ISTAR SYSTEM BUILDING IN THE ARMY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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1 ISTAR SYSTEM BUILDING IN THE ARMY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC Martin PSÍK, Petr ČECH Abstract: The article deals with research in the area of ISTAR system building in the Army of the Czech Republic. The authors conducted analysis of the current state of Czech Republic army intelligence security and analysis of ISTAR system variants in different armies. The analysis conclusions helped specifically to focus research which aims to ensure the current ISTAR system usage method provides sufficient intelligence information for task force commander decisions. From the research findings were gained which enabled the authors to propose changes in ISTAR system building and also to suggest needed changes for task forces commanders and staff preparation. Keywords: ISTAR System, Army of the Czech Republic 1. Introduction Increasingly faster development of information and communication technologies (hereinafter ICT), more sophisticated weapon systems implementation and a changing operational environment enhance the need for gathering information in real time. Information gathered in this way is processed and transformed into intelligence information which is vital for decision making of task force commanders. ICT implementation in training and education is supported by NATO top management as well. Lieutenant General Viereck, one of the leading thinkers in extending new technologies into training and education, claims that a better approach to different forms of training and education will lead to training transformation which will be open in real time (and) which will increase capabilities of all partners [7]. Changes in commanding allied operations require finding new ways and possibilities for their intelligence provision. In recent years there has been an emphasis on placing intelligence components and reconnaissance centralization into one integrated system. These systems will be tasked to provide commander comprehensive intelligence information which is vital for his/her decision making. That is why it is being built in countries of North Atlantic Alliance system ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and ), or its variant ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, ) which fulfil stated requirements. In the Army of the Czech Republic (hereinafter ACR), centralization and interconnection of all systems and components from intelligence and reconnaissance into one centrally managed information system is not yet secured. ISTAR system can fulfil this requirement fully in conditions of the ACR. 2. ISTAR System building current state ISTAR system, and its derived and developed variant ISR, is becoming irreplaceable elements in the intelligence gathering process in operations and in times of peace for military. For a correct understanding of the term ISTAR it is necessary to present its definition: ISTAR is process of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance that integrates and synchronizes planning system and usage of all available forces and means designated to gathering, processing and distribution of information and communication means with aim to provide commanders with real picture of the situation, assistance in process of target acquisition and 71

2 selection as well as in decision making process [2, 3, 4]. It is required to understand ISTAR as a system of: - Intelligence performed by resources and means of ISTAR units with the aim to secure Commander s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR). - Surveillance compound of information gathering which is defined as systematic surveillance of airspace, surface and subsurface areas, places, persons and things with visual, hearing, electronic, photographic and other means. - Target acquisition compound of information gathering defined as detection, resolution and localization of the target with precision that enables effective weapon use. - compound of information gathering defined as combat mission performed by visual observation or by other finding means with the aim of gathering information about actions and intelligence information resources of the enemy or potential enemy or finding data regarding meteorological, hydrological or geological characteristics in a given area [1]. The whole ISTAR system consists of elements for: - ISTAR Coordination Cell (ISTAR CC). - Analysis and Control Element (ACE). - Information survey (system sensors) reconnaissance units, HUMINT and intelligence security units, technical sensors, means of hydro- and meteorological and topographical reconnaissance, OSINT units (Open Sources Intelligence) and other specialized reconnaissance varieties (artillery, engineers, radiological and chemical, etc.) [6]. ISTAR system is, as well as intelligence activities, based on intelligence cycle. It provides commander with intelligence provision before the start and during the decision making process, in the plan creation phase and in individual phases of combat activity commanding. It is a key factor to ensuring success in combat [2, 5]. ISTAR system processes are interlinked with individual phases of intelligence cycle, and vice versa the intelligence cycle with its phases supports final products of the system. ISTAR CC group is responsible for managing the processes in cooperation with Analysis and Control Element (ACE). In the framework of brigade (battalion) staff these elements cooperate with other headquarters elements e.g. with fire support coordination group, officer for engineers support coordination, officer for PVO coordination etc. ISTAR CC group is therefore the basic element responsible for planning, managing and tasking resources and furthermore it is the element responsible for ISTAR process coordination in brigade staff including target acquisition and annihilation. The task of Analysis and Control Element (ACE) is to gather and process information and to distribute intelligence information in ISTAR system. This group activity result is projected into Common Operating Picture (COP) [5]. For brigade level it is required, that: - ISTAR units were led with support of ISTAR C2 module which is capable of securing Commander s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR), - ISTAR units composition due to task given ensured: - Undertaking tactical reconnaissance with use of 72

3 armoured vehicles, unmanned air reconnaissance means, sensors and radars, - Target reconnaissance by artillery reconnaissance systems in close to real-time, - Use of automatic target allocation, which were recognized by armoured vehicles and unmanned air reconnaissance units, - Electronic warfare management, - Use of output from human resources intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT). - Sensors of all types were capable of fighting in enemy combat group 24/7, worked in crypto mode and the sufficient throughput of transmitted intelligence in real-time or close to real-time in any day time throughout the year was ensured, - Access to strategic reconnaissance systems was realized by mean of ISTAR C2 module. In the ACR the element with ISTAR/ISR capabilities will be created by forces and resources of 53 rd brew whose task is to provide the complex provision in area of intelligence and reconnaissance. It will provide support for brigade task force commander decision making with cooperation with this task force intelligence centre. For this purpose it will detach required sensors, reconnaissance units, staff and system commanding elements. 3. Methodology and research findings The aim of this research is to discover whether the current ISTAR system provides with a sufficient amount of intelligence information for task forces commander decision making. The research was realized using the/a structural interview method. The main criterion for candidate addressing was their present or past work placement in the framework of intelligence or reconnaissance expertise, prerequisite for expert knowledge of the research topic. The respondents were present or past professional soldiers with years of experience in the fields of intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic combat on tactical, operational or strategic levels (commanders, intelligence centre staff). Some of the respondents have experience from work in NATO international structures andmultinational headquarters in a framework of allied operations. Six respondents participated in the interview, each time two respondents from strategic, operational and tactical level of command. The interview consisted of 14 questions that were given to respondents in a given order. All interviews took place after prior appointment at the respondent s work place. Every interview with every respondent lasted for 45 minutes. The answers to individual questions were recorded in writing during the interview and after the interview they were transcribed into electronic form. Questions of the structured interview were divided into two parts. The first part of the interview (questions 1-6) focused on gaining general knowledge about respondents knowledge in the discussed matter and to gain their opinion on ISTAR and ISR terms. The second part of the interview was used to gain concrete findings about respondents experiences with intelligence provision and to gain their opinion on ISTAR system functionality in ACR intelligence provision framework. From the first part of the interview it emerged that ISTAR issues expertise is insufficient mainly because there is a lack of information about both implemented as well as in preparation measures. A possible reason for that might be the fact that in the ACR there are not enough publications and regulations concerned with the given issue (mainly on a tactical level). On the basis of these findings it is possible to 73

4 conclude that the knowledge about ISTAR issues is lowest at the tactical level and highest at the strategic level. Moreover it is possible to conclude from respondents answers that the lack of effort in securing full ISTAR system functionality in the ACR is a consequence of inefficient task forces intelligence use in missions abroad. The respondents consider as a mistake that the issues are only researched by experts on reconnaissance and intelligence activities. There is a lack of cooperation with other expertises and mainly with commanders and brigade staff. From the other part of the interview it emerged that the respondents understand the necessity of ISTAR system uses during task force deployment. It is necessary for ISTAR outputs to be effectively used by the commander. At present, however, the commanders do not show sufficient interest in intelligence activities outputs. One of the causes might be the fact that the way of task forces deployment does not create for commanders the corresponding need to obtain these outputs. The second cause might be insufficient preparation of commanders and staff members in area of intelligence, including appropriate tasking and using reconnaissance and surveillance units activities results. It is suitable to incorporate ISTAR element into task forces intelligence centre structure which will become, due to amount of sensors, main information source. Centralization of all sensors and processes into one unit will enable accelerating all activities and concurrently the rivalry between individual command authorities will not occur. The biggest restraint for future ISTAR implementation into the ACR is considered by respondents to be the limit on financial resources and related diminished ability to modernize current outdated and inadequate technical reconnaissance means. Another restraint they consider is the shortage of expertly trained staff, commanders indifference towards intelligence and reconnaissance units activities results usage and a certain degree of thinking inertia in the intelligence community. Also, there exists even a fear in some of the functionaries from responsibility with regards to risk which accompanies the real usage of ISTAR system elements abilities and possibilities ISTAR system must have abilities which will secure commanders requirements on information in the area of armoured infantry brigade intelligent responsibility (30-50 km depth) with its own forces and resources. Among the required capabilities is mainly HUMINT ability, ability to undertake unmanned air reconnaissance in areas of intelligence responsibility of armoured infantry brigade and combat and longrange reconnaissance. In the area of electronic warfare it mainly concerns signal intelligence and interference. From a perspective point of view it is not possible to build ISTAR system for current needs but it is necessary to build it so it can be able to fulfil tasks during deployments in other areas than Afghanistan. From this emerges a new request for units equipment, composition, structure and deployment. During task force brigade deployment it will be necessary to create an intelligence centre with ISTAR elements (see Figure 1.) which will be able to coordinate individual units and sensors deployment and concurrently will be able to use outputs from other reconnaissance types. ISTAR control group structure proposal is stated at Figure 2. 74

5 Brigade Intelligence Centre Intelligence Group ISTAR Control Group Figure 1 Brigade Intelligence Centre structure proposal ISTAR Control Group Combat Control Electronic Warfare Control Long-range Control Workfield HUMINT Control Unmanned Air Control Other Control Figure 2 ISTAR Control Group structure proposal For ensuring required abilities will be necessary to change the organizational structure and to form ISTAR battalion which will in peace times be concentrated combat, long-range, unmanned air and technical reconnaissance units, electronic warfare units and HUMINT (see Figure 3.). 75

6 ISTAR Battalion Combat Long-range Operational Tactical HUMINT Logistics Electronic Warfare Technical Intelligence Support Unmanned Air Means Figure 3 Suggestion of the ISTAR battalion structure Implementation of propositions given will increase intelligence provision efficiency, increase reconnaissance units and intelligence staff usability; will lead to reconnaissance units technical equipment improvement and also to individual professional growth in intelligence expertise area. 4. Conclusion The Czech Republic will participate in coming periods alongside its allies in solving crisis situations in different world areas. It can therefore be assumed that Czech soldiers deployment in foreign operations will be a core task for the ACR in years to follow. For successful deployments of our units it is necessary to ensure their effective intelligence support. Task fulfilment by task forces or organic units or unit depends also on correct commanders decision making. Commanders need for their decisions information that is provided by intelligence staff. Long-time experience with intelligence provision shows that intelligence staff is missing an element that could centralize control and interconnect all intelligence and reconnaissance elements into one information system which can provide information in real or near real time. This element will elaborate gained data and create intelligence information which is required for commander s decision making. To fulfil this requirement it is necessary to build and develop ISTAR system. Building of ISTAR abilities will increase also abilities of deployed units and task forces and together with the higher quality of commander s decision making process, it will help to succeed in fulfilling combat tasks with concurrent eliminations of own casualties. 76

7 References [1] AAP 6. Terminologický slovník pojmů a názvů NATO. Praha: Úřad pro obrannou standardizaci, katalogizaci a státní ověřování jakosti, [2] B-GL /FP-001. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and (ISTAR). Ottawa: National Defence and the Canadian Forces, [3] GOLIAN, M. AJP-3.9 a STANAG Brno: Ústav strategických studií, [4] PODHOREC, M., KÁČER, J. Zpravodajská činnost v bojových a nebojových operacích. Brno: Univerzita obrany, s. [5] PROCHÁZKA, J. Budování schopností ISTAR v AČR. [Závěrečná práce]. Brno: Univerzita obrany, s. [6] SPG-20-3/Sprav. Vojenská doktrína: Spravodajstvo, sledovanie, zisťovanie cieľov a prieskum v pozemných silách. Trenčín: Ozbrojené sily Slovenskej republiky, s. [7] VIERECK, K. NATO Security Learning. [online]. [cit ]. Available at: < 77