Building the Army Roadmap for the 21 st Century

Transcription

1 Adaptation to Change in Warfare Building the Army Roadmap for the 21 st Century A presentation by Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel (ret) U.S. Army EVP Burke-Macgregor Group LLC 12 March 2018 U.S. Army War College Futures Seminar

2 What you should take away from this presentation: Before the War began, I had time to think, but no money. When the war began, I had lots of money, but no time to think. General of the Army George C. Marshall, 1945 In 1940, a greater proportion of French manpower had undergone military training for a longer period than in any other nation. All this counted for little in the face of the shock of a comparative handful of upto-date German forces. B. H. Liddell Hart, Defence of the West, 1950, p We have gone to war with a 1918 Army against a German Army of General Maxime Weygand, French Commander-in-Chief, May 1940

3 Roadmap for Change: First, answer first order questions: Whom do we fight? Where do we fight? How do we fight? How do we get there? Does the new strategic environment require change in C2, organization and technology? What is the new rule set [the new Force Design Parameters: Time, Space, Lethality]; What are the new assumptions?

4 Roadmap for Change (continued): Second, develop an appropriate response (military strategy) linking strategic ends with operational means. Key Point: Military strategy must be congruent with: national culture; geography, and; scientific-industrial capacity. or risk failure.

5 Roadmap for Change (continued): Third, devise a new operational concept suitable to the new environment. Identify the form warfare will take (& new missions); Perform the analysis to link strategy with concept and capabilities; Develop the New Organization for Combat (people and technology); Ensure capability integration and shared technological development across Service lines (R,D&A).

6 Roadmap for Change (continued): Fourth, Appoint New Military Leadership! Identify the right people Character, Competence, Intelligence (C3I); Difficult, Eccentric, Non-conformist, Courageous; Install the new leaders in power ruthlessly implement change.

7 Roadmap for Change (continued): Fifth, within the available fiscal means reorganize and redeploy the force into: New Structure; (Extract savings, Shed Unneeded Equipment) ; New Warfighting Paradigm. Desired Outcome: The about right combination of organization, technology and human capital (dynamic, not static).

8 Institutional Resistance to Change: Military Institutions react to pressure for change in the following ways: 1. Question the intentions or legitimacy of the source for change ( kill the messenger ad hominem attacks); 2. Question the validity, or applicability of the demand for change ( that doesn t apply to us ); 3. Revise the Institutional assumptions to make them less testable (resistant to refutation).

9 Is there a Way through Resistance to Change? Yes. After WW I, the German Military Leadership created a special purpose organization ( ) to study the new technologies of war that was not subordinated to the existing German Army branch structure. Free of interference from the Army s conservative, branchoriented hierarchy, the special purpose organization created new combined arms formations that included tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, signal, logistics and anti-aircraft elements, all designed to cooperate closely with German fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. In 1935, Germany established the HQTRS for 5 new Panzer (armored) Divisions. By 1940, Germany fielded 10 Panzer Divisions. The outcome in 1940 was revolutionary change in warfare. But the revolution began in 1933 with a special purpose organization.

10 Summary of Key Points Wars are decided in the decades before they begin; through years of innovative field experimentation and rapid prototyping based on rigorous analysis and historical study: First, recognize the changed geo-strategic environment. Identify the new rule set / assumptions. Second, devise an appropriate response linking strategic ends with operational means. Third, identify the form warfare will take, then, build the new organization for combat. Fourth, with the right people in place, resolutely implement the change.

11 Backup Slides If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old People in any organization are always attached to the obsolete. Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21 st Century, 1999

12 Implications of New National Defense Strategy Warfighting Environment: Contested (non-permissive) battle space characterized by high lethality in all domains. Joint Operational Concept: Integrated, all arms-all effects warfare: Continuous tactical, operational, and strategic integration of Army Ground Forces with Aerospace and Naval Power; Force Design Parameters: Formations on the tactical/operational levels must be organized around the Joint Warfighting Functions of ISR, STRIKE, MANEUVER and SUSTAINMENT for employment under JOINT C2.

13 ISR-STRIKE: The Paradigm Shift ISR-Strike is the basis for an enduring paradigm shift in warfare. One salvo from 5 BM-30 Smerch (MLRS launchers) can devastate an area the size of NYC s Central Park (843 acres or 3.2 square miles) in minutes. Uragan-U Replacement for BM-27 and BM-30 MRL. Iskandar-M: SRBM and R-500 Kaliber Cruise Missile SRBM has 1500 lb warhead and a range of 500 km. R-500 Kaliber-M cruise missile has an alleged range of 2000 km. Containerized Kailber Cruise Missile Launched from standard 20 and 40 ISO containers.

14 Russian Army conducts Offensive Operations with Smaller, Dispersed Formations Designed for Higher Mobility and Lethality. Motorized Rifle Division: 8500 Soldiers Motorized Rifle Brigade: 3,000-4,000 Soldiers Tank Division: 6,500 Soldiers Tank Brigade: 3,000 Soldiers Recon UAVs km frontage Battalion Tactical Groups Battalion or Brigade 300mm Rocket Artillery SPH artillery 90 km Max Engagement Range for 300mm Rocket Artillery Barrage.

15 126 Russian Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) firing 20 volleys from each launcher in 8 hours can destroy a defending U.S. Division equivalent in an area the size of the Normandy Lodgment.

16 RSG inside the ISR-STRIKE Dominated Battlespace: -RSG ISR-STRIKE Capabilities offers greater dispersion, target acquisition, identification and tracking capabilities than opposing Russian Formations. -RSG is omnidirectional allowing it to rapidly alter its position without reorienting the whole formation.

17 RSG: Critical Features RSG MNVR BN SUST BN STRIKE BN C4I BN Mobile Armored MNVR BNs AGS (33 per battalion) IFV (50 per battalion) AMOS auto-loading 120mm mortars (12 per battalion) Core Capabilities in Specialized BNs Giraffe 4A radar (280 km surveillance, 100 km weapon locating) 12 MRLS (150 km GLSDB) 24 TARES Loitering Munition (200 km) Long range communications to include satellite communications. RSG MNVR BNs can operate like battalion tactical groups for independent action when needed. Flexible distribution of integrated enablers to MNVR BNs 10 SkyRanger SHORAD units (25 km surveillance, 4-6 km engagement) 5 NASAMS ADA firing units (120 km surveillance with Sentinel radar, 50 km engagement) 4 ARTHUR radar targeting units (60 km weapon locating) 8 C3 support units (40-50 km point to point 4G communications)

18 C4ISR is the critical target. Where are the Joint C4ISR nodes? Do we have redundancy? When can we see/know and act? How fast can we reload? RSG plays a key role in helping to close the ISR-area of responsive action and influence gap. Action is measured in minutes. RSG compels opposing IADs to displace or confront destruction. When IADS are destroyed/disabled AF weapons achieve maximum effect on all levels. Joint Force connectivity along the operational axis is secure. JFC conducts deep operational maneuver with aerospace and land power. JFC integrates Army and AF capabilities into an operational axis in defensive or offensive operations;

19 Operational Reach and Tempo are Determined by Logistics: How much can the formation carry? How far can it move? Can it operate off-road? WW II German Army attested to the need for tracked logistics carriers to cope with Eastern Europe s poor road conditions and tough terrain. This lesson was not lost on the Russians resulting in the creation of the DT series of tracked logistics carriers manufactured by Vityaz shown below. Chinese clone Originally built off a 710 HP T-64 engine. The DT-30 can haul up to 30 metric tons of cargo through snow, swamp, soft sand, and muddy terrain without getting stuck. Tracked logistics carriers using the PUMA s compact but very powerful 1,100 HP engine can be rapidly constructed with added features such as the Palletized Load Handling System currently in use on LHS and PLS. PUMA logistics carriers will enable the operational distances in the hundreds of kilometers.