrine, 21 September, 169 leaflets on tanks, 175 maintains influence over tactical doctrine after 21 September, 170 memos from Boehn, 233 no longer able to provide reserves, 30 September, 31 orders building of defensive lines, 227 political atmosphere of not conducive to good decision-making, rejects reflex counter attacks, 172 success in imposing common doctrine, warned by Rupprecht of need for immediate retreat, 34 operational level of war, 4 Palazzo, Albert, 125, 152 Pereira, Major-General George, 44, 201, Philpott, William, 5, 94 Pinney, Major-General Reginald relationship with Shute, 158, 207, 224 relationships with subordinates, Ponsonby, Major-General John, 67, 216 Prior, Robin and Wilson, Trevor, 9, 12, 13, 124 5, 192 Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, 9, 24, 29, 30, 40, 124, 127 Reichstag, 230 Ritter, Gerhard, 92 Robbins, Simon, 13, 125 Royal Air Force counter-battery role, 151 German views on British use of, role in campaign, support on 21 August, 25 Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, 2, 227, 230, 232, 241 army group commander, 25 concerned about shortage of men, 171 proposes new defensive scheme but is overruled by Ludendorff, warns of need for immediate retreat, 5 November, 34 5

9 285 Samuels, Martin, 192 view of German command style, 234 Sanitätsbericht, Sheffield, Gary, 8, 11, 12, 94, 125 Shute, Lieutenant-General Sir Cameron, 24, 215 fussing, 224 quality assurance, 201 relations with Pinney, 207 response to Maxse s pamphlets, 67 Simkins, Peter, 10, 11, 63, 125 Simpson, Andy, 12, 192, 194 Solly-Flood, Major-General Arthur, 179, 207 SS 135, 60, 123, 129, 131 2, 146, 192 artillery, 208 new edition, November, 156 pursuit, 211 quality assurance, 201 SS 143, 129, SS 144, 132 SS 152, 58 62, 155 Stab-in-the-back myth, 2 4 Stachelbeck, Christian, 54, 116, 234, Stephenson, Scott, 93 Stevenson, David, 39 stone shortage of, 84 6 Strachan, Hew, 15 surrender distinction between voluntary and involuntary, 96 8 tactical level of war, 5 tactics aircraft German views on British use of, Third Army use of, , 151 all-arms attacks, 136 artillery Third Army use of, British assault formations, British assault troop densities, British trench-fighting, cavalry, Third Army use of, combined arms brigade groups, British understanding of importance of in 1918, definition, 126 diversity and flexibility of British, 153 external factors driving diversity of British use of, internal factors driving diversity of British use of, pre-1914 British understanding of, 126 defence in depth November 1917 German scheme for, summer 1918 alterations to the November 1917 scheme, fire and movement British failure to use, British use of, gas Third Army use of, 137 German anti-tank defences, 175 German defensive doctrine flaws anti-tank defence, communications, shortage of manpower, German intelligence reports on British, German views on British use of artillery, medium machine guns Third Army use of, 140 small-unit tactics flexibility and diversity of British, tanks German views on British use of, 164 Third Army use of, tanks British superiority in, 74 5 distort German defence, German defensive measures against, 175 German views on British use of, 164 Third Army use of, tempo, 6 7, 203, 226 Terraine, John, 7 8, 11, 124 Thaer, Oberst Albrecht von, 240 Thorne, Brigadier-General Andrew, 219 Todman, Dan, 12, 125 training, British at unit level, 61 impact of individual commander s attitude, 68 Maxse s pamphlets responses to, 67 of recruits at home, 58 schools, SS 152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France

10 286 training, British (cont.) principles, 58 9 time constraints on, 63 5 variability of, 62 3 training, German of recruits and replacement, 68 9 shortage of trainers, 70 2 time constraints on, 70 Travers, Tim, 8, 13 14, 39, 126, 142, 154, Watson, Alexander, 15, 70, 93, 94, 106, 116 Whigham, Major-General Robert, 223 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 230 Zabecki, David, 234 Ziemann, Benjamin, 92